# Harrison RR

## OFF

### 1NC – OFF

Topicality

#### Outer space is outside earth

Dunnett 21 (Oliver Tristan, lecturer in geography at Queen’s University Belfast). Earth, Cosmos and Culture: Geographies of Outer Space in Britain, 1900–2020 (1st ed.). Routledge. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780815356301> EE

In such ways, this book argues that Britain became a home to rich discourses of outer space, both feeding from and contributing to iconic achievements in space exploration, while also embracing the cosmos in imaginative and philosophical ways.2

INSERT FOOTNOTE 2

2 This book primarily uses the term ‘outer space’ to describe the realm beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, conventionally accepted as beginning at the Kármán line of 100km above sea level. Other terms such as ‘interplanetary space’, ‘interstellar space’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘the heavens’ are used in specific contexts.

END FOOTNOTE 2

Cognisant of this spatial context, a central aim is to demonstrate how contemporary geographical enquiry can provide specific and valuable perspectives from which to understand outer space. This is an argument that was initiated by Denis Cosgrove, and his critique of Alexander von Humboldt’s seminal work Cosmos helped to demonstrate geography’s special relevance to thinking about outer space.3 The key thematic areas which provide the interface for this book’s research, therefore, are the cultural, political and scientific understandings of outer space; the context of the United Kingdom since the start of the last century; and the geographical underpinnings of their relationship.

#### “Appropriation” means exclusive ownership

Leon 18 (Amanda M., Associate, Caplin & Drysdale, JD UVA Law) "Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources." Virginia Law Review, vol. 104, no. 3, May 2018, p. 497-547. HeinOnline.

Appropriation. The term "appropriation" also remains ambiguous. Webster's defines the verb "appropriate" as "to take to oneself in exclusion of others; to claim or use as by an exclusive or pre-eminent right; as, let no man appropriate a common benefit."16 5 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary describes "appropriate" as an act "[t]o make a thing one's own; to make a thing the subject of property; to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure."166 Oftentimes, appropriation refers to the setting aside of government funds, the taking of land for public purposes, or a tort of wrongfully taking another's property as one's own. The term appropriation is often used not only with respect to real property but also with water. According to U.S. case law, a person completes an appropriation of water by diversion of the water and an application of the water to beneficial use.167 This common use of the term "appropriation" with respect to water illustrates two key points: (1) the term applies to natural resources-e.g., water or minerals-not just real property, and (2) mining space resources and putting them to beneficial use-e.g., selling or manufacturing the mined resources could reasonably be interpreted as an "appropriation" of outer space. While the ordinary meaning of "appropriation" reasonably includes the taking of natural resources as well as land, whether the drafters and parties to the OST envisioned such a broad meaning of the term remains difficult to determine with any certainty. The prohibition against appropriation "by any other means" supports such a reading, though, by expanding the prohibition to other types not explicitly described.168

#### Private entity means non-state

Warners 20 (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline.

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almost as comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### Violation - the aff does not defend the resolution OR they are extra-topical

#### Voter for limits and ground - justifies infinite unpredictable aff advantage ground which overstretches research burdens while spiking core generics

#### Fairness - manipulating the balance of prep structurally favor’s the aff - people come to debate for different reasons but pursuit of the ballot is the only unifying characteristic

#### Clash - unpredictability destroys research accessibility and nuanced refinement - empathy and value clarification are key to fight dogma and create better advocates - turns case because precluding testing means the aff should be considered presumptively false

#### Any dissad’s to the TVA are neg ground - it’s :

#### The appropriation of Outer Space by private entities is unjust

#### That’s Cho 21

#### Vote negative for deterrence - at worst agree with the aff and vote neg because we shouldn’t be burdened to debate it

### 1NC – OFF

Cap K

**Attempting to stage a semiotic break through “antipolitcs” and “unintelligbility” through “refusal” is a form of semiotic recapitulation that mystifies materialism. Violence is not an amalgamation of signs but is instead about flesh and bone – their project fuels capitalist pedagogy.**

**McLaren 10** [Peter, UC-Los Angeles and Nathalia E. Jaramillo, Purdue University, “Not Neo-Marxist, Not Post-Marxist, Not Marxian, Not Autonomist Marxism: Reflections on a Revolutionary (Marxist) Critical Pedagogy” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies 2010 10: 251]

