# Immaculate Heart Case Neg

### 1

#### Text: Space-faring nations including but not limited to the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation should comply to a Code of Conduct that prohibits harmful interference against human-made space objects and reduces practices that contribute to the weaponization of space.

#### Code of conduct solves weaponization – even if there are no enforcement procedures, the creation of international norms deters violators, a focus on actions solves all their verification concerns, and SSA creates transparency which makes it effective

Krepon, Hitchens, and Katz-Hyman 11 [February 2011, Michael Krepon is the President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Theresa Hitchens is Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Michael Katz-Hyman is a Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center on the Space Security and South Asia Projects “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of U.S. Spacepower”, Chapter 20 in “Towards a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays”, SM]

We view a code of conduct for responsible spacefaring nations as a necessary complement to a hedging strategy and as an essential element of a space posture that provides for the preservation and growth of U.S. space capabilities. A code of conduct makes sense because, with the increased utilization and importance of space for national and economic security, there is increased need for space operators and spacefaring nations to act responsibly. While some rules and treaty obligations exist, there are many gaps in coverage, including how best to avoid collisions and harmful interference, appropriate uses of lasers, and notifications related to potentially dangerous maneuvers. Because the increased utilization of space for security and economic purposes could lead to friction and diminished space assurance, it serves the interests of all responsible spacefaring nations to establish rules of the road to help prevent misunderstandings, catastrophic actions in space, and grievances. Another reason for pursuing rules of the road is that interactive hedging strategies could generate actions in space that diminish space security by nations concerned about the import of technology demonstrations and flight tests. We have therefore argued that hedging strategies are best accompanied by diplomatic initiatives to set norms that increase the safety and security of satellites vital to U.S. national and economic security. A code of conduct would serve these purposes. No codes of conduct or rules of the road are self-enforcing. Despite traffic laws, some drivers still speed. But having rules of the road reduces the incidence of misbehavior and facilitates action against reckless drivers. We acknowledge that there are no traffic courts for misbehavior in space, but we nonetheless argue that having agreed rules of the road in this domain will also reduce the incidence of misbehavior, while facilitating the isolation of the miscreant as well as the application of necessary remedies. Without rules, there are no rule breakers. Traditional arms control was devised to prevent arms racing between the superpowers. With the demise of the Soviet Union, concerns over arms racing have been replaced by concerns over proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Cooperative threat reduction initiatives have been designed to deal with contemporary threats. These arrangements have taken myriad forms, including rules of the road to prevent proliferation. Since the flight-testing, deployment, and use of weapons in space would increase security concerns, and since security concerns are drivers for proliferation, agreed rules of the road for space could supplement other codes of conduct that seek to prevent proliferation. Codes of conduct supplement, but differ from, traditional arms control remedies. Skeptics of new arms control treaties to prevent ASAT tests and space-based weapons argue that it would be difficult to arrive at an agreed definition of space weapons, and that even if this were possible, it would be hard to monitor compliance with treaty obligations. A code of conduct would focus on responsible and irresponsible activities in space that, in turn, would obviate the need for an agreed definition of space weapons. For example, a code of conduct might seek to prohibit the deliberate creation of persistent space debris. Again, our focus is on behavior, not an agreed definition of space weapons. Moreover, the deliberate creation of persistent space debris is very hard to hide and can be monitored by existing technical means. The United States has championed codes of conduct governing militaries operating in close proximity at sea in the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, as well as in the air and on the ground, in the 1989 Dangerous Military Practices Agreement. More recently, the United States has championed codes of conduct to reduce proliferation threats, including The Hague Code of Conduct (2002) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (2003). The 2001 Space Commission Report chaired by Donald Rumsfeld also endorsed rules of the road for space. 8 Codes of conduct typically take the form of executive agreements in the United States. They can begin as bilateral or multilateral compacts and they can expand with subsequent membership. Codes of conduct are either an alternative to, or a way station toward, more formal treaty-based constraints that often take extended effort. 9 Some rules of the road, formal agreements, and elements of a code of conduct already exist for space. The foundation document that defines the responsibilities of spacefaring nations is the Outer Space Treaty (1967). Other key international agreements and institutions include the Liability Convention and the International Telecommunications Union. There is growing sentiment among space operators to develop and implement several key elements of a code of conduct, including improved data sharing on space situational awareness; debris mitigation measures; and improved space traffic management to avoid unintentional interference or collisions in increasingly crowded orbits. A more comprehensive code of conduct might include elements such as notification and consultation measures; provisions for special caution areas; constraints against the harmful use of lasers; and measures that increase the safety, and reduce the likelihood, of damaging actions against manmade space objects, such as harmful interference against satellites that create persistent space debris. Key elements of a code of conduct are useful individually, but they are even more useful when drawn together as a coherent regime. Situational Awareness Space situational awareness (SSA)—the ability to monitor and understand the constantly changing environment in space—is one of the most important factors in ensuring the safety and security of all operational satellites and spacecraft. SSA provides individual actors with the ability to monitor the health of their own assets, as well as an awareness of the actions of others in space. Transparency measures can be particularly helpful in providing early warning of troubling developments and in dampening threat perceptions. One measure of U.S. spacepower and space prowess is America's unparalleled space situational awareness capabilities. Thus, the United States is in a position to become a leader in building space transparency, which is the foundation stone of norm setting and rules of the road in space.

### 2

#### The AFF’s portrayal of China is a reductionist view that arises from essentialist assumptions.

Pan 04—School of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University (Chengxin, 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political Vol. 29, No. 3, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” rmf)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist.ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United **S**tates. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat.

#### Their securitization logic enables and commits endless violence

Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian Reid, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25 2000 (1)

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A **nonlinear** economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

## Case

### Heg

#### Peak US unipolar heg has passed and isn’t coming back – domestic political polarization makes soft power impossible

Fukuyama, 8/18/2021 – senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Francis Fukuyama is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Mosbacher Director of its Centre on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. “Francis Fukuyama on the end of American hegemony”, Aug 18th 2021, <https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/08/18/francis-fukuyama-on-the-end-of-american-hegemony>, accessed 8/21/21, sb

