# Harvard R7 1AC

#### The advent of hypermodernity only became possible with the advent of speed. Technological acceleration has eroded the role of politics and the state in favor of a total militarization of society that threatens planetary annihilation. Debates on the Commercial actions in Space are no longer dealing with geopolitics, but chronopolitics, in which spatial control is superseded by the need to control time and to justify the legitimacy of US hegemony versus undeveloped nations. Attempts at restricting private actors in Outer Space will always be outpaced by the global war machine without dromology – our term for the study of speed.

Armitage 01 (John Armitage. John Armitage is Professor of Media Arts within Winchester School of Art at the University of Southampton. “Project(ile)s of Hypermodern(organ)ization” <http://www.ephemerajournal.org/sites/default/files/1-2armitage.pdf>) GL

Clearly, the transdisciplinary project(ile)s of hypermodernity cannot easily be incorporated into the traditional models of the political economy of corporations, organizations and the military. Ordinarily, of course, it is the explicit rules governing corporate, economic and institutional relations between roles that are of paramount interest to most political economists- In this article, therefore, I am not primarily concerned with traditional political economy but, rather, with theoretical and critical as well as social and cultural discussion, discovery and analysis. The prelude to this sort of approach must be the theoretical examination of corporations, organizations, military and institutional or bureaucratic determinants in their broadest sense, along with additional pertinent social and cultural determinants. Those that are of interest to the hypermodern theorist are characterised by, for instance, hypercapitalism and 'dromoeconomics' or the political economy of speed (Armitage and Graham, 2001 ), the hypermodern 'economies of excess' (Armitage, 200la) production and consumption and, in particular, the 'ephemeral commodities' of digitised information and communication- Such determinants are of course characteristic of the age of what Virilio (eg., 1999) calls 'chrono' or speed politics as life in the 'hypennodem city' of all encompassing social project(ile)s and the accelerated mentality of the movement of people gears up for what I label 'total mobilization' (Annitage, 200 I b). (continued) This theoretical framework and definition is important for my interpretation because I want to suggest that the current hypermodem and globalitarian project(ile)s of hypermodem(organ)ization are not merely technological but social and cultural in character. Simultaneously, such globalitarian project(ile)s are also caught up in the often-contradictory development of 'molar-project(ile)s' such as globalitarianism in which particular events and processes are terminated and 'molecular-project(ile)s' that allow for their initiation into the time-space of terminal velocities- Virilio (Armitage, 2000b: II), for example, refers to these project(ile)s in terms of a 'polar inertia' or 'the situation in which every city [and every person] will be in the same place - in time'. In my exposition, therefore, the logic of globalitarianism is predicated on the military origins of industrialization and international trade rivalry (Sen, I995). This is what Virilio (2000b: 43), writing from within the circumstances of the war in Kosovo in 1999, calls 'Pentagon Capitalism', the ensnaring of one's economic rivals in unproductive military expenditure. Yet, I argue that it is important to exercise caution not only when confronted with those states promoting militarized 'human rights' but also when reading those writers like Virilio, Bauman (200la) and Chomsky (2000) urging a critique of militarized human rights. For such critiques seem unaware of what Lingis ( I984: 67-68) calls 'phallocentric culture' and the 'institution of the dimension of verticality' regarding cultural values. Consequently, and adopting a rather different interpretation of globalitarianism to Virilio, I turn to the 'anarchitect' Woods' (2000) conception of 'everyday war' and warring identities for an explanation of what I call the 'de(con)struction' of the hypermodern city. This concludes my compressed conceptual account and the introduction of the essential themes of my attempt to further an understanding of hypermodern (organ)ization. In the next section, I will pay attention to the core features of the project(ile)s of hypermodern (organ)ization and their importance and, in the following section, focus on the project(ile) of hypercapitalism. Globalitarianism and militarization are the concerns of the last substantial section, and, as noted, these concepts are crucial to my interpretation and particular contribution to the apprehension of the project(ile)s of hypermodern (organ)ization. The final parts of this section contain a critical assessment of Chomsky and Virilio's work on globalitarianism while Lingis' and my own evaluation of the project(ile)s of hypermodern (organ)ization are contained in the conclusion- (continued) My hypermodern analysis is centred on the 'uncertainty principle' (Armitage, 2000c) that connects 'dromology' (Virilio, 1986) or the logic of speed to the intensification and complex networking of contemporary organizations and institutions with the aim of identifying and comprehending what I see as the three most important project(ile)s of hypermodern (organ)ization. First, and according to the uncertainty principle, hypermodern is not governed by the business rationale of modem capitalism that ruled modernity but by hypercapitalism. Moreover, the increasing levels of uncertainty relate to the principles of present-day business corporations and organizations in the context of the appearance of dromoeconomics and the ephemeralization of commodities. Second, military, informational and globalization project(ile)s are progressively molding the development of hypermodernity around the world and, as a result, are exposing whole populations to the dangers of the infonnation bomb - the 'explosive' transmission of information and interactivity from one nodal point of the planet to another. Such explosions are of course the scenes of Virilio's (2000a: 134; original emphases) integral accident, an accident that is "no longer local and precisely situated, but global and generalized". The scene of the integral accident can thus be witnessed in a variety of temporal and spatial sites ranging from the "collapse of the [New York] stock exchange" in I987 to NATO's war in Kosovo in I999 (Annitage, 2000b: 4]; Chossudovsky, 2001). Third, we are all increasingly subject to the demands of military dominated configurations. Much of our temporal and spatial existence is now militarized rather than civilianized\_ It is by way of militarized lCTs such as the lntemet, for instance, that we are becoming conscious of the juxtaposition and eradication of the temporal and spatial distinctions between the private and the public, the peaceful and the warlike. With the near-compulsory imposition of militarized technologies, including that ubiquitous 'Walkie Talkie', the cellphone, it is practically impossible to escape