## OFF

#### Content warning – death good

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp: The affirmative must not defend permissibility as sufficient to prove an obligation.

#### Violation: Their Advocacy and FW defend permissibility affirms

#### Prefer

#### 1] Precision – Permissibility negates -- the aff has to prove an obligation which means that failure to do so negates.

#### Ought is defined as

“Definition of OUGHT," Merriam Webster, No Date. Accessed 2/26/21. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> //Houston Memorial SC]

Ought is used to express obligation

#### Proving permissibility alone triggers moral Omissiblity – the aff has to prove that their aff is possible and necessary. Chart in doc for clarity.

**McNamara 06**[Paul McNamara(Associate Professor of Philosophy @ the University of New Hampshire). “Deontic Logic.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Tue Feb 7, 2006; substantive revision Wed Apr 21, 2010. Accessed 2/26/21. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic//> Houston Memorial SC]

Here too, all propositions are divided into three jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive classes: every proposition is obligatory, optional, or impermissible, but no proposition falls into more than one of these three categories. Furthermore, the permissible propositions are those that are either obligatory or optional, and the omissible propositions are those that are impermissible or optional. The reader can easily confirm that this natural scheme is also perfectly analogous to the threefold classification we gave above for the alethic modal notions.

A picture containing table

Description automatically generated

#### Our definition o/ws

#### A] Intent to define – our ev distincts obligations from permissibility in the context of morality.

#### B] Author Quals – our ev sources over 100 peer-reviewed articles, 4 years of substantive revision and backed by a credible publisher.

#### Precision o/ws

#### A] Jurisdiction – judge is contracted to vote inside the rez.

#### B] Side constraint – you need a model of the topic before winning a more pragmatic one

#### C] Absent rules debate collapses – you follow speech times – we need agreed upon rules else a structured activity doesn’t exist

#### 2] Infinite Abuse – They can just pick any advocacy that’s permissible like drinking water, or affs with 0 lit controls the IL to fairness because its impossible to negate when every descriptive fw and solvency deficit affirms under their model. also key to Topic Specific Clash since Private Appropriation are morally irresponsible is core topic controversy.

#### 3] Ethical repugnance – understanding permissibility as sufficient to greenlight neutral action is the foundation of rape culture by viewing action as ethically permissible until told otherwise – prefer a paradigm of explicit consent that assumes a lack of permission – that’s an independent voter for safety which o/ws on access.

**Fraser ’15** – Fraser, Courtney (J.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law). ‘From “Ladies First” to “Asking for It”: Benevolent Sexism in the Maintenance of Rape Culture’. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:141] Jan. 2015. Cw//az recut

The problem of sexual violence against women has been analyzed with an eye to the causal significance of misogyny, but legal analysis has neglected the role played by other facets of sexism, including ostensibly “benevolent” sexism (or chivalry), in the perpetuation of rape culture, which normalizes this violence. Additionally, discussions of sexual violence often overlook the epidemic of acquaintance rape, although it accounts for the majority of sexual assaults committed. This Comment draws on social psychology and gender theory to posit that benevolent-sexist ideologies construct women as creatures devoid of agency, leading men to routinely presume women’s consent to sexual activity whether or not such consent in fact exists. The legal treatment of women’s rape and sexual harassment claims shows these catastrophic effects of this process as women are relegated cognitively, socially, and legally to the role of passive receptivity—forced to prove an absence of consent as men are taught to assume its presence. This Comment reviews legal proposals to address rape and sexual harassment, some of which have been implemented, and concludes that direct legal reforms alone are insufficient. It asserts that gender norms, and the rigid binary division of gender, must be broken down if the rates at which rape is committed and acquitted are to decrease. It finally identifies possible steps that target the root of sexism and rape culture—binary gender differentiation—and concludes that the liberation of queer, trans, and intersex communities is essential to the feminist project of eradicating sexual violence.

#### TVA – choose between permissibility negates or whole-res. Presumption affirms solves all your offense.

### 1NC – OFF

#### The age of state-centric politics is over. The Newtonian IR paradigm fails to address interactions beyond Westphalian abstractions and guarantees extinction.

Pan 20 – Chengxin Pan, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020 (“Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1354066120938844 journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt, Available online at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066120938844>, Accessed 11-08-2020)

Wholeness and the study of IR The concept of wholeness is central to Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory (Bohm, 1980; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Zinkin, 1987: 6). Despite a growing effort to include a wider array of issues and factors, IR still has a rather “weak sense of a social whole” (Albert and Buzan, 2013: 121). Even as IR scholars focus on “macrolevel” factors such as international political systems, international structures, international societies, world systems, and global networks, these systemic factors are at best particular structural abstractions of world politics, such as anarchy, the distribution of capabilities, and international norms and rules. While these systemic or structural features are part and parcel of the whole, ontologically they are often seen as either mere external and causal determinants of state behavior, or ultimately reducible to parts (e.g. states, material resources, or ideas),15 rather than as the whole in the holographic sense of the word. By whole we mean the entirety of space, time, and the information, relations, structures, processes, movements, and parts/agents contained within that all-encompassing space-time. In the IR context, the whole goes well beyond states and the totality of their interactions. It embodies the whole social and ecological systems as well as their explicate and implicate relations both between and embedded within their constituent “parts.” Such “parts” may include regions, states, societies, cultures, religions, peoples, economies, markets, goods, histories, ideas, emotions, materials, creatures, and natural phenomena. Of course, what exactly makes up the whole for IR cannot be exhaustively tallied a priori, because by definition such a task is impossible in any given space-time. But the point is that wholeness should be given a higher ontological priority in IR. Just as trees do not grow as assemblages of previously separate branches, leaves, and roots, the world does not start off with merely fragmented parts and preexisting sovereign states which then come together to form a global system; it is the other way round: the whole permeates through the parts and forms the essential relational conditions under which parts emerge and exist. This approach makes it imperative for IR to look for relations in much broader contexts which otherwise have been invisible, understudied, or artificially carved up by mainstream IR. To advocate for wholeness does not mean always privileging “macro-level” issues at the global level. In any case, whole-part or macro-micro issues are always already entangled and co-emergent (Wendt, 2015: 257). Micro parts and issues, precisely because they are microscopic, may be particularly prone to be diffusely spread and enfolded into various parts of the whole. As a result, micro parts simultaneously develop an emergent, holographic property of the whole. The fact that the tiny coronavirus can be quickly enfolded into almost every corner of the whole world and turn global life upside down illustrates the part-whole entanglement, and we dismiss its holographically holistic nature and impact at our own peril. To further illustrate, often traditionally considered outside the purview of IR, micro issues or events such as music (Gienow-Hecht, 2015), sports (e.g. ping-pong diplomacy), the Chernobyl disaster (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union, van der Veen, 2013), a flight school in Florida (e.g. 9/11), US subprime mortgage crisis, Fukushima, Wikileaks, melting polar ice caps, a Tunisian street vendor (e.g. the Arab Spring and the Syria conflict) and now even COVID-19 may be all in various ways “localized” holographic instantiations of the wholes. As such, they can and do play an important part in both reflecting and shaping the whole, especially in the form of some unexpected events and surprising turns, such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the global financial crisis, the rise of Donald Trump, and the current global pandemic. True, some of those “micropolitical” issues have begun to attract IR’s attention (Kertzer, 2017; Solomon and Steele, 2017), but overall the discipline lacks an explicit and holographic ontological and conceptual foundation for a more systematic engagement with the duality of whole-part. Of course, we cannot deal with “the whole of reality all at once” (Bohm, 1980: 2; see also Wendt, 1999: 14). Often it is necessary to take things “apart” and analyze them as if they were separable units. But it is important to always remember the “as if” caveat, lest we reify them as something objectively autonomous. It is also worth remembering that ontologically international relations are always a holographic part of bigger wholes, not closed or autonomous systems or units in and of themselves. In this context, a quantum holographic perspective becomes imperative especially in the face, for example, of the increasingly apparent human-nature holographic entanglement as evidenced by mounting “glocal” environmental crises and their implications for economic development, international conflict, and planetary survival. Contrary to the prevailing IR approaches that continue to subordinate environmental issues to a state-centric framework and a “national economic” imperative (Saurin, 1996), a quantum holographic approach has the potential to bridge the ontological and conceptual division between the parts and the wholes.

