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#### Their metaphorization of identity through haunting valorizes resistance, survivability, and agency which instrumentalizes black madness for white liberation and ignores how the black mad subject experiences asociality

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 28-29

This strategy is not the only or primary way to read challenges to rac- ism and ableism. The problem exists (pace Hortense Spillers) at the level of grammar. These projects tend to have one vector: they “transform(ed) sys- tems and culture.”20 Note that transform operates as transitive where Black, disabled bodies perform the work of transformation rather than undergo the process of transformation. Yet Black, disabled bodies will not always behave as agents that transform or those who are transformed in equal mea- sure or, as noted above, with a degree of reciprocity. Allowing for more than one vector between Black, disabled bodies and the systems in which they operate clarifies the following: it is inaccurate that the only critical relation- ship between Blackness and disability (specifically, madness) is one of libera- tion from ableism. At times, Blackness exacerbates the presence of ableism, or cultural norms facilitate ableism.21 In accounting for these moments, I trouble the corollary of the logic above: namely, that whiteness withal the privilege embedded in it lacks the tools for its own liberation and must rely on Blackness to acquire its release. Here, Blackness becomes a reduced space where whiteness enacts its privilege by instrumentalizing Blackness. In this paradigm, Blackness for all its cultural complexity becomes another reac- tionary space that exists to indict whiteness, rather than a culture and sys- tem of thought all its own.22 We must consider the spaces when mere expo- sure of oppression is not only not emancipatory but can also be detrimental, where demonstration and acknowledgement of one’s various intersecting socially marginalized positions does not equal political agency. We must also consider what happens when Black cultural locations refuse whiteness as an interlocutor in favor of intraracial conversations. In short, when mad- ness is “a Black thang” (with all that evokes in terms of exclusivity and ableist objectification). I take up the question of intraracial context and conversation in the next discussion. For now, I turn to another foundational moment in the study of Blackness and disability to read in the breaks of the critical material. I con- tinue the conversation about the critical impulse of mutual constitution that looks to retrieve agentive stories of Black disabled folks as instantiations of anti-ableist radicality. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997) includes a chapter on physical disability in Ann Petry’s The Street, Toni Morrison’s oeuvre, and Audre Lorde’s Zami. Though Thomson’s dis- cussion does not explicitly discuss mental disability, cognitive impairment, or crazy-as-insult, I find it instructive for this conversation. Madness shad- ows each of the texts under scrutiny since the characters deviate from intra- cultural norms by being Black women who seek class ascension despite the odds (Petry) and wider American cultural norms by participating in and identifying with communities labeled deviant (and crazy) by the dsm IV (Lorde). Of course, Morrison’s characters are literally haunted by their ac- tions and kinfolk, which always forces the question of whether Morrison’s characters could be labeled crazy. It becomes useful to think about Mor- rison’s, Petry’s, and Lorde’s work (especially as part of Garland Thomson’s project) from the perspective of Octavia E. Butler: namely, that sanity is communally defined and anyone who deviates from agreed upon norms is treated as mad. The characters’ desires for themselves (and the methods they use to achieve them) exceed the racialized and gendered boundaries drawn for them. Indeed, because they also have physical disabilities, their behavior trespasses the boundaries drawn based on ability as well. Madness cannot be cleaved from these conversations. Thomson’s claims about the represen- tation of physical disability as agentive and liberatory have implications for whether madness has similar representational possibilities.23 Thomson offers that the collective project of these Black women’s writ- ings provides an antidote to white racist depictions. These powerful bodies— extraordinary, in Thomson’s lexicon—participate in a “collective project of cultural revision [that] challenges the African-American woman writer to produce a narrative of self that authenticates Black women’s oppressive history yet offers a model for transcending that history’s limitations.”24 Moreover, the primacy given to disabled women figures “reveals the shift in African-American literary representation from a modernist to a postmod- ernist mode, a change that parallels the ideological move of minority groups from assimilation to affirmation of cultural and ethnic differences.”25 While I partly agree that these representations “render oppression without rein- scribing it,”26 I hesitate to read in them the triumph that Thomson affirms. On the one hand, Thomson rightly points out that these characters do not completely represent physical deviance. On the other, they do not, as she says, “repudiate such cultural master narratives as normalcy, wholeness, and the feminine ideal.”27 I would attribute this aspect of their representation to the way that the social model of disability upon which Thomson relies does not fully account for the way madness shows up in these texts.28 The social model privileges a particular kind of mental agility and cognitive process- ing to combat the stigma and material consequences that arise as a result of ableism. In turn, the model dismisses madness as a viable subject position, ensuring that those counted as such—either by communal consensus or psy- disciplines—remain excluded from conversations about disability because they cannot logically engage. For the characters in Thomson’s study, this has the pernicious effect of erasing some of the master cultural narratives they work against: those that acknowledge their physical disability and link it to mental disability as a way to further disenfranchise and disempower them. Thomson’s work reads these figures (based on their representation of physical disabilities) as liberatory for the larger narrative and theoretical spaces of ethnic modernism. I hazard that these characters’ relationship to disability suggests an investment in internalized ableism, particularly vis- à-vis sexuality. For example, Thomson reads Ann Petry’s Mrs. Hedges, a tall, dark-skinned Black woman with avoirdupois who works as a madam, as one who refuses victimization. Important for this conversation is the way Mrs. Hedges is not only physically disfigured by burns but also read as ex- ceeding the gendered and racialized boundaries the text’s Black commu- nity (voiced through the protagonist) circumscribes for her. Her madness is not biomedically defined, but it carries psychosocial repercussions given how she is treated. Thomson bases her reading of Mrs. Hedges as liberatory on Hedges’s sexualized gaze on the main character and her profession as a madam. Yet, there is no room for Hedges to acquiesce to or enjoy the sexual- ized attention she receives from the rich white man who controls the street. The novel makes it clear that part of Hedges’s rejection of the man’s sexual advances is financial. She cannot be in bed with him literally and economi- cally. However, what the novel leaves open is that Hedges’s rejection of him is also about her own denigrated view of her sexuality.29 She is still limned as monstrous, grotesque, even if Hedges as a figure shifts the understand- ing of monstrosity. Inasmuch as Hedges’s physical disability allows her to move from one position in the economy to another more powerful one, she must rely on a chosen life of celibacy and a masculinized, monstrous ap- pearance to secure and maintain her new economic position. Her celibacy also shores up her power by keeping the madness of her disfigured, disabled, interracial sexuality in check. That is, though the disability is no longer in the background of the text, the cultural baggage of internalized ableism ap- pears in the foreground replete with eschewing sexual desire and limiting the association with traditional forms of femininity. Even if Petry’s proj- ect does—according to Thomson—pave the way for Black authors to shift from assimilation to affirmation and provide a challenge to the static rep- resentations of disabled figures in modernist texts, Mrs. Hedges’s refusal to engage in her own sexuality complicates a reading of this figure as liberatory vis-à-vis physical disability and the charges of madness that accompany her character. Reading Mrs. Hedges as agentive certainly poses challenges given the internalized ableism within Petry’s text, especially since the novel focuses on intraracial encounter. First, physical disability only liberates Mrs. Hedges from the intraracial economy of the street by providing an avenue for power. Yet, within intraracial encounter, she remains circumscribed by the discourses of madness because community members consider her mad for transgressing boundaries of race and gender. Second, the interracial encoun- ter does not allow for her agency within the critical literature. Thomson claims that Petry’s text, as well as the others, counters the limited represen- tations of disability within modernist texts. Implicitly, the logic of such a critical move—regardless of its truism—mandates that Blackness become the vehicle for (mostly white) others’ liberation from ableism in their read- ing practice. In that way, it is the presence of Blackness that shores up white liberalism by not only providing a representation of Blackness but also a complex rendering of white-centered notions of disability. Elsewhere, I have argued similarly—that we ought to attend to the way that Blackness and whiteness function in the interracial multiability en- counter. In my article on television’s Monk, I proposed that Blackness and madness cannot take up the same space within one interaction. I read the protagonist’s unnamed obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disability that “misfits” with other (usually minor) characters’ Blacknesses.30 At times, one is used for comedic fodder or erased in favor of representing the other or eclipsed as a way to demonstrate white liberalism. My article describes the relationship between these two identities as mutually constituted, but it evinces some slippage when attempting to discern why the protagonist’s disability erases the other characters’ Blackness. Since Blackness and mad- ness do not reside in the same body, the various drama-comedy scripts ter- giversate about what difference among difference can mean, often mobiliz- ing white liberalism to police disability and Blackness. Rereading my own work with an eye toward the breaks, I find that we not only lack a criti- cal vocabulary for describing Blackness and madness simultaneously, but it is also assumed that one must take priority over the other. The end result is that in this interracial encounter—whether fictionalized, theorized, or criticized—either Blackness or madness must be erased. Important for this conversation is that the multiracial, multiability encounter shifts depending on the social position of the characters. Blackness cannot and should not be marshaled as the radical space for white liberalism to mount its critique of ableism or racism. When Blackness and madness exist in the same space, multiple ways of reading should become possible, some of which eschew the possibility of radicality and others that might usher it in. The multiability interracial encounter also allows for Blackness and mad- ness to be erased when improperly thought of as agentive. Because both dis- courses are often conceptualized as unspeakable or illegible, their presence can facilitate and consolidate the power that creates abject material condi- tions. Nirmala Erevelles makes this point most forcefully: “The analytic category of disability is useful in destabilizing static notions of identity, ex- ploring intersectionality, and investigating embodiment, [yet] I argue that the effectiveness of much of feminist disability studies remains limited be- cause of its overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality.”31 In other words, Blackness and disability have the potential to destabilize the rhetoric of normalcy that holds them as abject, but they are curtailed in do- ing so when mislabeled as agentive. In Erevelles’s exploration of the lived conditions of war, she argues that when disability (both physical and men- tal) intersects with Black and brown bodies in the developing world or in disenfranchised communities within the developed world, their confluence indicts unchecked multinational corporate greed because it reveals the po- liticized nature of impairment. With this in mind, there can be no ableist or racist narrative available that prioritizes individualized achievement (read: overcoming) or bemoans bad luck (read: pity) because the root cause impli- cates specific governments, companies, the people who run them, and those who are complicit in them. In addition, Erevelles resists ascribing agency to the disabled people of color she discusses, perhaps because, in this version of David and Goliath, Goliath is winning. More to the point, the material conditions for celebration and agency require material resources not avail- able to everyone, and mere knowledge of one’s situation cannot be proxy for freedom from it, nor does awareness equal agency.

