# 1NC vs Peninsula SM

## 1.

#### Interpretation – Debaters must have a 1AC Solvency Advocate that advocates the specific proposal of the 1AC

#### Violation – Adler says

WTO issue a “TRIPS waiver.” This action would temporarily suspend WTO intellectual property protections, allowing more companies and countries to produce coronavirus vaccine components

#### Vote Negative

#### Shiftiness – we don’t know what they actually implement until the 1ar which is too late. Stable advocacy is key to reciprocal engagement and effective clash.

#### Precision – holding the Aff to the wording of the resolution matters – the distinction of waive vs ban is huge since the advocate asks for “temporary bans” which is a key part of Neg ground – Precision is key to topic clash and education since it holds us to the nuanced implications of policy-making.

## 2.

#### WTO Credibility is on the brink – patent waivers are the make-it-or-break it issue – failure to pass the Plan dooms the WTO BUT passage signals success that generate momentum for structural change.

Meyer 6-18 David Meyer 6-18-2021 "The WTO's survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn" <https://archive.is/etPtf> (Senior Writer at Fortune Magazine; Covers mostly European Business Affairs)//Elmer

The World Trade Organization **knows all about crises**. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the fairness of the global trade rulebook. The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has a lot to fix. However, one crisis is **more pressing than the others**: the battle over COVID-19 vaccines, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later. According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—**the WTO's future rests on what happens next**. "The credibility of the WTO will depend on its **ability to find a meaningful outcome** on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO. "**Final nail in the coffin**" The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO's founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to **reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event**. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. It's a dispute between countries, but the result **will be on the WTO as a whole**, say waiver advocates. "If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally **becomes an obstacle** as in contrast to part of the solution, I think **it could be the final nail in the coffin**" for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. "If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems."

#### Yes Link – the Plan is perceptively seen as bolstering the WTO since its by all WTO Members.

#### WTO collapse solves extinction

Hilary 15 John Hilary 2015 “Want to know how to really tackle climate change? Pull the plug on the World Trade Organisation” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/want-to-know-how-to-really-tackle-climate-change-pull-the-plug-on-the-world-trade-organisation-a6774391.html> (Executive Director, War on Want)//Elmer

Yet this grandiose plan soon fell victim to its own ambition. The WTO’s first summit after the launch of the Doha Round collapsed in acrimonious failure. The next was marked by pitched battles in the streets of Hong Kong as riot police fought Asian farmers desperately trying to save their livelihoods from the WTO’s free trade agenda. The WTO slipped into a coma. Government ministers must decide this week whether to turn off its life support. The answer is surely yes. It was the WTO’s poisonous cocktail of trade expansion and market deregulation that led to the economic crisis of 2008. Years of export-led growth resulted in a crisis of overproduction that could only be sustained with mountains of debt. The parallel deregulation of financial services meant that this debt soon turned out to be toxic, and the world’s banking system went into freefall. Nor is the WTO fit for purpose on ecological grounds. If last week’s climate talks in Paris taught us anything, it is that we must rethink the model of ever-expanding production and consumption in order to avoid planetary meltdown. Global capitalism may need limitless expansion in order to survive, but the planet is already at the very limits of what it can take. The choice is ours. Worst of all, it is the WTO’s ideology of unrestricted trade and corporate domination that lies behind all the bilateral trade deals that are proliferating at the moment, including the infamous Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). We need a radically different model of regulated trade and controlled investment if we are to have any chance of breaking the cycle of economic and ecological crisis. For the planet to survive, the WTO must die.

#### The WTO ensures structural poverty of the Global South – multiple warrants.

Walker 11 Aurelie Walker 11-14-2011 "The WTO has failed developing nations" <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries> (trade policy advisor at the Fairtrade Foundation. Aurelie has specialised in EU trade relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. She has worked as trade negotiator for an East African government, as advisor to business and government in Southern Africa on the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations and for European Institutions and think tanks. Aurelie now advocates on behalf on Fairtrade producers on international trade issues)//Elmer

Ten years ago, a new World Trade Organisation that put developing country needs at the centre of the international trade negotiation agenda was proposed. The Ministerial Declaration adopted at the start of the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations, on 14 November 2001, was a promising response to the anti-globalisation riots of the 1990s. But the **WTO** membership **has failed to deliver** the promised **pro-development changes**. Finding "development" in the Doha Development Round today is like looking for a needle in a haystack. **Developing countries** have been **completely sidelined** **by** the **economic** **and political interests of global powers**. Here are 10 examples of how the WTO has failed the poor: 1. **Cotton**: the Fairtrade Foundation revealed last year how the $47bn in **subsidies** **paid to rich-country producers** in the past 10 years **has created barriers for** the **15 million cotton farmers across west Africa** **trying to trade their way out of poverty**, **and** how **5 million** of the **world's poorest farming families** have been **forced out of business** and into deeper poverty because of those subsidies. 2. **Agricultural subsidies**: beyond cotton, WTO members have failed even to agree how to reduce the huge subsidies **paid to rich world farmers**, whose overproduction continues to **threaten** the **livelihoods of developing world farmers**. 3. **Trade agreements**: the WTO has also failed to clarify the deliberately ambiguous rules on concluding trade agreements that allow the poorest countries to be manipulated by the rich states. In Africa, in negotiations with the EU, countries have been forced to eliminate tariffs on up to 90% of their trade because no clear rules exist to protect them. 4. Special treatment: the rules for developing countries, called "special and differential treatment" rules, were meant to be reviewed to make them more precise, effective and operational. But the WTO has failed to work through the 88 proposals that would fill the legal vacuum. 5. Medicine: the poorest in developing countries are unable to access affordable medicine because members have failed to clarify ambiguities between the need for governments to protect public health on one hand and on the other to protect the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies. 6. **Legal costs**: the WTO pledged to improve access to its **expensive** and **complex legal system**, but has failed. In 15 years of dispute settlement under the WTO, 400 cases have been initiated. No African country has acted as a complainant and only one least developed country has ever filed a claim. 7. Protectionist economic policies: one of the WTO's five core functions agreed at its inception in 1995 was to achieve more coherence in global economic policy-making. Yet the **WTO** **failed to curb** the speedy **increase in** the number of **protectionist measures** applied **by G20 countries** in response to the global economic crisis over the past two years – despite G20 leaders' repeated affirmations of their "unwavering" commitment to resist all forms of protectionist measures. 8. Natural disaster: the **WTO fails to alleviate suffering** when it has the opportunity to do so. **In** the case of **natural disaster**, the **membership** will have **taken** almost **two years to** agree and **implement** temporary **trade concessions for Pakistan,** where severe flooding displaced 20 million people in 2010 and caused $10bn of damage. Those measures, according to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, would have boosted Pakistan's exports to the EU by at least €100m this year. 9. Decision-making: the WTO makes most of its decisions by consensus – and achieving consensus between 153 countries is nearly impossible. But this shows another failure of the WTO: to break the link between market size and political weight that would give small and poor countries a voice in the trade negotiations. 10. Fair trade: 10 years after the start of the Doha Development Round, governments have failed to make trade fair. As long as small and poor countries remain without a voice, the role of campaigning organisations, such as Traidcraft and Fairtrade Foundation, which are working together to eliminate cotton subsidies, will remain critical. The WTO has failed to live up to its promises over the past decade, which reveals a wider systemic problem in the global community. True and lasting solutions to global economic problems can only come when the model of global competitiveness between countries becomes one of genuine cooperation.

