## OFF

### 1NC – T

#### Interp – private entities are not government affiliated

UpCounsel ND [“Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know”. UpCounsel (interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help). No Date. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity> //Xu]

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

#### Violation – Chinese entities are all government affiliated – 3 warrants and WTO agrees.

Olson 20 [Stephen Olson (research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation). “Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?”. The Diplomat. September 30, 2020. Accessed 1/24/2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/> //Xu]

* Government ideologies/officials
* Subsidies
* Informal Understandings

But China has a very different vision. Government officials and government ideologies are directly infused into business operations. Private sector employees are “educated” on government policies and ideologies, with the expectation that this “enlightenment” will help inform their business decisions. This government-business symbiosis is further cemented by the provision of massive government subsidies (estimated to be about 3 percent of China’s GDP) to Chinese companies.

To be clear, China – like any other sovereign nation – is entirely free to define the nature of the relationship between the Chinese state and the Chinese private sector, and craft its own economic development philosophies. So there can be no complaint with China for exercising its sovereignty.

Complaints are justified, however, when these unique features of China’s economic system impinge on the ability of China’s partners to compete fairly with Chinese companies. In those cases, remedial actions can be pursued, in theory at least, through various channels in the global trade system.

Existing Trade Rules Inadequate

Unfortunately however, these rules – first laid out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then its successor organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO) – were predicated on the assumption that there is a clear and immutable dividing line between government and business. The smooth and effective functioning of those rules is contingent upon maintaining the integrity of that demarcation. But China’s state-directed system has blurred the line, and its new “opinion” binds business and government together even more closely, further muddying the waters – and complicating trade governance.

On issues ranging from industrial subsidies to intellectual property, current trade rules either fail to address, or fail to adequately address, the damaging distortions which are introduced into the trade system as a result of the “hand in glove” partnership between business and government in China. Unwritten “understandings” between business and government can steer purchases away from foreign competitors and toward domestic Chinese companies. Informal policies that are rarely codified can result in proprietary foreign technologies being “shared” among Chinese companies, SOEs, and government agencies. And preferential arrangements between Chinese companies which exclude foreign companies are made financially viable as a result of tacit government support.

#### WTO o/w – only international trade regulation, global consensus, and legal specificity.

WTO No Date [World Trade Organization. “What is the WTO?” No Date. Accessed 8/7/21. <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm> //Xu]

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

Who we are

There are a number of ways of looking at the World Trade Organization. It is an organization for trade opening. It is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. It is a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules. Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other.

What we do

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva).

What we stand for

The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system.

#### Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate

#### c] Durability – grammatical correctness makes debaters effective academics and professionals

#### Vote for predictable limits – their aff explodes the object of the resolution to include random entities from governments to universities to native tribes – that allows them to cherry-pick the best aff with no neg ground – also kills predictable advocacies which decks prepared engagement.

### 2 –

#### Interp: Debaters must show-up to the tech-check

(NSDA, National Speech and Debate Association) Online Speech and Debate Competition Tips No Date <https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=15gZxwk_e7FdlEAiRU0yrqOUQDbExZ-4h> DOA 9/18/21 Cho

Test your technology - It never hurts to test your technology more than once. In fact, problems can arise because of mistakes such as forgetting to plug in your computer the night before. Test everything; if there is an issue that occurs right before the round, it is best to have it resolved early. If you have backup technology, you may also want to test that. If your computer dies, but you know how to use your phone and you have printed a copy of your case, you may be able to keep going in a pinch.

#### Violation: They were late, screenshots in doc

#### 1] Tech issues – testing tech pre-round is key to functional debates like audio quality and sound settings. O/Ws A] Sequencing – controls the internal link to other standards B] Reversibility – you could get disqualified for being late.

#### 2] Prep Skew – I had to spend 15 minutes checking my tech while they could be prepping which irreparably skews the burdens in their favor. O/Ws on structural abuse since it’s the only verifiable impact.

#### 3] Delay – Late tech-checks and preventable tech issues delay RFDs and future pairings 2 impacts – (A) Scope – delaying the tournament skews flight 2 neg debaters, big prep-squads (B) Late rounds cause sleep-deficits which is bad for your health and skews your ability to effectively clash and engage.

#### Tech-check is at 6:30 eastern – that’s emory rules

Table

Description automatically generated

#### they weren’t here at 6:33 Eastern

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

#### And they disobeyed tabroom – that’s an independent voter EXTEMP

#### 

#### Not specifying the actor/states of the aff is a voting issue - decimates core neg ground and nuanced method debates - Cross X is too late for the 1NC strat

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [E] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested

### 4 – Xi Good DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Lash-out causes SCS, Philippines war, Vietnam war, India border conflicts, ECS, Japan War, Taiwan invasion, and US-China War.