#### Metaphors of haunting facilitate ableist narratives---they distract our attention away from the historical reality of institutions that prioritized violence against disabled bodies

**Gill**, Michael, [Syracuse University](https://experts.syr.edu/en/organisations/syracuse-university), [Cultural Foundations of Education](https://experts.syr.edu/en/organisations/cultural-foundations-of-education) and **Erevelles**, Nirmala, Dr. Nirmala Erevelles is professor of social and cultural studies in education. Her teaching and research interests lie in the areas of disability studies, critical race theory, transnational feminism, sociology of education, and postcolonial studies. [“The Absent Presence of Elsie Lacks: Hauntings at the Intersection of Race, Class, Gender, and Disability.” *African American Review*, vol. 50, no. 2, Johns Hopkins University Press, **2017**, pp. 123–37, doi:10.1353/afa.2017.0017.]KPOO-CJK

It is not just the actual violence from which Elsie Lacks suffers that haunts our reading of Immortal Life; it is also the treatment of this violence as unremark- able, its erasure naturalized as very much part of our daily landscape. When first teaching the Skloot text in the fall of 2010 in a course entitled “Gender and Science” at the University of Connecticut, one of the authors discussed how a section of the campus—now known as the Depot campus—that houses human resources and other campus offices and departments was home to the Mansfield Training School and Hospital. This space functioned as an institution that **segregated both children and adults with cognitive disabilities and epilepsy**, and was also one of the locations where eugenic sterilizations were carried out in the state of Connecticut. While the students did not know much about the history of this space, they were nevertheless aware of the narratives about ghosts haunting the Depot campus. We identify such narratives as **ableist practices that structure oppressive** andconsequently violent representations of the residents of these state institutions such that their life stories are reduced to tawdry inconsequence. Now that these buildings have been repurposed for use by educational institutions, we must reflect on how the spaces we traverse as educators/students are often layered with histories of ableist and racist regimes of violence that are rendered invisible and are thereby casually made to disappear into the woodwork. Such disappearances, Grace Kyungwon Hong explains, serve to erase the violence of the past and of the present in a way that enables **neoliberal regimes to maintain their legitimacy** and power over those whom they have deemed unworthy of life (30). To mention a parallel anecdote, the second author of this essay has been teaching a course on social and cultural studies in education for the past two years to pre- service teachers in another repurposed wing of the former Bryce Hospital, at one time one of the largest psychiatric institutional facilities in Alabama. Here, too, none of the students in the course was aware of the shameful history of Bryce, known for the landmark case Wyatt v. Stickney. This case, brought to court by the fifteen-year-old Ricky Wyatt and his aunt, a former Bryce employee, exposed the horrible conditions in which inmates lived and was the harbinger of the deinstitutionalization movement of the 1970s. However, as in the Depot campus example, the undergraduate stu- dents at the University of Alabama were more aware of another institution in the same town, the Jemison Center (also known as the Old Bryce), now in ruins, which served as a segregated institution for black children and adults and generated similar **ableist narratives of hauntings**. Here again, the **language of ghosts distracts our attention** from the historical reality of the violence committed against the institution’s black and/or disabled residents by transforming their real experiences of violence into a phantom presence easily consumed for cheap thrills. What are we to make of these erasures of the histories of lives lived that are now supplanted by tawdry tales of ghosts that haunt the spaces in which we live and work? For example, quickly Googling the “Depot campus” at the University of Connecticut produces plenty of blog postings documenting individual attempts to hunt down these ghosts. Many sites reference the pasts of these institutional settings as “proof” of these ghosts. An October 2015 article in Connecticut Magazine, in dis- cussing the Mansfield Training School and Hospital, avers: “Connecticut has more than its share of shuttered mental health facilities, where, although the actual histories are benign and the vast majority of patients were tenderly cared for, movie-inspired imagined cruelties and struggles make for fertile ground that’s ripe for supposed hauntings” (“Haunted Connecticut” 51). The “official” discourse of benign treatment actively hides the scope of violencethat is pervasive in carceral settings while casually attributing the inevitability of the proliferation of some narratives of haunting to Hollywood-inspired imaginations. Yet again, the experiences of violence enacted against incarcerated disabled bodies, many of them poor and black**, become metaphors in an ableist narrative of vengeful ghosts seeking justice**. Similarly, narratives of “paranormal” activity at the Jemison Center abound on the Internet. Many of these accounts reference the mixing of “fact” with “fiction” by acknowledging the segregated history of this institution that included the forced labor of former slaves, but then explain this history away by describing the alleged hauntings as an inevitable outcome of such institutional spaces. The stories of resident ghosts in these institutions become urban legends that attract visitors at Halloween, while actively obscuring complex historical accounts of the violence experienced by the actual inmates. As Emily Smith Beitiks, associate director of the Paul K. Longmore Institute on Disability, explains:9 The history of institutionalization is indeed horrific, but the **abuses that were committed were overwhelmingly directed at residents with disabilities**, not the other way around as haunted attractions suggest today. Yet these horror playgrounds of disability succeed because the history of institutions is not widely known. That so many people flock to these attractions year after year shows how much work we have ahead. In this essay, the “hauntings” we draw from our analytic toolbox do not belong to this genre of sensationalist representation. Conscious of the ways in which any discussion of hauntings can be transformed via neoliberal practices into a prof- itable venture, we refuse to reproduce these practices. Rather, as educators who are aware that we inhabit spaces of institutional violence that are seldom recognized, we take seriously the need to foster a critical pedagogy that foregrounds the histories of violence our neoliberal institutions feel compelled to hide, even while at the same time these institutions (as well as faculty, administrators, staff, and students) **allow for an ableist and racist circulation of ghosts to become stories** shared in the cafeteria, on social media, and at Halloween. Recently demands from student move- ments in many universities across the U. S. to remove the names of slaveowners and members of the KKK from the academic buildings named after them have led to discussions of whether such erasures will actually disrupt institutionalized racism in Predominantly White Institutions. How educational institutions address the histories of repurposed carceral institutions on their campuses should also merit a similar discussion. Our attempts to foreground these erasures of histories through hauntings as an analytic also cautions us against reproducing the narrative of the vengeful, ghostly, disabled subject while engaging in a materialist analysis at the intersections of race, class, and gender. In describing her methodology, Gordon asks: “What kind of case is a case of a ghost? It is a case of haunting, a story about what happens when we admit the ghost—**that special instance of the merging of the visible and the invisible**, the dead and the living, the past and the present—into the making of worldly rela- tions and into the making of our accounts of the world” (24). What we find striking in this methodology is the move to admit the ghost, and in doing so, facilitate entry. While most often the act of admission assumes letting someone into a location, whether an institution of higher learning because of test scores and grade-point averages or a hospital because of a supposed need for medical treatment, the act of admission to which we allude requires recognizing the ghost as a social figure who holds in its elusive form both the absence and presence of its history.

