## 1nc – Generic v2

### 1nc – Kritik

#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,”2017 // sam :)

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### That removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam :)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### Their attachment to apocalyptic threat analysis is rooted in the fear of the end of Western futures only salvageable via the heroism of the white subject – reject their All Lives Matter politics.

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Audra Mitchell and Aadita Chaudhury “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 309–332 // sam :)

Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Eurocentric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they recognize or construct as ‘white’4 and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not.5 Whiteness is also a form of property6 that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness. Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus.7 Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof.8 On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race9 as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler,10 continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’11 – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).12 The ‘habits’ of racism13 are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities. First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk, 14 which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and Humanprogress.org, are dominated by white men, with few exceptions.15 Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation16 that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant.17 As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017)18 work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer postapocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems. These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells19 contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown20 argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore21 demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded. Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff.22 Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon23 asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest24 – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies25 as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz26 proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture27 – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.28 In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley29 (italics ours) state, ‘if you are anything like we are, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing.30 Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds.31 At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’32 that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . . were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . including us’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic increase is in Caucasian girls’33 (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’34 in which responsibility for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important than figuring out how to. . . survive’,35 we argue that accurately attributing responsibility is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and chances for collective survival. Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological survival of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries.36 For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’.37 Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally,38 much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOC majority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’.39 Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations explode’.40 Drawing on Demeny’s work, HomerDixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico.41 In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’. BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’,42 and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance43 of over 6million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing.44 These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism.45 What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

#### Settler humanitarianism kills natives – the politics of care and healing endorsed by the affirmative are not benign interventions but rather actively genocidal disruptions of indigenous care and medicine – the logics of curing sickness is inseparable from the desire to cure the impure native.

**Maxwell 17** – Krista Maxwell’s research centers on Indigenous social and political organising around wellness and healing, health care and child welfare, from mid-20th century to the present. She is a professor of medical anthropology at the University of Toronto

Krista Maxwell, “Settler Humanitarianism: healing the indigenous child-victim.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 59(4): 974-1007 // sam :)