THE HORRIFYING images of desperate Afghans trying to get out of Kabul this week after the United States-backed government collapsed have evoked a major juncture in world history, as America turned away from the world. The truth of the matter is that the end of the American era had come much earlier. The long-term sources of American weakness and decline are more domestic than international. The country will remain a great power for many years, but just how influential it will be depends on its ability to fix its internal problems, rather than its foreign policy. The peak period of American hegemony lasted less than 20 years, from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to around the financial crisis in 2007-09. The country was dominant in many domains of power back then—military, economic, political and cultural. The height of American hubris was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when it hoped to be able to remake not just Afghanistan (invaded two years before) and Iraq, but the whole of the Middle East. The country overestimated the effectiveness of military power to bring about fundamental political change, even as it under-estimated the impact of its free-market economic model on global finance. The decade ended with its troops bogged down in two counterinsurgency wars, and an international financial crisis that accentuated the huge inequalities that American-led globalisation had brought about. The degree of unipolarity in this period has been relatively rare in history, and the world has been reverting to a more normal state of multipolarity ever since, with China, Russia, India, Europe and other centres gaining power relative to America. Afghanistan’s ultimate effect on geopolitics is likely to be small. America survived an earlier, humiliating defeat when it withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, but it quickly regained its dominance within a little more than a decade, and today it works with Vietnam to curb Chinese expansionism. America still has many economic and cultural advantages that few other countries can match. The much bigger challenge to America’s global standing is domestic: American society is deeply polarised, and has found it difficult to find consensus on virtually anything. This polarisation started over conventional policy issues like taxes and abortion, but since then has metastasised into a bitter fight over cultural identity. The demand for recognition on the part of groups that feel they have been marginalised by elites was something I identified 30 years ago as an Achilles heel of modern democracy. Normally, a big external threat such as a global pandemic should be the occasion for citizens to rally around a common response; the covid-19 crisis served rather to deepen America's divisions, with social distancing, mask-wearing and now vaccinations being seen not as public-health measures but as political markers. These conflicts have spread to all aspects of life, from sports to the brands of consumer products that red and blue Americans buy. The civic identity that took pride in America as a multiracial democracy in the post-civil rights era has been replaced by warring narratives over 1619 versus 1776—that is, whether the country is founded on slavery or the fight for freedom. This conflict extends to the separate realities each side believes it sees, realities in which the election in November 2020 was either one of the fairest in American history or else a massive fraud leading to an illegitimate presidency. Throughout the cold war and into the early 2000s, there was a strong elite consensus in America in favour of maintaining a leadership position in world politics. The grinding and seemingly endless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq soured many Americans not just on difficult places like the Middle East, but international involvement generally. Polarisation has affected foreign policy directly. During the Obama years, Republicans took a hawkish stance and castigated the Democrats for the Russian “reset” and alleged naïveté regarding President Putin. Former President Trump turned the tables by openly embracing Mr Putin, and today roughly half of Republicans believe that the Democrats constitute a bigger threat to the American way of life than does Russia. A conservative television-news anchor, Tucker Carlson, travelled to Budapest to celebrate Hungary’s authoritarian prime minister, Viktor Orban; “owning the libs” (ie, antagonising the left, a catch-phrase of the right) was more important than standing up for democratic values. There is more apparent consensus regarding China: both Republicans and Democrats agree it is a threat to democratic values. But this only carries America so far. A far greater test for American foreign policy than Afghanistan will be Taiwan, if it comes under direct Chinese attack. Will the United States be willing to sacrifice its sons and daughters on behalf of that island’s independence? Or indeed, would the United States risk military conflict with Russia should the latter invade Ukraine? These are serious questions with no easy answers, but a reasoned debate about American national interest will probably be conducted primarily through the lens of how it affects the partisan struggle. Polarisation has already damaged America’s global influence, well short of future tests like these. That influence depended on what Joseph Nye, a foreign-policy scholar, labelled “soft power”, that is, the attractiveness of American institutions and society to people around the world. That appeal has been greatly diminished: it is hard for anyone to say that American democratic institutions have been working well in recent years, or that any country should imitate America’s political tribalism and dysfunction. The hallmark of a mature democracy is the ability to carry out peaceful transfers of power following elections, a test the country failed spectacularly on January 6th. The biggest policy debacle by President Joe Biden’s administration in its seven months in office has been its failure to plan adequately for the rapid collapse of Afghanistan. However unseemly that was, it doesn’t speak to the wisdom of the underlying decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, which may in the end prove to be the right one. Mr Biden has suggested that withdrawal was necessary in order to focus on meeting the bigger challenges from Russia and China down the road. I hope he is serious about this. Barack Obama was never successful in making a “pivot” to Asia because America remained focused on counterinsurgency in the Middle East. The current administration needs to redeploy both resources and the attention of policymakers from elsewhere in order to deter geopolitical rivals and to engage with allies. The United States is not likely to regain its earlier hegemonic status, nor should it aspire to. What it can hope for is to sustain, with like-minded countries, a world order friendly to democratic values. Whether it can do this will depend not on short-term actions in Kabul, but on recovering a sense of national identity and purpose at home.

#### US military power causes war and conflict in the Middle East – and makes the U.S. less safe

Parsi, 8/13/2021 – Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft Executive Vice President

Trita Parsi is an award-winning author and the 2010 recipient of the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. He is the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an expert on U.S.-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign policy, and the geopolitics of the Middle East. “U.S. Military Domination Has Been Disastrous for the Middle East—And America”, National Interest, August 13, 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-military-domination-has-been-disastrous-middle-east%E2%80%94and-america-191808>, accessed 8/15/21, sb

U.S. military domination of the Middle East has been disastrous for the Middle East as well as for the United States itself. It’s not just that the strategy hasn’t worked, it has actually made the United States less safe. To begin withdrawing from the region militarily is not only the right decision; it is long overdue.

The track record of Pax Americana in the Middle East is crystal clear: The region suffered from five armed conflicts in 1998. By 2019, that number had grown to twenty-two. Obviously, these conflicts are not necessarily the fault of the United States, but as the de facto regional hegemon, Washington has designated itself responsible for the region’s stability. By its own misguided preference, the buck stops with the United States. (And not to be discounted, many of these conflicts are spillovers from the Iraq war, which certainly was the fault of the United States.)

But the problem goes deeper than just an erroneous strategy. Washington has long been confused about what its actual interests in the Middle East are. The average Washington foreign policy hand will give a long list of interests—from protecting Israel to safeguarding the region’s energy resources to “standing with our allies”—without the ability to distinguish between the ones justifying the use of military force and the ones that do not. Moreover, the all-encompassing interest of “standing by our allies” renders any discussion about U.S. security interests meaningless, as the United States effectively subordinates its own vaguely defined interests to those of its many (often reckless) security partners.

Hence, the rivals of our partners become our enemies, regardless of whether they actually pose a threat to America’s real interests. As our enemies-by-association accrue, the United States ends up in more wars and conflicts, few of which are necessary to enhance American security though taxing to the American people and the troops nevertheless. Along the way, the United States sets up more military bases in the region, sells more weapons to the region’s authoritarian states, and commits itself to provide security for more countries, all the while making U.S. troops in the Middle East sitting ducks for the growing list of regional entities with grievances against us—most of which are rooted in the United States’ unwanted military presence in the region in the first place.

America’s core interests in the region—the ones that could warrant the use of military force—are limited. Protect the United States from attack and facilitate the free flow of global commerce. By implication, this means that the United States needs to ensure that the region does not fall under the hegemony of a hostile power and that the Strait of Hormuz is kept open. As Eugene Gholz demonstrated in a recent Quincy Paper, neither of these strategic objectives necessitate permanent military bases in the region, let alone U.S. hegemony over the Middle East.

But it gets worse: The presence of U.S. forces in the region and our willingness to get entangled in our partners’ regional disputes with almost no questions asked have disincentivized countries benefiting from the American security umbrella to resolve their conflicts diplomatically. Relying on the United States to resolve their problems more or less cost-free was rationally deemed a better choice than engaging in tricky give-and-take diplomacy that invariably would entail costly compromises. The latter will only be deemed the optimal option once these partners can no longer hide behind U.S. military might.

