# 1NC

### 1

#### **The aff’s leads to ethical solipsism, where the subject believes they are the only one who matters – this internal link turns their impacts and propagates racism.**

Sullivan, ‘6 [2006; Shannon Sullivan; Penn State, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University; Indiana University Press; “Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits Of Racial Privilege”]

Phenomenological philosophy needs modification on this point. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, describes lived existence in terms of projective intentionality, in which **one projects meaning onto the world rather than receives it as a ready-made given**.58 But contra the conclusions of his analyses of ‘‘abnormal’’ patients who exhibit a failure of intentionality because of physical injury, projective intentionality should not be considered normal, that is, the appropriate ontological standard to be upheld for lived existence. This is not because the world is static or meaning is always already congealed. Merleau-Ponty rightly objects to this philosophical position. It is because **projective intentionality tends to suggest that it is desirable that all people live in as ontologically an expansive manner as possible. This suggestion is problematic from an antiracist and feminist perspective because it licenses white people to live their space in** racist ways**. It** implicitly **encourages them** not to concern themselves with other people’s lived existence**, including the ways in which other people’s existence is inhibited by white people and institutions**. In this way, **the nontransactional, unidirectionality of projective intentionality lends itself toward ethical solipsism.** Unlike metaphysical solipsism, **which** holds literally that only one subject exists, ethical solipsism **holds that the interests, projects, desires, and values of the one subject are the main ones or the only ones of any significance. The promotion of a more expansive (though not ethically solipsistic) existence is needed for those, such as black people, who have not been allowed to transact freely.** But **just the opposite is needed in the case of those, such as white people, who often transact too expansively, aggressively, and solipsistically, living as if they are the only ones who should be allowed to do so**.59 One can see white people’s problematic appropriation of space in the example Williams gives of an all-white crowd, except for herself, taking a walking tour of Harlem. The tour took place on Easter Sunday, and the guide asked the group if they wanted to go inside some churches since ‘‘ ‘Easter Sunday in Harlem is quite a show.’ ’’60 Aside from discussing how much extra time this additional stop would take, there was no discussion of whether white people’s gawking at black people in a church was ethically or politically problematic, nor did anyone ask whether the churches wanted to be observed by white people. Williams notes that the group was polite and well-intentioned but also that this well-intentioned attitude was precisely the problem: ‘‘no one [and, one might add, no space] existed for them who could not be governed by their intentions.’’61 Here are unconscious habits of white privilege at work. Camouflaged behind the good intentions of the white people was their ethical solipsism. **They viewed themselves as the only beings who possessed needs and desires worthy of consideration**. While white tourists could legitimately roam into a black church, **it is hardly imaginable that** a group of underdressed, cameratoting **black strangers would be allowed to observe the worshiping practices of a white congregation in,** for example, white and wealthy **Howard Beach.** **The white tour group’s projection of its intentions into the world, which made the space of a black church into a kind of** wild zoo for white people to wander through and observe its ‘‘exotic’’ inhabitants**, is an instance of the lived relationship to spatiality supported by an ethic of settlement that white people must combat in their fight against whiteliness.**

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that best combats racism – this is a prerequisite to any other ROB because debate itself is structured to exclude and silence Black voices – every other ROB presupposes a level playing field to evaluate arguments but that’s simply false

Reid-Brinkley 19, Shanara, Co-Director of CSUF Forensics and College of Communications professor, The Oxford Handbook of Voice Studies, “Voice Dipped in Black: The Louisville Project and the Birth of Black Radical Argument in College Policy Debate”, <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199982295.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199982295-e-28>, Accessed 8/24/21 VD

For Black people, Watts’s interpretation of voice is a critical examination of the power of rhetoric in the context of racial politics, and yet there are theoretical blind spots in his analysis. While Watts’s work attempts to speak to the problem of raced rhetorical moments, his lack of engagement with the notion of anti-Blackness produces conceptual limits for his interpretation of voice and the capacity of the Black to produce moments of voice. Watts’s understanding of voice requires negotiation among speakers and audiences marked by “obligations and anxieties” and produced by the “ethical and emotional dimensions of discourse.” In other words, to make voice a “happening” requires a recognition by those engaged in the rhetorical moment. Yet the politics of recognition for the (p. 217) Black body are necessarily tied to the social and political narratives attached to the Black body as a speaking body. The Black body represents dirt or a stain, or to use symbolic anthropologist Mary Douglas’s language, a “pollutant,” on and in the social body, one that must be controlled and contained (Douglas 2002). That bodies of color remain present despite the fact that they are supposed to be absent “is exactly what maintains white privilege” (Warren 2003, 47). The soundingness of Blackness only achieves recognition in a sociopolitical context where the very fact of Blackness holds significant meaning. In other words, the acoustic markers of Blackness are not just about differentiating the vocal utterings and tonal inclinations of particular cultures. It is about the announcement of the Black body into acoustic space where the utterance by the Black is inhabited simultaneously by the marker of not white, and thus not proper. Black utterance enters acoustic space as improper sound even in moments where the Black vocally attempts to mimic sound propriety as marked by normative whiteness. I am attempting to think through that which allows anti-Blackness to continue to cohere the American political landscape. It is the dynamics of the preutterance, that is, at the level of the flesh, that Blackness precedes the heardness or sonorousness of sound. By filling in the cracks between voice, the Black body and forces of anti-Blackness, I hope to contribute to Watts’s discussion of voice as a rhetorical happening and to voice studies’ engagement with theories of anti-Blackness. If the Black body can never be rendered fully invisible, then that body must somehow be contained, its excesses subdued to produce a form of the Black body that can become recognizable within the space of whiteness. Society tames Blackness by requiring those marked by Blackness to demonstrate their commitment to the norms of whiteness through the performance of the body; generally a mimicking of whiteness. If whiteness is normative, then in order for the speaking Black body to be heard, or come to voice, it must perform in a manner consistent with that norm. For example, the stylistic norms of the college debate community are inextricably tied to the social performance of identity attached to racialized bodies. Style includes bodily performance, how our bodies signify as part of rhetorical practice. In other words, body performance is integral to communal practices in debate that produce a social and competitive environment hostile to Blackness. If the image of the nationally successful debater is a white, male, and economically privileged body, then the stylistic practices of those bodies become the standard by which all other bodies are evaluated. Their practices, their behaviors, their identities become the models or thrones upon which others must sacrifice their identities in the pursuit of “the ballot,” or the win. Racially different bodies must perform that difference according to the cultural norms of the debate community. For Black students it can often mean changing their appearance, standardizing language practices, and eschewing their cultural practices. In essence, in order to have an opportunity for achieving in debate competitions Black students must performatively whiten. “Acting Black” is problematic because those performative identities are not recognizable in the normative frame of debate practice. In fact, Blackness signifies a difference, an opposite; a negative differential. It is not that the debate community explicitly operates to exclude people based on race; rather it (p. 218) competitively rejects Black presence, or non-normative nonwhite performance. It is the combination of cultural values, behavioral practices, and the significance of Black flesh that produce barriers to meaningful inclusion.

