## OFF

### 1NC – OFF

#### **Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action**

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation.

#### **This is the best piece of evidence I have ever found – it is a non-debate dictionary that cites LD as its example sentence.**

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

A picture containing text, sign

Description automatically generated



#### Violation: They cannot defend hypothetical implementation and use the state – or they are Extra-T

#### Voter for limits and ground - imprecisely includes thousands of affs that expand appropriation and deprives us of private space good makes it impossible to be neg

#### Grammar - very idea of a topic rests on the assumption that words have stable meanings and relationships - precision internal link turns every piece of aff offense

#### Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD. Switch to policy and read an aff about korea relations– solves all your offense

#### TVA: Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust such as Korean philosophy.

#### No Impact Turn’s - Infinite prior resolutional questions and procedural issues bring into question if the debate should have happened in the first place AND reading it on the neg and switch side solve

#### Vote on fairness – abuse skews your evaluation of substance – precedes education since if there’s abuse, you can’t expect me to clash. Drop the debater on T – I can’t respond to a new aff in the 2NR since I don’t have a 3NR to defend my offense. T link turns 1AR theory – proves the aff forced me to be abusive. Use competing interps—either there’s a bright line which collapses, or there isn’t which causes intervention.

### 1NC – OFF

#### North Korea is the fetishistic object of modern neo-conservatism, the next move in a great geopolitical sprint towards absolute and systematic dominion over the affective futures of the world as we know it. Their telos of systematic preemption globalizes a strategy of war by other means that artificially exchanges the possibility of individual conflicts for a globalized state of endless interventionism

**Massumi 15** [Brian, Professor of Communications at the University of Montreal, *Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception*, Duke University Press, 2015, p. 14-19]

You would hardly know that North Korea's announcement of its nuclear capacity had taken place in the previous month. It is mentioned only in passing, and then only in order to justify a military attack on ... Iran. The thinking is that North Korea will use its capabilities to proliferate the nuclear threat by assisting Iran in transforming its civilian nuclear program into a military one. North Korea could well become a breeding ground for nuclear terrorism. Let's see, where have we heard that argument before? Could have, would have...we will have been right to bomb Iran. The neoconservative's main interest in the North Korean situation is indirect. What they are most interested in is using the issue of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula as leverage for proliferating preemption elsewhere -- for staying the overall strategic course even as tactical adjustments are made in Iraq. North Korea is hardly on their map, outside of this connection. That is because what is on their map is oil. The ultimate reason Iran must be attacked is because, nuclearly emboldened, it might well put a "choke hold" on the Straits of Hormuz in order to block oil deliveries to the West and thereby endanger the economy. This potential threat makes preemption right all over again. Regime change is once again conditionally "necessary" in the Middle East, to make the region safe for American capitalism (Herman 2006). In the years since these discussions in 2006, an attack on Iran has not become the recursive truth of the situation. Neoconservative breastbeating on the issue has not stopped (nor have covert U.S. special operations). But under Obama, calls for direct intervention have lost their ring. As regards North Korea, traditional pressure tactics and diplomatic efforts have been revived. Preemption flows elsewhere, on the wings of a drone. None of this changes the global situation that in this brave new world of potential politics the operative logic of preemption renders only one thing certain: that the preemptive adventure has yet to run its course. Rest asymmetrically assured of the future affective fact that somewhere, at some scale, things will go proliferatingly kinetic again, by direct intervention or (Obama’s preference) by proxy. The self-perpetuating nature of the logic of preemption should be a subject of intense concern. It means that situations like the one in North Korea today will tend in one way or another to feed an operative war logic that is constitutively off-balance and thrives globally under far-from-equilibrium conditions. Racing headlong into a warlike future on the threat-edge of chaos is a hard way to live the present. It is imperative to find a new operative logic capable of disarming preemption. Returning to old logics, like prevention or deterrence, will not work. Voting a particular administration out of office is important, but in the end only a palliative. The search for an alternative will have to come to grips with this radical assessment of the situation in which the world finds itself, penned by one of the inventors of the concept of asymmetrical warfare: Our understandings and definitions of 'war' are hopelessly out of date, and the same holds for 'peace'. The international law of war is basically irrelevant today, and I doubt it can become relevant again. ...National security objectives will not be crystal clear, formulated in timely fashion, or fully underwritten by national will (Barnett 2003, 105). To quote another asymmetrical warrior: As people learn of the benefits of democracy, capitalism and the rule of law, they become fat and happy ...Until then, we all need to prepare for combat (Berkowitz 2003, 221). Given the preemptive "irrelevance" of international law and the exceptional escape hatches that have been bored into domestic legal structures like that of the US, the rule of law seems to have fallen on hard times. Since the collective objectives pursued in such times as these will "not be fully underwritten by national will," democracy seems to be in a bit of tight spot as well. That only leaves capitalism. Are we "fat and happy" yet?

#### The 1AC’s use of stable hegemony in regulating outer space whitewashes the fundamental asymmetries of IR – that greenlights Great Power domination and makes redemptive politics inevitable.

Havercroft and Duvall 09 [Jonathan Havercroft (Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton) and Raymond Duvall (Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change/MacArthur Interdisciplinary Program on Global Change, Sustainability, and Justice at the University of Minnesota). “Critical astropolitics The geopolitics of space control and the transformation of state sovereignty”. Securing Outer Space. 2009. Accessed 1/26/2022. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203882023-8/critical-astropolitics-geopolitics-space-control-transformation-state-sovereignty-jonathan-havercroft-raymond-duvall //Xu]

