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#### The valorization of resistance, survivability, and agency instrumentalizes black madness for white liberation and ignores how the black mad subject experiences asociality

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This strategy is not the only or primary way to read challenges to rac- ism and ableism. The problem exists (pace Hortense Spillers) at the level of grammar. These projects tend to have one vector: they “transform(ed) sys- tems and culture.”20 Note that transform operates as transitive where Black, disabled bodies perform the work of transformation rather than undergo the process of transformation. Yet Black, disabled bodies will not always behave as agents that transform or those who are transformed in equal mea- sure or, as noted above, with a degree of reciprocity. Allowing for more than one vector between Black, disabled bodies and the systems in which they operate clarifies the following: it is inaccurate that the only critical relation- ship between Blackness and disability (specifically, madness) is one of libera- tion from ableism. At times, Blackness exacerbates the presence of ableism, or cultural norms facilitate ableism.21 In accounting for these moments, I trouble the corollary of the logic above: namely, that whiteness withal the privilege embedded in it lacks the tools for its own liberation and must rely on Blackness to acquire its release. Here, Blackness becomes a reduced space where whiteness enacts its privilege by instrumentalizing Blackness. In this paradigm, Blackness for all its cultural complexity becomes another reac- tionary space that exists to indict whiteness, rather than a culture and sys- tem of thought all its own.22 We must consider the spaces when mere expo- sure of oppression is not only not emancipatory but can also be detrimental, where demonstration and acknowledgement of one’s various intersecting socially marginalized positions does not equal political agency. We must also consider what happens when Black cultural locations refuse whiteness as an interlocutor in favor of intraracial conversations. In short, when mad- ness is “a Black thang” (with all that evokes in terms of exclusivity and ableist objectification). I take up the question of intraracial context and conversation in the next discussion. For now, I turn to another foundational moment in the study of Blackness and disability to read in the breaks of the critical material. I con- tinue the conversation about the critical impulse of mutual constitution that looks to retrieve agentive stories of Black disabled folks as instantiations of anti-ableist radicality. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997) includes a chapter on physical disability in Ann Petry’s The Street, Toni Morrison’s oeuvre, and Audre Lorde’s Zami. Though Thomson’s dis- cussion does not explicitly discuss mental disability, cognitive impairment, or crazy-as-insult, I find it instructive for this conversation. Madness shad- ows each of the texts under scrutiny since the characters deviate from intra- cultural norms by being Black women who seek class ascension despite the odds (Petry) and wider American cultural norms by participating in and identifying with communities labeled deviant (and crazy) by the dsm IV (Lorde). Of course, Morrison’s characters are literally haunted by their ac- tions and kinfolk, which always forces the question of whether Morrison’s characters could be labeled crazy. It becomes useful to think about Mor- rison’s, Petry’s, and Lorde’s work (especially as part of Garland Thomson’s project) from the perspective of Octavia E. Butler: namely, that sanity is communally defined and anyone who deviates from agreed upon norms is treated as mad. The characters’ desires for themselves (and the methods they use to achieve them) exceed the racialized and gendered boundaries drawn for them. Indeed, because they also have physical disabilities, their behavior trespasses the boundaries drawn based on ability as well. Madness cannot be cleaved from these conversations. Thomson’s claims about the represen- tation of physical disability as agentive and liberatory have implications for whether madness has similar representational possibilities.23 Thomson offers that the collective project of these Black women’s writ- ings provides an antidote to white racist depictions. These powerful bodies— extraordinary, in Thomson’s lexicon—participate in a “collective project of cultural revision [that] challenges the African-American woman writer to produce a narrative of self that authenticates Black women’s oppressive history yet offers a model for transcending that history’s limitations.”24 Moreover, the primacy given to disabled women figures “reveals the shift in African-American literary representation from a modernist to a postmod- ernist mode, a change that parallels the ideological move of minority groups from assimilation to affirmation of cultural and ethnic differences.”25 While I partly agree that these representations “render oppression without rein- scribing it,”26 I hesitate to read in them the triumph that Thomson affirms. On the one hand, Thomson rightly points out that these characters do not completely represent physical deviance. On the other, they do not, as she says, “repudiate such cultural master narratives as normalcy, wholeness, and the feminine ideal.”27 I would attribute this aspect of their representation to the way that the social model of disability upon which Thomson relies does not fully account for the way madness shows up in these texts.28 The social model privileges a particular kind of mental agility and cognitive process- ing to combat the stigma and material consequences that arise as a result of ableism. In turn, the model dismisses madness as a viable subject position, ensuring that those counted as such—either by communal consensus or psy- disciplines—remain excluded from conversations about disability because they cannot logically engage. For the characters in Thomson’s study, this has the pernicious effect of erasing some of the master cultural narratives they work against: those that acknowledge their physical disability and link it to mental disability as a way to further disenfranchise and disempower them. Thomson’s work reads these figures (based on their representation of physical disabilities) as liberatory for the larger narrative and theoretical spaces of ethnic modernism. I hazard that these characters’ relationship to disability suggests an investment in internalized ableism, particularly vis- à-vis sexuality. For example, Thomson reads Ann Petry’s Mrs. Hedges, a tall, dark-skinned Black woman with avoirdupois who works as a madam, as one who refuses victimization. Important for this conversation is the way Mrs. Hedges is not only physically disfigured by burns but also read