#### The alternative is reject the aff in favor of African American literature – the alternative understands the permanent failure of Western metaphysics as a method of creating new theorizations of philosophy based in black experience

Yancy 20, George, philosopher who is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. He has been a professor of philosophy at Emory University since fall 2015. He is also a distinguished Montgomery Fellow at Dartmouth College, one of the college's highest honors, Educational Philosophy and Theory, “Black disciplinary zones and the exposure of whiteness”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2020.1830062>, Accessed 8/23/21 VD

My direct engagement with African American literature provided me with a Black culturally rich, symbolic, and narrative medium through which I was able to engage questions that were relevant to my lived experience as Black. Hence, African American literature functioned counter-hegemonically, encouraging me to contest the self-proclaimed “racelessness” of white philosophy. Critically rethinking the process of thinking as an historically mediated process became a vibrant way of making sense of and appreciating multiple philosophical voices and variegated social locations vis-a-vis different epistemic assumptions, and styles of knowledge production. Morrison’s text, Playing in the Dark (and her broader literary corpus) also helped me to think critically about the ways in which African American literature can speak to the situational facticity of Black people, their integrity, and their forms of meaning making in a white supremacist world, where they do not constitute the silent background that gives significance to whiteness, where they do not function as an axiological scaffold for uplifting the whiteness of humanity. Hence, African American literature, through its narrative tarrying with the quotidian complexity of Black life, helped me to understand how processes of racialization, and the gravity of anti-Black racism, are indispensable to understanding Black existence, and how Black people actively engage in processes of negotiation within and resistance to a world that denies them their right to be. African American literary figure Maya Angelou (2009/1969) speaks of how the human voice can infuse words “with shades of deeper meaning” (p.96). African American literature is a process of giving voice to Black life, of developing narrative creativity, of uncovering a broad and complex range of emotivity expressed by and between Black characters; it is a process of discerning the complexity of Black life and infusing Black life with shades of deeper meaning. This idea of accessing or expressing deeper meaning is what led me to new ways of thinking about the practice of philosophy and its limits, its epistemic closures, and aspirational aims toward mere conceptual purity. So, I was moved to rethink how to do philosophy, how to write philosophy, how to teach philosophy, and how to render visible the socially and politically constitutive, though contingent, forces that impact philosophy as a practice from somewhere, not nowhere. Black life, within the context of national and global anti-Blackness, mocks the academicism of many forms of philosophical practice within white academic spaces. Philosophy was not born from the head of Zeus fully formed, but born, as African American philosopher Leonard Harris says, of struggle. Philosophy, for me, is a site of suffering, not simply wonder or the effort to gain conceptual clarity. Confronting the status quo of white supremacy, allowing the pain of others to speak, challenging existing hegemonic social ontologies and oppressive political regimes, can leave a mark. Sometimes, as in my case, there are even threats of physical violence. After writing the article “Dear White America” in 2015 at The New York Times (“The Stone”), I personally experienced the weight of white racist hatred; it was affectively and somatically registered. The body has a way of keeping track of trauma. n terms of my own meta-philosophical turn, I came to understand that doing philosophy is an activity, one that is framed by various historically grounded assumptions, paradigms, disciplinary matrixes, linguistic communities, metaphorical devices, and narrative frames. Fundamentally, doing philosophy is a form of social engagement that is always already a process in medias res. And even while thinking “alone,” one does not think without a language, which is socially and historically saturated with meaning. Many white philosophers that I’ve encountered, despite their pretensions to the contrary, are unable to brush off the dust of history and begin doing philosophy ex nihilo. More specifically, philosophizing is an embodied activity that begins within and grows out of diverse lived contexts; philosophizing takes place within the fray of the everyday. In their attempt to escape the social, to defy history, and to reject the body, many white philosophers have pretensions of being godlike. They attempt to defy the confluent social forces, the multiple identificatory registers, and their historicity and particularity, that shape their philosophical voices. They see themselves as totally detached from the often inchoate, social, and existential traffic of life and the background assumptions (race, gender, class, ability, sexuality) that are constitutive of a particular horizon of understanding. Having “departed” from life, having rejected the force of effective history, embodied orientations (broadly construed), white philosophy is as good as dead, devoid of relevance, devoid of particularity, and escapist. This is why Mills (1998) says so provocatively that “a lot of philosophy is just white guys jerking off” (p.4). The dynamic racialized narrativity self-consciously embedded within Morrison’s literary work functioned as a template of how I might begin to write philosophy in a way that captured what African American philosopher Cornel West calls the funk of life (West & Ritz, 2009, p.4). I wanted my words on the page to do things, to carry the weight, in this case, of historical racist catastrophe. In an important interview that articulates the weight of African American literature as a mode of epistemic and social ontological generativity, Morrison communicates, it seems to me, the importance of African American literature as a way of reframing philosophical issues that mark the importance of situated narrativity vis-a-vis Black life. Indeed, describing how she understands her own literary efforts, Morrison says that her “books are about very specific circumstances, and in them are people who do very specific things” (Dreifus, 1994). She continues that “the plot, [and] characters are part of my effort to create a language in which I can posit philosophical questions. I want the reader to ponder those questions not because I put them in an essay, but because they are part of a narrative” (Dreifus, 1994). Within the context of a narrative, as opposed to a philosophical architectonic system, Morrison is able to place the reader into a lived space, a powerful narrative space that is able to articulate modalities of lived existence where, in this case, Black bodies are raped, racially brutalized, dehumanized, marginalized, and traumatized. In short, through a form of rhizomic narrativity, Morrison moves the reader through the messiness of the impact of existentially contingent history upon the Black body. Hence, one might say that Morrison posits philosophical questions that are inextricably linked to a dynamic racialized embodied narrative that is grounded within the quotidian, an everydayness that contains multiple and entangled roots in the deep and complex lives of Black people. After all, Black lives are lived narratives, journeys of pain, endurance, contradiction, death, inter-subjectivity, suffering, racism, sexism, terror, and trauma. Avoiding abstract and non-indexical discourse, Morrison reveals the power of literature to embody the flesh and blood reality of what it means to be Black within an anti-Black world. Mills (1998) also understands the existential gravity of an anti-Black world and how Western philosophy “abstracts away from what has been the central feature of the lives of Africans transported against their will to the Americas: the denial of black humanity and the reactive, defiant assertion of it” (p.9). Hence, Mills frames the African American literary tradition as one which contests the assumptions of a solipsistic Cartesian subject that is detached from the sociality of Black life within an anti-Black world. He references “those invisible native sons and daughters who, since nobody knows their name, have to be the men who cry ‘I am!’ and the women who demand ‘And ain’t I a woman?” (pp.9-10). Mills turns to this Black literary tradition to upend the universal pretensions of white philosophy by revealing the experiences of Black people and the specificity of the existential and identificatory predicaments that they face. Hence, Mills names the motifs found in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, Richard Wright’s Native Son, James Baldwin’s Nobody Knows My Name, John A. Williams’ The Man Who Cried I Am, and Sojourner Truth’s self-declaration of her Black womanhood in 1851 at the Woman’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio. By rendering explicit these motifs, Mills dethrones the assumption that what constitutes a philosophical conundrum is determined a priori. This move expands the domain of the range of the morphology of philosophical questions and problems addressed, and the origins of the literary-philosophical texts in which they emerge—who are the writers and what are their, in this case, racialized contexts? It was during my MA work in Africana Studies that such deeply and engaging texts were made available: The History of Mary Prince; Celia, A Slave; The Polished Hoe; Corregidora; I, Tituba: Black Witch of Salem; Muse & Drudge; Breath, Eyes, Memory; The Salt Eaters; Negritude Women, and so many more. Each text demonstrated how the Black human voice can infuse words with shades of deeper meaning, and how Black people are constantly negotiating questions of empire, and racialized denigration. African American literature was/is essential to how I approach my philosophical writing and how I think about the importance of philosophical focus, which attempts to uncover deep racialized existential trauma as it is lived, situated, and embodied within the belly of the white American beast. I aim to enflesh philosophical discourse that fails to capture the concrete fractured joys and prolonged sorrows of Black life, especially as Black life continues to be rendered nugatory and disposable in contemporary America. This is why within the context of my own philosophical interventions, I have unapologetically integrated into my philosophy courses African American literary texts, those that speak to the experiences of Black students who don’t see themselves reflected in traditional white philosophical texts. In this way, Black students do not feel overlooked or rendered invisible. In this way, their collective or shared histories are not denied or implied as having no philosophical value. African American literary texts are embedded with cognitive, emotive, visceral, somatic, interpersonal, intra-physic, surrealistic, political, ideological, spiritual, geopolitical registers. Such texts challenge fixed ontologies that, as Fanon (1967) would say, leave “existence by the wayside” (p.110). To attempt to understand Black-being-in-the-world, especially within the context of the past and present of white America, is to engage and phenomenologically elucidate the lived experiences of Black people through the lens of the sociogenic, which is, among other things, the space of social constitutionality and relationality. On this score, Fanon’s work, especially his famous chapter five of Black Skin, White Masks, tarries with the somatic, symbolic, and semiotic constitutionality of Black life, and how our Black bodies undergo processes of what I have called the “phenomenological return” (Yancy, 2017). It is a process where the Black body is thrown back, returned, as an object occupying space as it is “seen” by the white gaze, which is structurally procrustean. Fanon’s writing in Black Skin, White Masks, gets at the very heart of a racialized Black identity that undergoes processes of white interpellation that leaves his body in a state of malediction.

### 2

#### Bare life and fungibility define black madness - Black madness is in the position of abjection to whiteness as their mere existence disrupts the privileged notion of the autonomous bodymind and linear readings of time

