# 1AR

### 1AC: Plan

#### I affirm: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### Everything is objective.

#### There will be aprioris.

### 1AC: Trivialism

#### 1] Curry’s Paradox

Consider the statement p: “If p is true, then you ought to vote aff.” We will prove this statement.

Suppose p is true. Then, it is the case that “if p is true, then you ought to vote aff.” So, you ought to vote aff.

Notice that from the above, by supposing p, we proved that you ought to vote aff. Therefore, it is true that “If p is true, then you ought to vote aff,” i.e. p.

Since p is indeed true, you ought to vote aff.

#### 2] Principle of explosion

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of**[**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

1. We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**
2. **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.
3. However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.**

#### 3] Liars Paradox

**Camus** [Albert Camus (existentialist). “The Myth of Sisyphus.” Penguin Books. 1975(originally published 1942). Accessed 12/11/19. Pg 22. Copy on hand. Houston Memorial DX]

The mind’s first step is to distinguish what is true from what is false. However, as soon as thought reflects on itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction. Useless to strive to be convincing in this case. Over the centuries no one has furnished a clearer and more elegant demonstration of the business than Aristotle: “The often ridiculed consequence of these opinions is that they destroy themselves. For by asserting that all is true we assert the truth of the contrary assertion and consequently the falsity of our own thesis (for the contrary assertion does not admit that it can be true). And if one says that all is false, that assertion is itself false. If we declare that solely the assertion opposed to ours is false or else that solely ours is not false, we are nevertheless forced to admit an infinite number of true or false judgments. For the one who expresses a true assertion proclaims simultaneously that it is true, and so on ad infinitum.”

**4] Moral truths are contextual Joyce 02,** Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. //Scopa This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain **“linguistic frameworks”** (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new** terms and **ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; **accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”;** accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionally **philosophers have interest**ed themselves **in** the external **question** – the issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “**Are there numbers?**”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the** external **question,** as it has been typically construed, **does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer** to the question “Do numbers exist?” **is just** trivially **“Yes.”** From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To** step out of the thing language and **ask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake,** Carnap thinks, **because the very notion of “existence”** is a term which belongs to the thing language, and **can be understood only within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute** whether propositions exist, **whether properties exist,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus they **are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their** respective **positions.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

#### 5] The formulation of an alternative to trivialism is definitionally impossible.

**Kabay 2** [Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, ) "A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017 // WWBW]

But given that **it is a necessary condition for an assertion to be a denial of some conjunction that it is not a conjunct of the relevant conjunction, it follows that there are no assertions that can constitute a denial of trivialism.** This is because each and **every proposition is a conjunct in the conjunction that expresses trivialism. And so there is no proposition that can stand in for** altriv – **the alternative of trivialism**. For example, **one does not successfully deny trivialism by asserting ‘it is not the case that trivialism is true**’ i.e. by asserting ¬∀pTp.132 Nor can one express a denial of it by claiming ‘trivialism is incoherent’. Nor can one express a denial of it by pointing out that trivialism is incompatible with our perceptual experiences.133 **All such claims are conjuncts in the conjunction that expresses trivialism,** and so are not suitable candidates for playing the role of altriv. Each of these is identical to part of the content of trivialism or one of the assertions of the trivialist. **One could only assert a disagreement with trivialism by asserting a proposition that is not part of the content of trivialism. But there are no such propositions, as the assertion of trivialism is the assertion of all possible propositions.**

6]

Paul Kabay has argued for trivialism in "On the Plenitude of Truth" from the following:

Possibilism is true [premise]

If possibilism is true, then there is a world (either possible or impossible or both), w, in which trivialism is true [premise]

w is a possible world [premise]

It is true in w that w is identical to the actual world, A [2]

If it is true that there is a world, w, and w is a possible world, and it is true in w that w is identical to A, then trivialism is true [premise]

Trivialism is true [1–5][2][4]

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism#Argument_from_possibilism> Cho DOA 3.11.22

#### 7] Parrot Paradox

### 1AC: Para—consistency

#### **The law of non-contradiction is that a statement cannot be both objectively true and false. That’s wrong. Paraconsistent logic is the opposite view that statements can be both objectively true and false.**

