# 1AC – Fugitive Science – Harvard

#### The space race is deeply entangled with the development of carcerality, funded through wealth extracted from black communities through policing and exploitative labor. The use of space as a symbol of progress obfuscated racial divisions and cohered an ideological understanding of white upward mobility and black immobility.

Loyd 15. Jenna M. 2015. "Whitey on the Moon: Space, Race, and the Crisis of Black Mobility." In Montegary, Liz and Melissa White, eds. Mobile Desires: The Politics and Erotics of Mobility Justice. Palgrave Pivot, 41-52.

But Watts is a country which lies, psychologically, uncounted miles further than most whites seem at present willing to travel. (Pynchon, 1966) From the days of chattel slavery until today, the concept of travel has been inseparably linked in the minds of our people with the concept of freedom. (Robeson, 1988, original emphasis) In the 1960 presidential election, candidate John F. Kennedy invoked moon exploration to displace the salience of religious division by focusing on unifying issues, including the spread of Communism that was ‘fester[ing] only 90 miles from the coast of Florida’ and crises in family farms, hunger, and unaffordable medical care that ‘know no religious barrier.’ The real problem was ‘an America with too many slums, with too few schools, and too late to the moon and outer space.’ This listing of ‘real issues which should decide this campaign’ suggested urgent, yet equally solvable, concerns. The space race ratified a national challenge, suggesting that returning the gaze from this ‘new frontier’ to domestic problems was the next step for technoscientific progress. When Dr Martin Luther King spoke of the moon in 1967, he was a world away from Kennedy’s Cold War hopefulness (Jordan, 2003). He delivered his final speech, ‘Where Do We Go From Here?: Chaos or Community?’, to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) on the ten-year anniversary of the organization’s formation following the Montgomery bus boycott. Despite the gains of the civil rights move- ment, King concluded, ‘the Negro still lives in the basement of the Great Society.’ He went on to question the consonance between scientific and social progress that had seemed so central to Kennedy’s understanding of the nation: Today our exploration of space is engaging not only our enthusiasm but our patriotism.... No such fervor or exhilaration attends the war on poverty.... Without denying the value of scientific endeavor, there is a striking absurdity in committing billions to reach the moon where no people live, while only a fraction of that amount is appropriated to service the densely populated slums. If these strange views persist, in a few years we can be assured that when we set a man on the moon, with an adequate telescope he will be able to see the slums on earth with their intensified congestion, decay and turbulence. King concluded his remarks by asking: ‘On what scale of values is this a program of progress?’ (King, as cited in Gilroy, 1991 [1987], pp. 345–346). Spectacular Cold War images of space travel drew on and renovated a constellation of meanings associated with mobility that inform US national identity, including celebratory narratives of continental exploration, limitless possibility, and freedom. Kennedy did not see any conflict between mastering space travel and meeting domestic needs – each a concrete signification of American capitalist providence in the Cold War period. King’s speech marks both of these registers. His imagined telescopic view of the earth traverses an expansive scale of human possi- bility, but under Pax Americana, King finds that ‘common humanity’ is an ideological vision papering over the reality of grave economic and racial divisions. Even before a man (much less The Man) was on the moon, liberal and radical social critics alike were deploying a rhetorical device I call lunar criticism – ‘If we can put a man on the moon, we can do X, Y, or Z’ – to question US national priorities and narratives of progress. Liberal iterations of lunar criticism suggested that the gap between promise and practice could be bridged as part of fulfilling the national creed. Radical social critics argued that what appeared to be an incidental gap was in fact a racialized conflict. Reaching the moon began to look less like a virtuous American project than a white American project that furthered Black economic exploitation and abandonment. The space race as a spectacle of freedom and (white) upward mobility must be held in tension with the deepening ‘urban crisis’ (Beauregard, 2003). As both a powerful discourse and material geography, the urban crisis was constituted through Cold War investments in suburban housing, freeways, and defense industry construction, relative disinvestment in central cities, and through militarized, counter-insurgency responses to the urban unrest of the 1960s (Loyd, 2014). Yet, the interrelations between these spaces have been obscured through enduring spectacular productions of capitalist suburban hyper-mobility and ‘ghetto’ immobilization and backwardness (Siddiqi, 2010). As novelist Thomas Pynchon dissected, ‘Watts’ was another country to white Americans, represent- ing a psychological distance that white Americans were disinclined to travel. This chapter situates radical iterations of lunar criticism within the context of urban crisis and on the cusp of what Jodi Melamed, following Howard Winant, calls the post-World War II ‘racial break’ after which ‘state-recognized US antiracisms replaced white supremacy as the chief ideological mode for making the inequalities that global capitalism generated appear necessary, natural, or fair’ (Melamed, 2011, p. xvi). By contrast, race-radical antiracisms ‘have made visible the continued racialized historical development of capitalism and have persistently foregrounded antiracist visions incompatible with liberal political solutions to destructively uneven global social-material relations’ (p. xvii). In the spectacular treatment of urban uprisings, the space called the ‘ghetto’ ideologically and tactically cohered the problems of urban crisis, which were actually metropolitan (urban-suburban) in form and imperial in process. To develop this argument, I analyze the work of Gil Scott-Heron whose poetry, songs, and writing exemplify the race-radical tradition. His poem ‘Whitey on the Moon’ delivers a radical antiracist critique of the US space program that ties otherworldly investments to ongoing histories of Black forced im/mobility and immiseration. To that end, this essay responds to the call within the new mobilities scholar- ship to examine the ‘role of past mobilities in the present constitution of modern notions of security, identity and citizenship’ (Cresswell, 2012, p. 646). I begin by situating mobilities within post-war militarized spectacle and racial politics. I then move to an analysis of how race-radical lunar criticism grappled with the dialectics of urban crisis, which included the simultaneous deployment of rhetorics of mobility and new means of social control and state power. I conclude by exploring how Scott-Heron’s race-radical vision offers insights into contemporary mobilizations for mobility justice. Cold War spectacles of (upward) mobility What sort of national spectacle was the moon when King spoke? Spectacle tends to be understood as an ideological mask or distortion of reality, but Shiloh Krupar usefully conceptualizes spectacle as ‘a tactical ontology – meaning a truth-telling, world-making strategy’ (2013, p. 10). Indeed, in Blank Spots on the Map (2009), Trevor Paglen shows how NASA was the visible institutional face of an expansive and largely secret Cold War military geography. Krupar and Paglen show how US militarization has developed through institutional apparatuses and personnel that create a world of plausible appearances. Visuality and material landscapes are interconnected such that hypervisibility (that is, the space race) is a technological apparatus simultaneously creating unseen spaces of waste and sacrifice. Thus, spectacle is a tool of reification and division that works by disconnecting spaces and categories – delineating human from nature, valued from abjected – that are actually produced together. Caren Kaplan’s work on the visual logic of modern war-making connects such spectacles to the mobility of states and imperial citizens. Air power is an iteration of the cosmic view, a ‘unifying gaze of an omniscient viewer of the globe from a distance’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 401). Kaplan ties this viewpoint – which claims universality, neutrality, and freedom ‘from bounded embeddedness on earth’ – to Euro-American colonization (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402; also see Cosgrove, 1994). Modern military ‘air power is seamlessly linked to the cosmic view through its requirements for a unified, universal map of the globe that places the home nation at the center on the ground and proposes an extension of this home to the space above it, limitlessly’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402). The upshot, according to Kaplan, is that the mobility of air power simultaneously produces an imagination of fixed sovereign territories. Indeed, for Kaplan, modern war is paradoxical in that it ‘requires the movements of large armies and instigates the mass displacement of refugees, yet it also polices borders and limits freedom of movement’ (p. 396). I take these theories of spectacle to suggest that the Cold War space race produced a modern, white, upwardly mobile subject that obscured the simultaneous co-production of an immobilized, unfree population confined to a knowable, tactical domestic space. That is, the militarization of the ‘cosmic view’ facilitates not only abstract targets of foreign war, but also targets of domestic state and state-sanctioned violence and confinement. The militarized logic of the ‘home front’ both coercively compels a patriotic citizen subject and obscures the racial, gender, class, and other social divides within the nation that belie the state’s claim to national unity (Lutz 2002; Young 2003; Loyd 2011). As the United States faced vulnerability to charges of racism during the Cold War, a cultural project of racial liberalism enabling mobility of the US empire would simultaneously entail efforts to confine Black mobility and dissident thought. For example, Rachel Buff (2008) shows how the US government deployed the terror of deportation as a means of disrupting political organizing. In the immediate post-World War II era, both W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were barred from foreign travel for their views on peace, nuclear abolition, and decolonization (Kinchy, 2009; Robeson, 1988). The experience, no doubt, contributed to the observation that the Robeson epigraph makes on the race-radical desire for free mobility. Race-radical lunar criticism The United States would not make its lunar touch down until 1969 (after Kennedy’s and King’s assassinations), but King found a moon landing a more plausible future than a Second Reconstruction. And it was more plausible. By the time of his speech, long, hot summers of urban uprisings punctured the image of freedom and opportunity that the United States projected around the world. Moreover, the War on Poverty, while less than three years old, was virtually dead letter. The 1966 midterm elections ushered in legislators who claimed a mandate to terminate the War on Poverty and urban social investments. The ‘great rat debate’ of 1967 captured the level of political polarization as Congress quibbled over a miserly sum of ‘no more than $16.5 million to combat rodent infestations in ghetto neighborhoods.’ A year later, the Los Angeles Times observed, ‘[r]ats are still coexisting with the poor as comfortably as ever’ (Abramson, 1968). It is within this context that Gil Scott-Heron’s ‘Whitey on the Moon’ makes landing in 1970 on his first album, Small Talk at 125th and Lennox. The poem’s narrative arc is wryly humorous and brief, delivered in less than two minutes, with a simple drum accompaniment common in street poetry. Scott-Heron tells the story of sister Nell, who has been attacked by a rat even as Neil Armstrong lands on the moon: A rat done bit my sister Nell with Whitey on the moon. Her face and arms began to swell and Whitey’s on the moon. I can’t pay no doctor bills, but Whitey’s on the moon. Ten years from now I’ll be payin’ still while Whitey’s on the moon. Debts for Nell’s medical treatment, which would not have been incurred were there basic tenant rights and public health investments, will extend into the foreseeable future as costs for rent, food, and taxes will continue to rise to pay for the voyage. The final line of the song offers a sardonic resolution to the outlandish situation. When the next doctor bills arrive, he will forward them ‘air mail special to Whitey on the moon.’ Marvin Gaye’s 1971 song ‘Inner City Blues (Make Me Wanna Holler)’ likewise links high taxes and inflation to an imperial project that results in the devastation of Black lives: ‘Markets, moon shots, spend it on the have-nots/Money, we make it, ‘fore we see it, you take it.’ Scott-Heron and Gaye flip racist narratives of the welfare queen as responsible for poverty, naming instead state neglect and the theft of Black wealth. Their songs reclaim the value being appropriated to a desirable national project that denies it rests on Black expropriation and death. In this reading, the moon counters temporalities and spatialities of racial liberalism that rendered white supremacy as historical and anachronistic by insisting that American white supremacy is part of the modern geopolitical order. Visual artist Faith Ringgold also depicted this reality in her 1969 paint- ing of an American flag entitled ‘Flag for the Moon: Die Nigger.’ The word ‘die’ reads across the block of stars in the flag’s upper left corner. The stripes of the flag are formed by elongated black letters aligned from the bottom to the top edge of the flag, spelling out the word ‘nigger’ between the customary 13 red stripes. The painting’s message is three-fold: the use of black paint in place of white draws attention to the negative space between the lines to illustrate the tense interrelation between the invis- ibility of white supremacy and Black people to the history of the United States. Ringgold indicts the act of placing the flag on the moon as sending a spectacular message underscoring the abandonment of Black needs. Yet, the painting’s reference to H. Rap Brown’s Die, Nigger, Die! suggests the immediate tension between structural racism and the possibility for liberatory Black politics and identity (Patton, 1998, p. 198). ‘Whitey on the Moon’ is often cited as an expression of afrofuturism, which Mark Dery defines as a genre of Black social thought concern- ing ‘culture, technology, and things to come’ (Dery, as cited in Nelson, 2002, p. 9). For Kodwo Eshun, afrofuturism provides a ‘resource for speculation’ that traces the ‘potentiality of space and distance within the high-pressure zone of perpetual racial hostility’ (Eshun, 2003, p. 299). He explains that afrofuturism ‘uses extraterrestriality as a hyper- bolic trope to explore the historical terms, the everyday implications of forcibly imposed dislocation, and the constitution of Black Atlantic subjectivities: from slave to negro to coloured...to black to African to African American’ (pp. 298–299). In an afrofuturist reading, radical lunar criticism uses the vast physi- cal distance of the earth to the moon to imagine alternative futures to the gaping racial divides in earthly living conditions and well-being. As Stevphen Shukaitis suggests, ‘the imaginal machine based around space imagery is made possible by its literal impossibility. In the sense that this possibility cannot be contained or limited, it becomes an assemblage for the grounding of a political reality that is not contained but opens up to other possible futures that are not foreclosed through their pre-given definition’ (2009, p.107). Given the coloniality of the cosmic view and the simultaneous construction of Black ‘placelessness and constraint’ (McKittrick, 2011, p. 948), I suggest that Scott-Heron’s lunar criticism is not so much concerned with the otherworldly as a space for imagining the earthly impossible, but for assembling earthly sites of decolonization and liberation. Scott-Heron’s race-radical critique explores what Katherine McKittrick calls ‘spaces of encounter that hold in them useful anticolonial practices and narratives’ (2011, p. 950). He offers a theory of militarized spectacle in which juxtaposition, or division, falls way to connection, to shared production. He shows how a landscape of rat-infested housing produces the man on the moon – through taxes and a vanishing horizon of medical debt – and names the spectacle obscuring this process ‘Whitey.’ In contrast to liberal iterations of lunar criticism, which suggested that solving poverty was possible within the terms of American capitalism, Scott-Heron linked American capitalism to the production of poverty, militarism, environmental devastation, and human abandonment. These themes found in ‘Whitey on the Moon’ are consistent across his work, and include persistent criticism of spectacular popular culture and consumerism, war and state violence (‘No Knock,’ ‘King Alfred’s Plan,’ ‘Did You Hear What They Said?,’ ‘H20 Gate Blues,’ ‘B Movie’), concern for children’s well being (‘Speed Kills,’ ‘Who Will Save the Children?’), the threat of nuclear destruction and climate change (‘We Almost Lost Detroit,’ ‘South Carolina (Barnwell),’ ‘Spacesong’), drugs and habituation to other people’s suffering (‘Billy Green Is Dead,’ ‘Angel Dust,’ ‘Home is Where the Hatred Is’), and structural unemployment (‘Who Will Pay Reparations on My Soul?’). Scott-Heron’s poems link histories of forced mobility to the development of blues consciousness and revolution, exemplifying what Clyde Woods (2000) calls a ‘blues epistemology.’ Indeed, Scott-Heron described himself as a ‘bluesologist’ (Ward, 2011), pursuing the science of the blues, offering a diagnostic that the ‘I ain’t got no money blues, I ain’t got no job blues, I ain’t got no woman blues’ are the same things (Mugge, 1982). For Woods, the blues ‘has been used repeatedly by multiple genera- tions of working-class African Americans to organize communities of consciousness....It was used to confront the daily efforts of plantation powers to erase African American leadership and the memory of social progress. ... The blues and its extensions are actively engaged in providing intellectually brutal confrontations with the “truths” of working-class African American life. It draws on African American musical practices, folklore, and spirituality to re-organize and give a new voice to working- class communities facing severe fragmentation’ (2005, p. 1008). The economic and racial forces of displacement and fragmentation were not distant from Scott-Heron. He was born in Chicago and spent much of his childhood living with his grandmother in the small town of Jackson, Tennessee. He saw the African American section of Jackson demolished to build the new highway between Memphis and Nashville before moving at the age of 13 with his mother to New York City (Scott- Heron, 2012). They first lived with his uncle in the Bronx and later in the Robert Fulton Houses in Chelsea. From there, he rode the subway for over an hour to Fieldston, a private high school in the Bronx. After his first year of college at Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylvania, which he chose to attend because Black writers and leaders such as Langston Hughes, Kwame Nkrumah, and Thurgood Marshall studied there, he took a leave of absence to complete his first novel, The Vulture. The book was published in 1970, the same year as his first album (and book of poetry), Small Talk at 125th and Lennox, which also debuted the well-known poem ‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.’ Scott-Heron’s blues offered an anticolonial vision of race-radical revo- lutionary consciousness, evident on the album From South Africa to South Carolina (1975), which ties together nuclear colonialism in South Carolina with apartheid in South Africa. Claudrena Harold (2011) observes that, ‘Scott-Heron’s descriptions of “down home” routinely moved beyond the geographical borders of the former Confederacy and into the transna- tional terrain commonly referred to as the Global South.’ ‘Delta Man,’ for example, traces the development of revolutionary consciousness along the sites of the plantation and Great Migration, from the Mississippi Delta during slavery, to Nebraska following the Civil War, and then to the inner city. The bridge between each of these places – ‘revolution outta be where I’m comin’ from’ – shuttles possibility between sites of forced mobility. The history lessons found in ‘Spacesong’ and ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’, moreover, speak of white settler dispossession of Native inhabitants. Such an expansive internationalist, decolonial desire tempers the feeling of despair otherwise dominant in ‘Winter in America.’ The song was written in 1975 at a moment when the possibility of the Black freedom and peace movements had been betrayed, leaving ‘nobody fight- ing ‘cause nobody knows what to save.’ Within an internationalist blues epistemology, however, the hopeful suggestion is that spring can still be found in movements outside of the United States (Peddie, 2011, 122). Mobilizing urban crisis The militarization of the urban crisis was accompanied by an ideological project to enclose the racialized ‘Black ghetto’ as a place separate from modern white suburbia, reifying it as a space of dangerousness that may be subject legitimately to exceptional rules and abandoned. The great rat debate contributed to this ideological crystallization. Southern Democrats and Republican opponents of the bill used innuendo (‘rats of the two-legged variety’ and ‘rats of the four-legged variety’) to tie the bill to race and rioting in Newark (Strickland, 1969, p. 342). Another congressman mockingly referred to it as the ‘civil “rats” bill’ (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 542). ‘Whitey on the Moon,’ by turn, revealed the truth that state abandonment is not just an afterthought, but a productive absence directly abetted by state violence. In drawing together the exploration of the moon with the extraction of value from and suppression of Black freedom movements, race-radical lunar criticism rejected the bifurcated militarized spectacle of limitless space and anachronistic ghetto confinement. Indeed, Scott-Heron offers a documentary trace of the new ‘great confinement’ that was then in the making (de Giorgi, 2006). In ‘No Knock,’ Scott-Heron invites listeners to take an incredulous interpretation of new legislation that enabled the police to enter a dwelling without notice: Long rap about “No Knock” being legislated for the people you’ve always hated in this hell hole that you/we call home. “No Knock,” the Man will say to keep this man from beating his wife. “No Knock,” the Man will say to protect people from themselves. His poem ‘King Alfred’s Plan’ discusses a Nixon plan for preventive detention that would create a caged future in the absence of Black political unity. ‘Locked in cages, pens, hemmed in shoulder to shoulder arms outstretched for just a crust of bread...Let us unite out of love and not hate / Let us unite on our own and not because of barbed wire death.’ As race-radical lunar criticism illustrates, the material and ideological struggle over urban crisis constituted a space for grappling with intersecting structures of white racial rule and empire, namely whether and how they could be democratically reconstructed. This offers a cultural trace of the shift from military Keynesianism to post-Keynesian militarism that Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1998) names as the conjuncture for the sharp expansion of the carceral state. In contrast to the ‘symbiotic’ progression from ‘ghetto’ to prison confinement offered by Wacquant (2001), race-radical lunar criticism illustrates both the tremendous contests over shifting forms of unfreedom and their situatedness within a broader crisis of imperialism that anticolonial and ‘domestic’ freedom struggles provoked. The uneven geography that the warfare-welfare state produced was the grounds of struggle over the costs and harms of militarization. Investments in defense were widespread but concentrated in New South and New West sites in the so-called Sunbelt, what Markusen and colleagues (1991) dubbed the Gunbelt. This unevenness was not only regional, but also shaped patterns of development at the metropolitan scale (Loyd, 2014). This social and spatial struggle was deeply racialized and gendered. For this reason, it is misleading to interpret the space race as a form of militarization that uniformly trumps basic needs, as liberal versions of spending priorities suggest. Conflicts over who would pay for the costs of empire and militarization were mediated through strug- gles over racism that took a spectacular form, splitting inner city from suburb in ways that obscured the intersections among race, class, and gender. The Black welfare mother was enlisted as the spectacular figure of national disorder, even though most welfare recipients were white and most Great Society spending supported middle class suburban homes. Scott-Heron’s retort to this scapegoating restored the racial economic context within which Black families and communities struggled for freedom. Cross-class welfare rights and peace movements questioned military Keynesianism, meaning that they increasingly rejected the wages of empire and believed that a democratic reconstruction of US society was possible only by ending its wars. Conclusion: race-radical lunar criticism for the prison home front As a sublime symbol of progress, exploration, and national purpose, the moon represented a material symbol of upward mobility and possibility for the nation. The Cold War space race as spectacle cohered an ideological understanding of upward mobility and progress. This spectacle, moreover, was not simply a mode of visuality, but also built material spaces of the economically buoyant Sunbelt-Gunbelt and fostered confinement of Black central city spaces and dislocation of residents from industries being developed elsewhere. Urban crisis, then, was fundamentally a crisis over Black ‘upward’ mobility in terms of movement through space (that is, the Great Migration and moving beyond confines of racial ghettos) and claims to political power and presence in public spaces. Race-radical lunar criticism defied the Cold War spectacle that would split the world in two, the nation into Black and white, American or failed American, by illustrating the relationships between the ghetto and suburb, the ghetto and empire. Critical interpretations of the relationship between racialized poverty and wealth, as offered through Black lunar criticism, did not disappear, but were submerged within a discourse that naturalized Black confinement in ghetto and prison spaces while obscuring the consolidation of political and economic forces responsible for a new, multiscalar regime of mobility and immobility. The political and cultural contest over this lived and ideological space of urban crisis underscores the uncertain future of the prison resolution. With mass incarceration in question from the left and right, race-radical lunar criticism offers some guidance for understanding how the present crisis may be resolved in favor of mobility justice. Scott-Heron’s song ‘Alien (Hold Onto Your Dreams)’ criticizes divide and conquer tactics, and ties the trajectories of transnational Latino/a migrants to African American histories of forced mobility. Moreover, Scott-Heron’s dialectical blues understanding of the politics of space suggests that dismantling the United States’ unprecedented carceral state will hinge not so much on comparing rates of spending on confinement versus welfare but on analyzing their interconnection and on developing political unity and (even) love. The peaceful promise of outer space – displacing the Man from the moon – remains tied to liberatory, decolonial projects on earth.