#### The alternative is quantum holography.

#### That challenges the drawbacks of Newtonian theorization.

Pan 20 – Chengxin Pan, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020 (“Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38 © The Author(s) 2020 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1354066120938844 journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt, Available online at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066120938844>, Accessed 11-08-2020)

Despite its name, International Relations (IR) has long been predicated on a Newtonian substantialist ontology of things, rather than an ontology of relations, which are “the important missing dimension in most theories of IR” (Wight, 2006: 296). In recent years, IR’s “deep Newtonian slumber” (Ruggie, 1998: 194) has been disturbed by a “relational turn” (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Kavalski, 2018; McClurg and Young, 2011; Neumann, 2013; Nexon, 2010; Nordin et al., 2019; Nordin and Smith, 2018; Qin, 2018; Shih, 2016; Trownsell et al., 2019). Challenging two versions of Newtonian substantialism: atomism (individualism) and structuralism (structuralistsubstantialism) (Zanotti, 2017; see also Wendt, 1999: 26), the gist of this turn is that the fundamental reality is not independent things, but relations. Focusing on “a relation between entities” (Jackson and Nexon, 2019: 584–585, emphases in original), the relational scholarship also departs from the agent-structure and level-of-analysis debates. Yet, despite this significant and welcome development, IR’s relational turn suffers several drawbacks. First, it lacks a clear conception of relations/relationality beyond often tautological definitions. Second, insisting on the temporal priority of relations over entities, much of the literature sidesteps an implicit “chicken-egg” dilemma between entities and relations. Further and more importantly, the relational turn has not yet seriously engaged with another important development in the social sciences in general and IR in particular, namely, the “quantum turn” (Keeley, 2007; Wendt, 2015), or according to Der Derian and Wendt (2020), a permanent quantum revolution. This neglect is both surprising and lamentable. Both turns share an anti-Newtonian stand, and as a “momentous shift in metaphysical outlook” (Seager, 2018: 5), quantum mechanics espouses a doctrine of relational holism “in an all pervasive way” (Teller, 1986: 71), which would make quantum theory a valuable source in IR’s relational quest. To be fair, at least in the IR context the neglect seems mutual. With few exceptions and some general references to relational ontology (e.g. Wendt, 2015; Fierke, 2017; Zanotti, 2017), the burgeoning quantum turn literature in IR has not focused extensively on relations either. Wendt’s pioneering work on quantum theory, for example, is driven primarily by the need to “reconcile consciousness and meaning with the material world” (Wendt, 2006: 218), though he acknowledges that quantum mechanics’ holistic and relational contribution is “a thematic that needs to be developed down the road” (Wendt, 2015: 35). Therefore, the gap between these two turns in IR calls for an explicit quantum relational perspective. This is what this article sets out to do, by offering, more specifically, a quantum holographic approach. The basic notion of holography is that an “object” is “part of the whole while it simultaneously contains the whole” (Van Daele, 2018: 651, emphases added).1 In quantum theory, the holographic principle promises a solution to the well-known tensions between atomic-level quantum physics and Albert Einstein’s planet-level theory of gravity by suggesting that the universe is a holographic projection: what appears on the surface (event horizon) of a black hole is encoded information about what is inside, “just as a two-dimensional hologram encodes a three-dimensional image” (Merali, 2013: 517). So far still largely alien to this field (few exceptions include Pan, 2018; Wendt, 2015), quantum holography adds value to IR in several important ways. First, as a specific form of relationality, quantum holography helps mitigate the existing definitional vagueness about relations. Second, instead of asserting relations’ priority over entities, quantum holography accentuates the ontological duality of relations and things. Avoiding the ontological chickenegg dilemma over which comes first, the duality proposition suggests that relations do not exist either before or after things; rather, relations are from the outset implicated or embodied in things. Relations-in-things are implicate relations that can be better understood through quantum mechanics, whereas things-in-relations (and relations-between-things) represent more classical understandings of relations as something external, compositional, and derivative. Third, quantum holography provides a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of relations, including whole-part relations and internal relations, which have not been adequately theorized in IR. Furthermore, its differentiation between explicate and implicate relations enables us to incorporate mainstream IR’s Newtonian ontology as a limiting case in a broader quantum relational ontology, rather than simply brush it aside.

#### Critically evaluating the observer effect halts erroneous predictions.

Obi-Okolie 14 – Obi-Okolie, Favour, Delta State University, Abraka Delta State, Nigeria, 2014 (“Towards A Quantum Mechanical Model of Foreign Policy Analysis”, International Affairs and Global Strategy, Vol.27, ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online), Available online at <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/view/18219/18594>, Accessed 11-08-2020)

Uncertainty, as noted earlier, is one of the key features of quantum mechanics. It holds that no matter how carefully we observe, even with adequate knowledge of initial conditions, we can never objectively understand a physical reality. Applying the concept to politics, Cioffi-Revilla defines uncertainty as the “lack of sureness or absence of strict determination in political life”44 Rathbun furthers that “information is ambiguous because the world is complex and can only be approximated and partially understood due to cognitive limitations.”45 He therefore sought to explain the element of uncertainty within mainstream IR theories. For realists, it is experienced in fear of each other’s intention, while rationalists try to cope with uncertainty through international institutions charged to monitor and signal benign intent. For constructivists, uncertainty stems from an assumption that states are uncertain about action to take when norms as defined by identity are absent. Then cognitivists argue that uncertainty emanates from the confusion caused by the complexity of international politics as well as mental limitations of statesmen. 46 Assessing uncertainty from the quantum mechanical framework, we begin with Heisenberg who is arguably the first to introduce the principle. From his perspective, we cannot completely describe an object since we cannot simultaneously describe its momentum and position with exactitude. The more accurately we understand position, the less accurately we understand the momentum, vice versa. As such, it becomes impossible to predict the destination of a moving object since we cannot accurately determine its position and momentum at the same time. From quantum mechanical thought, this is may be due to hidden variables and/or non-locality. Non-locality describes the possibility of a quantum state to interact with another quantum state of the same pair, even when separated by large distances without an established means of communication. By position we refer to the location of an object relative to a reference point while momentum is taken to mean the measure of the motion of an object relative to its mass and velocity. Position in theoretical physics is synonymous with the condition of a State prior to an action or event being analysed. By condition we mean the geographic and politico-economic structure of a State. In the same vein, the foreign policy action of a State in a given case, accounts for momentum in physics. Therefore, by directly applying Heisenberg’s argument to foreign policy analysis, it is impossible to completely understand foreign policy behaviour of a State by merely understanding its condition prior to the behaviour being analysed. Also, it is impossible to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour. This explains why despite efforts to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour, mainstream approaches to foreign policy analysis have routinely fallen short in this regard. A good example showing the compatibility of Heisenberg’s uncertainty in foreign policy analysis could be found in the recent Arab Spring. An understanding of the socio-political landscape of the Arab world had led scholars of different schools to conclude that democracy was essentially incompatible with the Arab world. However, at the outbreak of the region-wide uprising, scholars began to foretell democratization. Soon, scholars began to make reversals in their predictions, such that it is no longer fashionable to equate the Arab uprising with democratization. What is deducible from this instance is that, in agreement with Heisenberg’s uncertainty, it is impossible to understand the present and predict the future by simply understanding initial conditions. This position is also understood by recalling that whereas the Cold War engaged IR scholars in a war of paradigms, none of the theories and models predicted the end of the conflict.47 Schrodinger’s wave equation furthers our understanding of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with foreign policy analysis. Inferring from his postulation, it is impossible to understand the totality of a State’s foreign policy behaviour. Rather, every State possesses every possible theoretical element that can be attributed to a State’s foreign policy. For instance, before observation is made, every state is weak and strong at the same time; aggressive and accommodating; cooperative and competitive. However, upon observation, the observer interferes with reality such that the condition of the State aligns with the premonition of the observer/analyst. Thus, we are uncertain of a State’s foreign policy behaviour until we decide to observe and/or analyse. Upon analysis, our uncertainty is substituted by the ‘creation’ of reality. It is at this point therefore that the foreign policy analyst relinquishes every claim to objectivity, having created the reality s/he claims to analyse. Relating the foregoing to Bohr’s contribution to Quantum Mechanics, the foreign policy analyst can no longer be regarded as an impartial observer but as an active participant. The instrument with which s/he assesses a phenomenon directly interacts with the physical object being observed to influence the result obtained. Consequently, we could safely assume that if no one was observing, then nothing would be existing. Then, should we now assume that occurrences in international politics are the creation of analysts? To a large extent, the answer weighs to the affirmative and accounts for why certain state and non-state actors, cognizant of this fact, have immensely invested towards gaining the attention of observers/analysts. Terrorist organizations routinely post videos of violence on the internet for analysts to ‘create’ their existence. States regularly release videos and images of military drills and military hardware. The essence is to gain attention of analysts who would therefore ‘create’ the desired reality. Indeed, terrorism is non-existent until it is so designated by analysts. More so, war is simply what analysts and observers make of it. In addition to the foregoing, quantum mechanics gives us insight in understanding causation. This is chiefly in its notion of interconnectedness which carries potentially far-reaching implications for foreign policy analysis. According to Senge, et al, we are now aware that interconnectivity is the organizing principle of the universe.48 The universe is interconnected in a complex web or relationships such that we cannot adequately understand a physical reality without acknowledging its web of relationships. However, this aspect of the universe was ignored by the Newtonian scientists perhaps as a result of the pervasiveness of relationships which can sometimes fade into the background so that “only the apparently separate ‘things’ of the world are noticed.”49 If objects are interconnected within the universe, do we then assume same for humans and States? Of course, yes. This is largely because humans as well as States share the same feature with all other objects: wave-particle duality. As particles they have form, boundaries, and identity while as wave, they possess an unstructured potential which, according to Zohar, spreads out across the boundaries of space, time, choice and identity.50 Therefore, State and non-State actors, as applicable to other objects, are interconnected or better still entangled in a complex manner that makes it particularly tasking if not impossible to accurately assess foreign policy behaviour. From the foregoing, it could be assumed that quantum mechanics emphasizes what we cannot do over what we can do. How does it then help our understanding of foreign policy? The answer is not far-fetched. By identifying what we cannot do, quantum mechanics saves us from raising false alarms and making erroneous claims. It rather makes case for intellectual diligence by encouraging cross-paradigmatic approach to foreign policy analysis. It underscores that no single theory or approach to foreign policy analysis is on its own adequate for foreign policy analysis. Thus, by engaging all possible approaches, the analyst increases the proportion of objectivity in his/her analysis

