CW: Non-descript metaphor of suicide

## 1AC – v2 – vs NatoWei

### Part 1 is Racial Capitalism

#### All Capitalism is Racial Capitalism – the modern system of labor cannot sustain itself without disposable populations.

Burden-Stelly 20 [Bracketed for women to womxn. Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, other footnotes excluded for readability. Charisse Burden-Stelly (Visiting Scholar in the Race and Capitalism Project at the University of Chicago. She is currently an African-American Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science at Carleton College). “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights”. The Monthly Review, Volume 72, Number 3. 7/1/20. Accessed 11/3/21. <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/> //Xu]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization. [Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51. My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40 Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41 Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44 Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48 The entrapment of Black [womxn] women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

#### Extinction – crisis cycles, resource competition, and war chest.

Robinson 17 (William; is professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara; April 19th 2017. Accessed 3/11/2022. “Global Capitalist Crisis and Trump’s War Drive”; <https://truthout.org/articles/global-capitalist-crisis-and-trump-s-war-drive/> //Xu]

Journalists and political observers have focused on geopolitical analysis in attempting to explain rising international tensions. While such analysis is important, there are deep structural dynamics in the global capitalist system that are pushing ruling groups towards war. The crisis of global capitalism is intensifying despite what we have heard from mainstream economists and elites giddy with recent growth spurts and the inflation of stock prices. In particular, the system is facing what appears to be an intractable structural crisis of overaccumulation and of legitimacy. Cyclical crises, or recessions, occur about every 10 years in the capitalist system and typically last some 18 months. There were recessions in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s. Structural crisis, so called because the only way out of crisis is to restructure the system, occur approximately every 40-50 years. A new wave of colonialism and imperialism resolved the first recorded structural crisis of the 1870s and 1880s. The next structural, the Great Depression of the 1930s, was resolved through a new type of redistributive capitalism, referred to as the “class compromise” of Fordism-Keynesianism, social democracy, New Deal capitalism, and so on. Capital responded to the structural crisis of the 1970s by going global. The emerging transnational capitalist class, or TCC, promoted vast neoliberal restructuring, trade liberalization, and integration of the world economy. The global economy experienced a boom in the late 20th century as the former socialist countries entered the global market and as capital, liberated from nation-state constraints, unleashed a vast new round of accumulation worldwide. The TCC unloaded surpluses and resumed profit-making in the emerging globally integrated production and financial system through the acquisition of privatized assets, the extension of mining and agro-industrial investment on the heels of the displacement of hundreds of millions from the countryside, a new wave of industrial expansion assisted by the revolution in Computer and Information Technology (CIT). Yet capitalist globalization has also resulted in unprecedented social polarization worldwide. According to the development agency Oxfam, just 1 percent of humanity owns over half of the world’s wealth and the top 20 percent own 94.5 of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent must make due with just 4.5 percent. Given such extreme polarization of income and wealth, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The global financial collapse of 2008 marked the onset of a new structural crisis of overaccumulation, which refers to accumulated capital that cannot find outlets for profitable reinvestment. Data from 2010 showed, for instance, that companies from the United States were sitting on $1.8 trillion in uninvested cash that year. Corporate profits have been at near record highs at the same time that corporate investment has declined. As this uninvested capital accumulates, enormous pressures build up to find outlets for unloading the surplus. Capitalist groups, especially transnational finance capital, push states to create new opportunities for profit-making. Neoliberal states have turned to four mechanisms in recent years to help the TCC unload surplus and sustain accumulation in the face of stagnation. One is the raiding and sacking of public budgets. Public finance has been reconfigured through austerity, bailouts, corporate subsidies, government debt and the global bond market as governments transfer wealth directly and indirectly from working people to the TCC. A second is the expansion of credit to consumers and to governments, especially in the Global North, to sustain spending and consumption. In the United States, for instance, which has long been the “market of last resort” for the global economy, household debt is higher than it has been for almost all of postwar history. US households owed in 2016 nearly US$13 trillion in student loans, credit card debt, auto loans and mortgages. Meanwhile, the global bond market — an indicator of total government debt worldwide — had already reached US$100 trillion by 2011. A third is frenzied financial speculation. The global economy has been one big casino for transnational finance capital, as the gap between the productive economy and “fictitious capital” grows ever wider. Gross world product, or the total value of goods and services produced worldwide, stood at some US$75 trillion in 2015, whereas currency speculation alone amounted to US$5.3 trillion a day that year and the global derivatives market was estimated at a mind-boggling US$1.2 quadrillion. All three of these financial mechanisms may resolve the problem momentarily but in the long run they end up aggravating the crisis of overaccumulation. The transfer of wealth from workers to capital further constricts the market, while debt-financed consumption and speculation increase the gap between the productive economy and “fictitious capital.” The result is ever-greater underlying instability in the global economy. Many now see a new crash as inevitable. There is another mechanism that has sustained the global economy: militarized accumulation. Here there is a convergence around the system’s political need for social control and its economic need to perpetuate accumulation. Unprecedented global inequalities can only be sustained by ever more repressive and ubiquitous systems of social control and repression. Yet quite apart from political considerations, the TCC has acquired a vested interest in war, conflict, and repression as a means of accumulation. CIT has revolutionized warfare and the modalities of state-organized militarized accumulation, including the military application of vast new technologies and the further fusion of private accumulation with state militarization. As war and state-sponsored repression become increasingly privatized, the interests of a broad array of capitalist groups shift the political, social, and ideological climate toward generating and sustaining social conflict — such as in the Middle East — and in expanding systems of warfare, repression, surveillance and social control. The so-called wars on drugs, terrorism, and immigrants; the construction of border walls, immigrant detention centers, and ever-growing prisons; the installation of mass surveillance systems, and the spread of private security guard and mercenary companies, have all become major sources of profit-making. The US state took advantage of the 9/11 attacks to militarize the global economy. US military spending skyrocketed into the trillions of dollars through the “war on terrorism” and the invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. The “creative destruction” of war acted to throw fresh firewood on the smoldering embers of a stagnant global economy. The Pentagon budget increased 91 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, and even apart from special war appropriations, it increased by nearly 50 percent in real terms during this period. In the decade from 2001 to 2011 defense industry profits nearly quadrupled. Worldwide, total defense outlays (military, intelligence agencies, Homeland Security/Defense) grew by 50 percent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to $2.03 trillion. The cutting edge of accumulation in the “real economy” worldwide shifted from CIT before the dot-com bust of 1999-2001 to a military-security-industrial-financial complex — itself integrated into the high-tech conglomerate – that has accrued enormous influence in the halls of power in Washington and other political centers around the world. An emergent power bloc bringing together the global financial complex with the military-security-industrial complex appeared to crystallize in the wake of the 2008 collapse. The class interests of the TCC, geo-politics, and economics come together around militarized accumulation. The more the global economy comes to depend on militarization and conflict the greater the drive to war and the higher the stakes for humanity.

### Part 2 is Solvency

#### I affirm Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy. Spec and definitions in doc.

#### First, the rez is future oriented.

#### Ought “Ought expresses ideas such as duty, necessity and moral obligation. It is not as forceful as must, but it is stronger than should. You ought to be punctual. We ought to help the poor. You ought to visit your friends once in a while. Ought generally points to present and future time. It can point to past time when it is followed by the perfect infinitive (have + past participle).”

That’s English Grammar 10 [“Must and Ought to”; English Grammar; August 16, 2010; <https://www.englishgrammar.org/must-and-ought-to/> //BWSWJ]

#### To is “used after some verbs, especially when the action described in the infinitive will happen later:”

That’s Cambridge Dictionary ND [“to”. Cambridge Dictionary (Our dictionaries are informed by the Cambridge English Corpus of more than 1.5 billion words of real English, and the Cambridge Learner Corpus, a unique collection of exam scripts written by students taking Cambridge ESOL exams all over the world). No Date. Accessed 2/1/2022. [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press)to //Xu]

#### Second, the only democracy is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marxists.org ND [“democracy”. Encyclopedia of Marxism: Glossary of Terms. No Date. Accessed 2/25/2022. <https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/d/e.htm#democracy> //Xu]

A political system of rule by the majority. Democracy is a much-abused term however, with even the most stunted, abstract and limited forms of suffrage going by the name of democracy. “... in capitalist society we have a democracy that is curtailed, wretched, false, a democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to communism, will for the first time create democracy for the people, for the majority, along with the necessary suppression of the exploiters, of the minority. Communism alone is capable of providing really complete democracy, and the more complete it is, the sooner it will become unnecessary and wither away of its own accord. ...” “Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich – that is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the machinery of capitalist democracy, we see everywhere, in the “petty” – supposedly petty – details of the suffrage (residential qualifications, exclusion of women, etc.), in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for “paupers"!), in the purely capitalist organization of the daily press, etc., etc., – we see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has never known want himself and has never been in close contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life (and nine out of 10, if not 99 out of 100, bourgeois publicists and politicians come under this category); but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy.” [Lenin, State and Revolution, Chapter 5] Communism means, in the first place, a step far above the limited democracy found under capitalism, by the most thoroughgoing proletarian democracy; and after that, the withering away of democracy as the majority less and less finds it necessary to overrule the will of any minority, because the majority is neither threatened nor damaged by the minority; in other words, without classes, conflict will be on a personal level not on a social level. In order to understand the breadth and strength of proletarian democracy, the working class must first recognise the limitations of bourgeois democracy: “While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people,...” [Civil War in France, Chapter 5] Generally speaking, bourgeois democracy develops in proportion to the growing maturity and strength of the working class: “In capitalist society, providing it develops under the most favourable conditions, we have a more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always hemmed in by the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich. Freedom in capitalist society always remains about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners. Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, the modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that “they cannot be bothered with democracy”, “cannot be bothered with politics”; in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life.” [State and Revolution, Chapter 5] It may appear that universal suffrage provides the opportunity for the working class to elect socialists to government and overthrow capitalism peacefully and constitutionally. The capitalist state would never allow this. The repressive nature of bourgeois democracy becomes clear however, only when the working class has outgrown bourgeois society and is ready to go beyond it: “Universal suffrage is thus the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the modern state; but that is enough. On the day when the thermometer of universal suffrage shows boiling-point among the workers, they as well as the capitalists will know where they stand. [Origin of the Family, Chapter 9] “... the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy. “The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.” [Communist Manifesto, Chapter 2] Marx and Engels’ worked out how the working class could transcend bourgeois democracy by observing the action of the Parisian workers in the Paris Commune of 1871: “The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally workers, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time.” [Civil War in France, Chapter 5] That is to say, proletarian democracy was not just representative democracy, but participatory democracy. Class society is founded upon the division of labour between mental and manual labour. Corresponding to this, the form of democracy which best suits the maintenance of class society is the separation of executive and legislative powers: i.e., one class of people decide what should be done, while another class of people do it. In order to transcend class society, the working class must introduce a mode of life in which everywhere the people doing something decide amongst themselves, by consensus what and how it should be done. Workers get little opportunity to learn about running the country or even their own workplace, because that work is done by politicians, capitalists and managers. Even politicians are kept in the dark and manipulated by the unelected people that run the businesses and government departments. Real power is in the board rooms and elite clubs for the rich. All positions of authority in Socialist society must be elected solely by workers and subject to recall at any time. The separation of executive and legislative powers in bourgeois, parliamentary democracy means that even if workers’ representatives gain a majority in parliament, they find that in reality they control nothing. “The highest form of the state, the democratic republic, which in our modern social conditions becomes more and more an unavoidable necessity and is the form of state in which alone the last decisive battle between proletariat and bourgeoisie can be fought out – the democratic republic no longer officially recognises differences of property. Wealth here employs its power indirectly, but all the more surely. It does this in two ways: by plain corruption of officials, of which America is the classic example, and by an alliance between the government and the stock exchange, which is effected all the more easily the higher the state debt mounts and the more the joint-stock companies concentrate in their hands not only transport but also production itself, and themselves have their own centre in the stock exchange.” [Origin of the Family, Chapter 9] Furthermore, the state – the police-military organisation built by the bourgeoisie for the sole purpose of protecting private property – is not elected, and cannot be legislated into something else: “Democracy means equality. The great significance of the proletariat’s struggle for equality and of equality as a slogan will be clear if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of classes. But democracy means only formal equality. And as soon as equality is achieved for all members of society in relation to ownership of the means of production, that is, equality of labour and wages, humanity will inevitably be confronted with the question of advancing father, from formal equality to actual equality, i.e., to the operation of the rule “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”. ... “Democracy is a form of the state, it represents, on the one hand, the organised, systematic use of force against persons; but, on the other hand, it signifies the formal recognition of equality of citizens, the equal right of all to determine the structure of, and to administer, the state. This, in turn, results in the fact that, at a certain stage in the development of democracy, it first welds together the class that wages a revolutionary struggle against capitalism – the proletariat, and enables it to crush, smash to atoms, wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois, even the republican-bourgeois, state machine, the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy and to substitute for them a more democratic state machine, but a state machine nevertheless, in the shape of armed workers who proceed to form a militia involving the entire population.” [State and Revolution, Chapter 5] Thus bourgeois democracy, which supports the interests of capitalists above all else, is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Democracy and freedom goes only so far; and as soon as the majority people decide that majority rule should apply – not only in the parliament, but also in the workplace, the factories and offices, in the army, in the schools and universities – then suddenly the capitalist state machine will without fail raise its head and say “Enough is enough!” and restore by whatever it takes the rule of the minority of wealthy capitalists over the majority of workers. Having “won the battle of democracy”, the workers must now make a revolution. The dictatorship of the working class majority replaces the dictatorship of the minority of big capitalists. The unelected police-military hierarchy of violence is dismantled to make way for genuine, unqualified, proletarian democracy. Contrariwise, socialism, in which majority rule applies everywhere, can only be a dictatorship of the proletariat which suppresses the right of the minority of capitalists to exploit workers. The dictatorship of the proletariat simply means the most thoroughgoing democracy, where money and privilege are no longer able to lay down the law to the working class majority, and free associations of people work out their lives in collaboration.

#### Third, the only free press is the people’s press.

Hardt 2k [Hanno Hardt (Professor Emeritus in the University of Iowa's School of Journalism and Mass Communication). “Communication is Freedom: Karl Marx on Press Freedom and Censorship”. Javnost - The Public. Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture. Volume 7, 2000 - Issue 4. Pages 85-99. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13183222.2000.11008760?journalCode=rjav20> //Xu]