#### **The critical purchase of the human relies on notions of agency which the mad black are barred from – the only ethical demand is to disinvest from the human**

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 79-80

Both strategies for engaging the human have merit: find the traces of what and who is used to constitute the concept and underscore the processes by which the human creates itself as superior. Recall that the mad Black is both an embodied positionality and an aesthetic intervention. As such, it hints at some common conceptual ground and useful disagreements. The mad Black cannot so simply slip into history as an aberration, nor can it so easily slip out of history as a failure. Here, the mad Black advocates a con- sistent questioning of how abjection functions, and from where it arises. It also acts as an adroit poker player. It sees the ideology of ability and raises it the possessive investment in whiteness (pace George Lipsitz), questioning how one arrives at universality if the so-called soundness of the bodymind is not the sole reason for exclusion. That is, the mad Black reveals a set of breaks to read: without a reliance on ocularity and a skepticism about lin- ear conceptions of time and narrative, it disrupts the easy alignment of dis- ability with whiteness or Blackness with degradation. Reading these breaks requires the disruption courted by Sylvia Wynter’s refusal of the category Man and broaches what Siebers termed the “conceptual horizon” marked by the ideology of ability.23 Mad Blackness calls for no less than a retooling of the terms of humanity itself. It questions the desire for ability, and the desire for whiteness. Since the Enlightenment positions madness and Blackness as a set of “ontological foils for the modern, rational, European subject,”24 the fissures reveal where, how, and with whom current ideological investments lie. Further, their undoing and unmaking requires an unmooring that reck- ons with constructs that have heretofore been unavailable. As my previous comments suggest, there exist a few cultural and social locations that allow us to question the utility of the human. Specifically, the appeal to universality and the possessive investment in whiteness cohere in one’s relationship to the nation-state. How is one defined as a citizen if madness or Blackness functions as a default disqualification? Those schol- ars working on physical disability have given a cursory nod to abjection,25 madness forces disability studies to reckon with where abjection arises and how it might be embraced.26 Taking a methodological cue from Nirmala Erevelles, who explores what it might mean to embrace disability as a part of Blackness, we need to examine abjection as a social location where Blackness and madness can powerfully defang the critical purchase of the human. It is not coincidental that much of the work on madness comes from the fields of rhetoric and composition because so many of the narratives we embrace about madness view it as a fundamental issue of communication. These scholars intervene in the sacralized understanding of madness as uncom- municative and therefore unripe for analysis in perpetuity. Madness and Blackness exert hortatory pressure on all modes of critical analysis, forcing an examination of how we place the human at the center or overlook it as the default premise.27

#### Black madness is in the position of abjection and bare life in relation to whiteness – black mad bodies are securitized against because their mere existence disrupts the privileged notion of the autonomous bodymind

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 48-49

To be clear, Butler’s aesthetic intervention does not exclusively exist in the ideological spaces of syntax and punctuation. One of the rules of science fiction is that the world the author creates must abide by its own internal logic. Within the world of Fledgling, part of the internal logic is the history of the Ina people. Though Butler does not break the rule insisting on an in- ternal logic, she does not abide by the idea that the characters must be aware of the internal logic to which they abide. That is, the Gordons’ liberalism and silence and the antagonists’ hatred and genocide are two sides of the same narrative coin. They each participate in an act of historiographical revision, changing their past relationship to disability and Blackness by ex- cising them. Unlike the critical impulse that permits representational detec- tive work to recuperate Black disabled bodies and experiences, they cannot recuperate that which they do not think they have lost. They cannot treat as radical that which they considered so abject so as to not exist at all. But- ler’s text intervenes in the narrative logic that assumes the accepted stories about Ina origin and history are complete without the input of either the present or purported anomalies from the past. Ina construct the absence of Blackness and madness as a ballast of their identity ab ovo. The Gordons do not want to admit to the idea of Ina racists. They do not want to deal with the reality that Ina can be gravely mentally injured. (In point of fact, Shori’s father, Iosif, is the only Ina who acknowledges that her head injury could be part of Ina experience.) Racism and ableism exert differing pressures on Ina history and ontology. Each destabilizes the Ina’s notion of self, such that their only recourse is denial. To embrace the presence of racism in that moment would be to admit the possibility of dishonor and to more heavily court embarrassment and shame regarding Ina history or identity. To think about Ina injury, particularly amnesia, troubles the overarching paradigm they have developed for discussing their relationship to illness. Most often, they think in terms of physical disabilities, usually temporary injury that can be rectified, such as broken bones or pierced flesh. Here, Shori’s amne- sia upsets their understanding of themselves as generally sound—in rela- tion to humans superlative—in mind and body. The absence of a possibility for cure destabilizes an aspect of themselves they consider fundamental— memory as tied to their longevity and as a necessary tool for their survival. Since mutual constitution occasions the recuperation of Blackness and mad- ness, they would be absorbed in their history or origin stories but not nor- malized based on abjection. According to these Ina, they were not present to be absorbed at all. This historiographical maneuver implies that madness and Blackness have and create separate historical trajectories which, when combined with a history that insists on whiteness and ability, is destructive to their sense of self. By muddying history, Butler allows Black madness to shift one of the hallmarks of science fiction: the audacity to imagine the future. The at- tempted genocide and the rhetoric of erasure push toward creating a bare life for Shori. Agamben develops the concept of bare life to account for those who exist between zoe (mere life) and bios (good life) and whose existence is included as a part of the Western cultural landscape but occluded from visual representation or polite conversation. Moreover, those with bare lives lose their rights as citizens, and their existence is limned by their fungibil- ity. Alexander Weheliye revises this concept to think through the Middle Passage instead of the Muselmann of the Holocaust, remarking that other bodies in the Western world are also susceptible to bare lives. In Weheliye’s revision, the bare lives to which Black people become susceptible are made possible by their de facto and long-standing position of fungibility vis-à-vis the state.68 In Shori’s case, the possibility remains that bare life becomes af- fixed to her Black amnesiac body not simply by virtue of genocidal action but also because of the accepted idea that the Ina exist outside the confines of race and racialization discourses. In thinking through Shori’s Black madness as variation rather than aber- ration, the text opens the space for Shori to display certain kinds of agency, loosen the hold of a bare life. Yet because her allies have to advocate for her to be considered Ina, I am hesitant to ascribe to Shori’s Black madness an agentive quality. That is, how far away from a bare life can she be if her ex- istence must be consistently justified before their Council of Judgment, and even then not fully decided or accepted? Black madness remains a provo- cation. Even as it forms the locus for the invagination of their history and the fold of their future, it both allows for agency and forecloses it. Black madness remains a wrinkle in the linear progression of history and time because of its opposition to their dominant ideology. As a result, it cannot have anything but a vexed agency, nor can it create itself outside the confines of a bare life. Moreover, Black madness, given its loss of time (amnesia) and aversion to time (changing the narrative) shifts the possibility of recupera- tion as a form of agency. Linked as it is to a bare life, affixed in history as such, it cannot fully recuperate its past nor rewrite the history to tell its story from its perspective.

