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#### Marxism falls prey to the psychosis of whiteness- it ignores the role of white supremacy in capitalism while only advocating for white class movements

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From a Black radical perspective, there are (at least) two reasons why we should be wary of solutions to the problems posed by racism offered from within a Marxist framework (Andrews, 2018). Firstly, and historically, Marxists have ignored, or downplayed, the impact of Western imperialism in defining the different relationships to capitalism in which White workers and their Black counterparts stand, and the extent to which White workers have been complicit in the exclusion of their non-White counterparts from working class movements. For Andrews (2018), this is a comment on the historical practices of Western Marxists and Marxist scholars in general and should not be read as a necessary feature of Marxism per se. Indeed, the body of Marxist scholarship produced by Cole, is an example of a nuanced and comprehensive account of the racism inherent in imperialism and discusses at length the complicity of Western labour in the imperialist project (see in particular, Cole, 2018a, 2018b). However, Andrew’s (2018) point is that, as a consequence of how many Marxist movements have operated in the past, in conjunction with the differences in the distribution of the benefits of capitalism across different racial groups, it is it difficult for non-White groups to identify with the struggles of the White working class: ...[T]he Western working class has benefitted from imperialism and forged political movements that mostly aim to distribute the wealth gained from the exploitation of darker people equitably between Whites. Trade unions have largely operated to “defend the short term interests” for their members within the framework of the nation state. On top of this, the unions have been a bastion of racism and exclusion. When Caribbean and Indian workers came to Britain they found themselves subject to colour bars from both the unions and workers’ organisations like social clubs. Groups like the Indian Workers Association had to form because they had no representation in the mainstream unions. Even now, though we are welcome to pay our fees, I don’t remember anyone ever expressing the feeling that their union was particularly supportive over issues of racism. If we are honest, the history of working class movements in the West has largely been one based on self-interest, and these interests do not align with the victims of imperialism. (Andrews, 2018: 189–190) So, considered from a Black radical standpoint, there is a good historical, political and economic reason to regard White workers as being in a relatively privileged position in comparison to their Black (and non-White) counterparts. The history of imperialism and the economic, social and political legacy that this history has created ensures that any advances enjoyed in the (predominantly White) Western world are made possible by exploitation of the (predominantly Black) developing world. For the Black radical, ‘Gains for [White] workers in the West have always been secured off the backs of those in the underdeveloped world. This is a necessary feature of capitalism’ (Andrews, 2018: 192). There are also good reason for Black workers to be wary of emancipatory movements that are led by White workers, who have historically excluded them. Secondly, Marxism has been unable to overcome what Andrews (2016, 2018) calls the ‘psychosis of Whiteness’, a feature of virtually all of Western thought. This phenomenon has parallels to Said’s (1978) notion of ‘orientalism’, whereby Eastern populations are alienated through a sustained tradition of academic writing that systematically portrays them as fundamentally ‘other’ to their White, Western counterparts. The psychosis of whiteness drives a similar meta-narrative within (White) western societies but focused on Black people, their history, and the legacy of colonialism and the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The psychosis of Whiteness infects academic discourse but also extends more widely to all areas of public pedagogy including film and other forms of storytelling (Andrews, 2016). The psychosis of Whiteness represents an irrational mindset and collection of ideas that downplays and denies the responsibility of White people for the horrors of imperialism, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the unjust political, social, and economic systems that have followed from them. Again, it should be noted, that Andrews’ comments about the meta-narrative created by the psychosis of Whiteness does not entail that this is a feature essential to Marxist thought, nor does it entail that every Marxist scholar falls prey to this psychosis. For example, Cole (2018a, 2018b) deals at length with the British Empire and it’s lasting legacy of racism, while Cole (2016: 97–108) explicitly deals with the slave trade in the USA and its’ persistent consequences. Cole’s work here draws on Marxist scholarship beginning with Marx and Engels themselves, through to contemporary Marxist thinkers. Nevertheless, for Andrews (2016, 2018), like the CRT concept of White supremacy, the psychosis of Whiteness encapsulates the idea that Whiteness is all-pervasive and invisible in Western societies, and that it is deeply embedded and fundamental to the functioning of these societies and for maintaining the ongoing and unjust status quo. The psychosis of Whiteness also entails an omission of the significance of Whiteness from our accounts of historical injustices and the creation and continued recreation of racial inequality, where, in reality, it has played a central role: Whiteness is actually rooted in the political economy; it is in the fabric and the institutions of social life. You cannot work the natives in the Americas to death without Whiteness. You do not enslave millions of African people and kill millions more without Whiteness. You do not steal the resources from the places of the world you have underdeveloped and then create a system of unfair trade practices without Whiteness. The modern world was shaped in the image of Whiteness. (Andrews, 2018: 194) The major fallacy committed historically by many Marxist thinkers (including some Black Marxists) is to fall prey to this psychosis of Whiteness and not to recognise the fundamental role that Whiteness played in the exploitation of Africa, the development of capitalism, and the role that it continues to play in the impoverishment of both the developing world and of Black people in the Western world. In other words, this is the fallacy of not recognising the essential role that White supremacy plays in shaping the evolution of modes of production within capitalism. For Andrews, Black people are not racialised as Black because of capitalist modes of production and the ideological forces that they create and which serve interests of an economic elite. Rather, Whiteness and White supremacy are ontologically prior to capitalism and create the circumstances in which Black people can, have, and continue to be racialised and exploited to a far, far greater degree than other groups, including the White working class. Whiteness, and the racism that it engenders is, in large part, responsible for the creation of the Western sociopolitical system and the nature of its modes of production that, in Marxist thought, are necessary for a move towards communism: ‘In fact, racism actually pre-dates class in a Marxist sense, shaping the development of the system that will eventually lead to the Proletarian revolution’ (Andrews, 2018: 200).

**Global warming is not evenly distributed nor equally created - warming only a miniscule symptom of a larger archetype of whiteness irreconcilable with their contingent, state-sanctioned solutions. They normalize a metanarrative of pragmatism which obfuscates the machinations of privilege.**

Wynter 7, (Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford University, "The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto," 3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/1516556/69a8a25c597f33bf66af6cdf411d58c2.pdf – hhs ew)

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

#### The aff is a form eco-activism reliant upon a bloodthirsty moralism which converts the oppressed into tools to fuel neoliberal speed-elitism

Hoofd 12 (Ingrid M Hoofd, assistant professor of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, November 2012, *Ambiguities of Activism: Alter-Globalism and the Imperatives of Speed*, pp 97-8, modified)