Ebert (2009; Ebert & Zavarzadeh, 2008) makes an important distinction between corporeality/materiality and matter/materialism. Materiality is related to objective idealism and refers to the acceptance of an idea in the mind as something real, something that escapes class interests. In this way, avant-garde scholars will deconstruct materialism as merely the effects of tropes and representations. It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for what is essentially an ontology. However, Ebert (2009) argues that this constitutes transforming **materialism into materiality**, into a contemplative corporeality of difference, purging materialism of its conceptuality and determinate meanings. Matter is turned into signs or the effect of signs or sign power. This has led to the recent interest in the politics of performativity—performing identities, performing pedagogy, performing class, and so on. However, Ebert argues that matter is not synonymous with physical objects; matter exists outside the consciousness of the subject, and it cannot be separated from its production and contradictions in history. **Matter is objective reality** in history. Ebert and Zavarzadeh (2008) characterize materialism as the objective (transformative) productive activities of humans involving them in social relations; these social relations occur under definite historical conditions that are independent of their will and are **shaped by class struggle** over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that excludes historical processes and operates as a medium of cultural practices is not materialism; it is materiality or what Ebert (2009) refers to as “matterism.” Avant-garde critics who would replace materialism with materiality (through the tropes of supplementarity, spectrality, undecidability, and difference) **severely undercut** the claim for the objectivity of class interests and ultimately replace class struggle with the struggle over the sign. Like Ebert, David McNally (2001) in his classic Marxist text, Bodies of Meaning, describes the deconstructive efforts of post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida as a form of linguistic idealism. In his critique of anti-fetishistic thought (like that of Marx), that palpates the farthest reach of linguistic meaning, Derrida devalues dialectical critique as useless by disavowing embodied human activity, by ignoring laboring human bodies and rejecting them as metaphysical illusions. When Derrida deals with issues of the economy, he is interested only in capital that begets capital—that is, in credit or fictitious capital. Likewise, in his critique of Saussure, he critiques the notion of a transcendental signified, a universal equivalent or what McNally refers to as meaning’s gold standard (something positive that can exist outside of an endless reference of commodities to other commodities). There is nothing extralinguistic for Derrida, since language suspends all reference to something outside of it. Similarly, for Derrida, money lacks a referent. It is driven by credit and speculation and lacks any material foundations. Derrida deals with fictitious or dematerialized money, money that can be produced without labor, that is, money as an expression of hyperreality. Capital in this view is nothing more than a self-engendering dance on a solipsistic path of self-fecundation. The real is folded into the representation. Derrida (and Baudrillard and others) assimilate the economy (the same one that is **throwing people out of their homes** and into the streets at present) into their poststructuralist model of language. Contrary to Derrida, Ebert and McNally maintain that **value is not a sign freed from its referent**; rather, value expresses itself in material form. It must pass through laboring bodies and their history of struggle, through toiling subjects and practical human activity that takes place in an organic social universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. And capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. The work of McNally and Ebert implodes the limitations of post-structuralist thought in dealing with capitalist exploitation. According to Ebert (2009), revolutionary agents of social transformation act ethically when they attempt to resolve the contradictions of their objective location in relations of exploitation. Capitalist violence often doubles as cultural discourses, and Ebert views popular culture, especially, as a narcosis of violence, predicated on distracting subjects from the **central antagonism** of capitalist society—the struggles over the surplus labor of the other––thereby producing subjects who cannot grasp the totality of the system. In Ebert’s view, the pedagogical practices developed by the poststructuralist avant-garde theorize experience in relation to trauma, desire, and **affective relations** in general as if these relations were antiseptically cleaved from relations of class, thereby replacing a conceptual analysis of the social totality with liberating pedagogical narratives grounded in local affective strategies—strategies that serve unwittingly as **epistemological covers** for economic conditions that help the subject cope with the objective material conditions of capitalist exploitation. This leads ultimately to a **de-historicization of social life** and draws attention away from the way in which all human beings who populate capitalist societies are implicated in some manner in international class struggles and the social division of labor (see also Zavarzadeh, 2003). Ebert and Zavarzadeh describe this process as a “pedagogy of affect.” They write that The **pedagogy of affect** piles up details and warns students against attempting to relate them structurally because any structural analysis will be a causal explanation, and all causal explanations, students are told, are reductive. Teaching thus becomes a pursuit of floating details—a version of games in popular culture. Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the kind of education capital requires for its new workforce: workers who are educated but nonthinking; skilled at detailed jobs but unable to grasp the totality of the system—energetic localists, ignorant globalists. This pedagogy provides instruction not in knowledge but in savviness—a knowing that knows what it knows is an illusion but is undeluded about that illusion; it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. Savviness is enlightened false consciousness: a consciousness that knows it is false, but its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.” (2008, pp. 107-108)

