## 1nc – Generic

#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,”2017 // sam

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### Removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing and incalculable under utilitarian logics.

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### The affirmation of American democratic legitimacy and its redeemability via the 1ac is rooted in the active disavowal of the genocidal foundations of American democracy. Their democratic utopia is grand, but the question remains: democracy for who?

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Adam Dahl “Empire of the People: Settler Colonialism and the Foundations of Modern Democratic Thought” pp. 1-7 Kansas University Press, April 2018 // sam

American democracy owes its origins to the colonial settlement of North America by European colonists. Since the birth of the republic, observers have emphasized how American democratic thought and identity arose out of the distinct pattern by which English settlers colonized the new world. Empire of the People shows how dominant interpretive and historical currents of modern democratic theory have neglected the other side of this equation: the constitutive role of colonial dispossession in shaping democratic values and ideals.1 By placing the development of American political thought and culture in the context of nineteenth-century settler colonialism, this book reveals how practices and ideologies of indigenous dispossession have laid the theoretical foundations of American democracy. Discussions of colonial America seldom take place in the context of broader debates about the legacies of European colonialism. As the literary critic Michael Warner states, “Very few sentences about colonial America would be significantly altered if the word ‘colonial’ were simply replaced by the word ‘early.’”2 If colonialism and empire entail the imposition of political rule and dependency status on colonized subjects, then American development is anticolonial to the extent that it was born out of revolt against empire. Yet by placing American democratic thought in the context of settler colonialism—a distinct form of colonialism aimed at the expropriation of native land rather than he exploitation of native labor—its colonial tendencies come into more direct focus. Colonial settlement and colonial dispossession are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, colonial settlement refers to the movement of people to a new political space in order to create a new socio-political order. “Settlement” and the related terms “colony” and “plantation” thus refer to the process by which settlers plant a colonial base that marks the origins of that society and establishes further dynamics of social, political, and cultural development. Rooted in the thinking of English theorists Sir Thomas More and Richard Hakluyt, English colonizers understood colonial settlement in agricultural terms as the planting of a seed from which self-perpetuating political communities would flourish. In its familiar etymology, the term “colonus” connotes both inhabitation and cultivation, combining processes of agriculture and settlement of foreign territories into a single process.3 On the other hand, colonial dispossession entails the displacement of preexisting social and political forms to constitute a new political community. The spatial movement of settlers from metropolitan centers to colonial peripheries most often entails the dispossession of indigenous communities by divorcing them from their territorial and cultural foundations. Despite the dual character of colonization, dominant narratives of American democracy rely on a bifurcated understanding that emphasizes the formative role of colonial settlement while neglecting colonial dispossession. Nowhere is this more evident than in one of the urtexts of American democratic identity, J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur’s Letters from an American Farmer (1782). In this seminal text of American political theory, Crèvecœur emphasizes the role of agricultural settlement in shaping key principles of democratic thought—pluralism, the rule of law, social equality, and popular sovereignty. For Crèvecœur, the novelty of American identity derives from the natural conditions of new world geography that prevent the formation of feudal institutions. Bound together by the common project of settlement, regardless of ethnic and religious differences, Americans are a “race of cultivators.” In highlighting the centrality of land and nature in shaping this new American identity, Crèvecœur asks, “What should we American farmers be without the distinct possession of that soil?”4 Although he emphasizes the process of colonial settlement, Crèvecœur disavows the centrality of colonial dispossession to the construction of democratic thought and culture. In characterizing the process of colonizing the island of Nantucket, Crèvecœur wrote, “This happy settlement was not founded on intrusion, forcible entries, or blood. . . . Neither political nor religious broils, neither disputes with the natives, nor any other contentions, have in the least agitated or disturbed its detached society. Yet the first founders knew nothing either of Lycurgus or Solon, for this settlement has not been the work of eminent men or powerful legislators.” When it comes to explaining “the political state