as ex- ceeding the gendered and racialized boundaries the text’s Black commu- nity (voiced through the protagonist) circumscribes for her. Her madness is not biomedically defined, but it carries psychosocial repercussions given how she is treated. Thomson bases her reading of Mrs. Hedges as liberatory on Hedges’s sexualized gaze on the main character and her profession as a madam. Yet, there is no room for Hedges to acquiesce to or enjoy the sexual- ized attention she receives from the rich white man who controls the street. The novel makes it clear that part of Hedges’s rejection of the man’s sexual advances is financial. She cannot be in bed with him literally and economi- cally. However, what the novel leaves open is that Hedges’s rejection of him is also about her own denigrated view of her sexuality.29 She is still limned as monstrous, grotesque, even if Hedges as a figure shifts the understand- ing of monstrosity. Inasmuch as Hedges’s physical disability allows her to move from one position in the economy to another more powerful one, she must rely on a chosen life of celibacy and a masculinized, monstrous ap- pearance to secure and maintain her new economic position. Her celibacy also shores up her power by keeping the madness of her disfigured, disabled, interracial sexuality in check. That is, though the disability is no longer in the background of the text, the cultural baggage of internalized ableism ap- pears in the foreground replete with eschewing sexual desire and limiting the association with traditional forms of femininity. Even if Petry’s proj- ect does—according to Thomson—pave the way for Black authors to shift from assimilation to affirmation and provide a challenge to the static rep- resentations of disabled figures in modernist texts, Mrs. Hedges’s refusal to engage in her own sexuality complicates a reading of this figure as liberatory vis-à-vis physical disability and the charges of madness that accompany her character. Reading Mrs. Hedges as agentive certainly poses challenges given the internalized ableism within Petry’s text, especially since the novel focuses on intraracial encounter. First, physical disability only liberates Mrs. Hedges from the intraracial economy of the street by providing an avenue for power. Yet, within intraracial encounter, she remains circumscribed by the discourses of madness because community members consider her mad for transgressing boundaries of race and gender. Second, the interracial encoun- ter does not allow for her agency within the critical literature. Thomson claims that Petry’s text, as well as the others, counters the limited represen- tations of disability within modernist texts. Implicitly, the logic of such a critical move—regardless of its truism—mandates that Blackness become the vehicle for (mostly white) others’ liberation from ableism in their read- ing practice. In that way, it is the presence of Blackness that shores up white liberalism by not only providing a representation of Blackness but also a complex rendering of white-centered notions of disability. Elsewhere, I have argued similarly—that we ought to attend to the way that Blackness and whiteness function in the interracial multiability en- counter. In my article on television’s Monk, I proposed that Blackness and madness cannot take up the same space within one interaction. I read the protagonist’s unnamed obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disability that “misfits” with other (usually minor) characters’ Blacknesses.30 At times, one is used for comedic fodder or erased in favor of representing the other or eclipsed as a way to demonstrate white liberalism. My article describes the relationship between these two identities as mutually constituted, but it evinces some slippage when attempting to discern why the protagonist’s disability erases the other characters’ Blackness. Since Blackness and mad- ness do not reside in the same body, the various drama-comedy scripts ter- giversate about what difference among difference can mean, often mobiliz- ing white liberalism to police disability and Blackness. Rereading my own work with an eye toward the breaks, I find that we not only lack a criti- cal vocabulary for describing Blackness and madness simultaneously, but it is also assumed that one must take priority over the other. The end result is that in this interracial encounter—whether fictionalized, theorized, or criticized—either Blackness or madness must be erased. Important for this conversation is that the multiracial, multiability encounter shifts depending on the social position of the characters. Blackness cannot and should not be marshaled as the radical space for white liberalism to mount its critique of ableism or racism. When Blackness and madness exist in the same space, multiple ways of reading should become possible, some of which eschew the possibility of radicality and others that might usher it in. The multiability interracial encounter also allows for Blackness and mad- ness to be erased when improperly thought of as agentive. Because both dis- courses are often conceptualized as unspeakable or illegible, their presence can facilitate and consolidate the power that creates abject material condi- tions. Nirmala Erevelles makes this point most forcefully: “The analytic category of disability is useful in destabilizing static notions of identity, ex- ploring intersectionality, and investigating embodiment, [yet] I argue that the effectiveness of much of feminist disability studies remains limited be- cause of its overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality.”31 In other words, Blackness and disability have the potential to destabilize the rhetoric of normalcy that holds them as abject, but they are curtailed in do- ing so when mislabeled as agentive. In Erevelles’s exploration of the lived conditions of war, she argues that when disability (both physical and men- tal) intersects with Black and brown bodies in the developing world or in disenfranchised communities within the developed world, their confluence indicts unchecked multinational corporate greed because it reveals the po- liticized nature of impairment. With this in mind, there can be no ableist or racist narrative available that prioritizes individualized achievement (read: overcoming) or bemoans bad luck (read: pity) because the root cause impli- cates specific governments, companies, the people who run them, and those who are complicit in them. In addition, Erevelles resists ascribing agency to the disabled people of color she discusses, perhaps because, in this version of David and Goliath, Goliath is winning. More to the point, the material conditions for celebration and agency require material resources not avail- able to everyone, and mere knowledge of one’s situation cannot be proxy for freedom from it, nor does awareness equal agency.