Although Deudney has not extended his “historical security materialist” approach into explicitly theorizing space weapons, per se (dealt with only tangentially and implicitly in the last two chapters of his recent book), his proposals during the Cold War to foster institutional collaboration between space powers as a way of promoting peace can safely be understood as a form of the mutually binding practices that he associates with the federalrepublican mode of protection. In addition, one of the general conclusions that Deudney reaches about “historical security materialism” is that the more a security context is rich in the potential for violence, the better suited a federal-republican mode of protection is to avoid systemic breakdown. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that within Deudney’s work is a nascent theory of how a federal-republican international system could limit conflict between space powers by binding them together in collaborative uses of space for exploratory and security uses. In this sense, Deudney can be read as the liberal-republican astropolitical counterpart to Everett Dolman.5 While Deudney’s astropolitical theorizations hold out the promise of a terrestrial pacification through space exploration it is interesting to note a significant aporia in his theory – empire as a possible mode of protection. While real-statist modes of protection have an internal hierarchical authority structure, they are based on assumptions of external-anarchy, which is to say a system of sovereign states. Conversely, the federal-republican model is based on a symmetrical binding of units, in a way that no single unit can come to dominate others and accordingly in which they preserve their sovereignty (Deudney 2000, 2002, 2007). In a third mode, to which Deudney gives only scant attention, the case of empire, the hegemony of a single unit is such that other units are bound to it in an asymmetrical pattern that locates sovereignty only in the hegemon, or imperial center. Successful empires, including the Roman, British, and American, permit local autonomy in areas that are not of the imperial power’s direct concern while demanding absolute obedience in areas that are of vital concern to it, particularly when it comes to issues of security.6 Deudney’s implicit astropolitical theory thus ignores structurally asymmetric relations – in effect he ignores power. It is as if in wanting to have the world avoid the possibility of a planetary hegemony at the heart of the premise with which he and Dolman began their respective analyses, he white-washes it by failing to acknowledge the profound asymmetries of aspirations and technological–financial–military capacities among states for control of orbital space. In the next two sections we respond to Deudney’s call for “historical security materialism” by focusing on the premise that he skirts but that Dolman emphasizes, that military control of space means (at least the possibility of) mastery of the Earth. Specifically we examine how a new mode of destruction – space weapons – is the ideal basis for the third mode of protection – empire – through its potential for substantial asymmetry. We argue that the power asymmetries of space weapons have very significant constitutive effects on sovereignty and international systemic anarchy, and underlie the constitution of a new, historically unprecedented, form of empire. Before turning to that central thesis, however, we will first sketch the general contours of a critical astropolitics, which builds on the foundational premise of Dolman and Deudney, but modifies their theories in light of the significant insights of critical theory, particularly with respect to constitutive power. We ask: what consequences of astropolitics can a critical approach illuminate that may be concealed by an astropolitics informed by either liberal-republican or realist assumptions? How can insights offered by the revival of geopolitics in the writings of Deudney and Dolman – particularly the call for a new security materialist mode of analysis – be used to supplement and refine critical international relations theory? Critical astropolitics In the broad intellectual tradition of geopolitics, advocates of a critical perspective – particularly Simon Dalby, John Agnew, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail – have challenged mainstream geopolitical theory for assuming and validating power relations implicit in the production of geopolitical knowledge, and for a tendency to be a reifying and totalizing discourse that erases difference and political contestation from processes of representing space (Agnew 2003, 2005; Dalby 1991; Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1998; Ó Tuathail 1996). Ó Tuathail has criticized earlier forms of geopolitics for their ocularcentrism and what he terms the “geopolitical gaze.” Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, he reads geopolitical discourse as power/knowledge, such that knowledge of spaces produces subjects empowered for expansive control. Geopolitical representations – what Ó Tuathail terms geo-power – are in a mutually supportive relation with the imperial institutions in which they are produced (Ó Tuathail 1996: 6–20). Empires cannot function without clear representations that explore, chart, and bring under control cartographic spaces. The spatial imaginary of the “geopolitical gaze,” then, is immanent to empire. In a related vein, Simon Dalby, too, has studied the role that geographical representations play. He has examined official policy documents and academic analyses of U.S. strategic thinking in both Cold War strategies and the Bush doctrine to determine how geographical representations of the earth shape U.S. imperial strategy (Dalby 2007). Additionally, John Agnew’s work examines how a particular geopolitical imagining – a global order constituted by sovereign states – “arose from European–American experience but was then projected on to the rest of the world and in to the future in the theory and practice of world politics” (Agnew 2003: 2). Such scholarly work of critical geopolitics makes two crucial contributions. First it draws on the interpretive strategies of various theorists – from Foucault to Derrida and others – to critique the assumptions of mainstream geopolitical analysis. Second it moves toward a reformulation of geopolitics in a form that is more conscious of how power operates in the theory and practice of world politics. In the first two parts of this chapter we have drawn on the first of those contributions for our critical reading of realist and liberal-republican astropolitics, albeit without our making explicit reference to specific social theorists. Thus, just as Mackinder’s geopolitics re-presented how the world operated in a way that could be understood and controlled by British imperialists, it can be argued, following Agnew’s, Ó Tuathail’s and Dalby’s lead, that the kinds of representations of space proffered by Dolman (as orbits, regions, and launching points of strategic value) make the exercise of control over space intelligible from an American imperialist perspective. The “astropolitical gaze” and its cartographic representations are mutually productive with the current U.S. policy of attempting to secure control over orbital space. As we saw, realist astropolitics celebrates the ways in which extending U.S. military hegemony into space could amplify America’s imperial power. Yet, Dolman’s realist astropolitik leaves under-theorized the normative implication of space-based imperialism. Instead, Dolman merely asserts that America would be a benevolent emperor without explaining what checks on U.S. power might exist to prevent it from using the “ultimate high ground” to dominate all the residents of the Earth. Conversely, Deudney focuses on the potential for inter-state collaboration to produce a federalrepublican global political order. However, Deudney leaves under-theorized the very real possibility that a unilateral entry into space by the U.S. could create an entirely new mode of protection and security. While our approach to critical astropolitics shares the political commitments and many of the theoretical foundations of critical geopolitical scholarship, our interest is more in the study of the constitutive as opposed to the representational consequences of astropolitics. Accordingly, in the remainder of this chapter we draw on the second contribution of critical geopolitics – the reformulation of geopolitical theory through concepts of critical theoretical analysis – to address the normative and theoretical absences we have identified in the realist and liberal astropolitical writings of Dolman and Deudney. First, we will draw on the critical theories of sovereignty offered in writings of Foucault, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri to theorize the form that the missing mode of protection/security from Deudney’s “historical security materialist” analysis – empire – would take. Second, we conclude by arguing that such a mode of protection/security would lack any effective counterbalances to its ability to project force, and as such it is unlikely that it would be the benevolent imperial power that Dolman claims it would be.