#### Classical decision theory is unfalsifiable and ignores superpositions of state preferences.

Der Derian and Wendt 20 – James Der Derian is the Michael Hintze Chair of International Security Studies and Director of the Centre for International Security Studies at The University of Sydney, having taken up his appointment in January 2013. His research and teaching interests are in international security, information technology, international theory and documentary film; Alexander Wendt is an American political scientist who is one of the core social constructivist researchers in the field of international relations, and a key contributor to quantum social science (“Quantizing international relations: The case for quantum approaches to international theory and security practice”, *Security Dialogue* 2020, Vol. 51(5) 399–413 © The Author(s) 2020, Available online at <https://journals-sagepub-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010620901905>, Accessed 11-04-2020)

So far, this is about what is going on at a very micro level; the question facing international relations scholars and social scientists more generally is whether superpositions and wave-function collapse can be found at the human or macro scale, not just by analogy, but really. Most physicists would still say no because of the decoherence problem, where microscopic quantum effects ‘wash out’ in large, wet and warm environments like the brain (Waldner, 2017). However, that opposition is clearly challenged by the emergence of quantum biology and especially quantum decision theory. Classical decision (‘rational choice’) theory assumes that people have a portfolio of preferences and beliefs in their minds, which ideally obey the rules of classical logic and thereby make their holders rational. Moreover, although rarely explicit, it seems clear that a tacit assumption of this model is that the brains behind the human mind are classical. If they were quantum, why would the standard of rationality be classical, given the vastly greater, almost ‘super-rational’ computational powers of a quantum brain? All of which is to say, according to the rationalist orthodoxy, the contents of our mind/brains – our ‘types’, in the jargon – will always be in well-defined states. If they are rational, then actors can be assumed to know their own types, but often not those of others; as classical states, others can be assumed to have types, but they are hidden away in other brains. Thus, the primary strategic problem facing rational actors in such a world is trying to determine others’ types so that interaction will be optimal (think security dilemma theory).25 A very different picture emerges from quantum decision theory, best explained by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and co-authors in an essay suggestively entitled ‘Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT (Kahneman–Tversky)-Man’.26 Playing off ‘Harsanyi Man’, the ideal Bayesian rational actor operating under uncertainty, Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. represent a person’s ‘state’ as a superposition of all their potential types relevant to a given situation, each of which is modelled as a distinct vector in an n-dimensional decision space. The superposition of these vectors does not collapse into an actual type until a measurement (interaction) occurs, whether on one’s own or on someone else’s initiative. At that point, depending on the context, one vector will become what is called ‘preferred’ and a single type will emerge in the collapse of the wave function (manifested as ‘behaviour’). Note that this is the exact opposite of the standard, classical view. Rather than being an expression of underlying, well-defined preferences and beliefs, the latter become well-defined only through the act of measurement itself. Thus, whereas Harsanyi Man’s problem is merely uncertainty about others’ types, KT ‘Man’ (sic) does not even know her own type until she makes a choice. Perhaps the feeling of ambivalence is more genuine than classical metaphysics would have us believe. Quantum international relations builds on the resonances between Lambert-Mogiliansky’s highly mathematical quantum model of human beings as collapsing superpositions and Judith Butler’s performative model of agency (which figures centrally in Karen Barad’s approach to quantum social theory as well).27 Although, as a feminist theorist, Butler’s foil is identity theory more than rational choice, her critique of the former is similar to what we have just seen – namely, gendered performances are not enacted by an intrinsically gendered subject with pre-existing desires and beliefs; rather, they make someone a gendered subject with those desires and beliefs in the first place. We would not want to overstate the affinities between these theorists, but it is striking to us that two approaches that – at least on the surface – could hardly be more different epistemologically or methodologically would arrive at such similar pictures of the human being. Call it consilience if you want, but, at the very least, in quantum social science and quantum international relations there seems to be an opportunity for a fresh and potentially very fruitful inter-paradigmatic dialogue not just about social ontology but about epistemology as well. We acknowledge (once more) that all of these new bodies of research challenge a fundamental but completely implicit assumption of the social sciences: that quantum theory is only relevant at the subatomic scale, above which quantum effects decohere and classical physics takes over. In different ways, these new sciences suggest that, far from washing out above the molecular level, in living organisms quantum effects might actually get amplified, right on up to the human scale.

#### Being IR scholar is a reverse qualification.

Menand 5 – Louis Menand has contributed to The New Yorker since 1991 and has been a staff writer since 2001. His book “The Metaphysical Club” was awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for history and the Francis Parkman Prize from the Society of American Historians. He was an associate editor at The New Republic from 1986 to 1987, an editor at The New Yorker from 1992 to 1993, and a contributing editor at The New York Review of Books from 1994 to 2001. He is the Lee Simpkins Family Professor of Arts and Sciences and the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University. In 2016, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal by President Obama, November 28th ("Everybody’S an Expert", New Yorker, Available online at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert, Accessed 11-10-2020)

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one. Plausible detail makes us believers. When subjects were given a choice between an insurance policy that covered hospitalization for any reason and a policy that covered hospitalization for all accidents and diseases, they were willing to pay a higher premium for the second policy, because the added detail gave them a more vivid picture of the circumstances in which it might be needed. In 1982, an experiment was done with professional forecasters and planners. One group was asked to assess the probability of “a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983,” and another group was asked to assess the probability of “a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The experts judged the second scenario more likely than the first, even though it required two separate events to occur. They were seduced by the detail. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who “know one big thing,” aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,” and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the “actor-dispensability thesis,” according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only “off on timing,” or are “almost right,” derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out. Foxes, on the other hand, don’t see a single determining explanation in history. They tend, Tetlock says, “to see the world as a shifting mixture of self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies: self-fulfilling ones in which success breeds success, and failure, failure but only up to a point, and then self-negating prophecies kick in as people recognize that things have gone too far.”

### 1NC – OFF

#### All existence is just one object – “The blobject.” There are no independent parts, just variations of the blobject. Prefer –

#### 1] Language – Language has an indirect relationship with the external world since we can refer to non-tangible concepts such as humor, while still being coherent, which nullifies differences between objects

Language cannot encompass physical reality, but can represent it incompletely – we may not be able to “touch”” humor, but can still laugh at funny jokes.

**Horgan & Potrc 1** [Terry Horgan(Department of Philosophy @ University of Arizona, B.A. Philosophy from Stanford University, Ph.D. Philosophy from University of Michigan) and Matjaz Potrc(Professor for Analytic Philosophy @ University of Ljubljana). “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta Philosophica. 2000. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://philpapers.org/rec/HORBAI-2> //Houston Memorial SC

