# 1AC

### 1AC: Framework

#### **Justice requires that private entities don’t infringe on basic rights, liberties or opportunities**

Shelby 11 Tommie Shelbie [Professor of Philosophy @ Harvard], Winter 2011, "Justice & Racial Conciliation: Two Visions" American Academy of Arts & Sciences ,http://www.tommieshelby.com/uploads/4/5/1/0/45107805/racial\_conciliation.pdf DOA 1.19.22 CHO

The Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965) helped to break through the legal barriers to black inclusion in American social life, to curb discrimination, and to empower blacks politically. King thus proclaimed in Where Do We Go from Here? (1967) that many whites had come to accept racial equality, at least in principle, and to reject de jure segregation and discrimination. Nevertheless, troubling racial disparities–in income, education, wealth, employment, health, and poverty–caused by continuing discrimination and centuries of gross mistreatment and abuse, remained unaddressed. He argued that racist opposition was not the only reason these disparities had yet to be met with an adequate response. An equally if not more difficult obstacle was that most whites, even many who rejected racism, resisted racial justice measures that might have a personal cost. As King wrote, “The great majority of Americans . . . are uneasy with injustice but unwilling yet to pay a significant price to eradicate it.”3 In response to this resistance, King reminded us that meaningful attempts to bring about a just society have unavoidable costs. Quality education for all children, decent and well-paying jobs for adults, and the eradication of slums for the benefit of the poor require great resources. King was committed to the fundamental ideals of racial equality and integration. He understood the former as a demand of social justice that could be described in terms of two principles. First, each citizen, regardless of his or her race, should enjoy equal civic standing and the equal protection of the law. Justice does not permit second-class citizenship on the basis of race. Second, government should ensure that no one’s basic rights are curtailed or general life prospects reduced because of the racial prejudice of others. It is not enough that the state refrain from treating some citizens as if they were civic inferiors unworthy of equal concern and respect. Private individuals and associations must be made to follow suit, at least when individuals’ basic liberties or vital socioeconomic opportunities are at issue. Moving toward racial equality required a concrete policy of desegregation. The primary goal of desegregation was to abolish the unfair exclusions and prohibitions of Jim Crow, a social system that gave whites privileges and advantages they did not merit, deprived blacks of rights and opportunities they deserved, and generally stigmatized black people as inferior. To end discrimination in housing, education, employment, and lending, nondiscrimination laws needed to be enacted and scrupulously enforced. In the political sphere, achieving racial equality meant granting blacks the unfettered right to vote and hold political office.

#### **That necessitates a Rawlsian framework of systemic injustice that uses philosophical abstraction** for understanding material inequities.

Roberts interviews Shelby 18 Neil Roberts, (Political science at Williams) 1-2-2018, "Race, Injustice, and Philosophy: An Interview with Tommie Shelby," AAIHS, <https://www.aaihs.org/race-injustice-and-philosophy-an-interview-with-tommie-shelby/> DOA 1.19.21 CHO

Roberts: You examine the “dark ghetto,” explore the moral and political outlooks undergirding architects of American ghetto communities, highlight the Moynihan Report’s limits, and pose the problem of the existence of ghettos—asymmetrically pertaining to Blacks—as an issue of justice, and invoke W.E.B. Du Bois, John Rawls, and Nas to rethink this problem. In the process, you contrast two ways of studying the dark ghetto: the “medical” model and “systemic-injustice” model. Why should we distinguish these latter frameworks and engage with the aforementioned thinkers? Shelby: The medical model of social-scientific policy making, which attempts to solve social problems through narrowly targeted interventions, marginalizes questions of political morality that should not be ignored. The framework has three main pitfalls. There is the tendency to hold alterable features of society as fixed and then to suggest minor changes that leave an overall unjust system intact. This often leads to seeing resistance to the status quo as mere pathology or dysfunction. There is also the tendency to view unjustly disadvantaged people as in need of assistance but not as moral and political agents in their own right. And there is the tendency to focus solely on the problems of the poor (or to see the poor themselves as the problem) and therefore to lose sight of (or obscure) the numerous ways the privileged benefit from and are complicit in maintaining an unjust social structure. The systemic-injustice framework I defend aims to avoid these pitfalls. Du Bois’s The Philadelphia Negro (1899) is the first sophisticated social-scientific book on race and urban poverty in America (though he called U.S. ghettos “slums”), and it exemplifies the medical model of social reform. Du Bois fuses liberal technocratic intervention with Black elite noblesse oblige—a tendency he never fully abandoned despite his increasing radicalism in later years. Rawls provides, to my mind, the most comprehensive, compelling, and developed philosophical theory of justice we have. His theory is much more egalitarian than many have appreciated (for instance, he rejects welfare-state capitalism), and despite the theory’s abstractness, it has great relevance for thinking about the ghetto. His idea of the “basic structure” as the central unit of evaluation and his emphasis on fair cooperation among equals in particular have had a large impact on my thinking. Nas is an exemplar of a form of expressive resistance to ghettoization that I call “impure dissent”—and he is also on any defensible top-five list of MC’s.

#### Thus the standard is *consistency with the Systemic Injustice model.* Actions by private entities are unjust if they infringe on other agents’ rights or liberties.

#### Prefer additionally

#### 1 – Starting point – every other ethical FWK relies on a conception of what is just or unjust before describing how to create an ethical system that maximizes those outcomes or prevents infringement on it. Any normative or ethical system requires an epistemology of values as the grounding wire. Anything else is impact justified and circular which collapses.

#### 2 – Reconciliation of ideal equality of agency creates a frame of reference that condemns desire and impulse

**Farr 1** Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

“One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### Impact Calc

#### 1] Injustice is defined as

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/injustice> CHO

absence of justice: violation of right or of the rights of another : UNFAIRNESS 2: an unjust act : WRONG

#### Two impacts

#### A] The sole aff burden is to prove that the appropriation of private entities in the squo is unjust.

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

A picture containing text, sign

Description automatically generated



#### B] Side constraint – the resolution is a question of whether a particular system violates justice i.e. rights of fairness. That means that the aff doesn’t and shouldn’t defend anything beyond this question. The Neg burden is to prove that private appropriation in the squo doesn’t violate any rights and thus is just and fair. Means they don’t get alts or cps that are extra-resolutional and affirm since they don’t disprove the rez.

#### 2] Juxtaposition – the aff imagines an ideal, just society and compares it with the material experiences of the status quo that exposes the contradictions between *egalitarian principles* and *racial inequalities* to uncover and declare injustice. That generates the *normative justification* to organize revolutions.

#### 3] Reject Consequentialism

#### A] Post-hoc ergo propter hoc – just because X happened after Y is not sufficient to say that Y was caused by X.

#### B] Post-fiat consequences are irrelevant because we don’t advocate for a shift from the status quo which means impacts are NUQ

#### C] Actor Spec – there’s no actor OR action in the rez which means that its purely a question of systemic justice

### 1AC: Contentions

#### 1] Private space colonization is not value-neutral but is facilitated by the cosmic elite that exacerbates existing structures of inequality.

Parker 09 [Martin Parker (Professor of Organization and Culture at the University of Leicester School of Management). “Capitalists in Space”. The Sociological Review (Vol. 57, No: s1, 83-97). 2009. Accessed 1/2/2022. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2009.01818.x> //Xu]

Dickens and Ormrod summarize these economically and political libertarian arguments as generally falling into five broad themes – the freedom of the individual; the centrality of growth for humankind and the requirement for access to unlimited resources; the inspirational effects on the rest of mankind; the inherent nature of human curiosity; and the possibility of peace on earth as a result of all the above (2007: 165 passim). In other words, we have wars and conflict on earth because there are too many people competing for scarce resources and being unable to express their curiosity and need for freedom. It's not a big jump from a defence of the frontier, as the only place where authentic humanity can be found, to a defence of the free market. This is a familiar translation, with freedom having both a spatial and an economic character. So, within the space libertarian community, there is much talk of deals with various companies – the media, venture capitalists speculating on future income, sponsors who want publicity and so on. In 2002, the libertarian Cato Institute of Washington DC published an edited collection entitled Space: The Free Market Frontier, which included a contribution from Dennis Tito (Hudgins, 2002). According to these authors, NASA is now the problem, and needs to be moved out of the way or convinced that commercialisation is the only way, and not relying on tax payers' dollars. NASA must become an organization that doesn't administer or regulate space, but assists in opening it up for private markets. This is a dramatic turnaround from a government-funded organization renowned for its arrogance and intellectual superiority. Even the Russians have shown the sort of entrepreneurial zeal more akin to American capitalism' (Kemp, 2007: 50) The rhetoric of the pioneer, and of the frontier, suggests that ordinary honest citizens will be able to stake their claims. However, as Dickens and Ormrod argue, these self-described space pioneers are not ordinary people, but members of a kind of ‘cosmic elite’ (2007: 4). Reading Kemp's description of the sort of people who are investing in these companies, it is easy to see what they mean (2007: 5). Added to Richard Branson are the founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal, Compusearch and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates. The entry level costs are huge, and the risks are gigantic. Even the people who might be travelling as space tourists will have to be very wealthy indeed. Virgin Galactic are currently asking $200,000 per flight, which is an expensive five minutes. Dickens and Ormrod's materialist analysis of the space industries concludes that off-earth capitalism is pretty much like capitalism on earth, in the sense that it runs into periodic crises that need to be fixed by the development and exploitation of new markets. These ‘fixes’ are necessarily temporary, but the promise of the ‘outer spatial fix’ is that it (potentially) opens a variety of ways in which capitalism might be extended beyond the boundaries of the earth. Adopting some ideas from the geographer David Harvey, they argue that the commodification of space allows for various circuits of capital to be re-imagined and a hegemonic model of neo-liberalism to spread skywards. The relation between the military industrial complex and the war state is crucial in this regard, with space technologies including surveillance satellites, missile guidance, and the ‘weaponization’ of space being obvious gains. This much is clear from NASA onwards. However, the link between (for example) military satellites and communications and monitoring devices is clearly a very close one. Hence, access to the military high ground also means access to surveillance and media power over the entire planet, and this goes for both states and ‘defence’ companies. A further circuit is that of space tourism, clearly a domain only accessible to the hyper-rich, but further markets include the exploitation of materials from the moon, asteroids or planets; solar energy; off-earth manufacturing; colonies and terraforming projects. All of these would come with their attendant spin-off industries, such as clearing up space junk, provisioning off-planet habitats, accounting and legal services, security and so on.