of the natives,” he noted that they “were not extirpated by fraud, violence, or injustice as hath been the case in so many provinces” but were naturally “hastening towards a total annihilation.”5 While he briefly acknowledges the colonial violence involved in other settlements, Crèvecœur masks the constitutive effects of colonial conquest on American democratic identity. In taking Nantucket as a microcosm for the settlement of the nation, Crèvecœur asserted that, in contrast to Europe, here “everything is modern, peaceful, and benign. Here we have had no war to desolate our fields.”6 Rather than a political process involving war and conquest, Crèvecœur presents settlement as a natural process. By colonizing the land, settlers become the corporeal incarnation of nature, subsuming the democratic characteristics of the landscape into the organic body politic. The basic features of American democratic peoplehood thus emerge from the land. In treating the American founding as a natural process of colonial settlement rather than an act of “powerful legislators,” Crèvecœur short-circuited what William Connolly calls “the paradox of political founding.” Found most forcefully in Book II of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, the paradox of political founding illustrates the problems by which a people become a political people capable of ruling themselves: “For an emerging people to be capable of appreciating the sound maxims of politics and to follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause . . . men would be, prior to the advent of laws, what they ought to become by means of laws.” For Rousseau, the “true constitution” of republics is “not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens.”7 Yet citizens cannot develop the proper habits, customs, and opinions of republican self-rule without first having a system of good laws. To dissolve the chickenor-egg type paradox, Rousseau introduced the figure of the legislator, who uses extra-legal means to establish the foundation of law. For Connolly, this points to a larger problem besetting all democratic governments—the fact that any political order is founded on extra-legal violence that stands outside of democratic legitimacy. In a manner emblematic of American political thought more generally, Crèvecœur’s account of colonial settlement dissolved the paradox by disavowing colonial dispossession. This book traces the conceptual and theoretical lineages of this disavowal throughout the course of American democratic theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In a material sense, colonial dispossession involves the construction of a new society on top of expropriated land. Conceptually, it entails the construction of a spatial imaginary that empties the territorial ground of democracy of its prior inhabitants by disavowing the presence of indigenous orders. I treat colonial dispossession less as a policy or institution than as a theoretical mechanism that allows settlers to ideologically obscure the foundational violence of colonial conquest. Colonial dispossession is a form of what Walter Benjamin calls “founding violence” or “law-making violence,” a process by which the elimination of native life-forms enables the constitution of new legal, cultural, and political norms.9 Such foundational violence establishes the basis of democratic sovereignty. As James Tully writes of settler colonial dispossession, “the ground of the [colonial] relation is the appropriation of the land, resources, and jurisdiction of the indigenous peoples, not only for the sake of resettlement and exploitation . . . but for the territorial foundation of the dominant [i.e., democratic] society itself.”10 Thus, to uphold the legitimacy of American settler democracy, settler political thought must disavow the origins of democracy in colonial dispossession and in turn erase the political and historical presence of native peoples. It is important to clarify, however, that by focusing on the foundational disavowal of native dispossession, I do not mean a “politics of forgetting” or a form of “national amnesia.”11 Disavowal in ordinary language is a “refusal to acknowledge” and in psychoanalytic terms is “the refusal to recognize the reality of traumatic perception.”12 Disavowal is not simply a passive ignorance of native life-forms in the historical archive of colonial violence. It is an active refusal to historically and ethically grapple with the presence and political claims of indigenous peoples as well as the colonial violence that paved the way for the emergence of modern American democracy. While amnesia and forgetting are passive and might be noted merely by registering the silences in a text, disavowal implies the active and interpretive production of indigenous absence. In settler democratic thought, the absence of native conquest is not assumed or forgotten; it is discursively produced.13 Consequently, the traces of disavowed colonial violence remain in historical and textual memory. Focusing on the theoretical disavowal of colonial dispossession in democratic thought sheds light on the familiar problem of the relationship between race and democracy. To explain the persistence of slavery in colonial Virginia and its centrality to emergent notions of political liberty, Edmund Morgan famously argued that slavery and freedom in the American political imagination, rather than being