**Capitalist scapegoating produces fascism, anti-queer violence, endless war and environmental destruction – state is key**

**Robinson 14** (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. **Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole.** The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. **And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators.** By a crisis of humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, **threatening the ability of billions of people to survive,** and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 **This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction.** Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. **2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare.** Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. **There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on;** 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. **The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction.** Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.**5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries.** In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. **It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation,** homophobia, **racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence,** indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

**The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of a material analysis toward revolution - Our form of study builds the Party based on the scientific formulation of Maoist principles to catalyze a mass base against capitalism and white supremacy**

* Black author

**Williams 18** [Carine, 7/30/18, “Why Black People Need Maoism in 2018”, *The Hampton Institute*, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/why-black-people-need-maoism.html#.XWwv7ZNKh0s> //KZaidi]

When they hear Maoism, many people think of China, Peru, and the Philippines. They picture peasants "surrounding the cities from the countryside." This is, of course, understandable, but a mistake. **Maoism is not** simply "**everything** that **Mao did**," or "everything that happened in China between 1949 and now." I have spent a great deal of my time writing working to dispel these sorts of myths, some peddled in an unprincipled fashion by anti-Maoists. **Maoism is a** living, breathing **science.** By science we mean something **with universal principles that can be** taken and **applied by all who have a material interest in** making **revolution**. In the United States, this is Black people, or the New Afrikan nation. It was not by accident that the original Black Panther Party (BPP) developed close relations with the revolutionary leadership of the People's Republic of China. Huey didn't go to China to play; he went to study and learn things that could be applied back home. Of course, he eventually degenerated in political line and practice, taking a right opportunist course along with Bobby Seale (always a centrist) and Elaine Brown (who guided the party, in his absence, into a mainstream political force that led into the arms of the Democratic Party). This opportunism in the highest expression of revolutionary sentiment, practice, and force in this country to date needs to be studied and ruthlessly criticized, yet we should be careful. **We must place things in their historical context** and ensure that we are able to divide one into two, meaning see the beneficial as well as the negative aspects of a thing but also realize that one aspect must be primary. **The BPP was destroyed by** a combination of factors: **lack of a** really **scientific method of analysis** and cohesive program of **political education,** failure to promote and apply the Marxist-Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism (**debate inside the party,** formation of a political line through this debate, and the upholding of this decision by all party members and organs), **and a culture of liberalism that ended with comrades fighting comrades,** thus **opening the door for** external factors (**the FBI** and other LE agencies) to play havoc and get cadre railroaded into prison and killed. **We must study** and learn all of these lessons, **because when we develop another organization** with the prestige, mass base, and power that the Panthers had, and we will, **they will come for us** all **again**. So, why do we need Maoism? Because we are against the most brutal, bloody, and vicious empire known to humankind. This country is looting and enslaving our class siblings all over the world. To overturn this order of things, to smash it and rebuild it in the interests of the revolutionary proletariat of the entire world, we must apply the synthesis of 200 years of systematic, organized class struggle, which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: the continuity of the revolutionary project that was Marxism-Leninism, with a rupture from the dogmatism and revisionism. Maoists do not uphold "Actually Existing Socialism" because a scientific analysis rooted in the principles laid down by the revolutionary movements and projects that gave us Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao would demonstrate that stealing food from Filipino fisherfolk, like the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been doing, is 100% non-Marxist. This is in disagreement with many Marxist-Leninist organizations today, which uphold these things and other imperialist depredations carried out under the faded red banner of China. The Maoist argument is that Marxist-Leninist terrain has been spent, and the 21st century must learn from Maoism. "You haven't seized state power yet!" others cry. Indeed, and there has never been a truly Maoist party that has initiated armed struggle in the imperialist metro poles. This doesn't mean that Maoist principles cannot be applied to these countries, this means that we must be ever more creative in our application and ever more disciplined in our party-building efforts. **Party building** in the USA **requires the careful** and thorough **cultivation of a** mass **base.** Tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of **people must** depend on and follow this party and **participate in** mass **organizations before it can** even begin to **call itself a vanguard.** This is what many who came out of the New Communist Movement of the mid-late 1970s failed to realize. **The days of** endless **squabbling sects that fight over "mass bases"** of a handful of other activists **must** be put to an **end**, and we must have a truly mass perspective. There is optimism in the spread of For the People (FTP) organizations and the development of the Organizing Committee for a Maoist Communist Party (MCP-OC) which has a more mass orientation and places primacy on the development of a class analysis and political line in the USA that is based in painstaking investigation and rooted in the aspirations and struggles of the most oppressed, along with a record of seeking to develop international solidarity and prison work. **This**, I believe, **is the best hope for New Afrikan Maoists** in the United States and I wholeheartedly encourage Black comrades to develop FTP-type organizations in their own communities under OC guidance. Even if this isn't done, at the very least **studies in Maoism**, studies in Maoist revolutions, and studies in Maoist theory **are beneficial**. After and during these studies, **think about how it can be applied** on your block and in your community. Learn about and be like Fred Hampton. **Time is up** for spinning our wheels; **we must** get together, **unite on a principled** and unshakeable **basis, and mount** a formidable **resistance against** decades and centuries-old oppression based in **capital**ism **and white supremacy.** I also encourage support and donation to the Hampton Institute as an invaluable resource in promoting revolutionary ideology and practice in the finest Marxist tradition.