In her ethnography of how Canadian humanitarianism affects Inuit, Lisa Stevenson (2014) makes a provocative observation. She notes that Inuit do not experience settler-state interventions aimed at making them live, such as mid-twentieth-century sanatorium-based tuberculosis treatment, and contemporary suicide-prevention programs, as forms of care, but rather as erasures of their identities, cultures, and histories. She analyses this disjuncture as flowing from “the psychic life of biopolitics” in the settler-colonial context: “In the psychic lives of both the colonizer and the colonized, the biopolitical commandment to stay alive at all costs is haunted by the desire on the part of the colonist to murder the colonized, and also by the recurring sense the colonized have that what appear to be the most benign public health programs are, in fact, genocidal” (2014: 44). Stevenson’s account depicts how Indigenous peoples, in their everyday lives, must grapple with the settler-state’s efforts to ameliorate the effects of ongoing dispossession through paternalistic care. The case of Aboriginal healing shows how settler-humanitarianism shapes such settler-state interventions and also how Indigenous people experience the after-effects. In the process of producing Canadian Aboriginal healing policy, a host of Indigenous and non-Indigenous political actors transmuted “healing” from a collective, social process with anticolonial underpinnings into an individualized, marketized set of biopolitical interventions. We should not be surprised, then, that many residential school survivors, and their families and communities, have experienced the psychic life of these ostensibly benevolent “healing” interventions as ongoing settler-colonial violence that reinforces the political status quo. Here I consider the psychic life and troubling social effects of, first, the regime for implementing the Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), and second, the discourse on historical trauma that has become central to Aboriginal healing in Canada. Some close observers of the social effects of the Common Experience Payment (that made to all claimants able to prove attendance at an institution recognized by the state as a residential school), found their assessment complicated by the belief that the payments constituted a form of wealth redistribution, benefitting the most marginalized (see also de Costa 2009). One such observer is Leslie Saunders, long-time coordinator of the Meeting Place, a Toronto drop-in center serving homeless and marginally-housed people, many of whom struggle with addictions. They include many residential school survivors, mostly Cree and Anishinaabeg from northern Ontario, who submitted claims under the Settlement Agreement. Commencing her account to me of how participation in this process had affected many regular users of the Meeting Place, Leslie stated, “I think the Aboriginal school money is a positive thing, generally speaking, because it does give some money to people that previously didn’t have any money at all.” Like many commentators, she applauded the Common Experience Payment as a form of wealth redistribution, and hoped the settlement would redress the racialized socio-economic inequities that characterize contemporary Indigenous-settler relations in Canada. But this was neither the purpose nor the effect of the compensation. Rather, these payments were embedded in a continuing colonial relationship, and they stamped the recipients with an enduring label of “damaged goods.” Leslie made this clear as she elaborated: However, having said that, it has also spiked the addictions and the suicides, because people are drinking themselves to death with this money. Some of them are so re-traumatized by the process that is required to get that money that it’s putting them in a terrible mental state, because they’re forced to dredge up all these horrible memories that they’ve worked so hard to try to numb out.50 And then after they’ve been re-traumatized, they’re handed this cheque, and so, of course, they do the only thing many of them know how to do, and that’s numb out the pain with more drugs and alcohol. So, I really wished that they could have come up with a different process.51 Cree and Anishinaabe residential school survivors using the Meeting Place are arguably among the most socially and economically marginalized of claimants. But research with a broader range of survivors confirms that their experiences were not atypical (Reimer 2010a; 2010b). For many, seeking reparations under the Settlement Agreement has been harmful in itself, entrenching their victim status and exacerbating everyday forms of suffering. Many claimants struggled to obtain the required evidence of attendance due to inconsistent church and government record-keeping. Nearly twenty-five thousand endured the distress of having their Common Experience Payment applications dismissed when their claims of suffering were judged illegitimate, and many of them initiated appeals.52 Those seeking compensation became entangled in state bureaucratic procedures “in which they carry the burden of proof of their … damage while experiencing the risk of being delegitimised in legal, welfare, and medical institutional contexts” (Petryna 2002: 216). Residential school survivors’ responses to the Settlement Agreement underscore the inherently anti-political effects of humanitarian interventions, which work to bolster, rather than transform, the established, settler-colonial political order (see Ticktin 2011). Many beneficiaries rejected the assumption, fundamental to the Settlement Agreement, that cash payments would be healing, and instead equated acceptance of them with capitulation to dominant interests (Reimer 2010a). Some concluded that “to settle for individual monetary compensation was misguided and insufficient” (Reimer 2010a: 93–94). Only about one-quarter of recipients described the payment in terms suggesting the possibility for positive transformation, for example, as a meaningful symbol of public recognition of their suffering and admission of government wrongdoing, or an important step towards reconciliation (ibid.). Infrequent but powerful Indigenous challenges to settler-humanitarianism continued in public events organized by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While anthropologists have documented how the workings of the TRC generated significant momentum for “historical trauma” discourse, some exceptional contributions deviated from the TRC’s “template” for survivor testimonies, which centered on traumatic experience and suffering, counterbalanced by a measure of hope (Niezen 2016; see also Molema 2016). Instead, some former students used this forum to condemn the “retraumatizing and dehumanizing” effects of the Independent Assessment Process (IAP), which those seeking compensation for sexual and physical abuse must undergo (Molema 2016: 141). Speaking at an event in Vancouver, residential school survivor