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#### Their valorization of public space in contrast to private space is a fundamental misunderstanding of outer space and reifies the impacts of ghettoization, carcerality, and gentrification

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From the days of chattel slavery until today, the concept of travel has been inseparably linked in the minds of our people with the concept of freedom. (Robeson, 1988, original emphasis) In the 1960 presidential election, candidate John F. Kennedy invoked moon exploration to displace the salience of religious division by focus- ing on unifying issues, including the spread of Communism that was ‘fester[ing] only 90 miles from the coast of Florida’ and crises in family farms, hunger, and unaffordable medical care that ‘know no religious barrier.’ The real problem was ‘an America with too many slums, with too few schools, and too late to the moon and outer space.’ This listing of ‘real issues which should decide this campaign’ suggested urgent, yet equally solvable, concerns. The space race ratified a national challenge, suggesting that returning the gaze from this ‘new frontier’ to domestic problems was the next step for technoscientific progress. When Dr Martin Luther King spoke of the moon in 1967, he was a world away from Kennedy’s Cold War hopefulness (Jordan, 2003). He delivered his final speech, ‘Where Do We Go From Here?: Chaos or Community?’, to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) on the ten-year anniversary of the organization’s formation following the Montgomery bus boycott. Despite the gains of the civil rights move- ment, King concluded, ‘the Negro still lives in the basement of the Great Society.’ He went on to question the consonance between scientific and social progress that had seemed so central to Kennedy’s understanding of the nation: Today our exploration of space is engaging not only our enthusiasm but our patriotism. ... No such fervor or exhilaration attends the war on poverty. ... Without denying the value of scientific endeavor, there is a striking absurdity in committing billions to reach the moon where no people live, while only a fraction of that amount is appropriated to service the densely populated slums. If these strange views persist, in a few years we can be assured that when we set a man on the moon, with an adequate telescope he will be able to see the slums on earth with their intensified congestion, decay and turbulence. King concluded his remarks by asking: ‘On what scale of values is this a program of progress?’ (King, as cited in Gilroy, 1991 [1987], pp. 345–346). Spectacular Cold War images of space travel drew on and renovated a constellation of meanings associated with mobility that inform US national identity, including celebratory narratives of continental explora- tion, limitless possibility, and freedom. Kennedy did not see any conflict between mastering space travel and meeting domestic needs – each a concrete signification of American capitalist providence in the Cold War period. King’s speech marks both of these registers. His imagined telescopic view of the earth traverses an expansive scale of human possi- bility, but under Pax Americana, King finds that ‘common humanity’ is an ideological vision papering over the reality of grave economic and racial divisions. Even before a man (much less The Man) was on the moon, liberal and radical social critics alike were deploying a rhetorical device I call lunar criticism – ‘If we can put a man on the moon, we can do X, Y, or Z’ – to question US national priorities and narratives of progress. Liberal iterations of lunar criticism suggested that the gap between promise and practice could be bridged as part of fulfilling the national creed. Radical social critics argued that what appeared to be an incidental gap was in fact a racialized conflict. Reaching the moon began to look less like a virtuous American project than a white American project that furthered Black economic exploitation and abandonment. The space race as a spectacle of freedom and (white) upward mobility must be held in tension with the deepening ‘urban crisis’ (Beauregard, 2003). As both a powerful discourse and material geography, the urban crisis was constituted through Cold War investments in suburban hous- ing, freeways, and defense industry construction, relative disinvestment in central cities, and through militarized, counter-insurgency responses to the urban unrest of the 1960s (Loyd, 2014). Yet, the interrelations between these spaces have been obscured through enduring spectacular productions of capitalist suburban hyper-mobility and ‘ghetto’ immobi- lization and backwardness (Siddiqi, 2010). As novelist Thomas Pynchon dissected, ‘Watts’ was another country to white Americans, represent- ing a psychological distance that white Americans were disinclined to travel. This chapter situates radical iterations of lunar criticism within the context of urban crisis and on the cusp of what Jodi Melamed, following Howard Winant, calls the post-World War II ‘racial break’ after which ‘state-recognized US antiracisms replaced white supremacy as the chief ideological mode for making the inequalities that global capitalismgenerated appear necessary, natural, or fair’ (Melamed, 2011, p. xvi). By contrast, race-radical antiracisms ‘have made visible the continued racialized historical development of capitalism and have persistently fore- grounded antiracist visions incompatible with liberal political solutions to destructively uneven global social-material relations’ (p. xvii). In the spectacular treatment of urban uprisings, the space called the ‘ghetto’ ideologically and tactically cohered the problems of urban crisis, which were actually metropolitan (urban-suburban) in form and imperial in process. To develop this argument, I analyze the work of Gil Scott-Heron whose poetry, songs, and writing exemplify the race-radical tradition. His poem ‘Whitey on the Moon’ delivers a radical antiracist critique of the US space program that ties otherworldly investments to ongoing histories of Black forced im/mobility and immiseration. To that end, this essay responds to the call within the new mobilities scholar- ship to examine the ‘role of past mobilities in the present constitution of modern notions of security, identity and citizenship’ (Cresswell, 2012, p. 646). I begin by situating mobilities within post-war militarized spectacle and racial politics. I then move to an analysis of how race-radical lunar criticism grappled with the dialectics of urban crisis, which included the simultaneous deployment of rhetorics of mobility and new means of social control and state power. I conclude by exploring how Scott-Heron’s race-radical vision offers insights into contemporary mobilizations for mobility justice. Cold War spectacles of (upward) mobility What sort of national spectacle was the moon when King spoke? Spectacle tends to be understood as an ideological mask or distortion of reality, but Shiloh Krupar usefully conceptualizes spectacle as ‘a tacti- cal ontology – meaning a truth-telling, world-making strategy’ (2013, p. 10). Indeed, in Blank Spots on the Map (2009), Trevor Paglen shows how NASA was the visible institutional face of an expansive and largely secret Cold War military geography. Krupar and Paglen show how US milita- rization has developed through institutional apparatuses and personnel that create a world of plausible appearances. Visuality and material landscapes are interconnected such that hypervisibility (that is, the space race) is a technological apparatus simultaneously creating unseen spaces of waste and sacrifice. Thus, spectacle is a tool of reification and division that works by disconnecting spaces and categories – delineating human from nature, valued from abjected – that are actually produced together. Caren Kaplan’s work on the visual logic of modern war-making connects such spectacles to the mobility of states and imperial citizens. Air power is an iteration of the cosmic view, a ‘unifying gaze of an omnis- cient viewer of the globe from a distance’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 401). Kaplan ties this viewpoint – which claims universality, neutrality, and freedom ‘from bounded embeddedness on earth’ – to Euro-American coloniza- tion (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402; also see Cosgrove, 1994). Modern military ‘air power is seamlessly linked to the cosmic view through its requirements for a unified, universal map of the globe that places the home nation at the center on the ground and proposes an extension of this home to the space above it, limitlessly’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402). The upshot, according to Kaplan, is that the mobility of air power simultaneously produces an imagination of fixed sovereign territories. Indeed, for Kaplan, modern war is paradoxical in that it ‘requires the movements of large armies and instigates the mass displacement of refugees, yet it also polices borders and limits freedom of movement’ (p. 396). I take these theories of spectacle to suggest that the Cold War space race produced a modern, white, upwardly mobile subject that obscured the simultaneous co-production of an immobilized, unfree population confined to a knowable, tactical domestic space. That is, the militariza- tion of the ‘cosmic view’ facilitates not only abstract targets of foreign war, but also targets of domestic state and state-sanctioned violence and confinement. The militarized logic of the ‘home front’ both coercively compels a patriotic citizen subject and obscures the racial, gender, class, and other social divides within the nation that belie the state’s claim to national unity (Lutz 2002; Young 2003; Loyd 2011). As the United States faced vulnerability to charges of racism during the Cold War, a cultural project of racial liberalism enabling mobility of the US empire would simultaneously entail efforts to confine Black mobility and dissident thought. For example, Rachel Buff (2008) shows how the US government deployed the terror of deportation as a means of disrupting political organizing. In the immediate post-World War II era, both W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were barred from foreign travel for their views on peace, nuclear abolition, and decolonization (Kinchy, 2009; Robeson, 1988). The experience, no doubt, contributed to the observation that the Robeson epigraph makes on the race-radical desire for free mobility.

**Liberal anti-trust is the process through which Western empire, colonialism, and environmental destruction cohere themselves– antitrust scholars’ idealized capitalism irreconcilably provokes competition between worker and owner, masking the structural failure of propertization.**