## 3.

#### Counterplan Text - Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce patents for medicines excluding orphan drugs.

#### Orphan drug legislation is specifically key to stimulate research into rare diseases because the small number of patients would make the drug otherwise infeasible to manufacture.

Horgan et. al 20 D, Moss B, Boccia S, Genuardi M, Gajewski M, Capurso G, Fenaux P, Gulbis B, Pellegrini M, Mañú Pereira M, M, Gutiérrez Valle V, Gutiérrez Ibarluzea I, Kent A, Cattaneo I, Jagielska B, Belina I, Tumiene B, Ward A, Papaluca M: Time for Change? The Why, What and How of Promoting Innovation to Tackle Rare Diseases – Is It Time to Update the EU’s Orphan Regulation? And if so, What Should be Changed? Biomed Hub 2020;5:1-11. doi: 10.1159/000509272 [https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272) //sid

The European Union’s (EU) Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products (OMPs) (referred to as “the regulation” in this paper) states that “patients suffering from rare conditions should be entitled to the same quality of treatment as other patients,” and concludes that “it is therefore necessary to stimulate the research, development and bringing to the market of appropriate medications by the pharmaceutical industry” [[1](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref1)]. Rare diseases had already been identified as a priority area for Community action within the framework for action in the field of public health [[2](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref2)], and the regulation’s stated aim is – “to provide incentives for the research, development and placing on the market of designated orphan medicinal products.” It set up a mechanism to ensure that “orphan medicinal products eligible for incentives should be easily and unequivocally identified,” with the condition that “objective criteria for designation should be established” [[3](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref3)]. The core incentive of the regulation is the granting of 10 years (+2 years for paediatric orphan medicines) of marketing exclusivity and a range of financial and scientific provisions granted via the European Medicines Agency to support product development and application for Marketing Authorisation. Nearly two decades later, the success of the measure has been demonstrated. Investment both from public research funders and from companies of all sizes in rare disease research has resulted in the approval of more than 150 orphan drugs – compared with just eight therapies for rare diseases available before the adoption of the regulation. That translates into a lot of patient benefit. With clinical research stimulated by the legislation, the EU sees some 2,000 clinical trials providing still more innovation or hope for treatments in the current R&D pipeline [[4](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref4)]. But over the intervening years, the limitations in the functioning of the legislation have become apparent too, and these merit attention if the beneficial effects for patients and caregivers are to be maximised [[5](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref5)]. This paper explores the successes and limitation of both the regulation and its implementation mechanisms in the current regulatory context, and suggests some improvements that could maximise its benefits and boost rare disease research even further. The discussion needs to be precise if it is to be effective. Review of the functioning of the regulation may coincide with a period of more intense scrutiny and concerns over containing the rise of expenditure to ensure sustainability of healthcare systems, with a particular focus on expensive innovation which are often developed within the orphan conditions. While there is undoubted importance in the wider but distinct debate over healthcare costs, it does not bear directly on reviewing the orphan medicines regulation [[6](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref6)]. At the same time, economic questions do, however, have relevance to the debate on orphans, since patients’ access to the medicines that become available is conditioned by the national arrangements for reimbursement or listing of products: there is an increasing tension between the potential access to agents that can modify or even cure rare diseases, and the models for reimbursement available to European payers. Part of this hesitancy can be ascribed to the novelty of the challenges presented by many innovative treatments, which by their nature present unknowns to payers. Clearly, there is also a need to deal with uncertainty with regard to value demonstration, especially when value or values are perceived not to be sufficiently demonstrated. The risk is that such powerful economic reservations can have a cumulative negative impact on the motivation for pursuing research into rare disease treatments – thus running counter to the guiding principle of the legislation itself [[7](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref7)]. Current value assessment rules across Europe for orphan drugs remain largely inadequate and can become a real fourth hurdle to effective patient access to those treatments [[8](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref8)]. The regulation’s stimulation of new product development has also helped promote the development of EU biotech companies. The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of more than 150 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) focusing on rare diseases. No wonder that one of the prominent Members of the European Parliament over this period, Francoise Grossetête, emphasised the importance of the regulation in addressing “real medical needs” and generating “therapeutic breakthroughs” [[9](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref9)]. The underlying strength of the concept of providing incentives for R&D in areas of unmet need is confirmed by the fact that Germany and other Member States are now exploring whether OMP-type incentives could contribute to solving the major risks of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), through promoting development of new anti-bacterials even where simple market economics do not provide sufficient motivation for investment [[10](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref10)]. Thanks to increased investments and the associated efforts thus made possible, some rare diseases now benefit from effective treatments. There are leading examples in the area of haemophilia, paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria (PNH), and some lysosomal storage diseases such as Gaucher. The full list of conditions for which “orphans medicines” have been launched in Europe is too extensive to reproduce here, but by way of illustration it ranges from rare cancers to rare variants of common diseases (pulmonary hypertension, neonatal diabetes) and to rare congenital, mostly childhood-onset disorders (Gaucher, cystinosis, inherited hyperammonaemias) [[11](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref11)]. However, these tales of success should not lead to any delusions that the process has been – or is becoming – easy. Successes in developing innovative treatments are hard-won. Without consistent and determined effort, innovation does not happen – and innovation in rare diseases is all the more challenging. The key elements of the innovation process are well documented, but the nature of the challenges is perhaps not always fully appreciated by those outside the healthcare sector, being seen as costs and not as investments. Rare diseases are categorized as “orphan diseases” because their occurrence in a small number of patients means that, despite apparent high unmet medical need, there is limited scientific understanding, making it difficult to justify the development risk and investment to develop new treatments. The OMP regulation was developed explicitly to support efforts in this field of innovation [[12](https://www.karger.com/Article/Fulltext/509272#ref12)].