#### **The critical purchase of the human relies on notions of agency which the mad black are barred from – the only ethical demand is to disinvest from the human**

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Both strategies for engaging the human have merit: find the traces of what and who is used to constitute the concept and underscore the processes by which the human creates itself as superior. Recall that the mad Black is both an embodied positionality and an aesthetic intervention. As such, it hints at some common conceptual ground and useful disagreements. The mad Black cannot so simply slip into history as an aberration, nor can it so easily slip out of history as a failure. Here, the mad Black advocates a con- sistent questioning of how abjection functions, and from where it arises. It also acts as an adroit poker player. It sees the ideology of ability and raises it the possessive investment in whiteness (pace George Lipsitz), questioning how one arrives at universality if the so-called soundness of the bodymind is not the sole reason for exclusion. That is, the mad Black reveals a set of breaks to read: without a reliance on ocularity and a skepticism about lin- ear conceptions of time and narrative, it disrupts the easy alignment of dis- ability with whiteness or Blackness with degradation. Reading these breaks requires the disruption courted by Sylvia Wynter’s refusal of the category Man and broaches what Siebers termed the “conceptual horizon” marked by the ideology of ability.23 Mad Blackness calls for no less than a retooling of the terms of humanity itself. It questions the desire for ability, and the desire for whiteness. Since the Enlightenment positions madness and Blackness as a set of “ontological foils for the modern, rational, European subject,”24 the fissures reveal where, how, and with whom current ideological investments lie. Further, their undoing and unmaking requires an unmooring that reck- ons with constructs that have heretofore been unavailable. As my previous comments suggest, there exist a few cultural and social locations that allow us to question the utility of the human. Specifically, the appeal to universality and the possessive investment in whiteness cohere in one’s relationship to the nation-state. How is one defined as a citizen if madness or Blackness functions as a default disqualification? Those schol- ars working on physical disability have given a cursory nod to abjection,25 madness forces disability studies to reckon with where abjection arises and how it might be embraced.26 Taking a methodological cue from Nirmala Erevelles, who explores what it might mean to embrace disability as a part of Blackness, we need to examine abjection as a social location where Blackness and madness can powerfully defang the critical purchase of the human. It is not coincidental that much of the work on madness comes from the fields of rhetoric and composition because so many of the narratives we embrace about madness view it as a fundamental issue of communication. These scholars intervene in the sacralized understanding of madness as uncom- municative and therefore unripe for analysis in perpetuity. Madness and Blackness exert hortatory pressure on all modes of critical analysis, forcing an examination of how we place the human at the center or overlook it as the default premise.27

#### Black madness is in the position of abjection and bare life in relation to whiteness – black mad bodies are securitized against because their mere existence disrupts the privileged notion of the autonomous bodymind