mutually exclusive, developed in relation to one another. In so doing, Morgan resisted the temptation to flip the script by casting slavery and oppression as dominant trends in colonial thought and advances in liberty and equality as the exception. In Morgan’s account, racial slavery was not antithetical to American liberty, but laid the conceptual and economic foundation of freedom for white settlers. In a conceptual sense, American colonists developed their notions of freedom not despite but because of slavery by contrasting their own status as freemen with that of their slaves. In a material sense, individual freedom rested on the economic independence afforded by the profits from slave labor. At the political and collective level, then, the vast economic growth produced by slave labor enabled the emergence of a free American state and citizenry. The central problem for American colonists prior to the Revolution was the “struggle for a separate and equal station among the nations of the earth.”14 Slavery constituted freedom at both an individual and collective level, allowing colonists to develop their notions of political and individual liberty. According to Morgan, slavery and liberty existed not in an oppositional or even identical relationship to one another, but in a web of contradictions, giving rise to what he calls “the American paradox of slavery and freedom, intertwined and interdependent, the rights of Englishmen supported on the wrongs of Africans.”15 While Morgan made these claims through analysis of literature in colonial Virginia, his emphasis was on slavery rather than indigenous dispossession. Empire of the People recasts the paradox of race to focus not just on the relationship between slavery and freedom, but also on the relationship between democracy and dispossession. Dispossession was not an unfortunate by-product of modern democracy, nor was settler colonial ideology an entirely separate political tradition from democratic thought. The two surged alongside each other and reinforced each other in their historical development. This pushes historically oriented scholars of race and politics in a different direction to bring questions of land and indigeneity back into the fold in studies of American political thought. Institutions and ideologies of conquest and colonization, as well as those of slavery and racial exclusion, were closely linked to the development of democratic ideals and institutions. For all Morgan did to advance our understanding of the complex relationship between race and democracy, he neglected crucial dynamics of colonial America. By adhering to a periodization of “colonial America” as pre-republican and pre-independence, Morgan ignored the colonial dynamics of America that persisted not only into the republican period but also into the present. I thus propose to shift the meaning of “colonial America” to a theoretical register away from an exclusively historical register that casts the qualifier “colonial” in terms of temporal periodization. In its theoretical register, the idea of “colonial America” centers on the constitutive role of settler colonialism in shaping American democratic thought. Understood in this way, “colonial America” names not a phase of American intellectual and political development, but the settler colonial foundations of American democracy that continue to structure the basic features of modern democratic thought and politics. The critical indigenous theorist Jodi Byrd helpfully highlights why political theorists have not sufficiently appreciated the centrality of settler colonialism to the making of modern democracy. Indigenous politics tend to get framed through a politics of race and racialization. As Byrd writes, “When the remediation of the colonization of American Indians is framed through discourses of racialization that can be redressed by further inclusion into the nation-state, there is significant failure to grapple with the fact that such discourses further reinscribe the original colonial injury.”16 By framing processes of colonization in terms of a politics of exclusion (the solution to which inclusion into the constitutional, multicultural state) rather than a politics of dispossession and sovereignty (the solution to which is the reclamation of indigenous governance), discourses of racialization in turn reinforce structures of settler sovereignty through the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the imperial state as the remedy for conquest. In a related way, treating the problem of colonization in terms of “internal colonialism” tends to cast indigenous peoples as “minorities within” settler states rather than as conquered and dispossessed populations. The idea of internal colonialism thus feeds “the construction of the United States as a multicultural nation that is struggling with the legacies of racism rather than as a colonialist power engaged in territorial expansion since its beginning.”17 If we are to properly understand the settler colonial foundations of American democratic thought, we need alternative frameworks of analysis that capture the history of native communities in the United States as a process of colonization and dispossession. Recovering and contesting these historical elisions is essential because the enduring legacies of colonial dispossession and their disavowal counteract native claims to selfgovernance in the present.18