#### Turns Case

Orpha 21 [“Orphan drugs for Third-World countries”. Orpha. Last Updated 2021-09-03. Accessed 9/4/21. <https://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/Education_AboutOrphanDrugs.php?lng=EN&stapage=ST_EDUCATION_EDUCATION_ABOUTORPHANDRUGS_TWC> //Xu]

Many vaccines are intended to prevent infections that are rare or of limited importance (found in a limited geographic area but with a very high number of cases in this region). To develop these vaccines, money has to be invested and may not be recovered by the sales of the product. Such products are a precarious venture for any pharmaceutical company planning to market them, and many hesitate. As these vaccines are neglected by the pharmaceutical industry, they are called « orphan vaccines ». Several obstacles have to be faced before developing vaccines : the increasing cost of research and development projects (especially for a vaccine) ; a complex legislative and regulatory environment for drugs ; the obsession to streamline and optimise the product portfolio of each pharmaceutical company. top of page The prices of vaccines Contrary to popular opinion, the number of sales of vaccines is not directly linked to the extent of the epidemic (number of subjects that may be immunised), but rather to the cost of the vaccine dose. The price of the vaccine must be calculated by minimising the research and development, production, marketing and distribution costs in order to break into a limited market. It is almost impossible to make 'economies of scale' when manufacturing vaccines. Economic models of vaccines have shown an inverse relationship between the number of doses manufactured and the cost per dose of the vaccine. A tiered pricing strategy has been endorsed by the World Health Organisation (WHO), in which high-cost but low-volume vaccines in industrialised countries could subsidize the low cost and larger volume of sales in developing countries. Unfortunately, this may not be feasible if the quantity of vaccines needed in developing countries is low. Product viability with regard to patent protection Development of new drugs relies heavily on the respect of intellectual property rights, represented by the patent, which reassures investors that drugs will provide a fair return on invested funds. The lack of patent protection or legal framework for intellectual property rights in some developing countries prevents the long-term viability of a vaccine. In Third World countries It is difficult to develop new vaccines in these countries, because the optimal use of existing vaccines, considered as a priority, first need to be ensured. Within the framework of WHO, the Children's Vaccine Initiative (CVI), set the development of vaccines with commercial prospects as a priority. This cost-oriented definition reflects the difficulty of developing drugs for tropical diseases, even the most prevalent ones such as malaria. Other non-economic factors could justify an industry's decision to develop and market an orphan vaccine: the desire to enhance the company's ethical profile, by fulfilling a medical or social need ; the capacity to develop, product and market a drug ; a larger company strategy (e.g. extension of a product range). Development strategy for orphan vaccines The pharmaceutical industry must : have a high Research and Developmentcapacity; Master the technology of patents; Identify the poorest countries and those that least need the vaccine, in order to create financing systems for a low price for the vaccine.

## 4.

#### The aff continues a strategy of globalization under the guise of ending imperial occupation. The plan can only give way to a decentralized financialization. every time they insist the plan is a “step in the right direction” constitutes an active attempt to mystify postcolonial exploitation

**Ventura 3** (Patricia Ventura, associate professor of English at Spelman College, PhD in English from the University of Florida, 2003, “Cultural Logic of the United States in the Globalization Era,” <http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0000816/ventura_p.pdf>) gz

What makes this opposition to modern sovereignty so difficult to understand is that the US, the global hegemon, **also has largely rejected imperialism**. This rejection does not deny that the US is the exploiter nation extraordinaire. However, “globalization” is **not** just a fancy name for twenty-first century imperialism enforced by American missiles instead of the British fleet. Exploitation today is very different than it was in the past though the two bear a family resemblance as evidenced in the obvious (and confusing) similarity between “Empire” and “imperialism” and in the confounding similarity between the adjectival forms “imperial” and “imperialist(ic).” However, the differences between the concepts arise from the different registers in which the two operate. The older regime colonized and subjugated completely; **Empire does not depend on occupation of the land and conquest of the people**; certainly the military power of the likes of the US, NATO, and Russia and, in a different way, China are all quite visible and menacing. But what is more visible is capitalism’s culture of consumption and the meagerness of a wage system that cannot accommodate the needs of those who want to consume imperial culture. More metaphorically visible than Queen Victoria’s warships or today’s fighter planes are the literally **invisible digital and virtual elements of the information economy**. The movements of currency, the traffic on the Internet, aren’t really there in a physical sense. Thus, the language of imperialism, of land grabs and slavery, is **not adequate** for capturing the dynamics of a system that encompasses imperialistic tendencies while adding many wholly unprecedented features. In Hardt and Negri’s terms, the system rests on a foundation of “the bomb,” “money,” and “ether” (Empire 137). The bomb represents the limiting of sovereignty of most of the countries of the world. The bomb represents the absolute capacity for destruction and is the ultimate form of biopower. Money too reduces sovereignty and represents the deconstruction of national markets. Ether represents the management and construction of communication, culture, and education systems. It is Empire and its supports and scaffolding, not imperialism, that is today’s enemy of progressive politics. Yet postcolonial theory still functions in the mode of anti- imperialism. “Its tendency to see globalization as little more than a form of intensified neoimperialism headquartered in the United States is one reason why it has been possible to see postcolonialism as the study of globalization avant la lettre” (O’Brien and Szeman 607). However, seeing globalization within these parameters constitutes the precise problem. For one of the crucial lessons of Empire is that globalization is **not propelled from a center point which radiates out colonizing the periphery** as in imperialism. Globalization develops from a type of capitalist expansion that works to overcome (**not destroy**) both the nation and imperialism in order to incessantly **expand markets by destroying barriers between inside and outside**. Indeed, Hardt and Negri, citing Rosa Luxemburg in arguing that “imperialism would have been the death of capital had it not been overcome. The full realization of the world market is necessarily the **end of imperialism**” (333). But this realization of the world market came as a response to the multitude’s rejection of their meta-[classification] into First, Second and Third Worlds— not simply as a way to resolve the contradictions of capital itself. Indeed, Empire claims: The real heroes of the liberation of the Third World today may really have been the emigrants and the flows of population that have destroyed old and new boundaries. . . .The Third World, which was constructed by the colonialism and imperialism of nation-states and trapped in the cold war, is destroyed when the old rules of the political discipline of the modern state are smashed. It is destroyed when throughout the ontological terrain of globalization the most wretched of the earth becomes the most powerful being because its new nomad singularity is the most creative force and the omnilateral movement of its desire is itself the coming liberation. (363) What we see then is a process by which imperialism was destroyed by the movement of the multitude. **Empire is born of those movements** but develops as a response to them. It is only the multitude then that wields the power of creativity. This is the power that resulted in that flowering of political potential that we now call the 1960s.

#### Liberal Governance produces Endless War through a biopolitics of security that culminates in extinction.

Evans 16, Brad. "Liberal Violence: From the Benjaminian Divine to the Angels of History." Theory & Event 19.1 (2016). (a senior lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics & International Studies)//Elmer

