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#### Hume was racist af

Willis 16, Andre, associate prof of religious studies @ Brown, Hume Studies, “The Impact of David Hume's Thoughts about Race for His Stance on Slavery and His Concept of Religion”, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/742650/pdf>, Accessed 1/15/22 VD

Whatever we are to make of these related (and important) concerns, we can reasonably assert two points about Hume’s notion of race based on this infamous footnote. The first is that at its core, the footnote assumed human beings to be naturally constituted by distinctive racial types most easily identifiable by skin color and region. Hume took the extant racial categories—which began as descriptors of lineages of groups of European bloodlines and became, in the hands of natural historians and scientists, categories about clusters of traits, and their links to skin color—to be both correct and useful for thinking about human differences. Hume, well known for his strategic “studied impartiality” and his targeting of “political extremism and dogmatism of any kind,” was a bit more dogmatic when it came to race.15 He accepted popular ways of thinking about human differences and built on the racial categories delineated by “scientific” study of observable human differences (what some might think of as the “religion” or “belief system” of the natural sciences), without any criticism. In short, he crafted a narrative about human difference.16 The second uncontroversial point confirmed by this footnote is that Hume believed black people to be “originally distinct” from, and “naturally inferior” to, whites. Seeming to abandon his empiricist commitments (including the tenet that the empirical method could deliver only probable conclusions), Hume is firm and unambiguous in the footnote: black people do not have the capacity to express the entire range of human ideas and emotions. And, given his explicit use of the phrases “naturally inferior” and “original distinction,” it is fair to say that he thinks this group is not able to change their status. That is, for Hume, the natural inferiority of blacks is fixed and unchanging; they simply will be without “symptoms of ingenuity” and will lack “civilization,” “arts,” and “sciences” forever. Even at their highest development, their intellect will not extend beyond that of a “parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.”

#### White philosophy intentionally obfuscates the role whiteness plays in its theories – the same philosophy that attempts to appeal to everyone through race neutrality and universality said Black people were equivalent to parrots – white philosophy itself is contingent upon gratuitous violence against Black people

Yancy 20, George, philosopher who is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. He has been a professor of philosophy at Emory University since fall 2015. He is also a distinguished Montgomery Fellow at Dartmouth College, one of the college's highest honors, Educational Philosophy and Theory, “Black disciplinary zones and the exposure of whiteness”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2020.1830062>, Accessed 8/23/21 VD