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Limitations of liberal and progressive ‘techlash’ reforms In response to the rise of Big Tech, the intellectual classes in the Global North, led by American scholars, researchers and journalists, have formulated a liberal/progressive critique of Big Tech **and a corresponding set of capitalist reforms** they call the ‘techlash’. Their framework, informed by progressive-era figures like Louis Brandeis and Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), aims to restore the **Golden Age of Capitalism** through enlightened state regulation. This circuit of intellectuals are drawn primarily from elite universities (Ivy League, MIT, Stanford, Oxford, etc.) and the corporate media. Money for their research is sourced from elite academia and media outlets, wealthy foundations, philanthropists and Big Tech itself. The techlash critics ignore or downplay the **analytical and moral centrality of digital capitalism and colonialism,** ecological context and the need for a socialist transformation. A de facto vanguard within the intellectual community tuned into tech, together with Big Tech itself, these elite intellectuals set the bounds of leftist discourse and **exercise ‘tech hegemony’ over the broader narrative**.37 There are two branches of critique put forth by the American techlashers: a legal branch which focuses on anti-trust as its centrepiece to reform digital capitalism and a human rights branch which focuses on discrimination, privacy, content moderation and workers’ welfare. These intellectuals are typically in agreement with each other and often weave their critiques and solutions together. Let us consider each in turn. Legal reformers Within the legal domain, a new wave of anti-trust scholars have occupied centre-stage to address the digital economy.38 At the leftmost end of the spectrum in the United States, ‘neo-Brandeisian’ anti-trust scholars draw inspiration from Louis Brandeis, who viewed a fair and just democracy as one without extreme concentrations of wealth and power into the hands of corporations. Neo-Brandeisians share with socialists the idea that socioeconomic inequality in part springs from the monopoly power of big corporations. **However, anti-trust reformers depart from socialists in irreconcilable ways.** For one, they envision a ‘**small business capitalism’** of private property owners **kept intact by enlightened state regulators**. Socialists, by contrast, argue that the capitalist system **naturally concentrates wealth** and objects to class inequalities and private ownership of the means of production. For another, neo-Brandeisians fetishise **competition as a force for social good**, rather than a force **which pits owners and workers against each other in the battle for revenue, profits and market share.** Critically, the limits of economic growth are not acknowledged anywhere in the literature, nor are digital colonialism and American empire. **This is an analytical failure** because the fact that Big Tech corporations exercise global dominance should be evaluated in light of their international and environmental impact**. It’s as if central features of the global tech economy – American empire and ecological crisis – don’t even exist**. It is a moral failure because all parties affected should be involved in formulating and implementing remedies, but, instead, the United States’ scholars, lawmakers, courts and regulators are the ones making critical decisions about **reforming American firms with global reach.** European counterparts share in the US anti-trust reformist agenda, with an added caveat: the Europeans are explicitly trying to cut down the American super-giants in order **to build their own tech giants and colonise global markets**. In Europe, there are already tens of unicorns (privately held start-ups valued over $1 billion). Rich European countries dominate this race. The UK leads the pack and aims to produce its own trillion-dollar behemoth. President Emanuel Macron will be pumping €5 billion to tech start-ups in hopes that France will have at least twenty-five unicorns by 2025. Germany is attracting billions for its start-ups and spending €3 billion to become a global AI powerhouse and a world leader (i.e., market coloniser) in digital industrialisation. For its part, the Netherlands aims to become a ‘unicorn nation’. In 2021, the European Union’s competition commissioner, Margarethe Vestager, told the press in no uncertain terms that Europe needs to ‘build its own European tech giants’.39 Thus, the notion that European leaders are against Big Tech is demonstrably false. They are trying to shrink the American super-giants (GAFAM) so they can carve out market share for burgeoning European tech giants. It’s pure power politics – an inconvenient truth for America’s neo-Brandeisians, who laud and borrow ideas from their European counterparts. The new anti-trust scholars erase these realities from within their own **self-referential echo chambers**, and instead act as if anti-trust is a matter of remedying harms to their own citizens. This is not a small point. Even if anti-trust reforms go through**, the space created for new market entrants will almost certainly be dominated by the rich countries**, who still have **the most advanced engineers and resources** to pay them **high salaries and poach foreign talent.** Human rights reformers Another branch of analysis and solutions comes from a human-rights-oriented crowd centring around the politics of big data. This genre of ‘critical data studies’ literature blossomed during the 2010s through a corporate-academic research nexus funded by Big Tech, wealthy foundations and philanthropists. To be sure, meaningful contributions were made to the field of digital, particularly with respect to algorithmic discrimination (such as racial bias in search engine results and facial recognition). Yet this came at the expense of narrowing the focus of consideration from who owns the digital ecosystem itself – prevalent in the Free and Open Source Software community beginning in the 1980s – to one in which discrimination and data policy became paramount. A handful of other topics have been taken up by this ‘tech rights’ community, such as **content moderation and worker welfare.** Yet **these conversations have also come at the expense of a focus on property.** For example, the dominant literature on ‘content moderation’ addresses topics of who and what content companies like Facebook and Twitter will permit, amplify, or shadow-ban in their networks.40 Yet this area of concern fails to problematise **why** corporations – much less American ones – should own our social media networks in the first place, orienting them around profit, **accumulation**, wealth concentration, growth and market expansion. A more democratic option called the Fediverse – a set of public-owned and controlled, interoperable social media networks – is socialist in spirit and used by several million people every day.41 Yet content moderation scholars and media pundits virtually ignore it, at best calling for a ‘public option’ ostensibly in a mixed capitalist economy.42 As part of a non-profit industrial complex that waters down leftwing causes, donors like the Knight Foundation43 and even the Charles Koch Foundation44 are providing the funds needed to scale up this literature. Unsurprisingly, those who take the money fail to oppose American empire and capitalism proper. Unions and worker welfare form another set of topics within the human rights branch of tech ethics. Thanks to neoliberal reforms, a drop in worker unionisation has led to increased worker exploitation and inequality. Yet **the call for Big Tech worker unionisation seems rather vague and skirts major issues**. While one should support gig and warehouse worker unions trying to improve pay, working conditions and support for marginalised workers, there’s also an uncomfortable tension: Big Tech is structured to be **a colonial force of ecological destruction that needs to be dissolved as rapidly as possible.** Indeed, there’s a theme of ‘Big Tech exceptionalism’ that runs through the techlash community. For the Left, there are no calls to unionise or diversify Phillip Morris, Pfizer, Shell Oil, Goldman Sachs, Bayer/Monsanto, though there could be. Perhaps it would be justified for those corporations, too. But if so, **the workers should be pushing to dissolve their own companies – and that’s not presently being done in tech.** We also don’t have leading ‘ethics’ researchers from Pfizer, Shell Oil and the like, yet some of the most prominent techlash researchers work for Big Tech itself.45 There’s little discussion of either of these points.

#### Their theory of IR presumes the sovereign subject whose existence relies upon colonized zones of racial dispossession and propertied formations – in other words, the subject of IR theory depends on an asymmetrical segregated order of nation states. Their global order cannot exist without racial violence