#### Private space appropriation as worldmaking isn’t value neutral but is an apparatus of white science – scaling from cosmic elite and unequal IR, there is always someone left behind.

Stockwell 20 [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources. By constructing their endeavours in ways that appeal to the common good, NewSpace actors are therefore concealing the reality of how commercial resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at the expense of the vast majority of the global population.

#### The project of white science is that of erasure – blackness is rendered underthought and invisible in the name of progress and worldmaking. Your ballot should ask – what other possibilities exist?

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* reps matter – interrogate underlying

I quote her at length to express the full shape of what is a facile-at-best, antiblack-atworst comparison between the nature of urban development and large-scale structure formation—of galaxies, galaxy clusters, stars, etc. Randall flattens the process of modern urbanization in a way that necessarily, if haphazardly, displaces the antiblack violence inherent in the organization and growth of cities to clarify the effects of dark matter on large-scale structure formation in the universe. She presents an idyllic, simplistic framing of urbanization without addressing the violence animating the planning, arrangement, rearrangement, and maintenance of “urban” spaces: gentrification and the ensuing displacement (New Orleans, in the still-burgeoning wake of Hurricane Katrina, provides a case-study);165 the creation of food deserts and the destructive responses to the ways Black communities attempt to develop self-sufficient sources of nourishment (AfrikaTown in Oakland);166 forms of environmental racism (e.g. the poisoning of the water of at least Flint, MI); and the overpolicing of Black communities. To make this critical elision in the name of clarification to knowingly or unknowingly ground that clarification in an obfuscation of the realities of antiblack violence at the level of spatial arrangement and relation. Clarification for the lay audience remains imbricated in an obfuscation of the violence that emerges in the arrangements, infiltrations, intrusions, displacements and death that characterize the relation between Blackness and space. This problem of obfuscation persists as she crafts the second metaphor, in which dark matter metaphorically stands-in for the “rank-and-file of society.” In an article about Dark Matter and the Dinosaurs that she writes for The Boston Globe entitled, “Seeing dark matter as the key to the universe—and human empathy,” she clarifies and focuses what she might mean by “rank-and-file.” Recounting a reading from the first chapter of her book for an audience at the artists’ colony, Yaddo, during which she ventured to help clarify the dark matter’s “unseen but important influences” on the universe, Randall recalls being asked, “I know this might sound like a crazy question, but were you really talking about race?” In her telling, Randall beams at the thought: “the real issue I was addressing was the transparency—both metaphorical and literal—of people, phenomena, particles, and forces that we don’t necessarily appreciate but that are important to our shared reality.” She revels in this connection and extends the metaphor into seminars she teaches at Harvard. Dark matter is the dominant form of matter in the universe, but it goes unnoticed and remains undetectable to current research methods and instruments. Ordinary matter does not interact strongly with or resemble dark matter; dark matter merely passes through ordinary matter, and ordinary matter phenomenological exacts more influence on the known universe, its shape, contents, and so on. Some might consider dark matter dangerous because of its “ominous-sounding name.” Dark matter’s very existence confounds and fascinates scientific and lay intellects alike, prompting extensive research into what it is, how it behaves, and what the full extent of its influence on reality might be. In all, thinking critically about or researching dark matter demands an attempt at understanding the invisible, the underthought, the unimaginable, the terrifying, the otherworldy, the Black. For Randall, research into dark matter, and the parallels between dark matter’s function in the universe and the positions of Black folk and nonblack people in the world, prompt questions of empathy: what is it to think through and about, and to identify with, the constituents, sentient or particulate, of another world? Of another universe? This is peculiar in its own right, particularly given the position of power Randall occupies. Occupying the political-ontological position of the Human, as a white, blonde woman of increasing acclaim in a field that continues to marginalize not only Black people (and on a different register, people of color), but Black womyn (cis- and transgender) in particular—providing fewer research opportunities, accepting fewer candidates to elite programs, research laboratories and projects, and offering little or no access, reinforcement, or encouragement at early ages167—she presents this metaphor, like the first, in a way that works to obfuscate the antiblackness undergirding it. Worse, in the second instance in particular, she wields Blackness, via the invocation of race and the focus on the “dark” of dark matter, as a tool to make a general claim about the need for empathy (the very concept of which Saidiya Hartman tears asunder in her work)168 without a substantive recognition of the singularity of Blackness. In both instances, clarification and connection turn on Randall’s blindness to the realities that characterize the Black position in the antiblack world, in the field of Physics (and in STEM fields in general) and with regard to the spatial formations created by the violent process of urbanization. In all, while dark matter can at least draw and hold the fascination, care, adoration, research, and funding of physicists, researchers, and laypersons with scientific interests, dark matter—at least in Randall’s metaphor—does not experience or capture the profound, debilitating, exclusionary, and fatal violence generally characteristic of Black life and death for Black folk around the globe. Troubling as these elisions are, they intersect with what are useful metaphors for our consideration when thinking about the relation between Blackness and space. If for Randall Black folk and dark matter function similarly, as the structuring, transparent— rather, unseen, unthought—feared condition of possibility for the formation of structure of the universe, the very condensation of matter that eventually produces the earth, its inhabitants, and the structures those inhabitants create to house and arrange themselves or others, then this metaphor proves useful. That Black folk qua dark matter likely facilitates the condition that make what we call “space” possible, be that space physical, politicalontological, psychic, or imaginative, clarifies the darkness before us in the labyrinthine structure of the mausoleum before us. Not only does it affirm what we understand to be the violent mechanics that edify this structure to begin with, but it also directs our questions about how we might make or inhabit a space to do the wake work of mourning and moving with the dead. The “dark universe,” this “zone of nonbeing,”169 this nowhere, that gives the (non-dark) universe form, as a metaphor for the kind of spatial arrangement we occupy primes us to read what Beatty and Me are doing with and in Dickens, CA. Differently, how Beatty and Me work with the dark matter of Blackness to shape the space of Dickens as a site of Black interaction, confrontation, and creation will help confirm and challenge both what we know about being and going nowhere, and also better frame our understanding of the possibilities afforded us by being lost.