#### **The impact is antiblack ableism that justifies suffering beyond suffering under the guise of hyper/ability**

Bailey and Mobley 19, Moya Bailey is an African American feminist scholar, writer, and activist, notable for coining the term misogynoir, which describes a specific form of discrimination experienced by black women. Bailey is an associate professor at Northwestern University. Izetta Autumn Mobley completed her doctoral studies at the University of Maryland, College Park in American Studies. Her research focuses on race, disability, slavery, public history, digital humanities, and material and visual culture. 10/12/19, “Work in the Intersections: A Black Feminist Disability Framework”, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0891243218801523>, apark 8/17/21

By using historical and theoretical examples from Black Studies and Disability Studies, we show that a Black feminist disability framework is emergent and intersectional. These examples, when analyzed with such a framework in mind, are rich with unexplored connections across both disciplines. Embedded within the narratives of some of the central figures and theories of these fields are the ingredients for creating the unifying framework. For example, the excess strength and otherwise “too muchness” of Blackness is an oft-deconstructed trope in Black Studies. The myth of the strong Black woman has been critiqued in many ways, notably by a powerful range of Black feminist scholars but has rarely been examined as a form of ableism—internalized or social (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009; Cole and Guy-Sheftall 2009; Collins 2000, 2005; Giddings 2007; Harris-Perry 2011; Mataka 2000). The myth suggests that Black women are uniquely strong, able to endure pain, and surmount otherwise difficult obstacles because of their innate tenacity. Black women are disallowed disability and their survival is depoliticized. Survival is a form of resistance and a source of celebration, particularly in the face of the reality that, as Lucille Clifton said, “Every day something has tried to kill me and has failed” (Clifton 1993, 25). There is a productive tension in recognizing the critical connections of the celebration of survival in the context of the demands made on Black bodies to transcend all suffering (Derricotte 2010). Resilience is praised while trauma, violence, and pain are too common to actually be interrogated for very long. The logic of Black hypervisibility produces subjects that are barred from weakness—and disability in Western thought as figured through non-normative bodies is the ultimate sign of unsuitability. To counteract such notions of unsuitability, a form of strategic essentialism has been adopted that upholds internalized ableism and ultimately disallows Black suffering through embracing an identification with this presumed hyper-ability. How many of us grew up with parents who warned us of having to be twice as good as our white counterparts? Designed to fortify Black children against the profound racism that is masked in a masquerade of meritocracy, this notion of having to be “twice as good,” while often true, also marks the difficulties with discussing trauma, health disparities, and psychiatric or physical disabilities within Black communities. If one is not able to work twice as hard to keep up with the masquerade, then what value does one have to the project of Black redemption? The cultural tradition from which this adage stems has been supported by studies and corroborated with empirical evidence. Black people are more likely to be surveilled, punished, and passed over for promotion than their white counterparts in all societal institutions. Black workers must demonstrate a significantly higher level of skill than their white counterparts in order to keep their jobs despite receiving lower wages and fewer opportunities for promotion (White 2015). Black people cannot afford to be disabled when they are required to be phantasmically abled in a white supremacist society. By bringing disability studies and a Black feminist theoretical lens to address this myth, scholars are better able to explain Black people’s reluctance to identify as disabled and potentially offer new strategies for dismantling ableism within Black Studies.

#### **The alternative is a methodological and narratological mad blackness that disrupts notions of ocularity and linearity while refusing calls to radicality, agency, and solutions**

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 17-18

Considering Black cultural contexts where mental illness and cognitive dis- ability occur, the two major Western modes of interpretation—ocularity and (drawing on our earlier conversation) linear time—no longer retain the exclusive right to interpret meaning. The Black mad are, in some sense, no more. They become the mad Black. I theorize mad Black and mad Blackness as a formulation that disrupts the ocular and linear legacies of the West’s conception of space and time, respectively. To theorize the concept of the mad Black or mad Blackness opens up critical space to consider how the dis- courses of madness and Blackness not only operate in intraracial spaces but also intensify and dismantle common understandings of each other. When mad becomes a modifier for Black it carries with it the charge of excess (i.e., more Black, really Black, unapologetically Black, Blackity Black), anger, and insanity as it simultaneously functions as an intensifier for Blackness itself. In some ways, madness amplifies Blackness in this conception, pushing it to excess, but it also has the potential to dismantle it. Said potential lies precisely in the disruption of Western space and time. Sight no longer acts as the dom- inant modeof sense making. Linear progressions of time no longer capture the movement of subjects and objects through narrative. Mad Blackness fills in the gaps heretofore created by reading strategies (i.e., mutual constitution) that rely on these two Western modalities of interpretation. For instance, Octavia E. Butler’s mad Black character cleaves time from space with her very existence, such that the linear progressive narrative plane is disrupted. She also foregrounds the lie in thinking of the impeachability of sight as the dominant mode of interpretation. Her allies cannot see her illness. Their understanding based on sight—no matter its superlative quality— is impoverished. The mad Black then is not solely disruptive because of its embodiment. But also, the mad Black figure and mad Blackness stage a narratological intervention in how we analyze and tell stories about race and disability writ large. Mad Blackness describes the aesthetics of a text that refuses to adhere to ocularcentrism or linearity. In these texts—including but not lim- ited to the ones in these conversations—madness and Blackness pervade the structure of the text such that linear renderings of the narrative always do a disservice to the text and an emphasis on sight forecloses interpretive possibility. To be clear, it is not that ocularcentrism and linearity are wholly inappropriate, but rather that they are explicitly incomplete due to the influ- ence of madness and Blackness in the structure and characters of the text. As a result, mad Blackness necessarily critiques texts that denigrate madness or Blackness or both. Despite, and perhaps owing to, this disruptive quality, I would not define mad Blackness as a revolutionary force, nor would I expect mad Black figures to offer solutions. Their disruption—of interpretation, of narrative—does not require that they provide solutions, since that contrasts their suspicion of linearity and teleology, nor does it require that they be benevolent, since that often requires they be in service of those that create and maintain anti- Black ableist and sanist structures. This book, Black Madness :: Mad Black- ness, is one such example of a mad Black text. As I mentioned, the conversa- tions herein reveal critical conversations to themselves, and seek to perturb some of the foundations upon which Black studies and disability studies rest all while yoking them irrevocably together.

#### **Our mad methodology allows for the extension of radical compassion to disembodied voices that condemns Western boundaries of sanity**

Bruce 21, La Marr Jurelle Bruce earned his BA in African American Studies and English & Comparative Literature from Columbia University and his PhD in African American Studies and American Studies from Yale University. June 2021, *How to Go Mad without Losing Your Mind*, Duke University Press, p 9-11

Mad methodology seeks, follows, and rides the unruly movements of madness. It reads and hears idioms of madness: those purported rants, raves, rambles, outbursts, mumbles, stammers, slurs, gibberish sounds, and unseemly silences that defy the grammars of Reason. It historicizes and contextualizes madness as a social construction and social relation vis-à-vis Reason. It ponders the sporadic violence of madness in tandem and in tension with the structural violence of Reason. It cultivates critical ambivalence to reckon with the simultaneous harm and benefit that may accompany madness. It respects and sometimes harnesses "mad" feelings like obsession and rage as stimulus for radical thought and action. Whereas rationalism roundly discredits madpersons, mad methodology recognizes madpersons as critical theorists and decisive protagonists in struggles for liberation. To be clear, I am not suggesting that madpersons are always already agents of liberation. I am simply and assuredly acknowledging that they can be, which is a heretical admission amid antimad worlds. I propose a mad methodology that neither vilifies the madperson as evil incarnate, nor romanticizes the madperson as resistance personified, nor patronizes the madperson as helpless ward awaiting aid. Rather, mad methodology engages the complexity and variability of mad subjects. Regarding anger, the warrior poet Audre Lorde asserts that it is "loaded with information and energy." Mad methodology is rooted in the recognition that phenomenal madness, medicalized madness, and psychosocial madness, like angry madness, are all "loaded with information and energy." Mad methodology proceeds from a belief that such information can instruct black radical theory and such energy can animate black radical praxis. Most urgently, mad methodology primes us to extend radical compassion to the madpersons, queer personae, ghosts, freaks, weirdos, imaginary friends, disembodied voices, unvoiced bodies, and unReasonable others, who trespass, like stowaways or fugitives, in Reasonable modernity. Radical compassion is a will to care for, a commitment to feel with, a striving to learn from, and an openness to be vulnerable before a precarious other, though they may be drastically dissimilar to yourself. Radical compassion is not an appeal to an idyllic oneness where difference is blithely effaced. Nor is it a smug projection of oneself into the position of another, thereby displacing that other. Nor is it an invitation to walk a mile in someone else's shoes and amble, like a tourist, through their lifeworld, leaving them existentially barefoot all the while. Rather, radical compassion is an exhortation to ethically walk and sit and fight and build alongside another whose condition may be utterly unlike your own. Radical compassion works to impart care, exchange feeling, transmit understanding, embolden vulnerability, and fortify solidarity across circumstantial, sociocultural, phenomenological, and ontological chasms in the interest of mutual liberation. It persists even and especially toward beings who are the objects of contempt and condemnation from dominant value systems. It extends even and especially to those who discomfit one's own sense of propriety. Indeed, this book sometimes loiters in scenes and tarries with people who may trouble readers. I hope that this book also models the sort of radical compassion that persists through the trouble. I characterize mad methodology as a parapositivist approach insofar as it resists the hegemony of positivism. (As a philosophical doctrine, positivism stipulates that meaningful assertions about the world must come from empirical observation and interpretation to generate veritable truth. However, when engaging the phenomenal, the spiritual, the aesthetic, the affective, and the mad, we must deviate from the logics of positivism.) Mad methodology finds great inspiration in other cultural theorists' parapositivist approaches, including the Apostle Paul's account of "faith," Édouard Glissant's "poetics of relation," Avery Gordon's haunted and haunting sociology, Saidiya Hartman's "critical fabulation," Jack Halberstam's "scavenger methodology," Ann Cvetkovich's compilation of an "archive of feelings," Christina Sharpe's "wake work" and Patricia J. Williams's "ghost gathering." These thinkers study sublime, opaque, formless, subjunctive, scarce, dead, and ghostly phenomena that thwart positivist knowing. As a parapositivist approach, mad methodology does not attempt to wholly, transparently reveal madness." How could it? Madness, after all, resists intelligibility and frustrates interpretation. Conceding that I cannot fully understand the meaning of every encounter, I often precede my observations with the qualifiers maybe, it might be, and it seems. Between these covers, I madness embrace uncertainty and irresolution. I heed poet-philosopher Glissant's insistence that "the transparency of the Enlightenment is finally misleading... It is not necessary to understand someone-in the verb 'to understand' [French: comprendre] there is the verb 'to take' [French: prendre]-in order to wish to live with them.I want to live with the madpersons gathered in this study, but I do not t to take them. I strive to pursue madness, but not to capture it. Recall that II began this chapter by warning you to hold tight. Mad methodology also, sometimes, entails letting go: relinquishing the imperative to know, to take, to capture, to master, to lay bare all the world with its countless terrors and wonders. Sometimes we must hold tight to steady ourselves amid the violent tumult of this world-and sometimes we must let go to unmoor ourselves from the stifling order imposed on this world. I am describing a deft dance between release and hold, hold and release. In short, mad methodology is how to go mad without losing your mind. At length, this book will show you.

