# 2NR

#### They have justified skepticism and have offered no way to soilve it

# 1NCD

## OFF

### 1NC – OFF

#### Reading hidden game-over spikes vs me is a voting issue DTD for deterrence

#### THOMPSON:

Marshall Thompson – Former Debater and Current Coach. http://vbriefly.com/2015/04/21/marshall-thoughts/

First, I think that evaluating who is the better debater via who dropped spikes excludes lots of specific individuals, especially those with learning disabilities. I have both moderate dyslexia and extreme dysgraphia.  Despite debating for four years with a lot of success I was never able to deal with spikes. I could not ‘mind-sweep’ because my flow was not clear enough to find the arguments I needed, and I was simply too slow a reader to be able to reread through the relevant parts of a case during prep-time. **ab**I was very lucky, my junior year (which was the first year I really competed on the national circuit) spikes were remarkably uncommon. Looking back it was in many ways the low-point for spike. They started to be used some my senior year but not anything like the extent they are used today. I am entirely confident, however, in saying that if spikes had had anywhere near the sameprevalence when I started doing ‘circuit’ debate as they do now, I—with the specific ways that dyslexia/dysgraphia has affected me—would never have bothered to try to debate national circuit LD (I don’t intend to imply this is the same for anyone who has dyslexia or dysgraphia, the particular ways that learning disabilities manifest is often difficult to track). Now, the mere fact that I would have been prevented from succeeding in the activity and possibly from being able to enjoyably compete is not an argument. I never would have been able to succeed at calligraphy, but I would hardly claim we should therefore not make the calligraphy club about handwriting. Instead, what I am suggesting is that the values that debate cares about and should be assessing are not questions of handwriting or notation. We expect notation instrumentally to avoid intervention, but it is not one of the ends of debate in itself. Thus, if there is a viable principle upon which we can decrease this strategic dimension of spikes but maintain non-intervention I think we should do so. I was ‘good’ at philosophy, ‘good’ at argument generation, ‘good’ at research, ‘good’ at casing, ‘great’ at framework comparison etc. It seems to me that as long as I can flow well enough to easily follow a non-tricky aff it was proper that my learning disabilities not be an obstacle to my success. (One other thing to note, while I was a ‘framework debater’ who could never have been good at spikes because of my learning disability I have never met a ‘tricky debater’ who could not have succeeded in debate without tricks simply in virtue of their intelligence and technical proficiency; that is perhaps another reason to favor my account.) Second, spikes add in a greater dimension of randomnessto the round. If they are seen then they are ‘caught’ then they don’t really help you win, if they are not they do. Against most debaters one can ‘reliably’ beat them or will ‘reliably’ lose to them. With cases with lots of spike however, one might generally beat them and then once just miss a spike and it is all over. If the round were to have happened at a different time then the spike might have been caught. This ‘luck’ dimension strikes me as at least giving reason to think it does not track with what we want when assessing who did the better debating.

#### Hold the line – disabled participation is a voter that outweighs – accessibility controls the internal link to participation in debate that makes in-round impacts relevant. Also turns the aff because proves the aff isn’t universalizable to disabled people

### 1NC – OFF

#### We’re hijacking their syllogism – Humans are not agents they are patients

#### This isn’t schmagency – we aren’t choosing not to be agents but rather that we were never agents in the first place.

#### A rock didn’t choose not to be an agent, it just constitutively isn’t. We never chose to be alive or exist which takes out performativity

#### Prefer

#### 1] Neuroscience – humans constitutively are selfish and imbued with contradictions in moral decision making.

#### **FeldmanHall 12** FeldmanHall, Oriel et al. “Differential neural circuitry and self-interest in real vs hypothetical moral decisions.” Social cognitive and affective neuroscience vol. 7,7 (2012): 743-51. doi:10.1093/scan/nss069 CHO