Liberal War as Divine Violence Despite universal claims to peaceful co-habitation, **liberal regimes** have been compelled to **make war on whatever threatens it** 40 . This is why the liberal account of freedom has depended upon a lethal principle, which discursively **wrapped in** the **language of** rights, **security** and justice, inaugurated planetary state of warfare and siege. It has promoted an account of freedom that, in the process of taking hold of the problem of the planetary life of political subjects, linked human potentiality to the possibility of its ruination. If liberal violence has then produced a necessary lethal corollary in its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species in order to alleviate unnecessary suffering; so it has also needed to foster a belief in the necessity of violence in the name of that suffering and vulnerability to which it continually stakes a claim. The Liberal wars of the past two decades in particular have revealed a number of defining principles41 . Aside from relying upon technological supremacy and universal claims to truth, they have been overwhelmingly **driven by** a **bio-political imperative**, which has displaced concerns with Sovereign integrities with forms of violence carried out **in the name of an endangered humanity**. In this regard, they have destroyed the Westphalia pretence, seeing the catastrophes of our global age in fact as a condition of possibility to further the liberal will to rule. Since incorporation in this setting has proceed on the basis that all life should necessarily be included within its strategic orbit, the veritable evisceration of any sense of “the outside” (as conceived in terms of its political imaginary) has led to the **blurring of all** conventional **demarcations** between friends/enemies, citizens/soldiers, times of war/times of peace. What is more, as life itself became increasingly central to questions of security, issues of development as broadly conceived would no longer be regarded as peripheral to the war effort. It would in fact become a central motif as most notably articulated in the strategic mantras “War by Other means” and “War for Hearts and Minds”. Not only would this point to new forms of de-politicisation which, less about Schmittean exceptionalism, were more explicable in terms of the fundamental political and social transformation of societies. It would also lead to the production of violent subjects, as the recourse to violence became sure testament to a conception of humanity realised through the wars fought in its name. **Liberal violence**, in other words, proved to be **unbounded**, **unlimited** and without conventional Sovereign warrant – namely revealing of the fundamental principles of what Benjamin once elected to term “the divine”. Diagnosing the liberal wars of the past two decades as a form of divine violence offers a more disturbing reading of the violence of the liberal encounter. If the violence of political realism, at least in theory, appreciated the value of limits and boundaries, what seems to define the lethality of liberal freedom has been a commitment to war without boundaries, hence limitless. As Dillon and Julian Reid acutely observed: [L]iberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary corollary of the aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species ... There is, then, a martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war ... Liberalism is therefore **obliged to** **exercise** **a** **strategic calculus of necessary killing**, in the course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough... [However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live, than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing’42 . This brings us to Steven Pinker’s Better Angels of Our Nature43 . Reworking the well-rehearsed liberal peace thesis, for Pinker, the reason we have become less warlike today can be account for in terms of our liberal maturity. Leaving aside the evident theological undertones to Pinker’s work, along with the numerous empirical flaws in his thesis, his not so original thesis at least accredits its all too Euro-centric sources of inspiration on matters of civility: ‘The reason so many violent institutions succumbed within so short a span of time was that the arguments that slew them belong to a coherent philosophy that emerged during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. The ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill coalesced into a worldview that we can call Enlightenment humanism’. John Gray has been rightly suspicious of the entire project and claims being made here: The idea that a new world can be constructed through the rational application of force is peculiarly modern, animating ideas of revolutionary war and pedagogic terror that feature in an influential tradition of radical Enlightenment thinking. Downplaying this tradition is extremely important for Pinker. Along with liberal humanists everywhere, he regards the core of the Enlightenment as a commitment to rationality. The fact that prominent Enlightenment figures have favoured violence as an instrument of social transformation is—to put it mildly—inconvenient... No doubt we have become less violent in some ways. But it is easy for liberal humanists to pass over the respects in which civilisation has retreated. Pinker is no exception. Just as he writes off mass killing in developing countries as evidence of backwardness without enquiring whether it might be linked in some way to peace in the developed world, he celebrates “re-civilisation”... without much concern for those who pay the price of the re-civilising process44 . Gray showed his evident concerns here with the promissory nature of liberal violence. Indeed, what he elsewhere terms the violence of the liberal missionary, reposes Nietzsche’s further instance that ‘god is dead and man has killed him’ with a devastating humanistic critique45 . Such violence, in the end, however has proved to be politically, ethically and economically narcissistic. Just as liberal advocates in the zones of crises now increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world46 , this has been matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence which also takes place almost exclusively at a distance. Indeed, as liberal actors increasingly give up on the idea that the world may be transformed for the better, new modalities of violence are emerging which seem to be more logically in fitting with the new politics of catastrophe that increasingly defines our terrifyingly normal times. As the promise of violence and catastrophe now appears inescapable, **insecurity** is becoming **normalised**, dystopian realism becoming the prevailing imaginaries for political rule, and once cited claims to emancipation, unending progress and lasting security for peoples all but abandoned47 . The politics of catastrophe and its relationship to “end of times” narratives adds another layer to our theological enquiry. As Jacob Taubes once noted48 , there is perhaps something theologically different at work here between the pre-modern apocalyptic movements and the catastrophic reasoning now defining the contemporary moment. For all their nihilism and monotheistic servitude, at least the apocalyptic movements of yesteryear could imagine a better world than already existed. There is therefore a vast difference between the subjects which names its disaster ‘apocalypse’ to that which reads disaster in terms of ‘catastrophe.’49 Unlike apocalypse, there is no beyond the catastrophic. Its mediation on the “end of times” is already fated. Catastrophe denies political transformation. It demands instead a forced partaking in a world that is deemed to be insecure unto the end. The upshot being, as all things become the source of endangerment, the human becomes the source of our veritable undoing. Angels of History Every war produces its casualties. Some of these stand out in terms of the sheer body count. The horror of mass warfare reduced to the most banal forms of inhuman quantification. Others, no less