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To be clear, Butler’s aesthetic intervention does not exclusively exist in the ideological spaces of syntax and punctuation. One of the rules of science fiction is that the world the author creates must abide by its own internal logic. Within the world of Fledgling, part of the internal logic is the history of the Ina people. Though Butler does not break the rule insisting on an in- ternal logic, she does not abide by the idea that the characters must be aware of the internal logic to which they abide. That is, the Gordons’ liberalism and silence and the antagonists’ hatred and genocide are two sides of the same narrative coin. They each participate in an act of historiographical revision, changing their past relationship to disability and Blackness by ex- cising them. Unlike the critical impulse that permits representational detec- tive work to recuperate Black disabled bodies and experiences, they cannot recuperate that which they do not think they have lost. They cannot treat as radical that which they considered so abject so as to not exist at all. But- ler’s text intervenes in the narrative logic that assumes the accepted stories about Ina origin and history are complete without the input of either the present or purported anomalies from the past. Ina construct the absence of Blackness and madness as a ballast of their identity ab ovo. The Gordons do not want to admit to the idea of Ina racists. They do not want to deal with the reality that Ina can be gravely mentally injured. (In point of fact, Shori’s father, Iosif, is the only Ina who acknowledges that her head injury could be part of Ina experience.) Racism and ableism exert differing pressures on Ina history and ontology. Each destabilizes the Ina’s notion of self, such that their only recourse is denial. To embrace the presence of racism in that moment would be to admit the possibility of dishonor and to more heavily court embarrassment and shame regarding Ina history or identity. To think about Ina injury, particularly amnesia, troubles the overarching paradigm they have developed for discussing their relationship to illness. Most often, they think in terms of physical disabilities, usually temporary injury that can be rectified, such as broken bones or pierced flesh. Here, Shori’s amne- sia upsets their understanding of themselves as generally sound—in rela- tion to humans superlative—in mind and body. The absence of a possibility for cure destabilizes an aspect of themselves they consider fundamental— memory as tied to their longevity and as a necessary tool for their survival. Since mutual constitution occasions the recuperation of Blackness and mad- ness, they would be absorbed in their history or origin stories but not nor- malized based on abjection. According to these Ina, they were not present to be absorbed at all. This historiographical maneuver implies that madness and Blackness have and create separate historical trajectories which, when combined with a history that insists on whiteness and ability, is destructive to their sense of self. By muddying history, Butler allows Black madness to shift one of the hallmarks of science fiction: the audacity to imagine the future. The at- tempted genocide and the rhetoric of erasure push toward creating a bare life for Shori. Agamben develops the concept of bare life to account for those who exist between zoe (mere life) and bios (good life) and whose existence is included as a part of the Western cultural landscape but occluded from visual representation or polite conversation. Moreover, those with bare lives lose their rights as citizens, and their existence is limned by their fungibil- ity. Alexander Weheliye revises this concept to think through the Middle Passage instead of the Muselmann of the Holocaust, remarking that other bodies in the Western world are also susceptible to bare lives. In Weheliye’s revision, the bare lives to which Black people become susceptible are made possible by their de facto and long-standing position of fungibility vis-à-vis the state.68 In Shori’s case, the possibility remains that bare life becomes af- fixed to her Black amnesiac body not simply by virtue of genocidal action but also because of the accepted idea that the Ina exist outside the confines of race and racialization discourses. In thinking through Shori’s Black madness as variation rather than aber- ration, the text opens the space for Shori to display certain kinds of agency, loosen the hold of a bare life. Yet because her allies have to advocate for her to be considered Ina, I am hesitant to ascribe to Shori’s Black madness an agentive quality. That is, how far away from a bare life can she be if her ex- istence must be consistently justified before their Council of Judgment, and even then not fully decided or accepted? Black madness remains a provo- cation. Even as it forms the locus for the invagination of their history and the fold of their future, it both allows for agency and forecloses it. Black madness remains a wrinkle in the linear progression of history and time because of its opposition to their dominant ideology. As a result, it cannot have anything but a vexed agency, nor can it create itself outside the confines of a bare life. Moreover, Black madness, given its loss of time (amnesia) and aversion to time (changing the narrative) shifts the possibility of recupera- tion as a form of agency. Linked as it is to a bare life, affixed in history as such, it cannot fully recuperate its past nor rewrite the history to tell its story from its perspective.

#### **The impact is antiblack ableism that justifies suffering beyond suffering under the guise of hyper/ability**

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By using historical and theoretical examples from Black Studies and Disability Studies, we show that a Black feminist disability framework is emergent and intersectional. These examples, when analyzed with such a framework in mind, are rich with unexplored connections across both disciplines. Embedded within the narratives of some of the central figures and theories of these fields are the ingredients for creating the unifying framework. For example, the excess strength and otherwise “too muchness” of Blackness is an oft-deconstructed trope in Black Studies. The myth of the strong Black woman has been critiqued in many ways, notably by a powerful range of Black feminist scholars but has rarely been examined as a form of ableism—internalized or social (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009; Cole and Guy-Sheftall 2009; Collins 2000, 2005; Giddings 2007; Harris-Perry 2011; Mataka 2000). The myth suggests that Black women are uniquely strong, able to endure pain, and surmount otherwise difficult obstacles because of their innate tenacity. Black women are disallowed disability and their survival is depoliticized. Survival is a form of resistance and a source of celebration, particularly in the face of the reality that, as Lucille Clifton said, “Every day something has tried to kill me and has failed” (Clifton 1993, 25). There is a productive tension in recognizing the critical connections of the celebration of survival in the context of the demands made on Black bodies to transcend all suffering (Derricotte 2010). Resilience is praised while trauma, violence, and pain are too common to actually be interrogated for very long. The logic of Black hypervisibility produces subjects that are barred from weakness—and disability in Western thought as figured through non-normative bodies is the ultimate sign of unsuitability. To counteract such notions of unsuitability, a form of strategic essentialism has been adopted that upholds internalized ableism and ultimately disallows Black suffering through embracing an identification with this presumed hyper-ability. How many of us grew up with parents who warned us of having to be twice as good as our white counterparts? Designed to fortify Black children against the profound racism that is masked in a masquerade of meritocracy, this notion of having to be “twice as good,” while often true, also marks the difficulties with discussing trauma, health disparities, and psychiatric or physical disabilities within Black communities. If one is not able to work twice as hard to keep up with the masquerade, then what value does one have to the project of Black redemption? The cultural tradition from which this adage stems has been supported by studies and corroborated with empirical evidence. Black people are more likely to be surveilled, punished, and passed over for promotion than their white counterparts in all societal institutions. Black workers must demonstrate a significantly higher level of skill than their white counterparts in order to keep their jobs despite receiving lower wages and fewer opportunities for promotion (White 2015). Black people cannot afford to be disabled when they are required to be phantasmically abled in a white supremacist society. By bringing disability studies and a Black feminist theoretical lens to address this myth, scholars are better able to explain Black people’s reluctance to identify as disabled and potentially offer new strategies for dismantling ableism within Black Studies.

