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**The spatialization of outer space is no more than the image of a battlefield. Not only is there no space war, there is no space to impede on. Terrestrial constructions of space create a 2D flattening of the cosmos that creates a permanent state of war. Ignoring this virtuality only shifts weaponry from one place to another and spatializes warfare into colonial infinity**

Bormann, 2009

Natalie Bormann, Northeastern University Teaching Professor of Political Science; Undergraduate Program Director, Securing Outer Space : International Relations Theory and the Politics of Space Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan, Chapter 5: “The lost dimension? A spatial reading of US weaponisation of space”, 2009-03-12, eBook on Proquest from csuf library, accessed 4/11/22, sb

A spatiality of outer space I think it’s there that things change. In other words, one realizes at what point, in Space, the view reveals what is most essential. Other than the view, there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus, the conquest of space, of Outer Space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of Space? (Virilio and Ujica 2003) ‘Space is accidental’ (Virilio 1991: 102). Roger Handberg (2000: 1) once wrote that ‘Space is first of all a place or location’ and hence, to contemplate space simply in strategic and military terms would be disingenuous. And clearly, there is no denying the centrality of spatiality and spatial narratives in the forging of a weaponisation of outer space. The articulation of certain boundary-producing imageries in the construction of legitimacy for deploying weapons in orbit has served to create a particular understanding of that which purports a response: a perpetuate crisis and the possibility of permanent war in outer space. Space has thus (been made to) become an opportunity, a new frontier of competition, a canvas whereupon the imaginary of confrontation and its corresponding strategy of deploying space weapons can be projected. Former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it aptly in his reaction to the US and Soviet space race during the Cold War when he warned that ‘there is an increasing danger that outer space will become man’s newest battlefield’ (Moltz 2002: 2). In retrospect, this seems now a reasonable warning, and in particular when pointing at Donald Rumsfeld who, on 8 May 2001, took unequivocal steps to assert that: there is no question but that the use of land and sea and air and Space are all things that need to be considered if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of security [. . .] that is desirable for the United States and for our friends and allies. [emphasis added] The representation of a ‘battlefield’ and combat in and through space is certainly contingent in our reading of key documents; for instance, in 2001, the US Space Commission evoked the powerful image that the US is an ‘attractive candidate for another Pearl Harbor’ in space, making the case that weapons in space were needed to counter perceived US vulnerabilities in form of an attack on a virtual US territory and habitat in space. Further examples for the ways in which claims to spatiality are deeply implicated in the forging of US space weaponisation abound; they range from mapping outer space as a ‘final frontier’, the ‘ultimate high ground’, or a space that follows ‘the rules of the road’ for which there is a ‘space road map’. One finds these discourses generally embedded within the logic of the our/their space nexus coupled with the attributes of defending our space versus an offending other that allow for the drawing of the boundaries around space. In 2004, US Strategic Command (2004) contemplated that the first step in space control is identifying exactly what’s in orbit around the Earth, who it belongs to, and its mission. It goes on to claim that space control involves the ability to ‘ensure our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries. And lastly, the US National Space Policy of 1996 narrates a story along similar lines when it proposes the need to assure that ‘hostile forces cannot prevent our use of space’. How does this matter? I argue that the task of tracing these constructions of spatiality, the meaning-giving of the ‘material’ as reality, is vital for the direction space policies have taken (and will continue to take). There is no spatiality – as produced in the aforementioned examples – that is not organised by the determination of frontiers and boundaries that in turn determine the space ‘inside’ these drawn lines. The virtual function of space weapons is what has allowed for the process of ‘drawing’ and mapping around ‘our space’, and has allowed for ‘stationing’ weapons to control, patrol and defend along a virtual territory with virtual frontiers (the extend of which has been determined by the reach of technology). The construction of a space of a certain kind, and the protection of its ‘new’ frontiers, is what precedes its weaponisation; it is what renders it meaningful. If we assume the construction of space, as opposed to the notion that space can be explored, then we need to ask: what has informed this process? What turns space into a battlefield? Military space and permanent war in space ‘[War] now takes place in “aero-electro-magnetic space”. It is equivalent to the birth of a new type of flotilla, a home fleet, of a new type of naval power, but in orbital space’ (Virilio 2000b). What should be clear by now is that material space is pre-constructed. According to Virilio, it is the technical that precedes the spatial. The possibility of new military technology underpins the ways we invent and organise our environment, geographies and landscapes. And it is the effects of technology which produces outer space as a place and authorises contingent action in support of weaponisation. This is not to suggest that technologies have an existence of and on their own and independent of social practice; of course, technology cannot be studied in isolation (see Bourdieu 1992). The new technologies that allow us to penetrate outer space are producing new domains of experience and new modes of representations and perception. Now, that technology is deeply infatuated with current policies in outer space comes to no surprise, and we find ourselves amidst visions of ‘hyper-spectral imagery’, ‘advanced electro-optical warning sensors’ and ‘space-based radars and lasers’. While I am interested in these technologies of, and soon in, space I am even more interested in the ways in which they augment spatiality and accelerate claims to, and over, spatial authority. Thus, how do these technologies relate to space? Virilio is clear on this: to begin with, and to strip these technologies of their obfuscation, they shrink the planet (and space outwith the planet, the exoatmospheric); and they do so in two ways. First, Virilio insists that technologies lead to a doing away of spatial distance and the geo-strategic reference points that go with it. As the Rumsfeld Commission put it quite aptly, ‘Space enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals and government offices’ (US Space Commission 2001). To take this notion further and to include the idea of a space-based laser as an example, from any given spot in outer space we will be able to strike and destroy each other at any given point and at any given time. Space stops to matter. The author contends that technologies therefore lead space to suffer from ‘torsion and distortion, in which the most elementary reference points disappear one by one’ (Virilio 1991: 30). The foreseeable deployment of a space-based laser, or, of a kinetic energy interceptor missile (designed to ‘hit and kill’ an incoming hostile missile) are testament to this sense of distortions insofar as space-based weapons would overcome the ‘location problem’ and the need of proximity close to target. As a recent study put it aptly, ‘interceptors fired from orbiting satellites could in principle defend the United States against ICBMs launched from anywhere on Earth [. . .]. Their coverage would not be constraint by geography’. The Transformation Study Report of 27 April 2001, reflects similar sentiments, claiming that ‘Space capabilities are inherently global, unaffected by territorial boundaries or jurisdirectional limitations’ [emphasis added]. It follows from here that, second, technologies ‘reduce-distance-reduce-reaction-time’ – or, as Virilio puts it much more eloquently: not only does technology deterritorialise space it also de-personalises it (and us in our relation to space). No doubt, outer space plays a key role in the ‘real-time’ enhancement of military operations on a global scale. Satellites are not only used to spot targets as they emerge and transmit data but they also allow us to offset weapons that meet these targets anywhere and at any time – instantly. The swiftness blurs if not erases the assumed (and familiar) distinction between offence and defence, which affects our views on spatiality insofar as the image of the battlefield can now become ubiquitous: ‘Every place becomes the front line’ (Virilio 1991: 132). Virilio further clarifies this for us; whereas in the past there was a sense that the ‘front’ is where the tanks are, now, he suggests, we assume that ‘where we find the satellites there is the fourth front’ (Virilio 2002: 3). This is furthered and amplified by the US Air Force vision that calls for ‘prompt global strike space systems with the capability to directly apply force from or through Space against terrestrial targets’ (US Air Force Space Command 2003). And fast forward to the present, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 is clear in its visualisation for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in which it seeks to establish what it aptly terms an ‘unblinking eye’ over the ‘battlespace’ that suggests the instant, constant and ‘persistent surveillance’ of US space in outer space (Quadrennial Defense Review 2006: 55). For Virilio, this process of de-materialisation of space in outer space along these lines can turn into a de-realisation of the objectives of fighting and destruction, and as suggested by the problematic of proximity that this chapter addresses. There is no time left for reflecting on, and responding to, warfare and its mode of targeting, hitting, destruction and killing and, subsequently, no time to invent space differently. The author expresses this as the ‘dematerialization of armaments, de-personalisation of command, de-realisation of the aims of war’ (Virilio 2000: 87). In an attempt to close the circle to the start of this chapter and draw the line back to the notion of an imagination of outer space as a battlefield – yet devoid of matter – consider the following: creating, fabricating, moulding and representing a field of combat in outer space, ubiquitous and instant in its ability to project modes of destruction and killing, in fact determines, reproduces and locks in the very existence and rationale of the need to defend space against an other, colonise space before a competitor can do so, and divide space into ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. Put differently, the invention of outer space as a battlefield with the above ‘qualities’ assumes a notion of vulnerability and threat to that space – at any time and from anywhere – before it in fact becomes one. Thus, outer space as a sphere of permanent crisis in effect constitutes and constructs the very reality that it purports to counter. I am referring here to Carol Cohn’s (1987) argument that military projects pre-empt threats and threatening intentions. In the context of past US/Soviet rivalry she contends that, if one asks what the Soviets ‘can’ do, one quickly comes to assume that ‘that is what they intend to do’. In other words, strategic planning and the logic of worst-case-scenarios commit us to assume something will happen. Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of normalization’ springs to mind by way of summary, and by which the author depicts technology as an essential component in the systematic creation, classification and control of space, habitat and its claim to contingent action drawn from that control over that space. The lost dimension revisited I began this chapter by implicitly suggesting that the ‘problem’ of outer space lies in the fact that – unlike the ‘blue sky above us’ or the ‘Azure Coast’ in the Virilio quote at the outset – we cannot ‘see’ outer space; unlike the tanks, guns, and soldiers, on ground and air, we cannot ‘see’ the satellites, anti-satellite weapons and space-based lasers. Both the place of outer space and its reference points for space-based weapons are presented to us through that which we can know about them – a particular reality, a certain landscape, and as organised in a meaningful and common-sensical way. This is not to suggest, however, that what we ‘see’ (again, ‘the blue sky’) is not equally dependent on that which we can know about it. According to Virilio, there is ‘little’ physicality in our geographical vision; most of what we ‘see’ is achieved through certain modes of representation, technology, narrating, and so forth. In this sense, this chapter was interested in that which we cannot look at on, and from, Earth and in the distance – yet, which is always-already ‘Earth-bound’ and locally embedded. It was interested in the landscapes and geographies of outer space which we cannot ‘see’ and visualise – yet, which are presented to us and narrated as spatially contingent. And it was concerned with the military technologies in outer space which are ‘Earth-bound, locally embedded, and close to us’ – yet, which provide for the possibility of a mode of war fighting and destruction ‘from the distance’, clean and sanitised, instant and with no time left for reflection.