### 1NC – OFF

Opacity PIK

#### CP Text – ????

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards racialized bodies

Conquergood, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Opacity is the best survival strategy for trans\* bodies – recognition culminates in anti-trans\* violence but opacity establishes a radical singularity.

**Stanley 17** [Bracketed from “trans” to “trans\*” Eric A. Stanley (Assistant Professor of Gender & Women's Studies @ UC Berkeley). “Anti-Trans Optics: Recognition, Opacity, and the Image of Force”. South Atlantic Quarterly. Volume 116, No 3. July 2017. Accessed 11/29/20. <https://ericastanleydotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/anti-trans-optics-saq-stanley.pdf> //Houston Memorial DX]

Images of Time Johnson is gone, but the tape remains. How might we read, or radically misread, the visual grammar of the tape to understand both the kinds of force it represents and to work against its seeming inevitability? The horrific murder of Johnson might also be understood as the tape’s extradiegetic final scene, the unfolding of a narrative structure that is not simply racist and transphobic, which are terms too adjacent to name the structuring work these forms of violence index. Tracing the history of the cinematic, as many have argued, is also a way of charting the instantiation of globalized white supremacy. To be clear, while we must attend to the racist or otherwise phobic depictions that have compromised public visual culture from lynching photography and D. W. Griffith’s 1915 The Birth of the Nation to contemporary times, if we end there we remain in a discursive loop where we continue to struggle within a regime that will never offer relief. After all, racist content would have little power if its form were not structured similarly. Here, then, reading with the tape of Johnson’s beating, we can see the ways optics, as that which both includes and exceeds narrative, produces Johnson as the “no-body” da Silva asked us to think.3 Franz Fanon’s often-cited passage from 1952 on his experience of watching a film in a Paris theater sketches the multiple spaces of seeing and being seen that constitute the visual as a racialized practice. Fanon states (1967: 140) “I cannot go to a film without seeing myself. I wait for me. In the interval, just before the film starts, I wait for me. The people in the theater are watching me, examining me, waiting for me.” Fanon suggests that the anticipation of blackness in the viewing apparatus of the cinema, which I would extend to viewing beyond the theater as well, is imbued with a form of anti-blackness that is not only seen but also otherwise sensed. Perhaps the most generative aspect of this analysis is that even before the film begins, the racialized gaze is there, anticipating him, while he also awaits its arrival. Fanon’s scheme both expands the “time” of the film, meaning it does not begin or end with the rolling of images, and moves us away from assuming that the most insipid forms of colonial racism, here anti-blackness, appear through image alone (Keeling 2003; Marriott 2007). Expanding the time of the image and the image of time allows us to read the murder of Duanna Johnson as the narrative conclusion of the beating tape. Further, while Fanon was writing specifically about the cinematic, his scheme allows us to build a similar analysis of our psychic bonds with and through surveillance as genre in the contemporary moment. The CCTV footage of Johnson functions much like what Gilles Deleuze (1989: 101), after Henri Bergson, called a “time-image.” For Deleuze, a time-image is the collapsing of past, present, and future that “makes time frightening and inexplicable” (101). While Deleuze was talking about simultaneity in narrative cinema, the time-image here might help us understand the specific genre of the tape where past and future are remade through the present. Or, in other words, the time-image of the tape reminds us that, perhaps for Johnson, there is no moment other than the time of violence. Here, Fanon’s insistence that the time of the image does not align with the opening scene of the film and Deleuze’s time-image illustrate the brutal semiotics of violence that await, in the interval, both the structure of the visual and the structure of life outside the theater for trans women of color. Given that representation produces and does not simply echo what is assumed to reside in the real, what, then, might representation and recognition offer for a trans politics that resides on the side of flourishing? Clocking By way of obscuring the question of reparation and redistribution, representation has been produced as the primary site of struggle over “diversity” for mainstream politics (including mainstream LGBT politics) in the United States. The last decade has witnessed a vast proliferation of trans representations that are offered as remedy to the relentless economic, psychic, affective, and physical violence many trans people, and in particular trans women of color, endure. These expanding representations are also used to buttress an argument supporting the unfolding progress of dominant culture. Yet, if we return to CeCe McDonald’s words that open this essay, we know that with this increased representation comes heightened, or at least sustained, instances of violence. While 2014 was named the “Trans Tipping Point” by Time magazine, this year, 2016, has counted the highest number of trans women of color being violently murdered in the United States. Yet, following the Johnson tape, if we are to understand the visual itself as technologies of anti-black and anti-trans optics, then how might we continue the important project of representation in a visual regime hostile to black trans life? Rather than an opening toward recognition, a position where one can make a claim instead of being exclusively claimed, representation for Johnson is the prefiguration of her undoing. Her being “clocked” as [trans\*] trans led to her initial arrest, subsequent beating, and, even perhaps, her murder. Being clocked, or being seen as trans, enacts the double bind of recognition: being seen by the other brings you into the world, but more often than not it is also that which might bring you out of it. Through representation—both the CCTV video and descriptions of Johnson in court—the defense was able to produce what Judith Butler (1993) and others have called a reversal of defense, where the party harmed is, through the magic of the law, transformed into the assumed aggressor. Johnson, and not the state, is made to hold the burden of proof. Tracing a genealogy of the racial and gendered parameters of recognition from G. W. F. Hegel and Fanon to da Silva and McDonald and beyond, how might we imagine the project of recognition as both nondialectical and nondevelopmental? The brutal scene of Johnson’s beating, replayed as the composed testimony of the quiet court, reminds us that recognition is not a smooth space of inevitability, even in struggle. Johnson’s trans identity forces us against a substitutive logic, to once again face the ways race and gender, as lines of recognition, symbols, and embodied parameters, ask for more. While Fanon rightly turns our attention to the limits of recognition in the colonial scene, he also maintains the teleology of subjectivity by holding on to the dialectics of structure, even for those deemed nonsubjects. Or, if for him revolutionary violence offers a way through the violence of anti-black coloniality, how might we push further on Fanon for those who must remain, as da Silva might suggest, “no-bodies against the state”? From Optics to Opacity Johnson’s attack and its cinematic afterlife capture the structures of recognition and misrecognition, representation and disappearance that constitute the work of gender and race in and as the fields of the visual. While writing from a place of gender self-determination that works toward gender as an opening, what is left of our various analytics of recognition? Or, how might we return to the beating tape: not simply to offer yet another way to imagine what we already know—that race, gender, and violence are tightly bound— but to ask how this bind might be undone?4 Furthermore, what tactics of production and sabotage might bring about visual cultures that detonate the never-ending list of anti-trans violence? This question specifically addresses those trapped in the interval of seeing and being seen. We must pose it without a fantasy of closure. To put it another way, at the center of the problem of recognition lies this: how can we be seen without being known and how can we be known without being hunted?5 Indeed, being a “no-body against the state,” a position some are already forced to live, stands against the sovereign promise of positive representation. Read not as absolute abjection but as a tactic of interdiction and direct action, being a “no-body” might force the visual order of things to the point of collapse. On the issue of recognition and radical singularity, Édouard Glissant (1997: 190) has stated, “from the perspective of Western thought, we discover that its basis is this requirement for transparency. In order to understand and thus accept you, I have to measure your solidity with the ideal scale providing me with grounds to make comparisons and, perhaps, judgments. I have to reduce.” This reduction, which Fanon might call being overdetermined, is, as we know, unequally distributed and mandated. Glissant offers a totality of relation in opacity, the radical work of nontransparency that allows for nondialectic difference—the collectivization of radical singularity. Glissant continues, “Agree not merely to the right of difference but, carrying this further, agree also to the right of opacity that is not enclosure within an impenetrable autarchy but subsistence within an irreducible singularity” (190). We might read the current order of popular trans representation to be a variation of agreeing to the “right of difference,” as transparency is the precondition of visibility politics. Opacity is here useful not necessarily as a practice of “going stealth,” residing below or beside the regimes of being seen but not known, although it might be. For Glissant (1997: 193), it is a form of solidarity without being grasped. Here, I am suggesting that it might be one form a radical [**trans\*]** trans politics might take. Opacity with representation: an irreconcilable tension that opens to something other than the pragmatism of the transparent and its visual economies of violence.6 There is no return and no triumphant narrative to be gleaned here, either from the brutal attack on Johnson or her subsequent death. There are, of course, countless instances of trans/queer people organizing, thriving, and resisting, even in the midst of ruthless encounters. Furthermore, antitrans and anti-black optics of the visual must be confronted, by expanding and dangerous practices that open the frame while also doing away with its necessity. And yet there is the inescapable fact that the archive of harm, dismemberment, state-sanctioned torture, and death is still unfolding. This unfolding, which we might call modernity, continues to claim those who exist against it, banishing the possibility of another history, but perhaps not banishing the image of something yet to come.

### 1NC – OFF

Pre-empts pik

#### PIK text: We endorse the entirety of the affirmative’s performance and methodology sans their deployment of pre-emptive spikes in the underview

#### 1] radical pessimism DA– their investment in predicting neg strat creates a form of futurism that is cruelly optimistic to queer bodies

#### 2] policing DA – trying to constrain the legitimacy of arguments before they even happen is the definition of micro-fascism by arbitrarily excluding debaters.

### 1NC – OFF

Futurity good K

#### Queer Futurity and Hope is good – pessimism locks in privilege and re-entrenches violence. Futurity isn’t a denial of current struggles but generates social energy to survive.