Free Press as People’s Press Marx addresses the relationship of press and people or nation as a crucial connection between the spiritual and material spheres of everyday life. Being an integral part of society also means that a free press represents not only ideas and ideologies of people, but also reflects engagement and participation. Marx concludes that because of its proximity to the people, the press reflects the real life with all of its natural contradictions, trials and errors, and because of its tender age (as a press for the masses rather than special interests), this press is liable to make mistakes, overstate, exaggerate, even distort events, only to learn from its practices. These are shortcomings, and Marx notes that people recognise their own conditions in the flawed performance of their newspapers and know that they will eventually rise to represent their moral spirit. Indeed, he concludes that attacks on the people’s press is a political acknowledgement and a significant initial recognition of its presence, its reality, and its power (RZ 1, 1/1/43; Fetscher 1969, 117). Thus, when Marx uses the term Volkspresse (peoples press) he refers to newspapers as representative examples of social, cultural, and political movements and mirrors of societal growth and intellectual advancement with all of their imperfections, failures, and successes. The press of this type functions neither as an authoritative instrument of elitist control, nor as a publication for and by the people (like Le Prolétaire, 1878-84, a weekly produced exclusively by manual labourers in Paris; see: Engels 1967/68c, I, 144), but constitutes a public sphere which accommodates the voice of the people, that is the working class, with its own tolerance for contradiction and dissent. The notion of Volkspresse implies a special relationship between people and the press that finds its expression in the editorial attention paid to the interests of people and suggests a specific, nurturing and protective role for newspapers as an extension of the public sphere in the process of public communication. It stands in opposition to a bourgeois press (and its notion of public opinion) and makes the idea of the bourgeois public sphere problematic for Marx, who argues that it contradicts the principle of universal accessibility. Indeed, according to Habermas (1989, 124), his critique of political economy demolished all fictions to which the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed. Specifically, Marx proposes that the free press is a public institution that unites people, confirms their self-confidence, and provides surveillance. He declares quite polemically that a free press is the ever-present, vigilant eye of the peoples spirit, the embodiment of a peoples trust in itself, the communication link that binds the individual to state and world, the embodied culture that transforms material struggles into spiritual ones while idealising their crude material form. It is the peoples outspoken self-confession, whose redeeming power is well known. It is the spiritual mirror, in which a people discover itself, and insight is the first prerequisite of wisdom. It is the public spirit, which may be delivered to every cottage cheaper than coal gas. It is multifarious, ubiquitous, and omniscient. It is the ideal world, which emerges from the real world only to return to it as an enriched spirit, newly charged (RZ 135, 15/5/42; Fetscher 1969, 80). Tracing the concrete historical roots of press freedom, Marx contemplates the conditions of freedom in a number of countries to find that the United States enjoy the natural phenomenon of a free press in its purest form. Yet, because literature and, with it, intellectual growth constitute the real historical determinants of a freepress, he concludes that Germany offers a sounder historical basis for the rise of press freedom (RZ 135, 15/5/42; Fetscher 1969, 83). By doing so, Marx confirms that the journalist as writer and journalism as intellectual labour are the real, historically grounded, definitional elements of the modern press. However, an increasingly commercialised world witnesses the turn from literature to trade as a source of inspiration and offers a different historical explanation one favoured by some of his contemporaries, like Albert Schäffle and Karl Knies (Hardt 1979). Marx confronts this perspective and argues that even as a commercial enterprise, the press remains different from other business ventures since it involves intellectual (Kopfarbeit) rather than physical labour (Arm- und Beinarbeit). In fact, he finds that the emancipation of arm and leg becomes humanly significant with the emancipation of the head (RZ 139, 19/5/42, Fetscher 1969, 88). Consequently, commercial freedom cannot be press freedom, since every particular sphere of freedom is freedom of a particular sphere, just as a specific way of life is the way of life of a particular nature (RZ 139, 19/5/42, Fetscher 1969, 90). Thus, liberal ideas of free trade, for instance, do not meet the requirement of genuine freedom; Marx insists on separating discussions of freedom that relate, if not combine, different spheres of human activity and, therefore, rejects the idea that press freedom is a category of commercial freedom. He illustrates his argument by suggesting, for instance, that it cannot be that the carpenter, who demands the freedom for his craftsmanship, is given the freedom of the philosopher. In fact, the first freedom of the press is not to be a business. If the press is seen as a business, it becomes a commercial concern to be assigned to the sphere of printers or booksellers rather than journalists or intellectuals, Commercial freedom, however, is not freedom of the press (RZ 139, 19/5/42; Fetscher 1969, 92). His remarks reflect not only the intellectual tradition of German journalism, but this perspective has significant consequences for considering the notion of press freedom, because it separates effectively the practice of journalism as intellectual labour from the institutional existence of the press as commercial enterprise; ultimately Marx identifies newswork and editorial practices, in general with freedom of expression that belongs to those working as journalists, while the economic concerns of the press are to be addressed from a different position. Freedom of the press must be understood as a (desirable or ideal) professional prerequisite for intellectual labour. By privileging the latter, Marx creates optimal theoretical conditions for the practice of journalism, since the press as an institution has no control over editorial functions (newswork as such) but serves journalists as a medium for public communication. Therefore, the notion of press freedom implies the achievement of freedom of expression; for Marx it is an individual or collective right that governs the relations between journalists and intellectuals generally and public and private authorities, including the owners of the press itself. In this sense, his writings on press freedom are also aimed at the emancipation of newsworkers from the ownership of the means of communication, that is, from the domination by publishers and stockholders. Implicit in his arguments for press freedom (or freedom of expression) also is a belief in the importance of ideas and their consequences for the well being of society. Marx writes from the vantage point of an intellectual who lives from the power of his words and relies on the need to communicate freely. He understands the potential effects of the press or any other medium, including books becausehe believes that the force of ideas can change the world. Thus, an intellectual life that is, the quality of ideas, their disclosure and dissemination contributes immeasurably to the cause of society. But as theories come to life in practice, beliefs need implementation; Marx is prepared to act, and his own work as journalist and editor illustrates the necessary relationship between ideas and actions (or theory and practice). As a result, intellectual labour and the process of communication, in general demand protection (by press laws and through the vigilance of intellectuals, and journalists, in particular) to ensure progress and maximise the potential for change. Marx treats press freedom as a necessary condition for a democratic society and, together with freedom of association and assembly, for instance, as a political goal. He demonstrates through his editorial practice, including the actual infractions and his numerous court appearances, the concrete foundations of his theoretical discussions of the nature of a free press and the location of press freedom as an unalienable right among other freedoms in the catalogue of human rights. His theoretical writings are tied into the political agenda of emancipating the working class. Indeed, press freedom is a prerequisite condition for competing political beliefs and struggling ideologies in the public sphere. It reinforces conflict and is a crucial element in defining hegemony, which relies on communication and exchange. Press freedom suggests access not only to contesting ideas, but also to the public discourse of society, which is strengthened by the potential of participation. Furthermore, protecting the process of public communication encourages alternative constructions of reality by confirming the merits of different social, political, or cultural forces. At the same time, however, press freedom works only for those who have the means of communication at their disposal, e.g., access to the media or sufficient public or private support to sustain the financial burden of a publishing enterprise. Speaking about the role of capital in the bourgeoisies rise to power, Engels (1967/ 68d, II, 57) remarks that freedom of the press is a bourgeois privilege, because printing requires money and buyers of the product, and these buyers need money, too. Marx is keenly aware of these conditions as editor and publisher of a newspaper whose specific political goals differentiate between the emancipation of the bourgeois class and the working class, but whose articulation of press freedom reflects an influence of nineteenth century liberalism. The latter champions the protection of the individual (politically and economically), advocates democracy, and promotes freedom of thought, speech, and press or cultural production in a bourgeois state. Marx employs the ideology of an enlightened, liberal bourgeoisie, whose assistance he sought in the fight against Prussian authority and in accordance with his long-term political strategy. But he seems to embrace liberalism only to undermine it with his insistence on press freedom in the service of an emancipatory struggle of the working class. According to Engels, the political interests of communists in Germany at the time were best served by supporting or collaborating with the bourgeoisie in its fight for power without falling for its promises to the proletariat and to overturn the regime of a victorious bourgeoisie as soon as possible (1967/68e, II, 14).In fact, a few years later, in 1850, Marx (1976, 50- 51) addresses the Communist League and urges the working class to remain politically independent and to make the revolution permanent. He explains, With us it is not a matter of reforming private property, but of abolishing it; not of hushing up the class antagonism, but of abolishing the classes; not of ameliorating the existing society, but of establishing a new one. Nevertheless, Marxs writings on freedom and the communication of ideas and against censorship and the authority of the Prussian state contain the vocabulary of mid-nineteenth century liberalism with references to democracy, freedom, and the role of the press, for instance and reflect the idea of the state as a facilitator of individual happiness.4 He uses the language of liberalism to particularly address pertinent issues regarding freedom of the press in ways that could help enlist bourgeois support for his specific political agenda, a strengthening of the working-class movement. But liberalism as a doctrinal aspect of capitalism does not embrace the totalising approach of socialism; the latter insists on the emancipation of working people, equality, and classlessness in the spirit of a perfect communal existence and certainly in opposition to capitalist individualism, which specifies and categorises the conditions of freedom and subordinates the individual to state or bureaucracy. Marx rejects the rather narrow (liberal) position that exchange relations (that is, economic relations) are compatible with freedom, since genuine freedom is self-determination. Instead, the earlier Marx follows a Western, humanistic tradition in his own intellectual practice by constructing the individual as an independent, productive, and non-alienated human being, while his political objectives help prepare the foundation of socialism as it would evolve from his later writings (and the work of Engels). Furthermore, Marx understood that as a determinant of political processes, the press produces and reinforces specific ideological positions; in fact, it becomes an instrument of propaganda, agitation, and organisation as Lenin would announce a generation later in his instructions to the Communist press at a point in history when the era of a Russian bourgeois press comes to an end. However, Marx does not theorise these functions, he merely generates and applies the power of the press based on his intellectual strength and the tenacity of his editorial staff to pursue his political mission. Indeed, his writings on press freedom expose considerable differences between his own understanding of a socialist press and the appropriation of his ideas by Lenin: they may serve as evidence of the misinterpretation and (deliberate) misrepresentation of Marx by Soviet-style communism in the 1920s and beyond. While his critique of capitalism includes, by necessity, a radical reconfiguration of the press and the role of unrestrained intellectual labour, Soviet communism treats the press or intellectual practice in the spirit of capitalism, that is, at the expense of genuine human emancipation and in favour of state directed goals, and promotes socialism by decree. Rosa Luxemburg (1976, 256), for instance, revisits the original ideas of socialism when she demands not only public control but also the most unlimited, broadest democracy and public opinion. Marx appreciates the potential effectiveness of the press to assist in educating the working class and reinforcing a nascent political movement. His journalism explains distant events (in India, China, Russia, or the United States) in terms of close-by, relevant affairs; thus, he applies historical thinking in his conclusions about the forces of capitalism elsewhere to encourage criticism and participation of the proletariat in the process of public communication. But his journalism is not only the expression of a socialist ideology, it is also the practice of translating theoretical thought into the language of everyday life where ideology becomes a material force with a potential of rallying the masses.5 Marx shares with contemporary German political economists, like Schäffle and Knies, an understanding of the press as a pivotal institution in modern society, but he also knows about its potential as a social and political means of persuasion, and therefore, as an attractive, if not indispensable weapon against political authority and for the rule of democratic ideas. But he also comes down on the side of press freedom in ways that preclude later interpretations of the role and function of the press in Soviet style socialism e.g., the bureaucratic subordination of the means of communication with a clear sense of the importance of ideas and their weight in the war against all forms of suppression and control. Because the goal of socialism, according to Marx, is to generate circumstances under which the individual overcomes alienation from work, from others, and from nature to return to the self and thus, to independence. For Marx communication is freedom, when socialism creates the conditions of a new social order in which the individual realises himself; self-realisation, however, depends on the production of ideas and ultimately consciousness by individuals who live in communication with their surroundings. To communicate under these circumstances also means the realisation of personal freedom and autonomy. For this reason, the process of communication is typically secured by a social order that advances the emancipation of the individual including the right of communication and charges the press with providing institutional support for the self-expression of a conscious existence. Implied in this development is a role for the intellectual, and therefore, for the presence of theory at the point of creation of a democratic society. Thus, Marx insists that freedom remains freedom, whether it expresses itself in printers ink, a parcel of land, consciousness, or in a political meeting (RZ 139, 19/5/42; Fetscher 1969, 99); but it is always individual freedom, that is the process of personal communication that is his concern. In this sense, communication is freedom only when emancipated from the commercial or political authority of the institution of the press. Marx also reveals in these early writings on press freedom and public communication his thinking about the social (or cultural) concept of the individual; by privileging expression (and the role of the press) Marx acknowledges the centrality of communication in the process of self-realisation. The individual does not exist except in terms of social relations; praxis is co-operative and existence interdependent. Thus, when individuality is realised through interaction, language and communication become the means by which individuals realise their being and engage in co-operative activities that constitute the essence of society. Human existence is an ongoing social process fuelled by the potential of communication. These nascent ideas are confirmed throughout his writings in later years. Their contemporary relevance, particularly as they pertain to the future of journalism, however, seems clear: to sustain democracy requires freedom of expression and the protection of the public sphere, including the media, particularly from those forms of censorship that arise with the control of intellectual labour by those who own or influence the public means of communication.

#### Empirics.

Blackwater 12 [Bill Blackwater (British left-winger, who has written for publications such as Monthly Review, Capitalism Nature Socialism, and Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy). “The Denialism of Progressive Environmentalists”. Monthly Review. Jun 01, 2012. Accessed 3/11/2022. <https://monthlyreview.org/2012/06/01/the-denialism-of-progressive-environmentalists/> //Xu]

