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#### CRISPR is inextricably tied to the “editing” of disabled people out of the future – it creates a utopian fantasy of futurity that those with “bad genes” are written out of

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But Doudna herself has recognized that CRISPR carries with it “great risk.” In a New York Times interview on October 22, 2020, she warned of the unknown consequences of embryo editing, cautioning researchers to wait to use CRISPR for these ends. As disability studies scholars and women with genetic differences who are experts in thinking about the consequences this technology will have for actual human beings, we have grave worries that the use of these “genetic scissors” will, in the future, cut people like us out of existence without others even noticing. Scientists who use CRISPR could see editing genes such as ours out of the gene pool as entirely uncontroversial. This attitude, in fact, would be consistent with wider societal views. The idea that ridding society of genetic differences that count as disease or defect is an undeniable “good” continues to be pervasive in our society. Americans generally see no problem with editing genes linked to broad swaths of people like us; after all, supporters of this view may argue, editing out a gene-linked condition is different from editing out a person, and curing disease is an indisputably good thing. But our genetic conditions are not simply entities that can be clipped away from us as if they were some kind of a misspelled word or an awkward sentence in a document. We are whole beings, with our genetic conditions forming a fundamental part of who we are. Still, many Americans—including medical providers and even some people with genetic differences—consider lives such as ours as not worth living as they are. Further, the common belief that ridding disease and anomaly from society is an incontrovertible good can lead very quickly from the actual possibilities of science to fantasies of “improving” humanity where we would all become some aspirational version of personhood that is somehow better, stronger, smarter, and healthier. But CRISPR’s tantalizing offer to achieve the supposedly “best” kind of people at the genetic level is an uneasy alert to those who are often judged to be biologically inferior—one we know all too well. People like us whose being is inseparable from our genetic condition would be the first to go. We both have genetic conditions that many people consider serious enough to eliminate from the human gene pool: one of us lives with cystic fibrosis (CF), and the other a form of syndactyly. Both of these conditions have shaped our bodies and our lives. Sandy’s affected lungs require several hours of treatments each day, and Rosemarie’s affected hands limit her manual dexterity. We are among the one billion people in the world (15 percent of the population) and 61 million people in the United States (26 percent of all adults) who are considered disabled. We are among the 10 percent of all adults who have a genetic condition. Because we were born with our conditions, we have benefited from learning early on how to live with the characteristics of our particular genetic distinctiveness. Our supportive families saw to it that we accessed good health care and received educations suitable to our talents and interests. Improved medical treatments, social progress, and political equality movements raised our quality of life in ways that people like us in generations prior to ours could not have imagined. When Sandy was born in 1967, people with CF had an average life expectancy of 15, but during 1970–1990, life expectancy doubled due to new medical therapies. Today’s average life expectancy is 44, but with novel medicines called cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) modulators, people with CF are expected to live even longer with fewer hospitalizations. These transformations in life expectancy attest to the changing nature of prognosis, one for which CRISPR’s editing cannot account. When Rosemarie was born, in the late 1940s, people with physical disabilities like hers were often institutionalized and led limited lives far from the support of their families. At that time, only one in five children with disabilities were educated in public schools with nondisabled children. Physically disabled children were most often sent to segregated schools where they received inferior education. With the Education for All Act of 1975 (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), however, the federal government guaranteed public education and services for all children with disabilities, thus changing their life trajectories. We learned to thrive with the bodies we have and possess identities and lives that include our genetic diagnostic categories but also go beyond them. Yet stubborn beliefs about “good” genes and “bad” genes nonetheless persist in discriminatory attitudes that affect us both. When Rosemarie was pregnant with her first child, the obstetrician assumed that her major concern was that the baby would have hands and arms like its mother, even though Rosemarie’s biggest concern was finding a good childcare situation that would complement her job responsibilities. When Sandy considered having a biological child, friends and medical providers questioned her decision to consider pregnancy because that meant passing on one copy of her cystic fibrosis gene to a future child. This imagined child would not have had the disease since her husband is not a carrier for CF (CF is an autosomal recessive disease). But some of those in Sandy’s circle still believed pregnancy inadvisable because, to them, producing a child who would carry the CF gene was equally undesirable. Sandy called out their assumption: that her condition was inherently inferior—a point they took as self-evident despite the fact that an estimated 24 percent of people worldwide are carriers for genetic conditions. These stories also reveal an enduring ideology about the inextricable, cultural link among disability, reproduction, and suffering. They illustrate the subtle, yet insidious, idea that some genes are inherently bad and contaminate the human gene pool; as such, people who carry them should not propagate and pass those genes on to their progeny so as to make those children either carriers or affected. These ideas also expose an even deeper, ableist assumption: that people with supposedly “bad genes” fundamentally suffer and hold a less valuable place in society than others. This isn’t to say that people with genetic conditions don’t suffer, but we don’t necessarily suffer all the time and we don’t necessarily suffer any more than other people without such conditions. Yet the cultural impulse to assume that people with genetic variations are in a constant state of suffering, and that it blights our lives, is so pervasive that it is even internalized by some with genetic conditions themselves. Such genetic determinism is a new form of eugenic thinking grounded in what the communications studies scholar James L. Cherney calls “common sense” ableism, a belief system that allows people to simultaneously deny any commitment to distasteful eugenic principles while also holding them up. Common sense ableism permits, even encourages, such injurious attitudes. Utilizing genome manipulation tools and performing genetic selection is tantamount to engaging in what Rosemarie calls “velvet eugenics.” Enforced by laissez-faire commercialism, rather than by the state, velvet eugenics seems like common sense, yet it hides its violence and inequality behind claims of patient autonomy and under a veil of voluntary consent. Ultimately, market-driven velvet eugenics embodies a similar goal of purging unacceptable human variations that campaigns to eliminate the supposedly unfit and inferior have held in the past. Both enact a mandate to exclude people with disabilities from coming into the world. People like us shouldn’t be edited out of existence in some version of a utopian future. This vision of a future without people like us limits our ability to live in the present. Evaluating the quality of life of another person is a complex, highly subjective, and context-dependent task that is morally questionable in a society based on the concept that all people are of equal value regardless of their individual differences. The limitations of human imagination make it questionable, if not unethical, for a person to grasp another person’s (or group of people’s) quality of life fully. Expanding diversity in all its forms, including disability, strengthens the human community ethically and biologically because it opens the public and private sphere to a variety of perspectives, life experiences, ideas, and solutions to live together with mutual flourishing. More important, our shared founding belief in the equal value of all members of a society should remind us that people’s worth should not be determined by social judgments about their contribution. All members of a community contribute to its welfare by existing in their individual distinctiveness. Genome editing is a powerful, scientific technology that can reshape medical treatments and people’s lives, but it can also harmfully reduce human diversity and increase social inequality by editing out the kinds of people that medical science, and the society it has shaped, categorize as diseased or genetically contaminated--people like us who are understood as having bad genes. But we should be reminded that bad genes don’t necessarily lead to bad lives, just as good genes don’t necessarily lead to good lives. If CRISPR is put to use to eliminate rather than to treat genetic difference, we as a society would essentially instrumentalize this moralistic and reductionist assumption.