In this sense, the U.S. military presence has stood in the way of indigenous efforts to resolve regional conflicts, much to the detriment of regional stability. If Afghanistan proves the first step in a broader U.S. withdrawal, the impetus will fall on regional states to shoulder the burden of regional stability themselves. The United States can—and should—support diplomatic efforts to that end. But that is the job of diplomats, not soldiers.

#### US hegemony is in terminal decay – Afghanistan proves

Hedges, 7/28/2021 – Former NYT Middle Each Bureau Chief

Chris Hedges is the former Middle East bureau chief of the New York Times, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and a columnist at Scheerpost. He is the author of several books, including "America: The Farewell Tour," "American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America" and "War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning." “Debacle in Afghanistan: Likely Taliban victory signals the collapse of American empire”, PUBLISHED JULY 28, 2021 5:40AM (EDT), <https://www.salon.com/2021/07/28/debacle-in-afghanistan-taliban-victory/>, accessed 8/13/2021, sb

The debacle in Afghanistan, which will unravel into chaos with lightning speed over the next few weeks and ensure the return of the Taliban to power, is one more signpost of the end of the American empire. The two decades of combat, the one trillion dollars we spent, the 100,000 troops deployed to subdue Afghanistan, the high-tech gadgets, artificial intelligence, cyber-warfare, Reaper drones armed with Hellfire missiles and GBU-30 bombs and the Global Hawk drones with high-resolution cameras, Special Operations Command composed of elite Rangers, SEALs and air commandos, black sites, torture, electronic surveillance, satellites, attack aircraft, mercenary armies, infusions of millions of dollars to buy off and bribe the local elites and train an Afghan army of 350,000 that has never exhibited the will to fight, failed to defeat a guerrilla army of 60,000 that funded itself through opium production and extortion in one of the poorest countries on earth. Like any empire in terminal decay, no one will be held accountable for the debacle or for the other debacles in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen or anywhere else. Not the generals. Not the politicians. Not the CIA and intelligence agencies. Not the diplomats. Not the obsequious courtiers in the press who serve as cheerleaders for war. Not the compliant academics and area specialists. Not the defense industry. Empires at the end are collective suicide machines. The military becomes in late empire unmanageable, unaccountable and endlessly self-perpetuating, no matter how many fiascos, blunders and defeats it visits upon the carcass of the nation, or how much money it plunders, impoverishing the citizenry and leaving governing institutions and the physical infrastructure decayed. The human tragedy — at least 801,000 people have been killed by direct war violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan, and 37 million have been displaced in and from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, Libya and Syria, according to the Watson Institute at Brown University — is reduced to a neglected footnote. Nearly all the roughly 70 empires during the last 4,000 years, including the Greek, Roman, Chinese, Ottoman, Hapsburg, imperial German, imperial Japanese, British, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Soviet empires, collapsed in the same orgy of military folly. The Roman Republic, at its height, only lasted two centuries. We are set to disintegrate in roughly the same time. This is why, at the start of World War I in Germany, Karl Liebknecht called the German military, which imprisoned and later assassinated him, "the enemy from within." Mark Twain, who was a fierce opponent of the efforts to plant the seeds of empire in Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, wrote an imagined history of America in the 20th century where its "lust for conquest" had destroyed "the Great Republic … [because] trampling upon the helpless abroad had taught her, by a natural process, to endure with apathy the like at home; multitudes who had applauded the crushing of other people's liberties, lived to suffer for their mistake." Twain knew that foreign occupations, designed to enrich the ruling elites, use occupied populations as laboratory rats to perfect techniques of control that soon migrate back to the homeland. It was the brutal colonial policing practices in the Philippines, which included a vast spy network along with routine beatings, torture and executions, that became the model for centralized domestic policing and intelligence gathering in the United States. Israel's arms, surveillance and drone industries test their products on the Palestinians. It is one of the dark ironies that it was the American empire, led by Jimmy Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, that spawned the mess in Afghanistan. Brzezinski oversaw a multibillion-dollar CIA covert operation to arm, train and equip the Taliban to fight the Soviets. This clandestine effort sidelined the secular, democratic opposition and assured the ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan, along with the spread of its radical Islam into Soviet Central Asia, once Soviet forces withdrew. The American empire would, years later, find itself desperately trying to destroy its own creation. In April 2017, in a classic example of this kind of absurd blowback, the United States dropped the "mother of all bombs" — the most powerful conventional bomb in the American arsenal — on an Islamic State cave complex in Afghanistan that the CIA had invested millions in building and fortifying. The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 were not an existential threat to the United States. They were not politically significant. They did not disrupt the balance of global power. They were not an act of war. They were acts of nihilistic terror. The only way to fight terrorists is to isolate them within their own societies. I was in the Middle East for The New York Times after the attacks. Most of the Muslim world was appalled and revolted at the crimes against humanity that had been carried out in the name of Islam. If we had the courage to be vulnerable, to grasp that this was an intelligence war, not a conventional war, we would be far safer and secure today. These wars in the shadows, as the Israelis illustrated when they tracked down the assassins of their athletes in the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, take months, even years of work. But the attacks gave the ruling elites, lusting for control of the Middle East, and especially of Iraq, which had nothing to do with the attacks, the excuse to carry out the greatest strategic blunder in American history — the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The architects of the war, including then-Sen. Joe Biden, knew little about the countries being invaded, did not grasp the limits of industrial and technocratic war or the inevitable blowback that would see the United States reviled throughout the Muslim world. They believed they could implant client regimes by force throughout the region, use the oil revenues in Iraq — since the war in Afghanistan would be over in a matter of weeks — to cover the cost of reconstruction and magically restore American global hegemony. It did the opposite. Invading Iraq and Afghanistan, dropping iron fragmentation bombs on villages and towns, kidnapping, torturing and imprisoning tens of thousands of people, using drones to sow terror from the skies, resurrected the discredited radical jihadists and was a potent recruiting tool in the fight against U.S. and NATO forces. We were the best thing that ever happened to the Taliban and al-Qaida. There was little objection within the power structures to these invasions. The congressional vote was 518-1 in favor of empowering President George W. Bush to launch a war, with Rep. Barbara Lee being the lone dissenter. Those of us who spoke out against the idiocy of the looming bloodlust were slandered, denied media platforms and cast into the wilderness, where most of us remain. Those who sold us the war kept their megaphones, a reward for their service to empire and the military-industrial complex. It did not matter how cynical or foolish they were. Historians call the self-defeating military adventurism of late empires "micro-militarism." During the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) the Athenians invaded Sicily, suffering the loss of 200 ships and thousands of soldiers and triggering revolts throughout the empire. Britain attacked Egypt in 1956 in a dispute over the nationalization of the Suez Canal and was humiliated when it had to withdraw its forces, bolstering the status of Arab nationalists such as Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. "While rising empires are often judicious, even rational in their application of armed force for conquest and control of overseas dominions, fading empires are inclined to ill-considered displays of power, dreaming of bold military masterstrokes that would somehow recoup lost prestige and power," historian Alfred McCoy writes in "In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power." "Often irrational even from an imperial point of view, these micromilitary operations can yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the process already under way." The death blow to the American empire will, as McCoy writes, be the loss of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. This loss will plunge the United States into a crippling and prolonged depression. It will force a massive contraction of the global military footprint. The ugly, squalid face of empire, with the loss of the dollar as the reserve currency, will become familiar at home. The bleak economic landscape, with its decay and hopelessness, will accelerate an array of violent and self-destructive pathologies including mass shootings, hate crimes, opioid and heroin overdoses, morbid obesity, suicides, gambling and alcoholism. The state will increasingly dispense with the fiction of the rule of law to rely exclusively on militarized police, essentially internal armies of occupation, and the prisons and jails, which already hold 25 percent of the world's prisoners although the United States represents less than 5 percent of the global population. Our demise will probably come more swiftly than we imagine. When revenues shrink or collapse, McCoy points out, empires become "brittle." An economy heavily dependent on massive government subsidies to produce primarily weapons and munitions, as well as fund military adventurism, will go into a tailspin with a heavily depreciated dollar, falling to perhaps a third of its former value. Prices will dramatically rise because of the steep increase in the cost of imports. Wages in real terms will decline. The devaluation of Treasury bonds will make paying for our massive deficits onerous, perhaps impossible. The unemployment level will climb to Depression-era levels. Social assistance programs, because of a contracting budget, will be sharply curtailed or eliminated. This dystopian world will fuel the rage and hyper-nationalism that put Donald Trump in the White House. It will spawn an authoritarian state to keep order and, I expect, a Christianized fascism. The tools of control on the outer reaches of empire, already part of our existence, will become ubiquitous. The wholesale surveillance, the abolition of basic civil liberties, militarized police authorized to use indiscriminate lethal force, the use of drones and satellites to keep us monitored and fearful, along with the censorship of the press and social media, familiar to Iraqis or Afghans, will define America. We are not the first empire to suffer this fate. It is a familiar ending. Imperialism and militarism are poisons that eradicate the separation of powers designed to prevent tyranny, and extinguish democracy. If those who orchestrated these crimes are not held accountable, and this means organizing sustained mass resistance, we will pay the price, and we may pay it soon, for their hubris and greed.