My entry into African American literature is inextricably linked to my entry into the field of European and Anglo-American (white) philosophy. In fact, it was the latter’s penchant for arid conceptual abstraction, race-evasion, anti-Blackness, and obfuscation regarding its white power and privilege, that eventually made the former a necessity, an existential urgency for a young Black man grappling with his racialized identity and what that entailed within a white supremacist America where the opposite of blackness is not simply whiteness, but the human. In short, African American literature, and Africana thought, more generally, came as a discursive lifeline, a balm for parts of my identity that needed to be developed and nurtured. To provide a sense of what was at stake, early on in my life I did not understand that the question of my humanity as a Black person was ever in question. By the time I fell in love with philosophy, I had already fallen head over heels for its whiteness, though I had not marked or named it as such. It was sort of like modeling my masculinity after the creation of Ian Fleming’s fictional character James Bond. As 007, I could be debonair and sophisticated, but I could not be Black, not really. I had to fantasize in white, to accept whiteness, if only unconsciously, to be Bond. So, even within the context of gender, I had not seen the link between conceptions and performances of masculinity and how they are historically linked to whiteness or white patriarchy. Regarding philosophy, and its subtle seduction, I should have seen it after I read the entire section on the subject of philosophy in The World Book Encyclopedia under the letter P. The faces that graced the pages were of all white men: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Bertrand Russell, William James, John Dewey, Ren e Descartes, David Hume, John Locke, and others. At the time, I was a 17-years-old young Black male living in one of America’s Black ghettoes, the public housing projects of Richard Allen Homes in North Philadelphia. It was a peculiar juxtaposition. There I was being raised in the midst of poverty, roaches, rats, and stench thinking hard about the existence or nonexistence of God, Aristotle’s unmoved mover, the reality of Platonic Forms, and Descartes’ skepticism regarding the certainty of his existence or whether or not he was dreaming when he thought he was awake. I would later come to discover that Black literary figure James Baldwin (1995/1962) was right: “You were born where you were born and faced the future that you faced because you were black and for no other reason” (p.7). However, I had not read Baldwin at that time, I had not come see my life through his eyes, through his lived epistemology dripped in Black love, hope, pain, and suffering. I didn’t receive a letter of love like the beautiful and powerful one that he wrote to his young 15-year-old nephew. I had not come to drink from his wisdom, his understanding of the cruel and oppressive logics of whiteness. Yet, hovering over the reality of that structural Black poverty, caused by national neglect, a history of racial segregation in the forms of red-lining and white neighborhood covenants, and necropolitical vectors, was a subtle white message that communicated that I was, as Baldwin says, “expected to make peace with mediocrity” (p.7). So, there I was, something of an oxymoron, reading beyond my years, beyond what the racialized urban school system intended for me to read. The trap of falling for whiteness is easy and unremarkable. It was an easy addiction, so to speak. Symbolically, it is a process of what Joy James (2004) has called “mainlining white supremacy.” She writes, “I likely started off in my preacademic years in incremental dosages, sniffing rather than shooting” (p.263). It is a powerful metaphor as whiteness involves forms of habituation that masquerade as common sense, as intelligibility itself. And once it takes control, one finds oneself in a state of denial, protesting that nothing is wrong. After all, think about it, the philosophers whom I read were not self-identified as white, the encyclopedia did not nominate them as white; they were simply philosophers, “raceless” human beings, persons. This is how whiteness functions. Whiteness structurally obfuscates its logics, it conceals its racial and racist epistemic assumptions through claims of “neutrality” and problematic claims of “universality.” Whiteness vis-a-vis philosophy also attempts to narrate an airtight history that covers over the racially motivated selective processes that undergird the normative and biased dynamics that shape philosophical canonization. As a result, I did not see white men, but human beings. In short, whiteness had succeeded. I was addicted, and whiteness thrived precisely because I had failed to see it; after all, it was invisible to me through its normativity. For me, whiteness, during many academic years of being taught white European and Anglo-American philosophy, remained unseen, unmarked, unnamed, unraced. Many years later, though, I would come to refer to the insidious operation of whiteness as the “transcendental norm,” a power structure that is binary, hierarchical, and hegemonic. I did not know that many of those same philosophers were white racists. I did not know that they saw me as a “sub-person.” I didn’t know that some actually claimed that Black people were incapable of generating original ideas and were compared to parrots (Hume, 1997, p.33), and that because I was Black I was thereby deemed stupid (Kant, 1997, p.57), or that people who looked like me or of African descent (except perhaps those from Egypt) did not possess Geist or Spirit, and that “nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in [our] character” (Hegel, 1997, p.128). I had completely missed this racialized misanthropic foundation of the philosophy taught to me by straight-faced white (predominantly male) professors of philosophy. In high school or during most of my early university years, no one informed me about the underside of modernity, the colonial history that privileged those white faces, that valorized their “true humanity” over my “lack” of humanity or “sub-personhood.” No one even hinted at the fact that many of those same philosophers would have laughed in my face had I said that I wanted to be a philosopher or perhaps desired to read their books. After all, how can a “nigger” read great philosophical texts? Indeed, how