#### The logic of CRISPR is built upon curative logic – the drive to rehabilitate and “cure” disabled people – this goes beyond individual treatments but is a system imbricated within the medicine itself

Kim 17, Eunjung, associate professor in the Department of Women’s and Gender Studies and the Department of Cultural Foundations of Education and Disability Studies Program at Syracuse University, “Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea”, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/curative-violence>, Accessed 8/12/21 VD

To cure typically means to restore “health” by removing illness and disability through medical treatment. Figuratively, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, it also means “to remedy, rectify, or remove (an evil of any kind),” illustrating that moral judgment about its object as “evil” is an important component of its meaning. The existing critique of cure within disability studies with a Western focus has targeted medical cure and its social impact, tied to criticism of the medical model that sees disability as an individual deficit or pathology to be corrected through professional interventions.14 The medical model also denies or obscures disability as a valuable element of human difference. Importantly, this criticism challenges the perception that disability needs to be cured and denounces the priority of cure over other social and environmental changes that enable people to live with disability and illness~~.~~ In other words, the compulsion of cure, regardless of whether any cure is available, preempts social and practical solutions to many of the problems and struggles that disabled people experience. Eli Clare relocates the site that needs “cure” in the context of the United States: “The disability rights movement, like other social change movements, names systems of oppression as the problem, not individual bodies. In short it is ableism that needs the cure, not our bodies.”15 The critique of cure, therefore, has attempted to shift priorities and to valorize disabilities as differences. Cure entails an individualized approach, which is likely to be determined by the affordability of medical care. Analyzing the Nuveen commercial and the film In the Gloaming, directed by Reeve, which depicts a character living with AIDS, Robert McRuer argues that the focus on cure prevents people from having conversations about the systems of power and about everyone’s complicity in them. McRuer emphasizes that curative approaches to disability and AIDS are inseparable. He argues that “people with AIDS are not passive observers who are simply waiting for a cure” and it is important to recognize that disabled people are making coalitions with other oppressed minorities and are demanding broad social and political changes.16 Disability studies scholars increasingly seek to examine the interlocking nature of oppressions among various marginalized groups and to highlight the importance of making existing medical care and prevention affordable and accessible, of eliminating ableist medical discrimination, and of undertaking efforts at prevention based on proper education and health care. What is problematic in the drive for medical cure is its narrow, simple focus on the gains and benefits that cure may bring, disregarding its associated harms, risks, and disenabling effects. It also closes off ways to support, in the present, “untreated” and “incurable” lives, that is, people who have a disability or an illness, as well as people who refuse or cannot afford treatments. When bodies are pronounced “incurable,” they are read as being in a condition of a “nonlife”— without a future and denied meaning in the present. At the same time, cure denies a place for disability and illness as different ways of existing in the present. Cure discourses and imagery operate in political, moral, economic, and emotional realms that go beyond individual medical treatments and personal desires for remedy. An emphasis on cure as the only path forward is damaging, because it obscures the fact that cure is always a multifaceted negotiation, often enabling and disabling at the same time, and may be accompanied by pain, loss, or death. If cure eliminates disability, why is disability persistently present within the drama of cure? The commercial about Reeve’s cure does indeed picture the presence of disability in the future, while rendering it unrecognizable. In addition to those who are watching the broadcast celebration on-screen with a sense of wonder, four people with visible disabilities walk behind Reeve onstage. They may be featured to represent either those still waiting to be cured, once greater sums are invested, or those who, like Reeve, are walking after a long period of using a wheelchair. As much as the image of Reeve’s walking surprises the viewers, it also shows new markers of disability, inviting a scrutinizing gaze at his virtual motion, which might seem different. He grabs the arms of the chair for balance as he rises, and he takes each step with care. As he gazes to the side, his neck doesn’t turn; the camera focuses on his face, his head (cropped from the image of his disabled body) digitally attached to the walking body. Significantly, this commercial shows a future inhabited by disabled bodies, including that of Reeve. In order for the imagined cure to be meaningful, then, it has to be accompanied by disability. Although disabilities of the individuals and Reeve onstage are read as soon-to-disappear, the very presence of disabled bodies counters the assumption that cure eliminates disability. This may bring us a different understanding about cultural productions that frame embodiments always in reference to one another. For many, cure demands that we suspend our living in the present and instead wait for a future without disabilities and illnesses, urging us to not live in the present. Alison Kafer calls this temporal framing “curative time”: “In our disabled state, we are not part of the dominant narratives of progress, but once rehabilitated, normalized, and hopefully cured, we play a starring role: the sign of progress, the proof of development, the triumph over the mind or body.”17 In the South Korean context, I add to this list the observation that a rehabilitated or cured body becomes a sign of decolonized and sovereign statehood under capitalism, for the colonized and communist state was understood as a disabled and even nonhuman body.18 Set against the impossibility of inhabiting the present, the promised transformation through cure is enticing enough to make losses and hastened death acceptable, even expected. Kafer continues, “Within this frame of curative time, then, the only appropriate disabled mind/ body is one cured or moving toward cure. Cure, in this context, most obviously signals the elimination of impairment but can also mean normalizing treatments that work to assimilate the disabled mind/body as much as possible.”19 The curative drive also demands an approximation of normality through “habilitation” (the acquisition of skills and abilities) and “rehabilitation” (the regaining of skills and abilities that have been lost or impaired). If one refuses to read the presence of disabled bodies as always moving forward on the compulsory path to be cured or to die, those four individuals with disabilities who follow Reeve onstage might be imagined as the disability community that congratulates him for his chosen transformation and his belonging to—rather than his departure from—that community. Even though Reeve’s focus on cure constrained his relationship with disability rights movements, this kind of imaginative reading attempts to disengage from curative time, which considers one embodiment an improvement from the previous one. This imagining attempts to unlearn the habit of projecting the cure imperative onto disabled bodies, instead focusing on the presence of disability itself and envisioning a future when cure exists as a negotiated transformation. The presence of disabilities in the representation of cure helps me situate cure in the work of time to examine how cure, even at an individual level, does not always provide relief or advance one’s health and functions. What happens when cure promises to take bodies from the category of disability to that of normality, but leaves them in the middle? Can cure coexist with disability? The analysis of cure informs us that disability never simply disappears through attempts at cure; it is recognized, then disfigured and disinvested. The curative attempts also affect gender, age, class, sexuality, race/ethnicity/ indigeneity, religion, health status, and nation-state. The temporal and rhetorical politics of virtual cure and the heightened emotions surrounding images of cure—hope, hopelessness, the sense of empowerment, nationalist sentiment, and so on—underscore the need to examine visual and literary cultures of cure beyond medical, scientific, and bioethical frameworks. What do emotional and material investment in cure and the political criticism about cure tell us about our identification and disidentification with disability and otherness? In many cases, curable and cured bodies are disabled, because of the history of disability they carry and because of the unending rehabilitation, up to a certain age, to gain the better bodies that supposedly await in their future. Much as happiness, as explored by Sara Ahmed—who draws from feminist, black, and queer scholars who criticize happiness as a device for oppression—is a wish that keeps “its place as a wish by its failure to be given,”20 so too cure keeps its place as a destination at which one can never arrive. In that sense, for disabled people normality exists always one moment away, urging us to suspend our life in the present and not to attempt social changes.

#### Disabled people are constantly written out of the CRISPR debate – the fact they can sit there and tell disabled people they shouldn’t exist proves this – the ROTB is to recognize and endorse crip stories about CRISPR

Beitiks 17, Emily, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 2012, Paul K. Longmore Institute of Disability, “5 Reasons Why We Need People with Disabilities in The CRISPR Debates”, <https://longmoreinstitute.sfsu.edu/5-reasons-why-we-need-people-disabilities-crispr-debates>, Accessed 9/30/21 VD