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When Foucault began to write and joined the French communist party, anti-colonial struggles and revolutionary projects were brutally evident worldwide including Algeria. Fanon’s famous book Black Skin, White Masks (1967a) was published in 1952, two years before Foucault published his dissertation (1954). But before this, Fanon fought as a Frenchman against the Nazis. Macey (2000) writes that he was cited for ‘distinguished conduct’ and awarded the Croix de Guerre with a bronze star. Fanon’s experience of French republicanism in Martinique, France and Algeria convinced him that seeking to include/integrate slaves, blacks, or the colonised within the historical strictures of imperial political (universal) orders and their contingent humanist projects was not viable because of their slave-racio-colonial underpinnings, or what Achille Mbembe (2001: 24) calls the imperial commandment. Foucault published Maladie mentale et personnalite ́ (1954) two years after the two major American political parties put aside their differing geopolitical interests to support NATO and other international institutions, recognising that such structures could link the United States to the prevailing world order and expand its influence worldwide (Kupchan 2009).3 In this work, Foucault recognises that modernity (and its liberal humanist foundations) is a problem. Even so, he is ambivalent about undertaking a genealogy (Muppidi 2009; Grovogui 2007; Trouillot 2005)4 of the emergence of liberal sovereignty to demonstrate that, historically, capitalism is a zero-sum game in the exploitation of territories and peoples. Critical theorists in International Relations (IR) such as Ashley (1988) and Weber (1999) recruit Foucault to understand global power but remain mostly within the deconstruction of the liberal interstate structure. IR Marxists problematise these analyses and others that articulate the emerging global sovereignty as ‘an international state dominated by the US’, not guided by a single biopolitical ‘logic of rule’ (Kiersey 2009: 35). These IR Marxist critiques are, thus, more concerned with the imperial genealogy of globalisation and the American state’s articulation and ordering of the world.5 While Foucault is critiqued by IR Marxists regarding his theorisation of the formation of the imperial, he demonstrated its connections with political economy, biopolitics, and power in a series of lectures between 1975 and 1979: ‘Society Must be Defended’, ‘Security, Territory, Population’ and ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ (Foucault 2004, 2008). Nevertheless, his theorisations are embedded in the French liberal and a white supremacy project, so that his analyses are delimited by a universalisation that is not truly global6 because it presumes the structuring and subject of politics to be ontologically European, masculine, and propertied. For instance, he does not explicitly address French colonialism. How do those who read his texts today feel this silence? Said, for one, compares him to Fanon to critique his narrowly French experience: ‘Fanon represents the interests of a double constituency, native and Western, moving from confinement to liberation; ignoring the imperial context of his own theories, Foucault seems actually to represent an irresistible colonizing movement that paradoxically fortifies the prestige of both the lonely individual scholar and the system that contains him’ (Said 1994: 278). In re-reading Foucault with Fanon,7 Said gestures to the limits of his and other Western writers’ work whose contributions are at once indispensable and inadequate in their understanding of the realities of (neo) colonial and global multiple worlds. Why is Fanon ‘contestatory’, whereas Foucault is not? How are these contestations crucial for today’s struggles, specifically the crises of governance in the postwar liberal international order? What if our vantage point in critiquing practices, theories, and normative orders began with the violence of the wretched, ‘laying the groundwork for a theory of antagonism’ (Wilderson 2010: 7) where demands and claims cannot be satisfied by simply transferring ownership of an organisation within existing strictures (Wilderson 2005: 7)? Fanon scales colonisation to the level of the slave and colonised body. He illustrates the incommensurability of the intimate encounter of black flesh with the body of the coloniser and focuses on the structuring processes required to make it possible. He begins his critique with the normative imperial order of slavery and colonisation and those humanist interventions claiming to protect the sovereign subject. He tells us that the constitution of this sovereign subject depends on an asymmetrical segregated-order: This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species ... When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species . . . The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. (Fanon 1967d: 39–40, emphasis in original) Fanon points out that this order’s constitution depends on direct violence that turns a species into slaves, black, and colonised. This violence makes it possible for zones to become ‘civil’ spaces of ‘generalized trust’ and security for the sovereigns; the species occupying them possess ‘generalized trust’ and are racially white. This relation ends up being taken for granted: belonging to a given race of property relations is the precondition for any ‘civil’ encounter. Indeed, as Wilderson argues, ‘Fanon makes clear how some are zoned, a priori, beyond the borders of generalized trust’ (Wilderson 2010: 33). The establishment of gratuitous violence zones, positions and constitutes simultaneously the species and the colonised. Further, ‘the condition of possibility upon which subjectivity’ (Fanon 1967d: 39–40) is based must be recognised and theorised. The creation of colonised zones, the interstate state system, racialised whiteness, and property relations require theorising if we are to disrupt those relations which unify and entify a normative ‘ethical order’. Fanon, of course, is clear: without the vertical existence of breath, that is, giving one’s breath as nourishment for blackness, slavery, and colonisation, there is no such order. This order, even when it claims inclusion, segregates subjects of recognition from ‘species’. Subjects are positioned into the interstate structure of worlds with sovereign protection, able to take by force and accumulate anything, from things to life itself. Fanon seems to have anticipated Foucault who argues: ‘Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power ... The individual ... is not the vis-a`-vis of power; it is I believe, one of its prime effects’ (Foucault 1980: 98). However, Fanon does not begin with this prime effect of power, as he wants us to learn to read social relations, racism, and economies of violence as if experiencing our own gratuitous violence, in an attempt to think the impossible place of the slave, the black body, and the colonised – in other words, the living being whose existence is already assumed as structurally impossible and, hence, as breath which can never be synonymous with life. The basis of the (inter) state structure, Fanon recognises, is already the juristic sovereign person whose essence, or what Goodrich calls the sovereign that the state has a right to kill, is already secured from the threat of mutilation. On the one hand, Foucault (1990: 138) asks this about state power: ‘How could power exercise its highest prerogative by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?’ On the other hand, Fanon makes explicit the matrix of violence which requires and makes sure that species are zoned as black and colonised: ‘Individualism is the first to disappear ... the colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native’s mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual’ (Fanon 1967d: 47): Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by a dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is right when he speaks of knowing ‘them’ well. For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say, his property, to the colonial system. (Fanon 1967d: 36) But why such insistence? What tension does Fanon want to foreground? Fanon actually has a different ‘locus of enunciation’ and insists on a long trajectory of the effects of the imperial, colonial, and slave order and vertical relations of what he calls ‘combat breath’ (Fanon 1967c: 65). By drawing out Fanon’s idea of ‘combat breath’ and articulating it as struggles that disrupt the practices of violence and the final destruction of countries and people, we see that enforcing the right to life of the radical individual (the propertied man of a structure of white supremacy which depends on slavery and colonisation) will authorise thanatopolitics and necroeconomics, not by suspending a right to life but rather by enforcing a right to that ‘liberal’ life. But this minimalist right to life could preclude crucial relations in the everyday continuum-spaces of the human and the non- human, including ecologies and it does by deploying practices of disfigurement and destruction. Fanon exposes the imperial European re-assemblage of power and demonstrates that state power shifts are connected to the emergence of an ‘international’ order and apparatuses that make possible a particular sovereign-master-colonising subject. In his view, colonial power says: ‘Since you want independence, take it and starve ... A regime of austerity is imposed on these starving men; a disproportionate amount of work is required for their atrophied muscles’ (Fanon 1967d: 96). Fanon notes the prevalence of suffocation and starvation in world politics, the devouring of the flesh and the subsequent redistribution of its existential vital energy that is turned into wealth. Amelioration requires more than changing working conditions and setting up less exploitative structures (such as socialism and communism). Rather, it requires ‘regime[s] which [are] completely oriented toward the people as a whole’ which prioritise the principle ‘that man is the most precious of all possessions’.8 Such a locus will preclude ‘that caricature of society where all economic and political power is held in the hands of the few who regard the nation as whole with scorn and contempt’ (Fanon 1967d: 98). War, for both Fanon and Foucault, is part of the violent process that makes it possible to ‘rule over the ordering of the colonial world’ (Fanon 1967d: 44). Fanon posits that war involves politico-ontological claims whereas Foucault wonders about the war that gave birth to the state. For him, ‘peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other’ (Foucault 2003: 50). He adds, ‘war is both the web and the secret of institutions and systems of powers’ (2003: 110–11). For his part, Fanon knows that war’s effects on the species are horrendous. Fanon discusses the case of two Algerian boys, 13 and 14, who stab a European classmate to death, in order to make the point that, like the European colonialist, the black slave may shirk his/her humanity by pursuing violence to establish political equality. The 13-year-old describes the dead child as ‘our best friend’, targeted simply because he was a friend and thus easily lured to his death. The pair is remorseless. Fanon speaks of the racial tensions in this case and recounts ‘long conversations’ with the 14-year-old, who describes the murder as an act of revenge: ‘I wanted to take to the mountains, but I’m too young. So [the other boy] and I said . . . we would kill a European’. ‘Why’? ‘In your opinion, what do you think we should have done’? ‘I don’t know. But you are a child and the things that are going on are for grown-ups’. ‘But they kill children, too’. ‘But that’s no reason for killing your friend’. ‘Well, I killed him. Now you can do what you like’. ‘Did this friend do anything to you’? ‘No. He didn’t do anything’. ‘Well’? ‘That’s all there is to it’. (Fanon 1967d: 201) Many theorists read these passages as confirmation that Fanon is a theorist who incites violence and proposes it as the only option against colonisation. Consequently, they underrate the extent to which Fanon, a ‘dissident’, considers it important to be present completely to the slave-colonial order and its traumatic effects which are not easily disentangled, good from bad. For him, this allows a nuanced understanding of its genesis, violence, and offers the possibility of transforming systems of valuation ranging from one’s breath to universal orders. In fact, in telling this story, Fanon makes visible the multiple costs of slavery and colonialism. For him, imperialism is buried in the bones of the native (Fanon 1967d: 40). He notes the costs of an imperial and sovereign-democratic form of life, while insisting on the timing and limitations of alternatives (such as national cultures): ‘the violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world ... will be claimed and taken over by the native at the moment when, deciding to embody history in his own person, he surges into the forbidden quarters’ (Fanon 1967d: 40). He says that violence does not necessarily replace a degraded slave with a self-actualised man. In essence, Fanon invites us to take a hard look at the myriad ways we avoid the inter- existentially onto-politically-structured violence in our everyday lives. Fanon begins his analysis of war by analysing slave and colonial (structural) violence. For him, war is crucial, but which war? Is it the distinction between enmity and war between brothers (war between liberal and democratic states) and war against strangers, the object of polemos? Or is it the ‘rational’ war calculated to enable a ‘kind of stabilisation’ in the interstate system (among the colonial sovereign states themselves), thereby evading questions about the doctrine of imperialism, its forced universal order (currently led by the US), its reason, and the freedom of the individual? Fanon unequivocally answers by demanding an inquiry into a fundamental process of world politics (including imperial relations, colonial relations, and slave relations) ignored by those who want to keep this order in place by violence. For Fanon, it is not enough to talk of war and the subjects who fight these wars, as both war and racial bodies are already technologies, inscribed in the economy of slave and colonial violence through which the ‘I’ (the subject) attains individuality within a politico-juridical order that enforces its actuality antagonistically; the human body (and not sentient flesh) and war are already vertically and horizontally positioned as legitimate forms of human formation. Fanon concisely says: ‘Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state’ (Fanon 1967d: 48). This requires more than biopolitical functions such as managing bodies and things, life and wealth. Its fundamental grounds are inter-antagonistically and inter-existentially set up. It is a relationship that depends on the slave-colonial-racist dynamics that create and systematically dehumanise and black(en) the person. Fanon writes: ‘the Black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’ (Fanon 1952: 33). He adds: Colonialism . . . is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence. The policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action, maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that government speaks the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native. (Fanon 1952: 91) Fanon repeatedly articulates this antagonistic relationship as if he wants to split asunder the dominant and normative belief that slavery and colonialism consolidate politics to fit all desires and serve the interests of all.

#### Accumulation, appropriation, and extraction all occur through racial dispossession – racialized populations are fractured and territorialized to form the state of hyper-exploitation for financial capital

Wang 18, Jackie, black studies scholar, poet, multimedia artist, and PhD candidate in the Department of African and African American Studies at Harvard, “Carceral Capitalism”, <http://criticaltheoryindex.org/assets/CarceralCapitalism---Wang-Jackie.pdf>, Accessed 10/30/21 VD