Manalansan 15 Martin F. Manalansan IV - Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who  is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory; "A Question from Bruno Latour" This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - <https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour> //Elmer  
My response to the question of “no future” comes from my encounters, engagements, and conversations with colleagues under the aegis of queer-of-color critique, scholars like David Eng, Gayatri Gopinath, Roderick Ferguson, Chandan Reddy, and the late José Esteban Muñoz, among others. We appreciate the renegade antireproductive stance **of the “no future” camp**, which states that we should not subscribe to a future that is entrenched in heteropatriarchal dreams of marriage and procreation. However, there was a general sense among us that the issue of “no future” comes from a vantage point and a comfortable perch **of privilege**. As a scholar invested and immersed in the plight of queers of color, **futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity**. To paraphrase my queer-of-color critique colleagues, we cannot not think of a future—it is the very fuel of existence, the pivot that animates and propels energies, performances, feelings, and other bodily capacities. The promise and peril of queer, both as a stance and as a field of study, is precisely in its anticipatory and hopeful dimensions. Queer is constituted by a yearning and a longing for something better than what is here right now. It is, as Muñoz would say, a horizon that **we are drawn to** and which is not yet here. Consider the group of undocumented immigrant queers of color in New York City whose lives I have been following for years. Dwelling in cramped domiciles and working in contingent jobs, there is very little to witness in their lives that suggests a kind of gay/lesbian triumphalism or the bright markers of the new normal. In fact, they live in precarious conditions but—a very important caveat—they live in moments that **showcase fleeting gestures** and images of fabulosity set amidst the squalor and mess of their lives. These moments, while fleeting, provide some way for them **to think of another day**, giving them a brief glimpse of a time and a place where there are sequined gowns, plush salons, and many sparkling things. While this might be called naïve hopefulness, thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think **beyond and against the status quo**—to plant the seed for social transformation. In other words, there is a political potential to queer futurity. Or, to put it another way, we need to complicate and unravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance and to be open to the various alternative ways a future or futures can be imagined, particularly by those in the margins. Otherwise, we can all just pack our bags, go back home, put on some makeup, close the door, and hide under the bedcovers.

#### Maintaining sustainable use of outer space is key to future generations – vote neg to engage futurity

**Islam 18** [Mohammad Saiful Islam, Mohammad works for the Institute of Advanced Judicial Studies and the Beijing Institute of Technology. 4-27-2018, "The Sustainable Use of Outer Space: Complications and Legal Challenges to the Peaceful Uses and Benefit of Humankind," Beijing Law Review, <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201> accessed 12/12/21] Adam

4.2. Ensure the Rights of Future Generations in Outer Space

Sustainable development is the establishing principle for achieving present human needs without damaging the demands of future generations maintaining integrity and constancy of the natural systems. The modern idea of sustainable development is derived from the Brundtland Report in 1987. Generally considered in modern application and exploration of outer space, fundamental elements are the area must be dedicated to peaceful purposes; and the area must be preserved for future generations [(Heim, 1990)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref17). It is an indispensable and inordinate challenge to confirm uphold the healthy environment and make sure development without destroying the rights of future generations in space. Article IX of The Outer Space Treaty provided, in the exploration and use of outer space, States should pursue studies and conduct exploration of outer space so as to avoid harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth [(Outer Space Treaty, 1967)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref35). The issues of what constitutes harmful contamination in Earth’s environment have yet to be interpreted. The legal definition of “adverse” and “harmful” will also modification as Earth, indigenous sciences progress, separately or in concert, with the planetary exploration space sciences [(Robinson, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref38). As a result of multifaceted political, economic, scientific, technological, educational, and other global problems, there has been practicing exclusively only international cooperation for sustainable space development among the developed countries [(Noichim, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref34). The space faring nations should promote a supportive environment for peaceful and sustainable use of space, decrease environmental effects on Earth and protect the terrestrial environment. We should escape a regime that will ultimately reflect the over-exploitation of resources and environmental havoc [(Fountain, 2002)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref9).

#### Extinction comes first under any framing – future value, magnitude, risk parity

Pummer 15 Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015 AT, recut BWSEK

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists tendency only. There is a to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable.

## ON

### 1NC – Solvency Overview

#### The ROTB is to vote for the better debater – Use Offense Defense

#### A] Presumption - there is no relationship between voting aff and their advocacy or solvency – ontology means its cruel optimistic to think voting aff does anything.

#### B] Non-sequitur – What parts of the 1AC were unintelligble? The parts where they read established scholars, using standard citational practices? Or the parts where they organized cards into a conventional 1AC and used NSDA Campus’s servers to broadcast?

#### C] Parameters – No reason your method requires the ballot- they need to specify the parameters of what it means to successfully engage in the strategy of anti-politcs

#### They say no ballot – bet. Vote neg to agree with the aff!

#### Their mindset of not helping future societies, children is a repackaging of neoliberalism only fighting for ourselves reproduces the selfish greed that motivates commericoalizntaion

### 1NC – AT: Underview

#### No Impact Turn’s - Infinite prior resolutional questions and procedural issues bring into question if the debate should have happened in the first place AND reading it on the neg and switch side solve

#### AT 1NC 2 – Theory isn’t silencing since losing isn’t exclusion – but losses are inevitable

#### No rvis means if we lose theory go back to substance – solves silencing but focuses on substantive engagement

### 1NC – AT: State Bad (Baedan)

**Governance is inevitable and turns case**

**Renaux 19** [Valarie, 5/29/19, Philosophy. Writing on Marxism, eliminativism in philosophy of mind and metaethics, suffering(-focused ethics), and philosophical pessimism, “Marxism and the State”, <https://medium.com/@valarierenaux/marxism-and-the-state-eeb6ceca4515> //GBS Majeed & Jacobs]