Nondisabled proponents are arguing we need to use CRISPR to prevent disabilities. Nondisabled opponents suggest we should be wary of CRISPR for its threat to disability justice. Both sides are talking about disability, but the conversation would carry more weight if disability activists were involved. This is why the work of disability activist and writer Harriet McBryde Johnson was so powerful. In a series of conversations with philosopher Peter Singer, one of the most outspoken advocates of preventing children with disabilities from being born, McBryde Johnson put a face to his theoretical exercises and argued that they had life or death consequences for people like her. (Still image via Vimeo) When I share my interests in these sorts of debates, I often get this wave of enthusiasm from other nondisabled people who seem to find it fun to sit around and discuss how much better the world would be if we could prevent or cure all disabilities. They want to talk it out through thought experiments and philosophical exercises. I mean no disrespect to those who think that way. After all, I’m married to someone with a philosophy degree, and some philosophers with disabilities have made important contributions to the way disability is theorized in ethical debates (e.g. Adrienne Asch and Anita Silvers). However, I think the debate needs more perspectives, personal stories coming from people with disabilities who help us to attach faces and lives to the debate and to remind us what a loss it would be to live in a world with less disability. (At the 2015 National Academies' International Summit on Human Gene Editing, the conversation did not include any featured speaker open about being a person with a disability. (There were efforts to invite one or two, and Ruha Benjamin did give a wonderful presentation, which you can view here, but the omission was startling.)

#### Disability is the master trope of human disqualification that structures oppression

**Siebers 9** (Tobin Siebers, “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, p. 5-8)

The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The **mental and** **physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority** via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior. Aesthetics studies the way that some bodies make other bodies feel. Bodies, minimally defined, are what appear in the world. They involve manifestations of physical appearance, whether this appearance is defined as the physical manifestation itself or as the particular appearance of a given physical manifestation. Bodies include in my definition human bodies, paintings, sculpture, buildings, the entire range of human artifacts as well as animals and objects in the natural world. Aesthetics, moreover, has always stressed that feelings produced in bodies by other bodies are involuntary, as if they represented a form of unconscious communication between bodies, a contagious possession of one body by another. Aesthetics is the domain in which the sensation of otherness is felt at its most powerful, strange, and frightening. Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness and pain, or sublimity and terror, the emotional impact of one body on another is experienced as **an assault on autonomy** and a testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and imagination. Of course, when bodies produce feelings of pleasure or pain, they also invite judgments about whether they should be accepted or rejected in the human community. People thought to experience more pleasure or pain than others or to produce unusual levels of pleasure and pain in other bodies are among the bodies most discriminated against, actively excluded, and violated on the current scene, be they disabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Disabled people, but also sex workers, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people, and people of color, are tortured and killed because of beliefs about their relationship to pain and pleasure (Siebers 2009). This is why aesthetic disqualification is not merely a matter for art critics or museum directors but a political process of concern to us all. An understanding of aesthetics is crucial because it reveals the operative principles of disqualification used in minority oppression. Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. **The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel.** This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that **disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification**, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, **the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled**, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature.

#### Educational spaces have become a places where military operations are waged to rehabilitate the crip back into normative society.

**Castrodale 15** (Mark Anthony, King's University College at Western University, Disability Studies, Faculty Member “A Critical Discussion on Disabled Subjects Examining Ableist and Militarist Discourses in Education” The University of Alberta Press, chapter five of Gendered Militarism in Canada ) TJS