In 2003 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, two prominent environmental lobbyists, founded the Breakthrough Institute, a think tank dedicated to modernizing what they call “liberal-progressive-green politics.” Its focus is on winning support from mainstream businesses, politicians, and consumers with an attractive message: by developing the right technologies and policy tools, tackling climate change and increasing wealth can go hand-in-hand. In their essay, “The Death of Environmentalism” (2004) and book, Break Through: Why We Can’t Leave Saving the Planet to Environmentalists (2007) Nordhaus and Shellenberger focus on educating and disciplining environmentalists to work with the grain of capitalism, rather than against it. Most of all, this has meant attacking that core principle of environmentalist thought—there are limits to economic growth. They say that this is both too negative in tone, and fundamentally wrong when it comes to tackling climate change. It will require massive investment in low carbon technologies, they argue, which in turn will depend on strong and ongoing growth. In practice, the approach they have adopted to boost the influence of their message (and themselves in the process) is to characterize all opinion within the environmental movement that is redder or greener than theirs as marginal, unrealistic, immature, or elitist. Far from being alone in this, Nordhaus and Shellenberger are representative of a wider school that might be called “progressive environmentalists.” They have even spawned a number of imitators, which David Roberts has described as “the Breakthrough crowd.” Their position is essentially the same as that of the New Democrat and New Labour camps regarding the environment; and their tactics of triangulation are precisely those pursued by the New Democrats and New Labour since the early 1990s. The faults of this progressive environmentalism, in trading long-term transformational ambition for short-term success, are equally familiar. The triangulation tactics of the likes of Clinton and Blair achieved some conspicuous electoral successes, but they did so at the expense of weakening the left’s capacity to mount a fundamental challenge to the basis of financialized capitalism. This was starkly revealed by the inability of left-wing parties to capitalize on the economic crisis since 2008, either by winning the intellectual argument against neoliberalism or by gaining clear electoral support.1 The approach of progressive environmentalism, meanwhile, is calculated to achieve short-term popularity, since it is stuffed with business- and consumer-friendly wishful thinking. But this must be at the expense of weakening the capacity of the environmental movement to highlight the unsustainability of our economic system and concomitant need for radical changes. Both in the content and practical effects of their positive ideas progressive environmentalists are not dissimilar from the environmental spokespeople (or self-styled “skeptics”) of the right—the kind, exemplified by Julian Simon and Bjorn Lomborg, who churn out panglossian accounts of how every environmental challenge will be overcome by the genius of capitalism. By virtue of their starting positions, however, they are very different. Nordhaus and Shellenberger are genuine environmentalists, possessing a detailed understanding of the challenges of climate change, and a sincere interest in finding practical measures that would decarbonize the global economy. The classic denial of the right-wingers rejects climate change itself: either that it is a problem, or that it even occurs at all. But what the progressive environmentalists deny is the impossibility of the economy to find ways, through enlightened policy tools and technological development, to evade environmental limits for the foreseeable future. Of course, this is denied by the right-wing environmental skeptics, too; but with them this is less active, since they deny that environmental limits pose a threat to growth in the first place. What makes Nordhaus and Shellenberger particularly worth studying is precisely the gulf between the scientificality of the challenges they set out and the daydream quality of their positive solutions. To focus on them is to witness, in their leaps of logic and lapses of reason, evidence of the psychodrama wrought by the denial of something one subconsciously suspects to be true. To view this evidence is to see a vivid illustration of the wider, if less active, practice of denial across Western society at large, in the face of a challenge which renders its dominant economic system unsustainable. Rebound and Denial Nowhere is the gap between analysis of the problem and prescription of the solution wider than in Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s writing on the “rebound effect.” Sometimes called the “Jevons Paradox” (after the nineteenth century British economist, W.S. Jevons, who first wrote about it), the rebound effect describes the phenomenon by which an increase in the efficiency with which energy is used tends, by lowering its costs, to result in an increase in overall consumption. In February 2011, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (along with Jesse Jenkins, Breakthrough’s director of energy and climate change) published a compendium of research on the subject.2 It is an astonishing read. What makes it so remarkable is its detailed exposition of the problem. It is a devastating critique of the positive arguments around achieving a business-friendly salvation from global warming through investing in energy efficiency, which are the stock-in-trade of progressive environmentalists—specifically including Nordhaus and Shellenberger themselves on other occasions.3 But the truly extraordinary thing about the report is that at the end of this relentlessly critical analysis, the authors are still parroting their faith in the good news: all the problems in cutting emissions will only work to our collective advantage, by…fuelling economic growth, which is, they assure us, the only path to decarbonizing the global economy! It is worth going through their arguments in detail, given the thoroughness of their job in considering the rebound problem—indeed, they offer a taxonomy of it. The first form they discuss is “direct rebound,” which in turn is made up of the “income effect” and the “substitution effect.” Following an improvement in energy efficiency, the cost of energy use will fall, in turn increasing demand for that service or product (the “income effect”; for example, driving a more efficient car more often). This leads to the adoption of new uses of energy in place of more labor-intensive activities (the “substitution effect”; for instance, using a dishwasher rather than doing dishes by hand). The authors assess direct rebound as being generally moderate in developed economies, eroding around 10–30 percent of the energy savings due to efficiency measures. Next they consider “indirect rebound.” A major element of this comes from the embodied energy in materials used to improve energy efficiency; double-glazed windows are a classic example. They conclude, from the embodied energy effect alone, that there are rebounds of 1–15 percent from energy-efficient new buildings. This rebound also comes in the form of capital equipment which is used to increase energy efficiency in industrial production. Rebounds increase as firms pursue incremental efficiency improvements over time, suggesting diminishing returns; this, in turn, undermines the optimistic suggestion that technological progress will be able to deliver greater and greater energy savings into the future. There is also the “respending effect,” whereby consumers spend the savings they make from lower energy costs on other goods and services, in turn boosting their production and the amount of energy embodied in them. The total respending effect for consumers could drive rebounds of the order of 5–35 percent. Next, Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Jenkins consider macroeconomic effects such as “market price effects.” Energy efficiency improvements lead to a sharp decrease in demand for a particular fuel, upon which the resulting drop in price results in a strong bounce in demand once more. The authors suggest that this could be an especially big factor in the developing world, where there is a large amount of untapped (elastic) demand for energy, held in check only by cost. Of more relevance to Western economies would be “composition effects,” whereby improvements in energy efficiency would by disproportionately favoring energy intensive industries lead to their expansion. The third macroeconomic factor considered is the largest and most obvious: the “economic growth effect.” Not only will energy efficiency stimulate higher output directly, it will also lead to lower costs for energy services; in turn this will translate into an increase in real income and stimulate economic growth, therefore leading to greater consumption of energy. The further issue is “emergent rebound.” Different aspects of rebound will reinforce each other, creating an overall rebound effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. Since most existing studies only consider these aspects individually, most of the existing quantifications of rebound are likely to be underestimates. One of the examples they suggest for emergent rebound is that energy efficiency improvements usually accompany improvements in the efficiency of capital and labor, fuelling economic growth and hence enhancing their rebound effects. Where there are major advances in energy efficiency—especially in technologies such as lighting, engines, motors, and computing—there may be “open opportunities for newly profitable uses of energy—as yet unforeseen new energy-using applications products, enterprises, or even whole new industries emerge.” They call this the “frontier effect.” As a result of these insights they mount an attack on the “natural capitalism” school of environmentalists, those—notably Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute—who have specialized in making environmentalism popular by stressing the economic benefits of energy efficiency to business. They cite Lovins on the numerous “side benefits” of energy-efficient investments—for instance, “retail sales pressure can rise 40% in well-daylit stores”—as well as arguing that, in efficient buildings, “labor productivity typically rises by about 6–16%. Since office workers in industrialized countries cost ~100x more than office energy, a 1% increase in labor productivity has the same bottom-line effect as eliminating the energy bill—and the actual gain in labor productivity is ~6–16x bigger than that.” As Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Jenkins comment: “If the economic impact of labor productivity improvements from efficient buildings is several orders of magnitude greater than the simultaneous savings in energy consumption…then the rebound due to economic growth/output effects alone should also be several orders of magnitude greater.” But they are not finished here. Next they cite ecological economists, such as Cutler Cleveland and Robert Kaufmann, who believe that the macroeconomic effects will be bigger than projected in other studies. Cleveland and Kaufmann believe the relationship between the cost of energy and rate of growth is much closer than is understood by neoclassical economics. The corollary of this is that energy efficiency improvements will lead to higher growth and waves of rebound than previously estimated. One of the supports Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Jenkins give for this position is an argument of Kaufmann’s: that the improvements in the energy intensity of the economy (i.e., the ratio of primary energy inputs to real GDP) that have been observed over the past half-century can be put down entirely to improvements in the quality of fuels used—the successive shifts from wood, to coal, oil, natural gas, and the increasing use of electricity—rather than improvements in technology. This completely undermines the case of those (not least Nordhaus and Shellenberger themselves) who harp on humankinds’s innate, innovative technological genius to deliver radical reductions in energy consumption and carbon emissions into the future. But perhaps the most significant implications of this work come not from the report itself, but from the press statements Breakthrough put out to accompany it.4 As Nordhaus and Shellenberger commented, “The findings of the new report are significant because governments have in recent years relied heavily on energy efficiency measures as a means to cut greenhouse gases.” And yet the leading studies on the economics of climate change mitigation—including the Stern Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Working Group III assessment reports, and McKinsey’s Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve—“have ignored or dismissed the strong evidence for rebound…resulting in climate mitigation scenarios that conclude that large emissions reductions can be achieved through greater efficiency.” The result is “a dangerous over-reliance on energy efficiency in climate mitigation strategies.” While not spelled out, the clear implication of this is that carbon mitigation will cost more than in the most high-profile estimates, and that we are even further away from a pathway towards a global decarbonization target than is generally accepted. The Breakthrough document is devastating to the whole project of “ecological modernization.” That movement, pioneered by the likes of Lovins in the 1970s and gaining momentum following the Brundtland Commission on sustainable development in the late ’80s, asserts that, with the right alignment of regulations and incentives, business-as-usual capitalism can be made compatible with environmentalist objectives. Indeed, while the Breakthrough report does not explicitly name capitalism as the problem, it seizes on the logic of the capitalist system as a whole as the reason why Lovins’s approach is both shortsighted and doomed to failure. As the authors make clear, “given the drive to maximize profits” (emphasis added), increasing the productivity of raw materials will not lead to a reduction in demand, but rather “will spur substitution of that input for other factors of production and/or increase economic production, output, and growth.” This is true to Jevons, the originator of the rebound argument, who was clear that even where increased efficiency did not lead to rebound within an individual concern, the pressures for growth within the economic system meant it would still rebound across the economy as a whole. The conclusion that Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Jenkins append to their paper is a three-part argument. The initial premise is that there are good reasons to accelerate the adoption of energy efficiency improvements “even though such measures may be unlikely to result in a significant reduction of long-term global energy demand or associated carbon emissions.” That is because, “While rebound or backfire may indicate that the pursuit of below-cost energy efficiency improvements does not make for particularly efficacious climate policy, the corollary to this conclusion is that such efforts probably make for very good economic policy. Accelerating the adoption of below-cost efficiency improvements is likely to result in greater economic productivity and growth.” In other words, while energy efficiency fails to be good for the environment because it leads to economic growth, we should still pursue it because…it leads to economic growth, and this is good because it will make us richer. The second premise is that, as energy efficiency will not deliver absolute reductions in energy use and carbon emissions, we should “focus primarily on shifting the means of energy production…relying on zero-carbon and renewable energy sources to diversify and decarbonize the global energy supply system.” Finally, the conclusion which ties these premises together is that, “A wealthier world, using energy more efficiently and productively, is a world with greater resources to devote to both decarbonizing its energy supply and adapting to those impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided.” And thus, since economic expansion is “driven in part by energy productivity improvements,” and since it “can facilitate the accelerated decarbonization of the energy system,” then “Below-cost efficiency opportunities should therefore be vigorously pursued.” Herman Daly once characterized this kind of argument, made by apologists for the environmental consequences of economic growth, as “hair of the dog that bit you.” Nordhaus and Shellenberger surely deserve some kind of award for pushing this argument to new limits of self-destructiveness. Wishing for the Right “Kind of Prosperity” Of course, Nordhaus and Shellenberger themselves would demure and stand by the logic of their case. Above all, they would argue that decarbonizing the global economy will require enormous investment in low carbon infrastructure: How would that investment be found, if not under conditions of continued economic growth? The weaknesses in their case can be shown by examining one of its main supports—the idea of the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC). It parallels an argument made by the economist Simon Kuznets in the 1950s: as economies industrialize, inequality will first grow before declining, as greater wealth becomes more evenly distributed. The environmental adaptation of this argument asserts that pollution first grows before reducing, as a wealthier society invests more resources in cleaning up the environment. Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Jenkins describe their understanding of the EKC: there is the well-established relationship between societal affluence and investment in noneconomic amenities, specifically ecological amenities (a concept pioneered by Kuznets). Wealthier societies are more capable and willing to pay higher costs for cleaner energy supplies, and rising demand in modernizing societies for ecological amenities, specifically cleaner air, has been a major driver of the decarbonization of energy supply over the last century or more.5 In framing their version of this idea, Nordhaus and Shellenberger explicitly draw on Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs,” whereby successive levels of physical, emotional, and social security must be met before an individual can develop themselves personally and in accordance with higher ideals. As people get richer and their immediate needs for food, shelter, and material goods are met, they turn their attention to the quality of the environment they are living within, and begin to divert an increasing amount of wealth and attention to improving it. Nordhaus and Shellenberger conclude, “Given that prosperity is the basis for ecological concern, our political goal must be to create a kind of prosperity that moves everyone up Maslow’s pyramid as quickly as possible while also achieving our ecological goals.”6 Unfortunately there are a number of problems with this argument. First, it is incorrect to imply that the concept underlying the Environmental Kuznets Curve derives from Kuznets himself, since there is no direct link between the mechanics of economic growth and income distribution that he was describing, and the relationship between wealth and environmental quality asserted by the EKC. Aside from the name, the only relationship between the original Kuznets Curve and the environmental version is that both are depicted in the form of an inverted “U” (i.e., a line on a graph, standing for something undesirable, which rises and then falls). This in itself is no more a “concept pioneered by Kuznets” than the commonplace remark that things often get worse before they get better. In any case, and more seriously, the original Kuznets argument has been falsified by the widening inequality in Western economies over the past four decades. The EKC actually hails from the early 1990s, notably from a World Bank report which argued that “it is possible to ‘grow out’ of some environmental problems.”7 This leads to the second problem with Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s argument: the EKC is not supported by the evidence. As the environmental economist Paul Ekins has found in a comprehensive review of that World Bank report and similar efforts, “the evidence of an EKC, even for any single environmental indicator, is inconclusive, and certainly cannot be generalized across environmental quality as a whole…. As a generally applicable notion, the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC) hypothesis can be deemed invalid.”8 As if that were not enough, the next problem is the way in which Nordhaus and Shellenberger concentrate solely on one element of the environmental consequences of economic growth—carbon emissions. In this they perform intellectual sleight of hand. They are quick to criticize other environmentalists for arguing that there are limits to economic growth, but the only limit they pay attention to is atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. About a range of other limits—such as biodiversity, availability of freshwater, and soil nitrogen—they have nothing to offer. This is unsurprising: these wider limits cannot be overcome, even in theory, by investments in low-carbon technologies financed by ongoing growth. Even accepting their terms and concentrating only on carbon emissions, Nordhaus and Shellenberger are misapplying the central logic within the idea of the EKC. They make great play of the way in which environmentalists are stuck within a “pollution paradigm,” harking back to campaigns to improve individual aspects of environmental quality, such as cleaning up lakes and reducing local air pollution. This will not work for global warming, they argue, since the key to tackling this is the creation of zero carbon infrastructure, which will in turn require the unleashing of the creative forces of economic development. In making this argument, however, it is precisely Nordhaus and Shellenberger who are stuck within their own pollution paradigm. Where the EKC has any purchase is precisely in the area of local pollution. Urban air quality in affluent regions has improved since the 1950s with the passing of clean air acts, deindustrialization, and improvements in motor vehicle technology. But where there is no evidence for an EKC is in the net impact of economic growth on the environment overall. Carbon emissions are, in fact, a near perfect anti-argument to the EKC, since they are both so intimately associated with economic growth and, in themselves, non-polluting in an immediate sense, being neither toxic to breathe nor even personally noticeable. The logic of the EKC will tend to lead towards measures which simply improve the ambient environment of wealthy areas, for instance by locating power plants and heavy industry elsewhere, allowing more affluent consumers to continue enjoying the economic benefits of fossil fuels without so much of the accompanying local pollution—that is, local to them. There is a further weakness in this use of the EKC, which is a deafness to its logic shared by most of its proponents. The EKC is most commonly used by right-wingers as a rhetorical weapon against environmentalists and their arguments in favor of regulation and against the untrammeled pursuit of growth. It is deployed as an argument that economic growth is not the enemy; the market will, if left to its own devices, clean up its own environmental mess. Mikhail Bernstam even talks about an “Invisible Environmental Hand.”9 What this ignores is the agency of these individuals whose greater affluence allows them to focus on less immediate, material needs, and through whose collective activity society is said to clean up the environment it lives in. Partly, this is a story of taking political action to impose state regulation on the economy. Proponents of the EKC are happy to reference the effects of such action, for instance of clean air legislation passed in the 1950s, but unwilling to acknowledge the story that lies behind them—since this is the very antithesis of their story about the market spontaneously solving its own problems. But if political action to curb the activities of private enterprise and shape the habits of private life has been crucial to improving environmental quality in some areas in the past, why should it not be the key to tackling the environmental problems confronting us today? There is a final and related problem with these arguments. The logic of the EKC suggests that, as society becomes wealthier, it also becomes less preoccupied with material concerns and thus begins to give greater value to other things, including preserving natural landscapes and wildlife in their own right. What else is this other than an argument that after a certain point of economic development, people do not want growth to be pursued at all costs? This implies that economic growth both must and should be restrained—must, because this is necessary to prevent further environmental destruction; and should, because this is what the people want. Any proponent of the EKC, if they want their theory to be verified in reality, should be encouraging environmentalists to bring the consequences of growth to the public’s attention, so that it can fulfil its essential political role and collectively restrain the activities of private enterprise. The overriding problem Nordhaus and Shellenberger face is making the case that the environmental gains that come in their theory from economic growth will outpace—dramatically so, in the case of decarbonizing a growing economy—the despoliation attendant on that same growth. In practice, they hardly ever make the attempt, merely advancing this as an article of faith. The best they do is a repeated insistence that economic growth should be of the “right kind”—but what this actually means and how it could be guaranteed they decline to say. Their positive ideas remain on the level of simplistic wish-fulfillment. Take, for instance, the following remarks defining their own vision of environmentalism: “It will see in institutions like the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund not a corporate conspiracy to keep people poor and destroy the environment, but an opportunity to drive a kind of development that is both sustainable and equitable.”10 Nordhaus and Shellenberger are imposing a fantasy on reality here, and it is given away when they say that the WTO, World Bank, and IMF will not be reformed to protect the global environment—but simply that they are choosing to see these institutions in that light. In Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger acknowledge that successfully arresting climate change will require equalizing per capita emissions across the globe. They then come to the realization that this will in effect mean equalizing living standards. But this cannot be a levelling down, they declare; it must be a levelling up, bringing the developing world up to the standards of America. Before one can even begin wondering whether there are enough natural resources to support such levels of consumption, they suddenly redefine economic wealth as immaterial well-being: “The new vision of prosperity will not be the vision of economic growth held by those who worship at the altar of the market. It will define growth not in gross economic terms but as overall well-being.”11 It is as though they themselves realize that endless growth is both impossible and undesired. The question is: If selecting well-being over economic growth is good enough for a future world, with its equalized carbon emissions and new vision of prosperity, why can it not be adopted today?

#### Objectivity is not the lack of bias but Objectivity of methodology.

Jones 9 Alex Jones 9-15-2009 "An Argument Why Journalists Should Not Abandon Objectivity" <https://niemanreports.org/articles/an-argument-why-journalists-should-not-abandon-objectivity/> (Alex S. Jones, a 1982 Nieman Fellow, is director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University.)//Elmer

In their book “The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect,” Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, describe what they call “the lost meaning of objectivity.”… As [they] point out, “In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist.” It was because journalists inevitably arrived with bias that they needed objectivity as a discipline to test that bias against the evidence so as to produce journalism that would be closer to truth. They argue that the quickening of objectivity as the American journalistic standard was born of a desire to have a more scientific way of approaching news. The nation’s faith in science was surging, and the scientific method seemed suited to journalism. Scientists begin their research with assumptions. They have expectations of what will happen, but they don’t know what will happen. They have, in other words, their own opinions and beliefs—their point of view or even bias—about what is likely the truth, and they do their research to test those assumptions. Their objective, scientific inquiry is not one that is without bias, but one in which bias has to stand up to evidence and results. This is the sensible and realistic approach to objectivity that might be termed genuine objectivity. It begins with the assumption that journalists have bias, and that their bias has to be tested and challenged by gathering facts and information that will either support it or knock it down. Often, there is information that does both, and that ambiguity needs to be reported with the same dispassion with which a scientist would report variations in findings that were inconclusive. If the evidence is inconclusive, then that is—by scientific standards—the truth. But journalistic objectivity is an effort to discern a practical truth, not an abstract, perfect truth. Reporters seeking genuine objectivity search out the best truth possible from the evidence that the reporter, in good faith, can find. To discredit objectivity because it is impossible to arrive at perfect truth is akin to dismissing trial by jury because it isn’t perfect in its judgments.

#### The people’s press necessitates objectivity –

#### 1] Dialectic Materialism – revolutionary organization is found in the fusion of theory and practice that mobilizes truth for rebellion.

Badiou 08 [Alain Badiou (professor emeritus of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, works with Organisation Politique, a postparty organization). Translated by Alberto Toscano (member of the sociology faculty at Goldsmiths College, University of London). “An Essential Philosophical Thesis: “It Is Right to Rebel against the Reactionaries”.” The Marxist-Leninist. 3/23/08. Accessed 2/24/22. https://marxistleninist.wordpress.com/2008/03/23/the-maoism-of-alain-badiou/ //Xu]