In this paper we articulate and defend a philosophical position we call blobjectivism, which has both an ontological and a semantical component. The ontological component, which we call ontological blobjectivism, makes two fundamental claims: 1. There really is just one concrete particular, viz., the whole universe (the blobject). 2. The blobject has enormous spatiotemporal structural complexity, and enormous local variability—even though it does not have any genuine parts. The semantical component of blobjectivism adds two additional claims: 3. Numerous statements employing posits of common sense and science are true, even though nothing in the world answers directly to these posits. 4. Truth, for such statements, is indirect language-world correspondence. In the first part of the paper we will argue that blobjectivism is a coherent conceptual possibility, and moreover is a position that accommodates both common sense and science quite well despite its radical ontological claims. The upshot will be that the position, because of the combination of its dramatic ontological parsimony and its capacity to accommodate ordinary and scientific claims as genuinely true, is a viable metaphysical-cum-semantical position that deserves to be taken very seriously and to be further articulated and explored. In the second part we will sketch a range of considerations that jointly and cumulatively provide a strong case for blobjectivism. Each consideration will tend simultaneously (a) to call into question a certain class of posits as items in the correct ontology, and thereby (b) to support the contention that truth, at least for language and thought involving these posits, is indirect correspondence. The effect will be to progressively broaden the scope of posits in language and thought that are ontologically dubious, and simultaneously to progressively broaden the range of statements and beliefs for which truth is appropriately construed as indirect correspondence. The 2 upshot of these considerations will be a class of competing ontologies of concrete particulars, all of which are ontologically quite austere insofar as they eschew vastly many of the posits of common sense and of science as ontologically real.1 Considerations will then be put forth to the effect that ontological blobjectivism has serious theoretical advantages vis-a-vis these various austere competing alternatives. We will be arguing in broad brushstrokes in this paper, painting a large philosophical canvas quickly and sometimes adverting to claims and arguments that have been developed in more detail elsewhere.2 We acknowledge at the outset that notion of truth as indirect correspondence, which will figure centrally in the discussion, is an idea that cries out for substantial further theoretical investigation. We will be adverting to relevant extant philosophical work on this notion, but we acknowledge that there is more to be done. We seek to underscore the central importance of the claim that truth is often indirect language/world correspondence, rather than direct correspondence—and hence the need to explore this claim further. 1. The Coherence and Tenability of Blobjectivism. Imagine a world consisting entirely of gunkish, jello-ish, stuff. Suppose that this jelloworld is literally partless, and yet also exhibits local variation (both spatially and temporally) in features like color, transparency, density, and the like. Given that this jello-world does not really have any parts, what would be an appropriate way to describe how various features are instantiated by the jello in various spatiotemporally local ways? One natural-looking way would be to introduce a linguistic/conceptual framework that posits certain kinds of discrete entities, and attributes various features to them. For instance, the framework might posit points and/or regions, and then attribute various properties (e.g., specific degrees of transparency or density, or specific shades of color) to these putative entities. This descriptive framework would be apt, because it would provide a way to track and describe the various aspects of real local spatio-temporal variability exhibited by the jello-world. There would be systematic correspondence between 3 certain statements couched in this discourse, on the one hand, and how things really are with the jello-world, on the other hand. Nonetheless, the posited points and regions would not be denizens of the jello-world itself, because this world is one which, ex hypothesi, lacks genuine parts. Thus, the operative language/world correspondence would be indirect, in the sense that the task of specifying how various properties are locally instantiated within the jello-world is accomplished by means of a descriptive/conceptual framework whose posits—viz., spatio-temporal points and regions—are mere constructs of the framework itself and are not genuine parts of the world being described. (That world has no real parts, by supposition.) The jello-world might occasionally exhibit quite abrupt local spatial or temporal variations, in the degree to which various magnititudes are locally instantiated. Some such variations would be naturally trackable by means of still further posits in our descriptive/conceptual framework—for instance, bodies, events, and processes. In the case of dramatic local spatial transitions from high density and opacity on one hand, to low density and transparency on the other hand, it would be natural to speak of certain kinds of bodies in the jello—e.g., lumps. Likewise, the jello-world might occasionally exhibit variation of a kind that is locally abrupt both spatially and temporally, and is naturally trackable by means of posits like events and processes—e.g., local congealings. Systematic patterns of local spatio-temporal variation might well be trackable by means of generalizations involving these further posits—for instance, the generalization “Congealings generate lumps.” Again, discourse employing posits like lumps and congealing-events would systematically track how things really are with the blobject—how it really does vary spatiotemporally in its local instantiatiation of magnitudes like density, transparency, color, and the like—even though it does not have any real parts. And again, such tracking would constitute an indirect kind of language/world correspondence—indirect because the posited entities would be linguistic/conceptual constructs that are not denizens of the partless jello-in-itself. 4 Color, transparency, density and the like need not be among the fundamental properties and magnitides instantiated locally in jello-stuff. It might turn out instead that other magnitudes of a theoretically more basic kind are locally instantiated in this partless world, and that “macroproperties” like color and transparency are supervenient upon, and explainable in terms of, lawful regularities involving these basic properties. Yet these basic regularities too might employ posits like points, regions, and particles—again as a way of facilitating the articulation of how the basic magnitudes are locally instantiated by the partless jello. So a conceptual/descriptive framework that posits various kinds of parts, and makes claims employing those posits, would be quite natural even if the world being described were one which, like our hypothetical jello-world, did not really have any genuine parts at all. Such talk would track genuine local spatiotemporal variation with respect to how magnitudes are instantiated. There would be substantial and systematic—albeit somewhat indirect—languageworld correspondence. Such correspondence, we suggest, would be a very plausible candidate for truth. After all, the posits would be playing the role of enabling us to say how the partless jellostuff instantiates magnitudes spatio-temporally locally—something that otherwise would not be easy, and perhaps would not even be possible.3 In light of these remarks about the hypothetical jello-world, it now emerges as a conceptually coherent possibility that our own world, in all its glorious complexity and local spatiotemporal variation, does not have any real parts. Indeed, this is a conceptually coherent ontological framework for physics, especially if one focuses on broadly field-theoretic formulations of physical theory. The ontological framework construes the entire cosmos as a physical field which, although it certainly exhibits local variation, does not really have parts.4 Likewise, it now emerges as a conceptually coherent possibility that numerous positwielding statements of physical theory are true even if the posits are mere constructs of the theoretical framework and are not genuine denizens of reality. It is possible (1) that for our world, as for the hypothetical jello-world, posit-wielding statements couched in the language of physics track genuine local spatiotemporal variation with respect to how physical magnitudes are instantiated; (2) that this tracking-relation constitutes truth for such statements; and nevertheless (3) that our world does not really contain any parts. If so, then the truth of such statements is a matter of indirect language/world correspondence, since the posits (e.g., space-time points and regions, as putative parts of the physical field that is the cosmos) enable us to say how things are physically with the cosmos without actually designating real entities themselves. Can more be said about truth, in order to make clear why and how truth could be an indirect kind of correspondence relation? Indeed so. Truth is plausibly construed as semantically correct assertibility, under contextually operative semantic standards. A statement‟s truth results from the interaction of two factors: the contextually operative semantic standards, and how things stand with the mind-independent world. When the semantic standards operate in such a way that a given statement can be correct semantically (i.e., true) even though the statement posits (i.e., quantifies over) certain items that are not there in reality, then truth (for discourse governed by such semantic standards) thereby becomes an indirect form of language/world correspondence.6 Since statements in physics-level discourse could be true even if the world does not really have parts, the same goes for statements of other kinds—statements employing terms and concepts of the “special sciences,” and statements of ordinary non-scientific discourse. After all, it is very plausible that all truths about our world are supervenient on physics-level truths—that the facts describable physically determine all the facts. Thus, insofar as the relevant truths of physics already involve indirect correspondence, in general this also should be so for truths of higher-level discourse, truths that supervene on physics-level truths. Here too, our language and thought would be tracking real local spatiotemporal variation in the blobject. And in general, the operative language/world correspondence relation now would be even more indirect than in physics: the contextually operative semantic standards would conspire with mind-independent reality in more complex, more subtle, and more holistic ways to render statements semantically correct (i.e., true). 6 Take, for instance, a statement like “In summer of 1999, NATO was conducting a massive bombing campaign against targets in Serbia and Kosovo.” Certainly there are genuine, mind-independently real, physical variations in the blobject that are tracked by this statement, even on the supposition that the blobject lacks real parts—e.g., the kinds of physical variations that correspond to talk of explosions. But the statement also presupposes a rich and complex network of intertwined concepts (nation, international agency, campaign, bomb, war, airplane, etc., etc.); these concepts figure in a broad fabric of interconnected statements. According to the ontological/semantical picture now being suggested, such statements typically would figure collectively in complex, somewhat holistic, indirect-correspondence relations to goings-on in the mind-independent world.7 Individual statements would often count as semantically correct (i.e., true), under contextually operative semantic standards, even though they employ posits (e.g., NATO, Serbia) that do not designate genuine denizens of reality.

#### **2] Redundancy – Blobjectivism is sufficient and over-complex views are redundant**

**Schaffer 18**[Jonathan Schaffer (Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers).“Monism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 12/10/18. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/> //Houston Memorial SC]

To my knowledge there is one main argument for existence monism, which is that it provides the simplest sufficient ontology. The idea is that we can give a complete account of the phenomena in which the world is the only concrete object mentioned, so that there is need to posit any further concreta. The argument may be formulated as follows: 1. The world is the only concrete object needed to explain how the world evolves. Somewhat more precisely, 1 claims that the complete causal story of the world can be told in terms of the physical aspect of the world (a0 path in physical configuration space), together with whatever laws of nature govern temporal evolution. No pieces of the world (such as tables or particles) need be mentioned in this story. To take a toy example, consider a Newtonian world containing what the folk would describe as **a rock shattering a window**. **The complete causal story here can be told purely in terms of the world's occupational** manner vis-à-vis Newtonian configuration space.[[16](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/notes.html#16)] The rockand the window need not be mentioned. The world bears all the causal information**.** The argument then adds that recognizing proper parts of the world is recognizing what is either explanatorily redundant or epiphenomenal: 2. **If the world is the only concrete object needed to explain how the world evolves, then if there were proper parts of the world,** these proper parts would be explanatorilyredundant or epiphenomenal entities. If the world suffices to explain everything, then there is nothing left for its proper parts to explain. Its proper parts can at best explain what the world already suffices for. So if the proper parts explain anything at all they are redundant, while if they explain nothing at all they are epiphenomenal. The argument continues with a rejection of both explanatorily redundant and epiphenomenal entities: 3. There are no explanatorily redundant or epiphenomenal entities. Such a rejection is best defended on methodological grounds. Occam's Razor cuts against both explanatorily redundant and epiphenomenal entities,as there can be no need for positing either.[[17](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/notes.html#17)] From which the argument concludes: 4. The world has no proper parts. The conclusion may seem shocking, but the argument is valid, and the premises seem plausible.[[19](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/notes.html#19)]

#### Pluralism triggers linguistic skep but Blobjectivism solves

**Horgan & Potrc 12**[Terry Horgan(Department of Philosophy @ University of Arizona, B.A. Philosophy from Stanford University, Ph.D. Philosophy from University of Michigan) and Matjaz Potrc(Professor for Analytic Philosophy @ University of Ljubljana). “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta Philosophica. 2000. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://philpapers.org/rec/HORBAI-2> //Houston Memorial SC

Reply: Surely it is implausible that there are truth conditions of the kind in question. But,given the general conception of truth as semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards, there simply need not be (and very probably are not) those kinds of truth conditions—conditions which would amount, in effect, to systematic paraphrases of all true statements into statements which would bear a direct-correspondence relation to the mindindependent world. What is required, rather, is that the semantic standards be masterable by humans—i.e., internalizable as a component of human linguistic and conceptual competence. But this latter requirement could very well be satisfiable, even if statements that conform to indirect-correspondence semantic standards are not systematically translatable into statements that eschew all part-posits and are true even under limit-case, direct-correspondence, semantic standards.

#### 3] Performativity – You concede the validity of blobjectivism since we can with thing like “Aff” “Neg” and “Fairness” that don’t have real correspondent entities, but can still maintain the indirect language/world correspondence.

4]Linguistic vagueness – To overcome nihilism, we must overcome weak logical incoherence by embracing vagueness’ boundaryless nature as a legitimate semantic standard for governing discourse.