#### This is part and parcel with a global system of fractal policing – the will to peace produces endless violence through shadow forms of engagement that are located beyond the cognitive maps of their conception of space policy as a solely material process

Öberg 14 (Dan Öberg, senior lecturer of war studies at the Swedish National Defence College, PhD from Yokohama National University, May 2014, “Introduction: Baudrillard and War,” *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies* Volume 11 Number 2, footnote 5 included in curly braces)

Up to now we have seen that Baudrillard’s critique illustrates how the Cold War, due to nuclear arms and deterrence, the changing role of media and IT, and high-tech weaponry force war to split into a real and a virtual mode. One important example of this is the way the Gulf War, waged as a business or advertising campaign, enables simulated models and technological processing to appropriate war’s being. The end of the Cold War therefore signifies how particular aspects of deterrence continue through other means and in so doing give rise to new effects. To Baudrillard, one of the most important effects is a constant policing of singularities, events, or any kind of potential political subversion. Baudrillard first identified this tendency in the Vietnam War (see below) but a more recent example which is equally relevant is the alleged shift from ‘enemy centric’ to ‘population centric’ counter-insurgency (see Kilcullen 2007). This illustrates an overlap between his thought and recent discussions on policing in critical War Studies. This discussion has engaged with the way war and policing intersects in contemporary Western interventions. It particularly focuses on understanding war as ordering, othering, and spatializing logics which force the distinction between war and policing to break down (Holmqvist 2014 and Bachmann et.al. 2014). So what is Baudrillard’s take on war as policing in relation to this particular debate? Baudrillard identified the Vietnam War as a means to violently reshape the social (a “generative” aspect of war which has also been debated in critical War Studies, see Barkawi and Brighton 2011). To him the Vietnam War was interesting first and foremost in how it masked both a peaceful coexistence between two blocks (East and West) and how it aimed to liquidate ‘savage’ and archaic societal structures. He argues that the war took place as long as there was a wild subversive element to the uprising (illustrated by the Viet Cong). But as soon as Vietnam as a country ‘showed’ the world that it was no longer unpredictable, the war ended (Baudrillard 1994a: 36-37). Therefore, the war in Vietnam masks not only the status quo of the Cold war but also the fact that: (B)ehind this simulacrum of fighting to the death and of ruthless global stakes, the two adversaries are fundamentally in solidarity against something else, unnamed, never spoken, but whose objective outcome in war, with the equal complicity of the two adversaries, is total liquidation. Tribal, communitarian, precapitalist structures, every form of exchange, of language, of symbolic organization, that is what must be abolished, that is the object of murder in war – and war itself, in its immense, spectacular death apparatus, is nothing but the medium of this process of the terrorist rationalization of the social – the murder on which sociality will be founded, whatever its allegiance, Communist or capitalist. Total complicity, or division of labor between two adversaries…for the very end of reshaping and domesticating social relations (Baudrillard 1994a: 37, my emphasis). Baudrillard therefore reads the Vietnam War as one illustration of a kind of global policing which not so much revolved around the two adversaries opposing each other but rather on the way in which deterrence enabled liquidating, reshaping, and domesticating social relations. This is also evident in the Gulf War as the aim there was to ‘impose a general consensus by deterrence’ (Baudrillard 1995: 83) which is no longer the bipolar deterrence of the Cold War but a monopolistic deterrence ‘under the aegis of American power’ (Ibid.: 84). Such a policing through war works as a way to eradicate the possibility of subversion in everyday life and thereby police not only the Gulf but also the heart of Europe (Ibid.: 52). More than anything this is a matter of policing the simulation of democratic consensus as consensus. A matter which Baudrillard ominously invokes as a continuation of war through a violent conditioning of the social: ‘…(T)omorrow there will be nothing but the virtual violence of consensus, the simultaneity in real time of the global consensus: this will happen tomorrow and it will be the beginning of a world with no tomorrow’ (Ibid.: 84). And here we might pause and ask, are the Russian wars in Chechnya or Georgia, the second Israeli war in Lebanon or interventions in Gaza, the interventions in Afghanistan (2001-) and Libya in 2011, not possible to see in terms of such policing? This would indicate a breakdown of the distinction of peace and war in which the same police-style violence is evident in both (Baudrillard,1998a: 17). But also, it would indicate that these are wars which aim to police the simulacrum of liberal order itself. If seen in this way we might appreciate how Baudrillard outlines a type of policing which goes towards the spatial through controlling a population and an area (linking it to the debate on policing in critical War Studies). But, more importantly, Baudrillards critique of war as policing points to the way interventions attempt to (1) police *the* *past* by whitewashing events so as to justify them retrospectively and (2) police *the* *future* through policing the consensus. Baudrillard reads the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan as having 9/11 as focal point and thereby becoming what he calls ‘rituals of exorcism’ which tries to justify the event and the trauma of the past. But also in the sense that interventions aim to police the future through a systematic reprogramming and neutralization of not only possible crimes (or subversive movements) but of every possible future friction that might challenge the order of things (2005a: 118-119; 2007a: 114, 118). If war continues through policing, one of its “side effects” – Abu Ghraib – also, perhaps, suggests that “war as policing” necessarily gives rise to “war as incarceration”. Andreja Zevnik’s ‘War Porn: an image of perversion and desire in modern warfare’ (2014, this special issue) picks up on Baudrillard’s analysis of Abu Ghraib and the images of torture which became overexposed in the media around 2005. She engages with Baudrillard’s essay ‘War Porn’ (2005b: 205-209) by looking at the way underlying ideologies and logics make such simulations possible, as well as help to reproduce them. By coupling notions of porn and obscenity with the Lacanian notions of law and perversion, the article illustrates how war’s violence has a tendency to perpetuate its own principle. And indeed, if we follow Baudrillard’s diagnosis, it is precisely as a mirror and an allergy to the violence perpetuated by this ‘unbearable power’ (Baudrillard, 2002a: 18, 5) that events like 9/11 occur. Terrorism would thereby be a virus caused by the sickness of globalism, indicating a type of war: ‘no longer between peoples, states, systems, and ideologies, but rather, of the human species against itself (Interview with Baudrillard in *Der Speigel* 2004). Baudrillard argues: With each succeeding war we have always moved close to a single world order. Today that world order, which has virtually reached its end, finds itself grappling, in all the current convulsions, with the antagonistic forces spread throughout the global dimension itself. A fractal war of all cells, of all singularities, rebelling in the form of antibodies. A clash so elusive that the idea of war has to be rescued from time to time by spectacular set-pieces like the Gulf War (Baudrillard 2003: 63, my emphasis).5 {5.Baudrillard’s statements might be far-fetched for the mainstream student of war. But paradoxically, the idea that the system creates the condition for possible retaliation is also evident in military science. For example, it is often stated in theory on insurgency and counterinsurgency that warfare is an *assymetric* phenomenon which aims at ‘targeting vulnerabilities and of doing the radically different’ (Thornton 2007: 2).} The suggestion that contemporary wars function as masquerades to obscure the fractal war against a “globalist” world order might be the most overtly political aspect of Baudrillard’s thought on war. If the appropriation of the real through the virtual indicated a shift in Baudrillard’s thinking from war as a derivative of the capitalist system (the Marxist view) to war as its own simulation (as outlined in part II of this introduction), this would indicate that this simulation hides a war which ‘haunts every world order, all hegemonic domination…for it is the world, the globe itself which resists globalization’ (Baudrillard 2002a: 12).6 Several articles in this special issue engage with this fractalization of war. William Pawlett (2014, this special issue) provides a reading of Baudrillard’s position on complicity and collusion particularly in relation to the notion of (and as a means to defy) hegemonic domination. Samuel Strehle (2014, this special issue) argues for a War Studies that take the undecidability of thinking (and the challenge to theory that this implies) as its founding principle, and in the epilogue Gerry Coulter (2014, this special issue) discusses Baudrillard’s war against cultural homogenization and sameness. Arguably Pawlett, Strehle, and Coulter all elucidate aspects of how to think ‘fractal war’ in relation to global policing of events and singularities. Moreover, Astrid Nordin (2014, this special issue) further investigates the implications of Baudrillard’s challenge as she inquiries into whether his thought might be extended to understanding the wars of “Others”. Engaging with China’s participation in the global “war on terror”, particularly the way contemporary Chinese rhetoric places itself as a (peaceful) alternative to the West and represents itself through war in relation to its neighbors, Nordin shows convincingly that there is no respite from our problems in the thought of ‘the Other’. Following Nordin and Coulter we realize that dividing lines between self and other do not run between the West and China, but rather in relation to the fractal particles at war in each and every one of us. As the texts illustrate, regardless of whether we agree with, or oppose Baudrillard’s critique against western globalism, it is important to notice (Coulter 2014, this special issue) that this critique is not a matter of simple ‘anti-Americanism’. William Merrin argues that Baudrillard in his challenge sets his eyes on a wider target: the entire Western semiotic culture (2005: 106). However, as Nordin convincingly shows this target might be less ‘Western’ than Baudrillard would acknowledge.