from 'decontextualized' business and corporate, organizational or militarized cultural values and contacts with others whether we are at home or abroad, at peace or at war (Richardson, 2001). Even our phallocentric and vertical bodies are now part of the militarized business and corporate sphere (Virilio, 2000c). The hypermodem configurations and project(ile)s that prepare contemporary businesses, organizations and institutions for hypennodem(organ)ization are thus hypercapitalism, uncertainty, globalitarianism and the relentless militarization of everyday life- In short, hypermodemity is principally characterised by the acceleration and intensification of modernity, inclusive of the levelling and what I call the 'de(con)struction' of the distinction between the private and peaceful, public and warlike realms. What we are presently living through, then, is not merely what Deleuze and Guattari (Goodchild, I996: 2l8-2l9) call 'deterritorialization' (leaving home and travelling in foreign parts) and 'reterritorialization' (making a new dwelling place) but the total mobilization and militarization of the economic, social, political and cultural field- Consequently, instead of conceptions of modernization, organization or heavy modernity, I prefer the terms hypermodemity and hypennodem(organ)ization because it is hypermodemity and hypennodem(organ)ization, together with the three project(ile)s of hypercapitalism, globalitarianism and militarization, that are 'de(con)structing' all important temporal and spatial distinctions. I discuss hypercapitalism and globalitarianism in detail in the following sections of this article. Current questions of militarization, while addressed at relevant points of the overall argument are not given a separate section for reasons of space. However, I have developed the idea of militarization in a related article (Annitage, 200lc). In the next section, then, I want to pay attention to the project(ile) and significance of hypercapitalism. Chomsky is correct to point to the US' actual rationale for its trade in the rhetoric of human rights- For it is by means of such a trade that is indulged in by all the advanced states that the 'enlightened' sale of military weaponry, training and the inculcation of militarized cultural values can take place. In Indonesia, for instance, the US' trade in the rhetoric of human rights has always been tied to state-approved weapons sales that, according to Chomsky, have amounted to over $1 billion since lndonesia's I975 illegal invasion of East Timor\_ Indeed, in the fiscal year I997-I998 alone, US state-approved sales of weaponry to the rest of the world soared from $3.3 million to $16.3 million, with the UK, France and other 'enlightened' states not far behind in tenns of ambition if not in sales (Chomsky, 2000: 67). Even so, one complication with Chomsky's critique of the US' motivation for trading in the hyperbole of human rights in the context of increased arms sales is that he does not appear to appreciate the full complexity of the 'imposition' of cultural globalitarianism on 'third world' cultures such as Indonesia. It cannot be assumed, for example, that the progressively brutalised peoples of Indonesia are either committed to some alternative model of human rights or that they automatically wish to dispense with their weaponry or the state-sponsored savagery in East Timor and the rest of the archipelago once and for all. In this respect, it is important to recognise that the present-day de(con)struction of Indonesia and other similar countries is not always only the result of Western cultural globalitaiianism but can sometimes include indigenous and ancient cultures of militarization- Of course, as Lingis has suggested, the West continues to institute its phallocentric cultural practices around the world, most notably in the fonn of the "institution of the dimension of verticality" (1984: 67-68). After all, says Lingis (2000: 187), how else are we to explain the West's propensity for human armies ï¬‚ying at stratospheric heights or the Third World War that it is currently waging on nature itself? It is important, therefore, to seek to appreciate the complex distinctions between the obvious trade in US-style cultural globalitarianism and human rights with third world countries like Indonesia and the often-ambiguous meaning, even suffering, that can arise from the self-initiated experience of militarization. Lingis is surely correct, then, when he writes that the "suffering we see may well be a suffering that does not seek to be consoled" (2000: 50). We must beware, he goes on, "of setting out to alleviate a suffering that another needs and clings to as his or her destiny - the inner tonnents of Beethoven, the hardships and heartaches of the youth who has gone to join the guerrillas in the mountains \_ \_ -" ( 2000: 50)- Lingis' concerns lead us to a second and final difficulty not with Chomsky's position but with Virilio's recent and near-total fixation on the social consequences of the project(ile)s of cultural globalitarianism and militarization. Against Virilio (2000a: 1), I want to suggest that the question of the infomiation bomb cannot be posed in the binary tenns of "The civilianization or militarization of science?". For to pose the question in this way is to privilege the civilianization over the militarization of science and to ignore or to suppress their perpetual integration into the singularity of technoscience and the resultant and relentless contemporary transfomnation of everyday life into everyday war. Unlike Virilio, therefore, I argue that the project(ile)s of hypercapitalized fast companies, organizations and military institutions are truly an extraordinary and singularly networked enterprise. Similarly, Woods (2000: 3l0-313) does not differentiate between everyday life and everyday war, proclaiming that "Architecture is war. War is architecture". Indeed, Woods contends that all identities, inclusive of corporate, organizational and military identities, are "transfonnational, sliding and shifting in an ongoing complex stream of becoming" (2000: 311)- For Woods, then, architecture can be simultaneously construction and destruction or de(con)struction, since both are indispensable to the creation not only of buildings but also fast companies and the networked enterprise of militarization- By its very nature, hypermodem(organ)ization is founded on aggressive and warlike acts, incorporating the dynamiting of sites, an indifference to contemporary culture and the disposal of pure power. This, therefore, is the war universe of the hypennodem city. In short, as Woods writes: "the everyday is not innocent of the violence by which war is usually stigmatized, or elevated, depending on point of view; it merely conceals domestic violence and other forms of physical and emotional aggression under the label 'abnormal"' (2000: I2). The existence of everyday violence and war therefore raises a challenge to Virilio's binary question- For it is no longer a question of either the civilianization or the militarization of science, but rather of how we are to interpret their firsion into what might be tenned the 'hypennodem military-scientific complex' of the twenty first century.