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To be clear, Butler’s aesthetic intervention does not exclusively exist in the ideological spaces of syntax and punctuation. One of the rules of science fiction is that the world the author creates must abide by its own internal logic. Within the world of Fledgling, part of the internal logic is the history of the Ina people. Though Butler does not break the rule insisting on an in- ternal logic, she does not abide by the idea that the characters must be aware of the internal logic to which they abide. That is, the Gordons’ liberalism and silence and the antagonists’ hatred and genocide are two sides of the same narrative coin. They each participate in an act of historiographical revision, changing their past relationship to disability and Blackness by ex- cising them. Unlike the critical impulse that permits representational detec- tive work to recuperate Black disabled bodies and experiences, they cannot recuperate that which they do not think they have lost. They cannot treat as radical that which they considered so abject so as to not exist at all. But- ler’s text intervenes in the narrative logic that assumes the accepted stories about Ina origin and history are complete without the input of either the present or purported anomalies from the past. Ina construct the absence of Blackness and madness as a ballast of their identity ab ovo. The Gordons do not want to admit to the idea of Ina racists. They do not want to deal with the reality that Ina can be gravely mentally injured. (In point of fact, Shori’s father, Iosif, is the only Ina who acknowledges that her head injury could be part of Ina experience.) Racism and ableism exert differing pressures on Ina history and ontology. Each destabilizes the Ina’s notion of self, such that their only recourse is denial. To embrace the presence of racism in that moment would be to admit the possibility of dishonor and to more heavily court embarrassment and shame regarding Ina history or identity. To think about Ina injury, particularly amnesia, troubles the overarching paradigm they have developed for discussing their relationship to illness. Most often, they think in terms of physical disabilities, usually temporary injury that can be rectified, such as broken bones or pierced flesh. Here, Shori’s amne- sia upsets their understanding of themselves as generally sound—in rela- tion to humans superlative—in mind and body. The absence of a possibility for cure destabilizes an aspect of themselves they consider fundamental— memory as tied to their longevity and as a necessary tool for their survival. Since mutual constitution occasions the recuperation of Blackness and mad- ness, they would be absorbed in their history or origin stories but not nor- malized based on abjection. According to these Ina, they were not present to be absorbed at all. This historiographical maneuver implies that madness and Blackness have and create separate historical trajectories which, when combined with a history that insists on whiteness and ability, is destructive to their sense of self. By muddying history, Butler allows Black madness to shift one of the hallmarks of science fiction: the audacity to imagine the future. The at- tempted genocide and the rhetoric of erasure push toward creating a bare life for Shori. Agamben develops the concept of bare life to account for those who exist between zoe (mere life) and bios (good life) and whose existence is included as a part of the Western cultural landscape but occluded from visual representation or polite conversation. Moreover, those with bare lives lose their rights as citizens, and their existence is limned by their fungibil- ity. Alexander Weheliye revises this concept to think through the Middle Passage instead of the Muselmann of the Holocaust, remarking that other bodies in the Western world are also susceptible to bare lives. In Weheliye’s revision, the bare lives to which Black people become susceptible are made possible by their de facto and long-standing position of fungibility vis-à-vis the state.68 In Shori’s case, the possibility remains that bare life becomes af- fixed to her Black amnesiac body not simply by virtue of genocidal action but also because of the accepted idea that the Ina exist outside the confines of race and racialization discourses. In thinking through Shori’s Black madness as variation rather than aber- ration, the text opens the space for Shori to display certain kinds of agency, loosen the hold of a bare life. Yet because her allies have to advocate for her to be considered Ina, I am hesitant to ascribe to Shori’s Black madness an agentive quality. That is, how far away from a bare life can she be if her ex- istence must be consistently justified before their Council of Judgment, and even then not fully decided or accepted? Black madness remains a provo- cation. Even as it forms the locus for the invagination of their history and the fold of their future, it both allows for agency and forecloses it. Black madness remains a wrinkle in the linear progression of history and time because of its opposition to their dominant ideology. As a result, it cannot have anything but a vexed agency, nor can it create itself outside the confines of a bare life. Moreover, Black madness, given its loss of time (amnesia) and aversion to time (changing the narrative) shifts the possibility of recupera- tion as a form of agency. Linked as it is to a bare life, affixed in history as such, it cannot fully recuperate its past nor rewrite the history to tell its story from its perspective.

#### The valorization of resistance, survivability, and agency instrumentalizes black madness for white liberation and ignores how the black mad subject experiences asociality