#### Using any domain analogies to describe asteroids is inappropriate – comparison with any earth-based or anthropogenic scenarios are problematic, asteroids are unique and should not be spatial related to terrestrial domain analogies

Mendenhall, 2018

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Finally, the problem of catastrophic and existential risks from asteroid collision is neither acknowledged nor addressed by the outer space regime. None of the domain analogies drawn upon during its formation capture the magnitude of this threat. Collision is now generally understood to be inevitable, but this realization emerged after the core elements of the OST regime were negotiated. Astronomers in the 1980s began to realize that near Earth objects were numerous, and many came “uncomfortably close to Earth.”64 . Humanity has a clear, definite collective interest in preparing for the detection and diversion of collision scenarios: “An asteroid or comet is the only natural disaster that can wipe out human society and the only natural disaster that human society can prevent.”65 And because the development and deployment of deflection techniques requires a long lead-time, starting now is imperative to avoid the risk of asteroid collision.66 Continued reliance on analogies will not effectively account for this threat. Even if it were compared with Earth-based or anthropogenic catastrophe scenarios, the risk of asteroid collision has an essential and unique feature: unlike most natural disasters, “cosmic hazards are unusual in that they are not spatially selective…any point on the planet appears to have a similar chance of being struck.”67 This randomness makes the threat seem diffuse, when it is actually very acute in the places that are struck, with reverberating consequences that damage surrounding regions. This situation creates a special need and challenge for regime building, one that could be overlooked when relying on other domain analogies.