#### White science necessitates a sovereign subject of mastery and individualization that creates international necro-zones of racialized sacrifice – the subject of IR theory depends on an asymmetrical segregated order of nation states.

Agathangelou 11 [Anna M. Agathangelou (political scientist from York University in Toronto. She is the co-director of Global Change Institute, Cyprus and was a visiting fellow in the Program of Science, Technology and Society at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard). “Bodies to the Slaughter: Global Racial Reconstructions, Fanon's Combat Breath, and Wrestling for Life”. Somatechnics, March 2011, vo. 1, No. 1 : pp. 209-248. Accessed 1/22/22. <https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3366/soma.2011.0014> //recut Xu]

Fanon scales colonisation to the level of the slave and colonised body. He illustrates the incommensurability of the intimate encounter of black flesh with the body of the coloniser and focuses on the structuring processes required to make it possible. He begins his critique with the normative imperial order of slavery and colonisation and those humanist interventions claiming to protect the sovereign subject. He tells us that the constitution of this sovereign subject depends on an asymmetrical segregated-order: This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species ... When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species ... The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. (Fanon 1967d: 39–40, emphasis in original) Fanon points out that this order’s constitution depends on direct violence that turns a species into slaves, black, and colonised. This violence makes it possible for zones to become ‘civil’ spaces of ‘generalized trust’ and security for the sovereigns; the species occupying them possess ‘generalized trust’ and are racially white. This relation ends up being taken for granted: belonging to a given race of property relations is the precondition for any ‘civil’ encounter. Indeed, as Wilderson argues, ‘Fanon makes clear how some are zoned, a priori, beyond the borders of generalized trust’ (Wilderson 2010: 33). The establishment of gratuitous violence zones, positions and constitutes simultaneously the species and the colonised. Further, ‘the condition of possibility upon which subjectivity’ (Fanon 1967d: 39–40) is based must be recognised and theorised. The creation of colonised zones, the interstate state system, racialised whiteness, and property relations require theorising if we are to disrupt those relations which unify and entify a normative ‘ethical order’. Fanon, of course, is clear: without the vertical existence of breath, that is, giving one’s breath as nourishment for blackness, slavery, and colonisation, there is no such order. This order, even when it claims inclusion, segregates subjects of recognition from ‘species’. Subjects are positioned into the interstate structure of worlds with sovereign protection, able to take by force and accumulate anything, from things to life itself. Fanon seems to have anticipated Foucault who argues: ‘Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power ... The individual ... is not the vis-a`-vis of power; it is I believe, one of its prime effects’ (Foucault 1980: 98). However, Fanon does not begin with this prime effect of power, as he wants us to learn to read social relations, racism, and economies of violence as if experiencing our own gratuitous violence, in an attempt to think the impossible place of the slave, the black body, and the colonised – in other words, the living being whose existence is already assumed as structurally impossible and, hence, as breath which can never be synonymous with life. The basis of the (inter) state structure, Fanon recognises, is already the juristic sovereign person whose essence, or what Goodrich calls the sovereign that the state has a right to kill, is already secured from the threat of mutilation. On the one hand, Foucault (1990: 138) asks this about state power: ‘How could power exercise its highest prerogative by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?’ On the other hand, Fanon makes explicit the matrix of violence which requires and makes sure that species are zoned as black and colonised: ‘Individualism is the first to disappear ... the colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native’s mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual’ (Fanon 1967d: 47): Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by a dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is right when he speaks of knowing ‘them’ well. For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say, his property, to the colonial system. (Fanon 1967d: 36) But why such insistence? What tension does Fanon want to foreground? Fanon actually has a different ‘locus of enunciation’ and insists on a long trajectory of the effects of the imperial, colonial, and slave order and vertical relations of what he calls ‘combat breath’ (Fanon 1967c: 65). By drawing out Fanon’s idea of ‘combat breath’ and articulating it as struggles that disrupt the practices of violence and the final destruction of countries and people, we see that enforcing the right to life of the radical individual (the propertied man of a structure of white supremacy which depends on slavery and colonisation) will authorise thanatopolitics and necroeconomics, not by suspending a right to life but rather by enforcing a right to that ‘liberal’ life. But this minimalist right to life could preclude crucial relations in the everyday continuum-spaces of the human and the non- human, including ecologies and it does by deploying practices of disfigurement and destruction. Fanon exposes the imperial European re-assemblage of power and demonstrates that state power shifts are connected to the emergence of an ‘international’ order and apparatuses that make possible a particular sovereign-master-colonising subject. In his view, colonial power says: ‘Since you want independence, take it and starve ... A regime of austerity is imposed on these starving men; a disproportionate amount of work is required for their atrophied muscles’ (Fanon 1967d: 96). Fanon notes the prevalence of suffocation and starvation in world politics, the devouring of the flesh and the subsequent redistribution of its existential vital energy that is turned into wealth. Amelioration requires more than changing working conditions and setting up less exploitative structures (such as socialism and communism). Rather, it requires ‘regime[s] which [are] completely oriented toward the people as a whole’ which prioritise the principle ‘that man is the most precious of all possessions’.8 Such a locus will preclude ‘that caricature of society where all economic and political power is held in the hands of the few who regard the nation as whole with scorn and contempt’ (Fanon 1967d: 98).

#### Thus, I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Against the will of private entities to appropriate outer space, we reject the regime of property as the white science of logistics.

Moten and Harney, 21 (Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*, pp 13-18) gz

The first theft shows up as rightful ownership. This is the theft of fleshly, earth(l)y life, which is then incarcerated in the body. But the body, it turns out, is just the first principal-agent problem. The body is just an overseer, a factor, a superintendent for the real landlord, the real owner, the individual, in his noxious, heavy-handed conceptuality. The legal term for this principal-agent problem is mind. In this regard, the designation ‘mind/body problem’ is a synecdochal redundancy in abstraction rather than an entanglement, or even an opposition, of *anima* and matter, mama and soul. There’s this formulation that Robert Duncan gets from Erwin Schrödinger that helps a certain disordering along. Schrödinger says “living matter evades the decay to equilibrium.” Well, if Proudhon is right, and slavery, murder, robbery, and property are a unit; if the general regime of private property is most accurately understood as social death; then what if death/private property is that equilibrium of which Schrödinger speaks? What John Donne speaks of by way of God’s sovereign capacity to preserve is a problem that will have been meant to solve a problem; and when Schrödinger speaks of evading the decay to equilibrium, he isn’t saying that all decay is bad. Corruption is our (accursed) share, our antological practice, our eccentric centering, as M.C. Richards might say. How we evade ownership/equilibrium is given precisely in that refusal to prevent loss that we call sharing, rubbing, empathy, hapticality: the undercommon love of flesh, our essential omnicentric or anacentric eccentricity. Every thing, in the wake of such disordering, is loss prevention. John Locke creates the tabula rasa as a container for properties – properties of the mind, and properties owned by the propertied mind. Self-knowledge is self-possession and self-positioning in Locke. His accumulation process is auto-location, because one can’t help but settle for that. From the first moment, which appears to keep happening all the time, all property is posited, beginning with the positing/positioning of a body for locating ownership, and the owned, and a mind for owning. The posit and the deposit inaugurate ownership as incorporation, whose inevitable end, given in continual withdrawal, is loss. This requires the production of a science of loss, which is to say the science of whiteness, or, logistics. Every acquisition, every improvement, is an ossification of sharing. This ossification is given in and as containment. The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body – flesh conceptualized – which bears the individual-in-subjection. A profound viciousness begins with this colonization of the posited body, the appointment of the posited mind, and the manipulation – in various modalities of brutality – of their mutually enveloping redundancy, given in the dead perpetual motion of the will to colonize. This enclosure, this settlement, will be repeated because it must be repeated. Every slave will have been every time the mirror in which the self, in seeing itself, comes into existence in and as itself, which is an omnicidal fantasy. Locke invents the derivative here, a degraded part of the accursed share that is poised to draw on the power of this share, but only to create more derivatives, to create more zones of dispossession by positing possession, in the denial of loss that prepares for loss. All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing. In its willfulness, property is theft; but beyond the murderousness that would attend theft-in-acquisition one mind/body at a time, the theft in question here is absolute serial murder, which we survive only insofar as all property remains vulnerable to sharing. This is to say nothing other than that all property is fugitive. It flees from its own positing, runs from being-deposited. All (property) jumps bail. Sharing, exhaustion, expending, derivation will have been contained and congealed in the measurable and accountable individual unit of the derivative. But sharing is our means, the earth’s means in us and our means in earth. Logistics would seem to value means over ends – everything is how to get it there, not what it is – but logistics is really the degradation of means, the general devaluation of means through individuation and privatization, which are the same thing. It is the science of lost means advanced with every act of loss prevention.