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This strategy is not the only or primary way to read challenges to rac- ism and ableism. The problem exists (pace Hortense Spillers) at the level of grammar. These projects tend to have one vector: they “transform(ed) sys- tems and culture.”20 Note that transform operates as transitive where Black, disabled bodies perform the work of transformation rather than undergo the process of transformation. Yet Black, disabled bodies will not always behave as agents that transform or those who are transformed in equal mea- sure or, as noted above, with a degree of reciprocity. Allowing for more than one vector between Black, disabled bodies and the systems in which they operate clarifies the following: it is inaccurate that the only critical relation- ship between Blackness and disability (specifically, madness) is one of libera- tion from ableism. At times, Blackness exacerbates the presence of ableism, or cultural norms facilitate ableism.21 In accounting for these moments, I trouble the corollary of the logic above: namely, that whiteness withal the privilege embedded in it lacks the tools for its own liberation and must rely on Blackness to acquire its release. Here, Blackness becomes a reduced space where whiteness enacts its privilege by instrumentalizing Blackness. In this paradigm, Blackness for all its cultural complexity becomes another reac- tionary space that exists to indict whiteness, rather than a culture and sys- tem of thought all its own.22 We must consider the spaces when mere expo- sure of oppression is not only not emancipatory but can also be detrimental, where demonstration and acknowledgement of one’s various intersecting socially marginalized positions does not equal political agency. We must also consider what happens when Black cultural locations refuse whiteness as an interlocutor in favor of intraracial conversations. In short, when mad- ness is “a Black thang” (with all that evokes in terms of exclusivity and ableist objectification). I take up the question of intraracial context and conversation in the next discussion. For now, I turn to another foundational moment in the study of Blackness and disability to read in the breaks of the critical material. I con- tinue the conversation about the critical impulse of mutual constitution that looks to retrieve agentive stories of Black disabled folks as instantiations of anti-ableist radicality. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997) includes a chapter on physical disability in Ann Petry’s The Street, Toni Morrison’s oeuvre, and Audre Lorde’s Zami. Though Thomson’s dis- cussion does not explicitly discuss mental disability, cognitive impairment, or crazy-as-insult, I find it instructive for this conversation. Madness shad- ows each of the texts under scrutiny since the characters deviate from intra- cultural norms by being Black women who seek class ascension despite the odds (Petry) and wider American cultural norms by participating in and identifying with communities labeled deviant (and crazy) by the dsm IV (Lorde). Of course, Morrison’s characters are literally haunted by their ac- tions and kinfolk, which always forces the question of whether Morrison’s characters could be labeled crazy. It becomes useful to think about Mor- rison’s, Petry’s, and Lorde’s work (especially as part of Garland Thomson’s project) from the perspective of Octavia E. Butler: namely, that sanity is communally defined and anyone who deviates from agreed upon norms is treated as mad. The characters’ desires for themselves (and the methods they use to achieve them) exceed the racialized and gendered boundaries drawn for them. Indeed, because they also have physical disabilities, their behavior trespasses the boundaries drawn based on ability as well. Madness cannot be cleaved from these conversations. Thomson’s claims about the represen- tation of physical disability as agentive and liberatory have implications for whether madness has similar representational possibilities.23 Thomson offers that the collective project of these Black women’s writ- ings provides an antidote to white racist depictions. These powerful bodies— extraordinary, in Thomson’s lexicon—participate in a “collective project of cultural revision [that] challenges the African-American woman writer to produce a narrative of self that authenticates Black women’s oppressive history yet offers a model for transcending that history’s limitations.”24 Moreover, the primacy given to disabled women figures “reveals the shift in African-American literary representation from a modernist to a postmod- ernist mode, a change that parallels the ideological move of minority groups from assimilation to affirmation of cultural and ethnic differences.”25 While I partly agree that these representations “render oppression without rein- scribing it,”26 I hesitate to read in them the triumph that Thomson affirms. On the one hand, Thomson rightly points out that these characters do not completely represent physical deviance. On the other, they do not, as she says, “repudiate such cultural master narratives as normalcy, wholeness, and the feminine ideal.”27 I would attribute this aspect of their representation to the way that the social model of disability upon which Thomson relies does not fully account for the way madness shows up in these texts.28 The social model privileges a particular kind of mental agility and cognitive process- ing to combat the stigma and material consequences that arise as a result of ableism. In turn, the model dismisses madness as a viable subject position, ensuring that those counted as such—either by communal consensus or psy- disciplines—remain excluded from conversations about disability because they cannot logically engage. For the characters in Thomson’s study, this has the pernicious effect of erasing some of the master cultural narratives they work against: those that acknowledge their physical disability and link it to mental disability as a way to further disenfranchise and disempower them. Thomson’s work reads these figures (based on their representation of physical disabilities) as liberatory for the larger narrative and theoretical spaces of ethnic modernism. I hazard that these characters’ relationship to disability suggests an investment in internalized ableism, particularly vis- à-vis sexuality. For example, Thomson reads Ann Petry’s Mrs. Hedges, a tall, dark-skinned Black woman with avoirdupois who works as a madam, as one who refuses victimization. Important for this conversation is the way Mrs. Hedges is not only physically disfigured by burns but also read as ex- ceeding the gendered and racialized boundaries the text’s Black commu- nity (voiced through the