#### US unipolar global military hegemony a failing, self-fulfilling prophecy – kills millions – endless failing warfighting

Bacevich, 8/6/2021 – Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Andrew J. Bacevich is president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “We Are Not an Indispensable Nation”, AUGUST 6, 2021, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/united-states-hegemony/>, accessed 8/15/21, sb

The 30-year interregnum of US global hegemony,” writes David Bromwich in the journal Raritan, “has been exposed as a fraud, a decoy, a cheat, [and] a sell.” Today, he continues, “the armies of the cheated are struggling to find the word for something that happened and happened wrong.”

In fact, the armies of the cheated know exactly what happened, even if they haven’t yet settled on precisely the right term to describe the disaster that has befallen this nation.

What happened was this: Shortly after the end of the Cold War, virtually the entire American foreign-policy establishment succumbed to a monumentally self-destructive ideological fever.

Call it INS, shorthand for Indispensable Nation Syndrome. Like Covid-19, INS exacts a painful toll of victims. Unlike Covid, we await the vaccine that can prevent its spread. We know that preexisting medical conditions can increase a person’s susceptibility to the coronavirus. The preexisting condition that increases someone’s vulnerability to INS is the worship of power.

Back in 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright not only identified INS, but also captured its essence. Appearing on national TV, she famously declared, “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.”

Now, allow me to be blunt: This is simply not true. It’s malarkey, hogwash, bunkum, and baloney. Bullshit, in short.

The United States does not see further into the future than Ireland, Indonesia, or any other country, regardless of how ancient or freshly minted it may be. Albright’s assertion was then and is now no more worthy of being taken seriously than Donald Trump’s claim that the “deep state” engineered the coronavirus pandemic. Also bullshit.

Some of us (but by no means all Americans) have long since concluded that Trump was and remains a congenital liar. To charge Albright with lying, however, somehow rates as bad form, impolite, even rude. She is, after all, a distinguished former official and the recipient of many honors.

Trump’s lies have made him persona non grata in polite society. Albright has not suffered a similar fate. And to be fair, Albright herself is not solely or even mainly responsible for the havoc that INS has caused. While the former secretary of state promoted the syndrome in notably expansive language, the substance of her remark was anything but novel. She was merely reiterating what, in Washington, still passes for a self-evident truism: America must lead. No conceivable alternative exists. Leadership implies responsibilities and, by extension, confers prerogatives. Put crudely—more crudely than Albright would have expressed it to a television audience—we make the rules.

More specifically, Albright was alluding to a particular prerogative that a succession of post-Cold War presidents, including Donald Trump and now Joe Biden, have exercised. Our political leaders routinely authorize the elimination, with extreme prejudice, of persons unwilling to acknowledge our indispensability.

Should Irish or Indonesian leaders assert such a prerogative, American officials would roundly condemn them. Indeed, when Russia’s president and the crown prince of Saudi Arabia each had the temerity to bump off an opponent, US officials (in the former case) and the American media (in the latter case) professed profound shock. How could such things be permitted to occur in a civilized world? When an American president does such things, however, it’s simply part of the job description.

THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT!

Now, allow me to acknowledge the allure of exercising privileges. I once flew on a private jet—very cool, indeed.

Today, however, Bromwich’s armies of the cheated have good reason to feel cheated. Their disappointment is not without justification. The bullshit has lost its mojo. Since the promulgation of the Albright Doctrine, US forces have bombed, invaded, and occupied various countries across the Greater Middle East and Africa with elan. They’ve killed lots of people, unsettling millions more. And our divided, dysfunctional country is the poorer for it, as the cheated themselves have belatedly discovered.

Blame Donald Trump for that division and dysfunction? Not me. I hold the militant purveyors of INS principally responsible. However contemptible, Trump was little more than an accessory after the fact.

To understand how we got here, recall the narrative that ostensibly validates our indispensability. It consists of sequential binaries, pitting freedom and democracy against all manner of evils. In World War I, we fought militarism; in World War II, we destroyed fascism; during the Cold War, we resisted and “contained” communism. And after 9/11, of course, came the Global War on Terrorism, now approaching its 20th anniversary.

Good versus evil, us against them, over and over again. That recurring theme of American statecraft has endowed INS with its historical context.

Today, in Washington, a foreign-policy establishment afflicted with rigor mortis reflexively reverts to the logic of 1917, 1941, 1947, and 2001, even though those past binaries are about as instructive today as the religious conflicts touched off by the Protestant Reformation of the 1500s.

Confronting evil is no longer the name of the game. Understanding the game’s actual nature, however, would require jettisoning a past that purportedly illuminates but actually imprisons Americans in an ongoing disaster.

Today, race dominates the national conversation. And few Americans would deny that we have a race problem. But the United States also has a war problem. And just about no one is keen to talk about that problem.

More specifically, we actually have three problems with war.

Our first is that we have too many of them. Our second is that our wars drag on way too long and cost way too much. Our third is that they lack purpose: When our wars do eventually more or less end, America’s declared political objectives all too often remain unmet. US forces don’t necessarily suffer defeat. They merely fail. For proof, look no further than the conduct and outcomes of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Two trips to the plate. Two whiffs. How could that have happened? In Washington, the question not only goes unanswered but totally unasked, which, of course, leaves open the possibility of yet another similar failure in the future.