**Horgan & Potrc 1** [Terry Horgan(Department of Philosophy @ University of Arizona, B.A. Philosophy from Stanford University, Ph.D. Philosophy from University of Michigan) and Matjaz Potrc(Professor for Analytic Philosophy @ University of Ljubljana). “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta Philosophica. 2000. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://philpapers.org/rec/HORBAI-2> //Houston Memorial SC

Transvaluationism is the name for the general approach to vagueness we have been describing. Transvaluationism claims that vagueness is weakly logically incoherent without beingstrongly logically incoherent. It also claims that vagueness is viable, legitimate, and indeed essential in human language and thought; its weak logical incoherence is benign rather than malevolent. Just as Nietzsche held that one can overcome nihilism by embracing what he called the transvaluation of all values, transvaluationism asserts that vagueness, although logically incoherent in a certain way, can and should be affirmed and embraced, not nihilistically repudiated. If vagueness is really boundarylessness, as it certainly appears to be, then, since boundarylessness involves disciplined weak logical incoherence, an adequate treatment of vagueness will have to be some version of transvaluationism. Moreover, transvaluationism is a fairly generic approach, potentially open to further development and articulation in a variety of different ways. Numerous details about the logic and semantics of vagueness remain open within the generic conception, and might get handled differently in different versions.9 But regardless of how the details go, any account of vagueness that seriously comes to grips with boundarylessness must be a version of transvaluationism—whether its proponents acknowledge this fact or not.10 In effect, specific proposals amount to suggested strategies for implementing the dominance without-defeat of collectivistic semantic standards over individualistic ones. We are ready now to draw out the powerful implications of boundarylessness for metaphysics and for semantics. First, metaphysics. The world cannot be logically incoherent, even in the weak way: it cannot have features that are the ontological analogues of mutually\ unsatisfiable semantic standards. (For example, there cannot be a genuine property H (for „heaphood‟), and a sequence of sand conglomerations each of which has one fewer grain than its predecessor, such that (i) initially in the sequence there are instances of H (with each predecessor of an H instance being an H instance), (ii) eventually there are non-H instances (with each successor of a non-H instance being a non-H instance), and (iii) for each pair of successive piles in the sequence, either both are H instances, or both are non-H instances, or both are neither. For, the only way to satisfy condition (iii) would be for all the piles to have the same status vis-à-vis H.) But vagueness involves boundarylessness essentially, and boundarylessness involves weak logical incoherence essentially. Hence there cannot be ontological vagueness—and in particular, there cannot be vague objects. Next, semantics. Weak logical incoherence is a feature of the contextually operative semantic standards governing vague discourse, in ordinary contexts of usage. Hence truth, for discourse involving vagueness, cannot be a matter of direct language-world correspondence; for, this would mean that the world itself would have to exhibit the same logical incoherence that is present in vagueness; and this is impossible. Thus—barring the wildly implausible, nihilistically self-defeating, position that vague statements are never true—truth for vague discourse must be aform of indirect correspondence. Furthermore, if this is so, then there is no particular problemabout the weak logical incoherence of the operative semantic standards—as long as these standards are logically disciplined, and hence are not also strongly logically incoherent. The upshot of these considerations is that the only viable general approach to vagueness is one that conceives it non-ontologically (thereby repudiating all vague objects), and construes ntruth (for vague discourse) as indirect correspondence. The correct ontology of concrete particulars will have to be one that admits no vague ones, and an appropriate semantics for discourse employing vague posits will have to be one that treats truth, for such discourse, as indirect correspondence. These conclusions have very wide application indeed, since vastly many of the posits employed both in common sense and in science are vague.

#### Negate –

#### [1] Affirming is impossible because \_\_ & \_\_ don’t exist as separate entities, they are just variations in the blobject. Their inherency proves that the squo is the blobject. Since action is prescripted behavior of the blobject, the only possible outcome is the squo which means there’s no ethical culpability.

#### [2] We cant be morally obligated by or to anything else, since there is no anything else, which triggers permissibility.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Revolution is closer than ever but requires communist organization.

Basanta ‘20

[Comrade Basanta, polit-bureau member of the CPN-Maoist. 06/14/2020. “On American Crisis — 2,” <https://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/CPN-Maoist/2020/OnAmericanCrisis-2-Basanta-Eng.pdf>] pat

Nowadays, the United States of America is undergoing a serious crisis. As a consequence of the health crisis brought in by the mishandling of the Covid-19, the unemployment and the economic crisis caused by lockdown, the Black Lives Matter movement created by the white racist supremacy on the part of ruling class, the US now has been trapped in a vicious circle of crisis after crisis. The former defence secretary Collin Powel and the former state secretary of the US James Mattis, who were strong pillars and confidants of Donald Trump, have turned sharp critics due to his mishandling of the on-going movement. President Trump has stopped talking with Dr. Anthony Fauci, the health advisor of the President as their row in the handling of pandemic sharpened. President Donald Trump has now been isolated almost from all quarters. Moreover, the political tussle in the upcoming presidential election is going to divide and polarise the US society further and he seems to get trapped in an awful crisis and further isolation causing insanity. No one can deny that the obstinate president can deploy military to cleanse racial opposition in the name of containing the 'anarchists' and 'terrorists'. The present crisis in the US seems like a wakeup call for a bigger crisis in the days ahead.

I feel to offer a red salute to the declaration of the autonomous region made recently in the Capitol Hill of Seattle, America. However, emotion is not decisive. The autonomous region established within the framework of the reactionary state power provokes the enemy more than it safeguards the liberation of the oppressed people in CHAZ. This kind of tactical move can be supportive if it is made a part of the overall strategy of revolution. The on-going movement seems to be spontaneous, and it does not have any stated destination. Reform in police does not solve the problem the proletariat and the oppressed black people have been confronting in the US. The solution to the on-going crisis in America is scientific socialism guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and led by a party of the proletariat. Worth noting is that, the spontaneous movement cannot bring about any revolutionary change in society but it creates a situation from the womb of which a correct ideological and political line and the leadership gestate. The present situation in the US shows that the objective condition is getting favourable for the success of the socialist revolution. But as Che Guevara has said the revolution is not like a mango which automatically falls from the mango tree when it is ripe. What is necessary to develop for the American proletariat at present is the armoury of weapons that help make the revolution a success when they act upon the favourably developing situation.

The first weapon for the success of the socialist revolution in the US is the formation of a genuine Communist Party guided by MLM. And the second weapon is a united front led by the party. In the particular situation of America the strong ideological and political unity mainly between the proletariats of white and black colours along with other oppressed people is a must. The reactionary cultural makeup of the US society based on white racist supremacy has made this task more challenging. The third weapon is the fighting force. All of these weapons are unlikely to get realised in a single attempt now in America. Nevertheless, the sharpening of contradictions in the US society and the objective necessity of revolution to solve them is creating an objective condition to realise it.

In the given situation, the communist revolutionaries in the US have to make a conscious effort to build up an ideologically and politically strong communist party and unite in it several groups and individuals scattered all across the US. Once the political party and its ideological and political line are built up, then the others will come on its way. The revolutionaries have to take up this task sooner than later for the emancipation of the entire oppressed people in America, including the blacks.

#### Debate is a site of revolutionary subjectivity and they have refused to align with the Party – interp and violation –

#### Revolutionary Subjectivity is a voter – it’s the only exportable skill from debate that models the organization of the revolution – ignoring procedural barriers decimates method testing and is an internal link to any benefit of their discourse.

#### DTD – organization requires uncompromising commitment to the revolution – losing is deterrence against reactionary subjects.

#### CI – revolution is about competing models of organization – reasonability is incoherent and does nothing to further the resolution – only robust method testing ensures praxis.

#### No RVIs – its neoliberal feel-good politics that creates a feedback loop from single instances of success – revolution requires unflinching commitment.

### 1NC – OFF

Dissolution:

#### The 1AC embodies an avatar of destruction that marshals violent energies to annihilate the archive -- vote negative for Black Alchemy, to transform the fears of the 1AC into incoherent spaces for Black life.

Murillo, 20—Assistant Professor, African American Studies School of Humanities, UC-Irvine (John, “Untimely Dispatch From the Middle of Nowhere 24,” Propter Nos Vol. 4 (2020), dml)

We work with the shards of Black life and death that called out to us because we knew and know that the critical, caring, and perilous work we need to do is bound up with destruction. These fragments of Black life and death surrounding us affirm our sense of our own untimeliness against the neatness of time, and of our stankiness in the middle of nowhere.

I have written elsewhere and at length about what I am calling “untime,” which describes the dereliction of Black temporality, and about “stankiness,”1 the defining characteristic of the nowhere of Black spatiality. The untimeliness that signals our destructive relationship to human models and experiences of time and the stankiness that signals our destructive relationship to human spaces and spatiality act as the Black prima materia, the Black and essential material, with which we must work to create these impossible stories we imagine, witness, bear, conjure, and live in and against the antiblack cosmos where and when we cannot be. What we knew, and now know with excruciating intimacy, to be the violent, distorted fabric of spacetime shaping the field of fragments around us is the material we must bend to create Black pocket universes from streets to pages (and everywhere and when between). We knew and know that in order to conjure Black spacetimes that might upend the antiblack cosmos, we would have to become avatars of destruction, able to bend the forces of untimeliness and stankiness and love toward the kinds of authentic upheaval that must be born if we are to save the earth and conjure the impossible story of a wholly unimaginable world.

Wherever and whenever we’ve ended up, nowhere is better or more apropos, and we’ve got no time to celebrate. We wordly wanderers wander wondering about the possibility of other worlds, word worlds that would warp and rend and otherwise radically reimagine the fabric of spacetime, especially since we understand the ways that our pain, terror, and subjection stitch that fabric together. We traverse the perilous folds in space and wrinkles in time in search of the fragments of a theory of Black spacetime because we recognized that understanding not only how time and space tear Black life, death, and creation absolutely asunder, but also how Black life, death, and creation unsettle and upend time and space,2 would be essential if we aimed to take time and make space for Black folk, in theory, in word, and in deed.