#### 2] The appropriation of outerspace requires carceral capitalism, ghettoization and private disinvestment.

Loyd 15. Jenna M. 2015. "Whitey on the Moon: Space, Race, and the Crisis of Black Mobility." In Montegary, Liz and Melissa White, eds. Mobile Desires: The Politics and Erotics of Mobility Justice. Palgrave Pivot, 41-52. CHO recut

But Watts is a country which lies, psychologically, uncounted miles further than most whites seem at present willing to travel. (Pynchon, 1966) From the days of chattel slavery until today, the concept of travel has been inseparably linked in the minds of our people with the concept of freedom. (Robeson, 1988, original emphasis) In the 1960 presidential election, candidate John F. Kennedy invoked moon exploration to displace the salience of religious division by focusing on unifying issues, including the spread of Communism that was ‘fester[ing] only 90 miles from the coast of Florida’ and crises in family farms, hunger, and unaffordable medical care that ‘know no religious barrier.’ The real problem was ‘an America with too many slums, with too few schools, and too late to the moon and outer space.’ This listing of ‘real issues which should decide this campaign’ suggested urgent, yet equally solvable, concerns. The space race ratified a national challenge, suggesting that returning the gaze from this ‘new frontier’ to domestic problems was the next step for technoscientific progress. When Dr Martin Luther King spoke of the moon in 1967, he was a world away from Kennedy’s Cold War hopefulness (Jordan, 2003). He delivered his final speech, ‘Where Do We Go From Here?: Chaos or Community?’, to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) on the ten-year anniversary of the organization’s formation following the Montgomery bus boycott. Despite the gains of the civil rights move- ment, King concluded, ‘the Negro still lives in the basement of the Great Society.’ He went on to question the consonance between scientific and social progress that had seemed so central to Kennedy’s understanding of the nation: Today our exploration of space is engaging not only our enthusiasm but our patriotism.... No such fervor or exhilaration attends the war on poverty.... Without denying the value of scientific endeavor, there is a striking absurdity in committing billions to reach the moon where no people live, while only a fraction of that amount is appropriated to service the densely populated slums. If these strange views persist, in a few years we can be assured that when we set a man on the moon, with an adequate telescope he will be able to see the slums on earth with their intensified congestion, decay and turbulence. King concluded his remarks by asking: ‘On what scale of values is this a program of progress?’ (King, as cited in Gilroy, 1991 [1987], pp. 345–346). Spectacular Cold War images of space travel drew on and renovated a constellation of meanings associated with mobility that inform US national identity, including celebratory narratives of continental exploration, limitless possibility, and freedom. Kennedy did not see any conflict between mastering space travel and meeting domestic needs – each a concrete signification of American capitalist providence in the Cold War period. King’s speech marks both of these registers. His imagined telescopic view of the earth traverses an expansive scale of human possi- bility, but under Pax Americana, King finds that ‘common humanity’ is an ideological vision papering over the reality of grave economic and racial divisions. Even before a man (much less The Man) was on the moon, liberal and radical social critics alike were deploying a rhetorical device I call lunar criticism – ‘If we can put a man on the moon, we can do X, Y, or Z’ – to question US national priorities and narratives of progress. Liberal iterations of lunar criticism suggested that the gap between promise and practice could be bridged as part of fulfilling the national creed. Radical social critics argued that what appeared to be an incidental gap was in fact a racialized conflict. Reaching the moon began to look less like a virtuous American project than a white American project that furthered Black economic exploitation and abandonment. The space race as a spectacle of freedom and (white) upward mobility must be held in tension with the deepening ‘urban crisis’ (Beauregard, 2003). As both a powerful discourse and material geography, the urban crisis was constituted through Cold War investments in suburban housing, freeways, and defense industry construction, relative disinvestment in central cities, and through militarized, counter-insurgency responses to the urban unrest of the 1960s (Loyd, 2014). Yet, the interrelations between these spaces have been obscured through enduring spectacular productions of capitalist suburban hyper-mobility and ‘ghetto’ immobilization and backwardness (Siddiqi, 2010). As novelist Thomas Pynchon dissected, ‘Watts’ was another country to white Americans, represent- ing a psychological distance that white Americans were disinclined to travel. This chapter situates radical iterations of lunar criticism within the context of urban crisis and on the cusp of what Jodi Melamed, following Howard Winant, calls the post-World War II ‘racial break’ after which ‘state-recognized US antiracisms replaced white supremacy as the chief ideological mode for making the inequalities that global capitalism generated appear necessary, natural, or fair’ (Melamed, 2011, p. xvi). By contrast, race-radical antiracisms ‘have made visible the continued racialized historical development of capitalism and have persistently foregrounded antiracist visions incompatible with liberal political solutions to destructively uneven global social-material relations’ (p. xvii). In the spectacular treatment of urban uprisings, the space called the ‘ghetto’ ideologically and tactically cohered the problems of urban crisis, which were actually metropolitan (urban-suburban) in form and imperial in process. To develop this argument, I analyze the work of Gil Scott-Heron whose poetry, songs, and writing exemplify the race-radical tradition. His poem ‘Whitey on the Moon’ delivers a radical antiracist critique of the US space program that ties otherworldly investments to ongoing histories of Black forced im/mobility and immiseration. To that end, this essay responds to the call within the new mobilities scholar- ship to examine the ‘role of past mobilities in the present constitution of modern notions of security, identity and citizenship’ (Cresswell, 2012, p. 646). I begin by situating mobilities within post-war militarized spectacle and racial politics. I then move to an analysis of how race-radical lunar criticism grappled with the dialectics of urban crisis, which included the simultaneous deployment of rhetorics of mobility and new means of social control and state power. I conclude by exploring how Scott-Heron’s race-radical vision offers insights into contemporary mobilizations for mobility justice. Cold War spectacles of (upward) mobility What sort of national spectacle was the moon when King spoke? Spectacle tends to be understood as an ideological mask or distortion of reality, but Shiloh Krupar usefully conceptualizes spectacle as ‘a tactical ontology – meaning a truth-telling, world-making strategy’ (2013, p. 10). Indeed, in Blank Spots on the Map (2009), Trevor Paglen shows how NASA was the visible institutional face of an expansive and largely secret Cold War military geography. Krupar and Paglen show how US militarization has developed through institutional apparatuses and personnel that create a world of plausible appearances. Visuality and material landscapes are interconnected such that hypervisibility (that is, the space race) is a technological apparatus simultaneously creating unseen spaces of waste and sacrifice. Thus, spectacle is a tool of reification and division that works by disconnecting spaces and categories – delineating human from nature, valued from abjected – that are actually produced together. Caren Kaplan’s work on the visual logic of modern war-making connects such spectacles to the mobility of states and imperial citizens. Air power is an iteration of the cosmic view, a ‘unifying gaze of an omniscient viewer of the globe from a distance’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 401). Kaplan ties this viewpoint – which claims universality, neutrality, and freedom ‘from bounded embeddedness on earth’ – to Euro-American colonization (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402; also see Cosgrove, 1994). Modern military ‘air power is seamlessly linked to the cosmic view through its requirements for a unified, universal map of the globe that places the home nation at the center on the ground and proposes an extension of this home to the space above it, limitlessly’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402). The upshot, according to Kaplan, is that the mobility of air power simultaneously produces an imagination of fixed sovereign territories. Indeed, for Kaplan, modern war is paradoxical in that it ‘requires the movements of large armies and instigates the mass displacement of refugees, yet it also polices borders and limits freedom of movement’ (p. 396). I take these theories of spectacle to suggest that the Cold War space race produced a modern, white, upwardly mobile subject that obscured the simultaneous co-production of an immobilized, unfree population confined to a knowable, tactical domestic space. That is, the militarization of the ‘cosmic view’ facilitates not only abstract targets of foreign war, but also targets of domestic state and state-sanctioned violence and confinement. The militarized logic of the ‘home front’ both coercively compels a patriotic citizen subject and obscures the racial, gender, class, and other social divides within the nation that belie the state’s claim to national unity (Lutz 2002; Young 2003; Loyd 2011). As the United States faced vulnerability to charges of racism during the Cold War, a cultural project of racial liberalism enabling mobility of the US empire would simultaneously entail efforts to confine Black mobility and dissident thought. For example, Rachel Buff (2008) shows how the US government deployed the terror of deportation as a means of disrupting political organizing. In the immediate post-World War II era, both W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were barred from foreign travel for their views on peace, nuclear abolition, and decolonization (Kinchy, 2009; Robeson, 1988). The experience, no doubt, contributed to the observation that the Robeson epigraph makes on the race-radical desire for free mobility. Race-radical lunar criticism The United States would not make its lunar touch down until 1969 (after Kennedy’s and King’s assassinations), but King found a moon landing a more plausible future than a Second Reconstruction. And it was more plausible. By the time of his speech, long, hot summers of urban uprisings punctured the image of freedom and opportunity that the United States projected around the world. Moreover, the War on Poverty, while less than three years old, was virtually dead letter. The 1966 midterm elections ushered in legislators who claimed a mandate to terminate the War on Poverty and urban social investments. The ‘great rat debate’ of 1967 captured the level of political polarization as Congress quibbled over a miserly sum of ‘no more than $16.5 million to combat rodent infestations in ghetto neighborhoods.’ A year later, the Los Angeles Times observed, ‘[r]ats are still coexisting with the poor as comfortably as ever’ (Abramson, 1968). It is within this context that Gil Scott-Heron’s ‘Whitey on the Moon’ makes landing in 1970 on his first album, Small Talk at 125th and Lennox. The poem’s narrative arc is wryly humorous and brief, delivered in less than two minutes, with a simple drum accompaniment common in street poetry. Scott-Heron tells the story of sister Nell, who has been attacked by a rat even as Neil Armstrong lands on the moon: A rat done bit my sister Nell with Whitey on the moon. Her face and arms began to swell and Whitey’s on the moon. I can’t pay no doctor bills, but Whitey’s on the moon. Ten years from now I’ll be payin’ still while Whitey’s on the moon. Debts for Nell’s medical treatment, which would not have been incurred were there basic tenant rights and public health investments, will extend into the foreseeable future as costs for rent, food, and taxes will continue to rise to pay for the voyage. The final line of the song offers a sardonic resolution to the outlandish situation. When the next doctor bills arrive, he will forward them ‘air mail special to Whitey on the moon.’ Marvin Gaye’s 1971 song ‘Inner City Blues (Make Me Wanna Holler)’ likewise links high taxes and inflation to an imperial project that results in the devastation of Black lives: ‘Markets, moon shots, spend it on the have-nots/Money, we make it, ‘fore we see it, you take it.’ Scott-Heron and Gaye flip racist narratives of the welfare queen as responsible for poverty, naming instead state neglect and the theft of Black wealth. Their songs reclaim the value being appropriated to a desirable national project that denies it rests on Black expropriation and death. In this reading, the moon counters temporalities and spatialities of racial liberalism that rendered white supremacy as historical and anachronistic by insisting that American white supremacy is part of the modern geopolitical order. Visual artist Faith Ringgold also depicted this reality in her 1969 paint- ing of an American flag entitled ‘Flag for the Moon: Die Nigger.’ The word ‘die’ reads across the block of stars in the flag’s upper left corner. The stripes of the flag are formed by elongated black letters aligned from the bottom to the top edge of the flag, spelling out the word ‘nigger’ between the customary 13 red stripes. The painting’s message is three-fold: the use of black paint in place of white draws attention to the negative space between the lines to illustrate the tense interrelation between the invis- ibility of white supremacy and Black people to the history of the United States. Ringgold indicts the act of placing the flag on the moon as sending a spectacular message underscoring the abandonment of Black needs. Yet, the painting’s reference to H. Rap Brown’s Die, Nigger, Die! suggests the immediate tension between structural racism and the possibility for liberatory Black politics and identity (Patton, 1998, p. 198). ‘Whitey on the Moon’ is often cited as an expression of afrofuturism, which Mark Dery defines as a genre of Black social thought concern- ing ‘culture, technology, and things to come’ (Dery, as cited in Nelson, 2002, p. 9). For Kodwo Eshun, afrofuturism provides a ‘resource for speculation’ that traces the ‘potentiality of space and distance within the high-pressure zone of perpetual racial hostility’ (Eshun, 2003, p. 299). He explains that afrofuturism ‘uses extraterrestriality as a hyper- bolic trope to explore the historical terms, the everyday implications of forcibly imposed dislocation, and the constitution of Black Atlantic subjectivities: from slave to negro to coloured...to black to African to African American’ (pp. 298–299). In an afrofuturist reading, radical lunar criticism uses the vast physi- cal distance of the earth to the moon to imagine alternative futures to the gaping racial divides in earthly living conditions and well-being. As Stevphen Shukaitis suggests, ‘the imaginal machine based around space imagery is made possible by its literal impossibility. In the sense that this possibility cannot be contained or limited, it becomes an assemblage for the grounding of a political reality that is not contained but opens up to other possible futures that are not foreclosed through their pre-given definition’ (2009, p.107). Given the coloniality of the cosmic view and the simultaneous construction of Black ‘placelessness and constraint’ (McKittrick, 2011, p. 948), I suggest that Scott-Heron’s lunar criticism is not so much concerned with the otherworldly as a space for imagining the earthly impossible, but for assembling earthly sites of decolonization and liberation. Scott-Heron’s race-radical critique explores what Katherine McKittrick calls ‘spaces of encounter that hold in them useful anticolonial practices and narratives’ (2011, p. 950). He offers a theory of militarized spectacle in which juxtaposition, or division, falls way to connection, to shared production. He shows how a landscape of rat-infested housing produces the man on the moon – through taxes and a vanishing horizon of medical debt – and names the spectacle obscuring this process ‘Whitey.’ In contrast to liberal iterations of lunar criticism, which suggested that solving poverty was possible within the terms of American capitalism, Scott-Heron linked American capitalism to the production of poverty, militarism, environmental devastation, and human abandonment. These themes found in ‘Whitey on the Moon’ are consistent across his work, and include persistent criticism of spectacular popular culture and consumerism, war and state violence (‘No Knock,’ ‘King Alfred’s Plan,’ ‘Did You Hear What They Said?,’ ‘H20 Gate Blues,’ ‘B Movie’), concern for children’s well being (‘Speed Kills,’ ‘Who Will Save the Children?’), the threat of nuclear destruction and climate change (‘We Almost Lost Detroit,’ ‘South Carolina (Barnwell),’ ‘Spacesong’), drugs and habituation to other people’s suffering (‘Billy Green Is Dead,’ ‘Angel Dust,’ ‘Home is Where the Hatred Is’), and structural unemployment (‘Who Will Pay Reparations on My Soul?’). Scott-Heron’s poems link histories of forced mobility to the development of blues consciousness and revolution, exemplifying what Clyde Woods (2000) calls a ‘blues epistemology.’ Indeed, Scott-Heron described himself as a ‘bluesologist’ (Ward, 2011), pursuing the science of the blues, offering a diagnostic that the ‘I ain’t got no money blues, I ain’t got no job blues, I ain’t got no woman blues’ are the same things (Mugge, 1982). For Woods, the blues ‘has been used repeatedly by multiple genera- tions of working-class African Americans to organize communities of consciousness....It was used to confront the daily efforts of plantation powers to erase African American leadership and the memory of social progress. ... The blues and its extensions are actively engaged in providing intellectually brutal confrontations with the “truths” of working-class African American life. It draws on African American musical practices, folklore, and spirituality to re-organize and give a new voice to working- class communities facing severe fragmentation’ (2005, p. 1008). The economic and racial forces of displacement and fragmentation were not distant from Scott-Heron. He was born in Chicago and spent much of his childhood living with his grandmother in the small town of Jackson, Tennessee. He saw the African American section of Jackson demolished to build the new highway between Memphis and Nashville before moving at the age of 13 with his mother to New York City (Scott- Heron, 2012). They first lived with his uncle in the Bronx and later in the Robert Fulton Houses in Chelsea. From there, he rode the subway for over an hour to Fieldston, a private high school in the Bronx. After his first year of college at Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylvania, which he chose to attend because Black writers and leaders such as Langston Hughes, Kwame Nkrumah, and Thurgood Marshall studied there, he took a leave of absence to complete his first novel, The Vulture. The book was published in 1970, the same year as his first album (and book of poetry), Small Talk at 125th and Lennox, which also debuted the well-known poem ‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.’ Scott-Heron’s blues offered an anticolonial vision of race-radical revo- lutionary consciousness, evident on the album From South Africa to South Carolina (1975), which ties together nuclear colonialism in South Carolina with apartheid in South Africa. Claudrena Harold (2011) observes that, ‘Scott-Heron’s descriptions of “down home” routinely moved beyond the geographical borders of the former Confederacy and into the transna- tional terrain commonly referred to as the Global South.’ ‘Delta Man,’ for example, traces the development of revolutionary consciousness along the sites of the plantation and Great Migration, from the Mississippi Delta during slavery, to Nebraska following the Civil War, and then to the inner city. The bridge between each of these places – ‘revolution outta be where I’m comin’ from’ – shuttles possibility between sites of forced mobility. The history lessons found in ‘Spacesong’ and ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’, moreover, speak of white settler dispossession of Native inhabitants. Such an expansive internationalist, decolonial desire tempers the feeling of despair otherwise dominant in ‘Winter in America.’ The song was written in 1975 at a moment when the possibility of the Black freedom and peace movements had been betrayed, leaving ‘nobody fight- ing ‘cause nobody knows what to save.’ Within an internationalist blues epistemology, however, the hopeful suggestion is that spring can still be found in movements outside of the United States (Peddie, 2011, 122). Mobilizing urban crisis The militarization of the urban crisis was accompanied by an ideological project to enclose the racialized ‘Black ghetto’ as a place separate from modern white suburbia, reifying it as a space of dangerousness that may be subject legitimately to exceptional rules and abandoned. The great rat debate contributed to this ideological crystallization. Southern Democrats and Republican opponents of the bill used innuendo (‘rats of the two-legged variety’ and ‘rats of the four-legged variety’) to tie the bill to race and rioting in Newark (Strickland, 1969, p. 342). Another congressman mockingly referred to it as the ‘civil “rats” bill’ (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 542). ‘Whitey on the Moon,’ by turn, revealed the truth that state abandonment is not just an afterthought, but a productive absence directly abetted by state violence. In drawing together the exploration of the moon with the extraction of value from and suppression of Black freedom movements, race-radical lunar criticism rejected the bifurcated militarized spectacle of limitless space and anachronistic ghetto confinement. Indeed, Scott-Heron offers a documentary trace of the new ‘great confinement’ that was then in the making (de Giorgi, 2006). In ‘No Knock,’ Scott-Heron invites listeners to take an incredulous interpretation of new legislation that enabled the police to enter a dwelling without notice: Long rap about “No Knock” being legislated for the people you’ve always hated in this hell hole that you/we call home. “No Knock,” the Man will say to keep this man from beating his wife. “No Knock,” the Man will say to protect people from themselves. His poem ‘King Alfred’s Plan’ discusses a Nixon plan for preventive detention that would create a caged future in the absence of Black political unity. ‘Locked in cages, pens, hemmed in shoulder to shoulder arms outstretched for just a crust of bread...Let us unite out of love and not hate / Let us unite on our own and not because of barbed wire death.’ As race-radical lunar criticism illustrates, the material and ideological struggle over urban crisis constituted a space for grappling with intersecting structures of white racial rule and empire, namely whether and how they could be democratically reconstructed. This offers a cultural trace of the shift from military Keynesianism to post-Keynesian militarism that Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1998) names as the conjuncture for the sharp expansion of the carceral state. In contrast to the ‘symbiotic’ progression from ‘ghetto’ to prison confinement offered by Wacquant (2001), race-radical lunar criticism illustrates both the tremendous contests over shifting forms of unfreedom and their situatedness within a broader crisis of imperialism that anticolonial and ‘domestic’ freedom struggles provoked. The uneven geography that the warfare-welfare state produced was the grounds of struggle over the costs and harms of militarization. Investments in defense were widespread but concentrated in New South and New West sites in the so-called Sunbelt, what Markusen and colleagues (1991) dubbed the Gunbelt. This unevenness was not only regional, but also shaped patterns of development at the metropolitan scale (Loyd, 2014). This social and spatial struggle was deeply racialized and gendered. For this reason, it is misleading to interpret the space race as a form of militarization that uniformly trumps basic needs, as liberal versions of spending priorities suggest. Conflicts over who would pay for the costs of empire and militarization were mediated through strug- gles over racism that took a spectacular form, splitting inner city from suburb in ways that obscured the intersections among race, class, and gender. The Black welfare mother was enlisted as the spectacular figure of national disorder, even though most welfare recipients were white and most Great Society spending supported middle class suburban homes. Scott-Heron’s retort to this scapegoating restored the racial economic context within which Black families and communities struggled for freedom. Cross-class welfare rights and peace movements questioned military Keynesianism, meaning that they increasingly rejected the wages of empire and believed that a democratic reconstruction of US society was possible only by ending its wars. Conclusion: race-radical lunar criticism for the prison home front As a sublime symbol of progress, exploration, and national purpose, the moon represented a material symbol of upward mobility and possibility for the nation. The Cold War space race as spectacle cohered an ideological understanding of upward mobility and progress. This spectacle, moreover, was not simply a mode of visuality, but also built material spaces of the economically buoyant Sunbelt-Gunbelt and fostered confinement of Black central city spaces and dislocation of residents from industries being developed elsewhere. Urban crisis, then, was fundamentally a crisis over Black ‘upward’ mobility in terms of movement through space (that is, the Great Migration and moving beyond confines of racial ghettos) and claims to political power and presence in public spaces. Race-radical lunar criticism defied the Cold War spectacle that would split the world in two, the nation into Black and white, American or failed American, by illustrating the relationships between the ghetto and suburb, the ghetto and empire. Critical interpretations of the relationship between racialized poverty and wealth, as offered through Black lunar criticism, did not disappear, but were submerged within a discourse that naturalized Black confinement in ghetto and prison spaces while obscuring the consolidation of political and economic forces responsible for a new, multiscalar regime of mobility and immobility. The political and cultural contest over this lived and ideological space of urban crisis underscores the uncertain future of the prison resolution. With mass incarceration in question from the left and right, race-radical lunar criticism offers some guidance for understanding how the present crisis may be resolved in favor of mobility justice. Scott-Heron’s song ‘Alien (Hold Onto Your Dreams)’ criticizes divide and conquer tactics, and ties the trajectories of transnational Latino/a migrants to African American histories of forced mobility. Moreover, Scott-Heron’s dialectical blues understanding of the politics of space suggests that dismantling the United States’ unprecedented carceral state will hinge not so much on comparing rates of spending on confinement versus welfare but on analyzing their interconnection and on developing political unity and (even) love. The peaceful promise of outer space – displacing the Man from the moon – remains tied to liberatory, decolonial projects on earth.