As a long-ago soldier of no particular distinction, I’m mystified at the apparent absence of curiosity regarding the inability of the world’s most generously supported military to accomplish its assigned missions. If the January 6th assault on the Capitol deserves a thorough investigation—as surely it does—then how can this nation pass over a succession of failed wars as if they were mere annoyances? Shouldn’t our collective commitment to “supporting the troops” include a modicum of curiosity about why they have been so badly misused, even if the resulting inquiry should prove embarrassing to senior civilian and military officials?

Liberal media outlets characterize Trump’s claim to have won the 2020 election as the Big Lie, as indeed it is. But it’s hardly the only one. Indispensable Nation Syndrome, along with the militarism that it’s spawned in this century, should certainly qualify as—at the very least—the Other Big Lie. Curbing Washington’s susceptibility to INS requires acknowledging that the proximate challenges facing this country are in no way amenable to even the most creative military solutions. Giving yet more taxpayer dollars to the Pentagon helps sustain the military-industrial complex, but otherwise solves nothing.

#### Trump marks the end of the hegemonic cycle – the affs call for hegemony ensures violent transition wars and failure of global cooperation.

Raffaele Marchetti 17 –Senior assistant professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the School of Government of LUISS, “End of the American hegemonic cycle,” February 14, 2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/raffaele-marchetti/end-of-american-hegemonic-cycle>

Trump’s election marks the end of the long phase of American world hegemony. Despite the electoral slogan “Make America Great Again” and the great expectations this may have generated, his presidency will presumably be characterized by an overall retrenchment. Many different interpretations have been provided on the reasons of Trump’s success ranging from populist framing to FBI support. Contrary to the mainstream debate, I see a more fundamental reason underpinning his victory: the changed costs/benefits balance in the US role in the world. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that at some point the hegemon will start to decline due to the increased costs of the management of the system which outbalance the benefits the hegemon gains out of it. The costs of the management of the system have in fact been accumulating in the last 4 presidencies. During the Bush administrations, security costs due to the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have, among other damage, impacted negatively on the US government. Equally, during the Obama presidencies costs due to economic stimuli have increased the overall debt of the country. As predicted by hegemonic theory, we finally come to a point in which the costs became too heavy for the citizens, or rather their perception of this becomes more evident, so that they start to protest and demand a change. This was intercepted by Trump much more than by Clinton, with Trump stepping back to decrease the costs of international projection. So-called “imperial overstretch”, formed much earlier, led Trump’s electorate to seek less international costs (and possibly, but less likely, more domestic benefits). Hence, the promised withdrawal from a number of Free Trade Agreements, the discussion of the terms of NATO participation, cancellation of the environmental deals etc. From this perspective Trump’s election has to do with a much longer trend of international order rather than the specific time-lapse of the electoral campaign, a trend of dis-engagement that had already begun during the Obama administration and will now be more clearly visible with Trump. The system in which we have been living in the last 70 years was created in large part by the US leadership. The UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and WTO are all institutional arrangements that have been strongly promoted by the post WWII hegemon and that have been preserved in life thanks to continuous support by the USA. Now all of this is put into question by the resistance of the newly elected president to engage in and with these multilateral organizations. Trump will most likely have a more unpredictable, possibly turbulent behaviour vis a vis all of these institutions and this will lead to their transformation and perhaps for some, to their marginalization. Other significant elements in this jigsaw puzzle have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. It is because of global transformation in production chains, the relocation of multinational corporation abroad coupled with the possibility of (re-)importing goods, and the subsequent loss of jobs that a component of the middle class has been badly affected by unemployment. But it is also thanks to globalization that China is rising fast and challenging the US leadership in economic, but also increasingly in political and military terms. It is clear by now that the policy choice for globalization taken by the US leadership in the ‘80s (republican) and ‘90s (democratic) was beneficial only at the beginning, but later turned out to be detrimental to the power position of the USA in the world economy. It is widely recognised that India and especially China are the real winners in the game of globalization, hence closing the gap with the west. Russia is an additional element in this calculation. This new would-be multipolar system, deprived of the overall western master plan, is left to pure bargaining, pure transactionalism played with ad hoc games, which is very much in line with Trump’s overall attitude to socio-economic engagement. And yet, this might have a de-polarizing effect, a de-escalating consequence in terms of the current world tensions that have grown in the last few years. Here I am thinking especially of the west-Russia split. Without a hegemonic power pushing for a specific world order, a more balanced system might emerge. We might end up with a Trump presidency that has polarizing effects domestically and depolarizing effects internationally. The line of march is clear: either new competition based on multipolar rivalry which might possibly escalate into conflicts, or the opening of new channels for dialogue, might lead to a foundational phase in which innovative rules of the international games are written by western and non-western powers together. It will be up to Trump and the other leaders to steer the way and to take a decision on which way to go.

#### Hegemony is unsustainable – unipolarity is over – China and Russia rise – GDP, military

**Allison 20 – Harvard Kennedy School of Government Professor**

Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence?fa_package=1125551> \*we read blue