#### The ROB is to open up spaces for mad black discussions – exposing these breaks in knowledge production is a pre-requisite to deconstructing violence because these discussions are always just erased

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 15-16

To that end, I draw on those who read within the folds and breaks, a concept and methodology that attends to connections between discourse and materiality as infinite and inextricably bound. The complex web of re- lationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability) is con- stituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts. Hortense Spillers’s work in “Interstices: A Drama of Small Words” (1984), and “‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’: An American Grammar Book” (1987), opens up this critical space and methodology in her discussion of the flesh. She depicts the flesh as a text that has, makes, and acquires meaning. The flesh of Black women in particular, since it has been erased from history, in its abrogated status exists within what Deleuze later terms the fold: a space not solely of possibility, but one that continuously gets erased. Since Deleuze develops the fold vis-à-vis Leibniz’s understanding of the Baroque aesthetic (read: within a tradition of Western and Enlightenment thought), I find it useful to think through how the fold shows up in the aesthetic praxis of the artists-theorists under scrutiny. The fold exists within the self, between the self and other, and between groups of others, as a space from which to interpret and understand the various critical and creative possibilities avail- able. In addition, development does not occur on a linear plane: it constantly folds, unfolds, and refolds. Most important for my readings, the fold func- tions as a space that creates and sustains possibility. Spillers’s work not only anticipates Deleuze but also expands its reach by making explicit which sub- jects consistently live within the fold, an idea disability studies scholar Len- nard Davis echoes when he writes about the way ideas and subjects within the fold get erased.48 Yet, the fold as understood by Deleuze is not merely the place where history and aesthetics rest. It is mercurial and oppositional, since, as Hortense Spillers theorized prior to Deleuze, it is emblazoned on Black flesh. Fred Moten’s In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radi- cal Tradition (2003) conceptualizes the “break,” a methodological kissing cousin to the fold, as a racialized space that pinpoints how history, music, and race—as discursive concepts and material consequences—function as oppositional even as they are coextensive. Moten’s “break” signals the kind of rupture that creates and catastrophizes Blackness and madness, which he punctuates by using other words to describe the break like the cut, or the process of breaking, like invagination, or intussuscepted (all of which I borrow).

## 2

#### Counterplan Text: Workers ought to unconditionally strike in a just government.

#### Acts of recognition by the colonizer block the future potentialities for change and reifies colonial oppression – the aff is an act of fixity, a colonial mimicry where the Other is only valuable once their desire to be recognized by the colonizer has been assured and fulfilled

LaRue 11, Robert LaRue, “MOVING BEYOND THIS MOMENT: EMPLOYING DELEUZE AND GUATARRI‟S RHIZOME IN POSTCOLONIALISM”, Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN ENGLISH THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON August 2011, <https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/6148/LaRue_uta_2502M_11318.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed 11/1/21, sb