We are familiar with Mao Zedong’s formula: “Marxism comprises many principles, but in the final analysis they can all be brought back to a single sentence: it is right to rebel against the reactionaries.” This phrase, which appears so simple, is at the same time rather mysterious: how is it conceivable that Marx’s enormous theoretical enterprise, with its ceaselessly and scrupulously reworked and recast analyses, can be concentrated in a single maxim: “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries”? And what is this maxim? Are we dealing with an observation, summarizing the Marxist analysis of objective contradictions, the ineluctable confrontation of revolution and counterrevolution? Is it a directive oriented toward the subjective mobilization of revolutionary forces? Is Marxist truth the following: one rebels, one is right?1 Or is it rather: one must rebel? The two, perhaps, and even more the spiraling movement from the one to the other, real rebellion (objective force) being enriched and returning on itself in the consciousness of its rightness or reason (subjective force).A. Practice, Theory, Knowledge We are already handed something essential here: every Marxist statement is—in a single, dividing movement—observation and directive. As a concentrate of real practice, it equals its movement in order to return to it. Since all that is draws its being only from its becoming, equally, theory as knowledge of what is has being only by moving toward that of which it is the theory. Every knowledge is orientation, every description is prescription. The sentence, “it is right to rebel against the reactionaries,” bears witness to this more than any other. In it we find expressed the fact that Marxism, prior to being the full-fledged science of social formation, is the distillate of what rebellion demands: that one consider it right, that reason be rendered to it. Marxism is both a taking sides and the systematization of a partisan experience. The existence of a science of social formations bears no interest for the masses unless it reflects and concentrates their real revolutionary movement. Marxism must be conceived as the accumulated wisdom of popular revolutions, the reason they engender, the fixation and detailing of their target. Mao Zedong’s sentence clearly situates rebellion as the originary place of correct ideas, and reactionaries as those whose destruction is legitimated by theory. Mao’s sentence situates Marxist truth within the unity of theory and practice. Marxist truth is that from which rebellion draws its rightness, its reason, to demolish the enemy. It repudiates any equality in the face of truth. In a single movement, which is knowledge in its specific division into description and directive, it judges, pronounces the sentence, and immerses itself in its execution. Rebels possess knowledge, according to their aforementioned essential movement, their power and their duty: to annihilate the reactionaries. Marx’s Capital does not say anything different: the proletarians are right to violently overthrow the capitalists. Marxist truth is not a conciliatory truth. It is, in and of itself, dictatorship and, if need be, terror. Mao Zedong’s sentence reminds us that, for a Marxist, the link from theory to practice (from reason to rebellion) is an internal condition of theory itself, because truth is a real process, it is rebellion against the reactionaries. There is hardly a truer and more profound statement in Hegel than the following: “The absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the theoretical Idea and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided” (Hegel, Science of Logic). For Hegel, absolute truth is the contradictory unity of theory and practice. It is the uninterrupted and divided process of being and the act. Lenin salutes this enthusiastically: “The unity of the theoretical idea (of knowledge) and of practice—this NB—and this unity precisely in the theory of knowledge, for the resulting sum is the “absolute idea” (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks). Let us read this sentence very carefully, since, remarkably, it divides the word “knowledge” into two. That is a crucial point, on which we shall often return: knowledge, as theory, is (dialectically) opposed to practice. Theory and practice form a unity, that is to say, for the dialectic, a unity of opposites. But this knowledge (theory/)practice contradiction is in turn the very object of the theory of knowledge. In other words, the inner nature of the process of knowledge is constituted by the theory/practice contradiction. Or again, practice, which as such is dialectically opposed to knowledge (to theory), is nevertheless an integral part of knowledge qua process. In all Marxist texts we encounter this scission, this double occurrence of the word “knowledge,” designating either theory in its dialectical correlation to practice or the overall process of this dialectic, that is, the contradictory movement of these two terms, theory and practice. Consider Mao, “Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?”: “Often, correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process . . . leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge, the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge” (Mao Zedong, Five Philosophical Essays). The movement of knowledge is the practice-knowledge-practice trajectory. Here “knowledge” designates one of the terms in the process but equally the process taken as a whole, a process that in turn includes two occurrences of practice, initial and final. To stabilize our vocabulary,2 and remain within the tradition, we will call “theory” the term in the theory/practice contradiction whose overall movement will be the process of “knowledge.” We will say: Knowledge is the dialectical process practice/theory. On this basis we may expose the reactionary illusion entertained by those who imagine they can circumvent the strategic thesis of the primacy of practice. It is clear that whoever is not within the real revolutionary movement, whoever is not practically internal to the rebellion against the reactionaries, knows nothing, even if he theorizes. Mao Zedong did indeed affirm that in the theory/practice contradiction—that is, in a phase of the real process—theory could temporarily play the main role: “The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, ‘Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement'” (Mao, On Contradiction). Does this mean that, at that moment, theory amounts to an intrinsic revolutionary possibility, that pure “Marxist theoreticians” can and must emerge? Absolutely not. It means that, in the theory/practice contradiction that constitutes the process of knowledge, theory is the principal aspect of the contradiction; that the systematization of practical revolutionary experiences is what allows one to advance; that it is useless to continue quantitatively to accumulate these experiences, to repeat them, because what is on the agenda is the qualitative leap, the rational synthesis immediately followed by its application, that is, its verification. But without these experiences, without organized practice (because organization alone allows the centralization of experiences), there is no systematization, no knowledge at all. Without a generalized application there is no testing ground, no verification, no truth. In that case “theory” can only give birth to idealist absurdities. We thus come back to our starting point: practice is internal to the rational movement of truth. In its opposition to theory, it is part of knowledge. It is this intuition that accounts for Lenin’s enthusiastic reception of the Hegelian conception of the absolute Idea, to the point that he makes Marx into the mere continuation of Hegel. (“Marx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge,” Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks.) Mao Zedong’s sentence lends its precision to Lenin’s enthusiasm. It is the general historical content of Hegel’s dialectical statement. It is not just any practice that internally anchors theory, it is the rebellion against the reactionaries. Theory, in turn, does not externally legislate on practice, on rebellion: it incorporates itself in the rebellion by the mediating release of its reason. In this sense, it is true that the sentence says it all, an all that summarizes Marxism’s class position, its concrete revolutionary significance. An all outside which stands anyone who tries to consider Marxism not from the standpoint of rebellion but from that of the break; not from the standpoint of history but from that of the system; not from the standpoint of the primacy of practice but from that of the primacy of theory; not as the concentrated form of the wisdom of the working people but as its a priori condition. B. The Three Senses of the Word “Reason” If this sentence says it all, it nevertheless does so according to the dialectic, that is, according to a simplicity that divides itself. What concentrates and sustains this division, while apparently cloaking it, is the word “reason” or “rightness”: one is right, the rebellion is right, a new reason stands up against the reactionaries. The fact is that, through the word “reason,” the sentence says three things, and it is the articulation of the three that makes the whole. 1. It is right to rebel against the reactionaries does not mean in the first place “one must rebel against the reactionaries” but rather “one rebels against the reactionaries”—it is a fact, and this fact is reason. The sentence says: primacy of practice. Rebellion does not wait for its reason, rebellion is what is always already there, for any possible reason whatever. Marxism simply says: rebellion is reason, rebellion is subject. Marxism is the recapitulation of the wisdom of rebellion. Why write Capital, hundreds of pages of scruples and minutiae, of laborious intelligence, volumes of dialectic often at the edges of intelligibility? Because only this measures up to the profound wisdom of rebellion. The historical density and obstinacy of rebellion precede Marxism, accumulating the conditions and necessity of its appearance, because they instill the conviction that, beyond the particular causes that provoke the proletarian uprising, there exists a profound reason, which cannot be uprooted. Marx’s Capital is the systematization, in terms of general reason, of what is given in the historical summation of causes. The bourgeoisie, which cognizes and recognizes class struggle, is happy to admit and investigate the particular causes of a rebellion, if only in order to forestall its return. But it ignores the reason, which when all is said and done the proletarians hold onto—a reason that no absorption of causes and circumstances would ever satisfy. Marx’s enterprise amounts to reflecting what is given, not so much in the particularity of battles but in the persistence and development of the class energy invested in them. The thinking of causes does not suffice here.3 The reason for this persistence must be accounted for in depth. The essence of the proletarian position does not reside in the episodes of class struggle but in the historical project that subtends them, a project whose form of practical existence is given by the implacable duration and successive stages of proletarian obstinacy. That is where reason lies. Only its clarification and exposition—simultaneously in the guise of reflections and directives—do justice to the movement, which rebellion brings to light, of the class being of phenomena. Today only the Maoist enterprise integrally develops what proletarians do and allow us to know through the unconditional and permanent character of their rebellion. Only thus can we say: yes, contradiction is antagonistic, yes, the workers’ rebellion, which is the fire at the heart of this contradiction, is the very reason of history. “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries” means above all: the obstinate proletarians are right, they have all the reasons on their side, and much more besides. 2. “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries” also means: the rebellion will be right, it will have reason on its side. At the tribunal of history, the reactionaries will have to provide reasons, to account for all their misdeeds of exploitation and oppression. The obstinacy of proletarian rebellion is certainly—and this is the first meaning of the word “reason,” or “rightness”—the objective, irreducible character of the contradiction that pits the workers against the bourgeois, but it is also the practical certainty of the final victory; it is the spontaneous, ceaselessly renewed critique of worker defeatism. That the state of affairs is unacceptable and divided—this is the first reason for the rebellion against the reactionaries. That it is transitory and doomed is the second. It is reason, no longer from the standpoint of the motivation or of the moment, but from the standpoint of the future. It is reason in the sense of victory, beyond reason in the sense of legitimacy. Rebellion is wisdom because it is just, because it is founded in reason, but also because it is rebellion that legislates about the future. Marxism repudiates any conception of reason solely based on justification. The proletariat does not simply have true reasons to rebel, it has victorious reasons. “Reason” is here at the crossroads of revolutionary legitimacy and revolutionary optimism. Rebellion is allergic to Kant’s moral maxim: “You must, therefore you can.” Besides, Kant concluded that an act thus regulated in terms of pure duty had doubtless never taken place. Morality is a defeated prescription. But the workers’ rebellion has indeed taken place, and it finds in Marxism its place of victorious prescription. Marxist reason is not an ought, a duty to be, it is the affirmation of being itself, the unlimited power of what stands up, opposes, contradicts. It is the objective victory of popular refusal. Materialistically, workers’ reason says: “You can, therefore you must.” 3. But “reason” means yet another thing, and this thing is the split fusion of the first two senses. This time, “it is right to rebel against the reactionaries” means: rebellion can be strengthened by the consciousness of its own reason. The statement itself “it is right to rebel against the reactionaries” is both the development of kernels of knowledge internal to the rebellion itself and the return into rebellion of this development. Rebellion—which is right, which has reason—finds in Marxism the means of developing this reason, of assuring its victorious reason. That which allows the legitimacy of rebellion (the first sense of the word “reason”) to become articulated with its victory (the second sense of the word “reason”) is a new type of fusion between rebellion as a practice that is always there and the developed form of its reason. The fusion of Marxism and of the real workers’ movement is the third sense of the word reason, that is to say, the dialectical link, both objective and subjective, of its first two senses. We encounter here once again the dialectical status of Marxist statements, all of which are divided according to reflection and according to the directive: grasping, beyond its causes, the reason of class energy. By the same token the theory formulates the rule whereby reason can prevail over the cause, the ensemble over the local, strategy over tactics. Rebellion formulates its reason in practical duration; but the clarified statement of this reason breaks with the still-repetitive rule that commands this duration. Rebellion arms itself with its own reason, instead of simply deploying it. It concentrates its rational quality: it organizes its reason and sets out the instruments of its victory. Knowing that one is right to rebel against the reactionaries, by delivering the (theoretical) reason of this (practical) reason, allows one to make the subjective (organization, the project) equal to the objective (class struggle, rebellion). “Reason,” which initially voiced revolutionary legitimacy and optimism, now speaks of the consciousness and mastery of history. C. Reason as Contradiction “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries” is indeed a sentence that says everything about historical movement, because it voices its energy, its sense, and its instrument. Its energy is class struggle, the objective rationality internal to rebellion. Its sense is the ineluctable collapse of the world of exploitation and oppression—that is, communist reason. The instrument is the possible direction of the relation, within history, between energy and sense, between class struggle (which is always and everywhere the motor of history) and the communist project (which is always and everywhere the value promoted by the rebellion of the oppressed). The instrument is reason become subject, it is the party. “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries” voices the whole, because it speaks of class struggle and the primacy of practice, communism and the withering away of the state, the party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The sentence voices integral reason, which is to say divided reason, according to the subjective and the objective, reality and project, the endpoint and the stages. And we can see how this integral reason is contradiction: it is impossible to be right, to have reason alone and for oneself. One is right, one has reason, against the reactionaries. One is always right against the reactionaries, the “against the reactionaries” is an internal condition of the true. That is also why Mao Zedong’s sentence summarizes Marxism; it says: every reason contradicts. “True ideas emerge in the struggle against false ideas,” reason is forged in the rebellion against unreason, against what the Chinese invariably call “reactionary absurdities.” Every truth affirms itself in the destruction of nonsense. Every truth is thus essentially destruction. Everything that simply conserves is simply false. The field of Marxist knowledge is always a field of ruins. Mao Zedong’s sentence tells us the whole dialectic: the class essence of reason as rebellion lies in the struggle to the death of opposites. Truth only exists in a process of scission. The theory of contradictions is wholly implicated in the historical wisdom of rebels. That is why the dialectic has always existed, just like rebellions. The dialectic philosophically concentrates the conception of the world of the exploited who stand up against the existing world and will its radical change. That is why it is an eternal philosophical tendency, which unremittingly opposes itself to conservative metaphysical oppression: “Throughout the history of human knowledge, there have been two conceptions concerning the law of development of the universe: the metaphysical conception and the dialectical conception, which form two opposing world outlooks” (Mao Zedong, On Contradiction). It is always a question of continuing the dialectic, of continuing it against metaphysics, which means: to give reason to the rebels, to say that they are right. Today, to give reason to the true Marxism against the false. To the Maoists, against the revisionists.

#### 2] Objective truths – like climate change, wealth inequality, and capitalist dispossession – are smoke screened by commercialist drive towards bourgeois glamour.

Pickard 20 [Victor Pickard (associate professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania). “We Need a Media System That Serves People’s Needs, Not Corporations’”. Jacobin. 01.27.2020. Accessed 2/25/2022. <https://jacobinmag.com/2020/01/corporate-media-system-democracy> //Xu]

Our corporate media system prioritizes making money over producing adversarial journalism and covering working-class issues. We should dare to imagine something different: a public media system that privileges democracy over profits. The past decade has witnessed the rapid decline of the newspaper industry in the United States. Revenue and readership have dropped precipitously, halving the nation’s newspaper employees. Actual journalism is vanishing, misinformation is proliferating, and our public media system — ideally a safety net for when the market fails to support the press — remains utterly impoverished compared to its global counterparts. From the collapse of its advertising-dependent business model to the dominance of platform monopolies like Facebook and Google, the commercial news media system faces a structural crisis. Commercial journalism never fulfilled all of society’s democratic needs, but now it’s abundantly clear that the market can’t support the bare minimum levels of news media — especially local, international, and investigative reporting — that democracy requires. Any path toward reinventing journalism must acknowledge that the market is its destructor, not savior. Commercialism lies at the heart of this crisis; removing it could be transformative. If we acknowledge that no entrepreneurial solution lies just around the bend — if we stop grasping for a technological fix or a market panacea — we can look more aggressively for non-market alternatives. In doing so, we can dare to imagine a new public media system for the digital age, one that privileges democracy over profits. A journalism that seeks out silences in society and ruthlessly confronts those in power. An information system that maintains laser-like focus on climate change, hyper-inequality, mass incarceration, and other social emergencies. A media system that treats workers as more than an afterthought. US history offers fleeting glimpses of an alternative system — experiments such as labor outlets, community-owned newspapers, media cooperatives, and, once upon a time, a thriving radical press. Even mainstream commercial news occasionally has provided investigative reporting that exposes corruption, changes policy, and benefits all of society. But these moments have been the exception. The history of US media is largely a history of misrepresentation, exclusion, excessive commercialism, and systemic market failure. However, it didn’t — and doesn’t — have to be this way. Another media system is possible — one that’s democratically governed and accessible to all. Infrastructures of Democracy We learn in school that self-governance requires an informed society sustained by a free press. Yet we rarely reflect on the infrastructures and policies necessary to maintain such a system. The loss of effective journalism and rampant misinformation are structural problems that require structural solutions. More to the point, they’re collective action problems that require policy interventions. Salvaging a nonprofit model from the ashes of market-driven jour­nalism goes far beyond resuscitating a golden age that never existed or preserving a status quo steeped in inequality and discrimi­nation. Guided by an ethical commitment to ensuring that all members of society can access information and create their own media, a public system can provide a strong base for further democratization. De-commercialization is an essential first step. The late sociologist Erik Olin Wright gave us a useful schematic to help think through the possibilities for de-commercializing jour­nalism and creating a truly public system. Wright proposed four general models for building alternatives to capitalism, each based on a different logic of resist­ance: smashing, taming, escaping, or eroding. After assessing these four approaches, Wright suggested that simultaneously eroding and taming capitalist relationships over time offered the best strategy for change — pushing to reform the existing system in ways that improve people’s everyday lives (taming), while also erecting alternative structures that gradually replace commercial models (eroding). We can apply this strategic vision to our media system, with five general approaches: Establishing “public options” (i.e., noncommercial/nonprofit, supported by public subsidies), such as well-funded public media institutions and municipal broadband networks. Breaking up/preventing media monopolies and oligopolies to en­courage diversity and to curtail profit-maximizing behavior. Regulating news outlets through public interest protections and public ser­vice obligations such as ascertainment of society’s information needs. Enabling worker control by unionizing newsrooms and facilitating media cooperatives. Fostering community ownership, oversight, and governance of newsrooms, and mandating accountability to diverse constituencies. While we should pursue these approaches simultaneously, the most surefire way to tame and erode commercial media is to create a truly publicly owned system.

### Part 3 is the Method

#### We affirm the normative statement but our analysis isn’t separate from the broader framework – justifications are a prior question to concrete analysis because they answer when, why and how the plan takes place

#### “Resolved” means to analyze.

Merriam Webster [It’s the dictionary! Big dictionary! On a website! Isn’t the internet incredible? <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved>] pat

b : to reduce by analysis

resolve the problem into simple elements

Our scenario analysis of the resolution develops the political grammar for revolution – before we can discuss how to get there, we first must theorize what exact future we are fighting for

#### Mass base cultivation must start through utopic communist demands like the aff that prophesize the end of Capitalism.