The one profound dissimulation that complicates much present-day online climate-change activism is the extent to which web-hosting and traffic aggravates environmental pollution and oil depletion. Especially large server parks, Internet backbones and routers, and park coolers require considerable and constant amounts of energy. 14 As with *CO2Fx*, this amount of pollution, which disproportionately puts disenfranchised communities and peoples at risk, gets dissimulated by way of the aesthetically pleasing and smooth surface of climate-change activism’s websites. Much of this aestheticisation is done on activist websites like One Blue Marble through lean black-on-white fonts and images of pristine nature or endangered animals, of which the tree and the polar bear are the prime poster children. As I have argued above, it appears from these websites that the desire to archive ‘nature’ runs in concordance with the factual disappearance of that very bit of ‘nature.’ The websites pretend to communicate in ‘noise-free’ fashion what is really the nostalgic desire for and ubiquitous consumption of a lost past. Besides this nostalgic and pristine visual representation of ‘nature’ on such websites, much of the discursive techniques reflect a similar romantic, anthropomorphised, and often feminine conception of nature. The ‘Climate Justice Assembly Declaration’ from Friends of the Earth, for instance, reads that ‘the Earth is saying “enough”!’ while calling for a day of global action in defence of ‘Mother Earth.’ This feminisation of nature— leading to the twin representations of nature as either an ideal site or a demonic force— is of course nothing new in itself. But what is new today is how the call for global activism is predicated on a trans-border imaginary evoked by the ‘one earth’ that climate change inhabits. The romantic idea of a mother earth under siege allows for a globalisation of struggles quite akin to how the ‘migrant’ comes to represent the global speed-elitist imagination in Chapter 3. The logical result is once more, as we also saw in Chapters 2 and 3, a strong emphasis on forging alliances globally; the ‘Climate Justice Assembly Declaration’ stresses that ‘We need to globalize these solutions,’ whereas the Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative (EJCC) claims in ‘A Climate of Change’ that ‘Ultimately, accomplishing climate justice will require that new alliances are forged and traditional movements are transformed’ (1). EJCC, in addition, advocates in their mission statement, called ‘What we believe,’ to use ‘the power of the Internet to . . . mobilize forces for action.’ Both documents, however, do not discuss this mobilisation through oil-devouring new media, and remain silent about exactly which kinds of alliances and connections need to be built. This silence on the matter of what kinds of alliances and with whom is, I suggest, no mere coincidence. Neither is the shift in the rhetoric from environmental activism to the importance of climate *justice* without significance. As we saw with the discussion of DeLuca’s piece, one of the tensions in earlier environmental activism resides in the way the claim for some pure ‘nature’ always ends up ~~running~~ [moving] through humanist ideas of salvation— there is no ethics that emerges from nature as such. The reworking of this tension in climate change activism leads to a tendentious welding together of racial, class-based, and gendered struggles with the environmental cause by way of the universal ‘one earth’ rhetoric. As in the problematic encapsulation of a variety of struggles under the umbrella of ‘the multitude’ in Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, recent climate-justice discourse posits the global-warming issue as containing within itself all alter-globalist efforts. The EJCC document, for example, states that ‘all justice is climate justice’ (1) and that ‘racism causes bad climate policy’ (3) by pointing out the statistical relationship between being non-white or poor and being affected by environmental hazards. Friends of the Earth even ventures to say that ‘the struggles for climate justice and social justice are one and the same.’ But while it is one thing to quite correctly point out relationships between marginalisation and pollution, it is quite another to claim that climate activism itself will alleviate or annul all other forms of oppression. Worse even, the latter document eventually works firmly within the current economical frame by sympathetically suggesting that ‘the economies of low-income communities’ need to be ‘strengthen[ed]’ (1). This should be done by creating a global legal sphere that allows for a calculation of leakage of carbon emissions across borders and the development of ‘green technologies’ which should be ‘exported to developing nations’ so as to spur their improvement (4). However well-meant, all this is very much in step with the general impetus of neo-liberal globalization. It fails to think through how the very rhetoric of the dissolution of borders, technological development, and the ‘bringing up to speed’ of marginalised groups is in fact intimately connected to the aggravation of poverty and climate change itself. The abstraction of alliances is therefore the marker of the violence of actual globalisation, as it washes out the profound contradictions and opposing aims of various forms of struggles.

#### The spectre of the climate disaster functions as a new zone of investment in which humanity can legitimize itself as in a perfectly cohesive image. Reflecting a divine will to will, the affirmative reasserts the unity of being in a reactionary attempt to ward off contingency, ultimately resulting in endless foddering and chatter by masses of indifference

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 59-72

Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth— appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the picturing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the possibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this specific inclination or latitude of the earth, and does so by gesturing to something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fantasies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, depleting, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders. The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the practice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—considered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, renewal, cyclic causality and organicism. This traditionally theological series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentionality, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly secular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain. It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of ecological ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors. The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive ~~paralysis~~ [inability] to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified. Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-globally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so various environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always interconnected across and through this one living globe, this living world that environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action. It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the temporal dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of globalism— or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely reinforced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single screen and panel of experts. Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the consequences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capitalism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body (be that a physical, political, national or economic body). Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cultures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular culture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isolable and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages populations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a political decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guaranteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space— discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a modern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and democratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a world that is always his world. The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calculative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclosure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form would not be disengaged from collective praxis. Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has precluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the creation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropological modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first terrain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but also through Empire. It is not something which is fought against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which extends against all the central and peripheral structures of power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27) We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multitude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that privileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or term above another. Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechanization, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural globalism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, without a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relationship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as instituted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitarian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is covered over in modernity. Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with biopolitics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its maintenance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reterritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an historical being. On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowledge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of formation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that harbors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing multitude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-referring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of monotheism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once linear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end concludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that of the soul: Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again; Know that all lines which circles do contain. For once that they the centre touch, do touch Twice the circumference, and be thou such (Donne 2000, 229). Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-reference, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monotheistic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to which it was once enslaved (2010). Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure of fruition. The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bodies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an interconnected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a nonglobal temporality and counter-ethics. Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imaginary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenology insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sensory- motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human populations as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize biopolitical modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent network of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and comprehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] of an organic thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actually, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text message places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to ourselves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and synthesis— only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.

#### Models of space debris risk are totally incalculable and only contribute to an ideological smokescreen for neoconservative policies that produce imperial imaginations of a unified Earth that allow hegemons like the United States to secure itself in the face of threats to their dominance like debris.

Ormord, 12 (James, School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 727 – 744)