#### 1] Self-proving – if paraconsistent logic is true then even if the law of non-contradiction is true its also false.

#### 2] Belief Revision is key to create flexible interpretations of truth (EXTEMPTED)

Belief revision is the study of rationally revising bodies of belief in the light of new evidence. Notoriously, people have inconsistent beliefs. They may even be rational in doing so. For example, there may be apparently overwhelming evidence for both something and its negation. There may even be cases where it is in principle impossible to eliminate such inconsistency. For example, consider the ‘paradox of the preface’. A rational person, after thorough research, writes a book in which they claim A1A1,…, AnAn. But they are also aware that no book of any complexity contains only truths. So they rationally believe ¬(A1∧…∧An)¬(A1∧…∧An) too. Hence, principles of rational belief revision must work on inconsistent sets of beliefs. Standard accounts of belief revision, e.g. the AGM theory (see the logic of belief revision), all fail to do this, since they are based on classical logic (Tanaka 2005). A more adequate account may be based on a paraconsistent logic; see Girard and Tanaka 2016.

#### 3] Cognitive dissonance – flexible beliefs are key to deal with conflicting truths and brain health means its biologically inevitable

Saul Mcleod, 2-5-2018, "Cognitive Dissonance Theory," No Publication, https://www.simplypsychology.org/cognitive-dissonance.html

Cognitive dissonance refers to a situation involving conflicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviors. This produces a feeling of mental discomfort leading to an alteration in one of the attitudes, beliefs or behaviors to reduce the discomfort and restore balance.

#### 4] Sorites Paradox – its impossible to quantify terms like “bald” or “tall” in which there is no criterion. Paraconsistency solves because it allows us to say Sebastian is both Tall and not Tall

Priest et al 22 [Graham Priest (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as a regular visitor at the University of Melbourne, where he was Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy and also at the University of St Andrews), Koji Tanaka (Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University), and Zach Weber (Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Otago). “Paraconsistent Logic”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Tue Sep 24, 1996; substantive revision Mon Feb 21, 2022. Accessed 3/10/ 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/ //CHO]

From the start, paraconsistent logics were intended in part to deal with problems of vagueness and the [sorites paradox](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/) (Jaśkowski 1948 [1969]). Some empirical evidence suggest that vagueness in natural language is a good candidate for paraconsistent treatment (Ripley 2011). A few different paraconsistent approaches to vagueness have been suggested. Subvaluationism is the logical dual to supervaluationism: if a claim is true on some acceptable sharpening of a vague predicate, then it is true. Where the supervaluationist sees indeterminacy, or truth-value gaps, the subvaluationist sees overdeterminacy, truth-value gluts. A subvaluation logic will, like its supervaluational dual, preserve all classical tautologies, as long as the definition of validity is restricted to the non-glutty cases. Because it is so structurally similar to supervaluationism, subvaluationism is also subject to most of the same criticisms (Hyde 1997). More broadly, (dialetheic) paraconsistency has been used in straightforward three-valued truth-functional approaches to vagueness. The aim is to preserve both of the following intuitive claims: Tolerance: For vague FF, it is not the case that xx is FF but some very FF-similar xx is not FF Cutoffs: For all FF, if some xx is FF and some yy is not, and there is an ordered FF-progression from xx to yy, then there is some last FF and some first non-FF Again, the key to the analysis is to take cutoffs as sites for inconsistency, for objects both F and not F. Then all tolerance claims (about vague F) are taken as true; but since, paraconsistently, the inference of disjunctive syllogism is not generally valid, these claims do not imply absurdities like ‘everyone is bald’. Paraconsistent models place a great deal of emphasis on cutoff points of vague predicates, attributing much of the trouble with the sorties paradox to underlying inconsistency of vague predicates (Weber 2010a).

#### 5] Universe of discourse

#### 6] TJFs

#### A] It’s the most fair since both sides are given reciprocal access to truth

#### B] It’s most education because it means everything we say is truthful and thus educational

**7] Permissibility and presumption affirm**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

**D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

**E] Presuming statements false is impossible since we can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything.**

**F] To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm.**

**G] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water.**

**H] If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.**

#### I] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate [is to]: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

### 1AC: Underview

#### 1] Affirming is harder – A] empirics

**Shah 20** [Sachin Shah, (Sachin Shah debated for Lake Highland Preparatory School and graduated in 2019. He received numerous bids to the Tournament of Champions and reached double-octafinals his senior year (2019). Outside of debate, he participates in robotics and lab research. He often enjoys solving Rubik’s cubes and programming challenges in his spare time, and is an avid side skew stastician.) "A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2020 January-February Lincoln Douglas Debate Topic by Sachin Shah" NSD Update, 2/13/20, http://nsdupdate.com/2020/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2020-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic-by-sachin-shah/?fbclid=IwAR0IP66d4U9axk\_2JiWqXPRY5wlJZE366BRXxoNEE5qaCJWvY5t9psKbIE0 DOA:2-13-2020 // WHSRS]