Drawing on the works of Foucault (1984, 1994, 1995, 2003), one sees that gendered and disabled bodies are constituted discursively through webs of knowledge-power relations, and subjects may also work to constitute themselves. Examination of the intersection of gender and disability may shed new light on the ways in which bodies are constituted in various educational sites in potentially disempowering and empowering ways. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1995) discusses disciplinary tactics and the “vast science of war” (p. 168) that applies to “the general foundation of all military practice, from the control and exercise of individual bodies to the use of forces specific to the most complex multiplicities” (p. 167). Military knowledges represent a body of knowledge of how to know, move, coerce, discipline, and govern people (Foucault, 1995). Foucault demonstrates military knowledge as a foundation of tactics, procedures, manoeuvres, exercises, and functions, which may be used to regulate and shape entire societies, thereby extending into educational realms. According to Foucault (1995), discipline entails a series of calculated measures, methods, and techniques aimed at observing, knowing, ranking, and rendering bodies useful and *docile*. For Foucault, a disciplined *docile body* may be corrected, controlled, and regulated as an “object and target of power,” where in every society individuals are subjected to “constraints, prohibitions, or obligations” (p. 136). Discipline increases the forces of the body in terms of socio-economic utility and decreases forces of resistance to encourage obedience (Foucault, 1995). *All* bodies may be enhanced. The perfect body, in military terms, is mouldable, moveable, and trainable (Foucault, 1995). Militarization entails seeking advantages, advancing a position, finding tactical opportunities, and developing new technologies. Coordinating bodies that are unpredictable and unruly becomes troublesome. Militaries have been interested and invested in bodies, in making bodies perform certain spatio-temporally coordinated tasks (Foucault, 1995). For militaristic purposes bodies are trained, observed, organized, located, fixed, coordinated **together** or independently, and moved in rhythmic timings and particular places. Foucault describes this ideal soldier as a male who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valour…the soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit. (p. 135) Soldiers’ bodies thus represent mouldable bodies that can be trained in the service of their country; they are oxymoronically disposable and indispensable citizens (see Taber, Chapter 4 of this volume, for a discussion of the latter). Disabled bodies are often characterized as deviant, labelled and sorted according to biomedical, psychological disciplinary fields of knowledges (Murray, 2007), understood as imperfect, faulty, fat, weak, penetrable, and leaky (Shildrick, 1997). The disabled body is seen as deficient, abnormal, and in need of fixing. Disability is associated with dependence, and the disabled body often represents an “entity to be conquered” (Batts & Andrews, 2011, p. 558). Urla and Terry (1995) assert that “scientific and popular modes of representing bodies are never innocent but always tie bodies to larger systems of knowledge production and, indeed, to social and material inequality” (p. 3). Unpacking the constitution of all bodies entails critically thinking about the biomedical gaze (Foucault, 2003), dividing practices, hierarchical rankings, and normalizing judgments (Foucault, 1995), the materiality of bodies (Butler, 1993), the carnal politics of embodiment, and theorizing relating to the intersection of disability, gender, sexuality, race, and class. According to Goodley (2011), “a body or mind that is disabled is also one that is raced, gendered, trans/nationally sited, aged, sexualised and classed” (p. 33). Seeking to improve bodies deemed to be weak and fragile, military operations have developed bio-robotic, technological inventions such as the exoskeleton, which may enhance balance, speed, agility, and efficiency of movement and increase load-carrying capacity (Bogue, 2009). Not only do these technologies support direct military objectives, but they **extend into the civilian arena, improving and rehabilitating disabled bodies often to move further and function faster in accordance with able-bodied norms.** All bodies may be blended with bio-medical, militarized technologies to render them more useful and productive. CDS offers avenues to critically examine military technologies in relation to how they shape the mattering of bodies. Technologies relating to augmentation and enhancement are of particular military interest. The ways in which bodies are moulded to fit and function with new technologies create hybrid bodies and perhaps new cyborg-body identities (Harraway, 1991). As an example, the prosthetic limbs of the model and athlete Aimee Mullins are imbued with aesthetic form and function. Thompson (2004) comments on how she “counters the insistent narrative that one must overcome impairment rather than incorporating it into one’s life and self, even perhaps as a benefit.…Mullins uses her conformity with beauty standards to assert her disability’s violation of those very standards. As legless and beautiful, she is an embodied paradox, asserting an inherently disruptive potential” (p. 97). Thus, socio-cultural standards of beauty and ability are tied to norms of gendered performativity, connected in a nexus of function and form, aesthetic norms and norms surrounding movement, and ability in various spaces and contexts. To transgress these norms is to violate the “ideal” of “able-bodied” and the “ways of being, or moving, that…approximate more closely to the bodily actions and practices of ‘able-bodied’ people” (Price & Shildrick, 2002, p. 67). **As militarized technologies, ideals, standards, and values enter educational realms and inform pedagogical practices, it is essential to critically evaluate new educational technologies, examining how they relate to the ways in which teachers and learners are constituted.** Such technologies may reflect normalized, gendered, and able-bodied ideals and reinforce dominant ways of thinking and being in the world. For Falk (2008), **all pedagogies may represent military pedagogies because education is a strategic weapon that shapes individuals’ subjectivities as nation-states vie for power**. As such, “**education doesn’t win hearts and minds. Education makes them**” (p. 2).

#### The alternative is curricular cripistemologies – we embrace the failure of crip students to be normate – to engage the cripistemolgical pedagogy of education

**Mitchell, Snyder, and Ware, 14** (David T. Mitchell is the executive director in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has a PhD in Disability Studies at the University of Chicago. Sharon L. Snyder is a researcher in the fields of disability studies, cultural studies, and literary studies. Together they have written and/or edited four books, The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability (1997), Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse (2000), The Encyclopedia of Disability (vol. 5): A History of Disability in Primary Sources (2005), and Cultural Locations of Disability (2006). Their most recent book, The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism and Peripheral Embodiment (forthcoming) analyzes crip/queer subcultures as social spaces of differentiation for the construction of non-normative identities. They also founded the disability production film house Brace Yourselves Productions, which has created four internationally award-winning films: Vital Signs: Crip Culture Talks Back (1995), A World Without Bodies (2002), Self Preservation: The Art of Riva Lehrer (2005), and Disability Takes on the Arts (2006). Linda Ware (ware@geneseo.edu) is Associate Professor in Education at the State University of New York in Geneseo, New York, where she teaches disability studies in education, Women’s Studies, and a disability studies writing seminar. She has published widely in leading journals that evidence her interdisciplinary interests in disability—Hypatia, Equity and Excellence, National Women’s Studies Journal, Disability Studies Quarterly, Journal of Teacher Education, Learning Disability Quarterly, Research in Disability Studies, International Journal of Inclusive Education, and the Review of Disability Studies. 2014, ‘“[Every] Child Left Behind” Curricular Cripistemologies and the Crip/Queer Art of Failure’, George Washington University, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558369)