Prior to the Iridium–Cosmos collision experts placed the odds of two objects larger than ten centimetres in diameter colliding in space at “millions, maybe even billions, to one” (Rincon, 2009). The chances of damage being sustained by operational objects as they collide with smaller objects are much higher, at 1–10%; this may be their single greatest threat (Rex, 1998; Williamson, 2006; Wright, 2009, page 6). A United Nations report in 1999 brought together a range of measurements and statistical models from different agencies in an attempt to draw up a risk assessment. These models “did not agree quantitatively because of differences in assumptions and starting conditions” (UN, 1999, page 25). But despite this, it concluded that collision risk in Low Earth Orbit (less than 2000 kilometres) was “not great”, and the collision risk in Geostationary Orbit was “correspondingly lower”. However, all were also agreed that the number of major collisions would rise exponentially if current trends continued. This is based on the understanding that because it takes a long time to disperse, debris created from one impact will go on to create more impacts in a ‘collision cascade’, referred to as the ‘Kessler Syndrome’ (Brearley, 2005; Williamson, 2006; Wright, 2009). In a 2006 report NASA referred to this situation as “supercritical” (Wright, 2009). Modelling this effect adds to the complexity of a risk assessment already understood to be limited by knowledge of current amounts of debris and of how spacecraft respond to impacts that “do not fall into categories normally known from solid-state physics” (Rex, 1998, page 100; UN, 1999). To these difficulties in modelling the physical risks to spacecraft should be added the impossibility of establishing the social and economic consequences of a collision cascade in Geostationary Orbit, which one author describes as a (limited) resource “necessary to human life” as “the space ... which allows contemporary communication practices to exist” (2) Geostationary Orbit exists at an altitude of 35 786 kilometres at which satellites appear stationary from Earth. See Collis (2009) for a useful discussion of its legal geography. (Collis, 2009, pages 55 and 49). Expert opinion has suggested a collision cascade “could take out world communications” (Ellis, 2009). Outer space was once considered inexhaustible. It is now being realised that the development of outer space has been unevenly concentrated in key regions (see MacDonald, 2007), with implications for thinking of outer space as a ‘common pool resource’. Debris might impede the use of space within a generation as the unintended consequences of human activity undermine its promise (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a). Earth’s orbit now has to be seen as a ‘fragile environment’ for human activity (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a; Williamson, 2006). A 1972 UN Convention established that the ‘launching state’ is liable for any damage caused by its activities or by nongovernmental entities operating under its jurisdiction. In terms of damage caused by debris in outer space, if fault can be established then financial reparation must be made to restore damage to people or property. There is therefore, in principle, a mechanism for establishing accountability. Lotta Viikari (2008) still holds out hope for the development of Environmental Impact Assessments and the extension of ‘polluter pays’ principles to space debris (page 20). This convention breaks down, however, in a ‘supercritical’ space environment in which it becomes increasingly difficult for a claims commission to establish cause, fault, and damages (Zhao, 2004). Due to the impossibility of establishing fault, no claims for compensation have ever been settled in regard to space debris (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, personal communication, October 2010). As international law only considers direct damage between states and their corporations, there is no incentive to protect the space environment itself (Brearley, 2005, page 26). As the shortcomings of the system of accountability have become increasingly apparent, measures to address the space debris issue have been agreed by international bodies. NASA guidelines having already been established following a commitment by President Reagan (in consultation with industry), the 1999 UN report detailed a number of possible strategies for dealing with the space debris issue. Firstly, space objects should avoid releasing debris as part of their normal operations, avoid on-orbit explosion (eg, by venting energy sources), and be disposed of at the end of their lifetimes, either by reducing their orbit so that they reenter the atmosphere more quickly or by moving them to a ‘disposal’ or ‘graveyard’ orbit further from the Earth, though neither is risk-free (Rex, 1998). Secondly, space object designers should protect them with adequate shielding and collision avoidance mechanisms. Many of these guidelines have since been reiterated in 2002 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee guidelines and were eventually accepted by the UN in 2008. The possibility but incalculability of a future collision cascade is a prime example of late-modern risk. It is particularly interesting to note that the reports were also marked by the paradox of risk modelling in a reflexive society (Beck, 2009, page 136): scientists attempted to incorporate responses to their predictions into the predictions themselves, thus reducing the predicted risk on which these responses were supposedly based. But the degree of voluntary international cooperation in response to the issue of space debris appears to vindicate Beck’s optimism about a cosmopolitanism ‘from above’, shared with others such as David Held [and echoed in regard to space debris by David Wright (2009, page 10)]. There are, however, reasons to be sceptical. In an excellent paper on sovereignty in outer space, Jill Stuart (2009) contrasts Held’s (2002) cosmopolitan sovereignty with regime theories based on the Realpolitik of state confrontation [or Everett Dolman’s (2002) ‘Astropolitik’, on which see Fraser MacDonald (2007) for a critique]. Cosmopolitan sovereignty is based on a cosmopolitan consciousness both influencing and influenced by international cooperation in outer space (eg, the International Space Station). Stuart argues that the declining importance of the nation-state resonates with the ‘overview effect’ of viewing a borderless Earth from space (White, 1987). Despite her optimism, Stuart is aware that there are serious issues with Held’s cosmopolitanism, especially when applied to outer space. There is good reason to believe that the apparent cosmopolitanism of human activity in outer space is an ideological smokescreen behind which neoconservative policies are being pursued (see, for example, Caldicott, 2002). In his analysis of images of Earth taken from space, Denis Cosgrove (1994) identifies both a ‘One World’ discourse that views a globally connected world as the project of a modern Christian American imperialism, and a ‘Whole Earth’ vitalist environmentalism that sees Earth as fragile, isolated organic unity. “Each”, however, “effectively exemplifies the Apollonian urge to re-establish a transcendental, univocal, and universally valid vantage point from which to sketch a totalising discourse” (page 288). Both thus erase locality. Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1996) also tears apart the ‘spaceship Earth’ ideology reflected in White’s overview effect, arguing that the illusion of a unified Earth serves only to disguise inequalities of power. The lack of accountability for space debris actually polarises international interest in space debris mitigation. States such as the US that rely on the ‘space operating environment’ to exercise control over social order (see Dickens and Ormrod, 2009), and that have an economic interest in maintaining capital growth in outer space, have a long-term interest in mitigating against debris [although the US withholds high-quality data because of security concerns (Rincon, 2009)]. States with only a short-term interest in space, such as Indonesia, have not been willing to mitigate space debris (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a). Rational actor theory has been employed to argue both that the major spacefaring nations will be willing to mitigate space debris voluntarily (Brearley, 2005) and that international agreements are necessary (Viikari, 2008). Such theory reaches its limits here as it cannot cope with the differing political and economic interests within states and their temporal nature. Even when alliances and agreements hold, it must be questioned whether the current trajectory of space debris mitigation serves the interests of a global public. As Enzensberger (1996) observes, industrial measures to protect the environment either serve to concentrate capital in the hands of larger companies as smaller companies cannot finance their own mitigation systems, or they manifest themselves as costs to the public (page 26). Viikari (2008, page 24) suggests the former is also true of competing spacefaring states. Viikari nonetheless advocates a system wherein ‘environmental losers’ could receive other benefits. Neil Smith (2009) anticipates the development of outer space becoming the next stage in the extensive expansion of capitalism. He also makes clear, in relation to carbon trading on Earth, that a system such as Viikari proposes would neither protect the nearby space environment nor spread the benefits of space activity more equally (it merely represents ‘the vertical integration of nature into capital’). The costs borne by the public, meanwhile, include those associated with debris-monitoring and with state mission compliance with international guidelines. There has also been discussion of developing lasers, tethers, and slings to drag debris out of orbit (ESA, 2005), all of which introduce their own forms of risk. A contract to develop such technology would benefit one space technology company or another but the cost would be borne by the public, as recently demonstrated by NASA’s $1.9 million award to Star Technology and Research to develop the ElectroDynamic Debris Eliminator (Chang, 2012). Commercial sector compliance with voluntary codes of practice is understandably low as it can be extremely costly and organisations within the sector cannot be held responsible in the event of catastrophe. Nor does capital, as an abstract and fluid entity, have any interest in the long-term future of the space environment. Satellites fix capital for a decade, but their investors have no concern for the future beyond this. Whether or not guidelines are forced on commercial operators will depend on the relationship between states or suprastates and capital. While the costs of mitigation are seen to undermine commercial viability it is unlikely that procedures will become compulsory. This includes the possibility of a launch tax, which would fly in the face of legislative trends in US space policy. Compulsory measures are more likely, however, if major stakeholders in the space industry become the ones to profit from them. European company EADS Astrium has funded £1 million in research into the CubeSail project at the Surrey Space Centre in the UK. The CubeSail is intended to drag satellites out of orbit at the end of their lifetimes. EADS is a major state contractor as well as a commercial operator. France has recently made it law that satellites under its jurisdiction must be deorbited after twenty-five years. There are profits to be made by Astrium if other countries follow suit. The politics of space debris call into question Beck’s assertion that the old alliances between the state, capital, and science are over. In recent work, Beck (2005, page 138) makes clear that he believes the transnational logic of capital trumps the power of states. But this work lacks the attention to the complexity of relationships between neoliberal and neoconservative politics that characterises the work of David Harvey (2003). Harvey argues that states vacillate historically between protecting regional interests and opening borders. The creation of larger and larger alliances of states is one potential outcome of this process. It may be that international state alliances in one form or another take responsibility for space debris. But Harvey reminds us that, firstly, these ‘cosmopolitan’ agreements do not represent the public interest but exist to safeguard capital accumulation, and, secondly, that they are always prone to dissolution. None of the parties involved support the measure most certain to improve orbital pollution, which is to stop (or limit) the launch of objects into orbit (UN, 1999). Instead, the solutions being pursued only serve to deepen the contradiction between those who benefit from risk mitigation and those who bear the costs. As attention to the problem grows, the perceived impending catastrophe appears to demand an immediate technological solution that actually obscures the politics at work [see de Goede and Randalls (2009); see also Swyngedouw (2007) on catastrophism and climate change].