Racial Capitalism and Settler Colonialism Given the dual character of capitalist accumulation identified by both Rosa Luxemburg and David Harvey, what new understanding of capitalism would be generated by focusing on dispossession and expropriation over .work and production? Contemporary political theorists as well as critical ethnic studies, black studies, and Native studies scholars and activists analyze how racial slavery and seeder colonialism provide the material and territorial foundation for U.S. and Canadian sovereignty. Rather than casting slavery and Native genocide as temporally circumscribed events chat inaugurated the birth of capitalism in the New World ("primitive accumulation"), they show how the racial logics produced by these processes persist to this day: In order to recuperate the frame of political economy, a focus on the dialectic of racial slavery and settler colonialism leads to important revisions of Karl Marx's theory of primitive accumulation. In particular, Marx designates the transition from feudal to capitalist social relations as a violent process of primitive accumulation whereby "conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part." For Marx, chis results in the expropriation of the worker, the proletariat, who becomes the privileged subject of capitalist revolution. [f we consider primitive accumulation 35 a persistent structure rather than event, both Afro-pessimism and settler colonial studies destabilize normative conceptions of capitalism through the conceptual displacements of the proletariat. As Coulthard demonstrates, in considering Indigenous peoples in relation to primitive accumulation, "it appears that the history and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state." It is thus dispossession of land through genocidal elimination, relocation, and theft that animates Indigenous resistance and anticapitalism and "less around our emergent status 35 'rightless proletarians.'" If we extend the frame of primitive accumulation to the question of slavery, it is the dispossession of the slave's body rather than the proletarianization of labor that both precedes and exceeds the frame of settler colonial and global modernity. 13 As lyko Day notes, Native dispossession occurs through the expropriation of land, while black dispossession is characterized by enslavement and bodily dispossession. Although both racial logics buttress white accumulation and are defined by a "genocidal limit concept" that constitutes these subjects as disposable, Day notes that "the racial content of Indigenous peoples is the mirror opposite of blackness. From the beginning, an eliminatory project was driven to reduce Native populations through genocidal wars and later through statistical elimination through blood quantum and assimilationist policies. For slaves, an opposite logic of exclusion was driven to increase, not eliminate, the population of slaves."14 A debate has ensued in critical ethnic studies about which axis of dispossession is capitalism's condition of possibility: the expropriation of Native land or chattel slavery? Was the U.S. made possible primarily by unbridled access to black labor, or through territorial conquest? Is the global racial order defined-as Day writes-primarily by the indigenous-settler binary or the black-nonblack binary? At stake in this debate is the question of which axis of dispossession is the "base" from which the "superstructures" of economy, national sovereignty, or even subjectivity itself emerge. Those who argue that settler colonialism is central have sometimes made the claim that even black Americans participate in settler colonialism and indigenous displacement by continuing to live on stolen land, while those who center slavery and antiblackness have sometimes viewed Native Americans as perpetrators of anriblackness insofar as some uibes have historically owned slaves and seek state recognition by making land-based claims to sovereignty-a claim that relies on a political grammar that black Americans do not have access to, as slaves were rem from their native lands when they were transported co the Americas (see Jared Sexton's "The Vel of Slavery"). Although weighing in on this debate is beyond rhe scope of this essay, I generally agree with Day's assertion that to treat this set of issues as a zero-sum game obfuscates the complexity of these processes. With that said, it is important to note that this book deals primarily with the antiblack dimensions of prisons, police, and racial capitalism, though I acknowledge that analyses of settler colonialism are equally vital to understanding the operations of racial capitalism and how race is produced through multiple expropriative logics. Gendered Expropriation Though this book focuses primarily on black racialization in a contemporary context, it is worth noting that expropriation reproduces multiple categories of difference--including the man-woman gender binary. Although categories of difference were not invented by capitalism, expropriative processes assign particular meanings to categories of difference. "Woman" is reproduced as inferior through the unwaged theft of her labor, while the esteem of the category of "man" is propped up by the valorization of his labor. Even when women are in the professional workforce, they are still vulnerable to expropriation when they are given or take on work beyond their formal duties-whether it's washing the dishes at the office, mentoring students, or doing thankless administrative work while male colleagues gee the "dysfunctional genius" pass. But above all, gendered expropriation occurs through the extraction of care labor, emotional labor, as well as domestic and reproductive labor all of which is enabled by the enforcement of a rigid gender binary. This system is propped up by gender socialization, which compels women to psychologically internalize a feeling of responsibility for others. Although, at a glance, ic might seem that the expropriation of women's labor happens primarily through housewifeitization, the marriage contract, and the assignment of child-care duties to women, in the current epoch-characterized by an aging baby boomer population and a shortage of geriatric health-care workers-women are increasingly filling this void by taking care of sick parents, family members, and loved ones. It is hardly surprising that two-thirds of those who care for chose with Alzheimer's disease are women, even as women are the primary victims of this disease. Given thac women's lives are often interrupted by both childcare duties and caring for ailing family members, it's also hardly surprising that women accumulate many fewer assets and arc more likely to retire into poverty than their male counterparts. A recent report found that the European Union gender pension gap was 40 percent, which far exceeds the gender pay gap of 16 percent. Overall, gender is a material relation that, among other things, bilks women of their futures. The aged woman who has toiled by caring for others is left with little by the end of her life. Though gender distinctions are maintained through expropriative processes, they also have consequences beyond the economic and material realm. While it could be said that disposability is the logic that corresponds to racialized expropriation, gendered subjectivation has as its corollary rapeability. It also goes without saying that these expropriative logics are not mutually exclusive, as nonwhite women and gender-nonconforming people may be subject to a different set of expropriative logics than white women. Racalized Expropriation Although I do not claim that expropriation should be defined exclusively as racialization (again, because different expropriative logics reproduce multiple categories of difference), this book deals primarily with the antiblack racial order that is produced by late-capitalist accumulation. Michael C. Dawson and Nancy Fraser are two contemporary political theorists who have defined expropriation as a racializing process in capitalist societies. In "Hidden in Plain Sight," Dawson takes Fraser to task for not acknowledging racialized expropriation as one of the "background domains" of capitalist society. Understanding the logic of expropriation, in his view, is necessary for understanding which modes of resistance are needed at this historical juncture. His article begins with a meditation on the question: Should activists and movements such as Black Lives Matter focus on racialized state violence (police shootings, mass incarceration, and so forth), or should they focus on racialized inequality cawed by expropriation and exploitation? What is the relationship between the first logic-characterized by disposability-and the second logic-characterized by exploitability and expropriability? Rather than describing these logics as distinct forms of antiblack racism, he analyzes them as two dimensions of a dynamic process whereby capitalist expropriation generates the racial order by fracturing the population into superior and inferior humans: Understanding the foundation of capitalism requires a consideration of "the hidden abode of race": the ontological distinction between superior and inferior humans-codified as race-that was necessary for slavery, colonialism, the theft of lands in the Americas, and genocide. This racial separation is manifested in the division between full humans who possess the right to sell their labor and compete within markets, and chose that are disposable, discriminated against, and ultimately either eliminated or superexploited.15 Black racialization, then, is the mark that renders subjects as suitable for-on the one hand-hyperexploitation and expropriation, and, on the other hand, annihilation. Before the neoliberal era, the racial order was propped up by the state, and racial distinctions were enforced through legal codification, Jim Crow segregation, and other formal arrangements. In a contemporary context, though the legal regime undergirding the racial order has been dismantled, race has maintained its dual character, which consists of "not only a probabilistic assignment of relative economic value but also an index of differential vulnerability to state violence." 16 In other words, vulnerability to hyperexploitation and expropriation in the economic domain and vulnerability to premature death in the political and social domains. My essay on the Ferguson Police Department and the city's program of municipal plunder is an attempt to make visible the hidden backdrop of Mike Brown's execution: the widespread racialized expropriation of black residents carried out by the criminal justice arm of the state. It is not just that Mike Brown's murder happened alongside the looting of residents at the behest of the police and the city's financial manager, but that racial legacies that have marked black residents as lootable are intimately tied to police officers' treatment of black people as killable. The two logics reinforce and are bound up with each other. In her response co Dawson's analysis of racialization as expropriation, Fraser develops Dawson's claims by looking at the interplay between economic expropriation and "politically enforced status distinctions." 17 Not only does accumulation in a capitalist society occur along the two axes of exploitation and expropriation, but one makes the other possible in that the "racialized subjection of those whom capital expropriates is a condition of possibility for the freedom of those whom it exploits." 18 In other words, the "front story" of free workers who are contracted by capitalists to sell their labor-power for a wage is enabled by, and depends on, expropriation that takes place outside this contractual arrangement. Fraser further extends Dawson's analysis by offering a historical account of the various regimes of racialization. In her analysis of the "proletarianization" of black Americans as they migrated from the South to industrial centers in the North and Midwest during the first half of the twentieth century, she points out that even in the context of industrial "exploitation," the segmented labor market was organized such that a "confiscatory premium was placed on black labor." Black industrial workers were paid less than their white counterparts. In some sense, the racialized gap in earnings can be thought of as the portion that was expropriated from black workers. It is not as though the black laborers who joined the ranks of the industrial proletariat were newly subjected to exploitation rather than expropriation, but that these two methods of accumulation were operating in tandem. In the "present regime of racialized accumulation"- which she refers to as "financialized capitalism"-Fraser notes that there has been a loosening of the binary that has historically separated who should be subjected to expropriation from who should be subjected to exploitation, and that during the present period, debt is regularly deployed as a method of dispossession: Much large-scale industrial exploitation now occurs outside the historic core, in the BRICS countries of the semi-periphery. And expropriation has become ubiquitous, afflicting not only its traditional subjects but also those who were previously shielded by their status as citizenworkers. In these developments, debt plays a major role, as global financial institutions pressure states to collude with investors in extracting value from defenseless populations. 19 While I agree with Fraser's claim that the "sharp divide" berween "expropriab le subjects and exploitable citizen-workers" has been replaced by a "contin uum" (albeit a continuum chat remains racialized), I would add that the existence of poor whites who have fallen out of the middle class or have been affected by the opiate crisis at the present juncture represents not racial progress for black Americans, but the generalization of expropriability as a condition in the face of an accumulation crisis. In other words, immiseration for all rather than a growing respect for black Americans. Fraser rightly points out that "expropriation becomes tempting in periods of crisis."20 Sometimes the methods of accumulation that were once reserved exclusively for racialized subjects bleed over and are used on those with privileged status markings. If expropriation and exploitation now occur on a continuum, then it has been made possible, in part, by late capitalism's current modus operandi: the probabilistic ranking of subjects according to risk, sometimes indexed by a person's credit score. As I will demonstrate in the coming sections, this method is not a race-neutral way of gleaning information about a subject's personal integrity, credibility, or financial responsibility. It is merely an index of already-existing inequality and a way to distinguish between which people should be expropriated from and which should be merely exploited.

#### Neoliberal capitalism will produce extinction – the system reproduces crises that depoliticize the left, undermine futural thought, and postpone its demise – the impacts are environmental collapse, endless war, and the rise of fascism