important, are its political and philosophical losses. What is increasingly clear is that the past two decades of liberal warfare, punctured but not initially determined by the tragedy of the events of September 11th 2001, ultimately put the very concept of war into question. The reluctance to officially declare war, even when our involvement in the politically motivated violence appears to be all too evident, now demands a move beyond the dominant frames which have shaped discussions for the past two decades. There is an important caveat to address here. What happened during last decade of the Global Wars on Terror cannot simply be inserted into a post 9/11 frames for analysis. Much of what passed for post 9/11 justice or military excessiveness was slowly maturing in the global borderlands for some considerable time. If there is a departure it needs to be accounted for against this broader post-Cold War humanitarian sensibility through which liberalism absorbed local crises into its political fabric to further condition its violent interventions. It has been all too easy for political and social theorists to put the blame for the violence and atrocities of the Global Wars on Terror onto the shoulders of George Bush and Dick Cheney. This has allowed liberals to appropriate Schmitt as one of their own, hence reducing the entire war effort to the reductionist measures of “US hegemony/exceptionalism”. Such retreats back into state centric models have not only proved unhelpful in terms of questioning the normalization of violence, they have failed to grasp the complexity of war – especially how questions of universality, economy, power and the formation of political subjectivities can be rethought through violent encounters. What is more, the limits of these analyses have been further evidenced by the complete lack of engagement with political theology, failing to recognize the violence of universal ambitions, along with the need to put the contemporary legacy of Kant on trial. Let us not forget Tony Blair and Barack Obama have embodied the liberal Kantian idea of political leadership better than any others throughout the history of liberalism. Any change in liberal fortunes must be understood in this context. We have witnessed in recent times profound changes in the violent cartography of what is a post-Iraq liberal influence. Instead of actively and one-sidedly engaging the world, humanely, violently or otherwise, what we are now encountering are new political arrangements shaped by forms of distancing and technological realignment. Just as liberal agents in the dangerous borderland areas increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world, this is matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence that also take place at a distance. The political and philosophical significance of this should not be underestimated. The technological and strategic confluence between the remote management of populations (notably surveillance) and new forms of violence are indicative of the narcissism of a liberal project that reeks of the worst excesses of technological determinism. Instead of looking with confidence towards a post-liberal commitment to transforming the living conditions of the world of peoples, what has taken its place is an intellectually barren landscape offering no alternative other than to live out our catastrophically fated existence. This is instructive regarding how we might envisage “the end of liberal times” as marked out and defined by this incommensurable sense of planetary siege. It also demands new thinking about the relationship between violence, technology and theology in these uncertain times. The **liberal wars** of the past decade have been **premised on** two notable claims to superiority. The first was premised on the logic of technology where it was assumed that high-tech sophistry could replace the need to suffer casualties. The second was premised upon a more **humanitarian ethos**, which **demanded** **local** knowledge and **engagement with dangerous populations**. The narcissistic violence of the Global War on Terror has put this secondary vision into lasting crises as the violence of liberal encounter has fatefully exposed any universal commitment to rights and justice. Not only did we appear to be the principle authors of violence, thereby challenging the notion that underdevelopment was the true cause of planetary endangerment, populations within liberal societies have lost faith in worldly responsibilities. **Metaphysical hubris displaced by a catastrophic reasoning** that quite literally **places us at the point of extinction**. Violence as such has assumed non-locatable forms as liberalism is coming to terms with the limits to its territorial will to rule. Physically separated from a world it no longer understands, it is now left to the digital and technological recoupment of distance to shape worldly relations with little concern for human relations. Drone violence is particularly revealing of this shift in the liberal worldview. While the first recorded drone strike was authorised by President George Bush in Pakistan on 18th June 2004, it has been during the Presidency of Obama that the use of the technology has become the more favoured method for dealing with recalcitrant elements in the global borderlands. Indeed, it seems, whilst the Bush administration favoured extraordinary rendition, detention and torture, the Obama policy for preventing the growth of inmates in camps such as Guantanamo has been their execution. Hence inhumane torture and barbarity replaced by the more dignified and considerate method of targeted assassination! While debates on drone violence tend to centre on questions its legality, especially whether it fits within established rules of war, little attention is given to the wider political moment and how the violence points to the changing nature of liberal power and its veritable retreat from the world of people. Whereas Bush and Blair launched a one-sided territorial assault on Iraq and Afghanistan in order to promote ‘civilisation’, Obama has waged his war in the deregulated atmospheric shadows where technological supremacy allows for the continuation of uninhibited forms of violence, while addressing the fact that the previous interventions failed by any given measure. Hence, this time, out of respect for public sensibilities a ‘precise’ or ‘surgical’ form of violence is delivered remotely to its distant adversaries. We should not forget however that the technologies, infrastructures and aesthetics essential for remote warfare are essentially the same as those that support the economy and consumer society. Targeted drone-strikes and the advertising that maintains the consumer hothouse essentially rely on the same computer-based technologies and algorithmic sense-making tools. Put another way, how Amazon mechanically predicts your next book purchase is not fundamentally different from how adversarial behavioural patterns are isolated in authoring a signature-kill. Drone technologies are not simply a new tool of warfare that allow for legal or strategic reassessment. They are paradigmatic to the contemporary stages of liberal rule. As technological advance compensates for the “soldiers on the ground” militaristic retreat, they further radicalise the very idea of the territorial front line such that any Schmittean notion of inside/outside appears like some arcane remnant of an out-dated past. What takes its place is an atmospheric gaze that further eviscerates the human. From the perspective of violence, displacing the primacy of human agency from the act of killing represents more than the realisation of the military’s dream of zero casualties. It reveals more fully the dominance of dystopian realism as the defining rationality shaping the political landscape in the here and now, and beyond50 . Demanding then of a new conceptual vocabulary that allows us to critique what happens when violence is neither orderly nor progressive, but is simply tasked to mitigate the demise liberal power and ambition in an uncertain world seems more pressing than ever.