#### Neoliberalism strips language of its critical possibility and produces race neutrality – this reifies whiteness and lets white people think they are free of responsibility – thus the ROB and ROJ is to endorse tactics racial capitalism

**Giroux 03,** Henry, American and Canadian scholar and cultural critic, Communication Education, “Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0363452032000156190?journalCode=rced20>, Accessed 6/28/21 VD

Under the reign of neoliberalism in the United States, society is largely defined through the privileging of market relations, deregulation, privatization, and consumerism. Central to neoliberalism is the assumption that profit making be construed as the essence of democracy, thus providing a rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible to maximize their financial investments. Strictly aligning freedom with a narrow notion of individual interest, neoliberalism works hard to privatize all aspects of the public good and simultaneously narrow the role of the state as both a gatekeeper for capital and a policing force for maintaining social order and racial control. Unrestricted by social legislation or government regulation, market relations as they define the economy are viewed as a paradigm for democracy itself. Central to neoliberal philosophy is the claim that the development of all aspects of society should be left to the wisdom of the market. Similarly, neoliberal warriors argue that democratic values be subordinated to economic considerations, social issues be translated as private dilemmas, part-time labor replace full-time work, trade unions be weakened, and everybody be treated as a customer. Within this market-driven perspective, the exchange of capital takes precedence over social justice, the making of socially responsible citizens, and the building of democratic communities. There is no language here for recognizing antidemocratic forms of power, developing nonmarket values, or fighting against substantive injustices in a society founded on deep inequalities, particularly those based on race and class. Hence, it is not surprising that under neoliberalism, language is often stripped of its critical and social possibilities as it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine a social order in which all problems are not personal, social issues provide the conditions for understanding private considerations, critical reflection becomes the essence of politics, and matters of equity and justice become crucial to developing a democratic society. It is under the reign of neoliberalism that the changing vocabulary about race and racial justice has to be understood and engaged. As freedom is increasingly abstracted from the power of individuals and groups to participate actively in shaping society, it is reduced to the right of the individual to be free from social constraints. In this view, freedom is no longer linked to a collective effort on the part of individuals to create a democratic society. Instead, freedom becomes an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility, reducing politics to either the celebration of consumerism or a privileging of a market-based notion of agency and choice that appear quite indifferent to how power, equity, and justice offer the enabling conditions for real individual and collective choices to be both made and acted upon. Under such circumstances, neoliberalism undermines those public spaces where noncommercial values and crucial social issues can be discussed, debated, and engaged. As public space is privatized, power is disconnected from social obligations, and it becomes more difficult for isolated individuals living in consumption-oriented spaces to construct an ethically engaged and power-sensitive language capable of accommodating the principles of ethics and racial justice as a common good rather than as a private affair. According to Bauman (1998), the elimination of public space and the subordination of democratic values to commercial interests narrow the discursive possibilities for supporting notions of the public good and create the conditions for “the suspicion against others, the intolerance of difference, the resentment of strangers, and the demands to separate and banish them, as well as the hysterical, paranoiac concern with ‘law and order”’ (p. 47). Positioned within the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant economic and political philosophy of our times, neoracism can be understood as part of a broader attack against not only difference but also the value of public memory, public goods, and democracy itself. The new racism both represents a shift in how race is defined and is symptomatic of the breakdown of a political culture in which individual freedom and solidarity maintain an uneasy equilibrium in the service of racial, social, and economic justice. Individual freedom is now disconnected from any sense of civic responsibility or justice, focusing instead on investor profits, consumer confidence, the downsizing of governments to police precincts, and a deregulated social order in which the winner takes all. Freedom is no longer about either making the powerful responsible for their actions or providing the essential political, economic, and social conditions for everyday people to intervene in and shape their future. Under the reign of neoliberalism, freedom is less about the act of intervention than it is about the process of withdrawing from the social and enacting one’s sense of agency as an almost exclusively private endeavor. Freedom now cancels out civic courage and social responsibility while it simultaneously translates public issues and collective problems into tales of failed character, bad luck, or simply indifference. As Amy Elizabeth Ansell (1997) points out: The disproportionate failure of people of color to achieve social mobility speaks nothing of the justice of present social arrangements, according to the New Right worldview, but rather reflects the lack of merit or ability of people of color themselves. In this way, attention is deflected away from the reality of institutional racism and towards, for example, the “culture of poverty”, the “drug culture”, or the lack of black self-development. (p. 111) Appeals to freedom, operating under the sway of market forces, offer no signposts theoretically or politically for engaging racism, an ethical and political issue that undermines the very basis of a substantive democracy. Freedom in this discourse collapses into self-interest and as such is more inclined to organize any sense of community around shared fears, insecurities, and an intolerance of those “others” who are marginalized by class and color. But freedom reduced to the ethos of self-preservation and brutal self-interests makes it difficult for individuals to recognize the forms that racism often take when draped in either the language of denial, freedom or individual rights. In what follows, I want to explore two prominent forms of the new racism, color blindness and neoliberal racism and their connection to the New Right, corporate power, and neoliberal ideologies. Unlike the old racism, which defined racial differences in terms of fixed biological categories organized hierarchically, the new racism operates in various guises proclaiming among other things race neutrality, asserting culture as a marker of racial difference, or marking race as a private matter. Unlike the crude racism with its biological referents and pseudoscientific legitimations, buttressing its appeal to white racial superiority, the new racism cynically recodes itself within the vocabulary of the civil rights movement, invoking the language of Martin Luther King, Jr. to argue that individuals should be judged by the “content of their character” and not by the color of their skin. Amy Elizabeth Ansell (1997), a keen commentator on the new racism, notes both the recent shifts in racialized discourse away from more rabid and overt forms of racism and its appropriation particularly by the New Right in the United States and Britain: The new racism actively disavows racist intent and is cleansed of extremist intolerance, thus reinforcing the New Right’s attempt to distance itself from racist organizations such as the John Birch Society in the United States and the National Front in Britain. It is a form of racism that utilizes themes related to culture and nation as a replacement for the now discredited biological referents of the old racism. It is concerned less with notions of racial superiority in the narrow sense than with the alleged “threat” people of color pose—either because of their mere presence or because of their demand for “special privileges”—to economic, socio-political, and cultural vitality of the dominant (white) society. It is, in short, a new form of racism that operates with the category of “race”. It is a new form of exclusionary politics that operates indirectly and in stealth via the rhetorical inclusion of people of color and the sanitized nature of its racist appeal. (pp. 20––21) What is crucial about the new racism is that it demands an updated analysis of how racist practices work through the changing nature of language and other modes of representation. One of the most sanitized and yet pervasive forms of the new racism is evident in the language of color-blindness. Within this approach, it is argued that racial conflict and discrimination is a thing of the past and that race has no bearing on an individual’s or group’s location or standing in contemporary American society. Color blindness does not deny the existence of race but denies the claim that race is responsible for alleged injustices that reproduce group inequalities, privilege Whites, and negatively impacts on economic mobility, the possession of social resources, and the acquisition of political power. Put differently, inherent in the logic of color blindness is the central assumption that race has no valence as a marker of identity or power when factored into the social vocabulary of everyday life and the capacity for exercising individual and social agency. As Charles Gallagher (2003) observes, “Within the color-blind perspective it is not race per se which determines upward mobility but how much an individual chooses to pay attention to race that determines one’s fate. Within this perspective race is only as important as you allow it to be” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 12). As Jeff, one of Gallagher’s interviewees, puts it, race is simply another choice: “you know, there’s music, rap music is no longer, it’s not a black thing anymore … when it first came out it was black music, but now it’s just music. It’s another choice, just like country music can be considered like white hick music, you know it’s just a choice” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 11). Hence, in an era “free” of racism, race becomes a matter of taste, lifestyle, or heritage but has nothing to do with politics, legal rights, educational access, or economic opportunities. Veiled by a denial of how racial histories accrue political, economic, and cultural weight to the social power of whiteness, color blindness deletes the relationship between racial differences and power, and in doing so reinforces whiteness as the arbiter of value for judging difference against a normative notion of homogeneity (Goldberg, 2002, takes up this issue brilliantly, especially in pp. 200––238). For advocates of color blindness, race as a political signifier is conveniently denied or seen as something to be overcome, allowing Whites to ignore racism as a corrosive force for expanding the dynamics of ideological and structural inequality throughout society (Marable, 1998, p. 29). Color blindness is a convenient ideology for enabling Whites to ignore the degree to which race is tangled up with asymmetrical relations of power, functioning as a potent force for patterns of exclusion and discrimination, including, but not limited to, housing, mortgage loans, health care, schools, and the criminal justice system. If one effect of color blindness’s functions is to deny racial hierarchies, another consequence is that it offers Whites the belief not only that America is now a level playing field, but that the success that Whites enjoy relative to minorities of color is largely due to individual determination, a strong work ethic, high moral values, and a sound investment in education. Not only does color blindness offer up a highly racialized (though paraded as race-transcendent) notion of agency, but it also provides an ideological space free of guilt, self-reflection, and political responsibility, despite the fact that Blacks have a disadvantage in almost all areas of social life: housing, jobs, education, income levels, mortgage lending, and basic everyday services (see Bonilla-Silva, 2001, for specific figures in all areas of life, especially the chapter “White Supremacy in the Post-Civil Rights Era”). In a society marked by profound racial and class inequalities, it is difficult to believe that character and merit—as color blindness advocates would have us believe—are the prime determinants for social and economic mobility and a decent standard of living. The relegation of racism and its effects in the larger society to the realm of private beliefs, values, and behavior do little to explain a range of overwhelming realities, such as soaring black unemployment, decaying cities, and segregated schools. Paul Street (2002) puts the issue forcibly in a series of questions that register the primacy of, and interconnections among, politics, social issues, and race.