#### 3] Consent – the appropriation of outer space was not consented to and is a coercive relationship

#### A] The launch site in Boca Chica created an uneven distribution of resources by disrespecting the right to privacy and property which was unjust [[1]](#footnote-1)

#### B] When the Thirty Meter Telescope at Mauna kea was proposed, private companies built a telescope without the consent of the original natives[[2]](#footnote-2)

### 1AC: Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse

#### – drop the debater – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off

#### – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time

#### – competing interps – reasonability narrows the theory debate to one issue of brightline, making it easy for the Neg to collapse to the issue in the long 2NR

#### – 1AR theory is the highest layer – the NC has 7 minutes to be abusive and 6 minutes to leverage the abuse against 1A theory in the 2N, making checking abuse lexically impossible

#### 2] Justice is not a method of whitewashing but impartiality that develops the revolutionary ethic to expose the contradictions of AntiBlackness and generate liberatory subjectivity.

PNM summarizes Shelby 16

Political Not Metaphysical, 02-24-2016, "“Racial Realities and Corrective Justice”: Tommie Shelby’s Reply to Charles Mills," Political Not Metaphysical, <https://politicalnotmetaphysical.wordpress.com/2016/02/24/racial-realities-and-corrective-justice-tommie-shelbys-reply-to-charles-mills/> CHO

Is this the case? Shelby thinks no. Rawls thinks his principles are supposed to guide social reform in two ways: first, they serve as goals to work towards and, second, they serve as standards for assessing the justice of particular social arrangements. Thus, Rawls’s theory does not ignore oppression; rather, it provides us with a standard for judging whether social arrangements are oppressive. This seems a strong prima facie case for claiming ideal theory is not, after all, ideological. Shelby then suggests that Mills’s charge is itself vague, and that disambiguating it can show how and why Rawls’s approach is not ideological: Ideal Theory as Ideal Society –i.e. certain information about racial injustice is excluded behind the veil of ignorance. Shelby suggests that this is a way of modeling impartiality, not of whitewashing history Strict compliance assumption –the methodological assumption that everyone complies with the principles chosen in the original position. Again, this assumption is not a denial of the obvious fact that people do not comply, but a way of modeling what social justice would be when fully realized. A further charge here is racial justice issues do not enter into our theorizing at all, on Rawls’s view. Shelby suggests otherwise: such considerations, as part of our considered convictions, are an important test on the adequacy of the principles derived from the original position. Shelby concludes by suggesting that Rawls’s theory helps answer three questions of particular important: (1) Which principles of justice should we use when judging injustices in our own society, and what justifies them; (2) What constitutes unjust racial treatment?; (3) what is the place of racial justice in an overall theory of justice? Shelby takes these issues up in a separate article. Shelby seems on solid ground in defending the potential relevance of ideal theory to these issues. But, one might wonder whether Mills could reply along the following lines: while ideal theory can play these roles, it can also serve as ideology, when conducted in a certain way. The ‘certain way’ here would be exemplified by philosophers ignore racial justice issues on the grounds that they are less important or less fundamental than issues in ideal theory. So: the same theory can function as either libratory or ideological, depending on how it is deployed. Ideal Theory: Useless or Useful Second, Mills might reply that ideal theory is useless or unnecessary for political philosophers. Shelby disagrees. In response, he defends a particular picture of the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. According to this picture, “ideal and nonideal theory [are not] two opposed or separable enterprises. They are rather complementary components of a single comprehensive theory of social justice….nonideal theory logically depends on ideal theory; and the aims of nonideal theory (to respond appropriately to injustice) give ideal theory its point”. There are two claims here: Dependence Thesis: nonideal theory logically depends on ideal theory Practicality Thesis: ideal theory gets is practical point from nonideal theory. I take it that (B) is largely uncontroversial. Of course, it might be in itself good to have a conception of a perfectly just society. But a large part of why we want that such an account concerns being oriented towards addressing injustices in our society. I think Mills would agree to this, and we should too. Let’s look at the argument for (A), which is much more controversial. According to the dependence thesis, charges of injustice presuppose ideals of justice, which particular individuals and institutions depart from. The problem with this claim is that there is a stronger and a weaker reading; the weaker reading is trivially true, and the stronger reading is false. To illustrate: according to the weaker reading, describing something as unjust requires some ideal of justice. That is trivially true. Knowing that slavery is unjust requires some conception of justice, however vague. This is a pretty weak requirement, and it is true. According to the stronger reading, describing something as unjust requires knowing the principles for a perfectly just society. There is reason to doubt that this is true. As Amartya Sen has argued (and I as I summarize here), making comparative assessments of unjust arrangements does not depend on a prior grasp of an ideal conception of justice. So, it seems, the strong reading is false. But, if we drop the necessity here, a sort of midway thesis between the strong and the weak readings seems very plausible: the ideal principles of justice can be of practical assistance in assessing the injustices that arises in nonideal theory. As Shelby points out, this might be particularly true in hard cases. Returning to Shelby’s argument, Shelby then suggests nonideal theory should aim at devising (at least) four kinds of principles: Principles of reform and revolution (guiding efforts to bring about more just societies) Principles of rectification (redress of past injustices) Penal principles (for noncompliance) Political ethics (duties and permissions individuals have under unjust conditions) He thinks Rawls’s theory is most helpful for cases (1) and (4), somewhat helpful for (3), and hardly helpful for (2). Taken together, though, we can conceive of (1) and (2) as ‘jointly constituting a theory of corrective justice’. Given that Rawls might help with (1), his theory provides some help with an overall program of corrective justice. But what about principles for (2)? Mills thinks these are particularly important. He suggests that Rawls theory provides no guidance. Shelby agrees that Rawls does not give us a ‘set of axioms from which theorems of rectification can be directly deduced’. But his account might nevertheless be a helpful guide. They might, in other words, provide us with ‘evaluative standards for judging when such rectification is prima facie called for’: e.g. when (1) culpable violations of the principles of justice (2) cause serious and identifiable harm. On this account, the fact that Jim Crow violates the liberty principle helps explain what is wrong with it, and why its victims are owed reparations. Ideal Theory is Too Ideal Shelby briefly responds to Mills’s third argument that ‘ideal theory has no applicability to our world’ because they only hold for an ideally just world. Shelby thinks this is mistaken: they are meant as goals for making our own society more just, even if additional principles are also needed. At this point in the article, Shelby thinks he has responded to Mills’s general criticism of ideal theory. In the next section, he considers a more particular issue: Mills’s criticism of Shelby’s deployment of Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO) as a tool for corrective racial justice. This issue turns, as we shall see, on the relationship between compensatory and distributive justice. Fair Equality of Opportunity and Corrective Justice Shelby sees the achievement of FEO as the aim of social reform. He does not see FEO as a principle of rectification. In short, the principle would not guide us in addressing part wrongs (rectifications). Rather, it would be a forward-looking measure to help us address current racial injustices in the form of material inequalities (in wealth and income). Shelby’s proposal is essential that policies that bring us closer to achieving FEO would help remove many of the burdens that afflict racial minorities. These unfair burdens are the product of a long history. But addressing them in terms of FEO is not the same as offering a claim for reparations. In short, distributive justice and compensatory justice are distinct. However, implementing FEO would help remove some of the (justified) resentment caused by past injustice by ensuring that groups harmed in the past are no longer as disadvantaged. The claims would thus be less urgent. Now, in saying this, Shelby does not mean to deny that reparations are important or pressing, or that public reconciliation commissions (for example) have important roles. Rather, he only means to suggest that such issues are less central to the project of racial justice than Mills assume (though still important). The fundamental issue, Shelby thinks, is “What kind of society would merit our allegiance and is therefore worth fighting for?” And this is a forward looking question. Shelby thus concludes: I am not opposed to abandoning an old paradigm when its limits have been demonstrated and a better approach emerges. If important questions cannot be answered within the old framework, we should of course revise the framework, choose another, or devise a new one. But I also think we should be careful to avoid reinventing the wheel (particularly when the reinvention is likely to work less well). I continue to think Rawls’s rich and well-developed theoretical framework is amenable to developing a nonideal theory of racial justice and so does not require “radical revision” on that score. And though I have learned much from, and am generally sympathetic to, Mills’s provocative writings on racial justice, I have yet to see a convincing argument from him that leads me to reconsider my stance on the value of Rawlsian liberalism for thinking about racial justice (160)

#### 3] Blackness isn’t historically calcified and such reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition – Humanist Movements are successful and increasing now.

Kelley 17 Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)//re-cut by Elmer

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of **social formation**, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it **may be structured in dominance** in some ways, **but not defined** by it. And Cedric's **Black Marxism**, you know, really made this point. He **talks about** the **ontological totality**, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, **structured by** white supremacy, structured by **violence**, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, **but** one in **which** western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the **Black radical tradition is** a **refusal to be property**, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so **we** sometimes **give white supremacy** way **too much credit**, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently **treat** **slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration** as a piece, **as** the reinstantiation of **the same thing,** the continuation, that denies the fact that **these** systems **are** actually **distinct**, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re **responses** to, in many ways, **to the weakness of** this as **a racial regime**. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. **Jim Crow** was a **response to** the **Black Democratic**, uh, **upsurge** after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass **incarceration**—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing **has** a lot **to do with**, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the **formation of political prisoners**, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. **Racial regimes** actually are always having to **shore themselves up** precisely **because they're unstable**. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### 4] Endorsing humanist struggle in this world is key to global justice and doesn’t require racist or Eurocentric conceptions of the human.