#### Vote to reject their singular disruption in presence as presence. Understanding war as instrument of policy/ the appeal to particularity disavows the structural nature of warfare. Only the development of an ontology of war that problematizes the project of military modernization can solve. True violence is the grid of subject construction- we must begin there.

Barkawi and Brighton ’11(Tarak, Department of IR at University of Cambridge, Shane, Department of IR at University of Sussex, “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique”, International Political Sociology (2011) 5, gender modified, [SG])

So, what can be said of the ontology of war, that fundamental character which manifests itself in each instance of war and is true of war in general? As a phenomenon, war presents itself in historically specific ways and most writing about it reflects this. Military historians begin with the archive and the particularity of testimony. Strategic analysts attend to specific alignments of forces and the effect of engagements on the course of a war. Those who experience a war encounter its particular violences and their cumulative impact. Despite this, the question of the fundamental character of war beyond its finite, historical manifestation recurs: just as war poets frequently intimate transcendent human truth, strategists and policy makers seek to recover eternal verities from narratives of past battles and campaigns. A proper approach to the ontology of war does not seek to resolve this discomforting tension, as though some decision were possible between ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘wars’’ as the correct object of inquiry. Rather, we propose to take it as a basic framework from which to proceed. We are not the first to do so. Clausewitz, tellingly described as both historically specific to the point of irrelevance (van Creveld 1991:ix; Kaldor 1999:13-30) and a source of timeless insight (Gray 1999:75-112), also grapples with the universal and the historically contingent character of war, what we call its historicity. We consider his efforts below and mark the recurrence of this conceptual tension in Etienne Balibar’s recent work (Balibar 2008). He discusses the continually transformative effect of ‘‘this war’’—the war we are in or may be subject to—upon efforts to think about ‘‘war’’ as such. The historicity of war, in the first instance, consists of the urgent grasp of ‘‘this war’’ on politics and society, of its ordering effects on thought and knowledge about war. What is it about ‘‘this war,’’ most fundamentally, that demands attention to the exclusion of other perspectives? Note a difference between accounts produced by strategists, commanders, staff officers, soldier poets, and memorialists, on the one hand, and much of the academic literature mentioned earlier. Participant perspectives, with varying degrees of directness, center on fighting, past, current, or potential. Fighting is that which thematically unifies war in general and in particular—‘‘war’’ with ‘‘wars’’—and no ontology of war can exclude it. Attention to fighting is that which marks out war-centered analysis from that reducing war to a secondary effect. Fighting and the violence of war exercise a profound grasp on the imagination, constituting the practical test to which strategic thought is oriented and the conventional mode for the achievement of victory. Fighting is dwelt upon in representations of war in popular literature and cinema. Even Sun Tsu’s aphorism that true strategic excellence consists in ‘‘[subduing] the enemy without fighting’’ (Sun 1971:77) derives its power from a paradoxical relation to this basic truth, perhaps best articulated in Clausewitz’s much quoted observation that fighting is as definitive for war as cash exchange for economy (Clausewitz 1976:97). However, what fighting is, how it might be understood and positioned within a fundamental theory of war, cannot be taken for granted. Clearing the ground for a new ontology of war requires recognition that fighting understood instrumentally, as the Clausewitzian duel, the test of arms, as ‘‘kinetic exchange,’’ misses its wider implication and importance. But as we saw above, fighting, or more broadly military operations, is the site of a decisive divide in inquiry that can be characterized as ‘‘war or society,’’ between a focus on war as fighting and on its impact on society. The former’s limitation of focus, we suggest, is not an intellectual failure but, rather, an outcome of the historicity of war. For those who focus on war as fighting, its reality as an actual and potential presence compels an instrumental relation to it, such that knowledge about war is never fully exterior to an order war itself creates. Fighting always entailsthe problem of how to survive and prevail, and the question of the appropriate instruments and means by which to do so occupies the minds of soldiers, strategists, and political leaders who embark on war**.** The question is what is occluded by such instrumentalization—by the order of knowing and being war creates—and what might be said of the wider ontological significance of fighting? Economics as a discipline after all has not been limited to or necessarily centered upon the study of cash exchange. War studies as the study of warfighting surely apprehends that most definitive of war, but rarely escapes from the limits of historic particularity and thereby constrains its own potential utility for a wider analysis of war. Fully developing our point about the instrumentalization that fighting demands would require attention to the broad and disparate literatures concerning the experience of war and its effects, something we do only in a limited fashion here. But it enables a preliminary observation on the ontology of war: war is defined by fighting or its immanent possibility and—as an historical, existential, issue in the lives of those who seek to understand it—this definitive element resists disinterested analysis, while tending to instrumentalize knowledge about war. One work that describes the powerful grasp of war on thought is Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. An extended essay on the relationship between ontology and ethics, Levinas’s work begins from the proposition that the proximity between war and knowing is fundamental, asking rhetorically whether or not ‘‘…lucidity, the mind’s openness on the true consist[s] in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?’’ (Levinas 1969:21) His point is the pervasive, but not always recognized or acknowledged, influence of war on knowledge, the ‘‘truth’’ of which functions within public rationality and institutions as a basis for the flourishing and survival of the polity. War for such rationality and institutions serves as a reality against which their truths are tested. Despite dissimulations by political figures and official organs, ‘‘the trial by force is the test of the real’’: a point of vindication or failure for those who might speak truth about the realities of war (ibid.). So far, Levinas appears to offer an imperative for instrumentalized strategic thought, for getting it right or facing ruin on the battlefield. But he quickly goes further to suggest there can be no rational comprehension of politics, no political calculation at all without understanding how ‘‘in advance [war’s] shadow falls over the actions of men.’’ Vitally, this imbrication of war and truth goes beyond the narrow framework of strategic thought and public rationality. That it does so is revealed in the reality of war itself, the violence of which ‘‘does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves’’ in ‘‘an order from which no one can keep [their] distance.’’ While fighting remains a kinetic exchange, the Clausewitzian Schlacht, and the most fundamental element of war, it is also an event and process with the ability to draw in and disrupt wider certitudes and coordinates of human life, to shape and accelerate the transitory and mutable in human affairs. It is a ‘‘casting into movement of beings hitherto anchored in their identity… by an objective order from which there is no escape…’’ (ibid.). War might, as Heraclitus tells us, make kings, gods, and slaves, but it also retains the power to unmake them, sometimes irrespective of their own actions. This transformative effect, the capacity to rework the reality of social and political existence, is, of course, the objective of waging war. War forces change, strategy being both the science of its management and the means to a putatively superior peace. But Levinas’ point, and the basis of his ethical intervention, is that irrespective of their being rendered such in strategic calculus and destroyed as such in fighting, people are not only, or even primarily, brute facts, strategic datum. Rather, they are, among other things, bearers of meaning and manifestations of contemporary truths. They are the authors and outcomes of social, political, and economic processes. Reinvested with full meaning, fighting marks the disruption of this wider order and the people and other entities which populate it, the unmaking and remaking of certainties, of meaning, of—potentially—the very coordinates of social and political life. ‘‘Since [Napoleon], all campaigns have produced such comet like vibrations that they can scarcely be thought of as only military because they involve the whole of society’’ (Clausewitz quoted in Bucholz 1985:25). As the basic element of the ontology of war then, fighting presents itself as a duality. First, it drives the intellectual instrumentality of truth about—and in—war, through its historicity and immediacy. But second, it also exceeds the terms of that immediacy. This ‘‘excess’’ is the capacity of organized violence to be more than kinetic exchange, to be constitutive and generative, to ‘‘cast into motion’’ subjects who are then alienated from themselves and come to know themselves and the world in new ways. For us, this ‘‘excess,’’ lying beyond the compelling, immanent socio-political logics of combatants, is at the core of the ontology of war. It is both that which gives war its status as an ontological event for politics and society and a problematizing framework from which a critical approach to war studies might begin. It is an ontology that retains the power of war-centered analysis without limiting inquiry to a focus on warfighting. We hold on to the ontological primacy of fighting, but wrest it from the instrumentality its historicity demands. In doing so, we note the material and intellectual importance of this historicity. War, like a societal centrifuge, has the power to draw in resources—intellectual, scientific, social, economic, cultural, and political—and unmake and re-work them in ways that cannot be foreseen. This disordering and reordering in part determines the dynamics of strategic thought, the rise and fall of various theories and paradigms of warfighting, as well as the more general subjective violence, the violence to meaning, to which Levinas testifies. We note also that this violence undoes many traditional enframements of war: in its contingency and destruction, it exceeds the strategic calculi of war as an instrument of policy; in its generative power of re-making, it exceeds reduction to its destructive consequences alone. Having offered these observations on the ontology of war, we now illustrate and expand upon them with particular reference to the problem of knowledge in and about war.