#### Reject the aff in favor of *revolutionary intercommunalism* – affirm the international movement against carceral capitalism and its technocratic managerialism

**Newton 04** (Huey Percy Newton was an African-American revolutionary, most known for co-founding the Black Panther Party with Bobby Seale. Together, Newton and Seale created the party's manifesto, the ten-point program.), “Revolutionary Intercommunalism & The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, 2004, pg. 31-33 NT recut apark 10/13/21

We say that the world today is a dispersed collection of communities. A community is different from a nation.. A community is a small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that exist to serve a small group of people. And we say further that **the struggle in the world today is between the 32 small circle that administers and profits from the empire of the United States and the peoples of the world who want to determine their own destinies.** We call this situation intercommunalism. We are now in the age of **reactionary intercommunalism**, in which a ruling circle, a small group of people, control all other people by using their technology. At the same time, we say that this technology can solve most of the material contradictions people face, that the material conditions exist that would allow the people of the world to **develop a culture that is essentially human** and would nurture those things that would allow the people to resolve contradictions in a way that would not cause the mutual slaughter of all of us. **The development of such a culture would be revolutionary intercommunalism.** Some communities have begun doing this. They liberated their territories and have established provisional governments. We recognize them, and say that these governments represent the people of China, North Korea, the people in the liberated zones of South Vietnam, and the people in North Vietnam. We believe their examples should be followed so that the order of the day would not be reactionary intercommunalism (empire) but revolutionary intercommunalism. The people of the world, that is, must seize power from the small ruling circle and expropriate the expropriators, pull them down from their pinnacle and make them equals, and distribute the fruits of our labor, that have been denied us, in some equitable way. We know that the machinery to accomplish these tasks exists and we want access to it. 33 Imperialism has laid the foundation for world communism, and imperialism itself has grown to the point of reactionary intercommunalism because the **world is now integrated into one community**. The communications revolution, combined with the expansive domination of the American empire, has created the "global village." The peoples of all cultures are under siege by the same forces and they all have access to the same technologies. There are only differences in degree between what's happening to the Blacks here and what’s happening to all of the people in the world, including Africans. **Their needs are the same and their energy is the same.** And the contradictions they suffer will only be resolved when the people establish a revolutionary intercommunalism where they share all the wealth that they produce and live in one world. The stage of history is set for such a transformation: the technological and administrative base of socialism exists. When the people seize the means of production and all social institutions, then there will be a qualitative leap and a change in the organization of society. It will take time to resolve the contradictions of racism and all kinds of chauvinism; but because the people will control their own social institutions, **they will be free to re-create themselves and to establish communism**, a stage of human development in which human values will shape the structures of society. At this time the world will be ready for a still higher level, of which we can now know nothing.

### Case

#### The aff’s theorization of race is white eugenics and allows for the real and psychic extermination of blackness to prioritize “threats” to the white body – this flips their try or die calculus

Preston 17, John, Bath Spa University, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education”, Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316728254_Rethinking_Existential_Threats_and_Education>, Accessed 12/5/21 VD

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster. Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT. In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination. Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people. In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat. Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocatio

#### We read blue

Shammas and Holen 19 [(Victor L, a sociologist working at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo; Tomas B., independent scholar in Oslo, Norway) “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” 1-29-2019, pg. 3-5] TDI