#### Their affirmation of the universal right to strike is rooted in the dispossession of the native – struggles over the distribution of the colonial loot always frame labor movements in opposition to indigenous struggle because settler labor always needs the structure of settler colonialism to maintain its relative global comfort.

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In order to reflect on the particular nature of accumulation by dispossession within a settler colonial context, another issue should be raised: that of the internal social relations within settler colonial societies. Indeed, the most striking aspect of settler colonial societies is the development of a colonial polity in which settlers live, produce, and reproduce themselves socially. They do so on the back of the dispossession of indigenous populations through which they acquire land, resources, and, depending on the context, labour. This—perhaps obvious—characteristic leads to the development of internal class relations and conflicts, alongside confrontations between settlers and indigenous peoples. The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society … In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. The specificity of Zionism in the history of settler colonialism, its lack of a colonial metropolis, had real consequences for the Zionists in Palestine. Firstly, it could not impose—at first—its control over the land through military force. Secondly it could not organise the transfer of populations to the colony in the same way a state could. In the words of Shafir (1996:155): “Zionism, then, was a colonisation movement which simultaneously had to secure land for its settlers and settlers for its land”. The dual need for land and labour was at the heart of many political developments in the Yishuv. If the question of land was resolved first through acquisition from largely absentee land owners and then (and most extensively) through military violence, the question of immigration came close several times to bringing the whole colonial project to its knees, as the European Jewish population tended to reject Zionism as a political response to the poverty and discrimination they faced. Two distinct political responses emerged within the early settler population. On the one hand, the Jewish farmers and their sponsors hoped to develop a cash crop producing agricultural sector focused on export to Europe and the exploitation of cheap Palestinian workers. This vision was based, as demonstrated by Shafir (1996), on the model of other European projects—especially the French settler colonies of North Africa. On the other hand, the nascent Labour Zionist movement demanded better wages and working conditions for Jewish workers in Palestine, which they argued would be the only way to attract and retain new settlers. This, they claimed, necessitated full separation between the Jewish and Palestinian sectors, removing thereby the “unfair competition” of the cheaper indigenous labour force. This led to the development of a series of new Labour Zionist institutions to organise this “Conquest of Hebrew Labour”, by organising strikes, pickets, and boycotts of Jewish owned businesses that employed Palestinian workers or sold products made by them. The Kibbutzim, the Histadrut,6 and the early Zionist militias were all born out of the process of organising this campaign (Lockman 1996). For example, the Histadrut’s constitution, passed at its founding congress, made clear that it was a Zionist body committed to the project of settlement through the development of an exclusively Jewish society. It stated that the Histadrut’s goal was to: … unite all the workers and labourers in the country who live by their own labour without exploiting the labour of others, in order to arrange for all settlement, economic and also cultural affairs of all the workers in the country, so as to build a society of Jewish labour in Eretz Yisra’el. (quoted in Lockman 1996:68) The similarity between the logic of this statement and that of the white South African strikers mentioned above is remarkable. This struggle—waged against Palestinian workers and Jewish farmers—led to a partial victory for the Labour Zionist movement (Lockman 2012). Key industries, such as construction and agriculture, were taken over by Labour Zionist institutions such as Solal Boneh and the Kibbutzim. At the same time, Jewish representation in colonial institutions was increased through collaboration with the British Mandate authorities especially in the context of crushing the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The Labour Zionists took over the Yishuv’s political leadership and created a dominant Jewish sector, without however being able to establish a fully segregated one. It did set in motion the logic of separation as well as laying the infrastructure for a Jewish state, which would be made a reality by its militias’ military violence and mass expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba. This case study shows that