**Tonstad 16** (Professor Tonstad is a constructive theologian working at the intersection of systematic theology with feminist and queer theory. Her first book, God and Difference: The Trinity, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude, was published by Routledge in 2016 and was named both as a best new book in ethics and a best new book in theology in Christian Century in the spring of 2017. “Debt Time is Straight Time” political theology, Vol. 17 No. 5, September 2016, 434–448, Edited for ableist language – “visible” changed to “recognizable” )

If debt time, as I have argued, is straight time, can other temporal modes of production and affiliation be imagined? If debt time depends on promises made in the past to subjugate the present and future, might other promising pasts (made available through the non-limitative, intergenerational relations that “homosexual production” sometimes promotes) redirect us toward other futures — futures located in queer time? Dreaming and day-dreaming allow for Kathi Weeks’s “utopian demand” that can teach us what a “different world” in which our dreams would come to life would look like.45 To reeducate our temporal desires, we need to “affirm what we are and will it, because it is also the constitutive basis from which we can struggle to become otherwise.”46 This affirmation is no mere acceptance of the past as it is enforced on us by the moral couplings effort-reward or debt-obligation. Rather, it is “an active intervention into our ways of inhabiting the past.” The utopic demand affirms a future in which the demand would no longer be utopic, while also estranging us from the ethos that there is no alternative.47Guy Hocquenghem writes, “Homosexual production takes place according to a mode of non-limitative horizontal relations, heterosexual reproduction according to one of hierarchical succession … another possible social relation … is not vertical but horizontal.”48 Horizontal temporal relations can join with new spatial orders to constitute a we. Franco Berardi notes that one of the reasons workers’ struggles have tended to disappear historically (as exceptions rather than lasting coalitions) is that “for struggles to form a cycle there must be a spatial proximity of laboring bodies and an existential temporal continuity. Without this proximity and this continuity, we lack the conditions for cellularized bodies to become a community.”49 Spatial proximity is not enough by itself — antiblackness in the United States is but one example proving the point — but it is essential to the formation of coalitions and new forms of solidarity. Without side-by-side relationships, spatial and symbolic, and without creating and becoming a we, we can neither understand “our” time aright to diagnose it, nor shift the future into a direction other than the one marked out by the insistence that there is no alternative. With such relationships, the door is open for possibilities for redirecting the trajectory of debt time that do not require “distance from dominant culture,” but instead can take their own “imbrication with contemporary socioeconomic forces”50 as a point of departure. The first step is to name the powers and in so naming call them up and make them visible [recognizeable]— materialization of the demons that ride and haunt us, seeking to destroy us. The next step is to reorder our temporal and spatial relations to each other to create a we that does not yet exist.The promise of queer prophetic performance Sleeping and waking cross each other: for we must wake from our dreams of dust and ashes in order to read the signs of the times, and we must sleep so that we can learn to dream new dreams. Between the space of sleep and waking, we encounter the memory of other times, a memory that may become grounds for a future that is no future. Naming the signs of the times (knowing the time in order to escape its grasp, refusing the future in order to redirect it) is a prophetic practice. Althaus-Reid says, “[I]f God is to be found in human relationships of economic and loving orders, it is obvious that the right not to be straight in a capitalist society and church has the goal of liberating God.”51 And who can set God free? We need a prophetic52 bodily reordering in which the untimely one will arrive and tell us, or better show us, the series of negations, intentional relations, and world-making activities that are our best hope for living love in a time of capital. These hopes weigh less than the Spirit of Gravity does on our shoulders (that always-already that the history of Christian capitalism imposes on us); with them we may hope for an easier yoke that would allow us to replenish our relations to ourselves and others. Prophets dream for us and against us; they sound the alarm and they fall into trances in which revelations are given to them. Prophets use speech, performance, visions, dreams, and bodies to shift the relations between structures of authority and embedded hierarchicalizations. Those manipulations, those reorderings of apparently fixed elements of the world, reproduce but can also reconfigure visions of orders of power.53 Most importantly, prophets contend with other prophets in inexplicable bodied acts,54 and prophets contend with the prophets of other gods.55 Prophetic contestation breaks open the “monopoly of actuality” that insists “there is no alternative.” “Blow the trumpet … sound the alarm!” “Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your old men will dream dreams, your young men will see visions. Even on my servants, both men and women, I will pour out my spirit in those days.”56 The passage from Joel points to the transgenerational and transgendered aspects of prophecy, and to the importance of dreams. Late capitalism denies us dreams, and late capitalism monetizes even our dreams. But prophets dream the dreams that the rest of us are denied. Prophecies “have been a means by which the “poor” have externalized their desires, given legitimacy to their plans, and have been spurred to action.” For this reason, prophecy had to be “replaced with the calculation of probabilities” — a calculation that depends on the postulate that “the future will be like the past.”57 We are seeking a future that is not like the past. Prophecy opens the possibility of the impossible beyond calculation and prediction. Prophecy can connect the partially open future with the overdetermined present to suggest strategies for redirection and recreation. Kirk Fuoss argues that performance always involves contestation; if he is right, the same would apply to prophetic performances.58 Prophetic performances may contribute to the development of what Valerie Rohy understands as queer non-causality: a temporality “whose beginnings are found in the future.”59 Rohy describes the way becoming gay may involve a circular causality that escapes linear historical determination. In the case of Oscar Wilde, for instance, “Wilde’s homosexuality both causes the gay male identity of the future and is caused by it.”60 Such alternative causalities may break the effort-reward, promise-fault couplings of determinate historical time — of debt time. If we become what is not yet possible, our becoming escapes the past’s determination without negating it. Queer performances that embody impossible futures may have the capacity to vivify and illuminate extant alternative imaginaries while challenging the “monopoly of actuality” exercised by debt time, especially if these queer prophetic performances distinguish themselves from capital not by their freedom from it61 but by practicing in relation to it. Performance can reeducate our imaginations (our dreams) in ways that do not pretend — as attenuated or homonormative gay culture sometimes does — that no other economic order is possible. We need to relearn the connections between sexuality and the economic order that lesbian feminists and black feminists recognized from the very beginning.62 We must enter desire’s school for reeducation so we may learn to name the present for the sake of a redirected future. In order to change our futures (to make them no future for the time of financialized capitalism and hetero-same reproduction), we need — as I have argued — spatial and symbolic side-by-side relations, we need to learn the nature of our time (and times), and we need to create the worlds that we need to learn to want through institution-building and the generation of publics.

#### Debate is a valuable pedagogical space for material analysis and scientific planning – our form of study uses historical synthesis to avoid error replication and catalyze a mass base transition. the ROB is to establish the conditions that makes revolution possible

Williams 18 [Carine, 7/30/18, “Why Black People Need Maoism in 2018”, *The Hampton Institute*, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/why-black-people-need-maoism.html#.XWwv7ZNKh0s> // KZaidi]

* Pre-post r tied together; weigh whichever best challenges communism;

When they hear Maoism, many people think of China, Peru, and the Philippines. They picture peasants "surrounding the cities from the countryside." This is, of course, understandable, but a mistake. Maoism is not simply "everything that Mao did," or "everything that happened in China between 1949 and now." I have spent a great deal of my time writing working to dispel these sorts of myths, some peddled in an unprincipled fashion by anti-Maoists. Maoism is a living, breathing science. By science we mean something with universal principles that can be taken and applied by all who have a material interest in making revolution. In the United States, this is Black people, or the New Afrikan nation. It was not by accident that the original Black Panther Party (BPP) developed close relations with the revolutionary leadership of the People's Republic of China. Huey didn't go to China to play; he went to study and learn things that could be applied back home. Of course, he eventually degenerated in political line and practice, taking a right opportunist course along with Bobby Seale (always a centrist) and Elaine Brown (who guided the party, in his absence, into a mainstream political force that led into the arms of the Democratic Party). This opportunism in the highest expression of revolutionary sentiment, practice, and force in this country to date needs to be studied and ruthlessly criticized, yet we should be careful. We must place things in their historical context and ensure that we are able to divide one into two, meaning see the beneficial as well as the negative aspects of a thing but also realize that one aspect must be primary. The BPP was destroyed by a combination of factors: lack of a really scientific method of analysis and cohesive program of political education, failure to promote and apply the Marxist-Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism (debate inside the party, formation of a political line through this debate, and the upholding of this decision by all party members and organs), and a culture of liberalism that ended with comrades fighting comrades, thus opening the door for external factors (the FBI and other LE agencies) to play havoc and get cadre railroaded into prison and killed. We must study and learn all of these lessons, because when we develop another organization with the prestige, mass base, and power that the Panthers had, and we will, they will come for us all again. So, why do we need Maoism? Because we are against the most brutal, bloody, and vicious empire known to humankind. This country is looting and enslaving our class siblings all over the world. To overturn this order of things, to smash it and rebuild it in the interests of the revolutionary proletariat of the entire world, we must apply the synthesis of 200 years of systematic, organized class struggle, which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: the continuity of the revolutionary project that was Marxism-Leninism, with a rupture from the dogmatism and revisionism. Maoists do not uphold "Actually Existing Socialism" because a scientific analysis rooted in the principles laid down by the revolutionary movements and projects that gave us Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao would demonstrate that stealing food from Filipino fisherfolk, like the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been doing, is 100% non-Marxist. This is in disagreement with many Marxist-Leninist organizations today, which uphold these things and other imperialist depredations carried out under the faded red banner of China. The Maoist argument is that Marxist-Leninist terrain has been spent, and the 21st century must learn from Maoism. "You haven't seized state power yet!" others cry. Indeed, and there has never been a truly Maoist party that has initiated armed struggle in the imperialist metro poles. This doesn't mean that Maoist principles cannot be applied to these countries, this means that we must be ever more creative in our application and ever more disciplined in our party-building efforts. Party building in the USA requires the careful and thorough cultivation of a mass base. Tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people must depend on and follow this party and participate in mass organizations before it can even begin to call itself a vanguard. This is what many who came out of the New Communist Movement of the mid-late 1970s failed to realize. The days of endless squabbling sects that fight over "mass bases" of a handful of other activists must be put to an end, and we must have a truly mass perspective. There is optimism in the spread of For the People (FTP) organizations and the development of the Organizing Committee for a Maoist Communist Party (MCP-OC) which has a more mass orientation and places primacy on the development of a class analysis and political line in the USA that is based in painstaking investigation and rooted in the aspirations and struggles of the most oppressed, along with a record of seeking to develop international solidarity and prison work. This, I believe, is the best hope for New Afrikan Maoists in the United States and I wholeheartedly encourage Black comrades to develop FTP-type organizations in their own communities under OC guidance. Even if this isn't done, at the very least studies in Maoism, studies in Maoist revolutions, and studies in Maoist theory are beneficial. After and during these studies, think about how it can be applied on your block and in your community. Learn about and be like Fred Hampton. Time is up for spinning our wheels; we must get together, unite on a principled and unshakeable basis, and mount a formidable resistance against decades and centuries-old oppression based in capitalism and white supremacy. I also encourage support and donation to the Hampton Institute as an invaluable resource in promoting revolutionary ideology and practice in the finest Marxist tradition.

### Part 4 is the Cold War

#### Central Planning solves everything –

#### 1] Red Innovation –

Nieto & Mateo 20 [Maxi Nieto is a PhD is sociology from the University of Elche and writer for Ciber Comunismo and Juan Pablo Mateo is a visiting scholar in the department of Economics at The New School, New York and economics professor at the University of Valladolid (Spain). January 2020, “Dynamic Efficiency in a Planned Economy: Innovation and Entrepreneurship Without Markets”, Science & Society, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276\_Dynamic\_Efficiency\_in\_a\_Planned\_Economy\_Innovation\_and\_Entrepreneurship\_Without\_Markets //](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276_Dynamic_Efficiency_in_a_Planned_Economy_Innovation_and_Entrepreneurship_Without_Markets%20//)gbs jacobs & majeed]

4.1. Innovation and social property. Innovation occurs as a result of a long and complex accumulation process of knowledge and creativity, where very rarely is a single individual solely responsible. This is an essentially social process in which a plurality of actors and institutions contribute in very different spheres and circumstances. The Austrian School presents an idealized image of innovation in capitalist economies, attributing it exclusively to the figure of the enterprising entrepreneur — whether in a disruptive sense (Schumpeter), or in a strictly coordinating sense (Kirzner). In fact, the entrepreneurial function develops within specific institutional frameworks and organized structures, both at the micro and macro levels. In this sense, a socialist economy has significant advantages for developing technological and business innovation, as opposed to a capitalist economy: i) socialism allows for greater and more efficient allocation of resources to R&D&I activities, thanks to centralized control of the surplus and the absence of sumptuous consumption and a rentier population; ii) there are no obstacles (property rights) to the free dissemination of new products and techniques; iii) the equal distribution of resources (which guarantees that no basic needs go unmet) allows for discovery and fuller development of talent, which likewise occurs when work is undertaken through tasks that are more balanced for the majority and less routine; iv) in allocating investment, more information is available and the criteria are more varied than mere expectation of profit; v) social ownership is more inclusive and participatory than capitalist enterprise in terms of generating and mobilizing knowledge (tacit or not) and encouraging innovation; vi) socialism does not impose short-term innovation cycles looking to generate products that can be commercialized in, say, four to six months, as is typical in capitalist economies. Under these favorable general conditions, the development of innovation in a socialist economy would unfold in three fundamental areas: i) Strategic planning: this traces the main lines of scientific, technological, and innovation research. Here would enter programs for the development of new technologies and infrastructures, as well as visionary projects that explore eventualities and future scenarios. This sort of research is carried out in universities, scientific academies, technological institutes, and other specialized centers in coordination with the business world. The process would consist in testing different alternative productive projects or techniques in order to verify results, in connection with the companies and sectors being served. ii) Companies: research, design, and innovation departments. iii) Business entrepreneurship: individuals and teams put forward proposals in hopes of securing financing. For any of these three areas, material incentives would exist that reward the degree to which the freely programmed objectives are achieved, in addition to purely social or moral incentives such as social recognition or professional and personal fulfilment. In the next section, we focus on how socialist entrepreneurship — something that the Austrian School considers impossible — would ostensibly work. 4.2. Ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship. In today’s most dynamic capitalist economies, entrepreneurship and business innovation are developed mainly in the so-called innovation ecosystems, which are institutional environments dedicated to promoting symbiotic interaction among the different actors involved in the process of creating and transforming companies and industries. This sort of institutional framework represents the antithesis of the liberal mythology where the individual capitalist–entrepreneur operates in a purely commercial environment, since these ecosystems are based on public institutions and resources as well as procedures that are not strictly mercantile.9 An efficient and dynamic socialist economy needs institutional environments capable of fostering and channeling the initiative of individuals with special talents to translate innovative ideas into business projects. It must be clear that an ecosystem of socialist innovation does not substitute for, but instead complements, the innovations developed by particular state institutions and programs (such as the transition to a new source of energy, new materials, etc.) as well 9 In the case of Spain, think tanks and capitalist consultants openly admit that “there is not enough private capital to invest in new companies, either through individual investment or through venture capital funds” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2015, 32). as innovations taking place in the industrial design departments of businesses. The actors involved in such an ecosystem are essentially the same as those participating in the equivalent ecosystems of the current capitalist economies. Principal differences would lie in the form of interaction among them (in the absence of mercantile links), their decision-making capacity (since no private property rights adhere), and the types of rules in force (including the incentive system). Among the main actors would be the following:

#### 2] Ecological Leninism –

Malm 20 [Andreas Malm is associate senior lecturer in human ecology at Lund University. He is author of Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming and Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency: War Communism in the Twenty-First Century. September 2020, “Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency: War Communism in the Twenty-First Century”, Verso Books //GBS Majeed & Jacobs]