Over the course of the 2018-2019 season, a pattern of negative side-bias was statistically observed across that year’s topics. The 2020 January-February topic provides an opportunity to ascertain if the negative side-bias continues to exist in debate. 2020 January-February Data Set Affirmative and negative ballots were gathered from the 18 Tournament of Champions bid-distributing tournaments on the January-February topic with results posted on [tabroom.com](http://tabroom.com/) as of writing this article: Blake, College Prep, Strake Jesuit, Newark, Peninsula, University of Houston, University of Puget Sound, Arizona State University, Sunvitational, Winston Churchill, Harvard-Westlake, Lexington, Durham Academy, Lewis & Clark, Emory, Columbia, Golden Desert, and Colleyville Heritage. Theswe qualifier tournaments range from octo-final to final bid level. This data set has a sample size of 4,900 ballots representing fairly diverse debating and judging styles. One-Proportion z-test When all posted ballots on the January-February topic are analyzed, **the negative won 52.37% of ballots**. Now the question is whether the difference between the actual (52.37%) and what would be expected (50%) is statistically significant, or due to chance. In order to calculate a p-value to determine the answer, a one-proportion z-test was used. **The null hypothesis was set to p = 0.5 (where p is the proportion of negative wins) since it is expected, barring any bias, that the affirmative and the negative would win the same number of times**. The alternative hypothesis was p > .5. The alpha is set at 0.05 [1]. **The z-test rejects the null hypothesis (p-value < 0.001, 95% confidence interval [51.0%, 53.8%]).** This implies there is less than a 0.1% chance that the proportion of negative wins observed could occur if the rounds are unbiased. This implies **there is a negative side-bias.** Adjusting for Skill Differentials **We can further characterize the side bias by taking into account the difference in the skill of each debater.** The previous analysis assumes that each debater has an equal chance of winning; the following analysis develops a more robust model that estimates the probability that each debater wins based on their respective skill level; rounds in which the affirmative debater is stronger are more likely to result in affirmative than negative wins. For a more robust account of debater skill differences, **this study implemented an Elo rating system**. This system rewards debaters more for defeating higher skilled debaters than when defeating less skilled debaters. Each debater starts with a rating of 1500, then as they win or lose rounds, their rating changes depending on the round difficulty. For example, if a 1500 rated debater loses to a 2000 rated debater, their rating would drop 2 points, while if they won their rating would rise 28 points. Each debater’s Elo modulates over the rounds they have. For the purposes of calculating Elo ratings for every debater, **rounds were gathered from 142 TOC bid-distributing tournaments from 2017-2020** (YTD) with round results posted on [tabroom.com](http://tabroom.com/). To further quantify the 2020 January-February side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). These proportions demonstrate a particular side’s ability to beat a higher ranked debater. The larger proportion would demonstrate a skew because a debater overcomes the disadvantage generated by debating a better debater at a higher rate on one side versus the other. Ideally, **the difference between the proportions would be 0 indicating no bias; however, p1 = 33.39% while p2 = 29.19%: a 4.2% difference.** In order to determine whether this difference is statistically significant, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0, because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 > 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative, demonstrating a side-bias. **This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis (p-value < 0.01).** This implies there is less than a 1% chance that the negative and the affirmative are equally able to overcome the skew produced by debating level differences if the rounds are unbiased. There is sufficient evidence that **the negative is able to overcome this skew more often than the affirmative. This further indicates negative side bias.** Conclusion **This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant** in several aspects: (A) The **p-value is less than the alpha**. (B) The **data is on the current January-February topic**, meaning it’s relevant to rounds these months [2]. (C) The **data represents a diversity of debating and judging** styles across the country. (D) **This analysis accounts for disparities** in debating skill level. (E) **Multiple tests validate the results**. It is also interesting to look at the trend **over multiple topics**. In the rounds from 142 TOC bid-distributing tournaments (September 2017 – 2020 YTD), the **negative won 52.75% of ballots (p-value < 0.0001**, 95% confidence interval [52.3%, 53.2%]). This suggests the **bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans nine different topics** [3]. Given a structural advantage for the negative, the affirmative may be justified in being granted a substantive advantage to compensate for the structural skew. This could take various forms such as granting the affirmative presumption ground, tiny plans, or framework choice. Whatever form chosen should be tested to ensure the skew is not unintentionally reversed. Therefore, this analysis confirms that **affirming is in fact harder again on the 2020 January-February topic**. So, once again, don’t lose the flip!