#### The 1AC’s avowal of globalizing healthcare access mystifies the ontological schema which subtends global imperialism through liberal expansion. Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological – only dwelling in debate’s interregnum brings theory and praxis into concomitance.

Spanos 8 (William V Spanos, distinguished professor of English at Binghamton University, PhD from the University of Wisconsin, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 26-31, modified) gz

I will return later in this book to Said’s provocative retrieval of empire’s spectral Others—his bringing of this marginalized figure out of the shadows of imperialism’s periphery to center stage, as it were. It will suffice here to suggest that by thus assuming the exilic perspective of the Abgeschiedene in addressing the question of global colonialism, it should now be clear that my intervention has not been intended to mimic the by now commonplace critical imperative of a certain “postcolonial” discourse, usually identified with Salmon Rushdie and Malek Alloula, in which “the Empire writes back” to the imperial “center.”32 This critical initiative, perhaps needless to say, has contributed significantly, especially by way of identifying the colonial project with cultural, specifically literary, production, to the inauguration of an anticolonial discourse that would be commensurate to the complex and multisituated operations of American (neo)colonialism in the “postimperial” age of globalization, above all, in that phase that has been represented by its intellectual deputies as the “end of history” and is now bearing witness to America’s unilateral imposition of capitalist democracy on “rogue states” that threaten the “American Peace.” But, as I have suggested, it remains inadequate to this most difficult of tasks, not impossible. This inadequacy is not simply the result of this criticism’s vestigial adherence to the kind of imperial thinking it would interrogate (i.e., its not being postcolonial— exilic or, rather, “a-part”—enough).33 It is also, and primarily, the result of a paradoxically limited historical sense. Despite its insistent appeal to history against theory, this praxis-oriented “postcolonial” criticism, like the genealogical criticism of Foucault and even Said, from which it ultimately derives, is not historical enough. In keeping with its indifference to, if not its antitheoretical bias against theory, it has, in fact, reduced the critical potential of this resonant motif of resistance by restricting the genealogy of imperialism by and large to the modern era—from the age of exploration in the fifteenth century to the age of imperialism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In overlooking its own origins in the exilic “theory” that emerged in response to the decisive self-destruction of the imperial (onto)logic of the discourse of the Occident in the middle of the twentieth century, this postcolonial discourse, in other words, has also lost sight of an earlier, deeper, and polyvalent structural origin of the colonial project. I mean the very epochal moment of the founding of the idea of the Occidental polis in late Greek and especially (imperial) Roman antiquity. This was the moment that bore witness to the West’s self-conscious inscription of metaphysics—of thinking the transitory and singular (contingent or always incomplete) event from the exclusionary or accommodational providential/ panoptic vantage point of its (preconceived) “completion”—as the truth of being and history at large.34 As a consequence of this forgetting of the provenance of imperialism in the Roman transformation of the “errant” thinking of the Greeks into a “correct” (and, in Fukuyama’s term, “directional”) thinking, the discourse of postcolonialism has delimited its genealogy of Western imperialism to the Enlightenment and after and thus the ideological parameters of imperialism to the practice of empire, that is, to the site of cultural geopolitics. Despite its suggestive spontaneous probings beyond it (mostly in the form of its inadequately thought reiteration of the relay of “white” metaphors—center/periphery; light/darkness; plantation/wilderness; settler/nomad, development (improvement)/underdevelopment— that systematically informs the “truth” discourse of metaphysics), they therefore remain vestigially and ~~disablingly~~ [stultifyingly] disciplinary. In other words, this privileged version of postcolonialist discourse is determined by a problematic that restricts itself to an idea of the imperial that remains indifferent to or, more accurately, overlooks the inaugural ontological ground on which the developing structure of the West as the West rests—a ground that, as I have shown, visibly reasserts itself in the neo-Hegelianism of the post-Cold War end-of-history discourse. As such, it is a critical discourse that addresses an imperialism that has been rendered anachronistic, if not exactly obsolete, by the triumphant culture’s representation of the end of the Cold War as the end of history and the annunciation of this “good news” as the advent of the New World Order. I mean, to retrieve and reconstellate into the present historical occasion the forgotten and decisively important ideological function of the ruse of the Pax Romana, the peace of what I have been calling the Pax Americana. On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a ~~disabling~~ [stultifying] indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxis-oriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and ~~disabling~~ [stultifying]— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of ~~blinding~~ [totalizing] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered ~~disablingly~~ [stultifyingly] invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana. To be more specific, this reconstellated destructive genealogy will show that the reality of the “triumphant” American democratic/capitalist polity rests on a fabricated ontological base that privileges the hierarchically structured binarist principle of principles—that identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around—and that, therefore, this polity is imperial in essence as well as in its multisituated political practices. It will show, in other words, that, in representing being meta ta physica (from after or above being’s temporal disseminations), this ontological base generates a “truth” discourse that, far from being transparently “objective,” open to the “empirical” event, is actually re-presentational, pan-optic, and retro-spective and, as such, utterly metaphorical— and ideological. To retrieve the now virtually forgotten, but extraordinarily resonant phrase Derrida coined to identify this truth discourse with European origins and interests, it will show that the alleged disinterested truth discourse of the West is, in fact, a binarist “white mythology.”40 It will show that its “truth” structuralizes or, more telling in the proximity of its sublimated metaphorics of temporal closure to the operations of colonization, spatializes or territorializes the differential dynamics of temporality around a polyvalent (Eurocentric) Logos. I mean by this Logos a Transcendental Signified or Principle of Presence invariably represented in Western history since the Romans’ codification of the domiciled colonus (“farmer”/“settler”) as the binary opposite of the nomadic sylvestris (“savage,” literally, “of the woods”) in the form of a combination of indissolubly related, hierarchically structured binary tropes of resolution or accommodation—most notably and enablingly, the centered circle, the panoptic eye (and its light), and, not least, the maturation process (the clearing of the wilderness and the planting and cultivation of the original seed). It is, for example, this relay of imperial tropes emanating from and circulating around the presiding Logos that informs Hegel’s imperial Philosophy of History, epitomized by the incantatory repetition of “World History”) in the following famous passage on “Enlightenment”: The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning. The History of the World has an East kat’ exochen (the term East in itself is entirely relative), for although the Earth forms a sphere, History performs no circle round it, but has on the contrary a determinate East, viz., Asia. Here rises the outward physical Sun, and in the West it sinks down: here consentaneously rises the Sun of self-consciousness, which diffuses a nobler brilliance. The History of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a Universal principle and conferring subjective freedom.41 And, I will show in chapter 6, it is this relay of imperial tropes, subsumed to the Hegelian paradigm by Fukuyama, that has pervaded the unexceptionalist discourse of American exceptionalism from the Puritan jeremiad in behalf of the “errand in the wilderness,” through the discourse of the frontier in behalf of the fulfillment of America’s Manifest Destiny, to that of the post-9/11 effort to recuperate the American national identity in the wake of the Vietnam War. More immediately, the reconstellation of destructive genealogy into the post-Cold War occasion will show that the relay of binarist “white” metaphors informing the truth discourse of the “triumphant” post- Enlightenment democratic/capitalist society constitutes a naturalized “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.”42 Contrary to the representation of the reigning disciplinary interpretation of being, this hegemonic diagram of power is operative simultaneously, however unevenly at any particular historical specific occasion, throughout the continuum of being, from the representation of being and the subject as such, through gender and race, to culture, economics, and the national and international polity. It is, in short, polyvalent in its imperial applications.

#### Interp– 1AC is an object of research, and the role of the negative is refuse that object.

Reps come first –

1. It frames the way we approach topics and it shapes the way we interpret them, so it precedes reality – we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if we didn’t think that Al Qaeda was based there. Discourse constitutes subjectivity as it frames how they approach the world

2. Proximity – it’s the only thing that happens in round, so in-round discourse is the only real takeaway we have from a debate round. Holding debaters accountable for their reps is key to accessibility which comes first because otherwise debaters leave if they feel like the space is violent. That also means they can’t sever out of their speech act.

## Case

### 1NC – Method

#### Spectacularized humanitarian acts such as vaccine access is the consumption of catastrophe that turns the Global South into the Pharmocracy’s adventure playground – always seeking to create and enlarge disasters to satisfy capital’s need for consumption.

* Translated Medecins sans frontiers to Doctors without Borders

Baudrillard 94, Jean. L'illusion de la fin. Stanford University Press, 1994. Pg 66-71 (Professor of Western Philosophy at the University of Paris)//Elmer

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - **charity cannibalism** being **worse than oppressive violence**. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of **our charitable condescension**: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world **repents and seeks absolution** - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the **reprocessing of catastrophe**. **Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontiers [Doctors without Borders**], international solidarity, etc. **The last phase of colonialism**: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution **becomes our adventure playground** . Thus, the **humanitarian offensive** aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in **which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination**. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of **reproduction of the catastrophe market** ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and **ensuring its continuity**, **just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development**. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order **to meet its need for spectacle** and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, **we shall have to invent one for ourselves.** The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

### 1NC – AT: Matheson

Its only about nuke war

### 1NC – COVID Defense

#### The Plan can’t solve COVID -

#### 1] Lack of key supplies

Tepper 21 James Tepper, 4/10 [James Tepper, (James M. Tepper is an American neuroscientist currently a Board of Governors Professor of Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience and Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University and an Elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)]. "Global Covid vaccine rollout threatened by shortage of vital components." Guardian, 4-1-2021, Accessed 8-8-2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/10/global-covid-vaccine-rollout-threatened-by-shortage-of-vital-components // duongie