protagonist) circumscribes for her. Her madness is not biomedically defined, but it carries psychosocial repercussions given how she is treated. Thomson bases her reading of Mrs. Hedges as liberatory on Hedges’s sexualized gaze on the main character and her profession as a madam. Yet, there is no room for Hedges to acquiesce to or enjoy the sexual- ized attention she receives from the rich white man who controls the street. The novel makes it clear that part of Hedges’s rejection of the man’s sexual advances is financial. She cannot be in bed with him literally and economi- cally. However, what the novel leaves open is that Hedges’s rejection of him is also about her own denigrated view of her sexuality.29 She is still limned as monstrous, grotesque, even if Hedges as a figure shifts the understand- ing of monstrosity. Inasmuch as Hedges’s physical disability allows her to move from one position in the economy to another more powerful one, she must rely on a chosen life of celibacy and a masculinized, monstrous ap- pearance to secure and maintain her new economic position. Her celibacy also shores up her power by keeping the madness of her disfigured, disabled, interracial sexuality in check. That is, though the disability is no longer in the background of the text, the cultural baggage of internalized ableism ap- pears in the foreground replete with eschewing sexual desire and limiting the association with traditional forms of femininity. Even if Petry’s proj- ect does—according to Thomson—pave the way for Black authors to shift from assimilation to affirmation and provide a challenge to the static rep- resentations of disabled figures in modernist texts, Mrs. Hedges’s refusal to engage in her own sexuality complicates a reading of this figure as liberatory vis-à-vis physical disability and the charges of madness that accompany her character. Reading Mrs. Hedges as agentive certainly poses challenges given the internalized ableism within Petry’s text, especially since the novel focuses on intraracial encounter. First, physical disability only liberates Mrs. Hedges from the intraracial economy of the street by providing an avenue for power. Yet, within intraracial encounter, she remains circumscribed by the discourses of madness because community members consider her mad for transgressing boundaries of race and gender. Second, the interracial encoun- ter does not allow for her agency within the critical literature. Thomson claims that Petry’s text, as well as the others, counters the limited represen- tations of disability within modernist texts. Implicitly, the logic of such a critical move—regardless of its truism—mandates that Blackness become the vehicle for (mostly white) others’ liberation from ableism in their read- ing practice. In that way, it is the presence of Blackness that shores up white liberalism by not only providing a representation of Blackness but also a complex rendering of white-centered notions of disability. Elsewhere, I have argued similarly—that we ought to attend to the way that Blackness and whiteness function in the interracial multiability en- counter. In my article on television’s Monk, I proposed that Blackness and madness cannot take up the same space within one interaction. I read the protagonist’s unnamed obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disability that “misfits” with other (usually minor) characters’ Blacknesses.30 At times, one is used for comedic fodder or erased in favor of representing the other or eclipsed as a way to demonstrate white liberalism. My article describes the relationship between these two identities as mutually constituted, but it evinces some slippage when attempting to discern why the protagonist’s disability erases the other characters’ Blackness. Since Blackness and mad- ness do not reside in the same body, the various drama-comedy scripts ter- giversate about what difference among difference can mean, often mobiliz- ing white liberalism to police disability and Blackness. Rereading my own work with an eye toward the breaks, I find that we not only lack a criti- cal vocabulary for describing Blackness and madness simultaneously, but it is also assumed that one must take priority over the other. The end result is that in this interracial encounter—whether fictionalized, theorized, or criticized—either Blackness or madness must be erased. Important for this conversation is that the multiracial, multiability encounter shifts depending on the social position of the characters. Blackness cannot and should not be marshaled as the radical space for white liberalism to mount its critique of ableism or racism. When Blackness and madness exist in the same space, multiple ways of reading should become possible, some of which eschew the possibility of radicality and others that might usher it in. The multiability interracial encounter also allows for Blackness and mad- ness to be erased when improperly thought of as agentive. Because both dis- courses are often conceptualized as unspeakable or illegible, their presence can facilitate and consolidate the power that creates abject material condi- tions. Nirmala Erevelles makes this point most forcefully: “The analytic category of disability is useful in destabilizing static notions of identity, ex- ploring intersectionality, and investigating embodiment, [yet] I argue that the effectiveness of much of feminist disability studies remains limited be- cause of its overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality.”31 In other words, Blackness and disability have the potential to destabilize the rhetoric of normalcy that holds them as abject, but they are curtailed in do- ing so when mislabeled as agentive. In Erevelles’s exploration of the lived conditions of war, she argues that when disability (both physical and men- tal) intersects with Black and brown bodies in the developing world or in disenfranchised communities within the developed world, their confluence indicts unchecked multinational corporate greed because it reveals the po- liticized nature of impairment. With this in mind, there can be no ableist or racist narrative available that prioritizes individualized achievement (read: overcoming) or bemoans bad luck (read: pity) because the root cause impli- cates specific governments, companies, the people who run them, and those who are complicit in them. In addition, Erevelles resists ascribing agency to the disabled people of color she discusses, perhaps because, in this version of David and Goliath, Goliath is winning. More to the point, the material conditions for celebration and agency require material resources not avail- able to everyone, and mere knowledge of one’s situation cannot be proxy for freedom from it, nor does awareness equal agency.