Odysseus’s experiences on Phaeacia provide an historical example of the insights awaiting those who undertake pedagogical practices informed by curricular cripistemologies. **Curricular cripistemologies involve the development of teaching pedagogies that deviate from core teachings by foregrounding crip/queer content as fortunate failure.** This pedagogical “incoherence” offers important social options for constructing alternative ethical frameworks for living. An alternative ethical framework results in the creation of useable crip/queer maps that, from a curricular cripistemological standpoint, are otherwise absent from normative teaching approaches. One overarching goal of such content is to provide opportunities for crip/queer embodiments to better speak to the political dilemmas of contemporary experience. The pedagogy of curricular cripistemology depends upon the insights of human interdependency illustrated in the examples above. It is neither a discourse of “specialness” wherein we learn to value disabled people as “human” too, nor tolerate their incapacities when we discover them scraping out an existence alongside others; nor do we find the value of disability guaranteed in overcoming social barriers wherein crip/queer peoples’ incapacities are offset by the compensatory qualities of an otherwise “extraordinary body” (Garland-Thomson 5). Nor do we discover disability as an opportunity for political correctness wherein all bodies are valued for “diversity” in a relativistic equation of multicultural differences. We witness this philosophical tendency even in disability studies, for example, in the universalist cast of arguments that “everyone’s disabled” featured in Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson’s “embodied ontology” (27) and Lennard Davis’s “dismodernism” (273). Relativistic valuations of difference often lead to a process explained by Lee Edelman as neoliberal normativity’s “tenacious will to sameness by endlessly turning the Other into the image of itself” (59). **Instead of these various strategies for culturally rehabilitating disabled people’s experiences into recognizable normativities, curricular cripistemologies cultivate ways of realizing failure as an appropriate response to the finite goals of inclusionism**. For instance, curricular cripistemologies critically assess how communities place limits on the facilitation of crip/queer people’s participation. Such forms of inclusionism often result in false perceptions of absence as a “chosen” exile and a naturalized condition of non-normative existence. **While social spaces superficially appear open to all who wish to navigate them, curricular cripistemologies unveil architectural, aesthetic, and moral spaces of inclusion that, paradoxically, strictly police ways of being different for the bodies they include.** Consequently, there is no inclusionism that does not come replete with a strategy of making estranged bodies better fit normative expectations. Paradoxically, then, curricular cripistemologies necessarily promote failure of rehabilitative regimens as a worthy goal. One’s rehab is another’s resistance, particularly when rehab requires classroom pull-outs to perform yet another battery of the MMPI (diagnostic assessment tests). Curricular cripistemologies reject the form-fitting mold of neoliberal normativities as substantively under-performing. Likewise, in The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference, Roderick A. Ferguson explores the impact of educational diversity strategies of cultural incorporation in public schools. Ferguson identifies late 1960s inclusionist practices as institutional ways of robbing minority students of alternative insights while seeming to embrace them (190). Similarly, inclusionist practices place crip/queer bodies in the compromising position of making normative practices more desirable: of course, they want to be like us, the story of institutional normalization goes, because our ways naturally enshrine that which all human beings desire. In this sense, curricular cripistemologies actively explore alternative modes of navigating the world as crip/queer embodiments. In effect, cripistemological pedagogies actively leave behind the goal of arriving at identities domesticated of their defining differences. Such approaches to the teaching mission force an encounter with the often discomforting content of living interdependently with others. “Every Child Left Behind,” or the Crip/Queer Art of Failure Most indicators point to the fact that inclusionist practices have resulted in new kinds of exclusion as opposed to integration. For example, while students with disabilities make up 13% of student populations, those labeled with intellectual disabilities receive a diploma only 36.6% of the time; 22% drop out. The rest (59%) finish their schooling but receive no diploma and, over the course of their education, spend time with non-disabled peers only in art, gym, or music classes (Smith 4–5). In other words, inclusionism’s primary purpose of molding crip/queer bodies into tolerated neoliberal normativities scores a less than passing mark. This article may be understood, then, as a companion to recent disability studies in education (DSE) efforts regarding the ongoing critique of inclusionist practices that leave all children behind. If one can be included only by passing as non-disabled then much of the value of crip/queer experiences is lost in traditional pedagogical practices. In undertaking this exposure of pedagogical heteronormativities we seek to accomplish three specific tasks: 1) engage disability studies in a dialogue with Judith Halberstam’s important recent work on “the queer art of failure” (147); 2) draw out how queer theorizing of the last decade can be productive for disability studies even though, as Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow point out, a more direct engagement with disability has been slow in coming within queer studies (3); and 3) pursue what may seem, at first, to be a counter-intuitive argument in the best interests of actively promoting a certain kind of failure in the context of curricular cripistemologies. All of these objectives emerge in our recent teacher training projects to more effectively address shortcomings foundational to inclusionist methodologies now operative in most public schools across the U.S. **To accomplish the alternative crip/queer goals of curricular cripistemologies we intend to explain why failure is necessary when educational inclusion operates as an exclusionary undertaking in, perhaps, the most entrenched, neoliberal, and common sense institution of all: public education.** By neoliberal we mean to define education as part of a newly emergent “tolerance” of multicultural differences. In particular, our critique centers on inclusionism as a neoliberal gloss of diversity initiatives that get some disabled students in the door while leaving the vast majority of crip/queer students behind. Neoliberal educational practices cultivate further funding opportunities by advancing claims of successful normalization rather than drawing upon crip/queer differences as sources of alternative insight. Curricular cripistemologies, in contrast, openly advocate for the productive potential of failing normalization [practices (if they were ever obtainable in the first place) because such goals entail erasing recognitions of the alternative values, practices, and flexible living arrangements particular to crip/queer lives. Whereas the administrative platform of former President George W. Bush pushed for U.S. educational reforms around the promotion of standardized testing to “leave no child behind,” we, in turn, present an argument for recognizing standardization of curricula as ultimately “leaving every child behind,” or at least promoting a certain type of norm-fulfilling child in whose name most students turn up wanting. This curricular abandonment of difference in the name of assimilation occurs primarily through an incapacity (or, perhaps, unwillingness) to adapt the lessons of systemically in-built accommodations and crip/queer content designed to address the range of learning differences comprising today’s classroom demographics. The neoliberal school attempts to resolve the accommodation of disability through downplaying rather than drawing from people’s differences. Through the promotion of active abandonment of crip/queer differences, neoliberal standards guide educational reforms saturated in the questionable values of ableism and normalization. In order to double back on this process, practitioners of curricular cripistemologies undertake critical examinations of “compulsory able-bodiedness” (McRuer 31) and “compulsory able-mindedness” (Kafer 16). Thus, what appears on the surface as disabled students’ incapacity to keep up with their normative peers, turns out to be a purposeful failure to accomplish the unreal (and, perhaps, unrealizable) objectives of normalization. **Within the multiplying paradoxes of neoliberal inclusionism, crip success is, paradoxically, to fail to become normate**. In The Queer Art of Failure Halberstam advocates a concept of “**failure [that] allows us [crip/queer people] to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods**” (3). This queer studies inversion of ways to read non-normative lives as failing standards of heteronormative expectations enables crip/queer people to pursue other modes of existence as alternates to sanctioned social roles. These alternative strategies of living pass by largely undetected because educational assessments measure only the degree to which students clear the bar of normalization. **By applying this crip/queer deployment of “failure,” curricular cripistemologies undertake pedagogical practices suppressed (or, at least, devalued) by normative neoliberal educational contexts**. In adopting a strategically counter-intuitive slogan such as “every student left behind,” then, the critique of inclusionism acknowledges the increasingly disciplinarian nature of public education’s normalizing objectives. Inclusion has taught teachers a dangerous lesson in what appears to be a failed model of adaptation: crip/queer students cannot effectively compete with their non-disabled peers. The pedagogical assessment of the distance that exists between crip/queer and normal students by standardized testing regimes is now part and parcel of the wider cultural abandonment of non-normativity.