can a “nigger” read at all? Implicit here is the question: for whom were these philosophical texts written? Who was the intended recipient/reader? Clearly, it was not me or Black folk who looked like me. So, there I was reading texts that were not intended for me to read, or, more precisely, were deemed impossible for me to read. By this logic, I must not be Black. Or, I was indeed white, which is the same thing. But since I was/am Black, I must not be “truly Black,” or perhaps I was “off Black” or an “aberration” of Blackness. In any case, it was as if I had broken a law of nature. Historically, it is important to note that it was Hume who claimed that my Blackness vis-a-vis whiteness, and all the characterological differences that constituted the racial divide, was due to an original distinction made by nature. This makes me a thing fit for teratology, something monstrous, or perhaps a miracle. After all, my Blackness, my being “inferior,” was made possible, for Hume, because of a “natural distinction” made by nature itself. So, to read philosophy, to do philosophy, to eventually become a professional philosopher I had, following logically from Hume’s racist assumptions, defied nature. It was only later that I came to get a handle on my addiction, to see through the lie of whiteness, its structural prevarication, its structural invisibility. The very assumption that philosophy qua philosophy is an exclusively white European or Anglo-American phenomenon—that reason is a white creation, that creative and rigorous thought itself is white, that the quintessence of humanity is white, that civilization is exclusively a white achievement, that white people are destined to rule the world, that goodness, virtue, beauty, and honor are white—is interwoven with a narcissistic, genocidal impulse to play the role of a malevolent “god.” White people who have succumbed to this form of idolatry speak to Black people with pity and contempt. As W. E. B. DuBois (1995) writes, “My poor, un-white thing! Weep not nor rage. I know, too well, that the curse of God lies heavy on you. Why? That is not for me to say, but be brave! Do your work in your lowly sphere, praying the good Lord that into heaven above, where all is love, you may, one day, be born—white!” (p. 454). That, however, is a “rebirth” that I refuse. Indeed, it is a “rebirth” that is actually a form of death, an invitation to commit a form of suicide, self-denial, selfnullification. It sounds like a Faustian bargain to me. This is one reason why African American literature became so incredibly important to me. In fact, it became so important that in the middle of my work toward completing the PhD in philosophy at Duquesne University, I decided to take a break to engage in intensive study for an MA in Africana Studies at New York University. At this time, African American literary figure Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark had hit the right historical and conceptual note with me. She helped me to see just how Blackness is always already linked to the construction of whiteness, how, as I read that philosophical entry in The World Book Encyclopedia, my identity formed the constitutive outside of the normative structure of white philosophy. By “white philosophy” I don’t simply mean its monochromatic whiteness, but what African American/Afro-Caribbean philosopher Charles Mills (1998) calls, “the conceptual or theoretical whiteness of the discipline” (p.2). The meta-philosophical assumptions of the discipline, its intuitions, its ethical and epistemic claims, its historical and social emergence as linked to contexts of white domination, had been, for me, concealed, unknown. As an undergraduate studying philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, the conceptual whiteness of philosophy was not simply unmarked, but seemed irrelevant or perhaps irreverent. As a graduate student studying philosophy at Yale University, the conceptual whiteness of philosophy remained unspoken or unrecognized through, I would argue, willful ignorance. In terms of thematizing or naming the whiteness of philosophy while pursuing my PhD at Duquesne University, there was silence in the form of undergraduate and graduate courses offered. Neither the courses offered nor the comprehensive examination to be taken by philosophy graduate students toward the end of their course requirements dealt seriously with race, whiteness, racism. Again, Morrison’s important text proved indispensable. By thematizing the binary racial structure embedded within literature written by white people, Morrison had helped me to see, by extension, that white European and Anglo-American philosophy had also been playing in the dark. This raises a profound question: what if white philosophy—many of its significant epistemic tropes, ethical assumptions, and philosophical anthropologies—is predicated upon its paradoxical closeness and distance from Blackness? More frighteningly, what if white philosophy is predicated upon the social death of, and gratuitous violence imposed upon, Black people? What if the recent horrible murder of George Floyd is what makes the structural and systemic dynamics of whiteness secure and safe? In stream with Morrison (1992), this would indicate a form of what she calls “Africanism.” She writes, “Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of destiny” (p.52). By “American self,” Morrison means a white American self. In our contemporary moment with Trump at the American presidential helm, that equation is dangerously truthful, maliciously xenophobic, and sadly fixed. To make America “great again” is to pretend that America was ever great. What is the “greatness” of America’s past other than a time of unabashed and cruel white supremacy, a time of celebrating the ideals of white “purity”? While a symptom, but not the cause, it is Trump who is stoking the flames for envisioning and celebrating new forms of white purity, which is indicative of an ideological white racist madness out of the Nazi playbook of racist horror. In September 2020, at a rally in Bemidji, Minnesota, Trump said to the white crowed, “You have good genes. A lot of it’s about the genes isn’t it, don’t you believe? The racehorse theory you think was so different? You have good genes in Minnesota” (Embury-Dennis, 2020). This is not a dog whistle, but a terrifying overture toward the inhuman practices of forms of “purification” that were embedded within the history of eugenics.