#### The demand for expansion of commercial markets to Outer Space is a shift past the temporal constraints of humanity – life accelerates as the concept of sedentary life is lost.

Virilio 10, Paul. The futurism of the instant: Stop-eject. Polity, 2010. (Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee)//Elmer

Faced with this unprecedented migration crisis, which is incomparably more serious than the immigration of the industrial age, and which is already being called the migration offensive of the third millennium, the issue of urbanization in the contemporary world might be seen in terms that undermine the customary distinction between sedentariness and nomadism. In fact, after the pluralist era of sustainable staying-put in the different neighbourhoods of registered urban land - a form of stationary settlement that once, in antiquity, introduced the notion of 'citizenship', as deriving from political localization, and with it, ultimately, of the 'legally constituted state' of nations - the era of habitable circulation is now dawning with the trans political de localization that is now overturning the geopolitics of settlement in the age of globalization. And this is happening at the precise moment that the teletechnologies of information are ensuring that sedentary man is at home everywhere, and the nomad nowhere, beyond the provisional accommodation offered by a now pointless transhumance. That transhumance is now taking place, not only from one countly to another. Now people are displaced within their vety homeland from their heartland to some vague territory where refugee camps have not only taken over from the shanty towns of days gone by, but from the towns. The megalopolis of the excluded of all stripes, pouring in from all sides, has now come to rival the all-too-real megalopolis of the included, the ultracity. The exoticism of misery thereby meets the exoticism of happy tourism, and it's not hard to imagine the scale of such a telescoping of these groups of people who have come adrift from their moorings in urbanity, as they did once, not so long ago, from their customary moorings in rurality. It's not hard to imagine, either, the scale of any traffic accident now that the traffic is no longer local, as it was in the days of the great invasions, but global. Allowed to travel since 1997, 37 million Chinese left their homeland last year. After the 2008 Olympic Games, you can bet that as many as 70 million will turn into tourists. Note on that score that there has long been a floating population of close to 100 million destitute peasants in China, wandering around looking for work and most often winding up in the counuy's vast railway stations, as Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao indicate: 'Peasants were kept out of the towns at the end of the 1950s by means of the grain distribution scheme and Mao Zedong's institution of an urban resident's permit - the hukow - which divided society into two classes: urban and rural. ... From that point on, town and country would be like two vehicles travelling on different tracks. After the 'sustainable' settlement that characterized the population flows of past history, 'habitable' circulation opens up dizzying perspectives for planetary resettlement. Having first lost its suburbs and then its rural hinterland, the metacity of tomorrow won't long be able to resist the demographic pressure coming from its outland, which will drive the exodus of settlers without hope of returning to the sedentariness of the semi-autonomous city of our origins. It's hard, in fact, to imagine the radiant future of 'sustainable development' in the face of the hullabaloo over communications and telecommunications tools tbat are undeniably progressive, but also completely incapable of dealing with the trans political tragedy of ecology. These tools can no more deal with the greenhouse gas effect on the atmmphere than with the effect on the dromosphere of the mass exodus of out-of-work hordes. Forget the instant city that the English futurists imagined. What developers now have in mind is a non-stop circus, a long-haul cruise for the exiles of outsourcing. This is the 'war of each against all', the ultimate figure of a sort of civil war of movement that will take over from the ancestral siege war of the commune or of the underprivileged suburban outskirts. Actually, what we are now seeing, as the third millennium gets under way, is the emergence of an absolutely unknown form of ex-territorialization of human potential that is soon likely to rule out all possibility of any kind of urban potential. This will lead to a new form of eccentricity, whereby the quest for an exoplanet, an ultraworld, as a replacement for the old one, now too polluted, will double up, here below, with the quest for an ultracity, a sort of logistical platform - something which the airport, the port and the railway station have only ever been scaled-down models of. Skipping the right to citizenship by virtue of birth in a country defined by geopolitics and the historical persistence of sites, the revolution de i'emport, or portable revolution, will round off the transport revolution, and the revolution in transmission will land us in this interactive planisphere that will, they say, be capable of supplementing the overly cramped biosphere and its five continents. It will do this thanks to the feats in information technology of a virtual continent, the great colony of cyberspace taking over from the empires of yore.