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The problem may be summarized as follows. Capitalism has indeed created the conditions for general prosperity and therefore for its own supersession. But it has also blocked, and continues to block, any hope of realizing this transformation. We cannot wait for capitalism to transform on its own, but we also cannot hope to progress by appealing to some radical Outside or by fashioning ourselves as militants faithful to some “event” that (as Badiou has it) would mark a radical and complete break with the given “situation” of capitalism. Accelerationism rather demands a movement against and outside capitalism—but on the basis of tendencies and technologies that are intrinsic to capitalism. Audre Lord famously argued that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” But what if the master’s tools are the only ones available? Accelerationism grapples with this dilemma. What is the appeal of accelerationism today? It can be understood as a response to the particular social and political situation in which we currently seem to be trapped: that of a long-term, slow-motion catastrophe. Global warming, and environmental pollution and degradation, threaten to undermine our whole mode of life. And this mode of life is itself increasingly stressful and precarious, due to the depredations of neoliberal capitalism. As Fredric Jameson puts it, the world today is characterized by “heightened polarization, increasing unemployment, [and] the ever more desperate search for new investments and new markets.” These are all general features of capitalism identified by Marx, but in neoliberal society we encounter them in a particularly pure and virulent form. I want to be as specific as possible in my use of the term “neoliberalism” in order to describe this situation. I define neoliberalism as a specific mode of capitalist production (Marx), and form of governmentality (Foucault), that is characterized by the following specific factors: 1. The dominating influence of financial institutions, which facilitate transfers of wealth from everybody else to the already extremely wealthy (the “One Percent” or even the top one hundredth of one percent). 2. The privatization and commodification of what used to be common or public goods (resources like water and green space, as well as public services like education, communication, sewage and garbage disposal, and transportation). 3. The extraction, by banks and other large corporations, of a surplus from all social activities: not only from production (as in the classical Marxist model of capitalism) but from circulation and consumption as well. Capital accumulation proceeds not only by direct exploitation but also by rent-seeking, by debt collection, and by outright expropriation (“primitive accumulation”). 4. The subjection of all aspects of life to the so-called discipline of the market. This is equivalent, in more traditional Marxist terms, to the “real subsumption” by capital of all aspects of life: leisure as well as labor. Even our sleep is now organized in accordance with the imperatives of production and capital accumulation. 5. The redefinition of human beings as private owners of their own “human capital.” Each person is thereby, as Michel Foucault puts it, forced to become “an entrepreneur of himself.” In such circumstances, we are continually obliged to market ourselves, to “brand” ourselves, to maximize the return on our “investment” in ourselves. There is never enough: like the Red Queen, we always need to keep running, just to stay in the same place. Precarity is the fundamental condition of our lives. All of these processes work on a global scale; they extend far beyond the level of immediate individual experience. My life is precarious, at every moment, but I cannot apprehend the forces that make it so. I know how little money is left from my last paycheck, but I cannot grasp, in concrete terms, how “the economy” works. I directly experience the daily weather, but I do not directly experience the climate. Global warming and worldwide financial networks are examples of what the ecological theorist Timothy Morton calls hyperobjects. They are phenomena that actually exist but that “stretch our ideas of time and space, since they far outlast most human time scales, or they’re massively distributed in terrestrial space and so are unavailable to immediate experience.” Hyperobjects affect everything that we do, but we cannot point to them in specific instances. The chains of causality are far too complicated and intermeshed for us to follow. In order to make sense of our condition, we are forced to deal with difficult abstractions. We have to rely upon data that are gathered in massive quantities by scientific instruments and then collated through mathematical and statistical formulas but that are not directly accessible to our senses. We find ourselves, as Mark Hansen puts it, entangled “within networks of media technologies that operate predominantly, if not almost entirely, outside the scope of human modes of awareness (consciousness, attention, sense perception, etc.).” We cannot imagine such circumstances in any direct or naturalistic way, but only through the extrapolating lens of science fiction. Subject to these conditions, we live under relentless environmental and financial assault. We continually find ourselves in what might well be called a state of crisis. However, this involves a paradox. A crisis—whether economic, ecological, or political—is a turning point, a sudden rupture, a sharp and immediate moment of reckoning. But for us today, crisis has become a chronic and seemingly permanent condition. We live, oxymoronically, in a state of perpetual, but never resolved, convulsion and contradiction. Crises never come to a culmination; instead, they are endlessly and indefinitely deferred. For instance, after the economic collapse of 2008, the big banks were bailed out by the United States government. This allowed them to resume the very practices—the creation of arcane financial instruments, in order to enable relentless rent-seeking—that led to the breakdown of the economic system in the first place. The functioning of the system is restored, but only in such a way as to guarantee the renewal of the same crisis, on a greater scale, further down the road. Marx rightly noted that crises are endemic to capitalism. But far from threatening the system as Marx hoped, today these crises actually help it to renew itself. As David Harvey puts it, it is precisely “through the destruction of the achievements of preceding eras by way of war, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity, abandonment and other forms of ‘creative destruction’” that capitalism creates “a new basis for profit-making and surplus absorption.” What lurks behind this analysis is the frustrating sense of an impasse. Among its other accomplishments, neoliberal capitalism has also robbed us of the future. For it turns everything into an eternal present. The highest values of our society—as preached in the business schools—are novelty, innovation, and creativity. And yet these always only result in more of the same. How often have we been told that a minor software update “changes everything”? Our society seems to function, as Ernst Bloch once put it, in a state of “sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was.” This is because, in our current state of affairs, the future exists only in order to be colonized and made into an investment opportunity. John Maynard Keynes sought to distinguish between risk and genuine uncertainty. Risk is calculable in terms of probability, but genuine uncertainty is not. Uncertain events are irreducible to probabilistic analysis, because “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.” Keynes’s discussion of uncertainty has strong affinities with Quentin Meillassoux’s account of hyperchaos. For Meillassoux, there is no “totality of cases,” no closed set of all possible states of the universe. Therefore, there is no way to assign fixed probabilities to these states. This is not just an empirical matter of insufficient information; uncertainty exists in principle. For Meillassoux and Keynes alike, there comes a point where “we simply do not know.” But today, Keynes’s distinction is entirely ignored. The Black-Scholes Formula and the Efficient Market Hypothesis both conceive the future entirely in probabilistic terms. In these theories, as in the actual financial trading that is guided by them (or at least rationalized by them), the genuine unknowability of the future is transformed into a matter of calculable, manageable risk. True novelty is excluded, because all possible outcomes have already been calculated and paid for in terms of the present. While this belief in the calculability of the future is delusional, it nonetheless determines the way that financial markets actually work. We might therefore say that speculative finance is the inverse—and the complement—of the “affirmative speculation” that takes place in science fiction. Financial speculation seeks to capture, and shut down, the very same extreme potentialities that science fiction explores. Science fiction is the narration of open, unaccountable futures; derivatives trading claims to have accounted for, and discounted, all these futures already. The “market”—nearly deified in neoliberal doctrine—thus works preemptively, as a global practice of what Richard Grusin calls premediation. It seeks to deplete the future in advance. Its relentless functioning makes it nearly impossible for us to conceive of any alternative to the global capitalist world order. Such is the condition that Mark Fisher calls capitalist realism. As Fisher puts it, channeling both Jameson and Žižek, “it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.”

#### Neoliberalism strips language of its critical possibility and produces race neutrality – this reifies whiteness and lets white people think they are free of responsibility – thus the ROB and ROJ is to endorse tactics against racial capitalism

**Giroux 03,** Henry, American and Canadian scholar and cultural critic, Communication Education, “Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0363452032000156190?journalCode=rced20>, Accessed 6/28/21 VD

Under the reign of neoliberalism in the United States, society is largely defined through the privileging of market relations, deregulation, privatization, and consumerism. Central to neoliberalism is the assumption that profit making be construed as the essence of democracy, thus providing a rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible to maximize their financial investments. Strictly aligning freedom with a narrow notion of individual interest, neoliberalism works hard to privatize all aspects of the public good and simultaneously narrow the role of the state as both a gatekeeper for capital and a policing force for maintaining social order and racial control. Unrestricted by social legislation or government regulation, market relations as they define the economy are viewed as a paradigm for democracy itself. Central to neoliberal philosophy is the claim that the development of all aspects of society should be left to the wisdom of the market. Similarly, neoliberal warriors argue that democratic values be subordinated to economic considerations, social issues be translated as private dilemmas, part-time labor replace full-time work, trade unions be weakened, and everybody be treated as a customer. Within this market-driven perspective, the exchange of capital takes precedence over social justice, the making of socially responsible citizens, and the building of democratic communities. There is no language here for recognizing antidemocratic forms of power, developing nonmarket values, or fighting against substantive injustices in a society founded on deep inequalities, particularly those based on race and class. Hence, it is not surprising that under neoliberalism, language is often stripped of its critical and social possibilities as it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine a social order in which all problems are not personal, social issues provide the conditions for understanding private considerations, critical reflection becomes the essence of politics, and matters of equity and justice become crucial to developing a democratic society. It is under the reign of neoliberalism that the changing vocabulary about race and racial justice has to be understood and engaged. As freedom is increasingly abstracted from the power of individuals and groups to participate actively in shaping society, it is reduced to the right of the individual to be free from social constraints. In this view, freedom is no longer linked to a collective effort on the part of individuals to create a democratic society. Instead, freedom becomes an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility, reducing politics to either the celebration of consumerism or a privileging of a market-based notion of agency and choice that appear quite indifferent to how power, equity, and justice offer the enabling conditions for real individual and collective choices to be both made and acted upon. Under such circumstances, neoliberalism undermines those public spaces where noncommercial values and crucial social issues can be discussed, debated, and engaged. As public space is privatized, power is disconnected from social obligations, and it becomes more difficult for isolated individuals living in consumption-oriented spaces to construct an ethically engaged and power-sensitive language capable of accommodating the principles of ethics and racial justice as a common good rather than as a private affair. According to Bauman (1998), the elimination of public space and the subordination of democratic values to commercial interests narrow the discursive possibilities for supporting notions of the public good and create the conditions for “the suspicion against others, the intolerance of difference, the resentment of strangers, and the demands to separate and banish them, as well as the hysterical, paranoiac concern with ‘law and order”’ (p. 47). Positioned within the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant economic and political philosophy of our times, neoracism can be understood as part of a broader attack against not only difference but also the value of public memory, public goods, and democracy itself. The new racism both represents a shift in how race is defined and is symptomatic of the breakdown of a political culture in which individual freedom and solidarity maintain an uneasy equilibrium in the service of racial, social, and economic justice. Individual freedom is now disconnected from any sense of civic responsibility or justice, focusing instead on investor profits, consumer confidence, the downsizing of governments to police precincts, and a deregulated social order in which the winner takes all. Freedom is no longer about either making the powerful responsible for their actions or providing the essential political, economic, and social conditions for everyday people to intervene in and shape their future. Under the reign of neoliberalism, freedom is less about the act of intervention than it is about the process of withdrawing from the social and enacting one’s sense of agency as an almost exclusively private endeavor. Freedom now cancels out civic courage and social responsibility while it simultaneously translates public issues and collective problems into tales of failed character, bad luck, or simply indifference. As Amy Elizabeth Ansell (1997) points out: The disproportionate failure of people of color to achieve social mobility speaks nothing of the justice of present social arrangements, according to the New Right worldview, but rather reflects the lack of merit or ability of people of color themselves. In this way, attention is deflected away from the reality of institutional racism and towards, for example, the “culture of poverty”, the “drug culture”, or the lack of black self-development. (p. 111) Appeals to freedom, operating under the sway of market forces, offer no signposts theoretically or politically for engaging racism, an ethical and political issue that undermines the very basis of a substantive democracy. Freedom in this discourse collapses into self-interest and as such is more inclined to organize any sense of community around shared fears, insecurities, and an intolerance of those “others” who are marginalized by class and color. But freedom reduced to the ethos of self-preservation and brutal self-interests makes it difficult for individuals to recognize the forms that racism often take when draped in either the language of denial, freedom or individual rights. In what follows, I want to explore two prominent forms of the new racism, color blindness and neoliberal racism and their connection to the New Right, corporate power, and neoliberal ideologies. Unlike the old racism, which defined racial differences in terms of fixed biological categories organized hierarchically, the new racism operates in various guises proclaiming among other things race neutrality, asserting culture as a marker of racial difference, or marking race as a private matter. Unlike the crude racism with its biological referents and pseudoscientific legitimations, buttressing its appeal to white racial superiority, the new racism cynically recodes itself within the vocabulary of the civil rights movement, invoking the language of Martin Luther King, Jr. to argue that individuals should be judged by the “content of their character” and not by the color of their skin. Amy Elizabeth Ansell (1997), a keen commentator on the new racism, notes both the recent shifts in racialized discourse away from more rabid and overt forms of racism and its appropriation particularly by the New Right in the United States and Britain: The new racism actively disavows racist intent and is cleansed of extremist intolerance, thus reinforcing the New Right’s attempt to distance itself from racist organizations such as the John Birch Society in the United States and the National Front in Britain. It is a form of racism that utilizes themes related to culture and nation as a replacement for the now discredited biological referents of the old racism. It is concerned less with notions of racial superiority in the narrow sense than with the alleged “threat” people of color pose—either because of their mere presence or because of their demand for “special privileges”—to economic, socio-political, and cultural vitality of the dominant (white) society. It is, in short, a new form of racism that operates with the category of “race”. It is a new form of exclusionary politics that operates indirectly and in stealth via the rhetorical inclusion of people of color and the sanitized nature of its racist appeal. (pp. 20––21) What is crucial about the new racism is that it demands an updated analysis of how racist practices work through the changing nature of language and other modes of representation. One of the most sanitized and yet pervasive forms of the new racism is evident in the language of color-blindness. Within this approach, it is argued that racial conflict and discrimination is a thing of the past and that race has no bearing on an individual’s or group’s location or standing in contemporary American society. Color blindness does not deny the existence of race but denies the claim that race is responsible for alleged injustices that reproduce group inequalities, privilege Whites, and negatively impacts on economic mobility, the possession of social resources, and the acquisition of political power. Put differently, inherent in the logic of color blindness is the central assumption that race has no valence as a marker of identity or power when factored into the social vocabulary of everyday life and the capacity for exercising individual and social agency. As Charles Gallagher (2003) observes, “Within the color-blind perspective it is not race per se which determines upward mobility but how much an individual chooses to pay attention to race that determines one’s fate. Within this perspective race is only as important as you allow it to be” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 12). As Jeff, one of Gallagher’s interviewees, puts it, race is simply another choice: “you know, there’s music, rap music is no longer, it’s not a black thing anymore … when it first came out it was black music, but now it’s just music. It’s another choice, just like country music can be considered like white hick music, you know it’s just a choice” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 11). Hence, in an era “free” of racism, race becomes a matter of taste, lifestyle, or heritage but has nothing to do with politics, legal rights, educational access, or economic opportunities. Veiled by a denial of how racial histories accrue political, economic, and cultural weight to the social power of whiteness, color blindness deletes the relationship between racial differences and power, and in doing so reinforces whiteness as the arbiter of value for judging difference against a normative notion of homogeneity (Goldberg, 2002, takes up this issue brilliantly, especially in pp. 200––238). For advocates of color blindness, race as a political signifier is conveniently denied or seen as something to be overcome, allowing Whites to ignore racism as a corrosive force for expanding the dynamics of ideological and structural inequality throughout society (Marable, 1998, p. 29). Color blindness is a convenient ideology for enabling Whites to ignore the degree to which race is tangled up with asymmetrical relations of power, functioning as a potent force for patterns of exclusion and discrimination, including, but not limited to, housing, mortgage loans, health care, schools, and the criminal justice system. If one effect of color blindness’s functions is to deny racial hierarchies, another consequence is that it offers Whites the belief not only that America is now a level playing field, but that the success that Whites enjoy relative to minorities of color is largely due to individual determination, a strong work ethic, high moral values, and a sound investment in education. Not only does color blindness offer up a highly racialized (though paraded as race-transcendent) notion of agency, but it also provides an ideological space free of guilt, self-reflection, and political responsibility, despite the fact that Blacks have a disadvantage in almost all areas of social life: housing, jobs, education, income levels, mortgage lending, and basic everyday services (see Bonilla-Silva, 2001, for specific figures in all areas of life, especially the chapter “White Supremacy in the Post-Civil Rights Era”). In a society marked by profound racial and class inequalities, it is difficult to believe that character and merit—as color blindness advocates would have us believe—are the prime determinants for social and economic mobility and a decent standard of living. The relegation of racism and its effects in the larger society to the realm of private beliefs, values, and behavior do little to explain a range of overwhelming realities, such as soaring black unemployment, decaying cities, and segregated schools. Paul Street (2002) puts the issue forcibly in a series of questions that register the primacy of, and interconnections among, politics, social issues, and race.