#### Theorizations of the human is fundamentally based in notions of rationality and universality that bar black people from such category

**da Silva 05,** Denise Ferreira, Professor and Director of the Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice at the University of British Columbia, Ethnicities, September 2005, “’Bahla Pelo Negro’: Can the subaltern (subject of raciality) speak?”, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1468796805054959, apark 8/28/21

Throughout the last two centuries, transparency and the ontological descriptor it authorizes, historicity, has governed modern ontological accounts and provides the ethical basis for conceptions of justice. This ethical supremacy of transparency results from Hegel’s (1977[1807]) notion of the Transcendental Subject (spirit) that consolidates modern representation. This resulted from an account of the trajectory of reason as the path of a self-producing/self-revealing sovereign which locates its ‘ends’ (goals, designs) in post-Enlightenment Europe where human beings have social configurations which actualize the principles reason authorizes, namely universality and self-determination. Besides consolidating the transparency thesis and historicity (interiority/temporality) as the privileged ontological horizon, Hegel’s resolution of reason into freedom had two other crucial effects. First, it rewrites the subject as a desiring thing, one that emerges out of a movement of engulfment of extended (exterior/spatial) things, which now become but vanishing moments that will be resolved (reduced/ sublated) as the subject moves towards transparency. Second, when it places post-Enlightenment European minds and social configurations safely in transparency, Hegel’s statement enables, as Foucault (1994) argues, the writing of man as the sovereign subject and privileged object of knowledge; that is, his resolution both necessitated and enabled the formulation of scientific projects which attempted to capture how reason operates in the actual ‘conditions of (human) existence’. Elsewhere (Silva, forthcoming), I describe the manufacturing of the arsenal, the analytics of raciality, assembled by the sciences of man and society, which transform the human body and social configurations as products/effects of universal reason. I show how the assembling of this arsenal became possible when the writers of the Science of Life, George Cuvier’s ‘laws of conditions of existence’ and Charles Darwin’s principle of ‘natural selection’, delimited a whole sector of nature, i.e. the domain of living (self-producing and self-moving) things. With this, they introduced another version of reason, namely productive reason, which combines Hegel’s Transcendental (self-producing) Subject with the scientific version of reason as a regulative force of the universe. Put differently, the Science of Life enabled knowledge projects which addressed self-consciousness as phenomena, in the Kantian sense These projects attribute the mind’s unique abilities – thought, language, representation itself – to the exterior regulation, to how universal reason governs the mechanisms (organic structures and functions) necessary for the emergence, maintenance, bodily and social (re)production of human life. Following the lead of the Science of Life, the 19- and 20-century sciences of man and society would manufacture another ontological horizon, namely globality (exteriority/spatiality). When their arsenals addressed bodily and social configurations found across the surface of the globe, they produced these configurations as signifiers of how the tools of productive reason institute – as they produce and regulate – human (moral and intellectual) difference. Nevertheless, as they already presuppose Hegel’s resolution, these knowledge projects always already assumed that post-Enlightenment Europe was securely placed in transparency. Their leading tools, the concepts of the racial and the cultural, consistently reproduce these assumptions when they address the mind as a product and effect of outer-regulation. In the 19th-century, the racial would enable statements that write the difference between post-Enlightenment Europeans and their contemporaries as irreducible and unsublatable. Such accounts of human difference result from how the Science of Man’s toolbox, through the examination of brain forms and functions and the theses of permanence of characters and hybridity, mapped bodily and social configurations seeking to reveal how exterior forces, i.e. ‘the laws of conditions of existence’, institute distinct kinds of human minds. In 20- century anthropology and sociology of race relations, the cultural would play this role. Here, however, the focus would be upon the variety of social configurations, the origins of which Franz Boas attributed to the ‘laws of thought’ and action and Radcliffe-Brown described as expressions of the basic structures of representation (Silva, forthcoming). When producing the global as a modern (scientific) signifying context, the racial and the cultural circumscribe the places of both (a) the transparent ‘I’, when they describe the privileged trajectory of the European ‘I’ (the subject); and (b) the affectable ‘I’, the ‘others of Europe’, whose (bodily and social) markers they write as the cause of their subaltern trajectories in modern social configuration. This is not a dismissal of the politics of difference. Not only do both, the racial and the cultural, re/place post-Enlightenment European minds and social configurations in transparency, as each finds that European bodily and mental configurations express the superior mental powers that enable the manufacturing of the principles of universality and selfdetermination, the ones that testify to the realization of the ‘ends’ of reason. When doing so, each also firmly places the ‘others of Europe’ in affectability, as each describes their bodily and social configurations as expressions of a mind which is subjected not only to the exterior tools of universal reason but which, because of that, would not resist the force of the post-Enlightenment European civilizations.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that best combats racism – this is a prerequisite to any other ROB because debate itself is structured to exclude and silence Black voices – every other ROB presupposes a level playing field to evaluate arguments but that’s simply false