#### Our desire to “Get of the Rock” are part-and-parcel w/ a worship for technological acceleration, to achieve the singularity.

Virilio 10, Paul. University of disaster. Polity, 2010. (Director of the Ecole Speciale d' Architecture in Paris)//Elmer

In physics, this situation goes by the name of SINGULARITY; whence the astrophysical quest for an eccentric planet that geo-engineering could possibly make habitable and adaptable to the 'future life' of the earthly genus, the genus humus - in other words, the human race. But when Stephen Hawking tells the BBC (in the summer of 2006), that, 'once we spread out into space and establish independent colonies, our future should be safe', he in fact denies the state of play of a knowledge singularly damaged in what it has been based on ever since the world began: the geophysics of matter known as Whole Earth. Hawking takes his contempt even further, moreover, by attributing to the speed of light the role of ensuring the salvation of history, after the abandonment of geography: If we used chemical fuel rockets like the Apollo mission to the moon, the journey to the nearest star would take 50,000 years. This is obviously far too long to be practical . . . However, by using matter/antimatter annihilation, we can at least reach just below the speed of light. With that, it would be possible to reach the next star in about six years. In those revealing words, where science and science fiction literally merge, the astrophysicist, a victim of postmodern illuminism, not only confirms the self-destructive urge of matter in attaining its goal. He unwittingly brings back sun worship - to the point of idolizing the acceleration of reality, this contemporary hubris of a NEOCREATIONISM that the famous BIG BANG seems to have allowed!

#### Spatial Expansion is never-ending – the Dromosphere feeds on Progress that attempts to fulfill what’s lacking that drives infinite acceleration.

Virilio 10, Paul. The futurism of the instant: Stop-eject. Polity, 2010. (Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland)//Elmer

We note, then, one more time: since planet Earth has, it would seem, become too small for Progress, and, in a word, insalubrious, we are so pressed on all sides that we not only no longer have time to feel fear, we don't even have a future for our plans .... All that then remains is space, all the tragi-comic space of an expanding universe accelerating towards the Big Crunch, the end of time as well as of cosmological history! So, this is it, this dromosphere of eccentric acceleration that dominates the history of our pathetically feeble powers (political, economic), reopening, with the magnitude of power of Progress, the issue of the very nature of a world now foreclosed and of this biosphere that, as certain astrophysicists already suspect, is the only one of its kind. With this absurd notion of a time without a future or a past worthy of the name, the ecology of the human chronotope turns into an ecology of what's lacking, of the scarcity of resources that are not only substantial but distantial - in terms of duration, of the time that was once present and is now disqualified by the vety brevity of the 'accident in knowledge' of which the stock market crash remains the most true-to-life caricature. On that subject, the quarrel of contemporary historians over the retrospective criminalization of history is nothing more than a panic-induced consequence of the taboo that today targets the future, the future of the whole panoply of our progressive aspirations.

#### Technology Accelerationism results in the Accident which causes Extinction.

Kellner 8, Douglas. "Virilio, war and technology: Some critical reflections." Theory, Culture & Society 16.5-6 (1999): 103-125. (Professor, George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair, Social Sciences and Comparative Education, UCLA)//Elmer

In addition, for Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era designates “a double movement of implosion and explosion,” so that “the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination“ (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased speed of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-controlled weapons systems constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geo-strategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, producing what Virilio calls “a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe” (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, “strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day,” with microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls “pure war,” a situation in which military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to control every aspect of life. In Virilio’s view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing “a state of emergency” in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a “geo-politics” to a “chrono-politics,” from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life. Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the flow of events diminishes the time and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and media manipulation difficult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political participation and interaction.