Now, however, that **hegemony is fading,** and Washington has awakened to what it calls “**a new era of great-power competition,**” with China and Russia increasingly using their power to assert interests and values that often conflict with those of the United States. But American policymakers and analysts are still struggling to come to grips with what this new era means for the U.S. role in the world. Going forward, that role will not only be different; it will also be significantly diminished. While leaders will continue announcing grand ambitions, diminished means will mean diminished results. **Unipolarity is over**, and with it the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order. For the United States, that will require accepting the reality that there are spheres of influence in the world today—and that not all of them are American spheres. THE WORLD AS IT WAS Before making pronouncements about the new rules of geopolitics, post–Cold War U.S. secretaries of state should have looked back to the final months of World War II, when U.S. policymakers were similarly resistant to accepting a world in which spheres of influence remained a central feature of geopolitics. Competing views on the issue lay at the core of a debate between two top Soviet experts in the U.S. government. On February 4, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta. At Roosevelt’s side was his translator and principal adviser on the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen. Just that morning, Bohlen had opened an urgent private missive from his close colleague George Kennan in Moscow. Kennan correctly forecast that the Soviet Union would attempt to maintain control of as much of Europe as it could. The question was what the United States should do about that. Kennan asked, “Why could we not make a decent and definitive compromise with it—divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence—keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?” Bohlen was appalled. “Utterly impossible,” he erupted in response. “Foreign policy of that kind cannot be made in a democracy.” Reflecting on this moment later, Bohlen explained: “The American people, who had fought a long, hard war, deserved at least an attempt to work out a better world.” Between 1945 and 1947, Bohlen worked alongside other leading figures in the Roosevelt and then the Truman administration to realize their “one world” vision, in which the allies who had fought together to defeat the Nazis would remain allied in creating a new global order. But he ultimately resigned himself to the world as it was—in short, Kennan had been right. “Instead of unity among the great powers on the major issues of world reconstruction—both political and economic—after the war, there is complete disunity between the Soviet Union and the satellites on one side and the rest of the world on the other,” Bohlen acknowledged in the summer of 1947 in a memo to Secretary of State George Marshall. “There are, in short, two worlds instead of one.” When he finally came to share Kennan’s diagnosis, Bohlen did not shrink from the implications. His memo to Marshall concluded: Faced with this disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the United States in the interest of its own well-being and security and those of the free non-Soviet world must . . . draw [the non-Soviet world] closer together politically, economically, financially, and, in the last analysis, militarily in order to be in a position to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area. This conviction became a pillar of the United States’ strategy for the coming decades, and it rested on the acceptance of spheres of influence. There would be areas that would be subjected to Soviet domination, with often terrible consequences, but the best course for the United States was to bolster those powers on the periphery of this Soviet sphere while reinforcing the strength and unity of its own sphere. For the four decades that followed, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the great-power competition that we know as the Cold War. In the Soviet sphere, the captive nations of Eastern Europe remained under the boot of an “evil empire.” American presidents faced repeated crises in which they had to choose between sending troops into Soviet-dominated nations to support freedom fighters seeking to exercise rights that the American creed declares universal and standing by as those freedom fighters were slaughtered or suppressed. Without exception, U.S. presidents chose to watch instead of intervene: consider Dwight Eisenhower when Hungarians rose up in 1956 and Lyndon Johnson during the Prague Spring of 1968 (or, after the Cold War, George W. Bush when Russian troops attacked Georgia in 2008 and Barack Obama when Russian special forces seized Crimea). Why? Each had internalized an unacceptable yet undeniable truth: that, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan once explained in a joint statement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” This bit of Cold War history should serve as a reminder: a nation that is simultaneously idealistic and realistic will always struggle to reconcile rationales and rationalizations of purpose, on the one hand, with realities of power, on the other. The result, in the foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria’s apt summary, has been “the rhetoric of transformation but the reality of accommodation.” Even at the height of U.S. power, accommodation meant accepting the ugly fact of a Soviet sphere of influence. TECTONIC SHIFTS After nearly half a century of competition, when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disappeared, in 1991, the United States was left economically, militarily, and geopolitically dominant. In the first two decades of the post–Cold War era, U.S. defense spending exceeded the defense budgets of the next ten nations combined (five of them U.S. treaty allies). Operationally, that meant that, as Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s 2018 National Defense Strategy put it, the United States “enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.” The United States and its allies could welcome new members into NATO, applying to them its Article 5 security guarantee, without thinking about the risks, since the alliance faced no real threat. In that world, strategy in essence consisted of overwhelming challenges with resources. But that was then. The **tectonic shift in the balance of power** that occurred in the first two decades of the twenty-first century was as dramatic as any shift the United States has witnessed over an equivalent period in its 244 years. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, then the president of Czechoslovakia, it has happened so fast, we have not yet had time to be astonished. The U.S. share of global GDP—nearly one-half in 1950—has gone from one-quarter in 1991 to one-seventh today. (Although GDP is not everything, it does form the substructure of power in relations among nations.) And as the United States’ relative power has declined, the menu of feasible options for policymakers has shrunk. Consider, for example, the U.S. response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. With currency reserves of almost $3 trillion, China can invest $1.3 trillion in infrastructure linking most of Eurasia to a China-centered order. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would increase its own investments in the Indo-Pacific in response, he was able to come up with just $113 million in new investments. China has, of course, been the chief beneficiary of this transformation. In the past generation, its GDP has soared: from 20 percent of the U.S. level in 1991 to 120 percent today (measured by purchasing power parity, the metric that both the CIA and the International Monetary Fund use to compare national economies). Although China faces many internal challenges, there are more reasons to expect this basic economic trend to continue than to bet that it will stop soon. With four times as many citizens as the United States, and if Chinese workers become as productive as Portuguese workers are today (that is, around half as productive as Americans), **China will see its GDP rise to double that of the United States.** In Asia, the economic balance of power has tilted especially dramatically in China’s favor. As the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer, China is the top trading partner of every other major East Asian country, including U.S. allies. (And as an aggressive practitioner of economic statecraft, Beijing does not hesitate to use the leverage this provides, squeezing countries such as the Philippines and South Korea when they resist Chinese demands.) Globally, China is also rapidly becoming a peer competitor of the United States in advanced technologies. Today, of the 20 largest information technology companies, nine are Chinese. Four years ago, when Google, the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI), the most significant advanced technology, assessed its competition, Chinese companies ranked alongside European companies. Now, that state of affairs is barely visible in the rearview mirror: Chinese companies lead in many areas of applied AI, including surveillance, facial and voice recognition, and financial technology. China’s military spending and capabilities have surged, as well. A quarter century ago, its defense budget was one-25th that of the United States; now, it is one-third and on a path to parity. And whereas the U.S. defense budget is spread across global commitments, many of them in Europe and the Middle East, China’s budget is focused on East Asia. Accordingly, in specific military scenarios involving a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, China may have already taken the lead. Short of actual war, the best tests of relative military capabilities are war games. In 2019, Robert Work, a former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, and David Ochmanek, one of the Defense Department’s key defense planners, offered a public summary of the results from a series of classified recent war games. Their bottom line, in Ochmanek’s words: “When we fight Russia and China, ‘blue’ [the United States] gets its ass handed to it.” As The New York Times summarized, “In 18 of the last 18 Pentagon war games involving China in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. lost.” Russia is a different matter. Whatever President Vladimir Putin might want, Russia will never again be his father’s Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the resulting Russian state was left with less than half the GDP and half the population and saw its borders rolled back to the days before Catherine the Great. Yet Russia remains a nuclear superpower with an arsenal that is functionally equivalent to that of the United States; it has a defense industry that produces weapons the world is eager to buy (as India and Turkey have demonstrated in the past year); and it boasts military forces that can fight and win—as they have demonstrated repeatedly in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. On a continent where most of the other nations imagine that war has become obsolete, and maintain military forces more for ceremonial than combat operations, military prowess may now be Russia’s major comparative advantage. BACK TO BASICS The claim that spheres of influence had been consigned to the dustbin of history assumed that other nations would simply take their assigned places in a U.S.-led order. In retrospect, **that assumption seems worse than naive.** Yet because many U.S. analysts and policymakers still cling to images of China and Russia formed during this bygone era, their views about what the United States should and should not do continues to reflect a world that has vanished.

#### Pursing heg locks in overstretch and a Russia-China axis.

Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079>)

There is little sign of active “splitting” currently, however. (A notable exception is recent collaboration with Beijing over North Korea’s nuclear program, even if it is marred by tension and distrust.) Rather, the United States is encouraging the perception of a common enemy. By militarily positioning itself within striking distance of Russia and China through a semi-encircling presence in eastern Europe and north-east Asia, expanding alliances, entertaining further expansion, ramping up freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, reviving the pursuit of an antiballistic missile shield, establishing a reputation as a sponsor of “color revolutions” and as an overthrower of regimes, Washington helps draw Beijing and Moscow closer together into a balancing coalition. A nascent Russia-China alliance is suggested by Russia’s own interagency inquiry into the possibility, the frequency of Putin-Xi contact, deliberate tightening of economic interaction, and overt displays and declarations of close military ties through joint exercises and arms sales.24

It does not have to be this way. The United States has a geopolitical advantage—its distant location. Most powers, most of the time, are more concerned by the potential threat of other nearby land powers than distant sea powers.25Based in the Western hemisphere, the United States has less of a compelling security interest in adversaries ’backyards, allowing Washington the choice of adopting a more distant pose. Russia and China, by contrast, are neighbors so cannot withdraw, both are primarily continental land-based military powers, and historically such proximity can exacerbate rivalries and mutual fears. Sino-Russian antagonism remains a built-in possibility. Only under the right conditions, though, can the rivalries again grow. This is not a plea for a trilateral realignment whereby one state agrees to be the United States’ “geopolitical hammer” and teams up with Washington to contain the other. Rather, it is to suggest that more American restraint in one theater could make space for Russia-China frictions to take effect in another.