#### This debate is not a question of root cause – relegating one form of violence as the root cause of all other forms of violence facilitates erasure of mad black bodies

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Quite frankly, Kriegel’s essay is painful to read. The outdated language, the faulty analogy, the internalized ableism, the profound lack of community— all of these depict experiences of disability and Blackness detached from social and/or political context. In Kriegel’s essay, Blackness and Black social movements provide a loose social mooring. To write at the tail end of the 1960s in New York requires an engagement with Blackness as a matter of accuracy and rigor. So, Kriegel’s essay considers—as it should—the import of social positioning vis-à-vis Blackness. Thinking of the essay as an artifact, it clarifies how the Black power movements and civil rights gains of the 1950s and 1960s paved the way for disability activism around the Rehabilitation Act (1973), and, by extension, the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), among others. Frantz Fanon provides the essay’s central theoretical inter- locutor, which could potentially position the “like race” idea less as analogy, shifting the discursive terrain such that the essay centralizes the projected experiences of Blackness. It doesn’t. Fanon’s theories do prove useful, how- ever, in thinking about the social situations that difference creates and abets. Even though the essay references the world, it is not grounded in it. As a result, the analysis fails on a few registers. The “like race” analogies for dis- ability function as missed opportunities for nuance. There are only certain well-worn paths that logic can follow. First, the comparative element leaves Kriegel little choice but to think through the relationship in hierarchical terms where one identity is more or less disenfranchised than the other. In- deed, this vacillates for Kriegel depending on the situation (i.e., the disabled have less social options, but Blacks have been victimized more), which dem- onstrates a kind of sophistication in understanding that each identity cat- egory operates differently depending on social context. Yet, the analogy still facilitates racist erasure: despite the fact that Kriegel’s rehabilitation facility is in Harlem, he does not think through the life of the Black disabled per- son, nor does he speculate about the interiority of those around him. They are merely sullen. The “as” of the simile and, by extension, the “like” of the larger analogy elide the differences between these identities because rhetori- cally one replaces the other. Erasure then allows for a collapse of important distinctions in experience (i.e., difference between Kriegel’s European im- migrant mother and the Blacks in Harlem), and the depiction of Blackness 2 Introduction as an abject monolith incapable of providing its own analogy and method. Placing Fanon in this context only allows him to expose and explain Black- ness as a pathology of the West, rather than allow Fanon to function as a theoretician that dialogues with and about Blackness and disability (albeit one who makes certain problematic “like race” analogies himself). In its failure, Kriegel’s essay foregrounds why the “like race” analogies are missed opportunities: They potentially promise a useful engagement with Black- ness and disability because they grant that the two share social similarities. However, without addressing collective histories, theoretical impulses, and subjectivities with nuance, the analogy reinscribes the erasure it originally promises to rectify.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that best makes space for disembodied voices – exposing these breaks in knowledge production is a pre-requisite to deconstructing violence because these discussions are always just erased