#### **The impact is antiblack ableism that justifies suffering beyond suffering under the guise of hyper/ability**

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By using historical and theoretical examples from Black Studies and Disability Studies, we show that a Black feminist disability framework is emergent and intersectional. These examples, when analyzed with such a framework in mind, are rich with unexplored connections across both disciplines. Embedded within the narratives of some of the central figures and theories of these fields are the ingredients for creating the unifying framework. For example, the excess strength and otherwise “too muchness” of Blackness is an oft-deconstructed trope in Black Studies. The myth of the strong Black woman has been critiqued in many ways, notably by a powerful range of Black feminist scholars but has rarely been examined as a form of ableism—internalized or social (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009; Cole and Guy-Sheftall 2009; Collins 2000, 2005; Giddings 2007; Harris-Perry 2011; Mataka 2000). The myth suggests that Black women are uniquely strong, able to endure pain, and surmount otherwise difficult obstacles because of their innate tenacity. Black women are disallowed disability and their survival is depoliticized. Survival is a form of resistance and a source of celebration, particularly in the face of the reality that, as Lucille Clifton said, “Every day something has tried to kill me and has failed” (Clifton 1993, 25). There is a productive tension in recognizing the critical connections of the celebration of survival in the context of the demands made on Black bodies to transcend all suffering (Derricotte 2010). Resilience is praised while trauma, violence, and pain are too common to actually be interrogated for very long. The logic of Black hypervisibility produces subjects that are barred from weakness—and disability in Western thought as figured through non-normative bodies is the ultimate sign of unsuitability. To counteract such notions of unsuitability, a form of strategic essentialism has been adopted that upholds internalized ableism and ultimately disallows Black suffering through embracing an identification with this presumed hyper-ability. How many of us grew up with parents who warned us of having to be twice as good as our white counterparts? Designed to fortify Black children against the profound racism that is masked in a masquerade of meritocracy, this notion of having to be “twice as good,” while often true, also marks the difficulties with discussing trauma, health disparities, and psychiatric or physical disabilities within Black communities. If one is not able to work twice as hard to keep up with the masquerade, then what value does one have to the project of Black redemption? The cultural tradition from which this adage stems has been supported by studies and corroborated with empirical evidence. Black people are more likely to be surveilled, punished, and passed over for promotion than their white counterparts in all societal institutions. Black workers must demonstrate a significantly higher level of skill than their white counterparts in order to keep their jobs despite receiving lower wages and fewer opportunities for promotion (White 2015). Black people cannot afford to be disabled when they are required to be phantasmically abled in a white supremacist society. By bringing disability studies and a Black feminist theoretical lens to address this myth, scholars are better able to explain Black people’s reluctance to identify as disabled and potentially offer new strategies for dismantling ableism within Black Studies.

#### **The alternative is a methodological and narratological mad blackness that disrupts notions of ocularity and linearity while refusing calls to radicality, agency, and solutions**