the Labour Zionist movement developed on the basis of opposing Jewish farmers as well as Palestinian workers, a political focus that also shaped its key institutions. The campaign for Hebrew Labour also demonstrates that the “elimination of the native” in the settler colonial context is not a given, as in the Wolfe-an framework, but the outcome of a specific set of struggles that pit both the indigenous population against the settlers, as well as different settler classes against one another. This approach is not only applicable to historical processes but also contemporary ones. In 2011, an Israeli social movement emerged from a small activist encampment protesting the cost of housing in Tel Aviv into a two and a half month long protest in which hundreds of thousands of people joined demonstrations and square occupations all over the country. The movement was supported by a large majority of Israelis, regardless of political persuasion or ethnic background (Perugorria et al. 2016), as well as by key institutions of the historic Labour Zionist movement, including the Histadrut and the national students’ union. It was an expression of class struggle within the settler population, where the victims of neoliberal economic reforms fought for greater redistribution of wealth. This process was self-consciously an internal one: the movement actively presented itself as made up of loyal, serving, citizens—an impression that was reinforced by the organisations that supported it—while keeping Palestinians and their demands at arm’s length. The Palestinian question remained taboo (Honig-Parnass 2011). The Netanyahu government’s response to the movement’s demands was to deepen settler dispossession. The question of unaffordable housing could be resolved easily, so the argument went, by expanding settlements. MK Arye Eldad argued that “[t]ens of thousands of Israelis can live in Judea, Samaria [the West Bank] and Jerusalem” (quoted in Harkov 2011). Similar proposals were a significant current among Israeli politicians. In August 2011, a group of 41 MKs (out of 120), including representatives from the Labour Zionist camp, called on Netanyahu to expand settlement construction in response to the demonstrators’ demands. Indeed, governmental initiatives have since focused on developing housing in East Jerusalem on the one hand, and in the Israeli periphery—more specifically within areas with high Palestinian populations, such as the Naqab in the south—on the other. An interesting episode in the summer of 2015 highlighted this approach. The government was in the process of negotiating a new agreement with the Chinese state over permits for up to 20,000 Chinese construction workers to come to Israel. When criticised, Netanyahu defended the deal on the basis that “the ability to build many apartments, thereby increasing supply, will, in the end, allow us to change price trends” (quoted in Reed 2015). Moshe Kahlon, the then finance minister, also explained that “the plan to bring thousands of Chinese workers into the country is intended to speed up construction work to solve the housing problem and bring down prices” (MEMO 2015). The government’s response to the demonstrations has been to provide affordable housing to the settler working class while simultaneously increasing its control over Palestinian land. A “settler colonial fix” is available to the Israeli elites, through which they can soften the blow of internal inequality through colonial expansion. The state’s response to the 2011 social movement’s demand for affordable housing through the intensification of indigenous dispossession, and the silent acceptance of this solution by a movement that had gathered such considerable public support, further underscores the claims made by this paper. Settler class struggle is waged over both the distribution of wealth within the settler population, but also over the distribution of the settler colonial loot. The participation of the settler workers’ movement in the process of accumulation by dispossession, through capturing land, resources, and labour, or through the expulsion of the indigenous population is a specific characteristic of settler colonial regimes. Indeed, whereas the theoreticians of accumulation by dispossession, discussed above, understood it as a process directed against workers and peasants, we see here settler workers actively participating in the process and enjoying its spoils. Furthermore, the discussion of this process within the framework of Zionism in Palestine, shows that this struggle takes place both within exploitative (first case study) and eliminatory (second case study) contexts. It is in part through this internal struggle over the distribution of the settler colonial loot, alongside the struggle against the indigenous population, that the nature of the settler colonial regime is determined, as discussed in the first case study, which described the shift in the process of settler accumulation from exploiting the indigenous population to attempting to eliminate it.