The impending catastrophe and how to combat it In the second week of September 1917, Lenin penned a long text called The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. ‘Unavoidable catastrophe is threatening Russia’, it begins; the breath of death is over the land and ‘everybody says this. Everybody admits it. Everybody has decided it is so. Yet nothing is being done.’ World War I, the Urcatastrophe of the century, had haemorrhaged Russia and the other belligerent countries and, so it seemed, put civilisation itself on the deathbed. ‘The war has created such an immense crisis, has so strained the material and moral forces of the people, has dealt such blows at the entire modern social organisation, that humanity must now choose between perishing’ or transitioning to ‘a superior mode of production’. Russia stood before the spectre of famine. The war had so torn apart the country that all production apparatuses and logistical structures that would normally ensure basic provisioning were out of commission and, for as long as the war went on, beyond repair. As if that were not enough, heavy floods in the spring of 1917 washed away roads and railway lines. The crisis took a new plunge in August, when grain prices suddenly doubled and Petrograd faced the challenge of surviving without flour. ‘Famine, genuine famine’, one government official complained, ‘has seized a series of towns and provinces – famines vividly expressed by an absolute insufficiency of objects of nutrition already leading to death’. It was in this situation that Lenin wrote his text. In the run-up to October, he and the Bolsheviks were suspended in a moment of abysmal emergency: war behind them, war to the side of them, famine advancing. Lenin obsessed over the breakdown. ‘We are nearing ruin with increasing speed’, he would write; ‘no progress is being made, chaos is spreading irresistibly’; ‘famine, accompanied by unprecedented catastrophe, is becoming a greater menace to the whole country week by week’. What could be done about it? Part of the answer had already been provided by the states fighting the war. To prevent their food systems from collapsing utterly, they had interfered in markets in a manner that pre-war liberal doctrines would never have licensed. Governments from Paris to Petrograd had ‘outlined, determined, applied and tested a whole series of control measures, which consist almost invariably in uniting the population and in setting up or encouraging unions’ and rationing and regulating consumption. The situation had itself ‘suggested the way out’ by calling forth ‘the most extreme practical measures; for without extreme measures, death – immediate and certain death from starvation – awaits millions of people’. But those measures had an obvious limitation: they dealt with symptoms. The drivers of catastrophe were left untouched. The inter-imperialist war and its primum mobile – simple ordinary capital accumulation – were kept going, leaving procurement systems on the edge or, as in Russia, over it. Here, then, was Lenin’s wager: to take measures of the kind already instituted by the warring states, step them up a notch and deploy them against the drivers of catastrophe. First was to end the war. Second was to get the grain supplies under control, seize stocks from rich landowners, nationalise banks and cartels, end private property in the key means of production – a revolution, as Lenin constantly agitated in these months, to stave off the worst catastrophe, which was why it must not be deferred. Against the Kerensky government’s feeble attempts to restore order, he railed that ‘it is unable to avoid collapse, because it is impossible to escape from the claws of the terrible monster of imperialist war and famine nurtured by world capitalism unless one renounces bourgeois relationships’ and ‘passes to revolutionary measures’. At the same time, his rhetorical gambit was to profess that the means for achieving this were at hand, almost uncontroversial. ‘All the state would have to do would be to draw freely on the rich store of control measures which are already known and have been used in the past.’ Indeed, he alleged that any government that wished to combat the impending catastrophe, whatever its affiliation, would have to take those radicalised measures. The objective logic of the situation left no other choice. Now, if we, for a moment, put aside the very considerable historical complications known to everyone, we can see that the logic of the present situation, mutatis mutandis, is not all that dissimilar. So what kind of control measures could be envisioned? Here we must again stay at the level of a rough sketch. Yes, this enemy can be deadly, but it is also beatable States in advanced capitalist countries could claim to have acted on the dangers of pandemics the moment they made the following announcement: today, we are launching a comprehensive audit of all supply chains and import flows running into our country. With our amazing capacity for surveillance and data collection, we’ll shift from citizens to companies, open their books, conduct thorough inputoutput analyses (of the kind scientists already excel at) and ascertain just how much land from the tropics they appropriate. We shall then terminate such appropriation, by cutting off chains that run into tropical forests and, insofar as any can be classified as ‘essential’, redirect them to other locations. Every Noranda, every Skanska and Engie will be withdrawn. The time has come to pull in the claws of unequal exchange, now a menace to all. We shall pay for tropical areas previously devoted to northern consumption to be reforested and rewilded. This will compensate for lost export revenues – not as charity or even a drain on our budgets, but as a running investment in the habitability of this planet, an establishment and maintenance of sanctuaries on which our health depends. We are here simply adhering to the categorical recommendations from scientists (whom we’ll put on the stage for regular briefings on national television): There is an urgent need to stop deforestation and invest in afforestation and reforestation globally. In response to the viral outbreaks, billions of dollars are spent on eradicating the infection, providing services to humans, and developing diagnostic, treatment and vaccination strategies. However, no or less attention is given to the primary level of prevention such as forestation and respecting wildlife habitats. The world should realize the importance of forests and the biodiversity carrying deadly viruses – this from four China-based scientists, venting some despair amid Covid-19. Similar advice has been given for years. ‘The most effective way to prevent viral zoonosis is to maintain the barriers between natural reservoirs and human society.’ Barriers? There is a force at work in human society that by its very nature cannot countenance such a thing. But again, the scientists: ‘The most effective place to address such zoonotic threats is at the wildlife-human interface. A key challenge in doing this is to simultaneously protect wildlife and their habitats’ – the most effective, and the most costefficient. ‘Allocation of global resources from high-income countries to pandemic mitigation programs in the most high-risk EID [emerging infectious disease] hotspot countries should be an urgent priority for global health security’, says the Pike paper. It estimates a tenfold return on such investment. Written six years before Covid-19, it speculates on the damage a zoonotic pandemic could wreak on the world economy and finds that mitigation at the source – reining in trade-driven plantations, livestock, timber, mining – would be a fantastically optimal way of saving money. This is evidently not a guarantee that it will happen. But the northern states of our fantasy have now committed themselves to reason and proclaim: this is the right and necessary thing to do, for us and everyone else on this planet. The immediate beneficiaries will be people living in or next to tropical forests, always first in line for spillover. But our control measures will also spare ourselves from living under this Damocles sword to the end of our days. So the war on wild nature starts to wind down. This begins with a ban on importing meat from countries in or bordering on the tropics. Can there be anything more nonessential? And yet beef is, as we have seen, the one commodity most destructive to these wonderlands of biodiversity. Meat consumption in general is the surest way to waste land, and any extensive reforestation – combined with a protein-needy human population of ten billion or more – presupposes its reduction. Mandatory global veganism would probably be the endpoint most salutary for all. It would give some room back to wild nature and disengage the human economy from the pathogen pools; increased meat consumption is the fastest way to dive deeper. But as economies are currently operating, neither vegans nor vegetarians in the North go (as we often like to think) free of guilt: soybean, palm oil, coffee, chocolate flow as much, or even more, into our stomachs. Control measures for addressing spillover should not follow dietary guidelines, but latitudinal gradients and ecological knowledge. Given what we know about bats, their habitats must have priority, be it steak or flapjacks that stream out of them. Clearly it would be the state that would have to do this. No mutual aid group in Bristol could even hypothetically initiate a programme of this kind. ‘We need (for a certain transitional period) a state. This is what distinguishes us from the anarchists’, with Lenin – or with Wallace: ‘In the face of the potential catastrophe, it would indeed seem most prudent to begin placing draconian restraints on existing plantation and animal monocultures, the driving forces behind present pandemic emergence.’ Note the word ‘draconian’. Progressives of all stripes might shudder at it, but they should return to the chapter on the working day in the first volume of Capital – the ten hours’ day being the original victory of the proletariat, realised when enforcement finally became a little harsh, after all the laxities and prevarication of the early factory legislation. One doesn’t curb capitalist exploitation by carrots. Tropical forests have a recent counterpart to the ten hours’ day: the tenure of Lula. Between 2004 and 2012, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon underwent its most rapid reduction in modern times, all the more remarkable for running against the trends in the rest of Latin America and Southeast Asia. By what means did the Lula governments accomplish this? By turning some degree of hard power on land-hungry capital: expanding protected areas, registering land properties, monitoring rainforests via satellites, enforcing the forest code and actually punishing those responsible for illegal logging. In 2012, the rate of deforestation stood 84 per cent below its peak of eight years prior. The country that holds two million species, or one tenth of the earth’s total, gave its forests a reprieve, slashing CO 2 emissions by some 40 per cent – perhaps the most impressive mitigation of zoonotic and climatic disaster on record. It didn’t last, of course. ‘Rosa Luxemburg has a great line about revolution being like a locomotive going uphill: if it’s not kept moving, it slides back, and reaction wins. The same can be said of reform. Lula’s two terms could have been a good first act in a transition toward something else; but there was no plan for a second act’, as one scholar of Brazil has noted. Instead came the far right and the abolition of every traffic light ever installed in the Amazon. What should really make one shudder is to think of the zoonotic and climatic legacy of Bolsonaro. Then what of China? After SARS, the state took some perfunctory measures to stem the wildlife trade, promulgating laws with loopholes big enough for rhinoceroses to walk through. It allowed for wild animals to be bred on farms (the Huanong Brothers). The protected species list was last updated in 1990 and omitted at least one thousand native species – including bats – the consumption of which was thereby unregulated, regardless of the public health consequences. Penalties were paltry, enforcement lax, ‘high profits and mild punishment driving the dealers’ to continue accumulating capital – until SARSCoV-2 prodded the state to ban the consumption of any wildlife, from freedom or captivity. Scientists and others worried that the legislation would fray this time too. One team from China writing in Science urged a permanent ban on consumption as well as possession, backed up by stiff penalties; Jingjing Yuan and colleagues went a step further and called for ‘sentence to life prison’ for anyone eating wild. Processing, transporting, marketing wild animals should be similarly sanctioned, the state maintaining a list of species authorised for trade – a list that could be periodically shortened – and sending inspectors into the markets on the fly (recalling the factory inspectors). What could be said against such a tough line? It has been argued that the moral norms of consumers should instead be coaxed into sobriety. The argument ignores three factors. First, if SARS was not enough to scare the clientele away from wet markets – research indicates that awareness of the risks did little to put it off – and if SARS-CoV-2 could not be relied on to do the job either, as some signs suggested – online sellers touted medicines containing rhino horn and other rare animal parts as cures for corona – then apparently one cannot entrust this question to individual enlightenment. Second, enforced laws change norms. The prohibition of child labour in factories and slave labour on plantations clinched their status as unacceptable practices; without those laws, some callous exploiters might have continued to this day. The edification may outlast the laws themselves. One of the few success stories Felbab-Brown can relate in The Extinction Market concerns the use of rhino horn for the making of the Yemeni daggers known as jambiyas. When demand soared in the 1970s, this market became a prime culprit in dragging rhino populations to extinction. But then someone intervened. Interestingly enough, the communist government of South Yemen was far more effective in eliminating demand for rhino-horn jambiyas by eliminating the demand for all jambiyas. It banned the possession of all weapons and aggressively collected them. In 1972, the jambiya ban was thus accompanied by a massive campaign to rid the country of them, with even rich and influential families targeted and forced to sell their daggers. When Yemen was reunited under the capitalist north, the communist principle survived. The ban ‘was not only effectively enforced by the [southern] government but ultimately internalized by the country’s population’. Rhinohorn jambiya went out of fashion. This deep into the sixth mass extinction, some similar courage to wage ecological class war would not seem inappropriate. Third, if there is something the corona crisis has taught, it should be that nudging consumers to voluntarily mend their ways is a strategy of the past. The German state didn’t beg its citizens to please consider living differently: it ordered the malls of Steglitz closed and locked the playgrounds in Kreuzberg. When there is a threat to the health or even physical existence of a population, one doesn’t leave it to the least conscientious individuals to play with the fire as they want. One snatches the matches out of their hands. Some have argued that a blanket abolition of the wildlife trade in China would cause financial losses and make people unemployed – figures between 1 million and an improbable 14 million have been floated – which is, of course, the excuse for every facet of business-as-usual. It could carry us all the way to Venus. But ending the wildlife trade is a responsibility for very many more nations than China. Even Germany has been identified as a central transit point for the global trade in pangolins. States have to figure out a way to extirpate this department of capital accumulation in toto; they have repressive powers to reallocate. Barack Obama purported to make crackdowns on wildlife trafficking a priority. Yet at the end of his second term, there were no more than 130 federal wildlife inspectors in the nation; only 38 of 328 ports of entry had such staff on site; their total number of detector dogs amounted to three. Compare this – from benevolent times – to the apparatus for stopping migrants. Here’s another overdue conversion: open borders to people and close them to commodities from the wild; turn ICE and Frontex and other fortress guards into agencies for shutting down the extinction vortexes. But law enforcement would require more than seizures on the border, which can incite suppliers to compensatory killing sprees. It is the middlemen that need to be netted en bloc. The main alternative to such an approach is to legalise the wildlife trade and encourage the ordered establishment of farms (the Huanong Brothers), but the curtain should now be down on this idea. Wild animals shouldn’t sit in cages. Breeding them in captivity and selling them on markets only whets the appetite for their meat, and experience shows that it’s all but impossible to tell the wild from the farmed; the former leaks into the latter, as long as the suck is there. Demand itself will have to be neutralised. Insofar as ostentation – the open display of status before peers and subalterns – is the purpose of wildlife consumption, criminalisation and actual law enforcement should hit where it hurts. Under the ground, public swagger is harder. This doesn’t mean, as Felbab-Brown is keen to stress, that hard state power is a silver bullet. But it is needed, and fast, she points out. ‘Unlike in the case of drugs’ – and most other illicit activities, one may add – ‘time matters acutely, especially when animals are being poached at extinction rates.’ Some reprioritisation is needed for repressive state apparatuses around the world. And then there is the question of bushmeat, an especially difficult nut to crack, which deserves its own separate investigations. One would wish that lifting areas and countries out of poverty would of itself make bushmeat obsolete, but alas, it might have the opposite effect: affluence can set the extinction vortex spinning. It has, on the other hand, been vociferously argued that one shouldn’t even consider taking the wild food out of the mouth of poor people. Unfortunately, that argument is self-defeating, for in the same moment bushmeat starts to endanger animal populations, it ceases to be a prop of food security and turns into its opposite: an exceedingly undependable protein source. Extinction exhausts it forever. The most viable palette of measures probably includes laws and their enforcement, a rollback of deforestation and ‘incentives for communities to switch to traditionally grown protein-rich plant foods’, such as ‘soy, pulses, cereals and tubers’ – breaking, in other words, the association of meat with the good life. That break begins in the richest countries. If anyone has a duty to lead and assist a global turn to plantbased protein, it is them. Needless to say, such measures would just be starters – local drivers of deforestation, for instance, would still have to be dealt with – and if they were all rolled out next week, infectious diseases wouldn’t thereby vanish at the snap of a finger. The treatment of symptoms will never stop being essential. And so one could look to Cuba, which seems to have spare capacity for every eventuality and continues to serve the world as a subaltern ambulance crew, including in this pandemic: in March 2020, fifty-three professionals in a Cuban medical brigade landed in Lombardy. They came to assist the swamped hospitals of one of the richest provinces in Europe. Of the dozen brigades dispatched over that month, others went to Jamaica, Grenada, Suriname, Nicaragua, Andorra, while Cuba itself agreed to receive a corona-stricken cruise ship turned away from other Caribbean islands – all in line with a tradition of ‘medical internationalism’ that never ceases to confound foes and experts alike. In the 2010s, this poor little nation had more health care workers stationed on foreign soil than the G8; more than the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières and UNICEF combined. When Ebola lacerated West Africa in 2014, hundreds of doctors and nurses dashed off to the miasmic front lines; when Hurricane Mitch tore through Central America and Haiti in 1999, not only did Cuban staff pour in, but Havana initiated a scholarship programme for medical students from the disaster zones; when an earthquake crushed Pakistan in 2005, Cuba sent 1,285 health workers for a year. Canada sent six. In a time of chronic emergency, the world should thank its lucky star there’s at least one state with a tenuous link to the communist ideal still around.