The 2010s may very well be remembered as the ‘Age of NewSpace', the decade when outer space was turned into a capitalist space, when private corporations pushed the price of launches, satellites, and space infrastructure downwards, exerting what industry insiders call the ‘SpaceX effect' (Henry, 2018), centered on the technological achievement of ‘reusability', recovering used rocket boosters for additional launches, promising to drastically reduce the price of going to space (Morring, 2016). As one report observes, ‘Not only has the number of private companies engaged in space exploration grown remarkably in recent years, these companies are quickly besting their government-sponsored competitors' (Houser, 2017). What the rockets, shuttles, ships, and landing pods will carry beneath their payload fairing or in their cargo hold, however, along with supplies and satellites, is the capitalist worldview, a particular ideology—just as Robinson Crusoe, in Marx’s ironic retelling in Capital, ‘having saved a watch, ledger, ink and pen from the shipwreck… soon begins, like a good Englishman, to keep a set of books' (Marx, 1976, p. 170), brings with him English political economy—'Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham', as Marx (1976, p. 280) says elsewhere— to his desert island. In early 2018, astronomers across the world learned that a New Zealand start-up, Rocket Lab, which aimed to launch thousands of miniature satellites into orbit around Earth (so-called ‘smallsats'), had planned to launch a giant, shining ‘disco ball'—the ‘Humanity Star'—into orbit around Earth. It was an elaborate marketing stunt masked by humanistic idealism. ‘No matter where you are in the world, or what is happening in your life', said Rocket Lab CEO Peter Beck, ‘everyone will be able to see the Humanity Star in the night sky' (Amos, 2018). Many astronomers expressed outrage at these plans, fearing that the light from the Human Star would threaten their ability to carry out scientific observations. But while these astronomers were incensed by the idea of a bright geodesic object disrupting their ability to carry out observations, concerns with the effects of the arrival of capitalistkind on their ability to collect data were non-existent. The astronomical community was angered by the idea of a material, concrete, visible object polluting “pure” scientific data, but it paid less attention to the (invisible and abstract) recuperation of the night sky as it was brought into the fold of capitalism. In an interview, Beck was quizzed about the Humanity Star and asked by a reporter about the difficulties of generating profits in space (Tucker, 2018). To this Beck replied, ‘It has always been a government domain, but we’re witnessing the democratization of it…[I]t [is] turning into a commercially dominated domain'. Beck established an equivalence established between the dissolution of space as the rightful domain of states and the advent of profitmaking ventures as signs of ‘democratization'. In space, according to Beck’s logic, democratization involves the disappearance of the state and the rise of capital. The argument, of course, is impeccably post-statist: on this account, states are monolithic, conservative Leviathans beyond the reach of popular control; corporations, on the other hand, are in principle representatives of the everyman: in the age of the start-up, any humble citizen could in theory become an agent of disruption, a force for change, an explorer of space, and a potential member of the cadre of capitalistkind. Following this logic, the question for the entrepreneurs of NewSpace is how to monetize outer space, which means turning space into a space for capital; their question is how they can deplanetarize capital and universalize it, literally speaking, that is, turn the Universe into a universe for capital. In this light, Peter Beck’s distortion of democratic ideals appears eminently sensible, equating democratization with monetization, that is, capital liberated from its earthly tethers. Emblematic of this capitalist turn in space was the founding of Moon Express in 2011, composed of a ‘team of prominent Silicon Valley entrepreneurs…shooting for the moon with a new private venture aimed at scouring the lunar surface for precious metals and rare metallic elements' (Hennigan, 2011). Following Google’s Lunar XPRIZE—an intertwining of Silicon Valley and NewSpace’s capitalistkind—which promised a $20 million prize for the first private company to land a spacecraft on the Moon, travel 500 meters, and transmit high-definition images back to Earth, all by March 2018,9 Moon Express claimed that it would be capable of landing on the lunar surface and earn the cash prize. Their stated goal was twofold: first, to mine rare resource like Helium-3 (a steadily dwindling scarce resources on Earth), gold, platinum group metals, and water, and, second, to carry out scientific work that would ‘help researchers develop human space colonies for future generations' (Ioannou, 2017). The ordering is telling: first profits, then humanity. These were the hollow, insubstantial promises of a venture-capitalized NewSpace enterprise: in early 2018, Google announced that none of the five teams competing for the Lunar XPRIZE, including Moon Express, would reach their stated objectives by the 31 March deadline and they were taking their money back (Grush, 2018). In this sense, it was typical for NewSpace in its formative years: a corporate field populated by (overly exuberant) private enterprises who promised more than they could deliver. But the belief in NewSpace is real enough. In a tome bursting with the optimism of NewSpace, Wohlforth and Hendrix claim that ‘the commercial spaceflight industry is transforming our sense of possibility. Using Silicon Valley’s money and innovative confidence, it will soon bring mass space products to the market' (2016, p. 7). The trope of humanity plays a key role in the rhetoric of the adherents of NewSpace. To fulfill the objectives of NewSpace, including profit maximization and the exploitation of celestial bodies, the symbolic figure of a shared humanity serves a useful purpose, camouflaging the conquest of space by capitalism with a dream of humanity boldly venturing forth into the dark unknown, thereby also providing the legitimacy and enthusiasm needed to support bolster the legitimacy of NewSpace. So long as the stargazers and SpaceX watchers are permitted their fill of ‘collective effervescence', to use Durkheim’s (1995, p. 228) concept, capitalist entrepreneurs will be able to pursue their business interests more or less as they please. The spectacle of outer space is crucial in this regard. Crucially, however, and despite this spectacle, SpaceX’s technology might not necessarily be more sophisticated than its competitors or predecessors. Some industry insiders have rebuffed some of the more the spectacular claims of NewSpace’s proponents, arguing that launch vehicle reusability requires a (perhaps prohibitively) expensive refurbishing of the rocket engines involved in launches: ‘The economics will depend on how many times a booster can be flown, and how much the individual expense will be to refurbish the booster…each time' (Chang, 2017). Reusability may be a technological dead-end because of the inherently stressful effects of a rocket launch on the launch vehicle’s components, with extreme limitations on reusability beyond second-use as well as added risks of malfunctions that customers and insurers are likely to wish to avoid. Furthermore, the Falcon Heavy still has not matched the power and payload capacity of NASA’s Saturn V, a product of 1960s military-industrial engineering and Fordist state spending programs. What SpaceX and other NewSpace corporations do with great ingenuity, however, is to manage the spectacle of outer space, producing outpourings of public fervor, aided by a widespread adherence to the ‘Californian Ideology' (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996), or post-statist techno-utopianism, in many postindustrialized societies. The very centrality of these maneuvers has initiated a new phase in the history of capitalist relations, that of ‘charismatic accumulation'—certainly not in the sense of any ‘objective' or inherent charismatic authority, but with a form of illusio, to speak with Bourdieu, vested in the members of capitalistkind by their uncanny ability to spin mythologizing self-narratives. This has always been part of the capitalist game, from Henry Ford and onwards, but the charismatic mission gains a special potency in the grandiose designs of NewSpace’s entrepreneurs. Every SpaceX launch is a quasi-religious spectacle, observed by millions capable of producing a real sense of wonder in a condition of (legitimizing) collective effervescence. Outer space necessarily reduces inter-human difference to a common denominator or a shared species-being. An important leitmotiv in many Hollywood science fiction movies, including Arrival (2016), is that a first encounter with an alien species of intelligent beings tends to flatten all human difference (including ethnoracial and national categories), thereby restoring humankind to its proper universality (see also Novoa, 2016). Ambassadors of Earth as a whole, not representatives of particular nations, step forth to meet alien emissaries. But even in the absence of such an encounter, the search for habitable domains (or rather, profitable locales) beyond Earth will necessarily forge a shared conception of the human condition, initiated with the Pale Blue Dot photograph in 1990. Typical of this sentiment are the words of the astronomer Carl Sagan, who famously observed of this photograph: ‘On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived out their lives'. This naïvely humanistic vision has been one of the dominant tropes in the discourse on space since the 1950s, and it remains strong today, as with the claims of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) that their task is to ‘uphold the vision of a more equitable future for all humankind through shared achievements in space'. This representational tendency mobilizes humanism to generate enthusiasm about space-related activities. But such representations are increasingly being recuperated by capitalist enterprise, so that it is not humankind but its modulation by space capitalists that will launch into the dark unknown. It is not humankind but capitalistkind that ventures forth. In early 2018, NASA was set to request $150 million in its 2019 budget to ‘enable the development and maturation of commercial entities and capabilities which will ensure that commercial successors to the ISS…are operational when they are needed', only one of many signs that space is becoming a space for capitalism. According to one estimate, the value of just one single asteroid would be more than $20 trillion in rare earth and platinum-group metals (Lewis, 1996), a precious prize indeed for profit-hungry corporations.10 Even the UNOOSA spoke vociferously in favor of the commercialization of space, appealing variously to the ‘industry and private sector' and elevating the ‘space economy' to a central pillar in its Space2030 Agenda (including the ‘use of resources that create and provide value and benefits to the world population in the course of exploring, understanding and utilizing space'), even as the UN agency falls back on a humanistic, almost social-democratic vision of the equitable distribution of benefits (and profits) from space mining, exploration, and colonization (UNOOSA, 2018). We find evidence of this strategic humanism in all manner of pronouncements from NewSpace entrepreneurs. To take but one example: Naveen Jain, the chairman and co-founder of MoonEx, a lunar commercialization firm, has claimed that ‘from an entrepreneur’s perspective, the moon has never truly been explored'. The moon, Jain has claimed, ‘could hold resources that benefit Earth and all humanity' (Hennigan, 2011). We should note the recourse to the trope of all of humanity by this NewSpace entrepreneur, mimicked in the 1979 Moon Agreement, a UN treaty, which also held that the Moon’s resources are ‘the common heritage of mankind' (Tronchetti, 2013, p. 13).11 In a purely factual sense, of course, Jain is wrong: Google Moon offers high-resolution images of the lunar surface,12 and the moon has already been explored, in the sense of being mapped, albeit rudimentarily and with room for further data collection. Crucially, however, these cartographic techniques have not been put to capitalist uses: mapping minerals, for instance, or producing detailed schemata that might one day turn the Moon into a ‘gas station' for commercial space ventures, as Wilbur Ross, Trump’s Secretary of Commerce, has proposed (Bryan, 2018). What is lacking, in short, are capitalist maps of the Moon, i.e., a cartography for capital. But as Klinger (2017: 199) notes, even though no one is ‘actively mining the Moon' at present, at least ‘six national space programs, fifty private firms, and one graduate engineering program, are intent on figuring out how to do so'; furthermore, Klinger draws attention to mapping efforts that have revealed high an abundance of rare earth metals, thorium, and iron in the Moon’s ‘Mare Procellarum KREEP' region (Klinger, 2017, p. 203). We have already noted that it is not humanity, conceived as species-being, a Gattungswesen, that makes its way into space. The term Gattungswesen, of course, has a long intellectual pedigree, harking back to Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and others. The term can ‘be naturally applied both to the individual human being and to the common nature or essence which resides in every individual man and woman', Allan Wood (2004, p. 17) writes, as well as ‘to the entire human race, referring to humanity as a single collective entity or else to the essential property which characterizes this entity and makes it a single distinctive thing in its own right'. Significantly, the adherents of NewSpace often resort to the idea of humanity in its broad universality (e.g., Musk, 2017), but this denies and distorts the modulation of humanity by its imbrication with the project of global (and post-global, i.e., space-bound) capitalism. It is precisely the sort of false universality implied in the humanism of the supporters of NewSpace that Marx subjected to a scathing critique in the sixth of his Theses on Feuerbach. Here Marx noted that the human essence is not made up of some ‘abstraction inherent in each single individual' (1998, p. 570). Instead, humans are defined by the ‘ensemble of social relations' in which they are enmeshed. Under NewSpace, it is not humanity, plain and simple, that ventures forth, but a specific set of capitalist entrepreneurs, carrying a particular ideological payload, alongside their satellites, instruments, and supplies, a point noted by other sociologists of outer space, or ‘astrosociologists' (Dickens and Ormrod, 2007a, 2007b).