#### Interp – the 1AC is an object of research - the role of the neg is to refuse that object – They can weigh their impacts but we should be able to negate the aff in its totality by testing their justifications because those are the reasons they staked out to vote aff –

#### 1] otherwise vote neg on presumption because there’s no ethical framework to determine if the plan in a vacuum is a good idea which proves our interp is reciprocal and solves infinite regression

#### 2] Their model doesn’t solve - it kills nuance by filtering the debate through a 10 second statement AND includes process counterplans and piks which still link to their offense

### 1NC – OFF

#### CP: South Korea should outline the reforms implemented in 1AC Panda – Memorial will read green

South Korea’s expanding space launch ambitions, sealed by the July 2020 revisions to the bilateral missile guidelines, need not heighten Northeast Asian insecurity. Seoul’s interest in more economical space launch activities and an expanded space-based layer of military surveillance is understandable. South Korean measures to increase transparency, however, could reduce the chance of misperceptions about Seoul’s intentions. Similarly, South Korea could help build confidence around its ongoing missile programs.

To mitigate a worsening security dilemma with Pyongyang and potentially Beijing, Seoul should declare the scope of applications for government-sponsored research and development in larger solid rocket boosters. While publicizing existing capabilities, like the Hyunmoo-4, may be undesirable due to the current South Korean government’s inter-Korean diplomatic efforts, Seoul can do so without provocative messaging (such as threatening North Korea with decapitation attacks or strikes on hardened military sites).

Beyond this, South Korea should also transparently release plans for specific KARI-led civilian spacefaring projects and military satellites that may make use of larger solid-propellant boosters. Such transparency would reinforce Seoul’s stated plans and build confidence. At a higher level, the South Korean government should take steps to clarify its ongoing commitment to the terms of the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

Meanwhile, as testing of the Hyunmoo-4 continues, South Korea should limit development on larger payload conventional missiles that could technically be compliant with the 800-kilometer-range restriction in the bilateral missile guidelines.

Separately, the United States and South Korea should work to build confidence in the region that the 2017 and 2020 changes to the guidelines will not adversely affect regional stability. To this end, they should open an ongoing bilateral consultative review of the missile guidelines. While Seoul is not seeking further changes to the guidelines, it would be productive for the allies to establish a semiannual or quarterly review of the guidelines and discuss related matters, including any issues of concern stemming from South Korean missile activities and civilian rocket research.