Spencer 19, Robert. "For Humanism: explorations in theory and politics edited by David Alderson and Robert Spencer." (2019): 124-126. (Senior Lecturer in Postcolonial Literatures and Cultures at the University of Manchester)//Elmer

This frequent resort in Orientalism to a Foucaultian methodology therefore obscures Said's fairly modest and more immediately political claim, derived from Gramsci and from the Marxist tradition from which the Italian Communist is inseparable, that orthodox representations of the Middle East are ideological and have played and continue to play a crucial as well as exceptionable and contestable part in maintaining European (and latterly American) control in the region. To characterise Orientalism as a discourse, as Said does almost in the same breath, is to make a much more ambitious and far-reaching claim about 'the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage — and even produce — the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period'. One assumes, of courses that Orientalism does not literally produce the Orients out of thin air as it were, but that it serves to construct an image of a consistent and knowable entity that actually bears little comparison with what are in reality the infinitely more diverse and societies of the Near and Middle East. But formulations like the one above go against every one of the emphases contained in the concept of hegemony: i.e. that power is pervasive but mutable and that its effects are comprehensive yet always limited and contested. A discourse, however, is so 'enormously systematic' that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get outside of and to censure. So intensive and all-embracing is **discursive power** in Said's account, so insinuatingly efficient and so detached from the invidious business of physical coercion, that it runs the risk of ignoring the potential (and even the manifest fact) of **organised political opposition** to power. Of course, Foucault famously insists that power invariably engenders its opposite: Where there is power, there is resistance and yet this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.'77 Resistance takes place, Foucault concedes, but it does so at powers behest. This being the case, it hardly merits the term. For this kind of resistance is surely a poor substitute for revolution. If the latter indicates irreconcilable antagonism then the former denotes a kind of dependent or symbiotic relationship with power. As Moishe Postone argues, the rhetoric of resistance often goes hand in hand with an inability to identify the system supposedly being resisted or even really to countenance that system's transformation: The notion of resistance…says little about the nature of that which is being resisted or of the politics of the resistance involved – that is, the character of determinate forms of critique, opposition, rebellion, and ‘revolution.’ The notion of resistance frequently expresses a deeply dualistic worldview that tends to reify both the system of domination and the idea of agency. It is rarely based on a **reflexive analysis of possibilities** for fundamental change that are both generated and suppressed by a dynamic heteronomous order. The idea of resistance extols agency but offers no judgements about the type of agency that should be undertaken by the oppressed. Moreover, it says nothing about strategy and goals. Nor does it name the system that is being resisted or even envisage openly that system's deposal and replacement, restricting itself instead to the reactive and defensive manoeuvres implied by the word in both English and French. Thus Bill Ashcroffs account of postcolonial resistance defines it as the 'subtle' and "'unspoken' 'form[s] of defence' by which 'an invader is "kept oue. This kind of resistance is not organised or concerted or even conscious, and is not dedicated to anything as dogmatic as prevailing over or even opposing the thing it resists. Can one even resist without obviously "opposing'? The answer to this is obviously "yes! '"79 That sort of answer is inseparable from a perception of helplessness, as Postone has argued; it connotes survival and defiance but not transformation. Indeed, Postone attributes what he calls 'the current impasse of the Left'80 to the abandonment of an older anticapitalist idiom and the advent of a far less rigorous worldview that fails to identify the target of resistance and that fails to interrogate the often reactionary politics and frequently terroristic strategies of many self-styled 'resistance' movements. Indeed, by blurring distinctions between very different forms of political action, the undiscriminating acclamation of resistance leads to some crass political misjudgements. We postcolonialists are not, surely, in favour of all reactions to dominant forms of power, but only Of those responses that possess the moral and political resources necessary to supplant those forms. Postone reminds us that militant Islamism, for example, may be a form of resistance but it is hardly revolutionary. It has less to do with any genuine confrontation with dictatorship and with the precipitate economic decline in many pre- dominantly Muslim countries than with anti-Semitism. misogyny and a totalitarian vision of a 'purified' society, none of which were top of the Left's traditional wish list. What Postone does not add, perhaps because he does not trace the popularity of the notion of resistance to the esteem in which Foucaults work is still held, is that Foucault himself made the very same misjudgement, as Kevin Anderson discusses in this collection, when his articles in the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera trumpeted the Islamic forces that hijacked the Iranian revolution. In the end, the notion of resistance does nothing but cement in place the system it purports to oppose, which ironically is what Foucault believes to be the fate of the idea and practice of humanism: 'The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself." In Foucault's view, subjectivity is both the effect of power and the means by which power is articulated and enforced. To be a subject is already to be subjected, and therefore to inscribe humanist slogans on one's banners is unwittingly to confirm and endorse that subjection. Indeed, in a celebrated and lyrical passage, Foucault bids farewell not just to the idea of a unified and all-determining human subject (which the mostly Marxist thinkers against whom Foucault defined his own thinking had already rejected) but to human subjectivity itself: If the [arrangements of knowledge since the sixteenth century] were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility — without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises — were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.83 This aversion to the prospect of a transformed and emancipated subjectivity has a deleterious effect on Foucault's work Foucault leaves himself bereft of any vision of subjective freedom to set against the subject’s domination by power. As Peter Dews has argued in relation to Foucault, 'a theory of power with radical intent requires an account of that which power dominates or represses, since without such an account relations of power must cease to appear objectionable. Candidates for this role in Foucault's work include, in Madness and Civilization, the expression of impulse and spontaneity, popular justice in the ultra-gauchiste Discipline and Punish of 1975 and the body and its pleasures in the later History of Sexuality. \*What is Enlightenment?', one of Foucault's last texts, even calls fr a more nuanced approach to humanism and the Enlightenment, this last perhaps, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson speculate," as a result of having his fingers burnt by the tragic outcome of the revolution in Iran and the furore surrounding his support for its Islamist turn. It is perhaps his awareness of these shortcomings in Foucault's work that led Said, in several texts written after Orientalism, to offer a lengthy appraisal of what he saw as the limitations of Foucault's characterisation of power. 'Criticism Between Culture and System' concedes that Foucault had done very constructive work in exposing the interestedness and violence frequently hidden beneath the discourses of rationality and scientific objectivity. Yet Foucault had neither illuminated the sources of power nor laid enough emphasis in his work on power's limitations and weak points. Indeed, Foucault had actually obscured power's origins in ruling classes and dominant interests. His work portrayed power instead, misleadingly, as 'a spider's web without the spider\* 86 and, Said might have added, without any flies either. Why power is exercised and by whom are questions rarely if ever broached by Foucault. Moreover, contests between classes, societies and ideologies are largely absent from Foucault's work which takes a curiously passive and sterile view not so much of the uses of power, but of how and why power is gained, used, arid held onto'.87 In understandably wishing to avoid the crude notion that power is unmediated domination, Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society, despite the apparently perfected methods of 'technocratic' control and seemingly nonideological that seem to govern everything. What one misses in Foucault is something resembling Gramsci's analyses of hegemony, historical blocks, ensembles of relationship done from the perspective of an engaged political worker for whom the fascinated description of exercised power is never a substitute for trying to change power relationships within society. Said soon recognised that Foucault's portrayal of power as inexorable had induced him to ignore the possibility and desirability - quite apart from the manifest actuality — of political struggle against the effects discursive power and against the social and economic order on which discursive power rests. No matter how it may be made to appear in texts or how it looks from privileged cultural perspectives, power rarely manifests itself in history in ways that are unproblematic and unopposed, let alone non-corporeal: 'history', Said reminds us, 'is not a homogeneous French-speaking territory but a complex interaction between uneven economies, societies, and ideologies'." To pretend otherwise is to characterise power as ineluctable and, just as unhelpfully, to portray power as a kind of performance addressed not to the body but, as Foucault puts it, to the soul. Yet to speak of power becoming a discourse is, to borrow a phrase from Susan Sontag, a breathtaking provincialism.90 Foucault's scholarly work which is barely far-reaching enough to be called Eurocentric, never addresses situations in which direct physical violence (as opposed to disembodied techniques of control) is still the principal means by which power is inflicted, most of which are outside the region with which his work is immediately concerned and many of which have been controlled historically by the nations whose histories interest him above all others. This soft-peddling of power's inseparability from violence is especially problematic when it comes to giving an account of how power operates in the colonial and postcolonial worlds. The reason for Said's more or less total renunciation of Foucault's work and therefore also the reason why I think postcolonial scholarship should likewise ditch Foucault's characteristic emphases and look instead to other, more enabling antecedents, is that we cannot come close to an accurate theorisation of colonial power without acknowledging its inseparability from violence and its fallibility as well as its resulting vulnerability to moral critique and political transformation. Foucault's works most grievous flaws, for Said. are its inadvertent parochialism and its tendency to depict power as all-penetrating and inexorable. Resulting from this was Foucault's inability to even countenance revolutionary historical change. The point is that the critic, if he or she is to merit that title, has an obligation not just to describe power but also to explain its existence, trace its origins, criticise its effects and beseech its dissolution. I have gone to some trouble to demonstrate and explain the reasons for Said's renunciation of the antihumanist dimensions of Foucault's work. This was so can now go on to show in precise terms how and why Said subsequently sought to present the processes of colonial power and of revolutionary opposition to colonial power from an unmistakably, indeed avowedly, humanist perspective. It is worth pausing to note however, that the discipline his early work inspired has not followed him down that path. 'Power' for Foucault is ubiquitous and perdurable; it is attended by 'resistance', which is similarly everywhere and everlasting. Foucault makes no moral judgements about power or about resistance. Content with describing this pas de deux, his philosophy contains no perspective on liberation. In Said's work, by contrast, precisely because that work is inspired by humanist convictions, 'power' is characterized quite differently, as a historical (rather than a metaphysical) phenomenon, as a system to which a name can be given, that can be subjected to a critique and that has been placed on borrowed time by **political projects** **that aim not just to resist but actively to transform and replace power**. Nobody needs me to tell them that *Orientalism*’s influence in postcolonial studies, a discipline it effectively founded and whose characteristic methodological and political emphases it therefore helped to shape, has been immense. Yet the book decidedly exaggerates the durability, scope and intensity of the colonial discourse it maps out, it obscure’s colonialism’s origin and purpose, and it postpones until later work any attempt to those anticolonial projects whose aspirations were so far-reaching and, at least in their early years, so staggeringly successful that it would be simply churlish to dismiss them as mere acts of 'resistance'. Colonial discourse', a concept whose adoption is in many ways postcolonial theory's original sin, has been portrayed as an expansive, subjectless and ineluctable phenomenon insinuated through discreet rituals and performances. Even when texts are declared to 'hybridise' colonial discourse, or else subject it to the rejoinders of 'difference', there is rarely any sense that colonial discourse might fundamentally be undermined, let alone overthrown - the Sisyphean labour of 'subverting' colonial discourse being what keeps us in work. Postcolonial critics have commonly been suspicious of categories like class. Little wonder, because capitalism is not a word frequently heard from their lips. Indeed, the discipline has been prone to muffle ongoing forms of imperial domination with the comforting rhetoric of globalisation and hybridity. Postcolonialists are indignant about 'Eurocentrism' (which is an idea) but rarely exercised by ongoing forms of imperialism (which is also a particularly brutal practice), in addition to being curiously silent about capitalism (which has been as willing as ever to bare its teeth since the 1970s and without reference to which the phenomenon of imperialism becomes literally incomprehensible). As far back as Aijaz Ahmad's In Theory (1992), postcolonial theory's left wing has arraigned the discipline for its most prominent critics' frankly idealist belief that it was not capitalist imperialism that structured and explained the world but more cultural or 'discursive' constructions like Eurocentrism, racism or nationalism: An obvious consequence of repudiating Marxism was that one now sought to make sense of the world of colonies and empires much less in terms of classes, much more in terms of nations and countries and races, and thought of imperialism itself not as a hierarchically structured system of global capitalism but as a relation, Of governance and occupation, between richer and poorer countries, West and non-West. And whether one said so or not, one inevitably believed that ideas — 'culture' was the collective term in most mystifications, or 'discourse', but it mainly meant books and films - and not the material conditions of life which include the instance of culture itself, determine the fate of people and nations. Eurocentrism, racism and nationalism, along with patriarchy for that matter, precisely because they were seen as mostly cultural phenomena, could be opposed by defending difference or invoking hybridity, laudable endeavours of course but also incomplete or at least insufficient. The consequences of what Arif Dirlik has called this 'shift in attention to questions of cultural identity in postcolonial discourse'" are at once theoretical and practical; theoretical because the phenomenon of capitalist imperialism thereby escapes our conceptual nets, practical because energies are then devoted to 'hybridising' the West or defending difference from it, undertakngs for which the category of capitalism, let alone the practice of anticapitalism, is simply nugatory. This is the 'postcolonial unconscious' as Lazarus defines it. Postcolonial theorists look for 'resistance' in 'mimicry, 'migrancy', 'hybridity', 'ambivalence', 'subalternity, 'liminality' or the 'multitude', all of which are terms that have in common an assumption that struggle takes place not against the system of capitalist imperialism (though it is rarely called that) but within that system and even at its behest. Happily, Said's later work set about qualifying and even repudiating many of the key claims made in what would prove to be a quite anomalous early book in the context of a sizeable oeuvre that remained militantly humanist in both its methodology and its political convictions. Insofar as it has hitched its wagon to post-structuralist philosophies like that of Foucault, postcolonial theory has, by contrast, been dragged too far from the political and intellectual commitments of its founding thinker and, in what amounts to the same thing, from the original convictions and aspirations of anticolonialism. Orientalism's readers were led astray by the unnecessary and incongruous references to Foucault, who if Lazarus is to be believed was perhaps name-checked in that book for tactical 5easons in order to ease the book's reception by 'leftist' scholars for whom Foucault was de rigueur at the time of Orientalism's publication. Said's humanism, however, presents the 'discourse' of Orientalism very differently. The whole of the rest of Said's work from his early work on the philosophy of 'beginnings' through his advocacy of the rights and aspirations of his Palestinian compatriots to his later writings on music and aesthetic style, is premised on an unmistakably and avowedly, not to mention gleefully and sometimes provocatively unrepentant, humanist stress on the limits to discursive power. Said was no Marxist of course, or at least he professed himself, understandably enough, extremely Ambivalent about Marxism's political record.94 But Said's desire to attend not just to the cobweb but to the spider, to the fly and to the web's frailty certainly makes his work in my view compatible with Marxism. His later work is adamant in particular that the limits to discursive power are set and exemplified by the ideas of human solidarity and human freedom which were articulated most powerfully by the first generation of anticolonial movements, whose achievements Said celebrated, whose defeat he mourned and whose transformative aspirations he longed to reignite. Said, in short, traced his own approach not to Foucault, whose name continued to be ubiquitous in postcolonial scholars' work long after he had