Throughout his work as a psychiatrist, Fanon‟s attempts to delineate the path(s) of colonial oppression and find a way to help colonized individuals move beyond the problems of colonization always returned to the idea that “the last shall be first” (Wretched 2). Although presented in various forms, Fanon‟s desire to replace the first with the last only creates a loop because, instead of opening new pathways, it seeks to “substitute” one “thing” for another (Wretched 1). Even though, for Fanon, it seemed that ontology did “not [to] permit us to understand the being of the black man” (Black Skin 110) it seemed so because the ontology of the colonized was viewed as starting in, and around colonization. Since the rhizome refuses points, instead preferring continuous connections and fluid motions, understanding ontology as effect serves no purpose. This reliance on a point-based experience, if Cartesian humanism holds that existence is to be understood as a series disconnected instances of “I‟s,” becomes most clearly evidenced in the language of colonization each time the colonizer, or even Fanon himself, articulates that it is the colonizer who “fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject” (Wretched 2). Fanon seems to look at Sartre‟s existentialism as a way to connect the dots. However, as discussed in chapter 1, in joining the “I‟s” into one system, Sartre presents Fanon with a new set of challenges. Fanon‟s insistence on the colonizer being the “point” of the colonized, and postcolonial, existence fixes postcoloniality. The rhizome, in its “lineness,” soothes the tensions between these points. While it must be acknowledged that it was the colonizer who created circumstances that brought the “colonized” into a state of colonization, the existence of colonized individuals should not be understood as fixed at the point of interaction. Instead, the existence of the colonized extends beyond—both before and after—this “moment” of interaction. An understanding of this extension is precisely what the rhizome promotes. In soothing the series of disjointed points into multiple lines, Fanon‟s attempt to escape the fixity of his colonized body can be more easily realized because there can be an understanding that the stereotype (which becomes the linguistic model to signify the colonized) does not, and cannot exist. Fixity blocks the history—and futures—of bodies by turning them into singular sites that begin at the present moment(s) of “recognition,” or, as Homi Bhabha so aptly states it, fixity “facilitates colonial relations, and sets up a discursive form of racial and cultural opposition in terms of which colonial power is exercised” (112; emphasis in original). Through colonial linguistics, the body becomes expressly felt, “overdetermin[ing the colonized] from without” (Black Skin 116). At each interaction with the white world, the colonized are “assailed at various points” while “the[ir] corporeal schema crumble[s], its place taken by a racial epidermal schema” (112) so that the only understanding of their body is that which is handed to them by the colonizer. The body no longer becomes just the experiences of the individual, it becomes layered with the images that the colonizer has of the black man‟s experience. If Fanon s interested in having “those who have kept [the colonized] in slavery” so that they can “help rehabilitate man, and ensure his triumph everywhere, once and for all” (Wretched 61; my emphasis) there can be no freedom from this fixed body because the signifying colonized will always carry “traces” (as Derrida would put it) of its previous image/utterance relationship. Fanon‟s insistence that postcolonials can finally be “elevated” and given recognition as “humans” seems contradictory because, within the colonizer‟s mind, the separation of “Us” and “Them” is needed in order to assure the colonizer of his/her place. Therefore, Fanon‟s desire to “take [the] place” of the colonizer (Wretched 23) belies the truth that the postcolonial individual will never have a place within the colonist‟s system of power. By demanding a substitution of roles, Fanon seems to have ignored—either intentionally or unintentionally—his own recognition that “in the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of bodily schema” and any “consciousness of the body” comes as “a third-person consciousness” (Black Skin 110-11). In other words, within the “white world” of colonization, there is no room for “man of color” to be anything other than what the white man sees him as. The fixed categories of “the Other” always remain because the without them, the colonizer‟s own identity becomes jeporadized since there would no longer be an understanding of “me” based on what “I am not.” By introducing Deleuze and Guattari‟s rhizome into this understanding of experience as reality, the reading of the body expands so that the body, instead of remaining fixed, becomes a state of constant motion. Through an understanding of the rhizome, the postcolonial body no longer becomes a single unit (a monolith), instead, it becomes lifted from its binary relationship as a signifier (it is lifted from its status as a monolithic corporeal schema) and is able to be “read” as fluid and as a system of possibilities. As the language of colonization turned the existence of colonized individuals into one of fixed categories (i.e. savage, cannibalistic, uncivilized, etc.), the rhizome‟s multiplicities offer a chance to, as Ingram argues, move beyond a state of representation—where the body has its meaning(s) inscribed on it from outside sources, such as the perceptions of others—and towards a state of signification—where the body is no longer tied to fixed categories of meaning (3). By moving beyond the reliance on representation—which can never fully grasp the entirety of the thing it attempts to represent— and moving towards signification, postcolonial individuals gain the perspective that they have “meaning, but not one that is fixed or predetermined” (18). The European humanism, from which Fanon draws his claims, depends on these representations. It is because of this dependence that there can never be a new understanding of the postcolonial individual within the system of European humanism. The rhizome seeks to “think outside of the form/matter binary” (9) and allow all of its lines to create their own meanings—meanings that are not created by the Other, but created with an understanding of the Other as part of, not apart from, each line. This may seem problematic since it seems to corrode any knowledge of the “Self,” but, in fact, the body is freed from an understanding of the “Self” that relies on a point-based system of “mirroring” (Lacan) which holds the system of oppression in place. This psychology is based on a single fixed point: the “dictatorial conception of the unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 17). The unconscious, in the system of mirroring, becomes the point of origin for the Self. This once again brings about the searching for an origin, for the point of beginning for the individual. And, since much—if not all—of psychoanalysis grounds itself in Western concepts/ideals, any attempt to excavate the postcolonial individual‟s origin from a psychological (or more appropriately psychoanalytical) means only leads back to a troubled system of power. Instead of looking to “uncover” or “reduce the unconscious or to interpret it or to make it signify according to a tree model,” a rhizome “is precisely th[e] production of the unconscious” because it disengages itself from the “leader/follower” framework (17-18). It is not safe to say that the rhizome is a social body, since it does not require agreements the way that language does (rhizomes do not require the approval of its member to validate its existence). It simply is. Each line in the rhizome exists with or without recognition. Saying that existence relies upon mutual recognition insinuates that neither party exists prior to their mutual interaction. Insinuations such as these once again seek to fix the location of individuals, turning them into subjects in a game of power. Lacan is correct when he discusses the mirror‟s role in the construction of the self, showing how it creates new movements and new recognitions within the individual (2); however, this admission is near-sighted because he fails to note the effects that the individual has upon the mirror. On their own, the two bodies exist independently of one another. When they meet, not only is the individual altered by the mirror‟s reflection, but the mirror is altered by the individual. Each wave of the individual‟s arm deterritorializes the mirror and reterritorializes it, giving it new properties and new motions. Each new reflection creates a new mirror, just as it creates a new understanding in the mirrored. And each understanding shifts in accordance with different mirrors. There no longer remains a singular “source,” a singular “point” from which the individual can take its recognition. It is by understanding these multilateral effects and assemblages (the ways in which each line of interaction) cast effects on one another that the rhizome comes to “produce” the unconscious. Instead, rhizomes should be seen as natural connections of bodies based, with a large emphasis, on motion. In addition to this, rhizomes require reconstitutions of all “bodies” involved, removing the unilateral shifts that are typically assumed to occur in colonization. In other words, as explained by Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, among others, postcoloniality can no longer be seen as the sole existence of the once colonized “Others.” As a rhizome, then, the postcolonial body (not only how it physically connects with the microbes, viruses, and other life forms in its environment, but the psychological understanding of it as well) exists in a constant state of flux and as a constant source of deterritorializations and reterritorializations. In the postcolonial context, this is a powerful shift in focus because it allows Fanon‟s theory of the body to free itself from the singlesided transmissions of colonial knowledge(s). While Bhabha‟s discussion on mimicry makes a similar move of shifting colonial knowledge from a monologue to a dialogue (as he argues that mimicry highlights the “performance” of the colonist‟s existence), it too rests on performance which is problematic because the system of ascension remains intact since “colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other”8 (122). And, it is this upward movement that threatens to impede the progress of postcoloniality. Even as colonized individuals disrupt the security (or the certainty) of the colonists‟ knowledge of their (the colonists‟) own place, the postcolonial‟s desire to “prove” themselves only serves to validate the colonizer‟s superiority. Deleuze and Guattari‟s rhizome, however, moves beyond mimicry, as “[mimicry] relies on binary logic to describe phenomena” (11), insisting on understanding reality as a something like a giant ocean where each instance of contact sends forth ripples, and as each ripple moves outward, which alter the dynamic of the surrounding waters. As the rhizome highlights the interconnectivity of beings (of bodies), the hierarchical structure of mimicry is laid horizontal, placing all subjects equal to one another. Rhizomes “are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions” existing on a single plane (9). Rhizomes can never contain “a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the form of the good and the bad” because there is no end. Every seeming “rupture” always “tie back to one another” (9), and this ability to self-heal and avoid dualisms or dichotomies speaks directly to the systems through which postcolonial individuals must work. An understanding of the postcolonial Self can be, then, understood as a line in a multiplicity of lines which can never be separated because they are one another.

#### The impact is racism - the desire for recognition reproduces whiteness and hierarchies

Mazzei 11, Lisa A. Mazzei, current University of Oregon Professor of Education Studies, “Desiring silence: gender, race and pedagogy in education”, British Educational Research Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (August 2011), pp. 657-669 (13 pages), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23076344>, accessed 11/4/21, sb