Cole 14 J. Michael Cole 7-10-2014 “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/> (former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, columnist for The Diplomat and a contributor for The National Interest)//Elmer

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability? Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States. While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military. Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.” This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater. With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction. 1. South China Sea The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests. 2. Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh Although Beijing claims that it is ready for a settlement of its longstanding territorial disputes with India, the areas remain ripe for the re-ignition of conflict. New Delhi accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometers in Jammu and Kashmir, and Beijing lays claim to more than 90,000 square kilometers of territory inside the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. A few factors militate against the suitability of those territories for an external distraction, chief among them the difficult access in winter, and the strength of the Indian military, which would pose a greater risk to PLA troops than those of Vietnam or the Philippines in the previous scenario. Nevertheless, memories of China’s routing of the Indian military in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 could embolden Beijing. Though challenging, the PLA would be expected to prevail in a limited conflict with Indian forces, and China would have taken on a greater regional power than Vietnam or the Philippines, with everything that this entails in terms of political benefits back home. 3. East China Sea and Japan Sparking a war with Japan, presumably over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, would represent a major escalation on Beijing’s part. Assuming that rational actors are in control in Beijing, a decision to begin hostilities with the modern and skilled Japan Self-Defense Forces would only be made if domestic instability were serious enough. Still, high resentment of the Japanese stemming from Japanese aggression before and during World War II and the competitive nature of the bilateral relationship make Japan the perfect candidate for an external distraction. More than any other conflict, hostilities with Japan would rally ordinary Chinese to the flag and tap into hatred that the leadership knows it could exploit if necessary. Although the chances of prevailing would be much smaller than in the South China Sea or Indian scenarios (especially if the U.S. became involved), the dividends of victory against Japan — anything from teaching Tokyo a lesson to redressing historical injustices — could be such as to become a major factor in appeasing major domestic unrest in China. Unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, it is unlikely that the leadership in Beijing would escalate tensions with Japan beyond the disputed islets. In other words, military action probably would not extend to other parts of Japan’s territory, unless, of course, the conflict widened. Containing the conflict by limiting it to the Senkaku/Diaoyus would therefore be part of Beijing’s strategy. 4. Taiwan The “reunification” of Taiwan remains a so-called “core interest” of China and a major component of the CCP’s legitimacy with the public. Despite rapprochement in recent years, a substantial component of the PLA remains committed to a Taiwan contingency. Although the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait are low at the moment, China never shelved its plans to annex the island by force if necessary, and has vowed to do so should Taipei seek to unilaterally change the status quo by declaring de jure independence. Under Xi, Beijing has also signaled that while it is willing to be patient with Taiwanese and would prefer to use financial incentives to gradually consolidate its grip on Taiwan, it does not intend to be patient forever. In other words, foot-dragging on Taiwan’s part, or the election of a political party that is less amenable to rapprochement than the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), could prompt Beijing to choose a more aggressive course of action. Serious unrest on the island could also provide Beijing with the “justification” it needs to involve the PLA, which would be deployed to “protect” Taiwanese “compatriots.” Given that definitions of progress on “reunification” are very much Beijing’s to decide, any incident could theoretically warrant the use of force against Taiwan, especially if major domestic unrest compelled the CCP to seek an external distraction. Militating against such a decision is the fact that anything short of a full invasion of the island would probably forever kill any chance of “peaceful unification” with Taiwan, as the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis demonstrated. A limited military campaign against Taiwan is therefore probably not a good option for an external distraction, as the backlash against aggression would undo years of calibrated Taiwan policy and destroy hopes of unification, which would greatly discredit the CCP with the Chinese public, not to mention the PLA. A full invasion of Taiwan would then provide greater chances of success, at least if we measure success by its impact on public opinion amid serious unrest in China. However, the growing power imbalance in the Taiwan Strait notwithstanding, invading the island would be an extraordinarily difficult — and costly — task; talk of a “quick, clear war” remains just that, and pacifying the island would be a formidable challenge. Should the conflict drag on, as it most certainly would, whatever advantage the CCP may have accumulated by tapping into nationalist sentiment could dwindle and further contribute to resentment against the party. Consequently, unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, Taiwan would be an extremely poor candidate for external distraction, worse even than Japan, where the chances of success in a limited campaign are higher. 5. United States The last, and least likely, candidate for external distraction would be for the PLA to turn its sights on U.S. forces in the Pacific. For obvious reasons, such a course of action would be a last resort, a last-ditch effort to prevent the complete collapse of the CCP due to domestic factors. The chances of prevailing in a direct military confrontation with U.S. forces in the region would be next to nil. A decision to attack the U.S. would qualify as irrational, a departure from the realm of calculations that would buttress decisions in any of the alternative scenarios discussed above. Still there are examples of countries that embarked on what, in hindsight, can only be described as suicidal adventures by attacking a much more powerful enemy. Japan demonstrated that this is possible during World War II. A likelier source of conflict between the PLA and U.S. forces would be indirect, such as U.S. involvement in limited hostilities between China and any of the countries mentioned above (with Japan and Taiwan as the likeliest). As the PLA is configured not to take on the U.S. military directly but rather asymmetrically, China would increase its chances of scoring domestic points by playing to its strengths — by inflicting damage on U.S. forces with its anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD. Sinking an aircraft carrier on its way to the East China Sea or towards the Taiwan Strait, for example, could do wonders in terms of public opinion and provide temporary cover for an embattled CCP. Ultimately, however, the costs of taking on the U.S. military, added to the extremely low likelihood that Chinese troops could secure the kind of victory that would be necessary to rescue the CCP from internal strife, mean that the U.S. is an especially bad candidate for external distraction.