ceased dropping it, but to the premises and principles of humanist intellectual practice articulated by half-forgotten American literary critics like R. P. Blackmur, Richard Poirier and Lionel Trilling, and especially by German comparative philologists like Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer." In one of his last books, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Said outlines what he sees as the two chief precepts of humanist practice. The first is the deceptively straightforward proposition that that which has been humanly made (and which is subject neither to the laws unearthed by the natural sciences nor to the unchanging verities pondered by metaphysicians) is uniquely susceptible to analysis and change. Societies, dogmas, texts and the very mores and ideas of the self are variable products of human work. Because they were conceived and made they can be reconceived and remade. Knowledge, however, is not uncontroversial or easily gained. Glossing Vico, Said remarks upon the mind's fallibility, its passionate rather than dispassionate nature and its unavoidable entanglement with interests and situations. Knowledge of what is humanly constructed is always incomplete and provisional, a thing to be negotiated, interrogated and improved. Hence humanism entails a taste for self-renewal and a restless impatience with the mind's dogmas: 'humanism is critique'.96 Indeed, this is the special vocation of the humanities in general, which provoke critical scrutiny of humanly produced institutions and ideas. What makes humans human, in other words, is their distinctive capacity for critical self-knowledge or, in the philologist Leo Spitzer's memorable phrase, 'the power bestowed on the human mind of investigating the human mind'.97 The distinctive (though not necessarily superior) human capacity, the thing that allows us in Sartre's words 'to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world,98 is consciousness or, if you like, the consciousness of consciousness. Self-criticism, then, is the first precept of Said's humanism. The second is the kind of cosmopolitan moral intelligence that can result from self-criticism. Humanists' interrogation of partial and limited perspectives can engender a newly ecumenical respect for humanity in its entirety. If self-criticism is one of the twin poles of humanistic endeavour therefore, then the second is the potential of self-criticism to broaden one's sympathies as well as one's sense of moral and finally political obligation. Said is a defender of humanism in the sense of what the humanities do (which is to examine humanly made phenomena like texts, ideas and institutions) as well as humanism in the sense of human rights (that is, the belief in the dignity, equality and value of all human life contained in Seneca's great dictum: 'nothing human is alien to me'). Having established the twin principles of humanistic endeavour, Humanism and Democratic Criticism goes on to elucidate the special attributes required of the American humanist in the wake of 9/11 and the United States' belligerent response. For a start, democratic humanism contrasts with the provincial version of this creed espoused by the enthusiasts for 'humanitarian intervention'. Nor does it have anything to do with any unselfconscious defence of one's own culture against interlopers, not just because America - as Said is at pains to stress — is a society made up of immigrants and therefore in conception if not always in fact a multifarious and hospitable place, but more importantly because it is of the very nature of **humanistic activity** to upset, interrogate and reformulate ostensible certainties. They cannot long survive the knowledge of self and world to which humanistic scrutiny gives rise. Critical consciousness or, put differently, a biting distrust of received wisdom is the humanist's customary mode. A form of incessant questioning, humanism necessitates a militant critique of jingoistic ideologies and a practical refusal to tolerate distant suffering: Principally it means situating critique at the heart of humanism, critique as a form of democratic freedom and as a continuous practice of questioning and of accumulating knowledge that is open to, rather than in denial of, the constituent historical realities of the post-Cold War world, its early colonial formation, and the frighteningly global reach of the last remaining superpower of today." Without criticism, as W. J. T. Mitchell has argued, glossing Said, humanism tends to be a sterile and complacent reverence for the cultural superiority of the West; without humanism, however, criticism is nothing but empty quibbling. Saree Makdisi has argued that Said's inclusive humanism was inseparable from his vision of a 'one state solution' in Israel/Palestine. Peace there will be the outcome not of the various ideologies of ethnic. racial or religious distinctness and separation but of an acceptance, which is clearly far easier to say than to do, that 'the other' .is human and has rights. For the Israelis, whose superior political and military clout and whose blame for expelling, occupying and tyrannising the Palestinians over the decades places on them a greater responsibility to bring such a reconciliation about, peace means resolving to treat the Palestinians not as bothersome nuisances that obstruct and frustrate Israel's exclusive entitlement to the land and its resources but as partners in pursuit of a just settlement. For the Palestinians, it means abandoning the millenarian fantasies of religious sects and the futile dream of overpowering their adversaries by force of arms, while talking to persuadable Israelis, campaigning in the West for pressure to be placed on governments that indulge Israel's unconscionable occupation and repudiating the failed and unimaginative policies of their own undemocratic, short-termist leadership. In Makdisi's words, 'the idea of Palestine is a struggle for the articulation of a new sense of what it means to be human'. In Said's: The real strength of the Palestinian is just this insistence on the human being as a detail — the detail likely to be swept away in order for a grandiose project to be realized. The Palestinian therefore stands on a small plot of land stubbornly called Palestine, or an idea of peace based neither on a project for transforming people into nonpeople nor on a geopolitical fantasy about the balance of power, but on a vision of the future accommodating both of the peoples with authentic claims to Palestine, not just the Jews. In the end, it is finally the humblest and the most basic instrument that will bring peace, and certainly that instrument is not a fighter plane or a rifle butt. This instrument is self-conscious rational struggle conducted in the interests of human community. Humanism = critical thinking + the ideal of solidarity. CONCLUSION The likes of Sartre and Fanon were faced with an ideology — Western humanism and the discourse of rights — that excluded most of the world's population. 'What was required, therefore,' as Robert Young argues in his preface to the Routledge collection of Sartre's essays on colonialism and neocolonialism, 'was either to do away with the concept of humanism altogether, or, more positively, to articulate a new **anti-racist humanism**, which would be inclusive rather than exclusive, and which would be the product of those who formed the majority of its new totality'.103 Why hasn't this second approach found a more receptive audience among postcolonialists? Paige Arthur notes the suspicion in France in the 1970s of Sartre's Marxism. She mentions the nouveaux philosophes' crude equation of communism with totalitarianism and their equally simplistic attribution of dictatorship in the tiers monde to the original objectives of anticolonial nationalism. The system had stood firm against the revolutionary swell of May 1968 and against the feeble barbs of that event's Maoist progeny. The likes of Bernard-Henri Lévy made a good living out of retro certainties about the Cold Wax and la mission civilisatrice. No doubt this anti-Marxist reaction was part of a wider intellectual hostility to the grands récits of enlightenment and emancipation, which as we have seen is also part of the intellectual climate of postcolonial theory, a discipline that was brought into being at this time. Yet while such objectives might have seemed passé to a disenchanted Western intelligentsia, they retain their force for thinkers and movements in (or concerned with) other parts of the world. There the goal of universal emancipation has lost none of its urgency in the overbearing context of neocolonial retrenchment. As Patrick Williams observes, too many critics have been unable to get beyond the simple equating of humanism with the unsatisfactory Enlightenment version: thereby 'ignoring and jettisoning all that the likes of Césaire, Fanon and Sartre hoped for. 104 Still, I think we can be quite optimistic about the future of the discipline. For even one of the authors I criticised earlier for conflating the idea of a 'common humanity' with Helen Tiffin, accepts in a recent book on postcolonial studies and the environment (co-written with Graham Huggan) that humanism not have attracted quite so many adherents over the years had it represented nothing more than a bellicose assertion of the sovereignty of white men over the rest of the world. Tiffin and Huggan manage to affirm the longevity of a tradition, which this chapter has tried to commend and explain, as well as indicate the nature of future theoretical and critical work when they acclaim a 'postcolonial humanism' for which 'the historically necessary decolonisation of the "human" leads not to a post- but a pan-humanism that opens up more generous understandings of the human defined in terms of cross-cultural solidarity and achievement rather than those more likely to seek shelter in comforting notions of cultural particularity and the privileges of birth'. Only now, prompted perhaps by the resurgent imperialism of the 'wat on terror' and by the perennial inequalities made worse by the unabated (if not accelerating) project of neoliberalism, is postcolonial theory beginning to attend, in its theoretical as well as its critical work to the specifically human dimensions of oppression and liberation. Iraq's assailants, openly scornful of international law and conspicuously motivated by corporate voracity, have unwittingly done us the service of discrediting the postcolonial field’s constitutive assumption that we come after colonialism and not in colonialism's turbulent midst. By all means let us agree to keep the term 'postcolonial', provided we construe it not as a descriptive category, the temporal or historical prefix of which can mislead us into thinking that the work of decolonisation has been completed or at least that the world's persistent imbalances are just a legacy of extinct structures, but rather as a goal or aspiration, one to which the connotations of transformation and liberation are attached. I have been calling for a return to the libertarian dimension of Marxism. The responsibility for the low esteem in which even libertarian strains of Marxism are held cannot all be laid at the door of the anti-Marxists. Since Marxism, in the shape of the slow death of the Soviet bloc under Brezhnev and his successors. of the gigantic catastrophes and convulsions of China under Mao, of the deformed and deflected revolutions of the 'Third World' and of the depressing sclerosis of the labour movement in Western Europe, had shown itself incapable of real introspection and reform, post-Marxism came along to bury it. Only a humanist Marxism can resist this fate. Stalinism was the result of the Bolsheviks' failure to replace, or even to resist the temptation to intensify, the authoritarian methods of the state they had inherited. The Left has failed to surmount this legacy, and no doubt will continue to do so, unless and until it finds a way of repudiating the methods of coercion and manipulation that characterise the system from which it seeks to break free. That the quest for libertarian values with which to guide this process has been undertaken most promisingly by a diverse tradition from within Marxism (rather than by theoretical and political traditions taken up against Marxism) is the main claim for which I have been trying to provide evidence. One looks in vain in the works of the thinkers I have been examining for any assertions that subjectivity is static, unitary, centred or entirely self-determining. Rather, human subjectivity is conceived there as dynamic and developing in history. ‘We may not know what absolute good is or the absolute norm,’ as Adorno argues, ‘we may not even know what man is or the human or humanity – but what the inhuman is we know very well indeed.’ Humanity constitutes a principle of opposition and an agent of transformation. A postcolonial humanism would therefore be a humanism based not just on humanist conceptions of the value and equality of human life but also on a rigorous critical approach towards all those complacent and unselfconscious humanisms that have bedevilled the world since the concept's revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the racist humanism of the Comte de Gobineau, the colonial humanisms of the European powers, and what Chomsky has called the 'new military humanism'i0' of the twenty-first century. What I have been objecting to is the mistaken assumption that one local, self-serving definition of humanity should be taken to be true of all humankind. In Said's terms, this is political humanism shorn of its intellectual complement, an ambitious universalism bereft of self-knowledge. Though they might dislike the term 'postcolonial', the many materialist critics who are working within that field as well as against some of its primary emphases, have sought to sharpen postcolonial-ism's critical and political edges by keeping alive the memory of an anticolonial tradition that is, as Benita Parry has put it, 'grounded in a Marxist humanism'. That tradition has 'inveighed against the abuse of humanism and universalism when these ideas were mendaciously invoked to disguise capitalist exploitation and colonial malpractices'. But it did not, crucially, 'disown their ethical potential or abandon their liberatory usages, a stance shared by theorists in colonized worlds who aspired to realize the unfulfilled enlightenment notions of reason, justice, and egalitarian- ism'.108 **Humanism may have been put to use by imperialism but** that does not make all humanisms imperialist. A commonly heard criticism of human rights discourse is that it is, to use Samuel Moyn's term, depoliticising.i09 That discourse implies and sometimes explicitly asserts that it is the responsibility of the powers that abuse those rights to desist and treat their victims differently. No perspective on transforming or replacing those authorities is contained in the discourse. Rights discourse, Jodi Dean adds, shrinks 'the scope of political claims to those of victims needing recognition and redress'.ii0 To speak at all one must demonstrate one's weakness and vulnerability, thus conferring the responsibility for redress to established powers that inflicted the injury in the first place. The systematic nature of the problem and the comprehensive character of the solution are therefore concealed. The plight of the Palestinians, for example, is often referred to as a 'humanitarian crisis, as though they were the helpless victims of a flood whose fate is to be managed by outside powers, dealt with, and occasionally relieved. Minority discourse must instead be seen as a, step taken towards a substantive ideal of equality not a desperate form of special pleading that leaves the system itself intact. Respect for human rights, especially the radical social and economic rights contained in the Universal Declaration (rights to work, a decent pension, a minimum wage, an education, free healthcare and so on), cannot be achieved without also addressing the massive inequalities that structure the world; 'There can be no true installation of human rights without the end of exploitation, no true end of exploitation without the installation of human rights', in Bloch's invaluable dictum. The more postcolonialism recognises the importance of this formulation the more I believe it will start to grasp the pertinence and cogency of its Marxist antecedents, or, in other and simpler though possibly more contentious words, the more Marxist it will become. I am therefore repeating the call issued by the editors of an important volume on the state of the discipline for postcolonial studies to envision trans: formative and even utopian alternatives to this situation: visions of a postcolonial world can we as humanists offer that will interrogate, perhaps even interrupt, the forms of globalization now dictated by politicians, military strategists, captains of finance and industry, fundamentalist preachers and theologians, terrorists of the body and the spirit, in short, by the masters of our contemporary universe?'ii2 Postcolonialists ought to recognise the sheer magnitude and durability of a world system that has succeeded in halting and frequently reversing many of the achievements of anticolonial movements since independence. They also need to name that system and beseech its transformation. Ultimately, postcolonial criticism is a discipline guided by moral and political investments. The task I have set myself is to show that this libertarian humanism oh as Edward Said calls it, democratic humanism has nothing whatever in common with the Eurocentric, exclusionary and teleological version that postcolonialists have understandably repudiated. Postcolonialism is a humanism because humanism gives us a rhetoric with which to reprove the system of imperialism and both a guide and motive for combating it. Humanism gives us a vocabulary with which to denounce the failings of a form of social and economic organisation that sacrifices human potential, human need and even human life to abstract goals of profit and utility. Humanism also enables us to distinguish reactionary and even fascist anti-imperialisms from progressive anti-imperialisms. We need to be clearer about our adversary — which is capital and its indispensable partner-in-crime imperialism, both of which are occluded by abstract references to 'the West' and 'Empire' — as well as much more confident and unambiguous about our goals. Decolonisation is the wilful and insistent seizure of the status of humanity, of a subjective freedom that is even today under mortal threat both from local despots and from the intercessions of those states that march into their former colonies under the duplicitously raised banner of universal human rights. Ideas about humanity and rights have been used as a justification for exploitation and control right down to the present vogue for 'humanitarian intervention'. But those ideas could hardly exercise such appeal and fascination, could not in fact aspire to be hegemonic, if they did not also contain a promise of liberation. As ever, humanist principles are more honoured in the breach than the observance. In fact they have been misused to such an extent that they sometimes no longer mean what mean or what they might have meant had numerous groups not been discouraged for centuries from participating in the process of their definition. Nevertheless, humanism remains the only feasible basis of protest and transformation. 'If only I knew a better term than humanity', as Max Horkheimer once lamented: 'that poor, provincial slogan of a half-educated European. But I don't.'1L3 That's because there isn't one.