Many of these same preservice teachers either come from rural communities or now live in the white suburban enclaves that form a perimeter around the cities in which they work and/or go to school. They have lived most of their lives in a white world where race has not been part of their own identification of self and where, if race was spoken of in reference to others, was an uncomfortable topic to be avoided. The pervasiveness of whiteness as normative and as visibly present (especially when not named) ‘classifies, [and] categorizes…on the basis of what is considered to be a natural and neutral epistemology’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 56). While we may acknowledge race as a social and discursive construction, it is the racial visibility that Seshadri-Crooks argues secures the ‘resilience and endurability of race’ as secure from deconstruction in ways that caste, class and ethnicity are not. I would further argue that the presence of a natural and neutral epistemology preserves whiteness in an acceptability of not naming. Jackson (2009), discussing Judith Butler, argues ‘desire for recognition is in actuality a site of power where who gets to be recognized, and by whom, is governed by social norms’ (p. 171). Because whiteness has historically gone unnamed and unnoticed as the hegemonic norm, a failure to voice whiteness, or put differently, the choice to articulate one’s white identity by not doing so, is another strategy for maintaining power through a move to maintain the normative (and unspoken) presence of whiteness, hence, ‘desiring silence’. While I worked with preservice teachers at this institution over a period of 10 years teaching a variety of courses and supervising field experiences, the majority of the data that I consider for this paper were generated from my teaching of a required course ‘Diversity and the Learner’ for students at the university preparing to teach in grades P–8.2 The stated aim of the course is to ‘enable students to acquire knowledge, skills, attitudes and values germane to an understanding of human growth and development with an emphasis on multicultural, psychological, and sociological factors…to analyze the cultural frames of reference and begin to develop a “multicultural” perspective.’ The data discussed for this article are drawn primarily from a semester in which of the 24 students enrolled in the class, 23 were white, non-Hispanic and one was black. It is also important to note that in addition to a lack of diversity in this class in regard to race and ethnicity, there was also a lack of diversity in regard to gender (2 males in a class of 24).3 For this paper I rely on my notes from classroom interactions as I attempted to understand and engage the silences that presented themselves in the classroom, my research log and, with the permission of students, their reflective journals and classroom assignments. The desire on the part of these students with whom I worked is to be (for the most part) good teachers, good girls and to carry on with the white identity and desires they have known and trusted. I am not suggesting that because they are ‘forced’ into interactions with the Other, and in many cases have their opinions that have been formed out of ignorance challenged, that they can or do automatically leave their bias behind. No, instead I am suggesting that their desire to carry on as before produces a form of regulation and resistance that I will discuss later in the paper, further informed by their positioning as females. There is no impetus to notice the sameness that surrounds them in their classmates, teacher educators or neighbours. It is and has been the Other that marks difference that permits whiteness and its attendant privileges to go, if not unnoticed, then at least unnamed. ‘Race establishes and preserves difference for the ultimate goal of sameness, in order to reproduce the desire for Whiteness’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 56). In a previous analysis of data from two teacher education courses comprised predominately of white female preservice teachers, I identified pedagogical silences and strategies that teacher educators might employ to both acknowledge and break the silences (Mazzei, 2008). What I attributed the silences to then was fear; fear of offending, fear of being wrong, fear of appearing stupid and fear of being marginalized by peers. The article ends with a discussion of how these students might be recognizing the potential loss they would encounter should they acknowledge and voice these fears. What I am proposing now is that perhaps there is less a resistance to fear that is producing the silences and, instead, recognition of their need to maintain privilege, identity and comfort that is producing a ‘desiring silence’. To begin to think, then, of the consequences of desire, I go to Alecia Jackson (2007, 2009) who discusses how desire, power and voice coalesce. It is this not said, this silent and desirous voice, that is produced by a longing for maintaining a normative and unchallenged (even unrecognized) whiteness (i.e., privilege) that is important here. Working within ‘a problematic of silence’ (Mazzei, 2007) coupled with this view toward the silences as ‘producing’ something may lead us not just to turn whiteness on its head, but silence as well, in a way that forces us to bring ‘production into desire on the one hand and desire into production on the other’ (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 17–18). In framing whiteness in the context of this paper, I am interested in how a lack of cognition regarding one’s racial identity/position as white serves to explain away and in many cases perpetuate the existence of racial barriers to social mobility (Sleeter, 2004). Since whiteness as a descriptor for whites often goes unnamed, unnoticed and unspoken, the silence or absence (that which is not spoken) of this racial identity continues to provide a framework for the analysis of the conversations I have with white teachers at both the preservice and inservice levels. If white teachers continue to effectively deny or fail to see their whiteness as raced then they will continue to see students of colour as ‘Other’ and respond to them from that perception—i.e., they are raced, I am not. Such an orientation perpetuates a racially inhabited silence that limits, if not negates, an open dialogue regarding race and culture. In such an environment stereotypes are furthered rather than confronted and perceptions of self and Other are allowed to remain circumscribed in a protective caul. In short, education as a means of transformation or change is subverted and silence as a means of control and protection of privilege is accepted. If we think silence is an enactment of a desire to be recognized as governed by social norms, then we acknowledge that the desire on the part of these white preservice teachers is a desire to be recognized ‘within the constraints of normativity’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 171). If they are recognized within such constraints, then their mark as white teacher remains intact. Privilege remains unchallenged and is thus exercised as a desiring silence that maintains an invisible mask of whiteness. In other words, these white preservice teachers do not speak of whiteness, or more specifically their own race, therefore whiteness is reinscribed as that which need not be named, thereby reproducing what Seshadri-Crooks refers to as a ‘neutral epistemology’. Instead of asking, ‘What is desire?’ the impetus is instead to ask, ‘What does desire ask of these students?’ Not what does it mean, but what does it do? Deleuze draws on Nietzsche for his theory of desire. For Nietzsche, the notion of desire has to do with drive. ‘What we call ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’, reason’ is nothing more than a competing of the passions or drives’ (Smith, 2007). Deleuze rejects desire as a lack, gap or what is missing and, instead, puts forth an immanent concept of desire. As such, desire is primary, positive and not left wanting but, instead, producing something. What matters for Deleuze is not what desire means; instead, he wants to know ‘whether it works, and how it works, and who it works for’ (Deleuze, 1990, p. 22). Through an engagement with Deleuzian desire, I focus on what is producing the silence and/or what the silence produces, in other words, a desiring silence. Not as in ‘to desire’ silence, but silences that are produced and that produce an effect, emerging from a ‘production of production’ (O’Sullivan & Zepke, 2008, p. 1, emphasis in original). Such silences may be produced by resistance or the attempt to maintain power that resists the ‘gravity of the circle of recognition and its representations’ (p. 1). What is desire? If desire does not begin from lack, in other words, desiring what we do not have, then where does it begin or, put differently, what spawns desire? Discussing Deleuzian desire, Claire Colebrook (2002) writes, ‘life strives to preserve and enhance itself and does so by connecting with other desires’ (p. 91). This preserving and enhancing of desire coalesces with power, not in a ‘repression of desire but the expansion of desire’ (p. 91). The task of Deleuze’s own method is to ‘explain how interests—such as humanism, individualism, capitalism or communism—are produced from desires: the concrete and specific connection of bodies’ (p. 92), in this case the bodies of white preservice teachers. The charge then becomes not to define desire, but to understand the interests that produce desire and the interests that desire seeks to produce and/or protect. In the case of white preservice teachers, the visibleness of white as a marker of their bodies has previously been deemed invisible because of its normative presence. This failure to have previously named whiteness thereby produces a desire to protect the invisibleness and hence a maintenance of whiteness as an unchallenged norm. ‘Desire itself is power, a power to become and produce images’ (Colebrook, 2002, p. 94, emphasis in original). A powerful white presence is an unnamed and silent image that continues to be masked in the power of that which will not be named. Desiring silence then re-produces an unspoken white presence. How does desire function to promote/produce regulation and resistance in teacher education? In her ethnographic study with those learning to teach, Deborah Britzman (2003) asserts ‘Much about the experience of learning to teach is negative: learning what to avoid, what not to do, and what not to become even as one finds oneself performing these disclaimed actions’ (p. 4). In my research, these teachers voice their reasons for being silent as a way of avoidance and perceived becoming. When asked why they were silent in my class, they spoke of not wanting to offend, not wanting to be challenged, not having the ‘right’ answer or not being respected by classmates (both white and non-white) who may hold different views. In other words, if they remain silent, they can avoid a loss of power and control that is maintained in a hegemonic and normative silence. Their desire therefore to regulate themselves and to resist being wrenched from their comfort zone produces a silence that attempts to reinscribe privilege, power and identity. Their silent voice coalesces with power to maintain whiteness.

## Case

#### Metaphors of haunting normalizes seeing black and trans people as abstractions.

Stephens 17 [R.L, longtime labor organizer, currently working for Unite Here! Former Jacobin writer, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ta-nehisi-coates-racism-afro-pessimism-reparations-class-struggle>] MI

“I do not believe that we can stop them … because they must ultimately stop themselves,” Ta-Nehisi Coates says of white racists in the final paragraph of his bestseller Between the World and Me, written as an open letter to his son. Coates describes racism as galactic, a physical law of the universe, “a tenacious gravity” and a “cosmic injustice.” When a cop kills a black man, the police officer is “a force of nature, the helpless agent of our world’s physical laws.” Society is equally helpless against the natural order. “The earthquake cannot be subpoenaed,” says Coates. In a widely replicated gesture, Coates locates the experience of racism in the body, in a racism that “dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth.” In the slim volume, fewer than two hundred pages, the word “body” or “bodies” appears more than three hundred times. “In America,” he writes, “it is traditional to destroy the black body.” Another brooding passage dwells on the inevitability of this violence. “It had to be blood. It had to be nails driven through a tongue and ears pruned away. It had to be the thrashing of a kitchen maid for the crime of churning the butter at a leisurely clip. It could only be the employment of carriage whips, tongs, iron pokers, handsaws, stones, paperweights or whatever might be handy to break the black body.” Yet Coates’s descriptive language and haunting narrative are not mere metaphors. They act as a kind of ontological pivot, mystifying racism even as it is anchored in its physical effects. Metaphor has long been used to capture racism’s almost unimaginable brutality. Lynching became “strange fruit” in Abel Meerpool’s song, made famous by Billie Holiday. In a wry, tragic innuendo, rape was referred to in Black communities as “nighttime integration.” The use of metaphor is not in itself an obfuscation. But Coates wields metaphor to obscure rather than illuminate the reality of racism. What we find all too often in Coates’s narrative universe are bodies without life and a racism without people. To give race an ontological meaning, to make it a reality all its own, is to drain it of its place in history and its roots in discrete human action. To deny the role of life and people — of politics — as Coates does is to also foreclose the possibility of liberation.

#### The aff’s method is an invention of ludic feminism, a politic that places faith in discourse to transcend material conditions. Aff is ruse for patriarchical capitalism to discredit collective material politics.