#### Space resources are impossible and the idea that they are attainable through mining and technology reappropriate frontier mindsets

Mendenhall, 2018

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The image of the frontier implies a fundamental similarity between the history of human access to land, atmosphere, ocean, and space. In each planetary domain, humans used advancing technology to access new resources and territorialize new spaces. The vision of outer space as the ‘final frontier’ implies big payoffs for intrepid explorers, and a way for sovereign states to advance their power and prestige. But the frontier analogy elides the nature of distance in outer space. It implies that the mineral resources on celestial bodies are “accessible, no farther beyond our grasp than the oil beneath the Beaufort” Sea. 52 Many tantalizing space resources, and especially the prospect of colonies, are out of reach of the physiological limitations of the human body (without major technological innovation). Space travel outside the solar system would exceed the human life span. For humans to survive in outer space, all the basic features of the Earth environment must be recreated and maintained. Although other frontiers, like Antarctica and the deep ocean, were rugged and challenging, those frontiers were a part of the Earth’s planetary system and therefore similar or proximate to livable parts of the planet. Those frontiers also have physical edges and ends which are finite and knowable. Outer space is theoretically and practically infinite, a frontier that can never really be crossed.

#### Geographic understandings of debris only recreated the hegemonic conditions of debris

Hunter/Nelson, 2021

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Dominant preoccupations with the operational capacity of orbit and collision risk place their focus on functionalist paradigms of orbital space and debris objects. The narratives created here—often both produced by and reproducing hegemonic geographical imaginations of orbital space—limit how debris are engaged with. We now highlight a selection of more capacious geographical imaginations of orbital space to offer inspiration for how scholars and stakeholders might (and do) engage with orbital debris differently. We hope that such expanded and creative engagements may better reflect the diversity of relationships between the terrestrial and extraterrestrial, as well as the unfathomable time scales of orbital objects.

Space archeologist Alice Gorman suggests an alternative imagination by arguing for a more heterogeneous view of orbital debris wherein outer space is considered a cultural landscape (Gorman 2005, 2009, 2019, 2020). This approach goes beyond human–nature dichotomies, recognizing places as co-created through human–environment interaction (Gorman 2005). Gorman embraces the cultural significance and complexity of near-Earth space, and she argues that terms like “wilderness” and “final frontier” are outdated given the now-multifaceted interactions between “the space environment and human material culture” (2005: 86). Through this, Gorman liberates space objects from risk and mitigation frameworks that regard all debris as out of place, assessing orbital matter instead through its “social, historical, aesthetic, and scientific significance” (Gorman 2009: 382). Considering the still-orbiting 1958 Vanguard 1 satellite, Gorman (2009) questions how attempts to “solve the space junk problem” could inadvertently destroy the cultural heritage of outer space, as defunct historic satellites are technically debris. She suggests that “the natural setting for these artefacts is the orbital landscape, and where they do not constitute a collision risk, there is no reason to remove them” (2020: 244). Gorman (2009) does not disregard the serious consequences that may result from debris-based collision events, but rather argues that the cultural heritage value of debris objects should also be considered and perhaps protected in the management of orbital space. This cultural landscape approach provides one possible alternative to narrowly functionalist paradigms of orbital space.

#### The impact is environmental geopolitics – that instrumentalizes outer space, stripping the cosmos of anything beyond it’s potential to be exploited, ushering in realpolitik regimes of control.

Klinger 19 (Julie Michelle Klinger - geographer and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space” Geopolitics <http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/03/Environmental-Geopolitics-and-Outer-Space.pdf>, DOA: 5/27/19, kbb)