Reid-Brinkley 19, Shanara, Co-Director of CSUF Forensics and College of Communications professor, The Oxford Handbook of Voice Studies, “Voice Dipped in Black: The Louisville Project and the Birth of Black Radical Argument in College Policy Debate”, <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199982295.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199982295-e-28>, Accessed 8/24/21 VD

For Black people, Watts’s interpretation of voice is a critical examination of the power of rhetoric in the context of racial politics, and yet there are theoretical blind spots in his analysis. While Watts’s work attempts to speak to the problem of raced rhetorical moments, his lack of engagement with the notion of anti-Blackness produces conceptual limits for his interpretation of voice and the capacity of the Black to produce moments of voice. Watts’s understanding of voice requires negotiation among speakers and audiences marked by “obligations and anxieties” and produced by the “ethical and emotional dimensions of discourse.” In other words, to make voice a “happening” requires a recognition by those engaged in the rhetorical moment. Yet the politics of recognition for the (p. 217) Black body are necessarily tied to the social and political narratives attached to the Black body as a speaking body. The Black body represents dirt or a stain, or to use symbolic anthropologist Mary Douglas’s language, a “pollutant,” on and in the social body, one that must be controlled and contained (Douglas 2002). That bodies of color remain present despite the fact that they are supposed to be absent “is exactly what maintains white privilege” (Warren 2003, 47). The soundingness of Blackness only achieves recognition in a sociopolitical context where the very fact of Blackness holds significant meaning. In other words, the acoustic markers of Blackness are not just about differentiating the vocal utterings and tonal inclinations of particular cultures. It is about the announcement of the Black body into acoustic space where the utterance by the Black is inhabited simultaneously by the marker of not white, and thus not proper. Black utterance enters acoustic space as improper sound even in moments where the Black vocally attempts to mimic sound propriety as marked by normative whiteness. I am attempting to think through that which allows anti-Blackness to continue to cohere the American political landscape. It is the dynamics of the preutterance, that is, at the level of the flesh, that Blackness precedes the heardness or sonorousness of sound. By filling in the cracks between voice, the Black body and forces of anti-Blackness, I hope to contribute to Watts’s discussion of voice as a rhetorical happening and to voice studies’ engagement with theories of anti-Blackness. If the Black body can never be rendered fully invisible, then that body must somehow be contained, its excesses subdued to produce a form of the Black body that can become recognizable within the space of whiteness. Society tames Blackness by requiring those marked by Blackness to demonstrate their commitment to the norms of whiteness through the performance of the body; generally a mimicking of whiteness. If whiteness is normative, then in order for the speaking Black body to be heard, or come to voice, it must perform in a manner consistent with that norm. For example, the stylistic norms of the college debate community are inextricably tied to the social performance of identity attached to racialized bodies. Style includes bodily performance, how our bodies signify as part of rhetorical practice. In other words, body performance is integral to communal practices in debate that produce a social and competitive environment hostile to Blackness. If the image of the nationally successful debater is a white, male, and economically privileged body, then the stylistic practices of those bodies become the standard by which all other bodies are evaluated. Their practices, their behaviors, their identities become the models or thrones upon which others must sacrifice their identities in the pursuit of “the ballot,” or the win. Racially different bodies must perform that difference according to the cultural norms of the debate community. For Black students it can often mean changing their appearance, standardizing language practices, and eschewing their cultural practices. In essence, in order to have an opportunity for achieving in debate competitions Black students must performatively whiten. “Acting Black” is problematic because those performative identities are not recognizable in the normative frame of debate practice. In fact, Blackness signifies a difference, an opposite; a negative differential. It is not that the debate community explicitly operates to exclude people based on race; rather it (p. 218) competitively rejects Black presence, or non-normative nonwhite performance. It is the combination of cultural values, behavioral practices, and the significance of Black flesh that produce barriers to meaningful inclusion.

#### The alternative is reject the aff in favor of African American literature – the alternative understands the permanent failure of Western metaphysics as a method of creating new theorizations of philosophy based in black experience