Our many lingering questions about the actual possibilities of Black creation are the connective force arranging the field of these fragmented, impossible stories we sought out and that sought us out, that we write and we tell, around us. For Jasmine, Shakara, Dajerria, Sandra, Kalief, Nephi, for my students across time and space, for my wife and my family, and for all the Black folk living and dying untimely lives and deaths in the middle of nowhere, these questions illuminate the path forward, propel and direct the vector of our imaginative journey, and shape our vision of a destination. Asking how we have marshaled, do marshal, and might better marshal the violent energy of our spatiotemporal dereliction and transmute it into the creative, caring energy required to conjure moments and sites for Black folk to disturb the air with our breath opens us into a serious consideration of the stakes and potentiality of Black creation. Our visitations with Black words and worlds created and lived by Black folk allow us to advance this consideration and to move ourselves toward taking the leap into the wholly Black black hole of it all.

Ultimately, our leap leads us to recognize that to make the arrangements, conjure ways out of no way, and take and make time when there is none to spare is to engage in dangerous work—and not in the least because the work tends to draw the fire, bullets, terror, and domination of the antiblack world, its institutions, and its agents;3 we work with volatile material, this stuff of untimely death and destruction, and this stank of nowhere, so we must negotiate how we imperil ourselves and the variously dead and living Black folk for whom we care. How we handle the forces that destroy us, that remove us from a subject position—that is, from a stable location relative to space and time—has significant import for us because our handling of these forces will impact those who encounter the creations we destructively produce.

How we alchemically transmute destruction determines the shape the product takes and the effects it might have on those for whom we endeavored to create it. How we treat this material across each step of the process of alchemical creation affects what form that material is able to take. Alchemy functions as a useful frame for this process because it requires the dissolution or destruction of our prima materia, our original material, as a necessary and first step toward the creation of something else. Nigredo, alchemy’s first step, signifies blackness and requires the dissolution of our source material, compelling us to think about how we break our material down to its volatile essential components. Albedo, alchemy’s second step, signifies whiteness and requires the distillation of the usable from what nigredo produces, compelling us to consider how we scrub clean or purify what we can or want to use of that material. And rubedo, alchemy’s final step,4 signifies redness and results in the synthesis of the fabled philosopher stone itself, compels us to consider how we alter and synthesize that destructive force into a radically different product. Alchemical transmutation is the process of radical breaking-apart/disordering, reorganization, and creation. When we think of Black creation, especially when that creation is inherently a ‘working-with-fragments,’ we must think (and have thought) about the ways we handle these fragments throughout the complex process of transmutation under untimely, spatially dislocated conditions.

This is a good way of thinking about what has been the subject and the work of the kind of impossible invention Black folk (vie to) perform: on the one hand, we spend pages trying to think about how this process works (its mechanics) and to what ends (its stakes and possibilities); on the other, we spend pages performing this work by unraveling the entanglement of Blackness, spacetime, care, and creation, extracting what is essential to this entanglement, and producing a theory of Black untimely creation out of nowhere. Across genres, styles, disciplines, and paradigmatic divides marked by woefully inadequate names, written account of a difficult and dangerous transmutation. Working with and through our destructive relationship with the fabric of the cosmos produces what we understand to be an essential contradiction of Black creative work: in this cosmos, our untimeliness and our displacement are constitutive to our capacities to make time or take a minute, and to make space or find our way; that which destroys our relationship to time, space, and each other remains inextricably bound up with our creative aspiration and imaginative aim. We knew this, and we know this, and we have created, and do and will continue to create under these conditions.

Fragment 117

Destructive Writing, and Fragmented Work

How

to tell

a

shattered

story?5

What is required to…tell an impossible story?6

I do not know

when or how else

to begin,

but I do know that

each and

e ver y Black frag ment

matters

Here are the fragments put together by another me7

The cord of cowrie shells drags across the polished dark wood of the floor beneath her feet, tracing a constellation through the small nodes of water she arranged before us. M. NourbeSe Philip conjures a liquid narrative arc from the watery remnants of the lost words and names, bodies and souls, and untimely timelines of Black lives lost at sea as she performs selections from Zong! for we who sought to bear water and witness.

Clamoring cowrie shells clatter a rhythm for our guided collective recollection. Like the beautiful fragments of shells to which she was condemned to beaches to search, they are their own w/holes, and their arrangement along the snaking cord traces the coordinate field of the event horizon that she asks us to cross. The wet drag of heavy, shelled rope through water scratch-splash-crashes above a low rumble, the drumroll of tidal forces altering the fabric of the small, dark cosmos of the theater. Overwhelming, oceanic, Black, chant, song, dance, breath, wake, word, and work warp, wrinkle, and collapse into one another. We get lost in the riff, rift, and riptide of the performance, rhythmically called by shell fragments to where and when the lost might be.8 In the cosmic Black magic being conjured, uncertainty is our familiar.

Zong! is M. NourbeSe Philip playing with fragments, a poiesis of destructive means and ends. There are orders of fragments at play, here, and play is only possible under the parameters set by Philip in an agreement with the limitations of the archive brokered by the 150 Black folk thrown overboard. The first order is comprised of the narrative bits of Black life and death that make up, but will always fail to fully add up to, the 150 souls lost beneath the waves. The second order is established by the fragmentary (and figmentary) nature of the available, historical account—the insurance claim and the court case. To become both magician and censor, the poet locks herself inside the limits of the available archive of the legal case, Gregson v. Gilbert, attempting to inhabit the same conditions endured by the slaves aboard the Zong/Zorgue. Sequestering herself to the language of the available record means situating herself in the “dysgraphia” characteristic of every untimely narrative fragment—of the Black lives thrown overboard from the deck of the Zong, of those left to die on a dinghy in the Mediterranean,9 of all of us. The “dysgraphia: the inability of language to cohere around the bodies and the suffering of [we] Black people who live and die in the wake and whose everyday acts insist Black life into the wake”10 is the condition of possibility for Philips’s magic. Incoherence makes her form of spellcasting—or spelling—possible. We read, we watch, and we are caught in the derangement of the spell.

The story of the Zong, the story that the dead demand to be told, can only be ‘un-told,’ or told in a deranged way by “re-presenting the sequence” of signs and symbols that index the available information. The writing becomes its own process of disfigurement and the process produces the second order of fragments: the language. The falling, failing, ripped-apartness of language, as an echo of the “seared, divided, ripped-apartness” of the “primary narrative” of Black flesh, becomes the manifestation of this destructive “praxis” and “theory,” “text for living and for dying, and…method for [writing] them both.”11 Spacing the words out and exploding their letters into the unintelligible disarray littering the pages of Zong! produces imaginative and physical strain. Eyes arrhythmically fail to track the lexical debris across, up, and down pages of the text, and the lack of an orthographic anchor subjects the imagination to a form of interpretive disorientation. The difference in legibility produced by a creative process that depends on the disfigurement of language and the refusal to impose meaning jettisons writer, reader, and witness into a state of imaginative vertigo.

M. NourbeSe Philip as Black poet, censor, and magician becomes something like a poetic Galactus: a Black cosmic entity and destroyer of words and worlds; a sentient, vigilant black hole in search of something in excess of meaning and sense, an “underlying current” subtending all that is written and all that the written account could ever mean. Against grammar, the “mechanism of force” structurally imposed onto the available language as symbolic order—the order of ideas, knowledge, and imaginations that ceaselessly and repeatedly murders Black beings—and the Black dysgraphia such grammar allows, Philip mutilates and disorders language, “literally [cutting] it into pieces, castrating verbs, suffocating adjectives, murdering nouns, throwing articles, prepositions, conjunctions overboard, jettisoning adverbs…[separating] subject from verb, verb from object—[creating] semantic mayhem” in the name of “reaching into the stinking, eviscerated innards…and [reading] the untold story that tells itself by not telling.” This “not-telling” is both vengeful and protective. It is vengeful because it is aimed at mutilating, jettisoning, murdering, suffocating, castrating, cutting, and exploding the archive in the same way the archive mutilates, jettisons, murders, suffocates, castrates, cuts and explodes Black being. And it is protective because Philip recognizes the need to avoid subjecting the dead “to new dangers and to a second order of violence,” one that not only affirms the violence of the grammar that imposes meaning and structure, but reproduces that violence (by ‘maintaining order’)—and this is a need recognized by Hartman, Spillers, Sharpe, myself, and countless others who know the perils of bearing fragmented witness and water.

Alchemically transmuting fragments is, in one sense, a form of violent play, a form of derangement and disorder that playfully transforms the violence that made them fragments into a form of violence that can challenge, or outright disintegrate, the symbolic order. Thinking in these terms frames Philip’s creative praxis as a form of offense. In this light, Philip poetically plays with language in order to conjure an assault on the normative constraints of language, grammar, and knowledge. Philip works with the lexical, political, and metaphysical refuse of the lost and dead Black folk thrown overboard by first recognizing them as such—as refuse, as effluvium, as whatever one might call the end product of spaghettification—and then by subjecting them to a form of destructively creative and creatively destructive alchemy that transmutes the violence that produced this refuse into something that attempts to dispose of the symbolic order and all its attendant limits. The organizing principle or grammar by which the antiblack fictions of the archive comes to be faces annihilation in the form of a poiesis that turns its refuse against itself.12 Reanimated13 or ghostly14 or deathly,15 the variously dead resurge in the breaks of word and meaning, and usher in an imaginative form of warfare waged at and against the limits of creative possibility imposed by the symbolic order that made Black folk deathly in the first place.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp – at all TFA tournaments, debaters must keep their cameras on for the duration of the round.