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Considering Black cultural contexts where mental illness and cognitive dis- ability occur, the two major Western modes of interpretation—ocularity and (drawing on our earlier conversation) linear time—no longer retain the exclusive right to interpret meaning. The Black mad are, in some sense, no more. They become the mad Black. I theorize mad Black and mad Blackness as a formulation that disrupts the ocular and linear legacies of the West’s conception of space and time, respectively. To theorize the concept of the mad Black or mad Blackness opens up critical space to consider how the dis- courses of madness and Blackness not only operate in intraracial spaces but also intensify and dismantle common understandings of each other. When mad becomes a modifier for Black it carries with it the charge of excess (i.e., more Black, really Black, unapologetically Black, Blackity Black), anger, and insanity as it simultaneously functions as an intensifier for Blackness itself. In some ways, madness amplifies Blackness in this conception, pushing it to excess, but it also has the potential to dismantle it. Said potential lies precisely in the disruption of Western space and time. Sight no longer acts as the dom- inant modeof sense making. Linear progressions of time no longer capture the movement of subjects and objects through narrative. Mad Blackness fills in the gaps heretofore created by reading strategies (i.e., mutual constitution) that rely on these two Western modalities of interpretation. For instance, Octavia E. Butler’s mad Black character cleaves time from space with her very existence, such that the linear progressive narrative plane is disrupted. She also foregrounds the lie in thinking of the impeachability of sight as the dominant mode of interpretation. Her allies cannot see her illness. Their understanding based on sight—no matter its superlative quality— is impoverished. The mad Black then is not solely disruptive because of its embodiment. But also, the mad Black figure and mad Blackness stage a narratological intervention in how we analyze and tell stories about race and disability writ large. Mad Blackness describes the aesthetics of a text that refuses to adhere to ocularcentrism or linearity. In these texts—including but not lim- ited to the ones in these conversations—madness and Blackness pervade the structure of the text such that linear renderings of the narrative always do a disservice to the text and an emphasis on sight forecloses interpretive possibility. To be clear, it is not that ocularcentrism and linearity are wholly inappropriate, but rather that they are explicitly incomplete due to the influ- ence of madness and Blackness in the structure and characters of the text. As a result, mad Blackness necessarily critiques texts that denigrate madness or Blackness or both. Despite, and perhaps owing to, this disruptive quality, I would not define mad Blackness as a revolutionary force, nor would I expect mad Black figures to offer solutions. Their disruption—of interpretation, of narrative—does not require that they provide solutions, since that contrasts their suspicion of linearity and teleology, nor does it require that they be benevolent, since that often requires they be in service of those that create and maintain anti- Black ableist and sanist structures. This book, Black Madness :: Mad Black- ness, is one such example of a mad Black text. As I mentioned, the conversa- tions herein reveal critical conversations to themselves, and seek to perturb some of the foundations upon which Black studies and disability studies rest all while yoking them irrevocably together.

#### **Our mad methodology allows for the extension of radical compassion to disembodied voices that condemns Western boundaries of sanity**

Bruce 21, La Marr Jurelle Bruce earned his BA in African American Studies and English & Comparative Literature from Columbia University and his PhD in African American Studies and American Studies from Yale University. June 2021, *How to Go Mad without Losing Your Mind*, Duke University Press, p 9-11

Mad methodology seeks, follows, and rides the unruly movements of madness. It reads and hears idioms of madness: those purported rants, raves, rambles, outbursts, mumbles, stammers, slurs, gibberish sounds, and unseemly silences that defy the grammars of Reason. It historicizes and contextualizes madness as a social construction and social relation vis-à-vis Reason. It ponders the sporadic violence of madness in tandem and in tension with the structural violence of Reason. It cultivates critical ambivalence to reckon with the simultaneous harm and benefit that may accompany madness. It respects and sometimes harnesses "mad" feelings like obsession and rage as stimulus for radical thought and action. Whereas rationalism roundly discredits madpersons, mad methodology recognizes madpersons as critical theorists and decisive protagonists in struggles for liberation. To be clear, I am not suggesting that madpersons are always already agents of liberation. I am simply and assuredly acknowledging that they can be, which is a heretical admission amid antimad worlds. I propose a mad methodology that neither vilifies the madperson as evil incarnate, nor romanticizes the madperson as resistance personified, nor patronizes the madperson as helpless ward awaiting aid. Rather, mad methodology engages the complexity and variability of mad subjects. Regarding anger, the warrior poet Audre Lorde asserts that it is "loaded with information and energy." Mad methodology is rooted in the recognition that phenomenal madness, medicalized madness, and psychosocial madness, like angry madness, are all "loaded with information and energy." Mad methodology proceeds from a belief that such information can instruct black radical theory and such energy can animate black radical praxis. Most urgently, mad methodology primes us to extend radical compassion to the madpersons, queer personae, ghosts, freaks, weirdos, imaginary friends, disembodied voices, unvoiced bodies, and unReasonable others, who trespass, like stowaways or fugitives, in Reasonable modernity. Radical compassion is a will to care for, a commitment to feel with, a striving to learn from, and an openness to be vulnerable before a precarious other, though they may be drastically dissimilar to yourself. Radical compassion is not an appeal to an idyllic oneness where difference is blithely effaced. Nor is it a smug projection of oneself into the position of another, thereby displacing that other. Nor is it an invitation to walk a mile in someone else's shoes and amble, like a tourist, through their lifeworld, leaving them existentially barefoot all the while. Rather, radical compassion is an exhortation to ethically walk and sit and fight and build alongside another whose condition may be utterly unlike your own. Radical compassion works to impart care, exchange feeling, transmit understanding, embolden vulnerability, and fortify solidarity across circumstantial, sociocultural, phenomenological, and ontological chasms in the interest of mutual liberation. It persists even and especially toward beings who are the objects of contempt and condemnation from dominant value systems. It extends even and especially to those who discomfit one's own sense of propriety. Indeed, this book sometimes loiters in scenes and tarries with people who may trouble readers. I hope that this book also models the sort of radical compassion that persists through the trouble. I characterize mad methodology as a parapositivist approach insofar as it resists the hegemony of positivism. (As a philosophical doctrine, positivism stipulates that meaningful assertions about the world must come from empirical observation and interpretation to generate veritable truth. However, when engaging the phenomenal, the spiritual, the aesthetic, the affective, and the mad, we must deviate from the logics of positivism.) Mad methodology finds great inspiration in other cultural theorists' parapositivist approaches, including the Apostle Paul's account of "faith," Édouard Glissant's "poetics of relation," Avery Gordon's haunted and haunting sociology, Saidiya Hartman's "critical fabulation," Jack Halberstam's "scavenger methodology," Ann Cvetkovich's compilation of an "archive of feelings," Christina Sharpe's "wake work" and Patricia J. Williams's "ghost gathering." These thinkers study sublime, opaque, formless, subjunctive, scarce, dead, and ghostly phenomena that thwart positivist knowing. As a parapositivist approach, mad methodology does not attempt to wholly, transparently reveal madness." How could it? Madness, after all, resists intelligibility and frustrates interpretation. Conceding that I cannot fully understand the meaning of every encounter, I often precede my observations with the qualifiers maybe, it might be, and it seems. Between these covers, I madness embrace uncertainty and irresolution. I heed poet-philosopher Glissant's insistence that "the transparency of the Enlightenment is finally misleading... It is not necessary to understand someone-in the verb 'to understand' [French: comprendre] there is the verb 'to take' [French: prendre]-in order to wish to live with them.I want to live with the madpersons gathered in this study, but I do not t to take them. I strive to pursue madness, but not to capture it. Recall that II began this chapter by warning you to hold tight. Mad methodology also, sometimes, entails letting go: relinquishing the imperative to know, to take, to capture, to master, to lay bare all the world with its countless terrors and wonders. Sometimes we must hold tight to steady ourselves amid the violent tumult of this world-and sometimes we must let go to unmoor ourselves from the stifling order imposed on this world. I am describing a deft dance between release and hold, hold and release. In short, mad methodology is how to go mad without losing your mind. At length, this book will show you.