The contemporary space race has a measurable environmental footprint on the surface of the Earth, in the atmosphere, and beyond. Since the 1960s, over three hundred rocket launch sites have been built globally. Many were built by colonial or imperial powers in post-colonial states to take advantage of more desirable equatorial launch locations, where less fuel is required to escape Earth’s gravitational pull. Among these, seventeen spaceports hosted ninety launches in 2017, each releasing between eighteen and twenty thousand tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and discharging fuel wastes into the ocean. These launches ferried astronauts and satellites to an orbital space that is littered with a hundred million pieces of debris. Five of the largest active launch facilities – Kennedy, Baikonur, Jiuquan, Alcântara, and Guiana – cover a combined 11,000 square kilometers. The environmental impacts of these activities transform space among diverse communities, in our atmosphere, and on the celestial bodies reached by humans and human-made machines. The environmental geopolitics of Earth and outer space are inextricably linked by the spatial politics of privilege and sacrifice – among people, places, and institutions. This paper unpacks several key terms – the environment, geopolitics, environmental geopolitics and environmental justice – and situates them within contemporary geographies of Earth and outer space to make the case for the immediacy of outer space to environmental concerns. At a time when the enclosure and militarization of outer space is being normalized in US political and popular discourse, a critical environmental approach to outer space serves several purposes. Environmental geopolitics enables us to rethink outer space through concrete processes that transform environments on Earth, in space, and in the atmosphere, the latter of which we typically define as the boundary between “inner” and “outer” space (Olson and Messeri 2015). Transforming these environments involves territorial politics, which are always about power/knowledge (Foucault 1980; Ó Tuathail 1996). Power/knowledge is exercised through the territorial practices of states, firms, and individuals in the ongoing production of space on and off Earth (Beery 2016a; Dickens and Ormrod 2016). An environmental geopolitics approach to outer space renders seemingly far out ideas concrete by engaging the tangible processes through which the immensity of the cosmos is made political, differentiated, and contested. This not only facilitates more rigorous empirical social science research and theory development with respect to outer space, but also reveals the stakes of ongoing processes of privatization and militarization of the greatest global commons. These processes threaten to expropriate all but an extreme minority of a peaceful cosmos explored for the benefit of all humankind, as stipulated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (UN 1967), signed by all space-faring states. This article proceeds as follows. Section one reviews geopolitical approaches to outer space environments in order to show how differentially empowered actors conceive of and relate to outer space. Section two describes outer space as an environment in order to establish it as a milieu in and through which environmental (in)justice can occur. Drawing on research from Brazil, the US, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, the third section presents the environmental geopolitics of outer space on Earth. The fourth section discusses orbital debris and planetary protection protocols as empirical entry points into environmental geopolitics in outer space. Power and vulnerability mediate the distribution of benefits and harms associated with human engagement with outer space. Because diverse actors with competing territorial agendas produce the spaces of outer space, questions of outer space are necessarily geopolitical. The manner in which we engage with outer space is environmental, insofar as we transform Earthly environments to get to and from outer space, we use space-based technologies to understand Earthly environments, and our engagement with outer space, whether orbits, moons, asteroids, or planets, has measurable environmental footprints. Although social scientists have brought outer space into concepts of the environment in recent years,1 environmental geopolitics has not duly problematized outer space, despite its relevance to the field as well as the relevance of outer space environments to diverse domains of geopolitical inquiry. This section considers the characterization of outer space environments within several geopolitical schools of thought. Classical geopolitical approaches foreground national interests and competition, often legitimizing extraterritorial empire-building (Haushofer 1925; Machiavelli 1961; MacKinder 1904), but perspectives vary with respect to outer space. Some maintain that whichever nation gains greatest control over outer space would gain the greatest strategic advantage through its conquest of the “ultimate high ground” (Dolman 2002). The effects of this view have been the steady militarization of space by major powers such as the US, China, India, and others (Burke 2018; Stares 1985). Other state-centric approaches observe that “those who can reap the benefits of space are much more likely to succeed in our interdependent and interconnected world” (Al-Rodhan 2016, 123), and so champion international space cooperation as a means of alliance-building to protect strategic interests (JohnsonFreese and Erickson 2006; Wang 2009), or to advance international agreements among partner states (Klinger 2018; Soares, Epiphânio, and Gilberto 2009). Both share a concern with how outer space should be used to enhance geopolitical power of nation states across terrestrial space. In this view, the environments of outer space are recast as strategic assets that must be instrumentalized to increase state power and authority. Using outer space as a source of state or imperial power is nothing new. Elites have used the cosmos as a material and meaningful source of authority for millennia. Emperors and monarchs claimed that “divine mandates” installed them in their thrones (Marshall 2001; Monod 1999; Spence 1988). Religious figures backed these claims to territorial control by anthropomorphizing the evolution of the cosmos to claim privilege vested in them by a “God” or “gods” that “resided” in “the heavens” (Brown 2003; Crone and Hinds 1986; Gordis 2003; McAnany 2001; Stopler 2008). Religious figures aligned with state or imperial power positioned themselves as indispensible to appeasing heavenly powers in exchange for subordination and material wealth transfers from other people. Powerful actors past and present used claims of exclusive access to the ultimate high ground, even if only imagined, to organize regimes of territorial control on Earth, lending classical geopolitics a deep historical resonance with respect to outer space. Whether from a military, royal, or religious standpoint, these classical views define the outer space environment as a source of natural, spiritual, or military threat (Olson 2012; Peoples 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan 2011). The invocation of these threats is politically and economically expedient for mobilizing capital and labor power in the form of tithes, tributes, or defense appropriations. By the same token, such discourses characterize outer space as replete with riches to be enjoyed only by the spiritually worthy (Schwaller 2006; Smart 1968) or capitalized on for strategic advantage by the most technologically advanced (Klinger 2017; Lewis 1996). In the latter case, outer space and its earthly infrastructures can be misconstrued as a “depoliticized environment” (Swyngedouw 2011), shaped by technological development policy instead of politics. This view naturalizes a state-centric realpolitik approach to the cosmos. This view strips the cosmos of any environmental significance beyond its potential to be instrumentalized to serve national strategic interests, and has been deployed with renewed vigor under the Trump administration in the United States.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of critical astropolitics – outer space is the cosmic playground for the aggrandizement of hegemony and only a fluid view of the geography of space can solve