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My direct engagement with African American literature provided me with a Black culturally rich, symbolic, and narrative medium through which I was able to engage questions that were relevant to my lived experience as Black. Hence, African American literature functioned counter-hegemonically, encouraging me to contest the self-proclaimed “racelessness” of white philosophy. Critically rethinking the process of thinking as an historically mediated process became a vibrant way of making sense of and appreciating multiple philosophical voices and variegated social locations vis-a-vis different epistemic assumptions, and styles of knowledge production. Morrison’s text, Playing in the Dark (and her broader literary corpus) also helped me to think critically about the ways in which African American literature can speak to the situational facticity of Black people, their integrity, and their forms of meaning making in a white supremacist world, where they do not constitute the silent background that gives significance to whiteness, where they do not function as an axiological scaffold for uplifting the whiteness of humanity. Hence, African American literature, through its narrative tarrying with the quotidian complexity of Black life, helped me to understand how processes of racialization, and the gravity of anti-Black racism, are indispensable to understanding Black existence, and how Black people actively engage in processes of negotiation within and resistance to a world that denies them their right to be. African American literary figure Maya Angelou (2009/1969) speaks of how the human voice can infuse words “with shades of deeper meaning” (p.96). African American literature is a process of giving voice to Black life, of developing narrative creativity, of uncovering a broad and complex range of emotivity expressed by and between Black characters; it is a process of discerning the complexity of Black life and infusing Black life with shades of deeper meaning. This idea of accessing or expressing deeper meaning is what led me to new ways of thinking about the practice of philosophy and its limits, its epistemic closures, and aspirational aims toward mere conceptual purity. So, I was moved to rethink how to do philosophy, how to write philosophy, how to teach philosophy, and how to render visible the socially and politically constitutive, though contingent, forces that impact philosophy as a practice from somewhere, not nowhere. Black life, within the context of national and global anti-Blackness, mocks the academicism of many forms of philosophical practice within white academic spaces. Philosophy was not born from the head of Zeus fully formed, but born, as African American philosopher Leonard Harris says, of struggle. Philosophy, for me, is a site of suffering, not simply wonder or the effort to gain conceptual clarity. Confronting the status quo of white supremacy, allowing the pain of others to speak, challenging existing hegemonic social ontologies and oppressive political regimes, can leave a mark. Sometimes, as in my case, there are even threats of physical violence. After writing the article “Dear White America” in 2015 at The New York Times (“The Stone”), I personally experienced the weight of white racist hatred; it was affectively and somatically registered. The body has a way of keeping track of trauma. n terms of my own meta-philosophical turn, I came to understand that doing philosophy is an activity, one that is framed by various historically grounded assumptions, paradigms, disciplinary matrixes, linguistic communities, metaphorical devices, and narrative frames. Fundamentally, doing philosophy is a form of social engagement that is always already a process in medias res. And even while thinking “alone,” one does not think without a language, which is socially and historically saturated with meaning. Many white philosophers that I’ve encountered, despite their pretensions to the contrary, are unable to brush off the dust of history and begin doing philosophy ex nihilo. More specifically, philosophizing is an embodied activity that begins within and grows out of diverse lived contexts; philosophizing takes place within the fray of the everyday. In their attempt to escape the social, to defy history, and to reject the body, many white philosophers have pretensions of being godlike. They attempt to defy the confluent social forces, the multiple identificatory registers, and their historicity and particularity, that shape their philosophical voices. They see themselves as totally detached from the often inchoate, social, and existential traffic of life and the background assumptions (race, gender, class, ability, sexuality) that are constitutive of a particular horizon of understanding. Having “departed” from life, having rejected the force of effective history, embodied orientations (broadly construed), white philosophy is as good as dead, devoid of relevance, devoid of particularity, and escapist. This is why Mills (1998) says so provocatively that “a lot of philosophy is just white guys jerking off” (p.4). The dynamic racialized narrativity self-consciously embedded within Morrison’s literary work functioned as a template of how I might begin to write philosophy in a way that captured what African American philosopher Cornel West calls the funk of life (West & Ritz, 2009, p.4). I wanted my words on the page to do things, to carry the weight, in this case, of historical racist catastrophe. In an important interview that articulates the weight of African American literature as a mode of epistemic and social ontological generativity, Morrison communicates, it seems to me, the importance of African American literature as a way of reframing philosophical issues that mark the importance of situated narrativity vis-a-vis Black life. Indeed, describing how she understands her own literary efforts, Morrison says that