#### That outweighs – the Accident is not limited to one technology or region but planetary and causes a chain reaction.

Virilio 4, Paul. The Paul Virilio Reader. Columbia University Press, 2004. (Director of the Ecole Speciale d' Architecture in Paris (Paul, Editor is Steve Redhead – Professor of Legal Studies in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology and PhD)//Elmer

Proof, if proof were needed, that far from promoting quietude, our industrialized societies throughout the twentieth century have essentially developed disquiet and the major risk, and this is so even if we leave out of account the recent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction… Hence the urgent need to reverse this trend which consists in exposing us to the most catastrophic accidents produced by the techno-scientific spirit, and to establish the opposite approach which would consist in exposing or exhibiting the accident as the major enigma of modern Progress. Although some car companies carry out more than 400 crash tests annually in the attempt to improve the safety of their vehicles, this still does not prevent television channels from continually inflicting road-death statistics on us (not to mention the tragedies which see the present repeatedly plunged into mourning). It is certainly high time (alongside the ecological approaches that relate to the various ways in which the biosphere is polluted) for the beginnings of an eschatological approach to technical progress to emerge – an approach to that finitude without which the much-vaunted globalisation is in danger of itself becoming a life-size catastrophe. Both a natural and a man-made catastrophe, a general catastrophe and not one specific to any particular technology or region of the world, which would far exceed the disasters currently covered by the insurance companies – a catastrophe of which the long-term drama of Chernobyl remains emblematic. So as to avoid in the near future experiencing an integral accident on a planetary scale, an accident capable of incorporating a whole host of incidents and disasters in a chain reaction, we should right now build, inhabit and plan a laboratory of cataclysms – the technical progress accident museum – so as to avoid the accident of substances, revealed by Aristotle, being succeeded by the knowledge accident – that major philosophical catastrophe which genetic engineering, coming on the heels of atomic power, bears within it. Whether we like it or not, globalization is today the fateful mark of a finitude. Paraphrasing Paul Valery, we might assert without fear of contradiction that ‘the time of the finite world is coming to an end’ and that there is an urgent need to assert that knowledge marks the finitude of man, just as ecology marks that of his geophysical environment.

#### Technological Acceleration is unsustainable – error replication is intrinsic to Technological reliance.

Featherstone 2k, Mark. "Speed and Violence: Sacrifice in Virilio, Derrida, and Girard." Anthropoetics VI, no. 2 Fall 2000/Winter 2001 6.2 (2000): 2001. //Elmer

Paul Virilio’s theory of the accident suggests that when one creates technology one also engineers the faults and mistakes that plague the machine. Virilio shows how technology and the accident are caught in a dynamic relationship, akin to Descartes’ (O’Neill, 2000) manic quest to exorcise doubt; the more complex the technology one develops the more evasive the faults that cause the machine to malfunction become. Thus, the invention of new technology represents the attempt to order the disorder of the system and drive out the chaotic influence of the accident. Regarding this technology / accident economy, Virilio writes: The accident is an inverted miracle, a secular miracle, a revelation. When you invent the ship, you also invent the shipwreck; when you invent the plane you also invent the plane crash; and when you invent electricity, you invent electrocution...Every technology carries its own negativity, which is invented at the same time as technical progress (1999: 89). Here, Virilio’s attempt to see technology as totality explains the idea of the accident as negative invention. Later in the same interview, Politics of the Very Worst, he expands his position in order to show how the machine combats error through technological innovation: ...the development of technologies can only happen through the analysis and surpassing of these accidents. When the European railroads were introduced, the traffic was poorly regulated and accidents multiplied. The railroad engineers convened in Brussels in 1880 and invented the famous block system. It was a way to effectively regulate traffic so as to avoid the devastating effects of progress, train wrecks. The sinking of the Titanic is a similar example. After this tragedy, SOS was developed, a way of calling for help by radio. The explosion of the Challenger space shuttle is a considerable event that reveals the original accident of the engine in the same way as the shipwreck of the first ocean liner (1999: 89). 2 Virilio’s reference to the Challenger space shuttle as the "original accident of the engine" allows one to understand the moment of the machine’s error from a theoretical point of view. It shows how the radical over-determination of the mechanical structure is represented by the accidental event and invites us to see how the crash is constitutive of the violent expenditure of an excessive "supplement," that the crash occurs because the machine has been designed to work at speeds that leave absolutely no room for error. Thus Virilio explains how the excessive pace of progressive technology is limited by the faults the accident exposes. The essential function of the destructive event is to consume the excessive energy of the superabundant machine and prolong the productivity of the technological model. According to this realization it is clear that the destructive accident is also the source of the machine’s renewal; its destructive consumption allows for the endless re-invention of the ordered system.

#### Independently, the dream of Outer Space as infinite possibilities desensitizes us to the present consequences of the acceleration of technology – makes conflict inevitable.

Virilio 7, Paul. The original accident. Polity, 2007. (Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland)//Elmer