‘If anything real is to be done, bureaucracy must be abandoned for democracy, and in a truly revolutionary way, i.e. war must be declared on the oil barons and shareholders’: Lenin. His casus belli was their refusal to produce enough oil and coal. He wanted a war on the barons and shareholders to force the pace of extraction – Russia ‘is one of the richest countries in the world in deposits of liquid fuel’ – having no inkling of any adverse effects. Fuel scarcity was part of his breakdown. Our breakdown has the opposite profile, and so, if anything real is to be done, there will have to be a war with another aim: putting this industry out of business for good. This begins with a nationalisation of all private companies extracting and processing and distributing fossil fuels. Corporations on the loose like ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, RWE, Lundin Energy and the rest of the pack will have to be reined in, and the safest way to do that is to put them under public ownership, either through acquisition or – more defensibly – confiscation without recompense. Then their endlessly burning furnaces can finally be switched off. But they should not simply be liquidated, as in dismantling every platform, sealing the holes, closing the offices, sacking the employees and throwing the lot of the technology on the scrap heap. To the contrary, these units have a constructive task ahead of them. It’s already too hot on earth, and it’s getting hotter by the year, and there’s no end in sight to the heating unless emissions are cut to zero – but even then, it will still be too hot plus residual, potentially self-reinforcing heating in the atmospheric pipeline (the more of it, the longer mitigation waits), and so a worldwide cessation of fossil fuel combustion would not be enough. CO 2 would also have to be drawn out of the air. This has been apparent for at least a decade: everybody says this. Everybody admits it. Everybody has decided it is so. Yet nothing is being done. Nothing at all? There are a bunch of start-ups developing machines for negative emissions. One of them, the Swiss-based Climeworks, might be the most valuable capitalist company on earth these days – valuable as in doing humanity what could eventually be a life-saving service. With machines that look like large fans in boxes, Climeworks sucks air – it could be any air, anywhere. The air is led into a filter that captures CO 2 . Once the filter is saturated, it is heated to 100 degrees Celsius, and the result is pure, concentrated carbon dioxide. The trick as such is no magic, as it has long been applied in airtight rooms – submarines, space stations – where CO 2 has to be scrubbed and flushed out for people to breathe. What Climeworks has just demonstrated, however, is that this is the most promising technology for taking CO 2 out of the earth’s atmosphere – far more so than ‘bioenergy carbon capture and storage’, or BECCS, the speculative solution most in vogue in the days of the Paris agreement. There the idea was to establish gargantuan plantations to cultivate fast-growing trees, harvest them, burn them as fuel, filter away the CO 2 and store it under the ground. But more plantations are not what we need. BECCS would devour such monstrous amounts of land – somewhere like the equivalent of all current cropland to stay below 2°C – that tropical forests might well have to be wiped out. Direct air capture needs no land to grow anything. The contraptions can be placed on roofs. The main inputs they crave are electricity and heat, and because they are small and easily switched on and off, they can be affixed to the grid and turned on when there is an excess of wind and sun (weather-determined moments of overproduction often regarded as a drawback of renewables) and use waste heat from any other process (no shortage of that in urban environs). The CO 2 can be mineralised. It can be buried under the ground in solid form; indeed, since 2017, Climeworks is doing just this in Iceland. As with other novel technologies – solar panels spring to mind – prices will nosedive with mass production. A capitalist solution to a problem made by capitalism? If only. A capitalist company has to have a commodity to sell. With the exception of the pilot plant in Iceland, Climeworks and the other start-ups are turning their concentrated CO 2 into goods with exchange-value. It can be gas sold to greenhouses or soft drink producers (Coca-Cola in the case of Climeworks in Zürich); it could go into microalgae or liquid fuel, possibly even for airplanes. Such commodities bury no CO 2 . They capture it and pass it on for release elsewhere, so that a profit can be made – or, as Nature reported regarding another start-up, Carbon Engineering, run by the famed scientist-cum-entrepreneur David Keith: ‘That CO 2 could then be pressurized, put into a pipeline and disposed of underground, but the company is planning instead to use it to make synthetic, low carbon fuels.’ And how could it plan otherwise? Just throwing the CO 2 away, locking it up in cellars where it must never again be touched, is no way to accumulate capital. It negates the logic of the commodity, because non-consumption would here be the innermost essence of the operation. As Holly Jean Buck shows in After Geoengineering: Climate Tragedy, Repair, and Restoration, a primer and clarion call that should be obligatory reading for anyone minimally concerned with planetary futures, this is the contradiction every direct air capture must run into: if it stays inside the commodity form, it cannot make good on its promise of negative emissions. It will recycle CO 2 , not tuck it away. To scale up these machines to the level where they would make their designated difference – supplementing zero emissions with drawdown – they would have to function as vacuum cleaners, sucking up carbon and putting it out of circulation, as a non- or even anti-commodity. How could such a decontamination of the biosphere run on profit? Where would the increment in exchange-value come from, in amounts sufficient to keep the clean-up going like any other department of accumulation? No one has yet come up with a plausible answer. Buck works through the logic and finds only one way out: the state. Other students of direct air capture have reached the same conclusion. It seems to inhere in it – if the Climeworks model turns out to have some unknown disadvantage, if something else comes to the fore as the superior tech, if there will ever be any negative emissions not growing from land, the same conundrum will reappear: resell the waste and forfeit the purpose, or respect the negative use-value. It’s the productive force or the property relations. And to scale up, one would need a lot of money. That money should come from those who carry historical responsibility for releasing the CO 2 in the first place. There would also need to be massive complexes of technical expertise, drilling and seismic skills, infrastructures for transporting concentrated CO 2 , empty holes in the ground for burial vaults, organisations of supranational size … Who has all these things in ample possession? The oil barons and shareholders, of course. Nationalise them, Buck proposes – not just for ‘getting rid of these corporations, as we might like to, but transforming them into companies that deliver a carbon removal service’. Make them public utilities for restabilising climate. In something of an understatement, Buck adds: ‘There will be a lot of struggles to engage in here.’ But now imagine that states were in fact determined not only to stop the drivers of catastrophe but to put them into reverse gear, and so they expropriated every single fossil fuel company and restructured them into waste disposers, while those already state-owned received the same directives – then we would really be on the way to zero emissions and further: towards 400 parts per million, 380, 350 … It would be some repair to match the tropical rewilding. The demand for nationalising fossil fuel companies and turning them into direct air capture utilities should be the central transitional demand for the coming years. But, needless to say, it would make no sense if CO 2 were still belching out into the atmosphere: emitting and capturing would be a bizarre dissipation of resources to no avail. Everything begins with draconian restraints and cuts. They alone could pave the way for actual drawdown; the sooner they start, the less need for a secondary mega-infrastructure of clean-up. The problem could also be attacked from another angle: not supply but demand, rather like in the first phase of the Covid-19 pandemic. Then it was demand, above all in the transport sector, that went off a cliff and pulled emissions along. In late April 2020, Scientific American publicised the forecast that total global emissions would fall by no more than 5 per cent during the year – in spite of the spring drop by one fourth in China and roughly one fifth in the US – as economies were expected to rebound in the summer and autumn. The journal noted that as record-breaking as a 5 per cent reduction would be, it would still fall short of ‘the 7.6 per cent decline that scientists say is needed every year over the next decade to stop global temperatures from rising more than 1.5 degrees Celsius’. Nearly 8 per cent every year – a far cry indeed from the expected 2020 hiatus (if not from the initial months-long collapses). What would that require? Comprehensive, airtight planning. Everybody knows this. Few say it. One can obviously not rely on spontaneous cessation of demand, or on people just quitting travel; there would have to be a continuous substitution of one kind of energy for another over the transitional period – or, ‘a single economic plan covering the whole country and all branches of productive activity. This plan must be drawn up for a number of years, for the whole epoch that lies before us’, to cite Leon Trotsky. One can of course find this idea so repugnant that one would rather give up on the climate of the earth. And that is indeed the choice the dominant classes and their governments wake up to make every morning. Regardless of whether the problem is attacked from the supply or the demand side, the race to zero would have to be coordinated through control measures – rationing, reallocating, requisitioning, sanctioning, ordering … – so as to fill the gap after fossil fuels. The substitutes themselves are in no need of elaboration. The literature on the Green New Deal and renewable energy roll-out and climate wartime mobilisation is extensive enough to guide a transition several times over. Here we truly are in the situation of Lenin’s September text: everybody knows what measures need to be taken; everybody knows, on some level of their consciousness, that flights inside continents should stay grounded, private jets banned, cruise ships safely dismantled, turbines and panels mass produced – there’s a whole auto industry waiting for the order – subways and bus lines expanded, high-speed rail lines built, old houses refurbished and all the magnificent rest. ‘The ways of combating catastrophe and famine are available’, approaching common knowledge. ‘If our state really wanted to exercise control in a business-like and earnest fashion, if its institutions had not condemned themselves to “complete inactivity” by their servility to the capitalists, all the state would have to do’ would be to roll up the sleeves. Another part of Lenin’s logic applies too: any government that would ‘wish to save Russia from war and famine’ would have to get down to this kind of work. be the central transitional demand for the coming years. But, needless to say, it would make no sense if CO 2 were still belching out into the atmosphere: emitting and capturing would be a bizarre dissipation of resources to no avail. But the lingering conclusion from our initial comparison between corona and climate is that no capitalist state is likely ever to do anything like this of its own accord. It would have to be forced into doing it, through application of the whole spectrum of popular leverage, from electoral campaigns to mass sabotage. Left to its own devices, the capitalist state will continue to attend to symptoms, which, however, must eventually reach a boiling point. One can imagine that in the next years and decades, storms will bite into property, droughts tear apart supply chains, crop yields halve, heat waves enervate labour productivity to the extent that the timeline of victimhood catches up with the dominant classes. The second contradiction will then be upon them. States might no longer be able to just parry the impacts, but feel compelled to safeguard the background condition before it crashes irretrievably. Judging from the reaction to Covid-19, they will grasp for a control measure that can flatten the curve at once, and there is one such known in the libraries of science: solar geoengineering. Spraying sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere is the single kind of injection with a potential to instantly reduce planetary fever. However large in scale, direct air capture would need decades to bring temperatures down; sulphate aerosol injection can cut insolation from one month to the next. Year after year of business-as-usual, this is the pseudo-solution that sneaks up on us like a thief in the night.Indeed, under the cover of the pandemic, in mid-April 2020, one of the largest experiments in geoengineering so far was carried out on the Great Barrier Reef, then subject to the third outbreak of mass bleaching in five years (did anyone notice?). Scientists were authorised by the state to spray trillions of nano-sized ocean salt crystals into the air from the back of a barge. The hope was that these particles would make clouds brighter, so they would reflect more sunlight away from the ocean and shield the reef from the heat. The team told the Guardian they could see corals ‘bleaching around us’ as they bobbed over them. This is a technology distinct from sulphate aerosol injection, namely marine cloud brightening, potentially deployed on a local or regional scale by a state such as Australia, which, numerous monumental disasters notwithstanding, cannot bring itself to impose any control measures on coal extraction. The logic is robust. As one of the sharpest scholars in the field, Kevin Surprise, has argued, solar geoengineering might well be launched on a planetary scale as a fix against the second contradiction, because capitalist states appear constitutionally incapable of going after the drivers. It is fairly widely known that such intervention in the climate system could switch the planet onto another track towards catastrophe. Meanwhile, the corals keep bleaching, the swarms forming, the ice melting, the animals moving. A pestilential breath devastating humanity There has been a lot of talk about ecological Marxism in recent years, and with the chronic emergency over us, the time has come to also experiment with ecological Leninism. Three principles of that project seem decisive. First, and above all, ecological Leninism means turning the crises of symptoms into crises of the causes. From August 1914, this was, of course, the thrust of Leninist politics: converting the outbreak of war into a blow against the system that engendered it. Our Great War is not an actual war between armies, nor a singular event that can be concluded or paused after half a decade: this emergency is chronic, which means that crises of symptoms will ignite again and again, and every time they do, the strategic imperative must be to switch energies of the highest voltage against the drivers. It is difficult to see how else the conditions can ever be ameliorated. Has anybody got another idea? Oh yes: make clouds and invent vaccines; block solar radiation and track the movements of people. At their best, such proposals amount – to borrow from Greta Thunberg’s favourite metaphor – to surviving inside a burning house by drinking lots of cold water. Virtually by definition, the most classical Leninist gesture is the only one that can point to an emergency exit. It is worth re-emphasising just how central the category of catastrophe was to the evolution of revolutionary Marxism. In her polemics with Bernstein, Luxemburg never tired of stressing it. She has become most renowned for the sound bite ‘socialism or barbarism’ but, as Norman Geras has shown in a superb exegesis, that deep dichotomy structured her theory and praxis all the way from the battle with Bernstein to her death at the hands of the Freikorps. One year into the war, she warned that humanity faced a choice between ‘the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery’ – or victory for ‘the conscious struggle’ against the imperialism that drove the war. ‘Wading in blood and dripping in filth’, capitalist society has become ‘a pestilential breath, devastating culture and humanity’. That peculiar type of society now ‘endangers the very existence of society itself, by assembling a chain of devastating economic and political catastrophes’; in its present phase, the expansion inherent in capital ‘has adopted such an unbridled character that it puts the whole civilisation of mankind in question’. Luxemburg expected world war to become a ‘permanent’ state of affairs. It didn’t, and here the differentia specifica of the chronic emergency must again be underscored: it works itself out through biophysical processes that cannot be fought or negotiated to an end. One does not bomb out or bargain with the radiative forcing of CO 2 . That forcing is an immutable function of the quantity of the gas in the atmosphere, which means that this pestilential breath has another order of permanency and aggravation – until the moment of deliberate intercession, still only hypothetical. Following Geras’s reading of Luxemburg, we can then say that ‘barbarism’, depopulation, a vast cemetery really are the inevitable ends of a capitalism left to itself (here precluding the long-term effectiveness of solar geoengineering as a stand-alone measure). But writing in 1975, he recoiled from this conclusion as excessively apocalyptic. ‘Ecological catastrophe may, today, be invoked to lend that vision plausibility’, he noted in passing; half a century later, there is scant need for the caveat. This, then, is the syntax of revolutionary Marxism, present already in the first section of The Communist Manifesto: the fight ends ‘either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes’. There can be little doubt about which of the two outcomes is currently the more likely. Hence the accentuated ‘conditional mood of the probability of a catastrophe that there is still time to forestall. Things will end up badly, if … But they can (still) be sorted out …’, as another thinker from the same tradition, Daniel Bensaïd, distils the predicament. It was because Luxemburg threw herself into efforts to forestall further catastrophe that she, for all their disagreements, ended up on the same side as Lenin. A second principle for ecological Leninism can be extracted from their position: speed as paramount virtue. ‘Whether the probable disaster can be avoided depends on an acute sense of conjuncture’, writes Bensaïd, who reconstructs the crisis of September and observes that ‘waiting was becoming a crime’. Or, with Lenin himself: ‘delay is fatal’. It is necessary to act ‘this very evening, this very night’. The truth of these assertions has never been more patent. As anyone with the barest insight into the state of the planet knows, speed, very regrettably, because of the criminal waiting and delaying and dithering and denying of the dominant classes, has become a metric of meaning in politics. ‘Nothing can now be saved by halfmeasures.’ Third, ecological Leninism leaps at any opportunity to wrest the state in this direction, break with business-asusual as sharply as required and subject the regions of the economy working towards catastrophe to direct public control. It would mean that ‘one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part’, to speak with Engels. Nothing from the past decades of stalled transitions indicates that ExxonMobil would like to metamorphose into a cleaner and storekeeper of unsalable carbon, or that meat and palm oil companies would gladly let their pastures and plantations be rewilded. It appears tautologically true that an actual transition would require some coercive authority. If anarchists would ever wield influence in such a process, they would quickly discover this circumstance and, just like anybody else, have to avail themselves of the state. But what state? We have just argued that the capitalist state is constitutionally incapable of taking these steps. And yet there is no other form of state on offer. No workers’ state based on soviets will be miraculously born in the night. No dual power of the democratic organs of the proletariat seems likely to materialise anytime soon, if ever. Waiting for it would be both delusional and criminal, and so all we have to work with is the dreary bourgeois state, tethered to the circuits of capital as always. There would have to be popular pressure brought to bear on it, shifting the balance of forces condensed in it, forcing apparatuses to cut the tethers and begin to move, using the plurality of methods already hinted at (some further outlined by the present author in How to Blow Up a Pipeline: Learning to Fight in a World on Fire). But this would clearly be a departure from the classical programme of demolishing the state and building another – one of several elements of Leninism that seem ripe (or overripe) for their own obituaries. On the other hand, the chronic emergency can be expected to usher in pronounced political volatility. ‘The deeper the crisis, the more strata of society it involves, the more varied are the instinctive movements which crisscross in it, and the more confused and changeable will be the relationship of forces’, to quote Georg Lukács. The rather startling measures used to combat the spread of Covid-19 might have been a foretaste. Who knows what openings other moments of impact might bring. In some, popular initiatives may rise to prominence. The 2013 edition of the ‘worldwide threat assessment’ compiled by the US intelligence community warned that climate disasters risk ‘triggering riots, civil disobedience, and vandalism’; similar predictions are legion. If or when they are fulfilled, the mission of ecological Leninists is to raise consciousness in such spontaneous movements and reroute them towards the drivers of catastrophe. Hence the heightened relevance of the slogan that for Bensaïd ‘sums up Leninist politics: “Be ready!” Be ready for the improbable, for the unexpected, for what happens.’ It includes a readiness to, with Lenin’s own words, ‘set to work to stir up all and sundry, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks’. If the matter is exigent, the material at hand must be used. On this view, ecological Leninism is a lodestar of principles, not a party affiliation. It does not imply that there are any actual Leninist formations capable of seizing power and implementing the correct measures – the world has never been shorter on them, and most of the few that remain show overt signs of infirmity. The old Trotskyist formula ‘the crisis of humanity is the crisis of the revolutionary leadership’ must be updated. The crisis is the absence – the complete, gaping absence – of any leadership. The seed bank exists in an arid space approaching empty desert; anything brought out from it would have to be genetically modified to grow under the present sun and watered by subjects inventing themselves anew. Two elements do, however, as we have argued, appear essential. The basic make-up must harbour a predisposition for emergency action and an openness to some degree of hard power from the state. Anarchism detests the state; social democracy shrivels in catastrophe. But there is no reason not to experiment with ecological Luxemburgism, or ecological Blanquism, or Guevarism, or indeed Trotskyism … nor is there reason to give up on the sheer deductive force of revolutionary Marxism: ‘The inherent tendencies of capitalist development, at a certain point of their maturity, necessitate the transition to a planful mode of production, consciously organised by the entire working force of society – in order that all of society and human civilisation might not perish’, again with Luxemburg. But ‘necessitate’ does not mean ‘preordain’. Something can be necessary and yet never come about.