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To that end, I draw on those who read within the folds and breaks, a concept and methodology that attends to connections between discourse and materiality as infinite and inextricably bound. The complex web of re- lationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability) is con- stituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts. Hortense Spillers’s work in “Interstices: A Drama of Small Words” (1984), and “‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’: An American Grammar Book” (1987), opens up this critical space and methodology in her discussion of the flesh. She depicts the flesh as a text that has, makes, and acquires meaning. The flesh of Black women in particular, since it has been erased from history, in its abrogated status exists within what Deleuze later terms the fold: a space not solely of possibility, but one that continuously gets erased. Since Deleuze develops the fold vis-à-vis Leibniz’s understanding of the Baroque aesthetic (read: within a tradition of Western and Enlightenment thought), I find it useful to think through how the fold shows up in the aesthetic praxis of the artists-theorists under scrutiny. The fold exists within the self, between the self and other, and between groups of others, as a space from which to interpret and understand the various critical and creative possibilities avail- able. In addition, development does not occur on a linear plane: it constantly folds, unfolds, and refolds. Most important for my readings, the fold func- tions as a space that creates and sustains possibility. Spillers’s work not only anticipates Deleuze but also expands its reach by making explicit which sub- jects consistently live within the fold, an idea disability studies scholar Len- nard Davis echoes when he writes about the way ideas and subjects within the fold get erased.48 Yet, the fold as understood by Deleuze is not merely the place where history and aesthetics rest. It is mercurial and oppositional, since, as Hortense Spillers theorized prior to Deleuze, it is emblazoned on Black flesh. Fred Moten’s In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radi- cal Tradition (2003) conceptualizes the “break,” a methodological kissing cousin to the fold, as a racialized space that pinpoints how history, music, and race—as discursive concepts and material consequences—function as oppositional even as they are coextensive. Moten’s “break” signals the kind of rupture that creates and catastrophizes Blackness and madness, which he punctuates by using other words to describe the break like the cut, or the process of breaking, like invagination, or intussuscepted (all of which I borrow).

#### **The alternative is a methodological and narratological mad blackness that disrupts notions of ocularity and linearity while refusing calls to radicality, agency, and solutions**

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Considering Black cultural contexts where mental illness and cognitive dis- ability occur, the two major Western modes of interpretation—ocularity and (drawing on our earlier conversation) linear time—no longer retain the exclusive right to interpret meaning. The Black mad are, in some sense, no more. They become the mad Black. I theorize mad Black and mad Blackness as a formulation that disrupts the ocular and linear legacies of the West’s conception of space and time, respectively. To theorize the concept of the mad Black or mad Blackness opens up critical space to consider how the dis- courses of madness and Blackness not only operate in intraracial spaces but also intensify and dismantle common understandings of each other. When mad becomes a modifier for Black it carries with it the charge of excess (i.e., more Black, really Black, unapologetically Black, Blackity Black), anger, and insanity as it simultaneously functions as an intensifier for Blackness itself. In some ways, madness amplifies Blackness in this conception, pushing it to excess, but it also has the potential to dismantle it. Said potential lies precisely in the disruption of Western space and time. Sight no longer acts as the dom- inant mode of sense making. Linear progressions of time no longer capture the movement of subjects and objects through narrative. Mad Blackness fills in the gaps heretofore created by reading strategies (i.e., mutual constitution) that rely on these two Western modalities of interpretation. For instance, Octavia E. Butler’s mad Black character cleaves time from space with her very existence, such that the linear progressive narrative plane is disrupted. She also foregrounds the lie in thinking of the impeachability of sight as the dominant mode of interpretation. Her allies cannot see her illness. Their understanding based on sight—no matter its superlative quality— is impoverished. The mad Black then is not solely disruptive because of its embodiment. But also, the mad Black figure and mad Blackness stage a narratological intervention in how we analyze and tell stories about race and disability writ large. Mad Blackness describes the aesthetics of a text that refuses to adhere to ocularcentrism or linearity. In these texts—including but not lim- ited to the ones in these conversations—madness and Blackness pervade the structure of the text such that linear renderings of the narrative always do a disservice to the text and an emphasis on sight forecloses interpretive possibility. To be clear, it is not that ocularcentrism and linearity are wholly inappropriate, but rather that they are explicitly incomplete due to the influ- ence of madness and Blackness in the structure and characters of the text. As a result, mad Blackness necessarily critiques texts that denigrate madness or Blackness or both. Despite, and perhaps owing to, this disruptive quality, I would not define mad Blackness as a revolutionary force, nor would I expect mad Black figures to offer solutions. Their disruption—of interpretation, of narrative—does not require that they provide solutions, since that contrasts their suspicion of linearity and teleology, nor does it require that they be benevolent, since that often requires they be in service of those that create and maintain anti- Black ableist and sanist structures. This book, Black Madness :: Mad Black- ness, is one such example of a mad Black text. As I mentioned, the conversa- tions herein reveal critical conversations to themselves, and seek to perturb some of the foundations upon which Black studies and disability studies rest all while yoking them irrevocably together.

### Case

#### Their Greene and Hicks evidence – they put “rational decisions” in size 6 font – their method requires you to be rational – and it says being a propagandist requires you to be able to “verbalize” it

#### READ THE PART THEY DIDN’T HIGHLIGHT – this card is about 1955 college debate being the last place for communist propaganda to work – that’s terminal defense against the aff

#### The Yamada evidence – it says health care workers understand the “social origins” of illness – the social model of disability privileges ability in order to combat stigma – that was Pickens 19

#### **Marx fetishized and put the black slave on a pedestal to bring value into the white proletariat where blacks were cast as just objects of pity**

Matory 18, Lorand, Lawrence Richardson Professor of Cultural Anthropology and Director of the Sacred Arts of the Black Atlantic Project at Duke University, “The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make”, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-fetish-revisited>, Accessed 6/30/21 VD