#### Reject the aff in favor of *revolutionary intercommunalism* – affirm the international movement against carceral capitalism and its technocratic managerialism

**Newton 04** (Huey Percy Newton was an African-American revolutionary, most known for co-founding the Black Panther Party with Bobby Seale. Together, Newton and Seale created the party's manifesto, the ten-point program.), “Revolutionary Intercommunalism & The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, 2004, pg. 31-33 NT recut apark 10/13/21

We say that the world today is a dispersed collection of communities. A community is different from a nation.. A community is a small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that exist to serve a small group of people. And we say further that **the struggle in the world today is between the 32 small circle that administers and profits from the empire of the United States and the peoples of the world who want to determine their own destinies.** We call this situation intercommunalism. We are now in the age of **reactionary intercommunalism**, in which a ruling circle, a small group of people, control all other people by using their technology. At the same time, we say that this technology can solve most of the material contradictions people face, that the material conditions exist that would allow the people of the world to **develop a culture that is essentially human** and would nurture those things that would allow the people to resolve contradictions in a way that would not cause the mutual slaughter of all of us. **The development of such a culture would be revolutionary intercommunalism.** Some communities have begun doing this. They liberated their territories and have established provisional governments. We recognize them, and say that these governments represent the people of China, North Korea, the people in the liberated zones of South Vietnam, and the people in North Vietnam. We believe their examples should be followed so that the order of the day would not be reactionary intercommunalism (empire) but revolutionary intercommunalism. The people of the world, that is, must seize power from the small ruling circle and expropriate the expropriators, pull them down from their pinnacle and make them equals, and distribute the fruits of our labor, that have been denied us, in some equitable way. We know that the machinery to accomplish these tasks exists and we want access to it. 33 Imperialism has laid the foundation for world communism, and imperialism itself has grown to the point of reactionary intercommunalism because the **world is now integrated into one community**. The communications revolution, combined with the expansive domination of the American empire, has created the "global village." The peoples of all cultures are under siege by the same forces and they all have access to the same technologies. There are only differences in degree between what's happening to the Blacks here and what’s happening to all of the people in the world, including Africans. **Their needs are the same and their energy is the same.** And the contradictions they suffer will only be resolved when the people establish a revolutionary intercommunalism where they share all the wealth that they produce and live in one world. The stage of history is set for such a transformation: the technological and administrative base of socialism exists. When the people seize the means of production and all social institutions, then there will be a qualitative leap and a change in the organization of society. It will take time to resolve the contradictions of racism and all kinds of chauvinism; but because the people will control their own social institutions, **they will be free to re-create themselves and to establish communism**, a stage of human development in which human values will shape the structures of society. At this time the world will be ready for a still higher level, of which we can now know nothing.

## 2

#### CP: The United States Federal Government should reduce anticompetitive business practices in regard to the appropriation by private entities in accordance with higher ethical principles

#### Space policies are all grounded on representations of outer space and rely on a virtual relationship to space itself produced by mediated technological which makes weaponization and conflict inevitable

Bormann 9 (Natalie Bormann – Teaching Professor at Northeastern University. “The lost dimension? A spatial reading of US weaponisation of space” Ch. 5 in *Securing Outer Space: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Space* (2009) pgs. 81-89. <https://books.google.com/books?id=xHt8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA78&lpg=PA78&dq=virilio+and+%22outer+space%22&source=bl&ots=stoPb9axPg&sig=ACfU3U1kOc7P7ncw4EeHZ-k5I0XgAK6jbw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj9isOt_6XjAhWpxVkKHY5SB0MQ6AEwCXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=virilio%20and%20%22outer%20space%22&f=false>, DOA: 8/1/19,)