#### Violation – theirs is off – SS

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Jurisdiction – they broke rules which is a side constraint on the ballot – judging contracts implicitly consent to all tournament rules to decide a round.

TFA 20 [Texas Forensics Association. “Guide for TFA Competitors and Rules for VIQTs”. Last updated 11/20/20. Accessed 9/9/21. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/11xwSF1fZuWwhFqfwnoV4lThb27Xs3Ko2Ec2Xa7G1T8A/edit#heading=h.64tsywojfkh3> //Xu]

Competitors should keep their cameras on for the duration of the round. This helps safeguard against outside coaching and assistance during the round. Keeping your camera on is also important to the social and interactive elements of competing online. Also, be mindful of the location of your camera when speaking. Try to look at the camera as much as possible when speaking in order to maximize eye contact with the judges and opponents. Be mindful of your facial expressions, as you will be constantly visible to all participants at all times in an online competition.

#### 2] Cheating – cameras-off incentives calling outside coaches but cameras-on allows competitors to verify there’s no oral communication take debates out of individuals hands – renders every claim false since we don’t know if they’re doing the better debating.

#### 3] Community – cameras-off environment renders debate impersonable – psychic violence o/w since it’s a side constraint on the pedagogical values of debate and durability since it affects debaters outside of round.

Terada 21 [Youki Terada (Research and Standards Editor @ Edutopia). “The Camera-On/Camera-Off Dilemma”. Edutopia. February 5, 2021. Accessed 9/9/21. <https://www.edutopia.org/article/camera-oncamera-dilemma> //Xu]

Students, too, benefit from being able to see each other onscreen. In the study, a majority indicated that “using videoconferencing helped build trust and rapport with other students and helped them to develop a sense of identification with others in their group.” The social context of living classrooms—the often-invisible human connection that reinforces learning—was missing for students, who insisted “that being able to hear and see each other in real time helped construct a ‘more complete picture’ of their peers.”

#### 4] resolvability – im ugly

#### Put away turns – its required.

TFA 20 [Texas Forensics Association. “Guide for TFA Competitors and Rules for VIQTs”. Last updated 11/20/20. Accessed 9/9/21. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/11xwSF1fZuWwhFqfwnoV4lThb27Xs3Ko2Ec2Xa7G1T8A/edit#heading=h.64tsywojfkh3> //Xu]

Necessary equipment

A computer with a webcam - in an online world, it really doesn’t matter if you’re using a desktop or laptop, so long as it has a working webcam.

Stable and reliable high-speed internet connection - you can Google “internet speed test” and run a diagnostic. Try testing from multiple locations in your home to find the best spot.

In team events, you’ll need a means to communicate with your partner(s) during the debate - this can be a phone call that runs in the background during the round, a separate Google Hangouts call, or some other means.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp: Debaters must not take prep time against disabled debaters and instead give it to disabled debaters. To clarify, I get 8 minutes of prep and they get zero

#### Violation: its pre-emptive and they violate if they take prep.

#### Accommodations

#### A] Strucutral fairness o/ws procedural fairness

#### B] Accessibility

#### I have ADHD and need extra time– key to engagement

#### A] Fairness – I need extra time to prep

#### B] Turns clash – extemp

#### Its reciprocal – since you can prep during my prep

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp – if debaters read util, they must take Adderall.

#### Violation – CX

#### Cut card about what Adderall does

#### 1] Dopamine – that’s good under blum

#### 2] Clash

Extemp

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp: debaters must not wear masks

#### Violation: you do

#### It prevents the worst disease outbreaks

Andrew S. Natsios ‘17, Executive Professor and Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the George H.W. Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, “The Growing Threat of Pandemics: Enhancing Domestic and International Biosecurity,” A Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs White Paper, March 2017, http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/white-papers/The-Growing-Threat-of-Pandemics.pdf

The world is experiencing accelerated levels of change. Massive expansion of global travel; economic interdependence; global supply chains; climate change; urbanization; deforestation; technological advancement; and the expansion of mechanized, scientific commercial food production are just a handful of the changes that have occurred globally in the last fifty to seventy years. Remote villages in Africa are not as disconnected from the US population as they once were, and people are coming in increasingly close contact with wildlife populations around the world. Armed conflict is causing an unprecedented migration of people, and, in fact, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that there are currently 65 million internally displaced people and refugees—the largest number in history. Air travel allows a person to move around the world in a day. All of these elements play a role in the increasing number of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases throughout the world. Preparing for and responding to diseases with pandemic potential is one of the greatest challenges modern society faces. These outbreaks cause loss of life, loss in personal and national income, and foreign policy challenges. The United States government’s current response approach relies too heavily on supplemental emergency appropriations from Con gress and other donors for the massive funding required. This has the effect of creating a slower than necessary response as organizations are waiting for funds to be allocated before they take action. Once the funds are appropriated, the money must then be spent quickly in an attempt to control the epidemic after it is already out of control. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other supporting public health officials need emergency funding authorities and appropriations, similar to the Stafford Act, which is designated for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other emergency management activities. We support the establishment of emergency funding authority but emphasize that establishing the emergency fund should not cause a reduction in funding for infectious disease preparedness more broadly. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa cost the United States government $2.4 billion in response operations. The United States and the rest of the international community spend billions of dollars responding to epidemics and pandemics that occur with greater and greater frequency. This reactive method of disease response is not sustainable and does little to prevent the emergence of infectious diseases at their source. Organizational and funding changes must be made at a domestic and international level to avoid the exponential loss of resources, personnel, economic development, and human life caused by disease outbreaks. We cannot continue to rely on a reactive strategy. The importance of preparing for a pandemic cannot be overstated. At the same time, the importance of educated predictions and communication, rather than “crying wolf” every time there is a possible threat, also cannot be overstated. Expressing certainty of a threat that doesn’t materialize hurts the credibility of the government—and more specifically, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) reputation—making it less likely that citizens will take future threats seriously. A prime example of this is the 1976 swine flu outbreak, a virus said to be a direct descendant of the 1918 flu. A massive, nationwide vaccination campaign was launched in preparation for the outbreak. The outbreak America so greatly feared never materialized and, instead, an increased risk of GuillainBarre syndrome was later linked to the 1976 flu vaccine (CDC, 2015b). This incident resulted in the firing of the CDC director and embarrassment for the federal government as well as laying the groundwork for the distrust of flu vaccines we see today. Despite all of this, the 1976 incident does not diminish the danger posed by infectious diseases, nor does it take away from the importance of preparing for disease outbreaks. Thoughtful, deliberate, near real-time surveillance and epidemiological analysis, diagnostics, and communication are critically important in responding to pandemic risk. Prematurely or incorrectly announcing disease threats can cause backlash and a lack of trust among the public. Recognizing that we face the threat of pandemics is the first step. Taking action to correct or minimize the threat is the second. This white paper outlines the major obstacles standing in the way of optimal pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response—many of which were discussed during the 2nd Annual Pandemic Policy Summit hosted by the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs. There are nine problem topics this white paper will cover. These areas are the need for effective, centralized leadership and collaboration and better use of available resources; improved international system response; to counter the anti-vaccine movement and stress the threat from vaccine-preventable diseases; to bridge the gap between animal and human health; implementation of more uniform health screenings and travel education; improved and sustained public health institutions and infrastructure; to respond effectively and in a timely way to disease outbreaks; to establish cultural competency in pandemic response; and to establish and expand the unique role of universities. Each problem outlined in this paper is coupled with action items that will help close the gaps in disease preparedness and response.

#### Cosmogenesis is inevitable

Merali 17 – Dr. Zeeya Merali, PhD in Cosmology from Brown University, Master’s in Natural Sciences from the University of Cambridge, Freelance Journalist and Author Whose Work Has Appeared in Scientific American, Nature, New Scientist, and Discover, and on the BBC, “Scientists Want to Create a Universe in a Lab, And They Actually Could”, Futurism, 10-20, https://futurism.com/scientists-may-create-universe-actually-could

Physicists aren’t often reprimanded for using risqué humour in their academic writings, but in 1991 that is exactly what happened to the cosmologist Andrei Linde at Stanford University. He had submitted a draft article entitled ‘Hard Art of the Universe Creation’ to the journal Nuclear Physics B. In it, he outlined the possibility of creating a universe in a laboratory: a whole new cosmos that might one day evolve its own stars, planets and intelligent life. Near the end, Linde made a seemingly flippant suggestion that our Universe itself might have been knocked together by an alien ‘physicist hacker’. The paper’s referees objected to this ‘dirty joke’; religious people might be offended that scientists were aiming to steal the feat of universe-making out of the hands of God, they worried. Linde changed the paper’s title and abstract but held firm over the line that our Universe could have been made by an alien scientist. ‘I am not so sure that this is just a joke,’ he told me.

Fast-forward a quarter of a century, and the notion of universe-making – or ‘cosmogenesis’ as I dub it – seems less comical than ever. I’ve travelled the world talking to physicists who take the concept seriously, and who have even sketched out rough blueprints for how humanity might one day achieve it. Linde’s referees might have been right to be concerned, but they were asking the wrong questions. The issue is not who might be offended by cosmogenesis, but what would happen if it were truly possible. How would we handle the theological implications? What moral responsibilities would come with fallible humans taking on the role of cosmic creators?