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

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Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

### 1nc – Framing

#### Our interpretation is that the 1ac is an epistemological project – before you evaluate the consequences of the plan text you should weigh its ideological underpinnings.

#### Accountability DA – “weigh the aff” is a settler ruse to ensure a lack of accountability for anti-native representations – only our model of debate ensures we can challenge violent representations which internal link turns fairness because it makes debate unsafe for black, brown, and native debaters. Psychological violence outweighs – your role as an educator is to prioritize a model of debate that makes debate safer for students.

#### University DA – the university’s investment in land theft structures its political possibilities – academic spaces are always already pursuing genocide. Absent a politics that engages with the settler colonial nature of the university the 1ac’s politics replicate that genocidal ideology.

## Case1

### 1nc – Util

#### Pain and pleasure fail as ethical starting points –

#### Ontology Outweighs – violence against the native is infinite and accumulates each day of occupation via the structural condition of sickness – the inevitable 1ar framing push won’t be able to account for or understand this violence – this means if we win our thesis claims we will win the framing debate.

#### Indigenous and black people are scientifically understood to experience less pain than white people – the evaluation of pain and pleasure is skewed by settler colonialism which means weighing is invested in settler colonialism.

### Unions

#### Unions are ineffective, 2 warrants:

#### Unions reaffirm the right of management to control labor – only breeds conservatism that hurts the working-class struggle

Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and a former head steward for UAW Local 2865, 2020 – [“Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough”, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing]

In unionized shops, they argued that union bureaucrats served as a junior partner to management, trading worker gains in wages, benefits, and representation in exchange for reaffirming the company’s right to manage. This was not a result of personal corruption or moral failings but a structural feature of the bureaucracy. Postwar labor relations, with full-time union representatives tasked with negotiating and administering complex, technical contracts with management representatives, meant that unions’ bureaucratic layer had a day-to-day experience closer to their management counterparts than the workers they represented. Likewise, they saw apathy and conservatism among the ranks not as a result of ignorance, but a rational response to the boss’s power and the union’s inability to counter it. The Johnson-Forest perspective found an audience in France, where the Socialisme ou Barbarie? group translated many of their pamphlets, as well as in Italy, where partisans [elaborated](http://www.plutobooks.com/9780745399904/storming-heaven-second-edition/) the ideas into a perspective known as *operaismo*, or workerism. By then, it had veered far from its Trotskyist roots, its strident skepticism of bureaucracy making it resemble more the syndicalism that Trotsky criticized. Other tendencies developed the “workerist” analysis of the workplace, unions, and worker consciousness, but without rejecting the role of leaders or parties as leading inevitably to bureaucratic domination. In the United States, the “Cochranite” [tendency](https://www.amazon.com/American-Labor-Midpassage-Bert-Cochran/dp/B005ICMFOY) was an early proponent of this perspective. One of its leaders, metal worker Harry Braverman, wrote one of the most penetrating analyses of how and why work had changed under capitalism in the twentieth century, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. Observing that a key source of workers’ power was their practical knowledge of the production process, Braverman showed how management appropriated that knowledge through a process of “deskilling,” separating production, conception, and execution in blue-collar factory, white-collar office, and service work.

#### Their prioritization of bureaucracy makes any strikes impossible

Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and a former head steward for UAW Local 2865, 2020 – [“Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough”, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing]

Regardless, despite the radically changed political and economic landscape, labor unions and movements will continue to face challenges similar to those unions have faced since Marx and Engels’s time. These stem from unions’ fundamental contradiction: they are necessary but insufficient vehicles for workers to achieve their goals. This is further complicated by the tightrope that unions must walk between militancy and bureaucracy. If self-preservation led unions to prioritize maintaining their bureaucratic organizations in recent decades, the escalating state and employer offensive has made that response increasingly untenable. Renewed militancy is key to labor’s future. The apparent recent rise in worker protest holds promise, but history suggests that it is nowhere near the scale necessary for reversing labor’s declining fortunes. Although it is impossible to know if and when a large enough upsurge will arrive, history also suggests that the direction the upsurge takes, and what gains or losses result from it, will depend on the patient, day-to-day work that unions do in forging the key agent of social change — the working class.

## Case 2

No brink for inequality – has existed for a long period of time now – 1ac can’t draw a line for when it becomes too much and causes the impact

AT Stryker – no ev that the right wing will be able to win future elections and do anything, just that the right wing exists

AT Solt – nationalism is non-uq, already exists. Inequality doesn’t drive nationalism – the declining middle class creates sentiments of dissatisfaction with the country and the govt instead of increasing the love of the country – younger gens prove

At Cribb – taking action on climate isn’t mutually exclusive with taking action on inequality. BUT the K solves for climate better because the settler drive is what creates the commodification of resources that create environmental destruction – proves that only we can explain the root cause

Inequality doesn’t cause right wing pop – ask any trump supporter – they don’t care about things like universal health care – they are against government programs designed to reduce inequality.

Just because inequality creates divide doesn’t mean that inequality creates rising right wing

Uncond right to strike doesn’t encourage people to strikes –