Among the commodities great and small that Marx juggles algebraically in order to work out his historical materialist theory of value and historical progress—diamonds, wheat, boot polish, silk, silver, gold, corn, cattle, yarn, linen, paper, clothing, coats, iron, teas, coffee, and sugar—the most valuable commodity of all is conspicuously vaporized: enslaved Black people ([1867] 1990: 125–77). Marx recognized them neither as living, breathing, suffering, and productive people nor as commodities. Nor, as he struggled to end the conversion of the industrial worker into a thing, did he treat the enslaved African as a person wrongly converted into a commodity. Rather, he expressly and unselfconsciously turned the “negro slave” into a stone “pedestal”—a rhetorical chit wagered in the recalibration of the value of the European wage worker. Like Hegel before him and, after him, the contemporary practitioners of bdsm and M/s, Marx is strangely evasive about the centrality of Black slavery in the spiritual self making and the social transformation of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Marx calculated the value of any given commodity as the ratio of the duration of collective labor time needed to produce it relative to the duration of collective labor time needed to produce every other available commodity, Black labor time disappeared into a cloud of unknowing and mysteriously re-appeared, its origins unrecognizable, in the enhanced and socially autonomous competence of white labor. Marx worked this fetish magic by establishing a priori the polar opposition and absolute inequality between two types of worker, denying the value of slave labor in order to amplify the value of white wage labor relative to that of white capitalist management. By evacuating the “negro slave” of his or her of productivity, Marx himself turned the once-thingified white worker into a historical super-hero and the “negro slave” into a thing with no more agency than a pedestal. The “negro slave” has been eviscerated and discarded like Popeye’s can of spinach. So why did Marx wish the best for the European proletariat and so willingly sacrifice the “negro slave”? I hypothesize that Marx’s own ambiguous class and racial identities, and the social encumbrances they imposed, explain a great deal about the Black fetish he made: Marx himself was a downwardly mobile petit bourgeois and an off-white European who, like the wage worker, suffered under the need to sell his labor power but, even more than most European wage workers, was bypassed by the full benefits of colonialism and slavery. Marx hitched his wagon to that of the ambitious European and Euro-American working classes because Europeans’ collective domination of the black and the brown had already extended the privileges of aristocracy from the hereditary lords to the propertied bourgeoisie, and the best hope of an impoverished Jewish man was to be included in the next echelon of whites in line for inclusion—non–property holders. A step ahead of Arendt’s fixed typology, Marx was a rebel pariah bent on becoming a parvenu. Neither under Napoleonic nor under Prussian rule had the newly emancipated Jews received automatic admission to the game. European overseas imperialism, settler colonialism, and the enslavement of Africans had subsidized the expansion of the circle of comfort and honor beyond the European aristocracy to include the European bourgeoisie. The rhetoric of Marx’s plea for the inclusion of the proletariat in that same circle was also a plea for his own inclusion, obscuring his own racial and class ambiguity. Marx constructed the European proletariat as the main agent of history and the class most deserving of rescue. Propertyless but neither brown nor black, Marx told a tale of the proletariat that also appears intended to be a tale of himself. It is perhaps for these reasons that Marx’s “negro slave”–thing bears such a resemblance to the Haitian zonbi (Matory 2015d). On the one hand, Marx’s “negro slave”–thing is quite unlike the usual slave in the religions of the West African Ewe (Rosenthal 1998) and the African diaspora. For most African American populations, the slave is the relative or the ancestor whose ingenuity and forbearance under difficult circumstances represents the best in us. In the Anglo-Afro-American political tradition, as in early Hegel, the slave is the paradigmatic aspirant to freedom. In the Afro-Atlantic religions, the slave is the paradigm of tirelessness, materially and immediately effective labor, amoral service to those who feed him, and apocalyptic vengeance against social superiors who fail to live up to their end of the bargain (Matory 2007). On the other hand, the Haitian walking dead, or zonbi kò kadav, work hard but without consciousness or volition and are frightening not because they threaten to harm other people but because they are what virtually every Haitian fears being turned into—a person socially dead, bereft of family and friends. The “negro slave” is an object of pity, but merely an object. Breathing but mindless, he is merely the alarm clock that wakes the European “wage slave” to his proper place in the world. The “negro slave” is less a person than a thing—a living, breathing antitype of the fulfilled human being that Marx sees as the deserved status of the European industrial worker. In effect, as a Haitian priest might put it, Marx has “zombified” the enslaved African, transferring the victim’s agency and potential for value production to the white proletariat. Marx’s representation of the enslaved African is not inevitable. His “negro slave”–thing is quite unlike the Afro-Atlantic sacred slave, who is tireless, competent, and potentially vengeful. He is equally unlike the slave in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, whose servitude makes him the paradigm of self-awareness and social consciousness. Marx has chosen to render the “negro slave” more like the African in Hegel’s later Philosophy of History—the antihuman who proves real (i.e., white) people’s worthiness to rule themselves democratically. The Black man is the precious sacrifice demanded by Marx’s fetish. Indeed, Marx’s rhetorical abracadabra draws on 300 years of Protestant common sense in the era of the slave trade. Drawing attention away from a slew of debatable premises, Marx poetically declares, in effect, you must be as confused as an African if you don’t believe his definition of the real nature of value. Under the threat of looking as stupid as an African, Marx’s readership is embarrassed into accepting two premises of Marx’s proletarian advocacy. After the labor theory of value itself, the second premise is that people as foolish as Africans do not realize that it is people who make gods. Yet Marx himself is scarcely aware of the degree to which he and his “theory” defer to the power arising from things. Historical materialism itself inhered in animated, physical things—not only the Black “pedestal” but also the factory, the overcoat, and the piano—that moved and shaped Marx and the other denizens of his world in ways beyond their consciousness and volition. These material things gave form and focus to Marx’s hopes and fears. Marx attributed an inexorable historical agency to industrial capitalism, his ideas were funded and shaped by his overcoats, and his piano appears to have been a siren of his unsustainable bourgeois aspirations. Moreover, Marx sacrificed the soul of the “negro slave” in the mystical hope of fulfilling those aspirations. Marx’s historical materialism was itself a fetish. But he seemed not to know it. Indeed, Marx’s “negro slave” alerts us to the fact that his theorization of fetishism—that is, the displacement of agency from people to things—has an obverse side: the selective stripping of agency and value from some people and their displacement onto other people and things. Through the rhetorical mechanism of the ltv, Marx displaced the agency of the “negro slave” and the value of his products onto the white proletariat and, through the proxy of the white wage worker, established Marx’s own whiteness.