Sage, 2014

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But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics. However, I am all too aware that in stressing the widespread application of this concept of the America transcendental state to understand American geopower— and, concomitantly, the fecundity of bringing together analyses of religion, verticality and now technocracy within critical geopolitics—I run the risk of constructing a totalizing, monstrous, edifice. The reader might rightly ask at this juncture, paraphrasing Nietzsche, have you not gazed into the cosmic abyss of American geopower for too long; are you not also reifying American geopower in the cosmos rather than challenging it? Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters I made reference to a rather singular sounding concept of the ‘American transcendental state’. But, as in the introduction, I must stress again here, that I took this decision for reasons of analytical clarity rather than to suggest I have revealed an independent, singular, definite and a priori reality (Law, 2006), some essence akin perhaps to what Agnew (2006: 184) refers to as ‘Americanism’. Instead, within each chapter I have traced the progressive assemblage of the American transcendental state—that is, nothing less than the divinely sanctioned, exceptional, and messianic, right and duty, of America, and its leaders in its name (Wallace, 2006: 225), to command cosmic space and time by evoking forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Agnew, 2006; Strum, 2010). But the immutability of this cosmic vision (Strum and Dittmer, 2010; Wallace, 2006) belies the transformative, fragmented, heterogeneous components that sustain it, across landscape artwork, through Kennedy’s Moon Speech, to the O-rings of Space Shuttle Challenger. Throughout this study I have suggested countless relations through which this vision is not only produced (Dijink, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995; Wallace, 2006) but circulated, maintained, resisted, repaired, transformed, and experimented with. How then to conceptualize this heterogeneous, but obdurate, cosmic being? Latour’s actor-network theory (1987; 2005; 2012) is useful to an extent here; first, we can conceptualize the transcendental state as an ‘immutable mobile’ that ‘ends up traversing the universe’ by ‘pay[ing] for each transport with a transformation’ (Latour, 2013: 127); it is ‘not displacement without transformation but displacement through transformation (Latour, 2005: 223); second, the transcendental state can be understood as offering a prophetic, but partial, ‘panorama’ of the ‘world [cosmos] to be lived in’ (p189) which must then, in turn, be: … carefully situated inside one of the many Omnimax theatres offering complete panoramas of society—and we now know that the more thrilling the impression, the more enclosed the room has to be. [American] Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability. (p242) Read against Latour’s concepts of the ‘immutable mobile’ and the ‘localizable panorama’ it is easy to see why my analysis of American transcendental state has involved mapping circulations within as well as beyond our lives. And this is a political move too, because it suggests that opportunities to test and resist the American transcendental state are closer to hand than we might think. As revealed in Chapter 8, a great deal of effort is required to keep the transcendental state circulating because the heterogeneous conduits it passes through—electrical wiring, teleconferences, flight readiness reviews, budget decisions and O-ring joints—are capricious and experimental; that is, affective. Other Chapters acknowledged similar fragility accompanying the assemblage of the transcendental state, including; the partially-owned Declaration of Independence (Chapter 1), the globally unifying Earthrise photograph of Apollo 8 (Chapter 3) and the rusting rockets on display in the gardens of the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). Now located within this chain of heterogeneous transformations, what strategies might aid us in purposefully transforming this now confined totality? Or put differently, how might we engage outer space to resist this cosmic deification of America (O Brien, 1988)? In concluding this study, I propose three techniques but no doubt there are many more. First, we can expose the void at the heart of this messianic-technocratic projection of geopower (Wallace, 2006). This approach was evidenced in Chapter 1 by Derrida’s (2002) deconstructive reading of Declaration of Independence. Derrida (2002) emphasizes how signing the Declaration in God’s name entails no democratic ownership over America’s future, in outer space or elsewhere. Across the development of American spaceflight, the perils of messianic, freefloating, notions of ‘Progress’, ‘Exploration,’ ‘Frontier’ and ‘The Future’ are all too apparent, not least for NASA itself. Lester and Robinson (2009) suggest the emergence of this critique within the American space policy community: We should accept that “exploration” is a multivalent term, with many meanings, some of which are contradictory, and all of which have historical precedent. For too long we have looked at the history of exploration selectively, seeking to find the antecedents which justify our own vision of exploration: as science, as human adventure, as geopolitical statement. This is a definitional fight which cannot be won. Space policy must acknowledge the multiple visions for space exploration, developing a clear-eyed metric of value which avoids the vagaries of lofty “exploration-speak”, If the merits of human exploration of the Moon and Mars are primarily symbolic and geopolitical, what are these goals worth in terms of federal funding? I am unconvinced by the economically instrumentalist conclusions made by Lester and Robinson (2009) about putting a value upon even NASA’s ‘softer’ geopower, but the general caution about harnessing nebulous messianic mythologies to advance American space exploration is valuable. Of course the problem is this tradition of finding our God in the cosmos is long-established as Olsson (2007) suggests via this retelling of the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma elish: Marduk is the Lord of lords … Hail to the Chief! Fifty were his names, so numerous that if ever attacked he could always hide behind another alias. Never catchable as the specific this or that, always on the move as an ambiguous this and that … Ungraspable multiplicity. … In this mist-enveloped region of religion naming is the name of the game, an exercise in ontological transformations where earthly people appear as projections of heavenly gods, social relations as signs in the sky. … a signified meaning searching for its own coordinates (Olsson, 2007: 23). Perhaps a more modest approach is required: we should simply resist the urge to name, and tame, the cosmos as a Whole, by naming a celestial Godhead in it that we claim for ourselves (Wallace, 2006) but cannot ever fully own. ‘Evil is the disaster of a truth when the desire to force the naming of the unnameable is unleashed . … Evil is not disrespect for the name of the other, but rather the will to name at any price’ (Badiou, 2004: 115-6; original emphasis). Challenging the cosmic aggrandization of America might therefore imply some attempt to resist naming our God/Future/Progress in the cosmos. Put simply, this all too easy act of cosmic de/reterroritalizaiton is too crude, too undemocratic, too costly. A second, related, strategy which can be adopted to resist the American transcendental state was discussed within Chapter 3; this is the capacity to push transcendence to another plane or refuge—to follow one line of flight of cosmic deterritorialization and then re-territorialize the Earth in a panorama that starts with a common human experience, rather than those of any particular nation/ God/future. The aim of this strategy is to mobilize a cosmic imagination that can register something of the shared experience of being human. In Chapter 3 I discussed how the Earthrise photograph from NASA’s Apollo 8 mission have stimulated new cosmic imaginations—including ‘spaceship’ Earth (Cosgrove: 2001, 257-262; Henry and Taylor, 2009; Ward, 1964), Noetic science (Benjamin, 2003: 60-61), global political ecologies (Connolly, 2002)—that defied nationalistic appropriations by inferring a human transcendence. However, as the American author Kurt Vonnegut explains such a transcendental image of humanity, emptied of territorial divisions and difference, is not itself without risk: ‘Earth is such a pretty blue and pink and white pearl in the pictures NASA sent me. It looks so clean. You can’t see all the hungry, angry earthlings down there—and the smoke and sewage and trash and sophisticated weaponry’ (Vonnegut cited in Burrows, 1998: 423). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest we should always remain sceptical that de-territorialization is a progressive act on its own: ‘Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (p500). A third strategy is to augment different affects amid the assemblage of the American transcendental state. As described in Chapter 8, the American transcendental state depends upon the cultivation of confidence in technocracy allied to an affective becoming hopeful—a positive openness to the future as life enhancing—orientated around the transcendence of America in cosmic space and time. But, as Anderson (2006), explains, becoming hopeful does not necessarily need to operate in this transcendental manner: hopefulness can also emerge not to ward off suffering, but through every day sorrows, through diminishment of the body’s potential to affect and be affected. Consider, for example, how Dotty Duke refused to discuss her fears and anxieties with her astronaut husband as she kept the ‘house in order and [took] out the garbage’ (Duke 1990—Chapter 5). Dotty Duke epitomizes a different kind of becoming hopeful—a capacity to remain open-ended about the future in a life enhancing manner through diminishment—devoid of discussion of a better future in Earth or in the cosmos; this is hope that challenges ‘the easy equation between transcendence and a future elsewhen or elsewhere in favor of an imminent transcendence from within vectors of diminishment’ (Anderson, 2006: 749; for more analysis of immanent transcendence related to Space see Smith, 2009: 211). Another affect which is useful in short-circuiting the hopeful assemblage of the transcendental state is boredom. Anderson (2004) describes boredom as the moment when the ‘“forgetting” intrinsic to habit has been momentarily incapacitated. It is the unravelling of habit, a sudden realization of the again’ (p743). Boredom depresses the life enhancing capacity of ourselves to be open to the future, engendering stillness and slowness of thought-action in spacetime, where, as Anderson (2004) puts it, the capacity to experience the ‘not yet’ (p749) is suspended. The evolution of American spaceflight might appear to some the antithesis of boredom, but, as Jorgensen (2009) suggests, the American humanization of outer space has gone hand in hand with endless repetition (of middle America): The August 1969 Life Special Issue, released to commemorate the landing, wants to produce sympathetic accounts of the astronauts. It is filled with glossy, high color photographs of the astronauts not only mastering outer space, but their domestic spaces as well. Neil Armstrong bakes pizza, Buzz Aldrin jogs through the suburbs, and Mike Collins prunes his garden. These images resonate with outer space itself, as the astronauts use tools in both terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. The spatula and shears the astronauts use to cook lamb curry and prune roses with resemble the objects they hold while walking the moon, these being a laser reflector, seismometer and solar wind sheet (p179). There is no hopefulness on offer in Jorgensen’s (2009) reading of American spaceflight. Instead the boredom experienced in the cosmic repetition of middle America signals despair: ‘Apollo 11 represented an America that had become unhinged by its own technocracy, its middle class lifestyle, and television’ (p188). Jorgensen (2009) is not, of course, alone in identifying aspects of spaceflight repetitive, even boring. As the emergence of the Teacher in Space program demonstrated (see Chapter 8), NASA itself has historically attempted to introduce elements of excitement, even increased risk, to engage a global audience. Yet, of course, a balance has always had to be struck, as Parker (2009) explains of Apollo: ‘Everything was supposed to be boring, because boredom meant no surprises, and hence the possibility of the adventure in some sense rested on its denial’ (p326). Although fleeting, boredom is surely an unavoidable ingredient in NASA’s technocratic confidence, but when focused and channeled, it does suspend hope in the cosmos as a better place, perhaps providing an opportunity for us to pause and register something of the sublime Otherness of Space, where we concurrently repeat and differ ourselves into infinity: ‘Media representations of space travel turn the vastness of space into the similitude of domesticity, as human familiarity comes to stand in for the infinite. At the same time, the domestic attains the dimensions of the infinite, and in turn becomes strangely unfamiliar to the television viewer’ (Jorgensen, 2009: 179). These three techniques of cosmo-political intervention—refusal to name, human transcendence, and sensitivity to new affects—are all worthy of greater attention, especially when they can be connected up to, and interfere with, the assemblage of the American transcendental state. Clearly not all of those involved directly in the development of spaceflight will want or be able to practise these techniques. Nevertheless even among this group these techniques are intended to offer greater receptivity to new cosmographical imaginations which move beyond the cosmic aggrandization of messianic-imperialistic-technocratic impulses. If we have entered the Cosmic Age where all territorializing assemblages, all States, now derive vital energy from the Cosmos (Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), then the imperative becomes not to simply do cosmopolitics (Latour, 2005) but rather which cosmo-politics do we want to pursue? My favoured vision of a Geography of Space is one where this question is endlessly asked but never answered with absolute confidence.