This geopolitical principle will prove controversial. The bipartisan consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume that only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice. Policymakers assume that the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power, or to apply enough power efficiently enough. They then call for the allocation of more resources and their smarter use in order to sustain U.S. dominance. The congressionally-mandated2018National Defense Strategy Commission report, appointed to make recommendations, is a case in point. It takes dominance as the obvious U.S. national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, U.S. military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars has eroded, due tor-educed defense expenditure, and advises that it spend more while cutting entitlements.26On this logic, a defense budget that is already10 times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s is not enough, for U.S. grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to achieve unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is not considered.

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expend-able for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### No primacy impact

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability. Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend. Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world. Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46 Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average. Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Liberal International Order is structurally UNsustainable – long term, LIO produces and creates anti-liberalism

Khan, 8/7/2021 – Integral University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh Assistant Professor

Guest Author, Suhail Ahmad Khan, Dr. Suhail Ahmad Khan is working as Assistant Professor at Integral University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India. Mr. Khan academic and research interest lies in Marketing, IT, Agribusiness and Food Policy. “Pitfalls of the Liberal International Order”, Kashmir Observer, August 7, 2021, <https://kashmirobserver.net/2021/08/07/pitfalls-of-the-liberal-international-order/>, accessed 8/15/21, sb

WHEN the Soviet Union was on the brink of disintegration, political scientist Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history and victory of liberalism. In his famous essay, The End of History?, he argued, “ what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold war or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” It was an expansive claim to make as the interwar period (1919-1939) had already revealed the shortcomings of liberal internationalism. During that period, liberal internationalism had led to the rise of Germany and subsequently to the Second World War. Three decades have passed since Fukuyama declared the victory of liberalism, and it is safe to say that he was wrong. Today, the liberal international order is in retreat due to the results it has produced.

Several core liberal values inform the liberal international order, and prominent among them are (1) individual rights, (2) free trade, and (3) institutionalism. These three values are contingent on each other since individual rights are essential for free trade, and institutions or rules are necessary to safeguard both individual rights and liberal markets. Under the liberal international order, it is expected that more and more countries will comply with standard international rules, and in the long run, will adopt twin political concepts of liberalism and democracy. Thus, the aim is to increase the number of liberal democracies in the international sphere. Liberal democracy, according to American journalist Fareed Zakaria is “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property.” For decades, many have considered the US the leading liberal democracy and the protector and promulgator of the liberal international order, but this may not be entirely true.

The US, it is argued, renewed the liberal international order after the end of the Second World War. Liberal theorist of international relations, John Ikenberry, in his essay The End of liberal international order? argues that “ for seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order.” It suggests that liberal values informed the US-led order during the bipolarity of the Cold war (Ikenberry uses Atlantic Liberal order for the same). However, if the international order led by the US had liberal undertones then it is difficult to explain why the US fostered good ties with Communist China during that era, toppled several democratically elected governments, improved relations with dictatorial regimes, such as the Shah of Iran, and armed the so-called fundamentalist groups like the Taliban. In essence, only under a realist framework can these acts be explained. In his essay Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of Liberal International Order, John Mearsheimer—a realist scholar of international relations, argues that the order led by the US during the Cold war was “neither international nor liberal. It was a bounded order that was limited to the West and was a realist in its all-key dimensions.” Essentially, it means that via this bounded order, the US and its allies wanted to pursue their ends by any means possible, liberal or illiberal alike. Moreover, it underscores that the liberal international order cannot emerge under a bipolar or multipolar political system, as under such circumstances, strategic competition undermines almost every liberal value. Thus, as realist scholars of IR argue, the liberal international order can only sprawl when the political system is unipolar, and the hegemonic power is a liberal democracy.

Indeed, when the international system was unipolar, and the hegemonic power was a liberal democracy (the US), the liberal international order sprawled. The years between the disintegration of the USSR and the global financial crisis of 2008 were the “golden years” of the liberal international order. The US, both passively and aggressively, spread liberal values, the liberal ethic attracted large masses around the world, and liberal economics progressed. As Ikenberry writes, “at the end of the Twentieth century, liberal democracies dominated the world—commanding 80% of the global GNP.” However, this “golden period” also led to the rise of China, and Russia regained its geopolitical status. With this, the US lost its hegemonic position, the international system became multipolar, and eventually, the liberal international order faced a crisis. As such, the current challenges to the order is due to the results it has produced.

During the golden years of the liberal international order, one of the ideas that emerged among the liberal circles was liberal interventionism. By virtue of liberal interventionism, liberal states would intervene in the internal affairs of other nation-states to promote liberal principles. Liberal interventionism was put to effect by the US and its allies in the Iraq war. On the pretext of ensuring world peace, the US invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and caused the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians. The US invasion also gave birth to terrorist factions, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which have caused much destruction to Iraq. Not only has ISIL left Iraq devastated, but the group which was a result of the US’s actions has led to anti-Muslim bigotry in the West. Other than Iraq, the US also intervened in Libya to promote democracy, which resulted in a decade long crisis in the country. Undoubtedly, the results that liberal interventionism has produced has led many people to adopt anti-liberal views and staunch support for their own cultural/national values. However, the adoption of specific national values is also a result of another liberal phenomenon, interconnectedness.

The interconnectedness between different nation-states is essential to ensure free trade, and the phenomenon operates through the flow of capital and people between these states. For many years, almost every individual enjoyed equal rights in most liberal states. However, more recently, the clash of values among different groups has led to a sudden surge of right-wing groups in liberal states, which has further led to xenophobia and the undermining of liberal values. France provides the best example of this phenomenon as there is an evident clash of values between French Muslims and French Secularists. The French government has adopted several measures to force the former to comply with French ideals and principles. Thus, national values have been given precedence over liberal ones. Conclusively, interconnectedness has fueled parochial nationalism and disregard for individual rights.

The clash of values has also proved detrimental to the growth of liberal democracies in non-western societies. Non-western societies view liberal values as a European product and the result of its certain socio-historical realities. According to Hamza Tzortzis, a Muslim researcher, “ the claim by some liberal ideologues is that Liberalism is universal; however, there are some philosophical issues with this line of thought. Firstly it is a logical fallacy to take something specific and make it general.” As such, there is a rejection of western liberal values in many non-western societies. And any superimposition of liberal values backfires as people tend to adopt more anti-liberal attitudes. With rising illiberal attitudes, the liberal international order cannot survive for long.