#### When we asked them to disclose, they said “30 minutes”

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

#### **Linear notions of time exclude mad black bodies**

Pickens 5 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory, Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 28-29

Here lies the critical lacuna we have yet to address. The historicization approach to discussions about race and disability presumes a linear progres- sion of time, an unfolding that takes place at a pace to which we have be- come accustomed delineated by demarcations of second, minute, hour, day, month, and year. However, as calendars themselves often lay bare, few cul- tures think of time in the same way. Which New Year do you celebrate? Is your calendar lunar or solar? Time does not progress in the same fashion for everyone. It becomes useful to think of history in terms of the fold. Here, I yoke Spillers’s concept of the flesh with Deleuze’s understanding of the fold (a point of connection between ideas where one begets the other) to Fred Moten’s conceptualization of being, living, writing, meaning “in the break” (where history and narrative converge—invaginate or intussuscept, to use his terms—as a requisite part of being intertwined). If we are to lin- ger in the fold, in the break, then we must reckon with the way madness and Blackness force us to render history countermnemonically: attending to gaps, mistakes, deferrals, silences, glitches. It is in this break, cut, fold that the relationship between Blackness and madness becomes most clear. Here is the relationship between Blackness and disability writ large, a relation- ship sutured at times by its connections, but also turned in and turned out by missed connections, erasures, and gaps.16 Despite the fact that both disability and race as ideas emerged at the same moments in history, they do not necessarily occupy the same tempo- ral plane when conjoined in quotidian interaction. In thinking of interra- cial encounter for instance, Sharon P. Holland reminds us of a “persistent problem in the Black/white encounter,” specifically that we must question “what happens when someone who exists in time meets someone who only occupies space?”17 As she delineates, Blackness appears as the antithesis of history, its excretion, whereas whiteness stands in for progression, being in time. Our sense of the two interacting in the same moment then is skewed by the fact that Blackness is not meant to be a part of history but rather its object. Black cultural production has consistently expanded upon this idea through its skepticism of linear progressive narratives that assume Western origins, choosing instead to position Africa (usually the continent, broadly conceptualized) as a futuristic space or elide Western notions of time and space.18 Thinking through the Black mad subject, we must consider that this person is meant not only to occupy space but to be consistently removed from space in order to make room for the more recognizable subject: the white able body. It is this body that dictates the terms of history and narra- tive. In the case of Billy Ray Johnson, the criminal justice system determined that his assailants were allowed to move on with their lives regardless of the violence and damage done to his body. If we are to consider Bell’s modest proposal, the Black mad subject is removed from time to make space for the white disabled body as well. In other words, the Black disabled subject exists only to shore up the value of others. So, when the Black/white encounter is divided along ability lines such that the disabled body is white and the able body is Black, what emerges is a dynamic of relationships that force Black- ness and disability into the realm of unspeakability, troubling the idea that both are created and sustained at the same time.

#### Even if you think this is silly, this is the best way to stop these practices in the LD community

#### Marxism is literally a historicization that adheres to linear readings of time and history – the idea that all conflicts in history are based on class – c/a the card above