#### The alt solves the Aff – Environmental geopolitics is the root cause of space privatization and rethinking the boundary of outer space reconfigures the power relations that produces these practices

Klinger, 2019

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At a time when the enclosure and militarization of outer space is being normalized in US political and popular discourse, a critical environmental approach to outer space serves several purposes. Environmental geopolitics enables us to rethink outer space through concrete processes that transform environments on Earth, in space, and in the atmosphere, the latter of which we typically define as the boundary between “inner” and “outer” space (Olson and Messeri 2015). Transforming these environments involves territorial politics, which are always about power/knowledge (Foucault 1980; Ó Tuathail 1996). Power/knowledge is exercised through the territorial practices of states, firms, and individuals in the ongoing production of space on and off Earth (Beery 2016a; Dickens and Ormrod 2016). An environmental geopolitics approach to outer space renders seemingly far out ideas concrete by engaging the tangible processes through which the immensity of the cosmos is made political, differentiated, and contested. This not only facilitates more rigorous empirical social science research and theory development with respect to outer space, but also reveals the stakes of ongoing processes of privatization and militarization of the greatest global commons. These processes threaten to expropriate all but an extreme minority of a peaceful cosmos explored for the benefit of all humankind, as stipulated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (UN 1967), signed by all space-faring states. This article proceeds as follows. Section one reviews geopolitical approaches to outer space environments in order to show how differentially empowered actors conceive of and relate to outer space. Section two describes outer space as an environment in order to establish it as a milieu in and through which environmental (in)justice can occur. Drawing on research from Brazil, the US, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, the third section presents the environmental geopolitics of outer space on Earth. The fourth section discusses orbital debris and planetary protection protocols as empirical entry points into environmental geopolitics in outer space. Geopolitical Approaches to Outer Space Environments Power and vulnerability mediate the distribution of benefits and harms associated with human engagement with outer space. Because diverse actors with competing territorial agendas produce the spaces of outer space, questions of outer space are necessarily geopolitical. The manner in which we engage with outer space is environmental, insofar as we transform Earthly environments to get to and from outer space, we use space-based technologies to understand Earthly environments, and our engagement with outer space, whether orbits, moons, asteroids, or planets, has measurable environmental footprints. Although social scientists have brought outer space into concepts of the environment in recent years,1 environmental geopolitics has not duly problematized outer space, despite its relevance to the field as well as the relevance of outer space environments to diverse domains of geopolitical inquiry. This section considers the characterization of outer space environments within several geopolitical schools of thought.