The representation of a ‘battlefield’ and combat in and through space is certainly contingent in our reading of key documents; for instance, in 2001, the US Space Commission evoked the powerful image that the US is an ‘attractive candidate for another Pearl Harbor’ in space, making the case that weapons in space were needed to counter perceived US vulnerabilities in form of an attack on a virtual US territory and habitat in space. Further examples for the ways in which claims to spatiality are deeply implicated in the forging of US space weaponisation abound; they range from mapping outer space as a ‘final frontier’, the ‘ultimate high ground’, or a space that follows ‘the rules of the road’ for which there is a ‘space road map’. One finds these discourses generally embedded within the logic of the our/their space nexus coupled with the attributes of defending our space versus an offending other that allow for the drawing of the boundaries around space. In 2004, US Strategic Command (2004) contemplated that the first step in space control is identifying exactly what’s in orbit around the Earth, who it belongs to, and its mission. It goes on to claim that space control involves the ability to ‘ensure our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries. And lastly, the US National Space Policy of 1996 narrates a story along similar lines when it proposes the need to assure that ‘hostile forces cannot prevent our use of space’. How does this matter? I argue that the task of tracing these constructions of spatiality, the meaning-giving of the ‘material’ as reality, is vital for the direction space policies have taken (and will continue to take). There is no spatiality – as produced in the aforementioned examples – that is not organised by the determination of frontiers and boundaries that in turn determine the space ‘inside’ these drawn lines. The virtual function of space weapons is what has allowed for the process of ‘drawing’ and mapping around ‘our space’, and has allowed for ‘stationing’ weapons to control, patrol and defend along a virtual territory with virtual frontiers (the extend of which has been determined by the reach of technology). The construction of a space of a certain kind, and the protection of its ‘new’ frontiers, is what precedes its weaponisation; it is what renders it meaningful. If we assume the construction of space, as opposed to the notion that space can be explored, then we need to ask: what has informed this process? What turns space into a battlefield? ‘[War] now takes place in “aero-electro-magnetic space”. It is equivalent to the birth of a new type of flotilla, a home fleet, of a new type of naval power, but in orbital space’ (Virilio 2000b). What should be clear by now is that material space is pre-constructed. According to Virilio, it is the technical that precedes the spatial. The possibility of new military technology underpins the ways we invent and organise our environment, geographies and landscapes. And it is the effects of technology which produces outer space as a place and authorises contingent action in support of weaponisation. This is not to suggest that technologies have an existence of and on their own and independent of social practice; of course, technology cannot be studied in isolation (see Bourdieu 1992). The new technologies that allow us to penetrate outer space are producing new domains of experience and new modes of representations and perception. Now, that technology is deeply infatuated with current policies in outer space comes to no surprise, and we find ourselves amidst visions of ‘hyper-spectral imagery’, ‘advanced electro-optical warning sensors’ and ‘space-based radars and lasers’. While I am interested in these technologies of, and soon in, space I am even more interested in the ways in which they augment spatiality and accelerate claims to, and over, spatial authority. Thus, how do these technologies relate to space? Virilio is clear on this: to begin with, and to strip these technologies of their obfuscation, they shrink the planet (and space outwith the planet, the exoatmospheric); and they do so in two ways. First, Virilio insists that technologies lead to a doing away of spatial distance and the geo-strategic reference points that go with it. As the Rumsfeld Commission put it quite aptly, ‘Space enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals and government offices’ (US Space Commission 2001). To take this notion further and to include the idea of a space-based laser as an example, from any given spot in outer space we will be able to strike and destroy each other at any given point and at any given time. Space stops to matter. The author contends that technologies therefore lead space to suffer from ‘torsion and distortion, in which the most elementary reference points disappear one by one’ (Virilio 1991: 30). The foreseeable deployment of a space-based laser, or, of a kinetic energy interceptor missile (designed to ‘hit and kill’ an incoming hostile missile) are testament to this sense of distortions insofar as space-based weapons would overcome the ‘location problem’ and the need of proximity close to target. As a recent study put it aptly, ‘interceptors fired from orbiting satellites could in principle defend the United States against ICBMs launched from anywhere on Earth [. . .]. Their coverage would not be constraint by geography’. The Transformation Study Report of 27 April 2001, reflects similar sentiments, claiming that ‘Space capabilities are inherently global, unaffected by territorial boundaries or jurisdirectional limitations’ [emphasis added]. It follows from here that, second, technologies ‘reduce-distance-reduce-reaction-time’ – or, as Virilio puts it much more eloquently: not only does technology deterritorialise space it also de-personalises it (and us in our relation to space). No doubt, outer space plays a key role in the ‘real-time’ enhancement of military operations on a global scale. Satellites are not only used to spot targets as they emerge and transmit data but they also allow us to offset weapons that meet these targets anywhere and at any time – instantly. The swiftness blurs if not erases the assumed (and familiar) distinction between offence and defence, which affects our views on spatiality insofar as the image of the battlefield can now become ubiquitous: ‘Every place becomes the front line’ (Virilio 1991: 132). Virilio further clarifies this for us; whereas in the past there was a sense that the ‘front’ is where the tanks are, now, he suggests, we assume that ‘where we find the satellites there is the fourth front’ (Virilio 2002: 3). This is furthered and amplified by the US Air Force vision that calls for ‘prompt global strike space systems with the capability to directly apply force from or through Space against terrestrial targets’ (US Air Force Space Command 2003). And fast forward to the present, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 is clear in its visualisation for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in which it seeks to establish what it aptly terms an ‘unblinking eye’ over the ‘battlespace’ that suggests the instant, constant and ‘persistent surveillance’ of US space in outer space (Quadrennial Defense Review 2006: 55). For Virilio, this process of de-materialisation of space in outer space along these lines can turn into a de-realisation of the objectives of fighting and destruction, and as suggested by the problematic of proximity that this chapter addresses. There is no time left for reflecting on, and responding to, warfare and its mode of targeting, hitting, destruction and killing and, subsequently, no time to invent space differently. The author expresses this as the ‘dematerialization of armaments, de-personalisation of command, de-realisation of the aims of war’ (Virilio 2000: 87). In an attempt to close the circle to the start of this chapter and draw the line back to the notion of an imagination of outer space as a battlefield – yet devoid of matter – consider the following: creating, fabricating, moulding and representing a field of combat in outer space, ubiquitous and instant in its ability to project modes of destruction and killing, in fact determines, reproduces and locks in the very existence and rationale of the need to defend space against an other, colonise space before a competitor can do so, and divide space into ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. Put differently, the invention of outer space as a battlefield with the above ‘qualities’ assumes a notion of vulnerability and threat to that space – at any time and from anywhere – before it in fact becomes one. Thus, outer space as a sphere of permanent crisis in effect constitutes and constructs the very reality that it purports to counter. I am referring here to Carol Cohn’s (1987) argument that military projects pre-empt threats and threatening intentions. In the context of past US/Soviet rivalry she contends that, if one asks what the Soviets ‘can’ do, one quickly comes to assume that ‘that is what they intend to do’. In other words, strategic planning and the logic of worst-case-scenarios commit us to assume something will happen. Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of normalization’ springs to mind by way of summary, and by which the author depicts technology as an essential component in the systematic creation, classification and control of space, habitat and its claim to contingent action drawn from that control over that space. I began this chapter by implicitly suggesting that the ‘problem’ of outer space lies in the fact that – unlike the ‘blue sky above us’ or the ‘Azure Coast’ in the Virilio quote at the outset – we cannot ‘see’ outer space; unlike the tanks, guns, and soldiers, on ground and air, we cannot ‘see’ the satellites, anti-satellite weapons and space-based lasers. Both the place of outer space and its reference points for space-based weapons are presented to us through that which we can know about them – a particular reality, a certain landscape, and as organised in a meaningful and common-sensical way. This is not to suggest, however, that what we ‘see’ (again, ‘the blue sky’) is not equally dependent on that which we can know about it. According to Virilio, there is ‘little’ physicality in our geographical vision; most of what we ‘see’ is achieved through certain modes of representation, technology, narrating, and so forth. In this sense, this chapter was interested in that which we cannot look at on, and from, Earth and in the distance – yet, which is always-already ‘Earth-bound’ and locally embedded. It was interested in the landscapes and geographies of outer space which we cannot ‘see’ and visualise – yet, which are presented to us and narrated as spatially contingent. And it was concerned with the military technologies in outer space which are ‘Earth-bound, locally embedded, and close to us’ – yet, which provide for the possibility of a mode of war fighting and destruction ‘from the distance’, clean and sanitised, instant and with no time left for reflection.

## Case

### Method

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### Util

#### The aff’s theorization of race is white eugenics and allows for the real and psychic extermination of blackness to prioritize “threats” to the white body – this flips their try or die calculus

Preston 17, John, Bath Spa University, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education”, Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316728254_Rethinking_Existential_Threats_and_Education>, Accessed 12/5/21 VD

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster. Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT. In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination. Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people. In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat. Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

#### No, just do it

Dillon 13 [Stephen, Prof. Queer Studies @ Hampshire College, “‘It’s here, it’s that time:’ Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in *Born in Flames*,” *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* vol. 23 no. 1,pp. 45-7//ak]

In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end. In her writing from captivity, Angela Davis articulates this logic in relationship to the prison. In the 1971 essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis argues that the sole purpose of the police was to “intimidate blacks” and “to persuade us with their violence that we are powerless to alter the conditions of our lives” (39). Davis theorizes the violence of police and prisons as pervasive and unrelenting. Throughout the essay, Davis names the complicity between an anti-blackness as old as liberal freedom and new forms of penal and policing technologies that emerged in the 1970s in response to political upheaval and insurrection. Davis calls for the abolition of what she terms the “law-enforcement-judicial-penal network” in addition to arguing for the construction of a mass movement that could contest the “victory of fascism” (50). Yet, in line with the political imaginaries at the time – an imaginary articulated by Born In Flames – Davis wanted more than an end to the prison and the violence of the police. Like other early black feminist writing, Davis did not just call for the overthrow of one form of state power so that a new one may take its place. Instead, Davis implied that the social order itself must be undone. For Davis, the prison was not the primary problem. The prison was made possible by the libidinal, symbolic, and discursive regimes that actualized the uneven institutionalized distribution of value and disposability along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality. Davis called for the total epistemological and ontological undoing of the forms of knowledge and subjectivity that were produced by the racial state. In short, hope, for Davis, meant that the prison could not have a future, and more so, that a world that could have the prison would need to end as well. Critically, Jackson did not understand the end of the future of the social order as particularly different from his present because “I’ve lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief” (1972, 7). Jackson’s understanding of the future arose from his critique of reform. Derived from his correspondence with Davis, Jackson argued that the essence of fascism was reform or more specifically “economic reform” (118).11 Every reform that modified or improved the operations of global capitalism and white supremacy only extended the life of the social order. And the life of the social order, according to Jackson and Fanon, is parasitic on the control, exploitation, incarceration, and premature death of black people. The creation of a new world could not rely on “long term politics” because patience, reform, and change meant nothing to “the person who expects to die tomorrow” (10). For Jackson, the future is a time those without a future cannot risk. The future was not coming and so the present could not wait.

#### We must adopt an ethic that is willing to risk total extinction in order to form the ethical subjectivities that are actually oriented towards a world without antiblackness.