#### We affirm the normative statement but our analysis isn’t separate from the broader framework of fugitive science – the anti-Black technologies of space exploration isn’t limited to whiteness, but is radically retooled toward a shadow archive of blurred lines and assemblages.

Murillo 19 [Brackets Original. Dr. John Murillo III (Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine. His primary research interests are Black speculative fiction, critical theory, quantum mechanics, and popular media). “Review: Fugitive Science: Empiricism and Freedom in Early African American Culture, by Britt Rusert”. Vol. 5 No. 1 (2019): Special Section on Crip Technoscience. Catalyst Journal. Apr 1, 2019. Accessed 1/4/22. <https://catalystjournal.org/index.php/catalyst/article/view/30498/24698> //Xu]

So we begin here and at a bit of length because this kind of narrative of experimentation and research done unseen, in the margins and between the lines, warrants revisiting after reading Britt Rusert’s profoundly illuminating Fugitive Science: Empiricism and Freedom in Early African American Culture. Rusert chronicles what she describes as a shadow archive—a history that lurks behind, undergirds, and complicates the dominant archive—of “African American science writing [and cultural production] in the antebellum period” (2017, p. 8), and she she calls this archive fugitive science. Fugitive science describes a heterogeneous, innovative, resistant, “dynamic and diverse archive of engagements with, critiques of, and responses to” (p. 4) the antiblack racial science that proliferated the antebellum episteme, and it expands the definition of science to include forms of praxis and experimentation typically, and often deliberately, unrecognized as science: conjuring, performance, astrology, mysticism, mesmerism, and imaginative speculation. Citing Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things: An Archaeology of rhe Human Sciences, Rusert charactizes fugitive science as a “counter-science,” (p. 6) one undergirded by a “subterranean politics and furtive insurgency” (p. 17) aimed at appropriating, confronting, mocking, or otherwise destabilizing the logics of the racial science of the antebellum period and its political and ideological echoes in eras beyond. It is a science of the “unthought” (Hartman & Wilderson, 2003) that innovates from the outside margins of history or in between the lines of the archive; it describes a set of “ongoing experiments in freedom, radical empiricisms” (p. 20) that refuse the normative constrictions and often deathly, antiblack consequences of what would typically be recognized as scientific inquiry. Irreducible to any one form of thought production (from writing to visual art to performance), it treats science—and knowledge writ large—as an “assemblage of different fields and practices that could” and should “be dismantled, reassembled, and redirected” (p. 132) toward Black thought’s work of “imagining the unimaginable” (Sharpe, 2014, p. 59): liberation from, or the end of, the antiblack world. In that way, Rusert’s fugitive science is alchemical: from base elements marshaled from countless arenas of thought and experience, fugitive scientists such as Benjamin Banneker, Henry Box Brown, Martin R. Delaney, Sarah Mapps Douglass, and even Brenda Smith, my grandmother, Blacken and transmute an altogether radical unique, and “unthinkable” scientific practice. Rusert categorizes three forms of fugitive science, but the lines between them blur and even disappear from case to case—it is, after all, a radically dynamic form of knowledge production; moving through the text, one might do well to also consider these forms to be like frequencies on which all fugitive science articulates. The oppositional frequency of fugitive science describes work done to intervene explicitly into scientific discourses, especially those that reinforced the ruling, antiblack episteme. Works operating on the practical frequency attempted to instrumentalize science and technology in ways that could help advance the project of emancipation. And finally, the speculative frequency of fugitive science wields the imaginative richness of scientific inquiry to explore the limits, conditions of possibility, and revolutionary potential of Black existence. Throughout her chronicling of the history and genealogy of fugitive science, Rusert reveals the fluidity of these forms, the ease with which an individual figure, work, or exchange may articulate on one or more of these frequencies at once. As examples, Benjamin Banneker’s confrontations with Thomas Jefferson over Jefferson’s infamous Notes on the State of Virginia locate the oppositional origin point for Rusert’s history of fugitive science. Banneker’s extensive critiques of Jefferson and those that followed in their wake—like James McCune Smith’s essays—act as intentionally and predominantly oppositional works meant to intervene against racial science. On another frequency, Martin R. Delany’s novel, Blake; or, The Huts of America, weaves a speculative history and future of revolutionary movement and organization that marshals both practical astronomical knowledge and metaphysical rumination. A work of more remarkably varied frequencies, Rusert reads Delany’s novel as aiming to radically destabilize the boundaries between metaphysical mysticism and science, and to provide information that could all advance the cause of Black liberation in and beyond the antebellum period. And on still another frequency, the little-known teachings and lectures on physiology of Sarah Mapps Douglass, which she offered almost exclusively to Black women and young girls, indirectly offers a response to “the forms of experimental science that exploited [Joice] Heth, [Sarah] Baartman, and countless other women of African descent in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world” (p. 185), where Black women were (and are) subject to layer of violent erasure that render(ed) them the “mute experimental subjects of nineteenth century science” (p. 181). Further, Douglass’s lectures operate on a lower frequency than the other subjects of Rusert’s texts, a frequency of the lapses silences of the unavailable archive—muted, censored, displaced, or forgotten into unavailability—necessitating speculation in the form of inferences, like stitches, drawn from the limited records Rusert is able to collect. In this way, Douglass also responds to the longue dureé of the deliberate and casual erasure of Black women from the still unfolding history and genealogy of fugitive science. Each work, moment, and exchange of fugitive science encapsulates a dynamic expression announcing anew the defiant, creative, and uncontainable project of Black freedom on multiple frequencies. Essential to fully tuning into the frequencies of these and the many fugitive scientists of Rusert’s study—and of Rusert’s study itself as well—is an attention to the grand questions about and implications for Black knowledge production and critical, creative thought that her chronicle compels us to (re)consider. As and after we read Fugitive Science, we must rethink the ways we define, recognize, and take seriously science, critique, resistance, and knowledge itself. After encountering the variable frequencies and forms fugitive science takes, how can we delimit what constitutes scientific inquiry? How might we better tune to the lower frequencies of intellectual and creative endeavors that we otherwise miss, that are rendered inaudible, or that we would normally disallow from being truly engaged as knowledge? Like I have been compelled to do, both at the outset of these remarks and in my own research, we might begin by radically reconsidering our encounters with the alternative, vexing, sometimes fraught fragments of experimentation, research, and speculation that comprise the vast, varied, and still-unfolding archive of Black thought. We might search the silences and lower frequencies for those articulations of Black innovation that fugitively traverse the static. We must, then, innovate an alternative form of reading and listening that will enable us to find what we, prior to reading this text, did not know we would do well to seek. Only then might the full expression of Fugitive Science and all its lessons from the antebellum period enable us to continue and advance the revolutionary struggle against racist science and its ripples in the contemporary moment.

#### View the 1AC as an act of Planning, not Policy – instead of forcing normative outcomes via spaces of study, you should affirm acts of self-preservation within educational spaces.

Greer 18, G. H. "Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools." Brock Education: A Journal of Educational Research and Practice 28.1 (2018): 5-18. (Concordia University (Canada), Art Education Department, Graduate Student.)//Elmer