### 1NC – K

#### Their demand for durable fiat is a form of white delusion that represents an active misapprehension of reality -- there is an epistemic imperative to dismantle this anti-black social practice.

**McRae ’19** [Emily; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at the University of New Mexico; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 44-45]

I offer this story not only as an example of everyday white delusion, but also to set the tone of this chapter: From both the Buddhist and critical race theoretical perspectives that I draw on here, ignorance (delusion) is not someone else’s problem. There is a moral, and epistemic imperative to confront our own ignorance, to dismantle the false beliefs and misunderstandings that inform our everyday sense of reality. In this chapter, I use the Buddhist concept of avidyā (ignorance, confusion, delusion) to analyze the causes, mechanisms, and possible correctives for white delusion. In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses of white ignorance, such as Charles Mills’s, which understand white ignorance not in terms of a passive lack of knowledge but as an active refusal by whites to confront basic facts about our social world.

I argue that Buddhist analyses of avidyā may help us understand the mechanisms of white ignorance and the practices for deconstructing it. On the Buddhist view, the mechanisms for maintaining avidyā include obsession with self and clinging to fixed narratives about the self (in the case of white delusion, “I’m not racist” or “I’ve earned and deserve everything I have”) and the refusal to take seriously cause and effect (such as a failure to historicize racism, the failure to understand broad, systemic effects of racism, and the inability to apply abstract knowledge of racism to specific cases). In my own case of white delusion, I was guilty of both kinds of mistakes: I was clinging to a narrative that obscured reality—that it was only women who bore the burden of managing physical appearance in our society—and I failed to apply my knowledge of how racism works in the abstract to the specifics of my partner’s life.  
Buddhist conceptions of ignorance or delusion may also help to locate possible correctives for white ignorance. Because avidyā is not simply a lack of knowledge, it cannot be completely remedied by exposure to facts and analyses of those facts. To be receptive to such knowledge in the first place, to remember and apply it, we must overcome our own dysfunctional emotional patterns that sustain our confusion. So, on a Buddhist ethical view, white people cannot combat white ignorance simply with knowledge about racism (which is already widely available) but rather white people need to do the personal and emotional work of deconstructing our own whiteness, as it arises in our own lives, to uproot our white ignorance. This is uncomfortable and ugly (but necessary) work that will require white people to correct for major moral blind spots by developing the moral skill of equanimity (or “tarrying,” as George Yancy has argued).3

#### Just like debate, international relations is complicit in an white supremacist rationalism that pathologizes the lived realities of black folx as an insufficient critical prospective -- only the alt’s intentional incorporation of race into policy debates enshrines the empathy AND connectedness necessary to challenge the mundane white supremacy preserved through their practice of denial.