Pinkard 13, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves), and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us. To shake free of this cycle, we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual. We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire civilization. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet requires a total risk of everything — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is people’s willingness to pay with their own lives. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip. This is what Daniel Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers. It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

### Advantage

#### **US hegemony is high now and destabilizing every possible theater, it’s a form of globalized warfare that leaves no part of the Earth, or space, untouched, this creates tensions, escalates conflicts, and link turns every impact to their DA.**

Sjursen 18. Danny Sjursen, US Army strategist and former history instructor at West Point, he served tours with reconnaissance units in Iraq and Afghanistan,11-21-2018, "The United States Is Militarizing the Globe," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/pentagon-united-states-military-worldwide-global-war/

American militarism has gone off the rails—and this middling career officer should have seen it coming. Earlier in this century, the US military not surprisingly focused on counterinsurgency as it faced various indecisive and seemingly unending wars across the Greater Middle East and parts of Africa. Back in 2008, when I was still a captain newly returned from Iraq and studying at Fort Knox, Kentucky, our training scenarios generally focused on urban combat and what were called security-and-stabilization missions. We’d plan to assault some notional city center, destroy the enemy fighters there, and then transition to pacification and “humanitarian” operations. Of course, no one then asked about the dubious efficacy of “regime change” and “nation building,” the two activities in which our country had been so regularly engaged. That would have been frowned upon. Still, however bloody and wasteful those wars were, they now look like relics from a remarkably simpler time. The US Army knew its mission then (even if it couldn’t accomplish it) and could predict what each of us young officers was about to take another crack at: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fast forward eight years—during which this author fruitlessly toiled away in Afghanistan and taught at West Point—and the US military ground presence has significantly decreased in the Greater Middle East, even if its wars there remain “infinite.” The United States was still bombing, raiding, and “advising” away in several of those old haunts as I entered the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Nonetheless, when I first became involved in the primary staff officer training course for mid-level careerists there in 2016, it soon became apparent to me that something was indeed changing. Our training scenarios were no longer limited to counterinsurgency operations. Now, we were planning for possible deployments to—and high-intensity conventional warfare in—the Caucasus, the Baltic Sea region, and the South China Sea (think: Russia and China). We were also planning for conflicts against an Iranian-style “rogue” regime (think: well, Iran). The missions became all about projecting US Army divisions into distant regions to fight major wars to “liberate” territories and bolster allies. One thing soon became clear to me in my new digs: Much had changed. The US military had, in fact, gone global in a big way. Frustrated by its inability to close the deal on any of the indecisive counterterror wars of this century, Washington had decided it was time to prepare for “real” war with a host of imagined enemies. This process had, in fact, been developing right under our noses for quite a while. You remember in 2013 when President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began talking about a “pivot” to Asia—an obvious attempt to contain China. Obama also sanctioned Moscow and further militarized Europe in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Crimea. President Trump, whose “instincts,” on the campaign trail, were to pull out of America’s Middle Eastern quagmires, turned out to be ready to escalate tensions with China, Russia, Iran, and even (for a while) North Korea. With Pentagon budgets reaching record levels—some $717 billion for 2019—Washington has stayed the course, while beginning to plan for more expansive future conflicts across the globe. Today, not a single square inch of this ever-warming planet of ours escapes the reach of US militarization. Think of these developments as establishing a potential formula for perpetual conflict that just might lead the United States into a truly cataclysmic war it neither needs nor can meaningfully win. With that in mind, here’s a little tour of Planet Earth as the US military now imagines it. OUR OLD STOMPING GROUNDS: FOREVER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA Never apt to quit, even after 17 years of failure, Washington’s bipartisan military machine still churns along in the Greater Middle East. Some 14,500 US troops remain in Afghanistan (along with much US air power) though that war is failing by just about any measurable metric you care to choose—and Americans are still dying there, even if in diminished numbers. In Syria, US forces remain trapped between hostile powers, one mistake away from a possible outbreak of hostilities with Russia, Iran, Syrian President Assad, or even NATO ally Turkey. While American troops (and air power) in Iraq helped destroy ISIS’s physical “caliphate,” they remain entangled there in a low-level guerrilla struggle in a country seemingly incapable of forming a stable political consensus. In other words, as yet there’s no end in sight for that now 15-year-old war. Add in the drone strikes, conventional air attacks, and special forces raids that Washington regularly unleashes in Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Pakistan, and it’s clear that the US military’s hands remain more than full in the region. If anything, the tensions—and potential for escalation—in the Greater Middle East and North Africa are only worsening. President Trump ditched President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal and, despite the recent drama over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, has gleefully backed the Saudi royals in their arms race and cold war with Iran. While the other major players in that nuclear pact remained on board, President Trump has appointed unreformed Iranophobe neocons like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo to key foreign policy positions and his administration still threatens regime change in Tehran. In Africa, despite talk about downsizing the US presence there, the military advisory mission has only increased its various commitments, backing questionably legitimate governments against local opposition forces and destabilizing further an already unstable continent. You might think that waging war for two decades on two continents would at least keep the Pentagon busy and temper Washington’s desire for further confrontations. As it happens, the opposite is proving to be the case. POKING THE BEAR: ENCIRCLING RUSSIA AND KICKING OFF A NEW COLD WAR Vladimir Putin’s Russia is increasingly autocratic and has shown a propensity for localized aggression in its sphere of influence. Still, it would be better not to exaggerate the threat. Russia did annex the Crimea, but the people of that province were Russians and desired such a reunification. It intervened in a Ukrainian civil war, but Washington was also complicit in the coup that kicked off that drama. Besides, all of this unfolded in Russia’s neighborhood as the US military increasingly deploys its forces up to the very borders of the Russian Federation. Imagine the hysteria in Washington if Russia were deploying troops and advisers in Mexico or the Caribbean. To put all of this in perspective, Washington and its military machine actually prefer facing off against Russia. It’s a fight the armed forces still remain comfortable with. After all, that’s what its top commanders were trained for during the tail end of an almost half-century-long Cold War. Counterinsurgency is frustrating and indecisive. The prospect of preparing for “real war” against the good old Russians with tanks, planes, and artillery—now, that’s what the military was built for! And despite all the over-hyped talk about Donald Trump’s complicity with Russia, under him, the Obama-era military escalation in Europe has only expanded. Back when I was toiling hopelessly in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army was actually removing combat brigades from Germany and stationing them back on US soil (when, of course, they weren’t off fighting somewhere in the Greater Middle East). Then, in the late Obama years, the military began returning those forces to Europe and stationing them in the Baltic, Poland, Romania, and other countries increasingly near to Russia. That’s never ended and, this year, the US Air Force has delivered its largest shipment of ordnance to Europe since the Cold War. Make no mistake: War with Russia would be an unnecessary disaster—and it could go nuclear. Is Latvia really worth that risk? From a Russian perspective, of course, it’s Washington and its expansion of the (by definition) anti-Russian NATO alliance into Eastern Europe that constitutes the real aggression in the region—and Putin may have a point there. What’s more, an honest assessment of the situation suggests that Russia, a country whose economy is about the size of Spain’s, has neither the will nor the capacity to invade Central Europe. Even in the bad old days of the Cold War, as we now know from Soviet archives, European conquest was never on Moscow’s agenda. It still isn’t. Nonetheless, the US military goes on preparing for what Marine Corps Commandant General Robert Neller, addressing some of his forces in Norway, claimed was a “big fight” to come. If it isn’t careful, Washington just might get the war it seems to want and the one that no one in Europe or the rest of this planet needs. CHALLENGING THE DRAGON: THE FUTILE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY IN ASIA The United States Navy has long treated the world’s oceans as if they were American lakes. Washington extends no such courtesy to other great powers or nation-states. Only now, the US Navy finally faces some challenges abroad—especially in the Western Pacific. A rising China, with a swiftly growing economy and carrying grievances from a long history of European imperial domination, has had the audacity to assert itself in the South China Sea. In response, Washington has reacted with panic and bellicosity. Never mind that the South China Sea is Beijing’s Caribbean (a place where Washington long felt it had the right to do anything it wanted militarily). Heck, the South China Sea has China in its name! The US military now claims—with just enough truth to convince the uninformed—that China’s growing navy is out for Pacific, if not global, dominance. Sure, at the moment China has only two aircraft carriers, one an old rehab (though it is building more) compared to the US Navy’s 11 full-sized and nine smaller carriers. And yes, China hasn’t actually attacked any of its neighbors yet. Still, the American people are told that their military must prepare for possible future war with the most populous nation on the planet. In that spirit, it has been forward deploying yet more ships, Marines, and troops to the Pacific Rim surrounding China. Thousands of Marines are now stationed in Northern Australia; US warships cruise the South Pacific; and Washington has sent mixed signals regarding its military commitments to Taiwan. Even the Indian Ocean has recently come to be seen as a possible future battleground with China, as the US Navy increases its regional patrols there and Washington negotiates stronger military ties with China’s rising neighbor, India. In a symbolic gesture, the military recently renamed its former Pacific Command (PACOM) the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Unsurprisingly, China’s military high command has escalated accordingly. They’ve advised their South China Sea Command to prepare for war, made their own set of provocative gestures in the South China Sea, and also threatened to invade Taiwan should the Trump administration change America’s longstanding “One China” policy. From the Chinese point of view, all of this couldn’t be more logical, given that President Trump has also unleashed a “trade war” on Beijing’s markets and intensified his anti-China rhetoric. And all of this is, in turn, consistent with the Pentagon’s increasing militarization of the entire globe. NO LAND TOO DISTANT Would that it were only Africa, Asia, and Europe that Washington had chosen to militarize. But as Dr. Seuss might have said: That is not all, oh no, that is not all. In fact, more or less every square inch of our spinning planet not already occupied by a rival state has been deemed a militarized space to be contested. The United States has long been unique in the way it divided the entire surface of the globe into geographical (combatant) commands presided over by generals and admirals who functionally serve as regional Roman-style proconsuls And the Trump years are only accentuating this phenomenon. Take Latin America, which might normally be considered a non-threatening space for the United States, though it is already under the gaze of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Recently, however, having already threatened to “invade” Venezuela, President Trump spent the election campaign rousing his base on the claim that a desperate caravan of Central American refugees—hailing from countries the United States had a significant responsibility for destabilizing in the first place—was a literal “invasion” and so yet another military problem. As such, he ordered more than 5,000 troops (more than currently serve in Syria or Iraq) to the US-Mexico border. Though he is not the first to try to do so, he has also sought to militarize space and so create a possible fifth branch of the US military, tentatively known as the Space Force. It makes sense. War has long been three dimensional, so why not bring US militarism into the stratosphere, even as the US Army is evidently training and preparing for a new cold war (no pun intended) with that ever-ready adversary, Russia, around the Arctic Circle. If the world as we know it is going to end, it will either be thanks to the long-term threat of climate change or an absurd nuclear war. In both cases, Washington has been upping the ante and doubling down. On climate change, of course, the Trump administration seems intent on loading the atmosphere with ever more greenhouse gases. When it comes to nukes, rather than admit that they are unusable and seek to further downsize the bloated US and Russian arsenals, that administration, like Obama’s, has committed itself to the investment of what could, in the end, be at least $1.6 trillion over three decades for the full-scale “modernization” of that arsenal. Any faintly rational set of actors would long ago have accepted that nuclear war is unwinnable and a formula for mass human extinction. As it happens, though, we’re not dealing with rational actors but with a defense establishment that considers it a prudent move to withdraw from the Cold War era Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia. And that ends our tour of the US military’s version of Planet Earth. It is often said that, in an Orwellian sense, every nation needs an enemy to unite and discipline its population. Still, the United States must stand alone in history as the only country to militarize the whole globe (with space thrown in) in preparation for taking on just about anyone. Now, that’s exceptional.