Planning While study in the undercommons is a sociality that provides **refuge, joy, and resilience**, planning is the ongoing process of resistance which protects study. In the terms of complexity theory, planning creates the conditions for study to emerge. Planning defends study, for example, by attending **to methods**, when economic forces are oriented toward outcomes. In such a case, study thrives in the fascination required to build a car from scratch but is extinguished by a production line. Planning may then take the form of activism against the process of de-skilling workers. Generally, study is in trouble where labour is detached from purpose, discovery, and agency; and planning poses resistance to such divisions. Resistance may take a passive form like absenteeism or an active form like student strikes; it is an ongoing social experiment. The subjects of difference who inhabit the undercommons initiate planning in support of further difference: “planning in the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the future presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 74). Importantly, “[p]lanning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference…” (p. 76). Planning resists the austerity of conformity. Difference may bring the concept of diversity to mind for social justice educators. There are a number of distinctions between the difference that propels planning in the undercommons and diversity as it is understood in the field of education. Social justice education organized around diversity involves “eliminating the injustice created when differences are sorted and ranked in a hierarchy that unequally confers power…” (Adams, Bell, Goodman, & Joshi, 2016, p. 3, emphasis in original). In this sense, equitable diversity is an end goal that is, significantly, often supported by the implementation of policy. Planning, on the other hand, is a process, rather than an outcome, that resists policy, as explained below. Planning appears distorted, if at all, **from the commons where the rules are made**: “Because from the perspective of **policy it is too dark in there, in** the black **heart of the undercommons, to see**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 79). Planning may become invisible or **appear criminal in the light**. Historical examples of such distortions are plentiful. The Freedom Riders were planning in 1961, boarding buses into their own brutalization to desegregate the southern United States; in the light of curricular history, Freedom Riders disappear and are replaced by parliamentary motions. There was planning at the Stonewall Riots in June of 1969 when homeless queer kids led by trans women of colour revolted against police brutality; the political necessity of Stonewall disappears in the parade lights of Pride every year on its own anniversary. Planning made visible but distorted is apparent in current events in the criminalization of self-preservation: from immigration (Ackerman & Furman, 2013), to activism (Matthews & Cyril, 2017; Alonso, Barcena, & Gorostidi, 2013), to panhandling (Chesnay, 2013). Educators who wish to see the planning of the undercommons, or to make it visible to students, must research to discover the exclusions of curriculum. When we include stories like the Stonewall Riots or the Freedom Riders in our teaching, we offer a connection to students who see their lives reflected therein. Stories of resistance to injustice, particular to local contexts, are important educational resources. In addition to these, pedagogical models which support the development and scholastic direction, of planning skills among students include: problem-based learning (Walker, Leary, Hmelo-Silver, & Ertmer, 2015), choice-based art education (Douglas, & Jaquith, 2009), critical media literacy (Funk, Kellner, & Share, 2016), and anti-oppressive education (Kumashiro, 2000). Policy From the perspective of the undercommons, policy inevitably conflicts with the forms of study and planning described above. Policy is the **instrument of efficiency**; it seeks measurable, predictable outcomes. The immeasurable social experiments and emerging differences of planning and study cannot be reconciled with administrative control as exercised through policy. Policy from the perspective of the undercommons operates under three rules. First, it diagnoses planners as problematic and prescribes itself as the solution; “This is the first rule of policy. It **fixes others**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 78). Second, policy requires the participation of planners in the fixing of themselves; “Participating in change is the second rule of policy.” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 80). In this way, participantsimplicate themselvesin order to fulfill the third rule of policy: that “wrong participation” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 81) provokes all manner of crises. If there is no crisis then the participant is fixed and may be deputised in order to fix others. More commonly, any crisis at all proves that policy was right about the planners all along; and of course, they were bound to fail. The circular logic of policy as viewed from the undercommons reflects what Spade (2015) calls administrative violence. Spade (2015) details a story which I relate here to clarify the operations of policy. Bianca, a trans girl, was sent home from her high school in 1999 for wearing clothing that affirmed her gender. She was not allowed to return to her classes. Bianca’s parents called the school and received no response. Spade met Bianca in 2002 when she was homeless, unemployed, and attempting to leave an abusive relationship. Bianca had enrolled in a welfare work program but was outed as a trans woman by her male identification (ID). She was subsequently harassed and forced to quit, losing her income and making her ineligible for Medicaid. She became homeless, and because of her male ID she was barred from women’s shelters and fearful of further abuse at shelters for men. Without an address, medical benefits, or an income Bianca was unable to complete the process to correct her ID and could not afford the hormone treatments that allowed her to maintain a feminine appearance. Bianca’s ability to pass as a cisgender woman protected her on the street from further harassment by both the public and the police. In order to afford hormone injections, Bianca engaged in sex work. The injections were not regulated because they had to be obtained illegally which placed Bianca at increased risk of infection by HIV, hepatitis, and other diseases. Although Bianca’s story is not recent, the factors that contributed to her difficulties are relevant: transgender youth are still significantly over-represented in groups of early school leavers, homeless youth, and survivors of violence (Morton et al., 2018; Keuroghlian, Shtasel, & Bassuk, 2014). In the language of the undercommons Bianca planned to survive by expressing her gender, but this plan was subverted by school policy, causing her not to graduate and significantly reducing her prospects for employment. Following the first rule of policy according to the undercommons, Bianca’s school would not accept her attendance until she fixed her gender. Bianca then followed the second rule of policy and made attempts to become a participant. She tried to stay at shelters and enrolled in a social welfare work program. In each of these cases, she experienced the crisis of harassment. Following the third rule of policy, these crises were framed as the result of Bianca’s wrong participation: she did not have the right identification. For survival, Bianca must then become a fugitive by engaging in criminalized activity: sex work and the illegal procurement of hormones. In an educational context, considering policy, according to The Undercommons, pushes educators to ask how the rules in our schools create, rather than respond to, fugitivity among students. Fugitivity Being a fugitive according to The Undercommons means being marked as an outsider. Fugitivity happens to people when: first they act, and second policy outlaws those actions. But fugitivity must also be embraced. Those who refuse the rules of policy, as outlined above, become fugitive. Fugitives will not be fixed, refuse to participate, and deny responsibility for the crises that befall them. Fugitivity recognises systemic racism, classism, ableism, and cis/heteronormativity in the disallowance of demographic-specific behaviour. It is fugitive sociality that composes the undercommons in order to provide refuge and resistance. In high schools, the undercommons provides social refuge in the form of patient listening and covert smiles to: hat wearing, cell phone texting, hall running, affection displaying, fugitive students; and granola bar giving, grade fudging, student failing, smiling before Christmas, fugitive teachers. These now-fugitive activities are planning behaviours, they sustain study for those that commit them. These things have been happening since before policy determined that education is a predictable and measurable thing. Fugitive planners generate study with unforeseeable ends and immeasurable learning. Turning planners into fugitives has some effects: ease of administration and evaluation is one; the reinforcement of unjust hierarchies is another.

#### The Kantian telos of the self-determined agent is a project of degrading logistics.

Harney et al 18 [Bracketed for g-lang. Stephen Matthias HARNEY (Professor of Strategic Management at Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University), Mattia FRAPORTTI (Singapore Management University), and Niccolo CUPINI (researcher at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland). “Logistics Genealogies: A dialogue with Stefano Harney”. Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. March 2018. Accessed 1/5/22. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7227&context=lkcsb_research> //Xu]

We could begin the next chapter of logistics with Kant. He says famously that we should treat [others] men as ends and not means. It’s true. It’s in all the business ethics textbooks! This would appear at fi­rst sight to run counter to the history of logistics, where people seem to be treated as means to an end. At fi­rst people and things seem to be mobilized as means to the end of profi­t through war and conquest, and then with the Atlantic slave trade and settler colonialism mobilization of people and things is for the end of pro­fit through racial capitalism. Logistics delivers humans, animals, energy, earthly materials to an end, to a point, the point of production. But this includes, crucially, the point of production of the settler, the pro duction of the entrepreneur, the banker, the slave trader, and the investor. These ­figures I mention are produced as ends. So it is not that Kant does not mean what he says, or that logistics is in con‑flict with what he wants. It is just that what he understands is this: that [agent] man is an end when [they are] he is this kind of ­figure, a ­figure who posits himself as self-made, self-suffi­cient, and self-determined. Kant may want this for everyone. But his very formulation, seeking this self-possessed man as an end, this man who has come out of the tutelage of someone else this kind of “man” requires the rise of logistics. Because the only way to create this kind of man as an end — or any kind since this man is Man — is to mobilize and deliver resources that allow for this false and indeed delusional claim of independence to appear plausible, at least to this man and men like him, such as Kant. These means are utilized for but one end: the production of profi­t and cispatriarchy that support and make possible this illusion of self-authored man who can declare himself an end. This end of man is, in other words, a degradation of means. Indeed, if I were asked to give a short definition of logistics, I would call it the general degradation of means. This is how Fred and I understand modern logistics. Other histories, other ways of living, might suggest to us that not being capable of being an end in oneself, indeed, of every fully being oneself, is in fact a way to disabuse this “oneself” delusion and place the incomplete self in the hands of others for use, for service, for love. Here means are enlarged, enriched, and entangled for each other. You may hear echoes of Agamben on use here, but let’s be cautious about that. We would have to do something for our comrade he will not do for himself, any more than Hegel would. We would have to bring him out of the ancient world of master and slave, because we are not talking here about countering logistics with a mutuality of means that allows all of us to reach a more balanced individuation, as in Agamben’s forgotten preclassical world. And more importantly, all that we have developed historically in the fugitivity of use — history and future in the present of logisticality and hapticality — all of this Agamben has chosen not to inherit by his willful disregard of the black radical tradition. We need only recall Fanon here on the difference of the colonial relationship of master and slave to see that the break or escape must be with recognition (of an end) itself, with both subject and object, and indeed, we should perhaps read Fanon as saying revolt and revolution are laboratories of a means without ends. In other words, when Fred and I speak about hapticality we are talking about a materialism beneath materialism, under materialism, an undercommon materialism, what our friend Denise Ferreira da Silva calls difference without separability. Our ability to be in the feel of each other is historical and magical, painful and beautiful. It emerges in its strongest form — from a thousand rivers — in the nautical event, the­ first horrible logistics dedicated to the ends of man/Man. An event that is the dispersion of event, its shoreless strand. It’s a way we inherit — or we can inherit — an experimental undermaterialism of sound, feel, taste, touch, including at a spooky distance. This is an undercommon materialism that, having been denied an end, already rejects that end for this spooky means. This includes what Cedric Robinson calls the capacity “to retrieve things that presumably no longer existed.” And if it has a theory — like Marx’s early theoretical senses — it is a theory that somehow, always, escapes. This hapticality is the fugitive call-and-response in the face of logistics, that degradation of means to produce [one] man as an end. The call-and-response and the ring shout are sonars of logisticality. It’s our endless revolution, and again as Robinson says, revolution is magic because it should be impossible.