her “books are about very specific circumstances, and in them are people who do very specific things” (Dreifus, 1994). She continues that “the plot, [and] characters are part of my effort to create a language in which I can posit philosophical questions. I want the reader to ponder those questions not because I put them in an essay, but because they are part of a narrative” (Dreifus, 1994). Within the context of a narrative, as opposed to a philosophical architectonic system, Morrison is able to place the reader into a lived space, a powerful narrative space that is able to articulate modalities of lived existence where, in this case, Black bodies are raped, racially brutalized, dehumanized, marginalized, and traumatized. In short, through a form of rhizomic narrativity, Morrison moves the reader through the messiness of the impact of existentially contingent history upon the Black body. Hence, one might say that Morrison posits philosophical questions that are inextricably linked to a dynamic racialized embodied narrative that is grounded within the quotidian, an everydayness that contains multiple and entangled roots in the deep and complex lives of Black people. After all, Black lives are lived narratives, journeys of pain, endurance, contradiction, death, inter-subjectivity, suffering, racism, sexism, terror, and trauma. Avoiding abstract and non-indexical discourse, Morrison reveals the power of literature to embody the flesh and blood reality of what it means to be Black within an anti-Black world. Mills (1998) also understands the existential gravity of an anti-Black world and how Western philosophy “abstracts away from what has been the central feature of the lives of Africans transported against their will to the Americas: the denial of black humanity and the reactive, defiant assertion of it” (p.9). Hence, Mills frames the African American literary tradition as one which contests the assumptions of a solipsistic Cartesian subject that is detached from the sociality of Black life within an anti-Black world. He references “those invisible native sons and daughters who, since nobody knows their name, have to be the men who cry ‘I am!’ and the women who demand ‘And ain’t I a woman?” (pp.9-10). Mills turns to this Black literary tradition to upend the universal pretensions of white philosophy by revealing the experiences of Black people and the specificity of the existential and identificatory predicaments that they face. Hence, Mills names the motifs found in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, Richard Wright’s Native Son, James Baldwin’s Nobody Knows My Name, John A. Williams’ The Man Who Cried I Am, and Sojourner Truth’s self-declaration of her Black womanhood in 1851 at the Woman’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio. By rendering explicit these motifs, Mills dethrones the assumption that what constitutes a philosophical conundrum is determined a priori. This move expands the domain of the range of the morphology of philosophical questions and problems addressed, and the origins of the literary-philosophical texts in which they emerge—who are the writers and what are their, in this case, racialized contexts? It was during my MA work in Africana Studies that such deeply and engaging texts were made available: The History of Mary Prince; Celia, A Slave; The Polished Hoe; Corregidora; I, Tituba: Black Witch of Salem; Muse & Drudge; Breath, Eyes, Memory; The Salt Eaters; Negritude Women, and so many more. Each text demonstrated how the Black human voice can infuse words with shades of deeper meaning, and how Black people are constantly negotiating questions of empire, and racialized denigration. African American literature was/is essential to how I approach my philosophical writing and how I think about the importance of philosophical focus, which attempts to uncover deep racialized existential trauma as it is lived, situated, and embodied within the belly of the white American beast. I aim to enflesh philosophical discourse that fails to capture the concrete fractured joys and prolonged sorrows of Black life, especially as Black life continues to be rendered nugatory and disposable in contemporary America. This is why within the context of my own philosophical interventions, I have unapologetically integrated into my philosophy courses African American literary texts, those that speak to the experiences of Black students who don’t see themselves reflected in traditional white philosophical texts. In this way, Black students do not feel overlooked or rendered invisible. In this way, their collective or shared histories are not denied or implied as having no philosophical value. African American literary texts are embedded with cognitive, emotive, visceral, somatic, interpersonal, intra-physic, surrealistic, political, ideological, spiritual, geopolitical registers. Such texts challenge fixed ontologies that, as Fanon (1967) would say, leave “existence by the wayside” (p.110). To attempt to understand Black-being-in-the-world, especially within the context of the past and present of white America, is to engage and phenomenologically elucidate the lived experiences of Black people through the lens of the sociogenic, which is, among other things, the space of social constitutionality and relationality. On this score, Fanon’s work, especially his famous chapter five of Black Skin, White Masks, tarries with the somatic, symbolic, and semiotic constitutionality of Black life, and how our Black bodies undergo processes of what I have called the “phenomenological return” (Yancy, 2017). It is a process where the Black body is thrown back, returned, as an object occupying space as it is “seen” by the white gaze, which is structurally procrustean. Fanon’s writing in Black Skin, White Masks, gets at the very heart of a racialized Black identity that undergoes processes of white interpellation that leaves his body in a state of malediction.