In this instance, the fixity of the obstacle rears up like some Justice of the Peace of the shift in perspective, and the tree or wall are only ever features of what the obstacle of the geophysical finiteness of a unique habitat represents, further down the track, for a species of animal every bit as much 'rural' as 'human'. It is a habitat that no transgenic engineering will make us leave, despite the postmodern ranting about some virtual space, a surrogate sixth continent for a neocolonialism every bit as illusory, in the end, as the conquest of astrophysical space by the adepts of NASA's 'manned flights' in the 1960s. Indeed, what astronautical illusion did yesterday's moon missions embody? What conquests, what 'fallout' was it a matter of, then, if not that of a space indefinitely travelable but uninhabitable! In other words, the fallout of a cosmic vacuum bearing no relationship to biospherical space, where what is travelable is simultaneously inhabitable, where circulating and settling are one and the same 'abode'. To so unduly privilege exotic feats to the detriment of any 'dwelling'- now- there's a crazy act for you, an action of panic deterritorialization that only 'the balance of terror' between East and West could provoke in the face of the probabilities of an atomic war making the Earth defmitively unfit for life. And so, the so-called 'conquest of space' was merely confirnution of Bossuet's observation, the cause of such 'exotic' progress only ever having been the efiect of terrorist deterrence between communism and capitalism. As a naval ofircer recently put it: 'Surely a successful military manoeuvre is a catastrophe averted just in tirne.' Nothing is ever gained without something being lost, and, therefore, technical progress is only an agreed sacrifice; proof of this was ofiered to us yet again by the launching of deepspace astronautics during the Cold War years. At this period in history that at one point saw the threat of the Soviet nuclear missile installation on Cuba (1962) put the all-too-precarious balance between the two great blocs at risk, planet Earth confronts a major hazard whereby, accordrng to the astrophysicist, Sir Martin Rees, 'the odds are no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization \_on Earth wlll survive to the end of the present century ... '" This was confirmed by the historian Arthur Schlesinger, former special assistant to President John Kennedy, who clain1ed in his memoirs on the subject of the Cuban Mrssrle Crisis that: 'This was not only the n1ost dangerous n10ment of the Cold War. It was the most dangerous moment in human history.' 6 So this is it, the successful manoeuvre: the conquest of space resulting from the catastrophe of the sacrifice of the planet averted just in time, in the duel between East and . West! Strangely, such a 'military' manoeuvre seems to be enjoymg a comeback, with the Pentagon installing the first missiles of a future 'anti-missile belt' during the summer of 2004, in a rush to see them in place for the presidential elections of 2 November 2004. And this was done without any conclusive experiment verifying the effectiveness of the system. Similarly, in his election programme the incumbent president, George W Bush, did not budge from the course set at tlw beginning of the year for astronautics. And so, when the International Space Station (ISS) is complete, a new craft is set to effect its first manned mission in 2014, before taking Americans back to the moon some time between 2015 and 2020. As for Bush's Democrat opponent, John Kerry openly slammed these pointlessly costly objectives and offered no set goal and no set calendar for space exploration. 7

#### Thus, We affirm the resolution. Resolved: The Appropriation of Outer Space by Private Entities is Unjust.

#### Our Affirmation of the Resolution is a form of sedentary politics. Instead of feeding the hand of technological speed, we should embrace the slow inertia of human experience which avoids the possibility of visions of the future absent the elimination of technological deterritorialization.

Michelsen 16 (Nicholas Michelsen. Lecturer in Political Theory and International Relations at King’s College. (2016). *Politics and Suicide: The Political Philosophy of Self-Destruction.* Routledge.)

Rather than celebrating deterritorialisation, for Virilio, we must build a reinvigorated mode of (eco)political critique that reveals the accident as ‘the hidden face of technical and scientific progress’.[102](#102_Virilio_2000__p__53_) It is only through such a critique that we ‘can bring about the progress of technical culture’. For Virilio, political critique is a question of ‘collaboration or resistance’ to technological deterritorialisation.[103](#103_P__Virilio__The_Politics_of_the_Very_Worst__An___) Drawing from Valery’s postulate that ‘consciousness only survives as awareness of accidents’, Virilio argues that the failure to appreciate the challenge of ‘the integral accident’ marks a kind of deliberate descent into madness: The very opposite of philosophy, ‘whereby the ~~insane~~ nature of our acts would not only stop consciously worrying us, but would thrill us and captivate us’.[104](#104_Virilio_and_Lotringer_2007__p__7_) This is clearly a direct critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s naturalistic commitment to deterritorialisation. Virilio refuses to celebrate the panic-logistics of creation. He rejects any promise in unrestrained machinic acceleration. Rather we must ‘make room in the realm of public information for fallibilism’.[105](#105_A__Museum_of_Accidents__is_necessary_to_unmask___) This is the opposite of an analytic of risk which retains the myth of the linearity of progress and its assumption of the ‘beneficial accident’.[106](#106_Virilio_2000__p__56__The_arrogance_of_risk_lea___) Rather than celebrate technological speed, we ‘urgently need to sing the praises of inertia’.[107](#107_Virilio_2010__p__66_) Virilio’s central injunction is to slow down, to inhibit deterritorialisation, precisely so that we can regain political speed. This is precisely a question of how we interpret death so as to become political. He argues that it is only a military vision that fully accepts death. The civilian sector develops ‘an interpretation of death which differed from the military interpretation’ precisely so that collective duration becomes possible. Politics is defined as a model of death which sees the necessity of interruption as a driver to collective organisation.[108](#108_Virilio_and_Lotringer_2007__p__138_) Believing we have evacuated the ‘problem of death’ with God, we embraced a transpolitical military logistics of the accident. The technological speed which defines modern society is thus the ‘speed [rather than politics] of death’.[109](#109_P__Virilio_and_S__Lotringer__Pure_War__New_Yor___) For Virilio it is the ‘question of sedentariness and our relation to intensity is central’ because ‘that’s where the question of politics lies, if politics has a future’.[110](#110_Virilio_and_Lotringer_2007__p__152_) Politics is the speed of living consciousness against death. Virilio demands our rejection of Deleuze and Guattari’s naturalistic theory of revolutionary deterritorialisation – he suggests it is a technomilitaristic and thus fascistic nonpolitics.[111](#111_Theirs_is__after_all__a_machinic_vision_of_lif___) It is simply insufficient for a politics to embrace the relationship between panic and creation. Only slowing down to speeds at which we can live allows a politics, in the form of a polis of communally experienced duration. In question here is precisely the relationship between suicide and politics. For Virilio, suicide is the definitive transpolitical strategy. It seeks the purity of the machinic event as such, but rather than becoming-revolutionary, it achieves only the transpolitical apotheosis of accidents which already marks the purely logistical or technocratic societies we inhabit. Suicide’s idiomatic relationship to modern accelerationary society is precisely the marker of its political deficiency. If, for Baudrillard, transpolitics had the capacity to implode the modern reality principle, for Virilio ‘it’s totally negative. It’s the contamination of traditional political thought by military thought, period! There is nothing positive in my use of the term transpolitics. It’s not post-politics, it’s not the end of politics, it is its contamination. It’s completely negative. Transpolitics means no more politics at all.’[112](#112_Virilio_and_Lotringer_2007__p__153_) The challenge Virilio presents to Deleuze and Guattari is that it is impossible think the politics of suicide in such a way that it is not a celebration of accidents, an embrace of the corruption of the political by a military logistics. This is why they must claim we can distinguish between political and accidental suicides: Whether they can provide enough rope to save us from disaster remains very much in