Vaccine-makers around the world face shortages of vital components including large plastic growbags, according to the head of the firm that is manufacturing a quarter of the UK’s jab supply. Stan Erck, the chief executive of Novavax – which makes the second vaccine to be grown and bottled entirely in Britain – told the Observer that the shortage of 2,000-litre bags in which the vaccine cells were grown was a significant hurdle for global supply. His warning came as bag manufacturers revealed that some pharmaceutical firms were waiting up to 12 months for the sterile single-use disposable plastic containers, which are used to make medicines of all kinds, including the Pfizer, Moderna and Novavax Covid-19 vaccines. But Erck and his British partners said they were confident they had enough suppliers to avoid disruption to the supply of Novavax. The vaccine is waiting for approval from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) but the first of 60 million doses ordered by the government are already in production in Teesside. The Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies factory began growing the first cells for the Novavax vaccine in Billingham, County Durham this month and in a few weeks they will fill the bioreactor bag, ready to be transported to GlaxoSmithKline’s plant at Barnard Castle to be put into vials for distribution. “The first hurdle is showing it works and we don’t have that hurdle any more,” Erck said. But he added there were others still to overcome. “There’s the media that the cells have to grow in,” Erck said. “You grow them in these 2,000-litre bags, which are in short supply. Then you pour it out and you have to filter it, and the filters are in short supply. The little things count.” Novavax almost ran out of bags at one of its 20 factories earlier this year, but there had been no delays for the UK operation, according to Martin Meeson, global chief executive of Fujifilm Diosynth. “We started working on our part of the supply chain in summer last year,” he said. “We had to accelerate some of the investment here, but the commitment we made last summer to start manufacturing in February has been fulfilled.” Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Photograph: Christophe Archambault/AP Both Meeson and Erck said the UK’s vaccine taskforce had been helpful in sorting out supply issues so far, but other countries and other medical supplies might be affected. ABEC makes bioreactor bags at two plants in the US and two in Fermoy and Kells in Ireland, and delivered six 4,000-litre bags to the Serum Institute in India last year for its Covid vaccines. Brady Cole, vice-president of equipment solutions at ABEC, said: “We are hearing from our customer base of lead times that are pushing out to nine, 10, even 12 months to get bioreactor bags. We typically run out at 16 weeks to get a custom bioreactor bag out to a customer.” He said ABEC was still managing to fulfil orders at roughly that rate. “The bag manufacturing capacity can’t meet demand right now,” he added. “And on the component side, the tubes and the instruments and so forth that also go into the bag assembly – those lead times are also starting to get stretched as well. But the biggest problem we see is it really is just the ability to get bags in a reasonable amount of time.” ABEC expanded its factories last year and has now started making 6,000-litre bags, which are roughly the size of a minibus. Other firms including MilliporeSigma, part of German company Merck, have also been expanding their manufacturing facilities. American firm Thermo Fisher Scientific expects it will finish doubling its capacity this year. The US government has also blocked exports of bags, filters and other components so it can supply more Pfizer vaccines for Americans. Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, said the restrictions were likely to cause serious bottlenecks. Novavax is hoping to avoid delays and “vaccine nationalism” by operating on four continents, with 20 facilities in nine countries. “One year ago, we had exactly zero manufacturing capacity,” Erck said. “We’re self-sufficient. The two main things we need to do are done in the UK. And in the EU we have plants in Spain and the Czech Republic and fill-and-finish in Germany and the Netherlands.” There was no need for vaccines to cross borders to fulfil contracts, he said. The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine was hit by a delay to a delivery of 5 million doses from India and a problem with a batch made in Britain, and the company has been dragged into a lengthy row between the UK and the EU over vaccine exports.

#### 2] Skill Disparities and Trade Secrets – Moderna proves IP isn’t the root cause.

Silverman 3-15 Rachel Silverman 3-15-2021 "Waiving vaccine patents won’t help inoculate poorer nations" <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/15/vaccine-coronavirus-patents-waive-global-equity/> (Rachel Silverman is a policy fellow at the Center for Global Development)//Duong

Reality is more complicated, however. Because of the technical complexity of manufacturing coronavirus vaccines, waiving intellectual-property rights, by itself, would have **little effect**. It could even backfire, with companies using the move as an excuse to disengage from global access efforts. There are more effective ways to entice — and to pressure — companies to license and share their intellectual property and the associated know-how, without broadly nullifying patents. The Moderna vaccine illustrates the limits of freeing up intellectual property. Moderna announced in October that it would **not enforce IP rights** on its coronavirus vaccine — and yet it has **taken no steps to share information** about the vaccine’s design or manufacture, citing commercial interests in the underlying technology. Five months later, production of the Moderna vaccine remains entirely under the **company’s direct control** within its owned and contracted facilities. Notably, Moderna is also the only manufacturer of a U.S.- or British-approved vaccine not yet participating in Covax, a global-aid-funded effort (including a pledged $4 billion from the United States) to purchase vaccines for use in low- and middle-income countries. It is true, however, that activist pressure — including threats to infringe upon IP rights — can encourage originators to enter into voluntary licensing arrangements. So the global movement to liberate the vaccine patents may be useful, even if some advocates make exaggerated claims about the effects of waivers on their own. We focused on covid. Now our other patients are suffering. One reason patent waivers are unlikely to help much in this case is that vaccines are harder to make than ordinary drugs. Because most drugs are simple chemical compounds, and because the composition of the compounds is easily analyzable, competent chemists can usually reverse-engineer a production process with relative ease. When a drug patent expires, therefore — or is waived — generic companies can readily enter the market and produce competitive products, lowering prices dramatically. Vaccines, in contrast, are complex biological products. Observing their contents is insufficient to allow for imitation. Instead, to produce the vaccine, manufacturers need access to the developer’s “soft” IP — the proprietary recipe, cell lines, manufacturing processes and so forth. While some of this information is confidentially submitted to regulators and might theoretically be released in an extraordinary situation (though not without legal challenge), manufacturers are at an enormous disadvantage without the originator’s cooperation to help them set up their process and kick-start production. Even with the nonconsensual release of the soft IP held by the regulator, the process of trial and error would cause long delays in a best-case scenario. Most likely, the effort would end in expensive failure. Manufacturers also need certain raw ingredients and other materials, like glass vials and filtration equipment; overwhelming demand, paired with disruptive export restrictions, has constricted the global availability of some of these items.

### 1NC – Infectious Diseases turn

#### Forcing factory production results in unsafe manufacturing and forces trade-offs with medicines for other infectious diseases.

Szabo et. Al 21 Liz Szabo et. Al 21 [Liz Szabo (Liz Szabo, a senior correspondent and enterprise reporter who focuses on the quality of patient care, has covered medicine for two decades.)]. "Why Even Presidential Pressure Might Not Get More Vaccine to Market Faster." Kaiser Health News, 1-26-2021, Accessed 8-5-2021. https://khn.org/news/article/ramping-up-covid-vaccine-production-could-take-months-even-with-bidens-best-tool-to-pressure-companies/ // duongie