**South** **Korea** has seen its **security** **environment** **deteriorate** **sharply** over the last decade as its northern neighbor has reached significant missile and nuclear milestones. Meanwhile, political malaise over cost-sharing has begun to **seep** into the **foundations** **of** the bilateral **alliance** **with** the **U**nited **St**ates since 2017. In this environment, precision strike missiles and a robust, indigenous space-based constellation of military surveillance satellites can plug important perceived gaps in conventional deterrence and even hedge against plausible shifts in how the United States postures its forces on the Korean Peninsula.

But Seoul’s ability to now use solid-propellant boosters to deliver satellite payloads to low-Earth orbit should not be the primary concern in the short term. Given the already impressive capabilities embodied in the Hyunmoo-4 and its predecessor, South Korea has already made itself stand out as a leader in missile technology. But as Seoul embarks into a **new** **era** as a spacefaring nation, it should take precautions to dispel concerns about its intentions and work to build confidence while practicing effective deterrence against North Korea.

### 1NC – OFF

#### South Korea is looking into 6G programs now but continued private sector investment is key.

Fletcher 7/1 [(Bevin, editor of FierceWireless. She previously served as senior reporter for Wireless Week and CED Magazine, covering the wireless industry on a variety of topics including regulation, technology, and business. She has also worked as a journalist at biotech and finance trade publications. Bevin has a bachelor's degree in journalism from West Virginia University.) “South Korea kickstarts 6G plans,” Fierce Wireless, 7/1/21. <https://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/south-korea-kickstarts-6g-plans>] RR

South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT this week established a 6G R&D implementation plan that calls for investing around $194 million by 2025 in six focus areas.

The plan targets government investment totaling KRW 17.9 billion ($15.78 million) in 2021 across 10 strategic technologies, including Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, with KRW 220 billion within four years.

The technologies correlate with the focus areas, including performance, Terahertz bands, space communications, ultra-precision; artificial intelligence; and reliability.

Specifically MSIT outlined strategic technologies that include Tbps-capable wireless and optical communication for maximum 1 Tbps speeds; Terahertz RF components and spectrum model for bands between 100-300 GHz; space mobile and satellite communications to help expand support altitude to 10 km above ground; end-to-end ultra-precision networking for 1/10 latency compared to 5G; intelligent wireless access and network with a focus on applying AI to all sections of the network; and technology for constant network quality monitoring for 5G focused on embedded security.

This year the focus is on laying the groundwork for technologies and identifying technical requirements for key areas of the 6G network. The government is also establishing 6G research centers at three universities in 2021, including KAIST, Sungkyunkwan University and Korea University.

South Korea is also targeting leadership in international standards and patents, with an emphasis on active public-private cooperation in the early stages of 6G.

“As next-generation communications network lays foundation for digital innovation, the public and private sector should work together to take challenges in leading global market in 6G era based on our experiences and knowhow in network,” said Minister Lim Hyesook of Science and ICT. “Furthermore, as both countries have solid foundation for collaboration thanks to Korea-U.S. Summit, we will work together in the early stage of 6G deployment based on such cooperation. We will continue to closely cooperate with relevant ministries, large companies and small and medium-sized enterprises to secure competitiveness in the future and further strengthen Korea’s position as a digital powerhouse.”

In May U.S. and South Korea agreed to encourage joint R&D on emerging technology including 6G.

South Korea and the U.S. signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the South Korean Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) for collaborative research opportunities, including 6G.

South Korea plans to promote joint studies on core 6G technologies and spectrum, including 11 studies with the U.S., one study with China and two studies with Finland. The country’s 5G Forum will sign MoUs for 6G collaboration with organizations in the private sector, like the Next G Alliance in the U.S.

While 5G deployments are still largely in early phases, industry and governments are turning an eye toward 6G. Europe started a flagship program called Hexa-X, targeting 6G leadership. Groups like ATIS’ Next G Alliance in North America are looking to form next steps and roadmaps for 6G. China has indicated the start of 6G efforts as well.

The U.S. and U.K. earlier this month announced plans to create a detailed science and technology partnership agreement, including collaboration on 6G.

Executives from Qualcomm and Ericsson testified on Wednesday before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology for a legislative hearing focused on securing U.S. wireless networks and supply chain.

Qualcomm SVP of Spectrum Strategy & Tech Policy Dean Brenner said at the hearing that 5G still has a long runway, but the company has started early work on 6G. He emphasized that there won’t be 6G without spectrum, allocated by the FCC, and that spectrum and technology interactions need to take place at a very early stage.

Jason Boswell, head of security and network product solutions for Ericsson North America, said before the subcommittee that if they had not already started on the race to 6G, “we would already be behind.”

In addition to the vendor’s own R&D, he noted it’s important to show collaborations including public-private partnerships. Boswell cited involvement with the NSF RINGS (Resilient & Intelligent NextG Systems) program, noting a focus on potentially significantly impactful technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, kilohertz spectrum. There will be many different things needed to take advantage of 6G – “not just make it go faster,” he added.

#### A strong South Korean space sector is key to launching 6G networks.

Clarke 10/24 [(Carrington, he ABC's Seoul Correspondent, covering East Asia for the network. He works across digital, television and radio) “Asia is in the midst of a space race, but it's not just about exploration. It's also a military flex,” ABC Net News, 10/24/21. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/carrington-clarke/8042208>] RR

South Korea may not yet have its own dedicated 'Space Force' like the US, but it has made clear that space is crucial to its defence.

However, there are also legitimate civilian and scientific motivations for its ambitions for a space industry.

South Korea's capacity to launch its own rockets is a critical step for reaching goals like a national 6G cellular network and a sovereign radio navigation system like the American GPS.

Lee Hyung-mok, who is a professor emeritus in physics and astronomy at Korea National University, said he and his fellow scientists were excited about the opportunity to use these rockets.

He said they will help transport observation equipment outside the earth's atmosphere, allowing them to better understand our universe.

#### 1AC Clarke proves our link – inserted in green

South Korea may not yet have its own dedicated 'Space Force' like the US, but it has made clear that **space** is **crucial** **to** its **defence**. However, there are also legitimate civilian and scientific motivations for its ambitions for a space industry. South Korea's capacity to launch its own rockets is a critical step for reaching goals like a national 6G cellular network and a sovereign radio navigation system like the American GPS. Lee Hyung-mok, who is a professor emeritus in physics and astronomy at Korea National University, said he and his fellow scientists were excited about the opportunity to use these rockets. He said they will help transport observation equipment outside the earth's atmosphere, allowing them to better understand our universe. Such a discovery doesn't come cheap and Professor Lee said he recognises that space travel can be expensive. He also said he knows that national defence is often an easier way to get the government to loosen the public purse strings. "Maybe the government decided to spend a huge amount of money because of the military importance," he said. Although competition might be spurring further investment in space, he still worries about where it might lead. "What I really hope is that instead of competing too much, it's better to collaborate," he said. "So in many areas, they try to work together." But he said within Asia, no-one is in that "mood" yet.