#### The aff fuels racism

Stover 8-6-2019 ( [Dawn Stover](http://www.dawnstover.com) is a contributing editor at the Bulletin. A science writer based in the Pacific Northwest, her work has appeared in Scientific American, Conservation, Popular Science, New Scientist, The New York Times, and other publications. One of her articles is included in the [2010 Best American Science and Nature Writing](http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/hmh/site/bas/bestamerican/scienceandnaturewritingbookdetails), and another article was awarded a special citation by the [Knight-Risser Prize for Western Environmental Journalism](http://knightrisser.stanford.edu/winner2010.html). “White nationalisms solution to climate change: fewer brown people” https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/white-nationalisms-solution-to-climate-change-fewer-brown-people/)dsrb

The white man charged with killing 22 people in El Paso on Saturday is [believed to be](https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/05/us/el-paso-suspect-patrick-crusius/index.html) the author of a racist “manifesto” posted shortly before the shooting rampage. The hate-filled screed described a “Hispanic invasion of Texas” and warned that white Americans are being “replaced” by foreigners. The manifesto also sounded a growing theme in far-right rhetoric: that nonwhite people are responsible for environmental problems ranging from [litter](https://www.mediamatters.org/tucker-carlson/tucker-carlson-i-actually-hate-litter-which-why-im-so-against-illegal-immigration) to [climate change](https://theweek.com/articles/857100/el-paso-shooters-manifesto-contains-dangerous-message-about-climate-change). Although the manifesto didn’t explicitly refer to climate change, its author titled the four-page document “The Inconvenient Truth,” seemingly a reference to Al Gore’s campaign to raise awareness about global warming. The forced marriage of white supremacy and environmentalism is not new (Adolf Hitler, for one, advocated both racial and environmental purity), but once again it is birthing ugly “solutions,” from shunning refugees to ethnic cleansing. Even those on the far right who don’t “believe” in climate change are happy to jump on the environmental bandwagon. As the far-right author and media pundit Ann Coulter tweeted last year, “I’m fine with pretending to believe in global warming if we can save our language, culture & borders.” In an [article](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/white-nationalists-discover-the-environment/595489/) about white nationalists discovering the environment, *The Atlantic* explains the manifesto writer’s mentality: The American lifestyle is destroying the environment, the author declares. But the answer is not to ask native-born white Americans to change their ways. It is to rid the country of Latinos. It is not brown-skinned immigrants who are primarily responsible for environmental degradation, though. In fact, climate change and other environmental crises are [driving migration](https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/did-climate-change-spark-the-border-crisis/), not the other way around. As *The Atlantic* reminds readers, “Large corporations and the wealthy consume the most environmental resources, not poor immigrants.” Population growth is, of course, contributing to climate change, along with rising affluence and per-capita consumption. But rather than tackling any of these issues, the manifesto’s author proposes genocide: “If we can get rid of enough people, then our way of life can become more sustainable.” Environmentalism, particularly climate change, has traditionally been a concern of liberals. But in the United States and Europe, some on the far right are merging environmental issues with nationalism, a blend dubbed “[eco-fascism](https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2018/09/eco-fascism-ideology-marrying-environmentalism-and-white-supremacy).” Writing in *The Nation*, Jeet Heer [describes](https://www.thenation.com/article/el-paso-mass-shooting-fascism/) how eco-fascism may find a toehold in US politics: This combination of a white nationalism with angst about the prospects for human survival is a perfect recipe for radicalizing young right-wingers and taking Trumpian themes to a new level of extremism. Instead of the merely restorationist day-dream of “making American great again,” the extreme right is using social media agitprop and the propaganda of the deed to harden young white Americans for a global race war fought over diminishing resources. The very real dangers of climate change provide race war fantasists the dystopian background they need to give urgency to their violent agenda. While left-leaning environmentalists have become increasing tolerant of immigration, *The Atlantic* [notes](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/white-nationalists-discover-the-environment/595489/) that “opposition to immigration plays an ever-greater role in defining the conservative movement.” Among registered Republican voters, immigration is [viewed as](https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/reuters-ipsos-data-core-political-2019-06-06) the country’s most important problem. A [growing number](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/climate/climate-change-republicans.html) of young Republicans, however, view climate change as a top priority. Eco-fascists want to connect those dots.

#### **Climate gentrification’s cost burden pathway pushes out poorer minority communities, with cities catering to the affluent and middle class to extract profit from those displaced by rising costs of housing associated with climate change. Old neighborhoods are claimed for new greening projects, perpetuating cycles of spatial inequality and environmental racism**

Hanganh Vo 20

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As being sustainable and “eco-friendly” became the mainstream culture, no one wanted to live around dirty and grimy streets full of litter and dark unwelcoming tall buildings anymore. This culture shift gave birth to the “greenification” of cities across the world. What started as rooftop gardens, planting of trees in neighborhoods to offset the green gas emissions of city life, and beautification of public parks, quickly became an easy way to push poorer residents out of their homes. Don’t get it wrong, green spaces are amazing reminders of nature in cities especially when all you can see is industrialization and pollution, a small patch of grass can make your day feel better. There is nothing wrong with bringing nature into the city and making cities more “eco-friendly” should be a priority in city planning. The issue comes when people gate-keep nature as a commodity that only the rich can afford, that poorer citizens do not deserve the same benefits of living in a green space as their richer counterparts. This leads to spatial inequality in the city, raising the real estate prices and pricing out many generational residents who can no longer afford to live in their childhood neighborhoods and are forced to move into places with more health hazards such as lower air quality. The rich have taken a territoriality approach to the limited city space that is left and monopolized green spaces in neighborhoods that few can afford. The “greenification” of cities without economic regulation is happening on a global scale and not only hurts the urban populations of local communities but suburban and exurban neighborhoods as well since everyone has to live somewhere. This becomes a case of evaluating the cities in a modern-day “mapping land, marking power” approach as those who live in this land now hold the power, they have more access to opportunities such as jobs and culture by living in the city. Since there are more risks associated with living by the coast, the cost of living rises as maintenance and expenses to fortify homes must now be factored into the overall price. This is called a "cost burden pathway". This pathway is an example of how climate gentrification pushes low-income households from the coast more inland. A real life example of this is the cost of real estate in New Orleans or Miami Beach in Florida. Since these coastlines are highly susceptible to flooding from rising sea levels, fortification of these homes will demand more money through necessary expenses such as flood insurance and home repairs. As the world around us continues to slowly heat up and the ice caps in the Arctic begin their great thaw, our seas have begun slowly but surely rising as more water fills our ocean basins. This is not only a major issue for the state of natural ecosystems across the world, but it threatens to create mass displacement and the collapse of local economies. The majority of the world’s population can be found on the coast, with many living in a 60-mile radius from the ocean. This creates massive amounts of population density in small spaces such as cities. These concentrated populations are often found in cities as they are trading hubs and centers of economic activity. Living in the city has become a privilege or a burden, with a large income inequality gap that leaves very little space for a traditional “middle class” to live in. As real estate prices have soared, finding a place to live in the city has never been more expensive. This tips the scale of supply and demand: there is more demand than supply for housing. Many companies in developed and underdeveloped cities have looked to the coast as a place where they can create housing. Some even make more “land” for housing, but only for those who can afford it. Traditionally, living by the coast was not a highly desirable place to live as it. Those who were closest to the water were furthest from the center of the city and market as living in redlined "undesirable" places. However, as cultural shifts changed, everyone suddenly wanted to live by the coast and take in the fresh salty breeze and sounds of crashing waves. Now as the water rises and coastal homes are susceptible to erosion and floods, the lower class population that once inhabited the ports and harbors have been flooded out and replaced with more affluent patrons who can afford it. However, places like Jakarta and Saigon which are megacities that touch the North Pacific Ocean, have many illegal inhabitants on their coast. They will be displaced and killed as the tides roll in, wiping out their houses and livelihoods. In the instance of Jakarta, which has been struggling with industrial extractivism, they have seen sinking in the meters due to land subsidence. While Indonesia does have extreme dependence on the burning of fossil fuels such as their coal industry, Jakarta’s issue lies with groundwater extraction which is sinking the city at a record rate. The example of Jakarta shows evidence that we have entered the Anthropocene as land subsidence and mass urbanization has caused this city to sink faster than the sea is rising. Urbanization is not a new phenomenon but when coupled with rising sea levels, this bodes for large-scale disaster. Those who live by the coast now in cities such as Rotterdam and New York City are dubbed the “sustainable” class, a subsection of the population that usually consists of white upper-middle-class millennials. Sea level risings have weakened socioeconomic relations in the city and have forced them to become a more homogenous mix of richer and affluent citizens instead of lower and middle-class ones. This phenomenon is called “climate gentrification”, gentrification due to climate change which causes cities to cater to a different demographic to create a profit off of those who have been displaced. These populations that are being moved are poor minority citizens which is why climate gentrification is often seen as environmental racism and environmental injustice. An example of this is the use of a "resilience investment pathway" in neighborhood construction in cities and suburbias alike. By making homes and buildings fortified to withstand harsher floods or taking the Dutch approach to engineer homes to "live with the water" instead of working against it, the cost associated with these precautions are often tremendously expensive. While these homes are built to lower the costs associated with the cost burden pathway, their upfront costs make it harder for lower income residents to purchase homes in these neighborhoods. Either pathway makes it extremely difficult for someone who comes from a low income background to create enough socio-economic mobility to live in these homes without a huge amount of crippling debt. These pathways create cycles of inequality that are rarely broken since these neighborhoods are located in places where there are the most opportunities and resources. This means that those who can not afford to live in the city or have a realistic commuting distance to jobs, have less access to opportunities that they could be qualified for. Climate change can be seen as nature’s version of slum clearance, as those who are most affected by the rising tides are the poorest inhabitants of these communities. This urban ecology of removing “human encumberments” from the land is therefore done by natural disaster with man-made influence instead of having to pay for the clearance of these slums with demolition. The “slums”, or underdeveloped parts of cities, are then reclaimed for green space and new housing where the former inhabitants can not afford to live.