#### 5] Equating humanism with structures is the divide-and-conquer tactic of imperialism – re-vitalizing the human does not situate ourselves of the world but past it.

Wilder 16 Gary Wilder July 2016 “Here/Hear Now Aimé Césaire!” *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Volume 115, Number 3 (Associate Professor of Anthropology at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York)//Elmer

I have suggested that Césaire’s struggle against imperialism was bound up with a program for human emancipation in and beyond the Caribbean. His untimely vision for decolonization was inseparable from a radically humanist commitment to deprovincialize **Africanity**, universalize black thought, redeem humanity, and remake the world. In Discourse on Colonialism he famously expressed his aim: “to live a true humanism to the measure of the world [à la mesure du monde]” (Césaire 1976: 397). This hope, I believe, was both quantitative and qualitative: beyond calling for a truly global humanism that would fit the size of the world, it also invoked a humanism that would be fitting for the world. Césaire pursued a form of decolonization that would transcend the sterile opposition between abstract humanism and territorial nationalism, while retaining the universalism of the former and the embodied specificity of the latter. He hoped to fashion a political form that would allow colonizers and colonized to recognize their entangled histories and build a common future without recourse either to the humanism that authorized colonialism or to the parochial nationalism and culturalism that would obstruct the creation of the kind of solidarities that both Antillean freedom and new planetary politics required. Thus in his “Letter to Maurice Thorez” Césaire, disaffected with departmentalization’s republican universalism and the Communist Party’s internationalist universalism, demanded a politics that neither “burie[d] [him] in a narrow particularism” nor forced him to “lose himself in an emaciated [décharné] universalism” (1956: 15). Hoping to transcend both “walled-in segregation” and “dilution in the universal,” he envisioned an alternative “universal rich with everything that is particular, enriched and deepened by all particulars, by the coexistence of all particulars” (15). Like Giuseppe Mazzini (2009), Senghor, and Frantz Fanon, he believed that particular peoples become more fully human (and therefore universal) by realizing their specific qualities most fully. For Césaire, in other words, a true humanism made to the measure of the world would have to be concrete and situated—one that worked through Antilleans’ history and lived experiences of racial and colonial domination. In his 1959 speech at the Second International Congress of Black Artists and Writers, Césaire called on “men of culture” to make black art and literature “sacred . . . by raising the particular situation of our peoples to the universal” (1959: 121–22). Rather than a humanism that searches for aspects of a predefined universal within particular peoples or societies, he believed that particular peoples in specific historical situations, as well as their situated thinkers, could offer concrete forms of life as global gifts that could indicate how to live a more fully human life, one that was nourished by poetic knowledge and that avoided the twin pitfalls of imperialism and provincialism. Césaire’s radical humanism did not abstract from differences in order to find some underlying or overarching sameness. Rather, it sought to join particular peoples within larger forms and **networks of transcontinental solidarity**. Such formations would be composed of and in ected by the intersection of distinct lifeworlds. At the same time, from his Caribbean or black Atlantic vantage, he questioned a view of world history or global politics that ontologized distinct forms of life. His situated humanism was founded on the recognition [recognized] that the entwined histories of slavery, imperialism, capitalism, republicanism, and modernism had bound metropolitan and Caribbean peoples to one another within a shared if asymmetrical modernity. On such grounds he refused to relate to European history, politics, and thought from the outside, as a foreigner. Rather, he claimed as his own proper inheritance those radical intellectual and political traditions that could no longer be conventionally figured as “French,” “European,” or “Western.” At the 1959 congress Césaire argued that black creators had “a human duty” even more profound than their “particular duties” because “finally, there is a question that no man of culture can escape, regardless of his country or his race, which is the following: ‘What kind of world are you preparing for us?’” Césaire responded to his own question by relating black self-determination to human self-realization: By articulating our effort with the effort of the liberation of colonized peoples, by struggling for the dignity of our peoples, for their truth and for their recognition, it is by de nition for the whole entire world that we fight, to liberate it from tyranny, from hatred, and from fanaticism. Beyond the struggles of the present, circumstantial as they are . . . we want a rejuvenated and rebalanced world, without which nothing will have any meaning . . . not even our struggle today . . . not even our victory tomorrow. Then and only then will we have been victorious and our final victory will mark the advent of a new era. We will have contributed to giving a meaning . . . to the most overused yet most glorious word: we will have helped to found a universal humanism. (1959: 122) Here then was Césaire’s radically literalist gesture of reclaiming, de-rusting, inflecting, and refunctioning “humanism” and “universalism.” For him the problem was not merely that in the hands of Europeans these were hypocritical claims and ideological screens, selectively enforced broken promises, or that these were provincial cultural notions born in the West and imposed on the world. Rather, he criticized these concepts for being abstract, empty, disembodied, unmediated, and nondialectical. It wasn’t humanism or universalism as such but their actually existing liberal, republican, and socialist **forms that he challenged**. In Discourse on Colonialism Césaire imagined an alternative process of modernization whereby the communal and democratic possibilities that had already existed within African civilizations might have been enriched through noncoercive forms of contact with Europe (1976: 401). Such writings mirrored his constitutional campaigns for nonnational forms of decolonization. Both enacted a radically humanist anticolonialism that **called on** colonial powers to act in partnership with colonized peoples to create plural postnational democracies that could enable new types of **planetary solidarity**.