Americans are dying of covid-19 by the thousands, but efforts to ramp up production of potentially lifesaving vaccines are hitting a brick wall. Vaccine makers Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech are **running their factories full ti**lt and are under enormous pressure to expand production or collaborate with other drug companies to set up additional assembly lines. That pressure is only growing as new viral variants of the virus threaten to launch the country into a deadlier phase of the pandemic. President Joe Biden has said he plans to invoke the Cold War-era authority of the Defense Production Act to provide more vaccines to millions of Americans. Consumer advocates — who had called for Donald Trump to use the Defense Production Act more aggressively as president — are now asking Biden to do the same. But even forcing companies to gear up production won’t **provide much-needed doses anytime soon**. Expanding production lines takes time. Establishing lines in repurposed facilities can take months. “The big problem is that even if you can get the raw material and get the infrastructure set up, how do you get a company that is already producing at maximum capacity to go beyond that maximum capacity?” said Lawrence Gostin, a professor of global health law at Georgetown University. Ordering the companies to work 24/7 “would be a naïve solution,” said Dr. Nicole Lurie, a senior adviser to the CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, an international group that finances vaccines for emerging diseases. “They’re probably already doing that to the extent they have the raw materials.” Lurie added, “If you completely wear people out, mistakes happen. You **have to balance speed with quality and safety.”** The technological challenges involved are daunting, and the companies haven’t been forthcoming about what’s needed to overcome any supply shortfalls. “We don’t know what the holdup is. Is it capacity? Raw materials? People? Glass vials? We just don’t know what the bottleneck is,” said Erin Fox, senior director of drug information and support services at the University of Utah Health Hospitals. Forcing other companies to start making the vaccines might not work either, Gostin said. “I’m not sure if Biden could require a private company to transfer its technology to another company,” Gostin said. “That is highly questionable legally. … President Biden’s room for maneuvering isn’t as great as people think.” Drug companies define “trade secrets” broadly, Fox said. “In general, drug companies don’t have to tell me who is making their product, where it’s made, the location of the factory. … That’s considered proprietary.” Part of the challenge relates to how these vaccines are made. The first two authorized products use lipid nanoparticles to deliver a snippet of the coronavirus’s genetic material — called messenger RNA, or mRNA — into cells. The viral genes teach our cells how to make proteins that stimulate an immune response to the novel coronavirus. Messenger RNA is fragile and breaks down easily, so it needs to be handled with care, with specific temperatures and humidity levels. The vaccines “are not widgets,” said Lurie, who served as assistant secretary for preparedness and response at the Department of Health and Human Services during the Obama administration. Every step, experts say, to get vaccines to market has its complexities: obtaining raw materials; building facilities to precise specifications; buying single-use products, such as tubing and plastic bags to line stainless steel bioreactors; and hiring employees with the requisite training and expertise. Companies also must pass safety and quality inspections and arrange for transportation. The Defense Production Act, for instance, would allow the government to commandeer a plant that already has a fermenter — there are plenty in the biotech industry — to expand production. But that’s just the first stage in making an mRNA vaccine and, even then, it would take about a year to get going, said Dr. George Siber, a vaccine expert who is on the advisory board of CureVac, a German mRNA vaccine company. Companies would first have to do a breathtakingly thorough cleaning to prevent cross-contamination, Siber said. Next, they would need to set up, calibrate and test equipment, and train scientists and engineers to run it. Finally, Siber said, unlike a drug, whose components can be tested for purity, there’s no way to be sure a vaccine produced in a new facility is what it claims to be without testing it on animals and people. “Making vaccines is not like making cars, and quality control is paramount,” said Dr. Stanley Plotkin, a vaccine industry consultant credited with inventing the rubella vaccine. “We are expecting other vaccines in a matter of weeks, so it might be faster to bring them into use.” However, even that will require patience. Johnson & Johnson, expected to announce clinical trial results this month, has said that it won’t be able to deliver as many shots as planned because of manufacturing delays. The company did not confirm a manufacturing delay and declined to respond to questions. AstraZeneca’s vaccine, also funded in part by U.S. taxpayers, is in use already in the United Kingdom and India, but the Food and Drug Administration has raised questions about its late-stage trial, so it may not be available here until the spring. Novavax, another U.S.-funded vaccine maker, has been plagued by delays and only recently began recruiting volunteers for its big trial. Merck, the most recent company to get federal support for covid vaccines, announced Monday it was scrapping its two candidates after they failed to produce adequate immune response in early tests. “None of the vaccine makers are manufacturing at the volume they ultimately want to be at,” Lurie said. “They all have manufacturing delays.” Pfizer, which has committed 200 million doses to the U.S. government by the end of July, said last week it expected “no interruptions” in shipments from its primary U.S. covid manufacturing plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Pfizer spokesperson Sharon Castillo said the company has expanded manufacturing facilities and added more suppliers and contract manufacturers. Those efforts, and the company’s announcement that its five-dose vials actually contain an extra dose, mean “we can potentially deliver approximately 2 billion doses worldwide by the end of 2021.” The U.S. government also has an option to acquire another 400 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, though the company declined to provide details on that option when asked. But countries around the world are competing for the same supplies and raw materials, Gostin said. Biden could use the Defense Production Act “to force Pfizer to prioritize U.S. contracts, but that would be politically risky,” given that other countries could retaliate by hoarding supplies. Although Pfizer is an American company, it has partnered with BioNTech, of Germany, to make its covid vaccine. “That would lead to a global mess.” Trying to corner the world market on vaccine ingredients or supplies would look bad, experts say, given that the United States just this week joined Covax, an international venture to source and distribute vaccines, in an effort to ensure poor countries aren’t left behind. Paradoxically, the rush to get vaccines to market may have resulted in a less efficient manufacturing process. Vaccine companies typically spend months making their factories run as efficiently as possible, as well as finding an ideal dose and the most effective interval between doses, Lurie said. Given the urgency of the pandemic, however, they delayed parts of this process and launched straight into mass production. Pfizer angered European countries last week when it paused vaccine production at a Belgian plant to upgrade its capacity. Pfizer said the weeklong closure would decrease vaccine deliveries to Europe for three to four weeks before boosting supplies in February. The move doesn’t affect U.S. vaccine supplies. “The U.S can’t necessarily readily access stuff that’s being held for vaccines in other countries,” Lurie said. And forcing other companies to make covid vaccines could jeopardize production of **other important shots,** such as measles, said Dr. Amesh Adalja, a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. Routine childhood immunization rates have fallen during the pandemic, raising the risk of epidemics. Using the act to prioritize covid vaccine manufacturing has already disrupted supplies of at least one drug, Fox noted. In December, Horizon Therapeutics warned doctors and patients to expect a shortage of a drug called Tepezza, used to treat thyroid-related eye disease, because its manufacturer was ordered to prioritize covid shots. Lawmakers and consumer advocates such as Public Citizen called on the government to use the Defense Production Act more aggressively. In a letter sent earlier this month, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Rep. Katie Porter (D-Calif.) said Moderna should share its technique for stabilizing its vaccine at normal refrigerator temperatures, without “ultracold” freezers. Moderna officials have said the intrinsic differences in the two companies’ mRNA material make that technology hard to share. Besides, they say, Pfizer has declined to share data with Moderna. Pfizer has declined to comment on the issue. Since Moderna’s effort is federally funded, the government presumably has march-in rights and could take over production, said Mike Watson, former president of Moderna subsidiary Valera, in an email. “The reality is that however far you push production capacity, you sooner or later reach a bottleneck.” Experts say it’s not as simple as demanding that glassmaker Corning step up and make glass vials, for example. Of course, the vials will need to meet rigorous requirements. But there’s also this: The U.S. is facing a shortage of mined sand, the main component needed to make glass vials.

#### That turns the Case – limited care and medicine for other infectious diseases will go to white, privileged populations leaving minorities and those in the global south vulnerable to unnecessary deaths.