This study examined the moral dynamic of self-gain vs other-welfare during real and hypothetical conditions. Our behavioral results show that moral decisions with real consequences diverge from hypothetical moral choices, verifying the ‘hypothetical bias’ effect (Kang et al., 2011). Compared with imagining their moral actions, people who make moral decisions under real conditions keep more money and inflict more pain on another subject. Although the research exploring real moral action is limited (Moll et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009), our results stand in stark contrast to findings demonstrating that people act more morally than they think they will (Teper et al., 2011). Our results also contradict the accumulated research illustrating a basic aversion to harming others (Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al., 2012). We contend that this is likely due to the fact that many of the moral scenarios used within the moral literature do not pit the fundamental motivation of not harming others (physically or psychological) against that of maximizing self-gain (Haidt, 2007). Accordingly, our findings reveal that engaging the complex motivations of self-benefit—a force endemic to many moral decisions—can critically influence moral action. Our fMRI results identify a common neural network for real and hypothetical moral cognition, as well as distinct circuitry specific to real and imagined moral choices. Moral decisions—regardless of condition—activated the insula, MCC and dorsal TPJ, areas essential in higher order social processes, such as empathy (Singer et al., 2004). This neural circuitry is well instantiated in the social neuroscience literature and fits with the findings that moral choices are influenced by neural systems whose primary role is to facilitate cooperation (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The TPJ has been specifically implicated in decoding social cues, such as agency, intentionality and the mental states of others (Young and Saxe, 2008). For example, TPJ activation correlates with the extent to which another’s intentions are taken into account (Young and Saxe, 2009) and transiently disrupting TPJ activity leads to interference with using mental state information to make moral judgments (Young et al., 2010). Although there is a large amount of research indicating that the TPJ codes for our ability to mentalize, there is also evidence that the TPJ activates during attentional switching (Mitchell, 2008). In addition, one study revealed that patients with lesions to the TPJ do not show domain-specific deficits for false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007). Although these differential findings suggest that the specific functionality of the TPJ remains unclear, we propose that TPJ engagement during real and imagined moral decisions suggests a similar mentalizing process is at play in both real and hypothetical moral decision-making: when deciding how much harm to apply to another, subjects may conscript a mental state representation of the Receiver, allowing them to weigh up the potential consequences of their decision. This neural finding reinforces the role of the TPJ—and thus the likely role of mental state reasoning and inference—in moral reasoning. However, we also found distinct neural signatures for both real and imagined moral decisions. In line with the literature, hypothetical moral decisions were specifically subserved by activations in the PCC and mPFC—regions also implicated in prospection, by which abridged simulations of reality are generated (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Although the overall pattern of brain activation during these hypothetical moral decisions replicates the moral network identified in previous research (Greene et al., 2001), the fact that the PCC and mPFC are activated both during prospection and during hypothetical moral decision-making implies that this region is recruited for a wide spectrum of imagination-based cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). Thus, either hypothetical moral decisions and imagination share a similar network or hypothetical moral decisions significantly rely on the imperfect systems of prospection and imagination. Further research exploring whether the PCC and mPFC are specific to hypothetical moral decisions, or recruited more generally for imagining future events, would help clarify their roles within the moral network. In contrast, real moral decisions differentially recruited the amygdala. These results are consistent with the vast literature implicating the amygdala in processing social evaluations (Phelps, 2006), emotionally relevant information (Sander et al., 2003) and salient stimuli (Ewbank et al., 2009). Research on moral cognition further implicates amygdala activation in response to aversive moral phenomena (Berthoz et al., 2006; Kedia et al., 2008; Glenn et al., 2009); however, this finding is not systematically observed in moral paradigms (Raine and Yang, 2006). In line with the literature, it is possible that in the Real PvG task the amygdala is coding the aversive nature of the moral decision; however, distress ratings indicated that both conditions were perceived as equally aversive. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation is that the amygdala is monitoring the salience, relevance and motivational significance (Mitchell et al., 2002) of the real moral choice space. Decisions, which produce real aversive consequences (i.e. lose money or harm another), are far more salient and meaningful than decisions that do not incur behaviorally relevant outcomes. The amygdala is also commonly recruited for decisions which rely on social signals to emotionally learn positive and negative associations (Hooker et al., 2006). It is possible that the amygdala activation found for real moral decisions is signaling reinforcement expectancy information of both the positively (self-benefit) and negatively (harm to another) valenced stimuli (Blair, 2007), which then subsequently guides behavior (Prevost et al., 2011). This theory not only accounts for the differential behavioral findings between the real and hypothetical conditions but also it is consistent with the more general theoretical consensus regarding human moral cognition (Moll et al., 2005), which emphasizes how lower order regions like the amygdala modulate higher order rational processes (Dalgleish, 2004). Our fMRI results further indicate that there are dissociable neural mechanisms underlying selfish and pro-social decisions. In the Real PvG, decisions that maximized financial benefit (selfish decisions) correlated with activity in the OFC, dlPFC and dACC—regions that support the integration of reward and value representations (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005), specifically monetary gain (Holroyd et al., 2004) and loss (Bush et al., 2002). Furthermore, the dACC was found to negatively correlate with empathic concern scores and positively correlate with self-reported similarity ratings in the Real PvG task. Together, this suggests that the dACC may be monitoring conflicting motive states (Etkin et al., 2011). However, the dACC has been further implicated in a variety of other functions, including emotion regulation (Etkin et al., 2011), and weighing up different competing choices (Mansouri et al., 2009). Thus, it is equally plausible that the dACC is processing the conflicting negative emotions involved with choosing to harm another for self-gain (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In the PvG task, the morally guided choice is to give up the money to prevent harm to another. Unlike selfish decisions, such pro-social decisions showed significantly greater activation in the rACC/mPFC and right temporal pole, demonstrating that the nature of real moral decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC. The rACC/mPFC is a structure engaged in generating empathic feelings for in-group members (Mathur et al., 2010) and for coding feelings of altruistic guilt and distress during theory of mind tasks (Fletcher et al., 1995). Clinical data have also shown that lesions to this area stunt moral emotions, such as compassion, shame and guilt, and contribute to overall deficits in emotional processing (Mendez and Shapira, 2009). In fact, research has demonstrated the rACC/mPFC as a region that responds specifically to the aversion of not harming others (Young and Dungan, 2011). Based on this, we propose that the rACC/mPFC activation found for pro-social decisions could be attributed to the empathic response generated by the emotional aversion (distress) of harming another—a key motivational influence and proximate mechanism of altruistic behavior. Theorists have pointed to the importance of studying moral cognition in ecological valid and consequence-driven environments (Casebeer, 2003; Moll et al., 2005). Our results illustrate that specific regions of the moral network subserve moral choices—regardless of whether they are real or imagined. However, we also found a divergence between real moral behavior and hypothetical moral intentions—which was reflected in the recruitment of differential neurobiological systems. Thus, if morality is a domain where situational influences and the impact of imminent, real consequences can sway our decisions, then it is crucial that cognitive neuroscience investigate moral decision-making under real conditions. This seems especially relevant in light of this new neurobiological evidence, supporting what the philosopher Hume presciently noted—‘the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation’ (Hume, 1977).