#### View our Affirmation as a form of epistemological eschatology – instead of deriving in the consequential benefits of technology, you should prioritize a re-framing that questions the limits of technology itself – this comes prior to any discussion.

Virilio 7, Paul. The original accident. Polity, 2007. (Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland)//Elmer

The feeling of insecurity that has crept up over the last dozen years or so in the city is not only linked to the discourteous acts of so-called 'incivility' currently plaguing city-dwellers. It is, it would seen, a symptom of a new expectation horizon, a third kind of horizon after 'revolution' and 'war' the Great War, the 'war to end wars'. I am talking about the expectation of the integral accident, this Great Accident that is not merely ecological. The latter has been part of our general mindset for the last thirty years or so. The integral accident is also, and above all, eschatological. It is the accident of a world now foreclosed in what is touted as 'globalization', this internationalization at once desired and dreaded now the subject of endless debate, as though the anthropological horizon of ideas and ideals suddenlv felt blocked off both by the foreclosure represented by a geographical lockdown and by the suddenness of worldwide interactivitv of exchange. ' There is immense expectation now, in fact, of an integral accident. Horror films are not just the formatted products of the Hollywood dream machine and of the bid to systematically scare viewers or cinemagoers, as though hell lay at the heart of the world. No. What this is about is the recent emergence of an end-of-the-world feeling - an end in no way apocalyptic or millenarian, synonymous with some end of History but, more simply, an end of geography, as though the overhyped consumer society had finally consumed planetary space-time and been duly taken over in turn by the new communications society. While ancient societies were almost all agoraphobic, shut in on themselves in their closed cities, within their outsized enclosures, postmodern societies suddenly seem claustrophobic, as though the open city of our day only leads, in the end, to exclusion. 'Completion is a limit,' Aristotle announced in his second axiom. The foreclosed world of economic and political globalization is effectively the ultimate limit of the geopolitics of nations, and the feeling of panicky insecurity felt by whole populations, along with the gigantic migration flows. of the imminent repopulation of continents, are proof of th1s. The warning costs nothing and our democracies would do well to heed it before future tyrants use it to their own advantage. And so, what is emerging, alongside the pollution of substances (of air, water, fauna and flora) at the very start of the twenty-first century, is the sudden pollution of distances and of the intervals that make up the very density of our daily reality; of this real space of our activities that the interactivity of the real time of instantaneous exchanges erachcates: the 'grey ecology' of the pollution of the life-size that rounds off the 'green ecology' of the pollution of nature by our chemicals and other products. Here, we might mention the emergence of two currents of thought that are in no way antagonistic but complementary: substantialism (or, if you prefer, materialism) and accidentalism (or, if you prefer, spiritualism). How can we fail to see that the primary political movement of the widespread accident is, of course, the one commonly referred to as 'the Greens'? A movement that is naturally more concerned with the pollution of material substances than with the pollution of time distances that reduces to nothing, or almost nothing, the extent and duration of our habitat; this human environment that, besides matter, yet possesses geophysical dimensions and proportions that are unextendable. Proportions every bit as vital as water or the air we breathe for those who already fear that the great Locking Up of the seventeenth century (at the origins of the Revolution of the Enlightenn1ent, according to Michel Foucault) might be reproduced - only, this time, not on the scale of the asvlums or prisons of the Ancien Regime, but on a scale encompassing the entire world. **This is why** we **urgently** need a second **political** movement focused on the integral accidentthat would complement the first - an eschatological party, this one, parallel to the ecological party officially recognized today. . Like the highs and lows of stereophony, this twin ecopolitical movement would create the effect of a field, a raised profile now indispensable to the right as well as the left in our democratic assemblies, since, as we all sense, this classic political representation will not be able to survive in the absence of a genuinely geopolitical definition of ecology. In other words, unless it takes account not only of the famous 'imperative of responsibility' of elected representatives, but also the 'precautionary principle' and the principle of vigilance of scientists and other decision-makers running the show. In this sense the crisis or, rather, the accident in 'representative democracy' has nothing short-lived about it, since the televiewer-citizen can't be governed like an unregistered student or a nineteenth-century reader, his vision of the world being literally completely different. This is something that certain ecologists have just cottoned on to, such as the Griinen in Germany, who are now bent on coming up with a better interpretation of the notion of globalization itself - an ecological as much as an economic variety. 1 'The civilized world should take seriously the growing threat of Terror on a catastrophic scale,' declared George W Bush, on 15 March 2002. Seriously, certainly, but not tragically, otherwise we would end up lapsing into nihilism and leaping, without any transition, fi:om the euphoria of the consumer societv to the neurasthenia of a society of dereliction about which Karl Kraus was clearly apprehensive when he wrote, in 1914: 'Shrouded in the neurasthenia of hate, all is truth.' 2 How can we fail to realize the extent to which, today, the game of politics has been defused and debased by this 'new idea' of so-called happiness carried by the looming shadow of the Revolution of the Enlightenment- but also by that of the Terror? How can we fail to see how powerless we are to tackle the major hazards and great disruptions looming large, in the face of which our hedonistic culture is basically defenceless? Geopolitical ecology would also mean this: facing up to the unpredictable, **to this Medusa of technical progress that literally exterminates the whole world.**