#### 3] Capitalism is lagging –

Cockshott 98 [Paul, 1998, Department of Computer Science, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland, “Application of Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Economic Planning”, *University of Strathclyde* //GBS Majeed & Jacobs]

Relevance of computer science Computation is always a physical process. It is always performed by real physical mechanisms. These may be humans, humans aided by pen and paper, humans aided by calculators or electronic computers. At some point in the future these may be replaced by other physical mechanisms, perhaps based on optics. Whatever the mechanism, it has an economic cost. Human statisticians must be paid, computers must be built. There exists a body of laws which describe the costs of computation (Kronso 1987). The investigation of these laws is the task of computer science. In conjunction with the disciplines of electronic engineering and software engineering, it develops practical techniques for the solution of large-scale computations. The computational feasibility of a problem depends upon the rate at which the number of elementary arithmetic operations required to solve it grows with the size of the problem. If we label the size of the problem N then the complexity of a problem is characterized by some function complexity = F(N) which defines the least upper bound of the number of elementary arithmetic steps required. Tractable problems should have polynomial complexity functions. For really large N it is desirable to have a function of linear or log.linear complexity. These costs are conventionally expressed in terms of time. They may alternatively be mapped into costs in terms of space. By physical replication of components it is often possible to reduce the time taken to perform a computation, but the product of time by space occupied tends to be invariant for a given algorithmic technique and a given problem. This has obvious economic implications. The time and space abstractions of complexity theory translate into real economic costs. A computation is not worth doing if the answer arrives too late to do anything about it. If the cost of the computer required to solve a problem is greater than the savings to be made from solving it, it is better not to try. A large number of problems may be viewed from the standpoint of computation. We can for instance consider the operation of a market economy as a computational process. Loosely speaking we would describe the ’problem’ as being defined by the available physical resources and the demand schedules of the consumers. The objective of the calculation would be to ’arrive at a set of prices and a distribution of resources that optimally met the demand schedules. We are justified in thinking of this as a computational process because of a very powerful theorem of computer science that any finite physical process may be viewed as a computation and simulated on a computer (Deutsch 1985) with an appropriate program. A market economy is a rather slow computer since the basic steps of information transformation (price changes) only come about by the intermediary of changes in the physical volume of outputs. The elementary steps in the computation may take months or years, during which the availability of resources and demand schedules change. As a result the computation does not terminate. A planning bureau in a centrally controlled economy is more obviously a computational process. In this case the computation is not tied to alterations in the volume of physical output but proceeds either through the exchange of draft plan proposals between economists (Kornai 1975) or through the execution of programs on the planning bureau’s computers. In currently existing planning bureaus a considerable part of the process is still human mediated, which slows down the computational cycle. It may be the case that the speed to compute a plan in this way will actually be slower than the relaxation time of a market. Computer technology has delivered very big increases in productivity over the last forty years. The speed difference between hand calculation and doing the same thing on the fastest modern computer is about 10 to the power of 11. No other technology has achieved increases remotely like this. This raises the possibility that an entirely automatic computer program could perform the computations necessary for the control and balancing of production far faster than either a market or a planning bureau. To demonstrate that this is feasible we have to show that the problem of plan allocation can be cast in a form that is amenable to computer solution and that the complexity function of this computation has a time/space product that is economically acceptable. Limits to the formalism of linear programming Kantorovich demonstrated that the plan problem as formalized by him was logically soluble using linear programming techniques. Although it is logically possible to compute the correct allocation of resources to industries by these techniques, their practical application is hindered by several factors. Among these are the lack of data or poor quality of data available to the planning authorities in socialist economies and the technical backwardness of their computing machines. More significant is the question of computational complexity. Nove emphasises the scale of the problem,saying that there are 12 million distinct products in the Soviet Economy. He quotes a Soviet Economist as saying that it would take the whole population of the world millions of years just to solve the equations required for the plan of the Ukraine. The cost ofsolving linear programming problems grows non-linearly with the number of industries considered. Just to store the technical coefficients as an input/output matrix for the USSR economy would take around 1000000000000000 bytes of computer memory. At current prices of around $1000 per million bytes, this means the computer would cost upwards of 100 billion dollars. This alone would rule out applying a linear program to the whole economy even before we consider the running time of the program. To be acceptable the computation period should not exceed a few months, otherwise decisions arrive too late. Ideally we would like answers the same day. The cost of the computers and communications networks needed for the process should be less than the existing computing budget of an advanced economy, so that the computational tail does not wag the economic dog. We next argue that the problem of creating a balanced plan is order NlogN and computationally tractable provided that it is cast in terms of a different optimization model. Representing the problem The approach is to construct an internal computer model of the complete production structure of the economy and of the desired pattern of output. A form of search algorithm is then undertaken to discover a pattern of resource allocation that is close to optimal. It only gets close to optimal since the type of search procedure used is an iterative optimization which is terminated once an acceptable level of performance is achieved. The production structure of an economy is conventionally represented as an Input/Output matrix from a computational viewpoint. The memory storage requirement of a matrix grows as N 2 and the time order of matrix operations is greater than linear. Advantage is taken of the fact that real input/output matrices will, if expressed in natural rather than value units, be sparse. This allows the problem to be remodeled. Assume that there exists an enumerated type PRODUCT in our computational model of the economy such that the range of values of the type corresponds to the range of real products in the economy. An implementation of the type might be the bar-code number associated with each product. The other types used in the model are STOCKS, FLOWS, TECHNOLOGIES, and INDUSTRIES. A STOCK is defined to be an ordered pair of type (integer, PRODUCT) defining a number of units of a product. A FLOW is also of type (integer, PRODUCT) but is defined to be of dimension d dt (STOCK) By convention we define the consumption of a product to be a negative flow and the production of a product to be a positive flow (having negative and positive valued integer parts, respectively). A TECHNOLOGY is defined to be a function of type (\*STOCK → \*FLOW). That is to say it maps a set of stocks to a set of flows. (In what follows the notation \*X will mean the type of a set of X.) The interpretation of this is that the technology will allow a production process to take place such that: a given set of stocks will cause a net consumption of some products and a net production of others. Specifically, we assume that to generate a given net output, stocks of inputs must be combined in fixed proportions. So that: STOCKj = Icj Where I is the intensity with which a technology operates, cj is a constant, and STOCKj is the minimum stock of input j needed to attain this intensity. It is assumed that the flows induced by the technology will be of the form: FLOWj = fjI where the f are constants. An INDUSTRY is characterized by the combination of a set of stocks with a technology, hence (\*STOCK, TECHNOLOGY).1 The industry’s dynamic behaviour is characterized by the application of the technology function to its stocks. The above representation of the problem has the great advantage over linear programming approaches that it involves no matrices. In practice the matrix of technical coefficients of the economy would be very sparse. By using a set representation, the same information can be encoded much more efficiently. Using a suitable compact set representation the store required will grow proportionally to the product of the number of types of goods times the number of direct inputs that go into each distinct good. Because the mean number of direct inputs to a product is likely to be hundreds not millions, the memory costs for a representation of an economy are reduced by several orders of magnitude. A computer of the appropriate size would be expected to cost a few million dollars rather than hundreds of billions of dollars. The plan problem The plan problem can be defined as follows: given a set of stocks that exist at the current time period, and given a desired pattern of consumption of consumer goods, and a pre-given set of technologies, find the industrial structure that best meets this. This involves deciding how to allocate the aggregate stock of means of production between all of the industries. This can be solved by using techniques borrowed Irom artificial intelligence. Welfare economics is dependent upon the assumption that consumers are capable of chosing an optimal consumption pattern subject to certain constraints. This is a particular representation within the domain of economics of the ability of neural systems-human brains-to perform constraint satisfaction computations. Humans carry out constraint satisfaction computations all the time with our most basic physical movements. When we walk across the room and pick something up, our brain has solved an enormously complex constrained cost minimization function that has as its parameters all sorts of information about the degrees of freedom of our joints, the lengths of our bones, the impossibility of walking through tables, the fact that energy consumption is minimized by walking on our feet rather than our knees etc. We are unaware of them because trial and error during infancy specialized our brains for this sort of calculation. Economic planning is a problem of constraint satisfaction. Neural systems are consumately effective at constraint satisfaction, so it is beneficial to apply what has been learned through the study of neural networks to this area. Neural nets can be thought of as collections of entities with local interactions. The same can be thought of industries. An industry interacts with its immediate suppliers and customers. A neurone interacts with the other neurones that supply it with input signals and in turn drives output signals to other neurones. The intensity with which an industry is operated can be modeled by the frequency with which a neurone fires. A real neural analogue computer might have a neurone to represent each industry and would be set up with appropriate weights on its synapses to represent the strength of its coupling to other industries. The system is then presented with externalstimuli representing the desired pattern of output and the available inputs and is ’trained’ to select a pattern of industry activation that meets these constraints. In practice we would simulate the neural analogue computer on one or more digital computers. We end up with a digital computer simulating a neural computer simulating the total production function of a whole economy. But the principle of training with positive and negative reinforcement remains. In order to achieve this we introduce function which we term a Harmony function. This is loosely based upon the notion of Harmony used in the literature on neural nets (Smolensky 1986). The notion behind it is that Harmony is a real-valued function that measures how closely the net output of the economy corresponds with the goal. The function TotalHarmony(output,goal) where out put,goal : ∗FLOW may be evaluated by summing the contributions to TotalHarmony from each product. We define the function PartialHarmony(p) where p : PRODUCT to take on the value 0 when the output of a product exactly corresponds to the goal; it becomes steeply negative as output falls below the goal and becomes slightly positive when output exceeds the goal. This corresponds to the notion that shortfalls are more important than surpluses. A possible form of the partial harmony function would be: PartialHarmony(p) = H (scale(out put(p),goal(p))) (1) Where the scale function is of the form: scale(o,g) = o−g g (2) and the function H takes the form: H(x) = 1 2 if x > 0 −x 2 if x ≤ 0 (3) Since this function has a downwardssloping first derivative it mimicsthe economists’ notion of diminishing marginal utility. The partial harmony function depends upon relatively local information: the computed supply and demand for the product of an individual industry. This makes it suitable for use in a neural-motivated model. Given the partial harmony function we can construct a total harmony function: TotalHarmony = Σp PartialHarmony(p) (4) We redefine the problem as that of finding an algorithm that will adjust the distribution of stocks between industries so as to maximize harmony. The algorithm We start off with a random distribution of stocks between all industries, subject only to the constraint that stocks of a product are only allocated to those industries that use it as an input. 1. Find the rate-limiting factors For each industry determine the product for which the input stock acts as a rate limiting factor. Assume that the production function for the industry in question requires that the inputs must be combined in fixed proportions. This step will be of order k0NM where N is the number of industries and Mis the mean number of inputs per industry. 2. Remove non-critical resources If we have determined the critical resource for a production process and if we have a linear production function we can determine the stock of each other product that is required to optimally match the stock of the current critical resource. This is again subject to the assumption that the inputs must be combined in fixed proportions. We call this the balancing stock. Given the balancing stock of each non-critical input we can deduct any excess stocks and assign them to a global reserve. This step will again be of time order k1NM This step does not reduce net production as the resources moved to the central reserve are defined to be non-essential. In consequence, total harmony is not reduced by this step. 3. Compute partial harmonies Evaluate the partial harmony of each product. This involves calculating the net production of each product, comparing it with the goal and applying the harmony function. If this is done by iterating through each industry and evaluating the product flow contributed by that industry the time order of this will be k2NM +hN where h is the cost of applying the partial harmony function to a single product. 4. Compute mean harmony Given the partial harmonies, the mean and total harmony can then be computed. This will be of order N. 5. Sort in order of harmony We assume that there is only one industry acting as a net producer of each product. The harmony function originally applies to products; we now associate each industry with the partial harmony of its product. This enables us to order the industries in terms of ascending harmony. As a sorting operation this will be of complexity Nlog(N). 6. Reallocate reserves The stocks in the global pool are reallocated to industries starting with those industries that are least harmonious. (Note that these are purely notional transfers performed on the representation of the economy in the computer; no real transfers occur until the whole computation has terminated.) For each of these industries we calculate the additional stocks required to bring the industry up to mean harmony and allocate these to it from the global pool. The time order of this stage will be k3NMp where p is the proportion of industries that can have this done to them before stocks run out. As each industry has resources allocated to it, it is moved into the appropriate position in the list of industries and the mean harmony is re-evaluated. The cost of this operation will be of order pN log(N). 7. Reduce harmony peaks Up to this point all steps have tended to conserve or increase harmony. This is because they all tend to maintain or increase total production. We now have to alter the composition of production towards the most harmonious overall structure. This involves reassigning resources from those industries with the highest harmony to those with the lowest. Since the derivative of our harmony function dH decreases throughout its range, the system is characterized by diminishing marginal harmony. In consequence, total harmony can in some circumstances be increased by moving resources from the production of products with above-average harmony to those with below-average harmony. Our next step is to transfer resources from the most harmonious to the least harmonious branches of production. The set of products that are of above-average harmony is identified, the outputs of the industries producing them are scaled down until they are producing at average harmony, and the resourcesreleased are allocated to the global reserve. The complexity of this operation is k4NMq where q is the proportion of products of above-average harmony. 8. Iterate steps 6 and 7 till increase in harmony is small The crucial point here is how often the process has to be iterated. The limit to the complexity of the whole operation will be: R(pN (k3M +log(N))+k4NMq) where R is the number of iterations required. If we assume that the number of products in an economy is of the order of a million then M may well be greater than log(N). If we assume that M is of the order of 100 then the number of steps for the balancing of a million-product economy would be of the order of Rk5108 For an optimized program we might estimate the number of steps to be between 10 billion and 100 billion. Given that the fastest current computers operate at several billion operations per second (Frenkel 1986), this seems to be well within the bounds of feasible computation. Experimental verification The algorithm was programmed in the C programming language and a series of experimental runs made with simulated economies. The inputs to the program were: (1) a set of N technologies, (2) a set of target outputs for each product, (3) a set of stocks of means of production. The inputs were prepared by another program that ensured that the technologies were feasible, i.e. that the Sraffaian (Sraffa 1960) basic sector was capable of producing a surplus product, and that sufficient stocks of means of production were provided to meet the goals. The particular details of the technologies, targets, and stocks were, subject to these constraints, produced by a random-number generator. It was observed that the algorithm as given above did redistribute the stocks between industries in order to equalize harmony levels between industries. However it was found that industries converged upon a mean level of harmony that still left unused stocks of resources. There seem to be two alternative interpretations of this tendency to leave excess stocks. One possibility is that the system gets trapped in a local maximum of harmony that is below the global optimum such that no small variation in resource allocation would allow the system to escape from this local maximum. Alternatively, the fault may lie with the algorithm having an excessive tendency to converge towards the current mean harmony level. The problem of local maxima is also encountered in neural net simulations and it is avoided by using the technique of simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al 1983). In that case, thermal noise is added to ensure that the system moves towards a global maximum of harmony. The algorithm was thus modified to incorporate simulated annealing. In steps 6 and 7 a target output is computed for each industry such that production at this level would result in the industry being at mean ’harmony’: targeti = H(meanharmony) (5) The target is computed using the inverse harmony function H’ for the industry concerned. In order to overcome the strong convergence on the mean and the possibility of local maxima induced by this formula, an amplification a and a random noise variable n were added so that the output level was biased upwards: targeti = (1+n+a)H(meanharmony) (6) This also should allow for the system to escape local maxima. With each successive iteration the bias a and the noise variable n were reduced, allowing the system to go through two phases. In the first phase the target is dominated by the amplification bias, and all industries increase their outputs until resource constraints inhibit this. During the cooling phase the amplification bias tends towards zero and resources are gradually redistributed between industries. Monte Carlo type tests were performed on three versions of the algorithm: version 1 did not use amplification or thermal noise, version 2 used amplification alone, version 3 used both amplification and noise. A total of 49 runs of each the three algorithms were made. In all 49 runs the number of industries, the output goals, the technology, and the available stocks of resources were held constant. Each run used a different initial allocation of these resources between industries. For each of these initial allocation patterns the three versions of the algorithm attempted to find a maximally harmonious final resource allocation. The mean and standard deviations of the harmonies were then recorded for each algorithm on each run (Cottrell 1989). The results are summarized in Table 1. These seem to show that there is a statistically significant difference between version 1 and versions 2 and 3. The 95% confidence intervals for mean harmony are non-overlapping. On the other hand, there is not a significant difference between versions 2 and 3. Although the average mean harmony is a little higher when thermal noise is added to amplification, the 95% intervals for the populations are substantially overlapping. This implies that we should fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality between the two population means. The conclusion is that the addition of thermal noise is not worthwhile Algorithm Ver.sion 1 Version 2 Version 3 Average mean harmony -0..9473 1.3131 1.3180 Standard error 0..0012 0.0408 0.0406 Top of 95% confidence interval -0..9498 1.2314 1.2367 Bottom of 95% confidence interval 0..9448 1.3948 1.3994 Verifying that solution is correct Does the algorithm return the same solution as would have been arrived at by analytic means? In order to determine this, it was set the problem of computing the maximal harmony resource allocation for a system for which there was a known analytic solution. The approach was to define a set of goals and a set of technologiesto achieve these goals, and then to analytically determine the set of resources that were just sufficient to meet these goals with the given technologies. Let F be the input output flow matrix, then the net production flow matrix P is defined by P = (I −F) Now let the matrix of capital stocks required to sustain one unit of production for each industry be denoted by C and the goal vector by g. We can obtain the vector of stocks s just sufficient to meet the goals from the equation: s = C·(P −1 · g) If this quantity of stocks is harmoniously allocated between industries then the mean harmony of the system should be zero. This follows from the definition of harmony, which states that it is zero when outputs exactly equal goals. When the planbalancing algorithm was presented with a collection of industries whose total stocks had been calculated in this way, it terminated with a mean harmony of -0.0089. Given that the analytic solution assumed a real-valued stock vector which was rounded down to integer form for the plan-balancing algorithm, this was taken as evidence that the solution produced was correct to within rounding errors. Chart, line chart

Description automatically generatedChart, line chart

Description automatically generatedExperimentally determined time order Test runs were done with various numbers of industries. At the lower limit the number of industries was 30, at the upper limit 3750. In Fig. 1 two plots are shown of the computation time against number of industries for systems with M = 13 and M = 25, respectively. It will be observed that the run times are approximately a linear function of the number of industries. In general it was found that systems with large M converged after slightly fewer iterations than systems with small M and that for a given value of M the number of iterations was relatively independent of N. Figure 2 shows the evolution of mean harmony with successive iterations. The two phase development: rapid expansion followed by equilibration can be clearly seen. Conclusion The experimental results confirm the initial complexity analysis of the algorithm. The computer used for the computation had a floating-point arithmetic performance of less than 1 million operations per second. It was able to handle a system of 3705 industries in just over 320 seconds. It seems reasonable to project a similar compute time for balancing a plan of an entire economy on a modern super-computer. Nove gives an estimate of 12 million distinct products in the economy of one of the super-powers. This is an increase in the scale of the problem of about 3 orders of magnitude as compared to the experiment. The latest supercomputers have a throughput of several billion operations per second. This is again a 3-orders of magnitude improvement. Because 12 the algorithm depends upon local information, it should be suitable for multiprocessors. This implies that plan balancing in natural units is approaching the limits of what can be practically computed. Since computer technology advances quickly, what is at present marginally possible will soon be routinely possible. Such computations would only be as valid as the data available. To work they would presuppose the existence of an automatic data collection network, which relayed up-to-date information on partial production functions to the computer that performed the optimizations. We have argued elsewhere (Cockshott and Cottrell 1989) that this is well within the capabilities of current microcomputer and telecoms technology. We conclude that automated resource allocation by computer constitutes a third economic alternative to market allocation or bureaucratic allocation.

### Part 5 is Preempts

#### Impact Framing – Revolutionary S is the risk we must take to abolish Racial Capitalism – there is no damnation worse than the current system.

Pinkard 13 [2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves), and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us. To shake free of this cycle, we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual. We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire civilization. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet requires a total risk of everything — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is people’s willingness to pay with their own lives. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip. This is what Daniel Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers. It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

#### Process Counterplan Framing – debates over institutional minutia siphon energy away from social transformation – distinctions in central tenants and epistemology should come first

**Bhattacharyya 13**, Race and Ethnicity Prof at Aston University (Gargi, How can we live with ourselves? Universities and the attempt to reconcile learning and doing, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 36, No. 9, 1411-1428) Asian author 👲

In Britain also there has been a move away from radical imagination in the politics of race, towards either highly institutionalized activity designed to measure and correct differential outcomes, or to ethnic particularity that challenges racism faced by a particular group but rarely links this activity to other struggles or a vision of an alternative society. However necessary these forms of organization may be because institutional outcomes continue to harden inequality between groups and mobilization needs to take place where people are, building on the affiliations that make sense to them the loss of a larger vision and set of aspirations diminishes what anti-racist politics can be. Kelly (2002, p. xii) goes on to specify the loss that arises from too exclusive a focus on matters of institutional detail or immediate politicking: Without new visions we don’t know what to build, only what to knock down. We not only end up confused, rudderless, and cynical, but we forget that making a revolution is not a series of clever maneuvers and tactics but a process that can and must transform us. This new revolutionary subject is unlikely to emerge from the mundane techniques of management that have come to typify ‘useful’ research in the field of racism. In response to the formulation of recent research funding in the UK, research in the field of race and racism that connects with ‘users’ has tended towards the technical. Much of this is shaped by the demand that research demonstrate its own ‘impact’, that is, shows its usefulness to an audience beyond academia, often before any findings are made and in order for time and money to be allocated.6 For the field of race and ethnic studies, this demand brings a model of knowledge as technique often management technique. Whether racism is seen to arise from communicational barriers between groups or from flawed institutional practices, the solution is presented as alternative practices do this and others will adapt their behaviour in these ways. If this were the extent of the imaginative failure, things would not be too bad. After all, universities rarely include the most exciting of ideas until the excitement can be rewritten as tradition. Sometimes banishment from the academy can help to get a different and more energetic audience for ideas that aspire to change our world. However, the politics of race seems to be institutionalized in an even more tightly confined logic in the spaces outside the academy. There may be a widespread recognition that racism demands an institutional response, but this is ripped away from any larger political narrative altogether. As a result, the attempts by scholars to address a public also tend to be limited by the narrow demands of such technical or legalistic approaches to what anti-racism can and should be. There is a dilemma here. For scholars who wish to connect with so called practitioners and who, perhaps, consider this world of equalities practice as their ‘public’ research is likely to become focused around these questions of technical organization. Of course, many of us still seek to document and explore the complexity of racism and its impact in the world but the focus for this endeavour becomes segmented by institutional focus and, often, a rush to make ‘recommendations’. Access to research funding in Britain, increasingly the only route to creating space for scholarly work, demands that research delivers this ‘impact’ of immediate and usable advice. At the same time, the ‘public’ of practitioners a group here that is overwhelmingly concentrated in organizations tasked with delivering services to diverse populations, whether through statutory services or the third sector appear to understand the role of the intellectual only as this kind of technical adviser.7 Useful research becomes only this research that can enable alternative and potentially more effective operation of bureaucratic practices of one kind or another. This framing of anti-racist research transforms the kind of politics that can be imagined for this intellectual endeavour. This is anti-racism as a matter of organizational adaptation, not any wider social transformation. Perhaps some believe that transformation occurs through the collective impact of these many small organizational changes that has certainly been the unspoken implication of anti- racist work since the Lawrence Enquiry but, whatever the benefits of improved institutional practices, if these in fact have been achieved, this approach abandons any sense of political movement. We may be producing work that connects with a public, but the aspirations of both scholars and public seem less than they were.