#### 6G is key to cyber security – turns noko cyber attacks

Ziegler et al. 10/14 [(Volker, (Senior Member, IEEE) received the Dipl.-Ing. (M.Sc.) and Dr.-Ing. (Ph.D.) degrees from the Department of Electrical Engineering, Universität (TH) Karlsruhe, Germany.) “Security and trust in the 6G era,” Nokia Bell Labs, 10/14/21. Graphs/Figures Omitted <https://d1p0gxnqcu0lvz.cloudfront.net/documents/Nokia_Security_and_trust_in_the_6G_era_White_Paper_EN.pdf>] RR

In our 6G security vision, we cluster security technology enablers into domains of cyber-resilience, privacy and trust, and their respective intersection as shown in Figure 3. Our approach emphasizes the need to extend cyber-resilience technologies by privacy-preserving technologies and on top of that, trust-creating technologies in order to achieve the ultimate goal of trustworthy 6G networks. We consider resilience against all kinds of cyber-attacks as the core element and indispensable foundation — a network that lacks these attributes of cyber-resilience will not be able to protect privacy and enable trust. While cyberresilience protects privacy against external attacks, end users may in addition want to reduce the amount of sensitive information that is revealed internally, i.e., to the multiple stakeholders involved in providing the communication services. Enabling technologies are needed beyond those in the area of cyberresilience. By adding specific technologies focusing on creating trust, we complete the overall picture of a resilient, privacy-preserving and trustworthy 6G network. In this paper, we have decomposed technology enablers into the following categories: pervasive AI/ML, automated SW creation, automated closed loop security operation, privacy preserving technologies, HW and cloud embedded anchors of trust, quantum safe mechanisms, physical layer security and distributed ledger.

Successful standardization has been the cornerstone of a unified technology landscape that has enabled the proliferation of the mobile communication generations to date. The ecosystem of standardization organizations that has been involved in the architecture and specification of 4G and 5G systems has its sights firmly set on the 6G future as well. Timing is of the essence for creating the optimal impact of standardization. Most SDOs start with studies on technology enablers first before moving into a normative phase of specification. While we expect normative 6G standardization work to start no earlier than 2024/25, we see the precursors of related studies in several technology fields, which we reference in the following.

Pervasive use of AI/ML can be considered a mega-trend of security relevance and driving force to help define the next generation of the Telecom Operation Map (eTOM) [20] and business process framework. In the section below on automated security operations, AI/ML is identified as one of the key drivers for a comprehensive vision of a Secure Telecom Operation Map (SecTOM) for the 6G era. AI/ML will enable and transform automation and analytics for e2e delivery of services to customers as well as for processes to design, create, deliver and support the entire software lifecycle. AI/ML-enabled 6G must include an AI/ ML-enabled 6G security architecture in both SW creation and network operations. Notwithstanding, the complexity and the challenge of continuous adaption requires practical implementations of such a concept, without detailed continuous logging and synchronization across the stacks and processes, but rather, based on smart and representative thread sampling. Mitigation of adversarial attacks will need dedicated research as part of a comprehensive “AIOps” paradigm (cf. “Automated security operations” below), which will include adversarial training to improve robustness, continual adaption of the algorithms that an ML model uses to classify data, and omni-present checks for consistency and integrity of the ML models.

In short, AI/ML will be used pervasively across 6G security architecture, process and technology domains. As discussed in Section III, along with its benefits, there will be new and emerging threats rooted in AI/ ML. ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Securing Artificial Intelligence (SAI) is already working on these aspects and this domain will gain more significance with the proliferation of AI/ML use towards 6G.

With AI/ML-supported, automated SW creation and secure network operations, 6G will address two of the major root causes of unsatisfactory security in today’s information and communication technology systems: vulnerable software and unsecure operational practices. Beyond this, 6G cyber-resilience clearly requires quantum-safe cryptography, considering the progress in the area of quantum computing. Physical layer security, i.e., exploiting the 6G radio technology not only for higher data rates and lower latency, but also for improved security, complements the set of cyber-resilience enablers we consider most relevant for the 6G area. Clearly, on the way towards 6G, these technology enablers will need to be broken down into more granular security mechanisms and further refined and optimized. They will also be part of the expected 5G security evolution, as described in Section II. New requirements coming up in the future as well as yet unknown technologies may also call for enhancing this initial set of cyber-resilience technology enablers.

Building on cyber-resilience, it is commonly agreed that privacy-preserving technologies need to be enhanced in 6G.

In our high-level view, we group all these into a single technology enabler, but we discuss the relevant technologies one-by-one in the following section below on privacy-preserving technologies. To complete the picture, two technologies aiming at enhancing trust are essential for trustworthy 6G networks: First, HW trust anchors that are resistant against tampering via software, with the challenge to apply them in a highly dynamic cloud environment, where workloads are no longer tightly coupled to specific hardware platforms.

## ON

#### T/L – They cut like evey card you should assign less creedence and err neg – I didn’t have much time to prep this aff

### Noko

#### Nonunique – host of other areas in which Noko is treated as unequal, like their nukes going unrecognized and devastating sanctions

#### Grossman has no terminal impact – it also assumes Noko stationing nukes in space, but they haven’t read ev about the feasibility of that

If North Korea could detonate a nuclear weapon in space, it could also undertake a ‘**Van** **Allen’** attack that would be designed to excite and **expand** the lower Van Allen **radiation** **belt** around Earth, exposing up to 803 satellites in LEO to high levels of radiation. US Defense Threat Reduction Agency analysis in 2010 suggested that satellites in LEO, which are not hardened against radiation found in higher orbits, would be vulnerable to nuclear detonations that ‘**pumped’** the intensity of the Van Allen belts. Weeks or months of cumulative damage generated by passing through the zones of radiation would **cause** those **satellites** **to** **fail**. A Van Allen attack is highly indiscriminate: any satellite passing through the excited lower belt would be damaged. US satellites would be just as defenceless as those belonging to China, Russia or other states.