## Case

### Util

#### Reps before extinction –

#### [1] There’s no epistemological obligation to debating over ethics and util – talking about extinction in zoom room 504 does nothing to our subjectivities but the discourse and ableist logics we engage in does

#### [2] Reps controls policy and your impacts – how we represent impacts formulates our attitudes towards those impacts – it’s what justified the US bombing the middle east in reaction to 911

#### Util is representatively ableist –

#### [1] Extinction is all lives matter – you’ve basically said you won’t care about crips when it’s only about crips but now that abled-bodied people’s lives are threatened, you’ll care about disabled folks

#### [2] Reps of extinction puts disabled people’s demands on the backburner – the “necessary evil” logic is used to stave off extinction which never happen

#### [3] Util only applies to who the government deems as recognizable and rhetorically valuable which clearly doesn’t apply to crips

### Innovation

#### IN the context of this advantage, disabled folks have no choice – it’s literally about for-profit medical companies advancing CRISPR research for their profits, not because disabled people want it

#### The reader 10/10 ev is a link to the K – it literally says CRISPR right now is not precise enough and that the aff leads to more precise technologies is another way for them to say this tech is good for crips when really, it’s based on eugenics

#### Their Thorne 20 CRISPR solves disease evidence is a link – CRISPR “disables” bad target genes for deletion or repair – quote “results in a disabling deletion of the target gene, or homologous repair” – this is literally curative logic that disabled “bad” genes

#### The idea of innovation is rooted in racial scripts that portray non-white people as unimaginative and unable to innovate – their conception of innovation only serves to define citizenship as whiteness

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WITH THE PASSAGE OF THE first federal intellectual property and naturalization statutes in the United States in the late 1700s, creatorship, citizenship, and whiteness came to be formally linked. Knowledge production, which had always functioned as a racialized practice, came to mark the boundaries of Americanness and the ideals of citizenship, in part through the rhetorical inclusion of whites and the rhetorical exclusion of people of color from those respective categories. 1 As the overtly racist purposes and ideologies of intellectual property law came to be constituted with national identity and race, they set the stage for future doctrinal approaches to repeat and rewrite their logics. Racial scripts that emerged before or coextensively with nation building also shaped copyright, patent, and trademark law, and the legal boundaries of citizenship. “Common sense” and “scientific” understandings of the intersections among race, creativity, innovation, hard work, and intelligence enshrined in law and popular culture became important heuristics through which intellectual property developed. 2 Doctrinal standards that, absent formal exclusions, would appear to be race neutral operated as mechanisms for shoring up white Americanness through production, ownership, and management of knowledge.