#### Interp – the aff must be weighed as an object of scholarship, not the causal consequences

#### [1] Reps of outer space shape reality and influence policy making which is specifically true for IR – the 1AC asks you to endorse their realist consequences which makes crusading violence inevitable

Maclaren, 2019

Andrew S. Maclaren, University of Aberdeen, UK, Teaching Fellow, Department of Geography & Environment, University of Aberdeen, “Geographies of outer space: Progress and new opportunities”, Progress in Human Geography, Volume: 43 issue: 2, page(s): 314-336, Issue published: April 1, 2019, DOI: 10.1177/0309132517747727, accessed 4/10/22, sb

The geographies of outer space are inherently linked to terrestrial understandings of nations and nationalism. Recent research, by both social scientists and geographers, has explored the relationship between nationalism and a variety of social practices and materialities (Merriman and Jones, 2017; Militz and Schurr, 2016; Penrose, 2011). My opening vignettes aim to resonate with this interest, through the discourses of nationalism, both visual and textual, included in human spaceflight programmes, and what this means on an embodied level, both individually and collectively. Using the Space Shuttle programme as an example, I look to demonstrate why a geography of outer space matters to the study of nationalism. First, I will consider some of the iconography that surrounds human spaceflight and the discourses they encode. Second, I will consider the importance of the embodied aspect of nationalism (Closs Stephens, 2016; Merriman and Jones, 2017; Militz and Schurr, 2016), particularly in line with contemporary interest in non-representational geographies and affect (Anderson, 2014). Sage (2014) has argued how outer space itself influenced the cultural imagination of the United States from the mid-20th-century through to the late-2000s. This leads to further considerations around the agency of spaceflight discourses and representations that emerged in the United States, and beyond, of an ‘American’ spaceflight. Indeed, it can be argued that the discourses encoded in spaceflight iconography are important signifiers of the nation, in line with Brunn’s assertion that when ‘states emphasise “the visual”…they inform and educate their own populations and those beyond about where they are, who they are, and what they are about’ (2011: 19). Material cultures of human spaceflight thus present an interesting avenue to investigate the interests of a state reflecting and reifying its own sense of identity.

#### [2] they have infinite prep time and staked out every part of the 1ac as a reason to vote aff – that means they should justify their research process

#### The impact is education – that o/w – reps surrounding topic area influence our subjectivities and the way in which we navigate the world which is the only portable impact to debate and proven by 1NC Mendhenhall 18

## 2

#### Use of the word “Crippling” is ableist – I shouldn’t need to read a specific card on this but I am – their Johnson 13 evidence in the AC says “crippling” – it’s the Debris cascades and causes global nuclear war card. They put crippling under erasure and replaced it with the word “weakening” which ISN’T definitionally correct per our evidence

Malone 2021

Ableism Is Embedded In Our Language. We Can Dismantle It. From slurs to euphemisms to callous idioms, ableist language is ubiquitous — but we can still avoid it. Emerson Malone Emerson Malone BuzzFeed News Reporter Updated on November 17, 2021, 11:47 am Posted on November 16, 2021, 11:28 am <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emersonmalone/ableism-language-disability>

Over the last two years of news coverage about the pandemic, there's been a creeping trend of characterizing the coronavirus’s effects on society — the labor shortage, the national debt, the infection rates — as “crippling.” “As we struggle to describe the destructive impacts of a highly contagious virus, we’ve fallen back on language that is not only out of date but deeply harmful,” Emily Macrae writes for Ricochet Media, citing this specific adjective appearing in coronavirus news coverage as merely one example of the larger issue of ableism in our vernacular. She adds, “Ableist language equates disability with deficit, focuses on individual shortcomings rather than systemic failings and involves terms that historically entrenched segregation without regard for their origins.” The BuzzFeed copy desk’s preferred online dictionary, Merriam-Webster, defines the adjective “crippling” in this use as “to deprive of capability for service or of strength, efficiency, or wholeness.” To reach this definition, however, you have to scroll past a more literal definition of the verb (“to deprive the use of a limb and especially a leg”) and the offensive noun “cripple” (“a lame or partly disabled person or animal”). To erase ableism from how we write and speak, we need to agree on what ableism is, and understand how it's manifest in our language. Ableism is defined succinctly as “discrimination or prejudice against individuals with disabilities.” This form of discrimination has pervaded our vocabulary, and many words we use on a daily basis have an insulting and inhumane association. Beyond “crippling,” ableism is on display when people use the words “lame,” “crutch,” and “handicap.” But for every ableist word out there that devalues those with a disability, there’s usually a more neutral alternative that doesn’t rely on a cliché or callous analogy. Here’s one resource we use: In a comprehensive glossary of ableist terms on their website, disability rights activist Lydia X. Z. Brown outlines several words with prejudicial connotations — from “lunatic” to “nuts” to “duh” to euphemisms like “fall on deaf ears,” “turn a blind eye to,” or “blinded by ignorance” — and which synonyms you can opt for instead. It’s easy to note demonstrably egregious examples of ableist idioms, but there are dozens of ambiguous euphemisms like “they’re being myopic” (which could be offensive to those with a vision impairment) or “you need to stand up for what you believe in” (keeping in mind those who physically cannot stand). If it seems dubious in context, a careful, perceptive copy editor might catch it and suggest a workaround.

#### They can’t win the debate on erasure good because they said weakening which means they used an analogy that THEY created for the word which is worse because they’re just using a more neutral or cliché alternatire which our Malone evidence kritiks – also proves they KNEW the evidence said this because they said language modified – they actively say the word because they said weakening

## Case

### Util

#### Reps first

#### Utilitarian justifications are simultaneously self-justifying and self-defeating – the moralistic call to stave off proximate impacts result in endless imperial aggression and mass atrocities, all of which only make global destruction more likely

**Pasquinelli 18** (Sydney Pasquinelli, Faculty in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2018, *The Lesser-Evils Paradigm for Imagining Islam: U.S. Executive Branch (Re)framing of Islam in the Early Cold War Era of Racialized Empire-Building*, PhD Dissertation, <http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/33906/1/Pasquinelli%20-%20Dissertation.pdf>, pp 156-161) gz