### Debris

#### No impact to debris – it hits stations all the time.

Cain ’15 (Fraser; 12/23/15; writer for Universe Today; “How Do Astronauts Avoid Debris”; http://www.universetoday.com/121067/how-do-astronauts-avoid-debris)

So, just how do we keep our space stations, ships and astronauts from being riddled with holes from all of the space junk in orbit around Earth? We revel in the terror grab bag of all the magical ways to get snuffed in space. Almost as much as we celebrate the giant brass backbones of the people who travel there. We’ve already talked about all the scary ways that astronauts can die in space. My personal recurring “Hail Mary full of grace, please don’t let me die in space” nightmare is orbital debris. We’re talking about a vast collection of spent rockets, dead satellites, flotsam, jetsam, lagan and derelict. It’s not a short list. NASA figures there are **21,000 bits of junk** bigger than 10 cm, **500,000 particles** between 1 and 10 cm, and more than **100 million** smaller than 1 cm. Sound familiar, humans? This is our high tech, sci fi great Pacific garbage patch. Sure, a tiny rivet or piece of scrap foil doesn’t sound very dangerous, but consider the fact that astronauts are orbiting the Earth at a velocity of about 28,000 km/h. And the Tang packets, uneaten dehydrated ice cream, and astronaut poops are also traveling at 28,000 km/h. Then think about what happens when they collide. Yikes… or yuck. Here’s the International Space Station’s solar array. See that tiny hole? Embiggen and clarinosticate! That’s a tiny puncture hole made in the array by a piece of orbital crap. The whole station is **pummeled by tiny pieces of space program junk drawer contents**. Back when the Space Shuttle was flying, NASA had to **constantly replace their windows because of the damage they were experiencing** from the orbital equivalent of Dennis the Menace hurling paint chips, fingernail clippings, and frozen scabs.

**Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

#### Use or lose is wrong – It’d be irrational AND never be contemplated by any state.

Kroenig 18 Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford UPress, pp. 137-142

The second, and more common, argument as to why nuclear superiority might be destabilizing is because the state in the position of nuclear inferiority (in this case, America’s adversaries) may feel “use ’em or lose ’em” (UELE) pressures, but this argument also withers under interrogation.26

According to strategic stability theorists, a US nuclear advantage increases the danger of nuclear war because the inferior opponent may fear that its nuclear arsenal is vulnerable to a first strike. Rather, than wait for the adversary (in this case the United States) to move first and wipe out, or seriously blunt, its strategic forces, the argument goes, the inferior state may decide to intentionally launch a nuclear war early in a crisis in order to avoid suffering a disarming first strike. This is the logic most often invoked by strategic stability theorists when they claim that US nuclear advantages are destabilizing. This is also the precise problem identified and inspired by Wohlstetter’s basing studies.

Use ’em or lose ’em enjoys a certain superficial plausibility, but, upon closer inspection, there are two fundamental reasons why the logic simply does not hold up. First, it ignores the fact that the superior state retains a healthy ability to retaliate. So, even if the inferior state is worried about having its nuclear weapons eliminated in a first strike, the decision to launch its nuclear weapons first as a coping mechanism would be a decision to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with at least a secure, second-strike capability. This means that even if the inferior state launches its nuclear weapons first, it will be virtually guaranteed to suffer devastating nuclear retaliation. Moreover, given that it is in a situation of extreme inferiority (so extreme that it might even be vulnerable to a preemptive nuclear strike), this would mean intentionally launching a devastating nuclear war that will likely turn out much worse for itself then for its opponent. It would simply be irrational for a state to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with an assured retaliatory capability.

Let us consider a concrete example. The United States maintains nuclear superiority over China, as we have seen in previous chapters. Strategic stability theorists want us to believe that if the United States takes additional steps to further enhance its superiority, then China would face even greater temptations to launch a nuclear first strike against the US homeland in the event of a serious crisis. In other words, strategic stability theorists hold that China would be so worried about losing a devastating nuclear war against United States that it would intentionally choose to start a devastating nuclear war against the United States. The argument does not make sense.

### Alliance

#### 1AC Sukin from this year is right about alliance cred being strong now – proves no impact to Soko space sector

#### US-Soko alliance is weak now – space capabilities are key to bolster it

Park 3/26 [(Si-Soo, covers space industries in South Korea, master’s degree in science journalism from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, bachelor’s degree in business from Hanyang University) “South Korean leader vows ‘landing on the moon by 2030,” Space News, 3/26/2021] JL

The U.S. Space Force’s top general expressed hope for deepening cooperation with South Korea’s military Oct. 18, saying “Katchi Kapshida,” which means “We go together” in Korean, a symbolic slogan of the long-standing Korea-U.S. alliance.

Chief of U.S. Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond cited the slogan during his video message for the 22nd International Aerospace Symposium at Grand InterContinental Hotel here, a biennial event organized by the Republic of Korea Air Force.

“A key part of deterrence comes from strong international partnership, mutual trust and shared value,” Raymond said. “A long-standing alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea is a great example of the strong partnership.”

He said the bilateral space partnership had been strengthened with the Aug. 27 agreement reached between him and Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Park In-ho at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. And having a “deeper partnership” is critical to ensure stable and peaceful use of the increasingly contested space domain, he noted. Under the agreement, the ROK Air Force will join U.S. Space Force-led joint military drills aimed at bolstering the latter’s defense capabilities in outer space. The two sides also set up a joint consultative body on space policy, share information on space surveillance and improve joint space operations capabilities such as missile defense.

“In fact, one of Space Force’s top priorities is making partnership with nations around the world, including the Republic of Korea. We are working with these nations to train together, develop capabilities together and operate together,” he said.

Benjamin S. Lambeth, a senior fellow at California-based think tank RAND Corporation, called South Korea a “formal partner” of the U.S. in space cooperation. “The ROK is now preparing to spend some $14 billion on improving its on-orbit capabilities. This suggests one solid basis for closer U.S.-ROK space ties,” Lambeth. “Another was last year’s launch of the ROK’s first military communications satellite by a U.S. Falcon 9 rocket.” He said America’s upcoming technical support to develop South Korea’s own satellite navigation system would offer “another promising venue” to enhance the partnership.

While speakers from the U.S. largely focused their presentations on how to strengthen the Space Force’s capabilities, Korean speakers discussed policies and regulations that will help bolster the nation’s space power and industry.

“Space is no longer a mere area of curiosity; rather, it has now become a key domain for our national security, and only rigorous preparation will ensure our survival in the future space environment,” said ROK Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Park In-ho. “To this end, civil-military-government cooperation has become more important than ever.”

#### 1AC Pollack is not reverse causal – doesn’t explain why Soko would sign onto BMD agreements given they said no for decades prior to having a space industry