The liberal international order underpinned by liberal principles is not as extraordinary as the West often puts it. The order’s quest to remake the world with the help of liberal democracies may bear desirable outcomes for a short period, but in the long run, it produces self-defeating results. The assumption made by many liberal proponents that liberal values will hold centre stage in most societies has fallen flat during the current crisis. In essence, liberal political ideology is as strong as any other ideology. Only during a crisis can any ideology’s weak theoretical and philosophical underpinnings be identified, and nowadays, liberalism is revealing its own weaknesses.

#### Clinging causes great power war—only disengagement solves

Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 Ch 6 p. 144-178

To answer these questions, we need a better understanding of the sources of conflict in a unipolar world. In this chapter, I develop causal mechanisms stemming from a unipolar distribution of military power and lay out a theory of how a unipolar structure of international politics generates important incentives for conflict. My argument is that a unipolar distribution of military power, while removing important incentives for conflict - such as competition among several great powers - is likely to trigger other, specific war-producing causal mechanisms. Furthermore, to the extent that the unipole remains engaged in the world, it is likely to be involved in conflict. This means that any military unipolar strategy other than disengagement will entail a conflict cost. In what follows, I show how each of the strategies the unipole may follow will trigger conflict dynamics that counter the pacifying effect of unipolarity described in extant scholarship on the topic. Therefore I question the view that unipolarity is peaceful.¶ To be more specific, the argument I lay out in this chapter shows how unipolar systems provide incentives for wars of two types: those pitting the sole great power against another state and those involving exclusively other states. I do not question the impossibility of great-power war in a unipolar world, but rather aim at fleshing out the picture by looking beyond great-power wars.

### Space War

#### We have militarization but not weaponization – countries are using space for the military and have the technology to weaponize, but won’t actually

Krepon,’ 03 [Michael Krepon is president of the Henry Stimson Center and Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?”, Henry Stimson Center Book, SM]

At present, the crucial distinction between the militarization and weaponization of space remains in place. The militarization of space was certainly inevitable during the Cold War, because both superpowers needed satellites to observe each other’s strategic capabilities and to enhance the effectiveness of their terrestrial war-fighting capabilities.11 Both nations orbited satellites to glean targeting information, to learn of meteorological conditions in theaters of combat, and to communicate with widely dispersed forces. Navigation satellites, although not nearly as accurate as the global positioning system (GPS) of today, were crucial for improving the accuracy of ballistic missiles. And space systems were indispensable for obscure but necessary functions like geodesic surveying, which facilitated ballistic missile accuracy by measuring perturbations in the earth’s gravitational field. Satellites provided early warning of missile launches and detection of nuclear detonations. In other words, over the course of the Cold War, space became an essential adjunct for war-fighting on the ground, without becoming another theater of combat. While the militarization of space proceeded apace, the weaponization of space was avoided. The continuum to characterize space warfare capabilities employed by the Joint Staff of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides a useful typology in this regard. Within the domain of space operations, the Joint Staff define four primary mission areas: space control, force enhancement, space support, and force application. Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection of U.S. and U.S. allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems. Space control operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and include offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain space superiority and situational awareness if events impact space operations. Space force enhancement operations multiply joint force effectiveness by enhancing battlespace awareness and providing needed warfighter support. There are five force enhancement functions: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and position, velocity, time, and navigation. Space support operations consist of operations that launch, deploy, augment, maintain, sustain, replenish, deorbit, and recover space forces, including the command and control network configuration for space operations. Support operations consist of spacelift, satellite operations, and deorbiting and recovering space vehicles, if required. Space force application operations consist of attacks against terrestrialbased targets carried out by military weapons systems operating in or through space. Currently, there are no space force application assets operating in space.12 This typology can be condensed further into three fairly distinct categories: 1. Activities that involve the direct application of force either from space, within space, or directed against objects in space from the earth’s surface or atmosphere. Space force application and much of space control fall into this category. 2. Activities that clearly involve no use of force, primarily space support activities. 3. Activities that do not involve the direct application of force but that can support and enhance other activities that destroy or disable an adversary’s capabilities in space, on the earth’s surface, or in the atmosphere. Clearly, category 1 activities involving space force application would constitute the weaponization of space. Additionally, space control activities resulting in the denial or negation of an adversary’s spacecraft would also constitute weaponization. Included in this definition of weaponization are dedicated ASAT weapons, “defensive” weapons carried on satellites or other space objects that could be used for offensive purposes, and attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in or from space. Excluded in this definition are military and civilian capabilities such as long-range ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and the space shuttle, which could be used as ASATs but which have clearly been designed to carry out other missions. Also excluded from this definition are category 2 and 3 activities listed above. This construct of space weaponization falls between overly broad definitions that are unhelpful and overly narrow definitions that are insufficient. Several nations now have the capability to do significant damage to satellites in orbit, perhaps by utilizing ocean-spanning ballistic missiles, or long-range missile defense interceptors, or space-launch vehicles to detonate nuclear weapons above the earth’s atmosphere. Space assets face other threats. The U.S. space shuttle was designed to repair and refurbish satellites, not to purposefully damage them. But it has this inherent capability. Commercially available communications equipment can be used to jam satellite uplinks and downlinks. The U.S. Air Force’s Space Aggressor Squadron, which “red teams” the possible behavior of potential adversaries, assembled a satellite jamming device for $7,500 using readily available equipment. Space warfare need not take place in space, since satellite ground-control stations are susceptible to hacking and to direct attacks by air power, ground forces, and commando operations.13 In other words, space-faring nations or consortiums, as well as states possessing long-range missile capabilities have long possessed the capability to create havoc in space by reorienting weapon systems designed for other purposes. The deployment of advanced missile defense interceptors and the airborne laser could provide additional capabilities against satellites. These residual capabilities do not, however, constitute the weaponization of space because they have not been used for this purpose. The acquisition of new military capabilities that could be applied to space warfare increases the necessity to prevent their flight-testing in “an ASAT mode,” if the distinction between militarization and weaponization is to be maintained. Cooperative monitoring arrangements are essential for this purpose. Put another way, because it is not possible to ban military technologies and capabilities that could be used for space warfare does not mean that the weaponization of space has already occurred. This barrier remains intact as long as versatile military technologies are not used against objects in space. The existence of versatile technologies and military capabilities means that any state using them against U.S. satellites can reasonably expect retaliation in kind or other unwanted consequences. Rather than constituting an insuperable problem, residual ASAT capabilities can help deter ASAT use. Residual ASAT capabilities also can help states to conclude that they do not need to pursue dedicated ASATs in order to deter space warfare. The essential distinction between the militarization and weaponization of space currently remains in place. Dedicated ASAT capabilities of Cold War vintage are not now deployed. Newer models are presumably in research and development behind closed doors, but flight tests of new “kinetic kill” ASATs or space mines have not been reported. And dedicated platforms for offensive military operations from space remain closer to gestation than to adolescence. The Pentagon has affirmed that there are no U.S. “force application” assets now operating in space, and there are no reported weapons in space orbited by other nations. The absence of flight tests and deployments of instruments of space warfare affirm that we have not yet crossed critical thresholds associated with the weaponization of space.