#### 2] Contradictions are constitutive – Kant was a racist which proves a double-bind: Either he was an agent which means he didn’t have practical reason because he didn’t follow his own framework or he wasn’t an agent which proves it isn’t constitutive.

#### 3] Fleshy Objects – there is zero way to verify who else is a practical reasoner or just a fleshy object. Means we have no reason to respect unconditional worth of others because a] they aren’t agents and b] even if they are we have know way of knowing – else negate because infinite culpability since a hamburger could be a practical reasoner

#### That negates

#### 1] Egoism – we have no reason to respect other means that theft and appropriation for self-interests are morally obligatory

Nobis summarizes egoism ND (The author doesn’t agree with egoism but explains what egoism would conclude in) [Nathan Nobis; Teaching Philosophy. 1000-Word Philosophy. Animals and Ethics 101; No Date; "Ethical Egoism"; 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology; https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this: Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee. You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with a lot of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and nobody would ever know. Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, certainly never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant. If ethical egoism is true, not only can you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you must: not doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.) Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does not best explain our moral obligations even if we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves. An egoist might respond that we are just assuming their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault.[5] But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that assault for personal gain is wrong than that egoism is true. Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t justify racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists.

Appropriation leads to selfish gains

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### 2] Terminal defense to your fw since it proves that its self-defeating and that contradictions are inevitable and proves that actions can’t be a priori unjust.

## ON

### 1NC – AT: Underview

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested

#### Fairness isn’t a voter since the ballot is determined off inequities

#### Permissibility is irrelevant on this topic since there is no action to be obligated to

#### Presumption negates –

#### A] If we deny the truth of the aff then you negate – textuality

#### B] resolved in the resolution denotes certainty which means if they aren’t determined and uncertain then you can’t affirm

### 1NC – Contention

#### 1] Unjust means unfair.

U.S. Supreme Court 97 [Brackets Original. 521 U.S. 591 (1997) AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., et al. v. WINDSOR ET AL. No. 96-270. United States Supreme Court. Argued February 18, 1997. Decided June 25, 1997. Accessed 1/11/21. <https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10149606034909104692&q=definition+of+unjust+as+unfair&hl=en&as_sdt=6,44> //Xu]

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. See 7A Wright, Miller, & Kane 518— 519.[19] The inquiry appropriate under Rule 23(e), on the other hand, protects unnamed class members "from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise." See 7B Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1797, at 340-341. But it is not the mission of Rule 23(e) to assure the class cohesion that legitimizes representative action in the first place. If a common interest in a fair compromise could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that vital prescription would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement context.

#### **That negates – unfairness is impossible because everybody is a priori equal.**

#### **2] For them to win that appropriation is unjust they have to win that its actually a bad or coercive enterprise – their evidence just says that its impossible to adjudicate morality in space – that’s a neg argument for ethical permissibility and justifies “you do you”**

#### 3] Kant says that ethical contingencies are irrelevant and only intrinsic injustice can be objectively bad – all of their stiltz ev says that this isn’t possible without an omnilateral will. We will concede that an omnilateral will doesn’t exist in space but that negates because it means nothing can be unjust in outer space

#### Bindingness – Externalism fails since it begs the question of how we gain knowledge of a priori truths. Their fwk isn’t binding – 4 warrants

#### 1] Tailoring

#### A] Every single maxim is tailoring since its specified to specific agents and actions like “appropriation by entities.”

#### B] Superman doesn’t have to respect other peoples maxims since nobody can stop him which prevents contradiction in conception – empirically proven by dictators that abuse their constituents without resistance.

#### 2] Rule following paradox

#### A] we will always be uncertain whether we have correctly discovered truth

#### B] we will always be uncertain whether we have correctly understand and act on truth

#### **3]** Meno’s – in order to discover something, it must not be known, but in order to know to discover something, it must already be known – this makes the quest for knowledge incomprehensible and thus impossible

#### 4] Cross-app neurosience

#### 5] Schmagency – no inherent reason why we act as practical reasoners

#### A] Moral error – we can forget, miscalculate or willfully ignore our logical reasoning processes

#### B] We didn’t choose to be alive which proves our supposed agency was not optional which means we constitutively aren’t agents. How do we know we are practical reasoners in then first place – it took humans thousands of years for kant to write his book.

### 1NC: FW LBL

#### Top level – they have failed to justify a robust epistemology claim that explains how they are able to solve all the flaws with experiential knowledge. If it is true that our experiences are flawed and biased, what is different about our logical reasoning processes. This answer is no-where to be found in the 1AC and we’ll end this debate in the 1n

#### LBL

#### 1] Induction fails is a lot scarier than you think

#### 2] Cartesian skepticism – we could be controlled by a kant monster that influences all of our thoughts into thinking that the aff is true which can’t be resolved by transcendentalism because we don’t have agency over our thoughts

#### 3] Sequencing – you had to read about kant before you understood the theory which proves that our access to morality is controlled by empiricism

#### 1] 1=0.

**Assume x=y**

**x-y+y=y**

**=**

**=**

**=**

**1 = 0**

#### 2] 1=2.

**Assume a=b,**

**a2=ab**

**a2-b2=ab-b2**

**(a+b)(a-b)=b(a-b)**

**a+b=b**

**2a=a**

**2=1**