#### The role of the judge is to be a critical intellectual – only this can avoid technological violence under the guise of progress.

Lacy 14 (Mark Lacy. Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University. (2014). *Security, Technology and Global Politics: Thinking with Virilio.* Routledge. Pg. 101-2)

In the previous chapters I have suggested that a dominant line of inquiry that moves through all of Virilio’s work concerns the endo-colonization of society, the desire to not only prepare for conﬂict with other states (and networks) but to use the technologies that emerge from the security and protection sciences to police and control populations at home. Virilio suggests that there is a dangerous synergy between societies addicted to innovating new technologies of security and control and the production of societies where life becomes more fragile and ‘accident prone’ (from the social unrest of financial crisis through to potential ecological insecurities). The seductive vision of the future popular in the ‘propaganda of progress’ depicts a cosmopolitan world where new technologies and ‘free markets’ will accelerate the ‘progress’ of the modern world: life will be safer and healthier, more enriching and humane, realizing untold levels of civility across the planet as we harness the potential of our technological and cultural ingenuity. Virilio’s ‘negativity’ on this vision of the future is to suggest that the role of the intellectual is to think more critically (and pessimistically) about the future – for it might be the case that technological innovation and acceleration leads to a world where we simply do not ‘need’ large sections of humanity; endo-colonization will be needed to police those that are excluded from the ‘good life’; and those who are lucky enough to access the good life will be under constant surveillance and control inside and outside the workplace. Economic and security elites will search constantly for ways to protect themselves from the ‘non-development’ of the society they helped produce (or degrade), to isolate themselves from the increasingly uninhabitable spaces that cover the planet. The ‘excluded’ of the future are left out of the propaganda of progress that we are sold, a source of uncertainty left out of the corporate scenarios on the future: progress will have provided the good life to all (or, the story goes, to greater numbers around the planet). For Virilio, the dominant politics of security is caught up with the search for solutions to control and contain dangerous otherness wherever it exists, not with taking seriously the insecurity and fragility that emerges from our way of life.1 Technologies and policies of security and control are the remedies of our sense (or perception) of vulnerability and insecurity in a world that feels increasingly fragile (from the ‘individualized’ or racialized threats to security or social cohesion posed by immigrants or minorities, the changing world order), measures designed to respond to our sense of siege psychosis. For Virilio, the role of the intellectual is to ask critical questions about the solutions that are offered to us to make life more efficient – not to necessarily reject all the solutions but to avoid being captured by the propaganda of technological progress, to be out of ‘sync’ with it: to examine the vulnerabilities that we are creating through our desire for progress, efficiency and security. Returning to the point on death and society that was mentioned in the previous chapter: just as Virilio encourages the reader to cultivate a more sober and critical view in times where the consequences of violence and war are sanitized (and sometimes glorified), so he wants us to maintain a critical distance from the culture that believes (or wants to believe) in perpetual technological progress, to question what progress is, to question the vision of the ‘good life’ that is sold to us.