#### The ROB is to open spaces for mad black discussions – exposing these breaks in knowledge production is a pre-requisite to deconstructing violence because these discussions are always just erased

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To that end, I draw on those who read within the folds and breaks, a concept and methodology that attends to connections between discourse and materiality as infinite and inextricably bound. The complex web of re- lationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability) is con- stituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts. Hortense Spillers’s work in “Interstices: A Drama of Small Words” (1984), and “‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’: An American Grammar Book” (1987), opens up this critical space and methodology in her discussion of the flesh. She depicts the flesh as a text that has, makes, and acquires meaning. The flesh of Black women in particular, since it has been erased from history, in its abrogated status exists within what Deleuze later terms the fold: a space not solely of possibility, but one that continuously gets erased. Since Deleuze develops the fold vis-à-vis Leibniz’s understanding of the Baroque aesthetic (read: within a tradition of Western and Enlightenment thought), I find it useful to think through how the fold shows up in the aesthetic praxis of the artists-theorists under scrutiny. The fold exists within the self, between the self and other, and between groups of others, as a space from which to interpret and understand the various critical and creative possibilities avail- able. In addition, development does not occur on a linear plane: it constantly folds, unfolds, and refolds. Most important for my readings, the fold func- tions as a space that creates and sustains possibility. Spillers’s work not only anticipates Deleuze but also expands its reach by making explicit which sub- jects consistently live within the fold, an idea disability studies scholar Len- nard Davis echoes when he writes about the way ideas and subjects within the fold get erased.48 Yet, the fold as understood by Deleuze is not merely the place where history and aesthetics rest. It is mercurial and oppositional, since, as Hortense Spillers theorized prior to Deleuze, it is emblazoned on Black flesh. Fred Moten’s In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radi- cal Tradition (2003) conceptualizes the “break,” a methodological kissing cousin to the fold, as a racialized space that pinpoints how history, music, and race—as discursive concepts and material consequences—function as oppositional even as they are coextensive. Moten’s “break” signals the kind of rupture that creates and catastrophizes Blackness and madness, which he punctuates by using other words to describe the break like the cut, or the process of breaking, like invagination, or intussuscepted (all of which I borrow).

### Case

#### This debate is not a question of root cause – relegating one form of violence as the root cause of all other forms of violence facilitates erasure of mad black bodies

Pickens 19 – Therí:  Assistant Professor of English at Bates College. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American literatures and cultures, Disability Studies, philosophy, and literary theory Therí Alyce Pickens, 2019, *Black Madness :: Mad Blackness*, Duke University Press, p 2-3

Quite frankly, Kriegel’s essay is painful to read. The outdated language, the faulty analogy, the internalized ableism, the profound lack of community— all of these depict experiences of disability and Blackness detached from social and/or political context. In Kriegel’s essay, Blackness and Black social movements provide a loose social mooring. To write at the tail end of the 1960s in New York requires an engagement with Blackness as a matter of accuracy and rigor. So, Kriegel’s essay considers—as it should—the import of social positioning vis-à-vis Blackness. Thinking of the essay as an artifact, it clarifies how the Black power movements and civil rights gains of the 1950s and 1960s paved the way for disability activism around the Rehabilitation Act (1973), and, by extension, the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), among others. Frantz Fanon provides the essay’s central theoretical inter- locutor, which could potentially position the “like race” idea less as analogy, shifting the discursive terrain such that the essay centralizes the projected experiences of Blackness. It doesn’t. Fanon’s theories do prove useful, how- ever, in thinking about the social situations that difference creates and abets. Even though the essay references the world, it is not grounded in it. As a result, the analysis fails on a few registers. The “like race” analogies for dis- ability function as missed opportunities for nuance. There are only certain well-worn paths that logic can follow. First, the comparative element leaves Kriegel little choice but to think through the relationship in hierarchical terms where one identity is more or less disenfranchised than the other. In- deed, this vacillates for Kriegel depending on the situation (i.e., the disabled have less social options, but Blacks have been victimized more), which dem- onstrates a kind of sophistication in understanding that each identity cat- egory operates differently depending on social context. Yet, the analogy still facilitates racist erasure: despite the fact that Kriegel’s rehabilitation facility is in Harlem, he does not think through the life of the Black disabled per- son, nor does he speculate about the interiority of those around him. They are merely sullen. The “as” of the simile and, by extension, the “like” of the larger analogy elide the differences between these identities because rhetori- cally one replaces the other. Erasure then allows for a collapse of important distinctions in experience (i.e., difference between Kriegel’s European im- migrant mother and the Blacks in Harlem), and the depiction of Blackness 2 Introduction as an abject monolith incapable of providing its own analogy and method. Placing Fanon in this context only allows him to expose and explain Black- ness as a pathology of the West, rather than allow Fanon to function as a theoretician that dialogues with and about Blackness and disability (albeit one who makes certain problematic “like race” analogies himself). In its failure, Kriegel’s essay foregrounds why the “like race” analogies are missed opportunities: They potentially promise a useful engagement with Black- ness and disability because they grant that the two share social similarities. However, without addressing collective histories, theoretical impulses, and subjectivities with nuance, the analogy reinscribes the erasure it originally promises to rectify.