Lesser-evil reasoning is used in “practical conflict-situations where a greater evil can only be avoided when a lesser evil is caused or permitted.” 30 The basic logic behind any lesser-evil justification is the same: if we are required to choose between two evils, we ought to choose the lesser-evil.31 Lesser-evil reasoning plays an important role in liberal democracy: frequently employed by political philosophers and scientists, politicians, and lawyers, its application influences outcomes of democratic processes like criminal trials, domestic policies, and foreign policies including wartime allowances.32 In *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, Michael Ignatieff encapsulates one of the oldest questions in republican politics: “What lesser evils may a society commit **when it believes it faces the greater evil of its own destruction?**”33 To answer this question, governments and their constituents must employ utilitarian logic to calculate aggregate risks and rewards. An exemplary lesser-evil justification was provided by the US military under **Truman**, in it**s decision to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki**. It reasoned that the lives saved by the bombing, and its subsequent cessation of the war, outnumbered the deaths it caused. The decision was therefore justified because it thwarted a greater-evil.34 **While lesser-evil reasoning emerged as a predominant feature of liberalism, it has roots in Christian theology**.35 Some ethico-political traditions are guided by moral absolutes, or “absolutely exceptionless moral norms whose violation is intrinsically evil.”36 In an absolutist framework, lesser-evils (like nuclear war) cannot be rationalized; an act that is evil is wrong without qualification and must never be performed.37 But even theologians understand that moral universals place significant limitations on leaders, especially in times of warfare.38 In *Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations*, Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey explain that whether a theological system permits lesser-evil acts depends on “the moral relevance and decisiveness of the distinction between what is *directly intended* and what is only *indirectly intended* or actively *permitted*.”39 Those sympathetic to lesser-evil reasoning find the distinction significant: an act of evil which is directly intended can never be justified; but an act of evil which is indirectly intended, or permitted because of circumstance, is qualitatively different and thus possible to excuse on moral terms. McCormick summarizes centuries of Catholic moral thought as tolerating evil only when “a proportionately grave reason for allowing evil to occur” exists. In such cases, “the resultant evil [is] referred to as an ‘unintended byproduct’ of the action, only indirectly voluntary and justified by the presence of a proportionately grave reason.”40 *Jus ad bellum*, or just war theory, notarized by a community of scholars wherein theologians played a significant role, is premised upon the principle of proportionality: that the total benefits of war must outweigh the total harms.41 The post-colonial condition demanded **rhetorical calculations of proportionality to justify imperial meddling in the politics of the post-colonies**. In *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*, Eyal Weizman shows that **in the context of benevolent hegemonic leadership**, application of lesser-evil reasoning requires a **constant policing of the world in order to measure and determine the relativity of evils**.42 Liberal state apparatuses partake in a form of governmentality, in which they **presume the inevitability and necessity of militarized presence in the post-colonies** and then pursue the path of engagement they have calculated to produce “the best of all possible worlds,” or the optimum permutation of good and evil. 43 In a 1978 lecture at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault firstly defines governmentality as: “The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections… that allow the exercise of… [a] form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.”44 The divine law and order which had undergirded colonial power was substituted by a **marketplace of good and evil**, in which **ethics were determined by a “vulgar pragmatism”—what works must be right!** 45 In *Covering Islam*, Said confirms the supply-and-demand-based production of dominant US discourse, revealing how images of Islam are used by the government and media to forward the US agenda. Within this framework, Islam “is not an interlocutor but in a sense a commodity.”46 **Covert and overt moves to distinguish the good or legitimate Muslims from the bad or inauthentic confirm the endurance of the colonial presumption of the *manageability* of Muslim populations**. The image of Western management, however, had transformed from a natural right into a liberal responsibility. To recruit Muslim allies, the US executive branch and its network of intelligence agents assumed the mantle of ***interpretive authority* over Islam**.47 Foucault distinguishes sovereign authority from governmentality in noting the latter is practiced primarily by “employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics— to arrange things in a way that… such-and-such ends may be achieved.”48 Whereas colonial powers impose laws upon colonies, post-colonial governments enact a series of tactical measures upon post-colonial allies and enemies.49 Interpretive authority combined with military and economic prowess gave inescapable force **unilateral US executive branch tactics**. These measures included **economic and political manipulation, “psychological warfare,” and military basing or intervention**.50 Pertaining to the outcomes of lesser-evil governmentality, Ignatieff asks: **“Is there no moral limit to what a republic can do when its existence is threatened?”**51 When a society feels vulnerable to a great force (X), the logic of lesser-evils may permit that society to take **any unethical action short of (X).** **If (X) is extinction, great injustices (like nuclear warfare) may be vindicated in the name of winning a war or saving humanity**. 52 While Ignatieff remains confident in the checks and balances of liberal democracies, which he claims are “all guided by a constitutional commitment to minimize the use of dubious means—violence, force, coercion, and deception—in the government of its citizens,” many scholars are less faithful. 53 In *The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War*, Andrew Fiala criticizes the US government for **exaggerating threats in order to skew utilitarian risk-calculus** and justify its violations of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.54 For example, the “existential” threat conjured by the Bush administration in its War on Terror **made the 2003 preemptive invasion of Iraq, as well as the use of illegal surveillance and interrogation tactics, more palatable to the American people and to US Congress**.55 Gordon R. Mitchell and Robert P. Newman interpret the War on Terror as a revival of Cold War logic; in both cases, **the construction of a singular and existential threat to Western humanity justified an extended period of heightened US military presence and police powers**.56 **Threat construction, lesser-evil reasoning, and hegemonic aspirations combine** in postcolonial US discourse to produce a “state of exception,” **whereby a sovereign power (usually the executive branch) is granted authority to suspend the laws and moral norms that dictate liberal (geo)politicking** *only* to confront an emergency.57 But when the crisis spans decades, **the “state of exception” becomes the norm**, often solidifying itself institutionally.58 Some scholars disapprove of the lowering of moral standards facilitated by lesser-evil reasoning. Mamdani blames the rise of Islamist terrorism in the twenty first century on US promotion of low-intensity conflicts and guerilla warfare, or “terrorism by another name,” in the late Cold War era.59 Hannah Arendt foreshadowed the blowback of the Cold War in her 1950 essay “The Eggs Speak Up,” where she condemned the US strategy to prop up (friendly) tyrannies and dictatorships as part of a broader strategy of defeating totalitarianism. Arendt advocates a “radical negation of the whole concept of the lesser-evil in politics, because far from protecting us against the greater ones, the lesser-evils have invariably led us into them.”60 **Lesser-evil reasoning gives policymakers a convenient method to gain legitimacy for foreign and domestic policies that constituents would normally (under non-emergency conditions) object to on moral and/or legal grounds**