Theoretical physicists have grappled for years with related questions as part of their considerations of how our own Universe began. In the 1980s, the cosmologist Alex Vilenkin at Tufts University in Massachusetts came up with a mechanism through which the laws of quantum mechanics could have generated an inflating universe from a state in which there was no time, no space and no matter. There’s an established principle in quantum theory that pairs of particles can spontaneously, momentarily pop out of empty space. Vilenkin took this notion a step further, arguing that quantum rules could also enable a minuscule bubble of space itself to burst into being from nothing, with the impetus to then inflate to astronomical scales. Our cosmos could thus have been burped into being by the laws of physics alone. To Vilenkin, this result put an end to the question of what came before the Big Bang: nothing. Many cosmologists have made peace with the notion of a universe without a prime mover, divine or otherwise.

#### That causes infinite suffering

Tomasik 17 – Brian Tomasik, Researcher, Cofounder and Advisor at the Foundational Research Institute, BS in Computer Science from Swarthmore College, Former Research Assistant at the University of Pennsylvania, Former Software Development Engineer II at Microsoft, “Lab Universes: Creating Infinite Suffering”, Essays on Reducing Suffering, 6-16, https://reducing-suffering.org/lab-universes-creating-infinite-suffering/

Background on lab universes

Some physical theories predict that it may be possible to create new, "baby" universes out of a small amount of matter. Technical reviews of the topic can be found in Stefano Ansoldi and Eduardo I. Guendelman, "Child Universes in the Laboratory," and Gordon McCabe, "How to Create a Universe." Popular-level introductions include the following:A Swarm of Ancient Stars - GPN-2000-000930

--Jim Holt, "The Big Lab Experiment," Slate, 2004

--Zeeya Merali, "Create Your Own Universe," New Scientist, 2006

--Robert Krulwich, "Build Your Own Universe," NPR, 2006.

McCabe explained the concept clearly (p. 6):

Now, one of the most intriguing possibilities opened up by inflation, is the possible creation of a universe 'in a laboratory'. Creation in a laboratory is taken to mean the creation of a physical universe, by design, using the 'artificial' means available to an intelligent species. It is the ability of inflation to maintain a constant energy density, in combination with a period of exponential expansion, which is the key to these laboratory creation scenarios. The idea is to use a small amount of matter in the laboratory, and induce it to undergo inflation until its volume is comparable to that of our own observable universe. The energy density of the inflating region remains constant, and because it becomes the energy density of a huge region, the inflating region acquires a huge total (non-gravitational) energy.

Andrei Linde, one of the founders of inflationary cosmology, put it this way (p. 8):

Indeed, one may need to have only a milligram of matter in a vacuum-like exponentially expanding state, and then the process of self-reproduction will create from this matter not one universe but infinitely many!

Another pioneer of inflation is Alan Guth, the subject of a 1987 New York Times article:

PHYSICISTS often probe the workings of nature on a cosmic scale, but Prof. Alan H. Guth and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology may have set themselves the ultimate research goal. They are seeking a mechanism by which humans might create a new universe from scratch.

Outrageous though such a notion may be, Dr. Guth and his collaborators are perfectly serious about their investigation. "Ten years ago, we couldn't even have posed the question of whether a man-made universe would be possible," he said. "But physics has progressed a long way since then, and today we can ask this and related questions in the real hope of finding scientifically testable answers. We are working in a new and exciting environment."

In his 1997 book, The Inflationary Universe (pp. 268-69), Guth wrote:

To put the story in perspective, one should remember that the process of eternal inflation [postulated by the theory of the self-reproducing inflationary universe ...] leads to an exponential increase in the number of pocket universes on time scales as short as 10-37 seconds. Since the time needed for the development of a super-advanced civilization is measured in billions of years or more, there appears to be no chance that laboratory production of universes could compete with the "natural" process of eternal inflation.

On the other hand, a child universe created in a laboratory by a super-advanced civilization would set into motion its own progression of eternal inflation. Could the super-advanced civilization find a way to enhance its efficiency? We may have to wait a few billion years to find out.

Infinite suffering

Starting a chain of eternal inflation in the laboratory would produce infinitely many new universes. But what types of universes would emerge? Suppose we assume -- as do Jaume Garriga and Alex Vilenkin in their 2001 article "Many worlds in one" -- that there are only finitely many possible universe histories of a particular duration (say, 13.7 billion years, the age of our universe); call these "histories" for short. The existence of infinitely many universes needn't, in general, imply the existence of all possible histories. As Alex Vilenkin notes in his 2006 book Many Worlds in One, the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, ... contains infinitely many integers but doesn't contain all possible integers, and one might imagine an analogous situation for universe histories (p. 114). However, because "the initial conditions at the big bang are set by random quantum processes during inflation" (p. 114), the theory of inflation does imply that lab universes would instantiate all possible histories infinitely many times (with probability one -- see the second Borel-Cantelli lemma). This would, of course, include infinitely many replications of the Holocaust, infinitely many acts of torture, and so on. Indeed, there would be infinitely many universes in which Hitler won World War II, as well as infinitely many universes that would be as close as physically possible to "hell on earth" (or on any other planet). The assumption of finitely many possible histories is not really important. As long as we assume that the probability is greater than zero that suffering will emerge in a random universe, creating infinitely many universes would create infinite amounts of suffering.

#### That comparatively outweighs extinction

Daniel 17 – Max Daniel, Executive Director of the Foundational Research Institute, Senior Research Scholar at the Future of Humanity Institute, MS in Mathematics from Heidelberg University, “S-Risks: Why They Are The Worst Existential Risks, And How To Prevent Them”, Foundational Research Institute, https://foundational-research.org/s-risks-talk-eag-boston-2017/

To come back to the title of my talk, I can now state why s-risks are the worst existential risks. S-risks are the worst existential risks because I’ll define them to have the largest possible scope and the largest possible severity. (I will qualify the claim that s-risks are the worst x-risks later.) That is, I’d like to suggest the following definition.

“S-risk – One where an adverse outcome would bring about severe suffering on a cosmic scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.”

So, s-risks are roughly as severe as factory farming, but with an even larger scope.

To better understand this definition, let’s zoom in on the part of the map that shows existential risk.

One subclass of risks are those that, with respect to their scope, would affect all future human generations, and, with respect to their severity, would remove everything valuable. One central example of such pan-generational, crushing risks are risks of human extinction.

Risks of extinction have received the most attention so far. But, conceptually, x-risks contain another class of risks. These are risks of outcomes even worse than extinction in two respects. First, with respect to their scope, they not only threaten the future generations of humans or our successors, but all sentient life in the whole universe. Second, with respect to their severity, they not only remove everything that would be valuable but also come with a lot of disvalue – that is, features we’d like to avoid no matter what. Recall the story I told in the beginning, but think of Greta’s solitary confinement being multiplied by many orders of magnitude – for instance, because it affects a very large population of sentient uploads.

## CASE

### 1NC – Zombies

#### I contend that philosophical zombies, entities that have no consciousness but are physically indistinguishable from agents, exist 🧟 –

#### 1] Swampman Objection –

Wikipedia summarizes Davidson ND [Donald Herbert Davidson (Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley). “Donald Davidson (philosopher)”. Wikipedia. No Date. Accessed 1/23/22. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)#Swampman> //Xu]

* Induction fails too lol

Swampman is the subject of a philosophical thought experiment introduced by Donald Davidson in his 1987 paper "Knowing One's Own Mind". In the experiment, Davidson is struck by lightning in a swamp and disintegrated; simultaneously, an exact copy of Davidson, the Swampman, is made from a nearby tree and proceeds through life exactly as Davidson would have, indistinguishable from Davidson. The experiment is used by Davidson to claim that thought and meaning cannot exist in a vacuum; they are dependent on their interconnections to the world. Therefore, despite being physically identical to himself, Davidson states that the Swampman does not have thoughts nor meaningful language, as it has no causal history to base them on.[10]

#### 2] Explanatory Gap –

Tye 21 [Michael Tye (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin). “Qualia”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Thu Aug 12, 2021. Accessed 1/23/22. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Explangap> //Xu]

Our grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is supplied to us by introspection. We also have an admittedly incomplete grasp of what goes on objectively in the brain and the body. But there is, it seems, a vast chasm between the two. It is very hard to see how this chasm in our understanding could ever be bridged. For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-and-such objective, physical changes, whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any subjective feeling at all.

#### 3] Knowledge Argument –

Wikipedia summarizes Jackson ND [F.C. Jackson (Emeritus Professor in the School of Philosophy (Research School of Social Sciences) at Australian National University). “Qualia.” Wikipedia. No Date. Accessed 1/23/2022. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> //Xu]

F.C. Jackson offers what he calls the "knowledge argument" for qualia.[19] One example runs as follows:

Mary the color scientist knows all the physical facts about color, including every physical fact about the experience of color in other people, from the behavior a particular color is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a color has been seen. However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be admitted that she learns something about the color red the first time she sees it – specifically, she learns what it is like to see that color.

This thought experiment has two purposes. First, it is intended to show that qualia exist. If one accepts the thought experiment, we believe that Mary gains something after she leaves the room – that she acquires knowledge of a particular thing that she did not possess before. That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red, and it must thus be conceded that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to a particular quale and one who does not.

The second purpose of this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind. Specifically, the knowledge argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical truths. The challenge posed to physicalism by the knowledge argument runs as follows:

1. Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about color experiences of other people.
2. After her release, Mary learns something about the color experiences of other people.

Therefore,

1. Before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people's color experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information.

Therefore,

1. There are truths about other people's color experience that are not physical.

Therefore,

1. Physicalism is false.

#### 4] Rule Following Paradox –

### 1NC – Condo affs bad

#### They don’t get condo affs

#### Strat skew

Clash

Ableism

#### If they get condo affs – justifies infinite neg abuse

#### A] reciprocity

#### B] self inflicted

#### C] ableism