Here, perhaps, is a manifestation of one of the foundational flaws in anarchist theory: its veneration of human nature (as it understands it, at least). Bakunin claims that “human nature” makes corruption and counterrevolutionary, anti-proletarian actions inevitable once a section of the working class seizes power. Why does he say this? What proof does he have? In a word, none. ‘Human nature’ as it is predominantly understood is nothing more than our proclivity towards certain actions within specific material contexts, which are subject to change — and thus so are the proclivities. Even if it could be established that capitalist society generates some kind of fundamental proclivity among the working class and even humanity as a whole to act out of greed, selfishness and short-termism (which is practically speaking impossible to prove anyway), it does not follow that this is inherent and unavoidable in the human animal itself as some kind of abstract template for our actions. By elevating the human creature itself to the level of pseudoreligious ideology, anarchism practises exactly the same form of ideologising that the bourgeoisie and the feudal and even patrician classes before them have long done. Marxism rightfully does not concern itself with such sophistry, with such meaningless protestations against placing power in the hands of the working class and its party. “During its lifetime the working class state will continually evolve up to the point that it finally withers away: the nature of social organisation, of human association, will radically change according to the development of technology and the forces of production, and man’s nature will be equally subject to deep alterations always moving away more and more from the beast of burden and slave which he was.”²⁴ This links closely with the final problem with Bakunin and the anarchists’ position on the state that we shall address here. Bakunin describes his fictitious once-proletarians as “look[ing] down” on the workers from the “governing heights of the State.” What does this mean? It means, in one clear sense, that Bakunin sees the state as something distinct from society, something separate from and alien to it, something parasitical and detached from the productive elements of society. But never has or will the state be something “imposed on society from without,”²⁵ something that stands above class distinctions, or gendered divisions in labour, or religious and secular ideology alike, or indeed anything else. **The state is not separate from society; it is society, it is the inevitable and necessary product of a society as it exists at certain stages of historical-economic development, and without it, the society would be reduced to utter barbarism, open, ubiquitous kinetic violence, a marked decline in living standards for all, both relative and actual, a severe degradation in the quality of goods, and so on. In a word, you would have social and even civilisational collapse. This is because ‘society’ is not one harmonious thing; rather, it is the aggregate of all human social and economic relations, and these humans and their socioeconomic situations are anything but uniform. Without the state, with its monopoly on violence and its often dominant role in the cultural narrative, these contradictions — irreconcilable contradictions — would be acted out through direct, physical struggle. There are but two outcomes to such a thing: either a state will be formed anew, but only after an extended period of acute crisis dealing devastating damage to all, and so the destruction of the state (and more precisely the failure to build a new state to replace it) was not only pointless but entirely undesirable to the society, or, worse still, the construction of a new state, for whatever reason, fails, and the population collapses into a regressed state of primitive-communism.** History would have been reset. There does not exist some dichotomy of society and state, only the existence of a society with a state, and if a society has a state, it needs a state, and simply seeking its destruction is entirely misguided and naïve, springing from a fundamental misconstruing of what the state is, what society is, and what one’s own material interests are. In a word, it is idealism — it is utopianism. It should be evident from the rest of this essay that the state is not something that can be simply dismantled and destroyed by force and violence; it can only “wither away” when the material conditions are right. To attempt to act outside of history as anarchism does is dangerous to all, never mind arrogant and individualist. It is a position in absolute opposition to the interests of the workers. General remarks on the nature of class dictatorship Mao Zedong famously taught that “[p]olitical power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”²⁶ **Truly there is no more succinct and accurate description of politics — which is, at its core, the systematised control and regulation of violence — than this.** Anything that suggests otherwise is an obfuscation; such obfuscations serve an agenda, and all but always one of the ruling class. The class destined to vanquish class society itself has no need of the propaganda and sophistry of traditional class rule; we can**, and should, state in no uncertain terms that the only rational expression of our political interests is a class dictatorship won and maintained by force of arms for the exclusive benefit of our economic class at the expense of all others.** The proletarian state represents, for the first time in history, the material and thus socio-political interests of the vast majority of the people. From this simple fact an equally simple conclusion can be drawn: namely, that both when the working class is barred from power and when it holds it, it is only benefited by a frank and open understanding of the thoroughly class- and violence-based nature of state power. In the former situation, the proletarian is aware that society is organised upon his exploitation and that he has no material interest whatsoever in the preservation of the status quo, while in the latter, he sees that he should not be afraid of ‘tyranny,’ that the bourgeoisie are justly and necessarily without power and rights, and that should they be granted them, they will use them to undermine and overthrow the régime and institute terror of a previously unprecedented scale and harshness. In short, the stripping away of the pretensions and illusions of the state represent, and reinforce, heightened class consciousness. In terms of our interests, power is best manifested naked, and as proletarians, we have, unequivocally, a side on which to fall in the class struggle. As such, our political goals must include as a matter of necessity the seizure of state power. **The lessons of the Paris Commune and of all revolutionary ventures throughout history is that the revolution that does not seize state power is thwarted.** Never, in all human history, has this truth been countered. What’s more, the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat is that it is exactly that: a dictatorship. All true communists know this to be so, and do not fear, but relish the opportunities that lie in controlling the state. The state is a tool — a weapon, and no weapon has morals in and of itself. Only when the sword is taken up and brandished in anger does it become an instrument of war and not simply a sliver of metal. The state is much the same. The anarchic view of the state is one of an enemy of ‘the people,’ one that is inherently undesirable and wretched, whoever straddles it. Marxism is not so naïve, not so utopian: the state serves her masters, and serves them well; when the working class reigns, the state delivers its Terror upon the counterrevolution and with it the socialist society can progress, in time, to a communist one. Without it, the working class movement is simply destroyed the instance the bourgeois reaction can organise itself anew. Marxism is scientific socialism; it is not utopianism. It would be false and misleading to claim that Marxism has ends; rather, it merely has analyses and observations. In their scientific study of the march of history and the intricacies of the capitalistic mode of production, the Marxists have discovered and laid out the series of progressions and laws that, hopefully, this essay has allowed the reader to understand, if only in brief: that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle,”²⁷ that the working class must smash the existing bourgeois state, **that the working class must create its own state to serve its own needs, and that this state must inevitably be the last stage of the state in all history.** Marxism does not talk of that which is impossible; only that which is possible. The triumphs of the working class movement during the twentieth century prove this to be so, but much that was won has since been lost. As the Great Acceleration of the Anthropocene deepens, the need to place power in the hands of the workers intensifies with every passing week towards a singularly apocalyptic zenith. In the past, Marxists have rightly given the slogan socialism or barbarism?, but today, that is no longer sufficient: today, it it must be socialism or extinction? In matters of war and revolution, liberalism’s façades are quick to fall from the eyes of the class conscious worker. The premier and central issue of working class politics must be the conquest of state power. Only then can we change the world.