Significantly, the racial scripts that came to be intertwined with intellectual property doctrine in this era did not disappear but remained, in rhetorical and ideological “fragments,” in the words of Michael McGee, 3 scattered through copyright, patent, and trademark doctrine, for centuries. This is not to say that race was or is always a dispositive factor in the outcome of intellectual property cases. Rather, it is to say that while markets could theoretically operate in race neutral ways, given the trajectories of racial capitalism and intellectual property law, they did not and do not do so. It is therefore imperative to study when and how racial exclusions from this era remain embedded in intellectual property law, as “sediments” 4 built into theory and practice.

This chapter examines how, historically and through formal exclusion, race, intellectual property law, and citizenship came to be consistently intertwined and racial scripts about the unimaginativeness, intelligence, laziness, disloyalty, hypersexuality, and dangerousness of people of color became central to defining who was and was not American. Between the 1700s and the mid-1900s, creatorship and citizenship were coproduced, with both of them drawing from the broader “rhetorical culture” 5 around race to articulate their core principles. The citizen creator was the idealized maker, the Romantic creator who comported with the fetishization of imagination, human progress, and consumer desire. Even as the nation’s racial politics became more progressive, or at least less formally racist, intellectual property discourses and policies consistently returned to the rhetorical and structural resources through which creatorship was cast as fundamentally white.

**Global warming is not evenly distributed nor equally created - warming only a miniscule symptom of a larger archetype of whiteness**

Wynter 7, (Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford University, "The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto," 3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/1516556/69a8a25c597f33bf66af6cdf411d58c2.pdf – hhs ew)

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

### WTO Cred

#### Taking action against IPP only when it’s economically valuable writes out POC creatorship

Vats, 2020 – Associate Professor in Communication and African and African Diaspora Studies at Boston College

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In responding to arguments about race, intellectual property scholars often appeal to economics as an explanatory framework for the outcomes in question. Despite Zahr Said’s optimistic observation that critiques to it are flourishing, 49 law and economics has and continues to be the predominant lens for theorizing intellectual property law. Often, as Mitu Gulati and Devon Carbado argue, 50 Critical Race Theory and law and economics go so far as to offer competing instead of complementary explanations for macro and micro institutional practices that produce inequality. Yet investigating the relationships among (intellectual) property, citizenship, national identity, and personhood calls for considering how race and capitalism are coproduced, particularly in a world in which former attorney general Michael Mukasey referred to intellectual properties as America’s most “precious commodities.” 51

Racial capitalism, as Cedric Robinson conceptualizes it, points us to the complex relationships between capitalism, race, and (neo)colonialism. 52 Jodi Melamed characterizes the scholarship that flows from Robinson’s work— which describes this book as well—writing: “A thread of emergent critical understanding, proceeding from the recognition that procedures of racialization and capitalism are ultimately never separable from each other, seeks to comprehend the complex recursivity between material and epistemic forms of racialized violence, which are executed in and by core capitalist states with seemingly infinite creativity (beyond phenotype and in assemblages).” 53

Read through the lens of racial capitalism, intellectual property rhetorics and structures are revealed to be part of a larger system of race and political economy that is “fully saturated by racialized violence.” 54 The economic value of devaluing the creatorship of people of color intersects with the economic value of legally, structurally, and ideologically overvaluing white creatorship in ways that reinforce the exclusion of people of color from that same category. Intellectual property outcomes, which mediate conflicts around already heavily circulated and valued cultural objects, are never produced in line with rational, race neutral economics, if such a thing even exists.

### Solvency

#### Dan Sfera is not qualified – writing a medium post – they’re a medical venture capitalist YouTuber using the Motley Fool as MEDICAL advice

#### Dan Sfera is another link to the K – it literally says “cure diseases” and gives specific instances like cystic fibrosis which is an inherited disability

#### Motley Fool is a pump-and-dump investment scheme that’s under SEC investigation for manipulating investors

Merle, 17 – Washington Post White-Collar Crime Reporter

Renae Merle covers white-collar crime and Wall Street for The Washington Post. “Scheme created fake news stories to manipulate stock prices, SEC alleges”, JUL 06, 2017 AT 7:48 AM, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-sec-stock-price-scheme-20170706-story.html>

"This is a modern take on what we call the old pump-and-dump schemes" of promoting a stock and then selling quickly to cash in on the price change, said Albert Dandridge, a partner with Philadelphia-based Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis. Bjorlin, who is expected to go to trial on civil charges as soon as this month, said she can't tell her side of the story yet. "This has ruined my life," she said. "No one has any idea what really happened." She could face millions of dollars in fines if convicted. In the meantime, her case is buzzing around financial circles and has become a reminder that allegations of fake news are hardly confined to the political world. The coordinated campaigns across many different websites have ratcheted up the possibility of duping the market, a modern twist on the days when the unscrupulous tried to trick investors with hallway whispers or direct-mail campaigns. So worrisome is the trend, the SEC recently filed complaints against more than a dozen companies and people, including Bjorlin, alleging that they pretended to provide independent analysis on financial websites such as Seeking Alpha, Forbes, the Motley Fool and Benzinga that were actually paid for by companies. "There are so many ways that people can reach investors now, we want people to be critical," said Melissa Hodgman, associate director of the SEC's enforcement division. "Even if it appears to be an independent site, we want people to take a breath and do some research. We can't always rely on what something looks like on its face."