#### Gentrification extends the framework of colonialism and slavery into the modern day, reinforcing white supremacist and settler logics and extending cycles of trauma in black and indigenous communities

Briana L. Urena-Ravelo 17, (nonprofit worker and community organizer with 17+ years of organizing, freelance writing, communications, non-profit childcare), 8-4-2017, "It’s true, gentrification isn’t the new colonialism, it’s just the old one.", Medium, https://afroresistencia.medium.com/its-true-gentrification-isn-t-the-new-colonialism-it-s-just-the-old-one-daf7e97a86f0 //mcd

I also honor and respect that though Indigenous American and non-Indigenous American peoples share many experiences under white supremacy, they yet have unique experiences under colonialism that needs to be heard and a right to be named by them, for them. I commit to do more to give space to and uplift Indigenous siblings and stand in solidarity with them. But the frame of the article isn’t Indigenous people’s right to name unique experiences and ways intentionally or not that we benefit from their oppression while respecting Black/Urban POC experiences with colonialism. Instead, it was essentially an essay from a non-Black/non-Latinx guy admitting he willingly goes to victims of gentirification and goes welp, this is all stolen by settlers via colonialism anyways and, well, you just wouldn’t understand what that’s like,because you’re not Native American, so you’ve never been through it. Indigenous Americans do not have a monopoly on that experience. Just like we know that slavery got transformed and modernized into mass incarceration, gentrification is not a symptom of colonialism but the latest manifestation of it, as they already stole and yet exploit the land and labor of Indigenous peoples, both kidnapped and local. As kidnapped Indigenous African peoples, Black people are just as much a part of the narrative of colonialism, land theft, and the struggle of belonging altogether, and to reduce colonialism to “Colonialism is only what happened to Native Americans and their land,” especially considering that reinforces European borders and ideas regarding Indigeneity, is colonizing. It’s harmful to essentially tell other surviving descendants of settler and slave colonialism experiencing colonialism via gentrification today that they’ve never lived it just because you yourself have an incomplete idea of what colonialism is and who it has has impacted. Black people were also taken from their land, and said ancestral land is yet exploited by colonizing entities, usurping and violating Indigenous sovereignty all over the continent. Millions upon millions of our people were killed in passage and throughout slavery across the Americas, killed during Jim Crow and other similar ages of social racial code, through civil rights and liberation movements, through the creation of ghettos and slums, through mass incarceration and policing. Black people also experienced the removal from and destruction of their tribal/ancestral languages, religions, etc. And while it behooved white supremacy to wipe out Indigenous American peoples, they didn’t want kidnapped Africans dead, they wanted us muled-submissive, empty, nameless, landless, zombies, without a mind or identity-so we would work and not resist a national narrative that see us as subjugated racialized labor class. A kidnapped African who understands herself as such is dangerous, she cries and fights and screams for what she has lost and will allow no more of it. One who instead sees herself as just an ill-designed inferior version of a white person, always aspiring but never reaching, striving to be paler, more Christian, etc, is easy to subjugate and control. So to perpetuate the narrative of an identity-less, land-less Black person who is encroaching on the conversation of colonialism as opposed to recognizing them as a foremost authority on it having experienced it themselves is reinforcing that identity-less, a-historical zombification of Black bodies. Naming gentrification as the current manifestation of colonialism also means acknowledging that Black people experiencing gentrification have since slavery little to no say regarding where we went and lived. I see this cycle repeated in the communities I am from. African American vernacular English asks where one “stays at” as opposed to where they live or are from, as there is an understanding that between broken families and cycles of migration/gentrification/slum living under white supremacy, one “stays” in upwards of dozens of places, but lives and is from nowhere, likely having no access to roots beyond a great grandparent or, if they’re lucky, an enslaved African. As for my own family, in the 80s, after centuries of experiencing the repercussions of colonial Spanish anti-Blackness and slavery, my family moved to the (stolen land currently known as) United States, from our land our ancestors were wiped off from/kidnapped to, the first land colonized by Columbus, for a chance at a better life. Instead we continue moving and belonging nowhere. I have lived in over 20 different places in historic Seneca and Anishinaabe territory in poor to lower class communities experiencing varying levels of gentrification/white flight. A double diaspora. No matter where I go, never home. A quote in the Last Real Indians piece from Savage Feminism goes “Even people experiencing gentrification still have more access to Indigenous homelands than the people whose ancestors have lived on them for tens of thousands of years do”. I do not have free access to this land as a poor Afro-Latina living in a patriarchal, anti-Black police state and haven’t once in my life been to either of my ancestral homes, same as millions of people in my community historically, thus the “Diaspora” aspect of our identity. Here and globally, we often live in lesser quality spaces with little to no autonomy over their movement or their land/spaces’ usage and its safety and upkeep, much less ours in it. Knowing all of this, it isn’t overly allegorical or carelessly hyperbolic to compare the phenomenas, to understand one as the continuation of the other. And the comparisons of their facets and its tolls on affected communities can continue on for ages. Crimes against Black and Brown women including TWOC, happen in both historical colonies/plantations/during European land stealing and currently on reservations/reserves and ghettos and gentrifying urban spaces. The over-policing and incarceration of Black and Brown bodies and the destruction of Black and Brown families happened historically and continue on today in reservations/reserves and ghettos and gentrifying urban spaces, so on. Ghettos, favelas, slums and barrios, like reserves and reservations, are white-constructed concentrations of exclusion and racialized poverty where violence of all sorts flourishes. And when those spaces get gentrified, whether through the ignoring of treaties to exploit land (DAPL) and resources or the influx of whiter, more affluent class and race foreign masses, forced removal, mass forced exodus and migration, rape, invasion, overpolicing, the death, destruction and dismantlement of existent vibrant cultures and so much more occurs. Trauma and PTSD is handed down. The cycle continues, the people of those experiences and places are the descendants of yesterday’s colonialism and displacement, re-experiencing the trauma of the past in the current day. It happens here and globally. It is true, Decolonization is NOT a metaphor, and anyone who erases Black and other people of color from the framework and ideology (though it was in large part built by global south peoples!) is engaging in white supremacist and dangerous, historically inaccurate recolonizing of our histories, rendering any discourse on Indigeneity and decolonizing null, void and violent in its incompletion.