### Case

#### The normative supervenes on the natural – natural facts like whether brains develop to permit rationality or subjectivity determine whether non naturalist moral facts can be premised on things like capacity for reason

**Lutz and Lenman 18.** Lutz, Matthew and Lenman, James, "Moral Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/>. //Massa

The first argument against normative non-naturalism concerns normative supervenience. **The normative supervenes on the natural; in all** metaphysically **possible worlds in which the natural facts are the same as** they are in **the actual world, the moral facts are the same** as well. **This** claim **has been called the “least controversial thesis in metaethics”** (Rosen forthcoming); **it is very widely accepted.** But it is also a striking fact that stands in need of some explanation. **For naturalists**, such an explanation is easy to provide: **the moral facts just are natural facts, so when we consider worlds that are naturally the same** as the actual world, **we will ipso facto be considering worlds that are morally the same** as the actual world. But for the non-naturalist, no such explanation seems available. In fact, **it seems** to be in principle **impossible for a non-naturalist to explain how the moral supervenes on the natural.** And if the non-naturalist can offer no explanation of this phenomenon that demands explanation, this is a heavy mark against non-naturalism (McPherson 2012).

#### 2] Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papinau ’07 (David [David Papineau is an academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge], “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/)) 2007)

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then [we can’t] it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Setting aprioris on arguments about race operate as a tool of epistemic racism – making us meet the prerequisite of whiteness to be seen as “experts” or a valid argument reinforces racialized knowledge hierarchies

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Public cultural deployments of expertise evolved in response to rapid scientific and biotechnological development and the concomitant need to reconstruct the relationships between whiteness and property and (neo)coloniality and property. In an age of biotechnology, whiteness, in Cheryl Harris’s words, remained “a prerequisite to the exercise of enforceable property rights,” 25 here in the context of expertise. However, the precise landscape of (white) expertise took on new forms. As Zoltan Majdik and William Keith write, “[D]elimiting who can be an expert and whose decisions come from a place of expertise to the provenance of epistemic principles limits our ability to act as experts.” 26 The epistemic distinction between nature and science that emerged as overt and extractive racism in the colonial era also became a de facto racial division in the race liberal era. That updated distinction facilitated the understanding of certain kinds of raced knowledge—and the persons who created it—as less valuable than others. Because whiteness and expertise remained linked in race liberalism’s racial episteme, those producing traditional knowledge were often constructed as less than whole people without the capacity to invent. 27 Whiteness continued to operate as a priori evidence of access to expertise or potential to expertise while non-whiteness worked as a marker of non-expertness and suspectness about potential to expertise. Moreover, because values such as hard work and ingenuity continued to hold a special place in the American imaginary, those who comported with those values were deemed good intellectual property citizens. People of color largely produced raw materials, which were “purified” and “refined” in the science-industrial complex for sale in the global economy. They did not do the hard scientific labor, in part because they simply could not do it, that merited valuable patent protection. Unconscious racial and (neo)colonial judgments about expertise, built into the racial episteme of the nation, thus delineated between nature/culture and expertise/non-expertise, and reified fundamentally raced hierarchies of knowledge production.

#### Aprioris bad

Yancy 20, George, philosopher who is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. He has been a professor of philosophy at Emory University since fall 2015. He is also a distinguished Montgomery Fellow at Dartmouth College, one of the college's highest honors, “Doing Philosophy in Black: Foundation Traces and the Weight of the Present”, Across Black Spaces: Essays and Interviews from an American Philosopher, <https://philpapers.org/rec/YANABS>, Accessed 1/14/22 VD

My point here is that, contrary to my impression that I was the only Black philosopher, African-American philosophy or philosophy in Black has a rich tradition whose conceptual parameters, historical trajectories, discursive possibilities, intuitions, meta-philosophical concerns, community composition, and canonical construction and reconstruction are in process. And how we address these various sites will not be through a priori rules, but through an active and generative self-corrective exegesis and by sustaining a strong space for socially shared and overlapping philosophical practices and orientations that are never hermetically sealed or transcendentally delimited. This is partly what makes African-American philosophy so vibrant to me. There is so much exciting philosophical, metaphilosophical, historical, and archival work to be done. And it is important that as a critical mass of professional philosophers, we never forget the deep political struggles and sacrifices to which we owe our existence. There are so many who created the necessary foundational shifts, disruptions, and fissures in both the larger racist institutional practices within the academy and within departments of philosophy which were (and still are) governed by the conceptual logics of whiteness. I have never taught in a philosophy department where I am one of even two Black philosophers. Hence, even though I now have deep connections with African-American philosophy and African-American philosophers, there is still often that feeling of being “the only Black philosopher.