#### 6] Humanism is not static or fixed – it’s a produce of codes and narratives – the aff can rewrite them.

Mathijssen16, I. E. The Potential of the Human: Reimagining the Notion of the Human with Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Édouard Glissant, and Octavia E. Butler. MS thesis. 2016. (MA Candidate in Comparative Literary Studies, Utrecht University)//Elmer

For Wynter, Fanon’s concept of sociogeny is quintessential to come to an understanding of how the hegemonic systems of knowledge are connected to the ways in which human beings experiences themselves. Her work, and so also my reading of it, is built around what she calls the sociogenic principle. Wynter shows that the notion of the human is produced within a self-generating and self-maintaining system of codes and narratives. For good reasons, she explicitly refers to the human as homo narrans. After all, these codes and narrative are human-made, yet human beings have turned out to be experts in obscuring the reality of their own agency to themselves. In order to expose what has been repressed, also Wynter’s project to reimagine the human is strongly focused on the past. Her rehistorization of the human is to **reveal how narratives about the human have come into being** and how they have prescribed human reality and behavior. I have shown that she is particularly interested in discontinuities, or “root expansion[s] of thought” (Wynter, “1492” 19), for these might inspire a breakthrough of the current hegemonic concept of the human. For Wynter, to look at the past in this way is exactly a move beyond resentment. According to Wynter, the human is currently explained in terms of the Darwinian narrative of evolution. The human is understood as a mere biological being whose behavior is genetically driven. While this biocentric version of the human is presented as a purely scientific truth, Wynter very importantly underlines that also this explanation of the human is a narrative that is created by human beings. Herewith, she creates the possibility to think outside of this seemingly final and fixed notion of the human. In Xenogenesis, Butler engages exactly with this biocentric narrative and its dangerous implications. The Oankali have come to the conclusion that human beings are, indeed, (mal)programmed by their genes only. They continually assure the human beings that nothing can change the human fate; resistance, hope, any such thing is considered to be futile. I have argued that far from endorsing this point of view, Butler evokes this deterministic outlook to foreground its paralyzing effect. The Oankali deprive the human of his/her autonomy and agency, and, consequently, also the possibility of any form of human responsibility is undermined. Wynter’s emphasis on the human as storyteller opens up this dead-end street and acknowledges the very agency of the human. The human is, then, what the human tells him/herself he/she is. Therefore, the hope for change is not at all naïve or futile; instead, it is a matter of taking responsibility for creating new narratives. In other words, the potential of the concept of the human lies exactly in his/her [their] capacity to narrate him/herself. And so also literature has a prominent role to play in the imagining of a new human and a new humanism. It is, thus, rather significant that the central figure of Glissant’s The Fourth Century, Papa Longoué, is a storyteller by profession. Also Xenogenesis reflects on the possibilities of narratives, specifically fiction. It is suggested that fiction enables human beings to connect and to share with that which is different and, as such, it is presented as a cure for xenophobia. It is, furthermore, important to note that also Fanon calls for invention (BSWM 179). That is not to say that we should all start inventing fictions in order to deal with reality; rather, Fanon, Wynter, Glissant, and Butler stress the importance to take a better look at the actual reality, which does not consist of categories, **fixed definitions** and homogenous groups. Glissant’s focus on specificities and diversity serves to counter the very ideology that intends to grasp human beings in a single category, to reduce them to a single truth. The true universalism that also both Wynter and Fanon strive for will necessarily have to be heterogeneous; a collective of interconnected lives. While traditional Eurocentric humanism could be said to evolve around the rational individual, the new humanisms that have been discussed in this thesis, all aim to conceptualize the collective. In Xenogenesis, the Oankali serve as a classic example of a collective existence in which individuals are strongly interdependent; they live in mutual reciprocity with each other and their environment and are able to directly share their thoughts and feelings. Butler seems to sooth those human beings (in the narrative, but presumably also the reader) who are frightened by this symbiotic way of life, who fear to be absorbed by the whole. In order to put things in perspective here, Butler again looks at reality, and foregrounds that the human body is to be considered as symbiotic too, as it actually is in need of difference. The boundaries that are said to define the human are, thus, not at all fixed.

#### 7] Humanism is not only redeemable, but ceding control of it is WORSE

Newman 5, Saul. Power and politics in poststructuralist thought: new theories of the political. Routledge, 2005. (Research Fellow at UWA and a Lecturer in Politics at Edith Cowan University, Western Australia)//Elmer

Stirner’s critique, despite its eccentricity, clearly poses problems for liberal political theory. By unmasking the disciplinary underside of liberalism – the oppressive normalizing practices that go into constituting the neutral liberal subject – Stirner has exposed the paradoxical nature of liberal notions of freedom, individual rights and autonomy. It is not that liberalism cynically parades itself as a philosophy that guarantees individual freedom, while in actual practice denying it. Rather, it is that the liberal notions of rights and freedoms are based on a certain conceptualization of the subject, derived from Enlightenment humanism and rationalism, which Stirner has shown to be an oppressive and alienating ideological construction. Freedom and autonomy are conditional upon the individual conforming to this abstract generality, therefore denying his difference and individuality. Those who do not or cannot live up to this ideal are excluded, marginalized and subjected to a whole series of regulatory, judicial, medical and disciplinary procedures which have as their aim the normalization of the individual. Stirner may therefore be seen as a crucial link in the post-Enlightenment and poststructuralist critique of liberalism – particularly in his questioning of the conditions under which the liberal subject is constituted. However, I would argue that this interrogation of the limits of liberalism does not necessarily invalidate it. For Stirner, there is nothing necessarily wrong with liberal ideas of individual freedom and equality of rights themselves. The point is, however, that there is always another side to this discourse of rights. There is an oppressive dimension through which these rights are instantiated, yet which remains undisclosed and disavowed. The purpose of Stirner’s critique has been to uncover the relations of power, discipline and exclusion through which liberal identities are constituted. Through a realization of the power relations upon which they are based, liberal rights and freedoms would have to be seen as contingent. In other words, if it is the case that liberal rights and freedoms are founded not on some universal, essential subjectivity, but on a series of arbitrary exclusions, discursive constructions and strategies of power, their status becomes undecidable rather than absolute. This undecidability does not mean, however, that the notion of rights itself is jeopardized. Indeed, it could be argued that the last thing we need today – what with the unprecedented expansion of state power in the name of ‘national security’ and the ‘war on terror’ – is any kind of weakening of rights. On the contrary, it means that the discourse of rights itself would be expanded beyond its current liberal capitalist conceptualization. It would encompass a whole series of potentially different and contingent political articulations. For instance, why could one not extend the notion of rights and individual autonomy to include identities that are currently excluded by liberal regimes and, through this, make problematic the status of these regimes themselves? This was precisely what Foucault tried to do: in his advocacy of prisoners’ rights, for instance, he was attempting to challenge the absolute status of the division between innocence and guilt and, through this, the conditions under which people are incarcerated (see 1977: 227). A Stirnerian concept of rights might follow along similar lines. It might involve an expansion of liberal rights and freedoms to those who are marginalized in liberal societies – the ‘lumpenproletariat’, or more contemporary subaltern identities like the homeless, the unemployed and illegal migrants. Illegal migrants and asylum seekers face some of the worst abuses at the hands of governments today. A radicalized discourse of rights might be used to challenge some of the practices of institutionalized exclusion and detention, practices regarded as acceptable in our so-called liberal-democratic societies, where rights and legal protections are enshrined in citizenship and denied to those who fall outside this category.6 Again this points to the paradoxical and two-sided nature of this discourse of rights that Stirner has highlighted. So for Stirner, the problem is not the rights and freedoms themselves, but rather the discursive regime of essentialist humanism and Enlightenment rationalism that they are articulated in. Stirner’s critique allows us to identify this essentialist paradigm, and thus disentangle these rights and freedoms from it. This would free liberal rights from their current epistemological limits and open them to different articulations, thereby allowing them to be used to interrogate the structures of power and practices of domination inherent in liberal capitalist societies. In this sense, through Stirner’s critique of liberalism, we may be able to theorize a ‘postliberalism’ – a liberalism which is not confined to essentialist identities and rational frameworks, but which, rather, refers to a political ethos of contestation with practices of domination.

### 1AC – OFF 1

#### Interpretation: At all TOC bid distributing tournaments, debaters must disclose citations for new positions 1 hour after debating

#### Violation – you didn’t – I have screenshots

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

#### You broke a new Grammar K Emory r3 vs Xu. Err neg on violation since Schrodinger’s cat on unbroken positions since we can’t know if you broke new positions if you don’t disclose

#### A. Scouting inequity – even if I have your K because you hit my teammate, it isn’t accessible to the rest of the circuit and cements inequality through team size and pairing luck

#### B. Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### C. Prep Skew – I’ve disclosed all positions on my wiki while you haven’t which makes pre-tournament prep irreciprocal, exacerbated by pairings being out for a week

#### No RVIs on 1AC theory – a] it gives the 1NC 7 minutes to dump on the shell which the 4 minute 1AR cannot come back from, b] it encourages the 1NC to go all in on theory which leads to maximal substance crowdout, c] 1AR is too short to win theory and substance so 1AC theory has to be no risk

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because each debater assumes the judge fairly evaluates their arguments.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] we didn’t read this against an argument.

1. Marina Koren (staff writer at The Atlantic). “The False Hope of an American Rocket Launch”. The Atlantic. June 3, 2020. Accessed 1/2/22. https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/06/spacex-nasa-launch-protests/612616/ //Xu] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Kailee Yoshimura (undergraduate student at the University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo, where she studies Cell, Molecular, and Biomedical Sciences with a Chemistry minor. She works as a research assistant in Dr. Abhijit A. Date’s lab at the College of Pharmacy at the University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo, where she maintains a cancer cell lab. Kailee is also a remote research intern in Dr. Antentor Hinton’s lab at Vanderbilt University and a summer AMGEN fellow at Stanford University School of Medicine). “Astronomers want the Thirty Meter Telescope on a sacred Hawaiian summit. But who is it for?”. Massive Science. June 20, 2021. Accessed 1/3/22. <https://massivesci.com/articles/opinion-hawaii-telescope-tmt-imperialism-astronomy/> //Xu] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)