**Gordon and Harper-Shipman ’20** [Lewis and T.D.; 2020; Professor of Philosophy at UCONN-Storr; Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Davidson College; *The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations*, “Race and Ethics in International Relations,” p. 75-77]

Through a systematic positing of rationalism and parsimonious models, conventional IR elides the possibility of including the lived realities of black, brown, and red peoples in the Global South as valid forms of evidence and critical perspectives. To the extent that these voices can be quantified in an undifferentiated manner, they do not figure legitimately into the existing disciplinary paradigm. Without intentionally incorporating race into the framework, scholars are unable to explain phenomena such as the Global North’s continued imperial domination through globalization or the racialized political economy of contemporary forms of slavery such as sex-traffcking and forced domestic servitude in the United States (Crawford 2002; Georgis and Lugosi 2014; J.A. Gordon 2019). Alternative methodologies that may allow for a more ethical incorporation of race into IR include the world-travelling goal of achieving ‘a space of mutual understanding using the tool of empathy, which is the ability to enter the spirit of a different experience and find it in an echo of some part of oneself’ (Sylvester 2017, 182; see also Anzaldúa 1987; Sylvester 1995).There isalso poise, an epistemological framework for offering a critique of and reconstructing IR in a fashion that is void of colonial, capitalist-patriarchy (see Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Grovogui (2001) proposes reverse ethnography as a methodology available to the formerly colonized for assessing the colonizers’ ontological dispositions for what they are and not what the colonizers say they are. Exposing the limitations in this line of thinking in IR knowledge production demonstrates the provincial nature of the predominantly white approach to International Relations, which contradicts the current positivist paradigm. that calls for universal theorizing. Finally, though not exclusively, ethics demands connectedness and its concomitant obligation to others. This involves being in-relation-with-others instead of being separate. Models of IR premised on purity would require the elimination of relations with others (read as forms of contamination), whereas those premised on being-in-relations leads to a form of structural, ongoing mixture and transformation, which Jane Anna Gordon (2014) describes as ‘creolizing theory’. As the white supremacist origins of IR oppose such a model, overcoming that history requires acknowledging a different model of coexistence on our planet.

Conclusion

Race conjoined with ethics in IR thus raises normative, disciplinary, and methodological challenges to the field. The first raises the obligation of overcoming the normative project of global white supremacy through acknowledging that history and addressing how its continuation is often preserved through ongoing practices of denial. It also demands addressing how dominant global policies and the arguments that support them also facilitate disempowerment, dehumanization, and violence in the Global South and its manifestations in the Global North. This leads to disciplinary and methodological concerns that break down a neat divide between epistemological and normative practices. As the constructivist approaches tend to lead also to normative constructivism, the challenge of race and ethics in IR becomes also the imaginative act of theorizing different kinds of power relations and modes of coexistence with fidelity to extant global challenges on the organization of human and other planetary forms of life.

#### Unethical delusions are an existential threat.

**Loy ’18** [David; April 21st; Former professor of Ethics, Religion, and Society at Xavier University; Mountain Cloud, “Are Humans Special? Part 3 by David Loy,” <https://www.mountaincloud.org/are-humans-special-part-3-by-david-loy-2/>]

If we are special because of our potential, we must choose. We are free to derive the meaning of our lives from delusions about who we are — from dysfunctional stories about what the world is and how we fit into it—or we can derive that meaning from insight into our nonduality with the rest of the world. In either case, there are consequences.

The problem with basing one’s life on delusions is that the consequences are unlikely to be good. As well as producing poetry and cathedrals, our creativity has recently found expression in world wars, genocides, and weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few disagreeable examples. We are in the early stages of an ecological crisis that threatens the natural and cultural legacy of future generations, including a mass extinction event that may lead to the disappearance of half the earth’s plant and animal species within a century, according to E. O. Wilson—an extinction event that may include ourselves.

What needs to be done so that our extraordinary co-creative powers will promote collective well-being (collective in this case referring to all the ecosystems of the biosphere)?

From a Buddhist perspective our unethical tendencies ultimately derive from a misapprehension: the delusion of a self that is separate from others, a big mistake for a species whose well-being is not separate from the well-being of other species. Insofar as we are ignorant of our true nature, individual and collective self-preoccupation naturally motivates us to be selfish. Without the compassion that arises when we feel empathy — not only with other humans, but with the whole of the biosphere — it is likely that civilization as we know it will not survive many more generations.

In either case, we seem fated to be special. If we continue to devastate the rest of the biosphere, we are arguably the worst species on earth: a cancer of the biosphere. If, however, humanity can wake up to become its collective bodhisattva —undertaking the long-term task of repairing the rupture between us and Mother Earth — perhaps we as a species will fulfill the unique potential of precious human life.

#### The alternative is to submit to Black Buddhist meditation -- in the face of a case about banning Chinese Space program, we only offer silence.