#### Against the genocidal logic of white science, we endorse revolutionary suicide as a risk we must take as resistance – there is no damnation worse than the current system.

Pinkard 13 [2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves), and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us. To shake free of this cycle, we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual. We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire civilization. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet requires a total risk of everything — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is people’s willingness to pay with their own lives. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip. This is what Daniel Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers. It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

#### White sovereign science isn’t limited to the research project of space but informs notions of climate change. It is not anthropocentric and isn’t just the extinction of humanity – climate change is a product of white culture and means the extinction of minorities – neutral representations make warming inevitable.

Wynter, ‘07 [2007, Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf]

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

The logistical project necessitates a para-ontological relationship with blackness – creations of unity drive the myth of transcendental control over space-time that renders politics and civil society damning.

Moten 13 [Brackets original. Fred Moten (Professor of Performance Studies at New York University). “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh): Just Friends”. The South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4, Fall 2013. Accessed 1/2/22. <http://raumstation.cc/content/archiv/poetiken_der_existenz/Moten-blackness-and-nothingness-mysticism-in-the-flesh.pdf> //Recut Xu]

Within this framework blackness and antiblackness remain in brutally antisocial structural support of one another like the stanchions of an absent bridge of lost desire over which flows the commerce and under which flows the current, the logistics and energy of exclusion and incorporation, that characterizes the political world. Though it might seem paradoxical, the bridge between blackness and antiblackness is “the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life” (Wilderson 2010: 57). What remains is the necessity of an attempt to index black existence by way of what Chandler (2007: 41) would call paraontological, rather than politico-ontological, means. The relative nothingness of black life, which shows up for political ontology as a relation of nonrelation or counterrelation precisely in the impossibility of political intersubjectivity, can be said both to obscure and to indicate the social animation of the bridge’s underside, where the im/possibilities of political intersubjectivity are exhausted. Political ontology backs away from the experimental declivity that Fanon and Du Bois were at least able to blaze, each in his own way forging a sociological path that would move against the limiting force, held in the ontological traces, of positivism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other, as each would serve as the foundation of a theory of relations posing the nothingness of blackness in its (negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness). On the one hand, blackness and ontology are unavailable for one another; on the other hand, blackness must free itself from ontological expectation, must refuse subjection to ontology’s sanction against the very idea of black subjectivity. This imperative is not something up ahead, to which blackness aspires; it is the labor, which must not be mistaken for Sisyphean, that blackness serially commits. The paraontological distinction between blackness and blacks allows us no longer to be enthralled by the notion that blackness is a property that belongs to blacks (thereby placing certain formulations regarding non/relationality and non/communicability on a different footing and under a certain pressure) but also because ultimately it allows us to detach blackness from the question of (the meaning of) being. The infinitesimal difference between pessimism and optimism lies not in the belief or disbelief in descriptions of power relations or emancipatory projects; the difference is given in the space between an assertion of the relative nothingness of blackness and black people in the face, literally, of substantive (antiblack) subjectivity and an inhabitation of appositionality, its internal social relations, which remain unstructured by the protocols of subjectivity insofar as mu—which has been variously translated from the Japanese translation of the Chinese wu as no, not, nought, nonbeing, emptiness, nothingness, nothing, no thing but which also bears the semantic trace of dance, therefore of measure given in walking/falling, that sustenance of asymmetry, difference’s appositional mobility—also signifies an absolute nothingness whose antirelative and antithetical philosophical content is approached by way of Nishida Kitaro¯’s enactment of the affinities between structures and affects of mysticism that undergird and trouble metaphysics in the “East” and the “West.” Indeed, the content that is approached is approach, itself, and for the absolute beginner, who is at once pilgrim and penitent, mu signals that which is most emphatically and lyrically marked in Édouard Glissant’s phrase “consent not to be a single being” and indicated in Wilderson’s and Mackey’s gestures toward “fantasy in the hold,” the radical unsettlement that is where and what we are. Unsettlement is the displacement of sovereignty by initiation, so that what’s at stake—here, in displacement—is a certain black incapacity to desire sovereignty and ontological relationality whether they are recast in the terms and forms of a Lévinasian ethics or an Arendtian politics, a Fanonian resistance or a Pattersonian test of honor. Unenabled by or in this incapacity, Nishida’s philosophy folds sovereignty in the delay that has always given it significance, putting it on hold, but not in the hold, where to be on hold is to have been committed to a kind of staging, a gathering of and for the self in which negation is supposed to foster true emergence in “a self-determination of that concrete place of the contradictory identity of objectivity and subjectivity” (Nishida 1987: 96). What I term, here, a delay is understood by Nishida as “the moment [that] can be said to be eternal . . . [wherein] consciously active individuals, encounter the absolute as its inverse polarity, its mirror opposite, at each and every step of our lives” (96). It is in echoing a traditional Buddhist teaching, which asserts the nonself even against what are considered foolish declarations of the nonexistence of self, that Nishida restages a standard ontotheological skit in which sovereignty—whether in the form of the consciously active indi- vidual or in that individual’s abstract and equivalent dispersion in the nation, “the mirror image of the Pure Land in this world” (123)—takes and holds the space-time, the paradoxically transcendental ground, of the everyday unreality of “the real world,” where the sovereign’s endless show carries a brutally material imposition. What remains to be seen is what (the thinking and the study of) blackness can bring to bear on the relation between the un/real world and its other(s). What if blackness is the refusal to defer to, given in the withdrawal from the eternal delay of, sovereignty? What if Nishida’s preparatory vestibule for a general and infinite self-determination is pierced, rather than structurally supported, by (the very intimation of) the no-place to which it is opposed in his own work? When Nishida argues that “the human, consciously active volitional world makes its appearance from the standpoint of the paradoxical logic of the Prajnaparamita Sutra literature,” which offers us the phrase “Having No Place wherein it abides, this Mind arises,” he means to assert the legitimacy of an idea or image of the whole that takes “the form of the contradictory identity of the consciously active self and the world, of the volitional individual and the absolute” (95–96). What if (the thinking and the study of) blackness is an inhabitation of the hold that disrupts the whole in which the absolute, or absolute nothingness, is structured by its relation to its relative other? What if the nothing that is in question here moves through to the other side of negation, in “the real presence” of blackness, in and as another idea of nothingness altogether that is given in and as and to things? Both against the grain and by way of Fanon’s negation of the condition of relative nothingness, which is instantiated in what he takes to be the white man’s manufacture of the black, black study is attunement of and toward blackness as the place where something akin to the absolute nothingness that Nishida elaborates and a radical immanence of things that is not disavowed so much as it is unimagined in that same elaboration converge. This is to say that what remains unimagined by Nishida—not simply radical thingliness but its convergence with nothingness—is, nevertheless, made open to us by and in his thinking. Nishida helps prepare us to consider, even in the nationalist divigation of his own engagement with the heart of a teaching that has no center, that blackness is the place that has no place. “Having no place where it abides, this Mind [of the Little Negro Steelworker] arises.”1 Things are in, but they do not have, a world, a place, but it is precisely both the specificity of having neither world nor place and the generality of not having that we explore at the nexus of openness and confinement, internment and flight. Having no place wherein they abide, in the radically dispossessive no-place of the hold, in “Mutron,” Cherry and Blackwell touch intimacy from the walls. In that break, the architectonic intent of the hold as sovereign expression and recuperation breaks down. Feel the complete lysis of this morbid body/universe. Touch is not where subjectivity and objectivity come together in some kind of self-determining dialectical reality; beyond that, in the hold, in the basho (the place of nothingness, that underground, undercommon recess), is the social life of black things, which passeth (the) understanding. In the hold, blackness and imagination, in and as consent not to be a single being, are (more and less than) one. We are prepared for this generative incapacity by Wilderson’s work, where what distinguishes the sovereign, the settler, and even the savage from the slave is precisely that they share “a capacity for time and space coherence. At every scale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective ‘mapness’ is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the ‘Savage’ and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements” (Wilderson 2010: 181). Absent the “cartographic coherence [that] is the thing itself,” we must become interested in things, in a certain relationship between thingliness and nothingness and blackness that plays itself out—outside and against the grain of the very idea of self-determination—in the unmapped and unmappable immanence of undercommon sociality. This is fantasy in the hold, and Wilderson’s access to it is in the knowledge that he can have nothing and in the specific incapacity of a certain desire that this knowledge indexes. It remains for us to structure an accurate sense of what nothing is and what it constitutes in the exhaustion of home, intersubjectivity, and what Sexton calls “ontological reach” (Sexton 2011a). The truth of the formulation that the black cannot be among or in relation to his or her own is given in terminological failure. What’s at stake is how to improvise the declension from what is perceived as a failure to be together to the unmappable zone of paraontological consent. The promise of another world, or of the end of this one, is given in the general critique of world. In the meantime, what remains to be inhabited is nothing itself in its fullness, which is, in the absence of intersubjective relationality, high fantastical or, more precisely, given in the fugal, contrapuntal intrication that we can now call, by way of Mackey and Wilderson, fantasy in the hold, where the interplay of blackness and nothingness is given in an ongoing drama of force and entry. In a tradition of Buddhist teaching that goes back to the opening of The Gateless Gate, a thirteenth-century gathering of ko¯ans (case studies that take the form of stories, dialogues and/or questions meant to induce in the initiate dual intensities of doubt and concentration), that drama emerges as a deconstructive and deconstructed question, as exemplified in conventional presentations and interpretation of “Jo¯shu¯’s Dog.” The ko¯an reads: “A monk asked [Zen master] Jo¯shu¯ in all earnestness, ‘Does a dog have Buddha nature or not?’ Jo¯shu¯ said, ‘Mu!’” (Yamada 2004: 11). Even when we take into account Steven Heine’s warnings (Heine 2012) regarding the legitimacy of traditional attributions and interpretations of the Mu Ko¯an—which require us to consider both that it was not Jo¯shu¯ who responded to the question or that Jo¯shu¯’s response was the opposite of mu and that, therefore, the negative way that response is understood to open ought now to be closed—we are left with an ontotheological possibility that blackness may well exhaust. There is an appositional response, which this phantom query cannot properly be said to have called, that persists in and as an echoepistemology of passage, a sociotheology of the aneschaton, the instrumental interruption of telos by the universal (drum) machine, Blackwell’s prompt out to the study of the last things, the study carried out by the things that are last, by the least of these, whose movement constitutes a critique of the general and necessary relation between politics and death, a critique of the critique of judgment, a deconstruction of the opposition of heaven and hell. Cherry brings the noise of the end of the world in the invention of the earth. Though eschatology is understood to be a department, as it were, of theology, it has been both displaced by an administrative desire for the teleological and appropriated by a retributive desire for a kind of finality of and in sentencing, each in its commitment to sovereignty and the already existing structures that depend upon the very idea. But it’s not that I want to enclose things in the dialectical movement between beginning and end. Invention and passage denote an already existing alternative for which we are not constrained to wait. We are already down here on and under the ground, the water, as worked, unwrought nothingness working fleshly releasement in a privation of feasting, a fragility of healing. Mu is a practice of mysticism in the flesh; “Mutron,” the ritual Blackwell and Cherry perform, is their concentration meditation. It indexes the specific and material history of the drowned and burned, the shipped and held, as the condition for the release not just of the prevailing worldview but of the very idea of worldview, of transcendental standpoint and Pure Land. Cherry and Blackwell are initiates, who in turn initiate us, in what it is to abide in the social materiality of no place, of Having No Place, as a place for study. This shows up as a radical displacement of binary logic, moving through negation, because the way of the hold is no via negativa. Rather, the hold is distressed circuitry, an impedance or impediment of current, a placement of the self’s or the settler’s or the sovereign’s dyadic currency in kenotic abandon. “Mutron” is a way out of no way given in and as the exhaustion of what it is to abide, where the first and the last are neither first nor last. To remain in the hold is to remain in that set of practices of living together where antikinetic theorizing is both bracketed and mobilized by performative contemplation, as in the monastic sociality of Minton’s, where the hermetic absence of and from home is given in and as a playhouse, a funnyhouse, a madhouse. The club, our subcenobitic thing, our block chapel, is a hard row of constant improvisational contact, a dispossessive intimacy of rubbing, whose mystic rehearsal is against the rules or, more precisely, is apposed to rule, and is, therefore, a concrete social logic often (mis)understood as nothing but foolishness, which is, on the other hand, exactly and absolutely what it is. Foucault’s meditations point precisely in this direction: The ship of fools was heavily loaded with meaning, and clearly carried a great social force. . . . The madman on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks. This enforced navigation is both rigorous division and absolute Passage, serving to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation of the mad in medieval society. It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities. His exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the threshold itself he was still detained at this place of passage. . . . A prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, . . . he is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the passage. It is not known where he will land, and when he lands, he knows not whence he came. His truth and his home are the barren wasteland between two lands that can never be his own. . . . The link between water and madness is deeply rooted in the dream of the Western man. (Foucault 2006: 10–11) Deleuze has seized on this dimension of Foucault’s thought to probe how for him “the inside [functions] as an operation of the outside.” Indeed, “in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea. . . . Thought has no other being than this madman himself. As Blanchot says of Foucault: ‘He encloses the outside, that is, constitutes it in an interiority of expectation or exception’” (Deleuze 1988: 81). Deleuze continues: Forces always come from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority. So there are not only particular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the unstable diagram. . . . [This is] “where one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence.” . . . [This is] life within the folds. This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes a master of one’s speed and, relatively speaking, a master of one’s molecules and particular features, in this zone of subjectivation: the boat as interior of the exterior. (Deleuze 1988: 100–101) Passage, which is to say this passage, which is to say the passage between these passages of Foucault and Deleuze, the passage between these and those of Wilderson and Mackey, is given in the hold that Cherry and Blackwell deconstructively reconstruct just so you’ll know that the music and its performance was never about transcendence unless transcendence is understood as immanence’s fugitive impurity. How would you recognize the antiphonal accompaniment to gratuitous violence—the sound that can be heard as if in response to that violence, the sound that must be heard as that to which such violence responds? Wilderson asks the question again so that it can be unasked; so that we can hear Cherry and Blackwell unask it in and as intimacy in dislocation. Unasking takes the form of a caesura, an arrhythmia of the iron system, that Blackwell presses into the interruptive, already interrupted New Orleans continuum of his roll whose distended rearticulation stretches out so you can go down in it enough to think about what it means somewhere you’re only supposed to be going through, to be contained in the atopic atemporality that propels you, as the immanence of the transcendental hallway of our endless preparation, our experimental trial, given as our ongoing study of how to speak, the terrible beauty of our imprisonment in the passage, our life in the folds. Blackwell asks a question that Cherry anticipates, but by which Cherry is driven and to which Cherry responds in the bent, appositional reflection that unasks it. This drama is revived in Wilderson’s questioning; the question is a seizure that moves us to unask it. That unasking is mu not because the question’s terms and assumptions are incorrect; not because the implied opposition of nothing and something—where nothingness is too simply understood to veil (as if it were some epidermal livery) (some higher) being and is therefore relative as opposed to absolute—doesn’t signify; but because nothing (this paraontological interplay of blackness and nothingness, this aesthetic sociality) remains to be explored; because we don’t know what we mean by it even when we recite or record its multiphonic swerve; because blackness is not a category for ontology or for phenomenological analysis. Wilderson’s question—“Would nothing ever be with nothing again”—precisely in its irreducible necessity, cannot be answered but can only be unasked in the lyricism of that ill logic that black monks incessantly, thelonially, perform, as difference without opposition, in “a black hole,” as Jay Wright says (Wright 2013: 56), “germ and terminal, expansive/in its nothingness.” What would it be for this drama to be understood in its own terms, from its own standpoint, on its own ground? This is not simply a question of perspective awaiting its unasking, since what we speak of is this radical being beside itself of blackness, its appositionality. The standpoint, the home territory, chez lui—Charles Lam Markmann’s insightful mistranslation of Fanon illuminates something that Richard Philcox obscures by way of correction, Among one’s own, signifies a relationality that displaces the already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford (Fanon 1967). Can this sharing of a life in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused and consent, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which to know, a place out of which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question? But not simply to be among one’s own; rather, also, to live among one’s own in dispossession, to live among the ones who cannot own, the ones who have nothing and who, in having nothing, have everything. To live, in other words, within the general commonness and openness of a life in Deleuze’s sense (hence the necessity of a philosophy of life; hence the necessity but also the rigor of a disbelief in social death, where social death is precisely understood as the imposition of the subject’s necessity rather than the refusal of the subject’s possibility, which, in any case, the imposition founds and enforces. At stake is the curve, the suppleness and subtlety, not only of contemplation on social life but of contemplative social life; at stake is the force of an extraphenomenological poetics of social life. And so we arrive, again and again, at a profound impulse in Fanon that—as Chandler indicates in his reading, which is the initial reading, of Du Bois—constitutes Du Bois’s horizon and which appears in the various forms of that question whose necessity is so fundamental that it must be unasked—the question of the meaning of (black) being, the question of the meaning of (black) things. We study in the sound of an unasked question. Our study is the sound of an unasked question. We study the sound of an unasked question. In the absence of the ame- nity (some pleasantness or pleasantry of welcome or material comfort), what is borne in the emptiness or nothingness of the amenity (of which love or soul is born, in exhaustion, as a society of friends), what are the other elements of mu? Chant and ko¯an and moan and Sprechgesang, and babble and gobbledygook, le petit nègre, the little nigger, pidgin, baby talk, bird talk, Bird’s talk, bard talk, bar talk, our locomotive bar walk and black chant, our pallet cries and shipped whispers, our black notes and black cant, the tenor’s irruptive habitation of the vehicle, the monastic preparation of a more than three-dimensional transcript, an imaginal manuscript we touch upon the walls and on another, so we can enter into the hold we’re in, where there is no way we were or are.