#### Outweighs – empirics account for all factors – that’s why we trust experiments over analytics.

#### B] Neg is reactive – they tailor the 1NC before the round to exploit the aff’s weakness. Not reciprocal – affs enter the round unaware. Also means no 2nr weighing – it supercharges the abuse since they can collapse in the 2NR and outweigh any turns I make.

#### C] Reciprocity – aff defends their framework, method, advantages but neg can contest any of those to win – outweighs since it’s structural. Also means neg only gets one route to the ballot since the aff only gets the 1AC.

#### D] Aff extends twice – takes valuable time from already most time-pressed speeches.

#### Impacts: A] Presumption and permissibility affirm since if we’re equal on the flow, I debated better. Theoretical warrants outweigh – more predictable since they depend on the structure of LD and don’t vary by topic.

#### B] If neg gets weighing, they must weigh prefiat args against side bias since otherwise I’m just making the ground even.

#### C] No neg args – aff autowins help spread the message that affirming is unfair so people will change LD rules to be more structurally fair. No neg responses – they’re circular since they assume they get neg arguments, but that’s what they must prove.

#### D] No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy 1NC args since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.

#### 2] Accept aff interpretations and reject neg fairness offense

#### A] 13-7 time skew and 6-minute collapse means they’ll always more time on theory so it’s epistemically skewed in their favor

#### B] They can uplayer and restart the round to have time to generate offense that matters

#### C] They have access to more positions due to generic backfiles and bidirectional shells which means neg theory is impossible to avoid.

#### D] fairness questions ability to engage in same practice, any abuse is solved for when you affirm next round takes out shells – only affirming solves because you can construct the aff the way you like while neg is reactive

#### 3] Vote aff if I win offense to a framing mechanism – prevents 1NCs from spreading out the aff by uplayering since they have to answer my offense no matter what.

#### And, means AC offense outweighs neg off cases – we can test them the most thoroughly since we both had 13 minutes to debate but there’s a 13-7 skew for neg arguments.

#### 4] Contradictions flow aff since I spoke first which makes any contradictions their fault – hold them responsible for making the round irresolvable by dropping them.

#### And, principle of explosion – the existence of one contradiction means any contradiction is justifiable since contradictions are binary rather than on a scale, which means everything would be true.

#### 5] if both sides have offense to a T or theory interp, affirm:

#### A] mooting theory means I’m the better debater since I neutralized more arguments in less time.

#### B] If I have to go all in on theory due to the time disadvantage, evaluating substance turns theory into a no risk issue if the neg can make theory indecisive.

#### C] All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means you need an rvi to become offensive and means their drop the debater warrant justifies voting aff if they concede any of my implicit interps

#### 6] the negative debater must not deny the affirmative permissibility and presumption ground.

#### A] Destroys affirmative strategy, incentivizes 1nc to dump frivolous terminal-D on the AC framework and each one becomes a NIB, aff has to line-by-line it all and cover a differing normative theory. Supercharged by time crunched 1ar – can’t beat multiple nibs on framework and win the AC.

#### B] reciprocity – the negative gets intrinsic access to multiple viewpoints against the aff through conditional offs, maintaining a defensive route for the 2ar is k2 create reciprocal routes. Outweighs – being irreciprocal by definition unfair

#### Vote on fairness – you can’t determine the better debater if the round isn’t fair. Vote on education – it’s the only reason schools fund debate and the lasting impact of debate.

#### drop the debater on 1ac theory—the 1ar doesn’t have time to win the theory debate and also contest substance

#### Competing interps on 1ac theory – key deter to abusive NCs since otherwise they can spread out the 1ar with paradigm issue dumps

#### no RVI on 1ac theory – they would have 7 minutes to answer a minute-long shell and the debate would end right there – the entire 1ac can’t be the shell because then they could just choose not to violate it

#### 7] The neg may not read theory or kritiks against spikes since

#### A] this moots AC offense because they can read theory on my theory arguments in the aff which ensures that I won’t be able to leverage any theory offense in the 1AR from the AC, giving them a huge time advantage

#### B] it leads to contradictions since the neg can just read theory against this arg, but this indicts those shells, so there’s no way to determine which comes first. But, prefer this shell because the neg has the ability to adapt in the NC.

#### 8] 1AR theory – the aff gets it – otherwise the neg can have infinite abuse. Drop the debater – the 2NR could concede the shell and win substance. No RVI– a 6 minute 2N dump on theory makes the 2AR impossible. It outweighs – I don’t have time to win the shell and substance in the time crunched 1ar.

#### 9]