**Vesely-Flad ’19** [Rima; May 13; Ph.D. Director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 5,” p. 85-86]

Lovingkindness practices toward the self, alongside personal interpretations of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path, guide many Black Buddhist practitioners who have suffered generational trauma and racist degradation in our contemporary moment. Valerie Mason-John, also known as Vimalasara, an African-Canadian teacher in the Nichiren tradition, speaks of the importance of the Four Noble Truths for people of African descent in particular. The First Noble Truth is that suffering is a universal experience. Mason-John states, “We of African descent know what suffering is. It’s in our DNA.”20 The Second Noble Truth states that suffering is a result of ignorant craving. For many Black Buddhists, the interpretations of the causes of suffering are greatly expanded into teachings of white myopia, the desire to exist in delusion, and the collective ego of the dominant white culture. The Third Noble Truth is that there is a path to end suffering. The very promise of liberation is enticing for people of African descent. The Fourth Noble Truth describes the path of liberation, known as the Noble Eightfold Path. In this path, “Right Concentration,” which leads to settling the mind, is a particularly compelling practice.

Manuel writes in The Way of Tenderness:

Only in the deep silence of meditation did I begin to disbelieve that I was born only to suffer. Eventually after many years of sitting meditation, I recognized the root of my self-hatred, both external and internal, as a personal and collective denial or denigration of the body I inhabited.

Her reflections are echoed by Owens’s reflections on silence: “silence became the medium in which I was reborn into a sense of happiness and contentment. But overall, it ushered me into a period of thriving and flourishing in my life.”22 In meditation, practitioners cultivate their ability to confront the suffering wrought by their mental constructs rather than avoid pain. They seek to heal the damage wrought by racism and to rearticulate profound teachings that are rooted in concentration practices. In-depth interviews with Black Buddhist teachers and practitioners illuminate a progression in the process of acknowledging one’s racial identity and embracing teachings of non-self. The progression begins with claiming and rearticulating Blackness as part of the social self, and in so doing, embracing African ancestry. For many, the next step is entering into an experience of silence that facilitates a recognition of the truth of non-self. Finally, Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners integrate embodiment with the psychologically liberating practice of silence. The ten Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners interviewed for this chapter emphasized four primary themes in their articulation of embodiment and Anatta: (1) Being visible in social spaces; (2) Claiming African ancestral lineages; (3) Embracing the two truths of relative and absolute existence; and (4) Liberating the self and the community.

## ON

### Russo-China Advantage

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation. East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise. Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016). Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c). Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far. It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues. The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West. When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

### ASATs Advantage

#### Vote Neg on Zero I/L – ASAT’s aren’t private actor space appropriation – this means the Plan can’t solve anything.

#### a] Outer Space means above the atmosphere.

Howell 17 Elizabeth Howell 6-7-2017 "What is Space?" <https://www.space.com/24870-what-is-space.html> (Ph.D., is a contributing writer for Space.com since 2012. As a proud Trekkie and Canadian, she tackles topics like spaceflight, diversity, science fiction, astronomy and gaming to help others explore the universe. Elizabeth's on-site reporting includes two human spaceflight launches from Kazakhstan, and embedded reporting from a simulated Mars mission in Utah. She holds a Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and a Bachelor of Journalism from Canada's Carleton University.)//Elmer

From the perspective of an Earthling, outer space is a zone that occurs about 100 kilometers (60 miles) above the planet, where there is no appreciable air to breathe or to scatter light. In that area, blue gives way to black because oxygen molecules are not in enough abundance to make the sky blue.

#### China’s ASAT’s are located on the ground.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 9-1-2020 "Pentagon report: China amassing arsenal of anti-satellite weapons" <https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1. China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. DoD has been required by law to submit this report since 2000. The Pentagon says Chinese military strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare. China for years has continued to “strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space,” the report says. China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new anti-satellite weapons programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, but the nation has been steadily advancing in this area, the report says. So-called counterspace capabilities developed by China include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance to monitor objects across the globe and in space.

#### b] Private entity are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 Von Der Dunk, Frans G. "1. The Origins Of Authorisation: Article VI Of The Outer Space Treaty And International Space Law." National Space Legislation in Europe. Brill Nijhoff, 2011. 3-28. (University of Nebraska)//Elmer

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version o fthe concept applicable under general international law, where 'direct state responsibility' only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 'indirect', 'due care' / 'due diligence' responsibility18, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state's own ("whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies" ...) or those of private actors (... "or by non-governmental entities"). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.