### 1NC - <Baedan> - Falsifiability

#### Falsifiability should be a filter for the entirety of the <ontology> debate - their theory is untestable and should be considered presumptively false OR its only value rest in enabling an understanding of the world and the subsequent actions as a result of that understanding

### 1NC - <Baedan> - Materiality Comes First

#### Materiality precedes <ontology> - even if they win <ontology> is true, materiality filters how futurism operate in real world - they agree that anti-queer violence can get worst so reducing harm is still an intrinsic good

### 1NC – AT Space

#### Profit motives not futurity – people who don’t have children still are interested like Tim Cook who is gay and still wants to get into the satellite business

#### Space is no longer gay – their ev is 2012 and space exploration and technological understanding has already happened – hubble telescope, ISS, megaconstellation and geo-eye ikonos proves either aff isn’t inherent OR inevitable cuz public-fills in.

#### BUT Double-bind – space is infinitely expanding, we could explore 1000 lightyears and there would still be space that is unintelligible to us that means space can’t be heterodominated

### 1NC - <Baedan> - Ontology

#### They can only verify Queer Ontology with examples meaning that one example should disprove their thesis

#### Lawrence v Texas, Obergefell v Hodges a litany of other examples prove progress is possible. Empirics first – if your theory can’t explain reality, then it’s wrong.

#### The child thesis is wrong—

1] Freedom, art, and science prove societies care about more than children – priests don’t have children but are deeply respected

2] Queers can adopt children and gay trans folk can give birth

#### Future not sole province of the child

Ruti, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, March, ‘17 (Mari, *The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory's Defiant Subjects*, Columbia University Press, pg. 90-91)

The stakes of Muñoz’s accusation are high, revolving around the question of who can afford to relinquish all hope of a better future in the way that Edelman’s rendering of queer negativity—with includes the derisive critique of the child as a sentimental emblem of reproductive futurity that I mentioned in chapter 1—calls for. Muñoz suggests that only those who “have” a future in the first place have the luxury of flirting with the idea of rejecting it; conversely, those whose futures are concretely (empirically) threatened are unlikely to advocate the annihilation of these futures. More specifically, Muñoz contends that it would be disastrous to “hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity,” arguing that the fact that this version of futurity is currently winning “is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: a ‘not-yet’ where queer youths of color actually get to grow up” (2009, 95–96). In this manner, Muñoz alerts us to the fact that while Edelman elevates the child to an icon of reproductive futurity, “the future” has never been the province of all children; that is, though Muñoz agrees with the broad outlines of Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurity, he reminds us that this critique does not apply to the vast majority of the world’s children, that “racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95). Like Edelman, Muñoz admits that the world as it stands is “not enough” (2009, 96), not able to offer adequate resources for subjective flourishing. But in his view, the way to deal with the world’s insufficiency and messiness is not to reject the future wholesale but rather to reconfigure its parameters. This, Muñoz asserts, can only be done by resurrecting “various principles of hope that are, by their very nature, relational” (94). As he elaborates, relationality may not always be “pretty,” “but the option of simply opting out of it, or describing it as something that has never been available to us, is imaginable only if one can frame queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix” (94).

#### Their theory is essentialist, contradictory, and empirically denied— Power 09:

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The logic of political hope, as Edelman describes it, depends upon desperately trying to exclude from the social order the negativity of the borderlands 8:2 4 symbolic, or, as he puts it, ‘the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses’ (Edelman, 2004: 5). Political reason is thus characterised both by its relentless positivity and by an endless struggle to fight off the meaninglessness that Edelman characterises as ‘queer.’ But what if, in practice, it is politics and reason that have become dislocated and that what is ideologically positioned as rational is, in fact, the very opposite? That is to say, Edelman presupposes that there is an intimate connection, a kind of structural isomorphism between the ideology of the family (and the child) and politics, and that politics will always represent itself via a certain image of the family as a war of warding off what it fears (the non-futural, the queer, the negative). But, we know that in practice politics, and the policies of elected governments, have extremely contradictory attitudes towards families, slashing budgets for crèches here, permitting only the most minimal of paternity leave there, and so on. There are obvious imperatives behind these tendencies, of course, which explain why, for example, pregnant women are often picked out for redundancy over their childless co-workers (Gentleman, 2009). They concern far less the symbolic role of the family in the political imaginary and far more the contradictory relationship between economic demands and ideological pressures: if the image of the child and the fantasy of futurity are shared by both politics and the economy, it is not necessarily in the same way. Capitalism may in the long run need future workers, but in the short term, the conflict between paying for maternity leave, for example, and making a profit are frequently at odds. But these economic contradictions complicate Edelman’s picture somewhat, as they point to something beyond the symbolic, and beyond the sheen of ideology. Whilst it is true that politics in the main presents itself as defender of the family (although this is perhaps less the case outside of the right-wing framing of some American discourses), it is clear that in practice ‘the family’ is often badly treated by the very same governments who claim to defend it. Furthermore, against Edelman’s opposition between the reproductively futural and the queer, there empirically exist extremely diverse kinds of family arrangements, and have done for a long time. As Barrett and McIntosh put it in The Anti-social Family: If there were a direct correspondence between the imagery of the family represented in the media and the actual composition of households, we would find the majority of the population living in nuclear residences of children and their parents. Yet, if the 1971 census is to be believed, fewer than a third of Britain’s households were enmeshed in such an arrangement and only one in ten was organized in the normatively sanctioned pattern of paternal breadwinner and maternal full-time housewife (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 32-3). Edelman could of course protest that his is not an empirical point, but a symbolic one, and there is certainly something enlightening about being able to ‘spot,’ in the wake of Edelman’s analysis, reproductive borderlands 8:2 5 futurism whenever it rears its smiling, big-eyed, irresistible head. But in the light of the relative empirical paucity of this normative notion of the family, and of the child taken care of by the father’s wage and the mother’s domestic care, a question arises as to how far Edelman’s notion of the ‘queer’ extends. If ‘queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children”’ (Edelman, 2004: 3) it must by definition exclude any family arrangement, however non-child oriented. Can you have family arrangements of those who take care of children but nonetheless are not ‘fighting for the children’? Can one have a generic attitude towards children, or has the logic of reproductive futurism filtered all the way down such that it is impossible to think of children as anything other than ‘special,’ as ‘little angels’? There are, however, plenty of children being raised in situations where very little was staked on their future, and plenty of family structures in which caring for young people is far more a question of pragmatics than of ideology. Edelman makes clear that he is not talking about really existing families and actual children, but it must be noted that Edelman sometimes slips from the figural to the literal, or at least certainly seems to position the woman on the side of the children in a rather dubious way. As Fraiman puts it in her reading of Edelman: ‘Figurations of women’s bodies … are subtly de-eroticised and assimilated to the figurative child’ (Fraiman, 2003: 131). Does Edelman fall too far into the rhetoric of the Christian Right by associating women too quickly with childbirth and some sort of supposedly natural maternal desire that in turn is supposed to characterise reproductive futurism? Edelman seems to assimilate all notions of the family with notions of the future, and to reify families as solid, reactionary entities to be opposed by identity-shaking queer negativity. But what is the ‘identity’ of the family as such? It’s not a real one in the sense of being the majority composition of living arrangements (at least in the British case, as noted above). It’s not a seamlessly ideological one either, seeing as the image of the family presented by (primarily right-wing) politicians is, in practice, rife with contradiction. It seems more likely the case that the ideology must be so extreme in order to cover over the real truth of the family as the economic support for an increasingly precarious labour market. In the 1950s, a male breadwinner’s wage was enough to support an entire ‘classical’ family, now both partners must (in most cases) work to earn anywhere near the same amount. If women are now fully included in the workforce it is because men’s wages have been depressed, even as women still fail to earn as much as their male counterparts. Who looks after the children is an increasingly complicated question, and neither the state nor the classical family seem able to do it effectively and affordably. Politics is so pro-child in theory because it is so anti-child (and anti-woman) in practice. The supposed futural ‘reason’ of representative politics is in effect profoundly fractured and contradictory, not in the least bit reconciled to either its image of the child, or to its image of itself. Edelman’s notion of the queer nevertheless seems to depend on an overly borderlands 8:2 6 homogenous picture of the social world. To write, as Edelman claims to, from ‘the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their presupposition that the body politic must survive’ (Edelman, 2004: 3) involves deliberately superimposing various ‘political’ categories onto various non-political categories. Thus, Edelman conflates democracy with the child, rationality with a naïve concept of progress and heterosexuality with reproduction, sweeping away the possibility of collective organisation and action. As John Brenkman puts it: ‘Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction’ (Brenkman, 2002: 176). By neglecting the contradictory economic imperatives at work in political conceptions of the family and fusing politics with reason Edelman leaves no room at all for what we could call a ‘queer reason’– queer from the standpoint of representational politics, and neither committed to the child nor to sexual essentialism.