Ebert 95 [Teresa Ebert“(Untimely) Critiques for a Red Feminism” in *Post-Ality, Marxism and Postmodernism*. Prof. cultural theory @ Univ at Albany, State University of New York] MI

The result of this ludic positing of a relation of indeterminacy is a materialism that does not act materially; it does not determine anything: it is an inert mass. For the poststructuralist feminist, such as Butler, Cornell, or Fuss, this non-determinate relation is what makes the theory of the non-discursive in postmodern feminism "progressive" and non-reductionist. However, this is a very conservative and constraining understanding of the non-discursive and its relation to the discursive. The indeterminacy that it posits as a mark of resistance and freedom is, in actuality, a legitimisation of the class politics of an "upper-middle class" Euroamerican feminism that is obsessed with the freedom of the entrepreneurial subject and as such privileges the "inventiveness" of the sovereign subject — in the form of what Butler calls "citationality," Cornell calls "remetaphorisation," and what more generally is understood as creativity, agency — over the collective social relations of production. This individuality is materialised in the uniqueness and irreplaceability of each body. The non-discursive for ludic feminists in the 1990's, thus, becomes more and more a question of not simply that which exists outside the discursive but as that entity which is resistant to the discursive — and the body is put forth as the prime site for this resistance. What I have said so far about the history and theory of materialism" in recent feminist theory should not conveniently be read to mean that, for example, no feminist theorist before the mid-to-late 1980's talked about "materialism" as a matter of the body or that no feminist theorist, at the present time, regards "materialism" to be a matter of language. My point is that, at the present time, the notion of materialism as "language" is, to use Raymond Williams' terms, a "residual" concept (writers such as Barbara Johnson, who have shown an interest in feminism in their more recent writings, for example, still, by and large, regard materialism to be a matter of language). The idea of "materialism" as a matter of body — as, in short, a force resisting the discursive — is an "emergent" theory. We see the effort to suture these two theoretical tendencies together in the work, for example, of Judith Butler. In his move from the project of "archaeology" (questions of language and knowledge) to "genealogy" (issues of power and practice), Foucault has concluded that the only possibility of social change is through an entity that can resist the all inclusive and all-encompassing regime of the dominant "episteme" that he himself had so thoroughly analysed in The Order of Things. Since the episteme defines and controls all that was intelligible, to move beyond its regime, one has to appeal to an entity that is non-thinking, non-intelligible and has the power to resist the episteme. This entity, for Foucault, is the body, and the power of the body is acquired through its relentless seeking of purposeless pleasure: pleasure not as the reward for performing the task of reproduction. As Foucault elaborated in his later works, such as History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish, the body has its own materiality that enables it to "exceed" and "escape" discourse and its associated regimes of power-knowledge. This, of course, does not mean that the body is not conditioned, inscribed, and moulded by discourse. However, it does mean that power-knowledge never succeeds in completely overcoming the body: culturalisation is never total and the body always exceeds the power-knowledge that attempts to completely control it. This "exceeding" is possible partly because of the internal conflicts and contradictions among the various discourses that attempt to control the body. The notion of the body as a resiting site in Foucault, however, is a highly political one and is devised in part to inscribe a bourgeois ludic "materialism" (of pleasure ) in place of historical materialism. Foucault himself is quite clear on this point. In his "Body/Power," Foucault states that The emergence of the problem of the body and its growing urgency have come about through the unfolding of a political struggle. Whether this is a revolutionary struggle, I don't know. One can say that what has happened since 1968, and arguably what made 1968 possible, is something profoundly anti-Marxist. How can European revolutionary movements free themselves from the 'Marx effect. . . .' This was the direction of the questions posed by '68. In this calling in question of the equation: Marxism = the revolutionary process, an equation that constituted a kind of dogma, the importance given to the body is one of the important, if not essential elements. (Power/Knowledge 57) The politics of Foucault's theorising of the body as a site of resistance materialism becomes even more clear when he says, "I wonder whether, before one poses the question of ideology, it wouldn't be more materialist to study first the question of the body and the effects of power on it" (Power/Knowledge 58). The materialism of the body in Foucault, then, is specifically designed to oppose collective revolutionary praxis by substituting individual regimes of purposeless pleasure-pleasure as a mode of the Kantian "sublime," a pleasure that is an excess of all systems of representation and an escape from discourse and all social meanings. Social meanings — it is assumed — are all ideological, and the true freedom of the subject is attained by transcending ideology: pleasure deconstructs ideology (the preordained obviousness upon which the metanarratives of a society are founded) and arrives at surprising encounters that can only be called novel "experiences" (Foucault's formal opposition to "experience" notwithstanding). This legacy of Foucauldian inferential materialism has dominated the ludic feminist notion of the non-discursive and the material. Materialism in ludic feminism (as in Berkeley and other idealist philosophers) is, in fact, more a theological category than a materialist one. It is a form of what Lenin in his critique of Berkeley called "objective idealism" (Lenin, Materialism 23). The masquerading of this objective idealism — or what, in the context of Lenin's discussion of Berkeley, could be called spiritual materialism — as "materialism" in ludic feminism has notescaped the attention of ludic feminists themselves. Kathryn Bond Stockton, herself a ludic feminist theologian, describes the prevailing mode of "materialism" in ludic feminism in this way: I mean materialism in its strongest sense: the material onto which we map our constructions, 'matter on its own terms that might resist or pressure our constructions, or prove independent of them altogether. This materialism is the nondiscursive something poststructuralist feminists now want to embrace, the extradiscursive something they confess necessarily eludes them. ("Bodies and God" 131) Unlike historical materialism, which foregrounds the historical praxis of the materiality of labour, materialism, for the ludic feminist in the 1990's, is not an actual historical praxis that determines other practices, rather it is a purely "inferential" entity. It is, in fact, the consciousness of the subject that creates ("invents") this ludic "matter." Any understanding of "matter" as a positive entity (labour) is dismissed in ludic feminism as vulgar determinism/positivism. The "matter" of ludic feminism, in short, is a non-determining matter that depends on the subject and, as such, it is a reinscription of traditional Euroamerican idealism — this time represented as postmodern (non-positivist) materialism — to cover up the contradictions and crisis of patriarchal-capitalist. Materialism becomes (through such practices as .performance") that which exceeds the existing systems of representation — an escapes from socially constructed meanings. In ludic feminism, then, materialism (as a resisting matter) is an "invention." The seemingly "antitranscendental" element that materialism is supposed to bring to bear upon social analysis for ludic feminists, as Stockton herself realises, "only masks their deep dependence" upon "mystic unfathomable Visibilities" (132). Ludic spiritual materialism, in Stockton's words, stands as a God that might be approached through fictions and faith but never glimpsed naked" (131). Stockton's analysis is a conservative and local one: she simply observes the striking similarities that exist between spiritual materialism in ludic feminism and Victorian theological thought. In so doing, she blocks a more global understanding of ludic materialism: ludic materialism is an outcome of the contradictions of the social divisions of labour in class society. Spiritual materialism is, in short, is a strategy for managing the crisis of class relations. Materialism, in other words, is "invented" in ludic discourses to bring back transcendentalism in a more postmodern and thus convincing rhetoric. Moreover, as I will discuss more fully below, the trope of "invention" and theories of "invention" are introduced in contemporary theory as a means to overcome the impasse of "constructivism." Constructivism effectively combated humanism along with humanist and essentialist notions of the subject, but it also left the subject and subjectivity too determinate: "upper-middle-class" ludic theorists have not been able to accept any theory that circumscribes the freedom of the subject (of capital). However, what is commonly represented, under the guise of invention, as "materialism" in ludic feminism, is merely a re-invention of the very familiar technocratic imagination so valorised in capitalism: materialism as techno-ludism. The most well-known example of techno-ludism — that is, the conjuncture of technocratic fancy, inventionism and spiritual materialism — is Donna Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto which has become for many the manifesto of new, post-socialist ludic materialism. An apt commentary on the writings of Haraway and other feminist techno-theorists is provided by Marx and Engels. In their critique of idealist philosophers, Marx and Engels called them "industrialists of philosophy" who live on "absolute spirit," and this description remains valid for (techno)ludic feminists today (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 27, Collected Works, Vol. 5). It is necessary to recall that Haraway's essay ends with what Stockton calls the trope of the "Christian Pentecost" ("Bodies and God" 138): Haraway claims that "Cyborg imagery ... is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia... a feminist speaking in tongues" (Simians 181). This spiritual materialism — this ludic matterism in its various forms from cyborgian techno-ludism to Butlerian "citationality" — is now the dominant theory of materialism in the postmodern knowledge industry. It is a materialism that does not determine the non-material but is, in fact, determined by the consciousness of the subject that infers it and thus constitutes it. ludic materialism, then, whether perceived as the matter of sign/ textuality or as the matter of the body is an invention to overcome the determinism of social constructionism: it is a device to return the freedom of the subject and the contingency and non-necessity of the social with a newly legitimated force to the entrepreneur and patriarchal-capitalism.