### 1NC – If TIme

#### Queer theory prematurely turned to death politics because it didn’t see the world change quickly enough – social change takes time and doesn’t deny the life of queer people – err against their confusing overarching politics in favor of material dissent.

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The 1990s, according to the historical record, seem to be the time of queer theory as this strange form of academic work emerged on the scene to subvert, titillate, deconstruct, and well “queer” things in literature (Sedgwick, 1990), philosophy (Butler, 1990), history (Halperin, 1990), politics (Berlant, 1997), and education (Pinar, 1998) to name a few. Yet, no quicker had queer theory been “born” when its “death” became thinkable. “Queer theory has only academic – which is to say, dead – politics” became, in the mid-1990s an audible thought. And for Berlant and Warner (1995) an audible thought that needed to be challenged by recognizing: Beginnings take a long time, and uneven developments are often experienced as premature deaths, a subject on which queer work is sadly expert. Because almost everything that can be called queer theory has been radically anticipatory, trying to bring a world into being, any effort to summarize it now will be violently partial. (p. 344) Beginnings require time – time to grow, develop, to breathe life into that which such beginnings encounter. However, only a decade after Berlant and Warner challenge assertions of queer theory’s “dead politics” more claims about, as I mentioned earlier, its normalization, death, and thoughts on its “afterness” (Parker & Halley, 2011; Talburt & Rasmussen, 2010) emerged. I first encountered queer theory amidst claims of its normalization, death, and “afterness.” When it was hot in the 1990s, I was a kid becoming a teenager, so when I encountered queer theory, I encountered its history. It was not new or avant-garde, nor was it emerging. It was a part of the university – it had already been institutionalized. It seemed to me that the excitement and rage queer theory once caused, had given way to boredom as canonical texts were assigned and diligently read. I realized in this that all the talk of normalization, death, and afterness were manifestations of this boredom. Boredom, however, is useful here as it provided time to think about and through what might move one’s self out of boredom and into some other state (Phillips, 1998). Boredom has allowed me – someone interested in queer theory – to take a breather and find my breath again. One cannot always be in a state of excitement. Boredom is necessary to reassess and recuperate one’s energies. Queer theorists it seems to me have at times been bored to death and are working through such a state to reexcite themselves and the field in which they operate. Queer, as Butler discussed above, after all inevitably becomes normalized in some ways. It also dies. It also becomes institutionalized. But it also lives on, takes new shape, survives, and thrives. While queer as a decision to live outside the social norms reminds us that “we” cannot rest and must decide to constantly engage the ways norms change, reality requires that we rest, sleep on it, and refresh ourselves. Queer theory may well argue for sexual vociferousness, but in real life, there is a refractory period. And this period can be rather boring; it’s why we smoke or quickly fall asleep after sex. In all of this, I believe there is still a need for queer theory and its decision to live outside the norms, whatever those norms may be. This, I believe might be done by looking toward new configurations of how the collective world might be thought about or through to contest that which needs contesting. This requires, I believe and will argue in the next section, adding to the body of work known as queer theory by engaging scholars not traditionally thought to be part of the current queer canon. However, I do not seek a radical rupture from recognizable thinkers, which should be obvious from those I have already cited. Instead, I seek a turn to a different thinker who might do something to help make “queer” exciting again by reinvigorating the esthetically political edges that contest the new normal – the new exclusions – that exist. I have myself been steeped in reading the “canonical,” so such ideas will be traceable in my readings of or engagements that follow. But, if like me, you are fatigued of Foucault, bored with Butler, disdainful of Derrida, dumbfounded by Deleuze and Guattari or just generally tired of feeling bullied into citing particular people and not others, let us try something else to press against the normalizing trends emerging in the twenty-first century. And let us do so grounding ourselves in thinking through the rather queer practice of dissent.