and former chief Jillian Harris reported that “a family member had hung himself the day before his IAP adjudication, and that over the course of the IAP, it was ‘like the spirit of suicide roared through our community’” (ibid.). In his ethnographic account, Arie Molema further documents how some survivors vociferously disrupted presentations to the Commission by Indigenous and settler political leaders. At one event, during a presentation from British Columbia Premier Christy Clark, a group of Indigenous protestors53 brandished a banner proclaiming “We Are Walking Dollars,” and threw bags marked with dollar signs onto the stage where Clark stood (ibid.). The administration of the Settlement Agreement is virtually completed at the time of this writing, but “historical trauma” discourse continues to gain momentum. Canadian health and social work professionals increasingly employ historical trauma as shorthand for Indigenous communities’ psychosocial damage, understood as originating in residential school experiences and transmitted inter-generationally within families. In health and child development literatures, a family history of residential school attendance is now an individual “risk factor” that explains a range of complex social phenomena in Indigenous communities, from lack of parenting skills (Ball 2008) to sexual assault (Patterson et al. 2008), Hepatitis C infection (Craib et al. 2009), and suicide (Elias 2012). These theorized relationships are, of course, impossible to prove empirically and can only be demonstrated as correlations. Invoking “historical trauma” to explain contemporary Indigenous social suffering has problematic, if unintended, corollaries, echoing settler humanitarianism. First, historical trauma discourse perpetuates settler-colonial assumptions about the inherent dysfunction of Indigenous families, assumptions that date to the imperial child-rescue movement’s universalization of middle-class British values. The persistence of these assumptions among health and social service professionals contributes to the continuing, disproportionate apprehension of Indigenous children by child welfare authorities (Blackstock 2008; de Leeuw et al. 2010; Richardson and Nelson 2007). Second, privileging past experiences of abuse diverts attention from how contemporary (neo)liberal settler-colonialism over-determines Indigenous social suffering. Finally, historical trauma discourse legitimates the indefinite deferral of Indigenous sovereignty over social reproduction, pending attainment of “capacity” (see also Irlbacher-Fox 2009) that is to be built through a host of behavioral interventions such as early childhood education and parenting programs, which themselves constitute assimilationist projects. CONCLUSION Indigenous healing has been co-opted by the Canadian state and reworked as settler-humanitarianism, partially displacing the critical, collectivist analyses of earlier Native healing activists. While some Indigenous leaders and professionals have enabled this process, many Indigenous intellectuals continue to advance alternative frameworks in public discourse. These link contemporary Indigenous experiences of social suffering—including interpersonal violence, substance abuse, and suicide—with collective, historical experiences of dispossession and violence, and ongoing racism, marginalization, and violent assaults on the land. Recent writings by Indigenous feminist environmental and sovereignty scholars and activists, for example, offer analyses comparable to those characterizing earlier understandings of Native healing praxis.54 Time will tell how such analyses may resist co-option; the case of Aboriginal healing as settler-humanitarianism offers trenchant lessons in this regard. Meanwhile, “reconciliation” is supplanting “healing” as the keyword for contemporary Canadian settler-humanitarianism. On 5 December 2015, recently elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly responded to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report. Having delivered brief remarks promising a “national reconciliation framework,” Trudeau conspicuously wiped his eyes with a tissue. This widely circulated image was later pronounced by the Huffington Post as one of “The 30 Best Canadian Political Photos of 2015.” As I observed in the introduction, the work of the Commission has enabled the Canadian settler-state to redeem itself in humanitarian terms, while failing to reckon with the implications of the residential school system as a settler-humanitarian project that continues to have not only psychosocial effects but also systemic continuities in the present. Trudeau’s compelling performance of settler sympathy (including the latest official apology for residential schools) is consistent with his government’s continuing disregard for Indigenous sovereignty, exemplified by its support for oil-pipeline construction on Indigenous territory and its failure to allocate adequate resources to redress gross inequities in public services funding on First Nations reserves. As I have argued here, settler expressions of sympathy for Indigenous suffering, and the interventions they justify, serve to simultaneously enable and conceal ongoing Indigenous dispossession. As the current Canadian government moves to develop a national reconciliation framework, critical observers should scrutinize the resulting discourses and interventions for settler humanitarianism

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

**Henderson 15** – Phil Henderson is a professor of political science at the University of Victoria

Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam :)

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

#### We are living in the crisis of modernity – collapse is imminent, brought on by the settler colonial present – only immediate commitment to decolonization can prevent human extinction – laundry list of scenarios.

**Paradies 20** – Yin Paradies is a researcher at Deakin University

Yin Paradies, “Unsettling truths: modernity, (de-)coloniality and Indigenous futures”, Postcolonial Studies, [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13688790.2020.1809069 //](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13688790.2020.1809069%20//) sam :)

In CANZUS3 settler-colonial societies, interest in colonisation is often focused on relatively distant colonial pasts where Indigenous4 peoples were ‘displaced’ (and other euphemisms for slavery, rape, torture, murder and genocide), with relatively scant attention paid to ongoing colonial presence/presents in which systemic, structural, physical, epistemic and ontological violence continue to oppress, assimilate and eradicate Indigenous peoples. This has resulted in vast over-representation of Indigenous peoples among, for example, the impoverished, unhealthy, imprisoned and homeless,5 as well as even greater under-representation among politicians, administrators, the wealthy, influential and famous. For Indigenous peoples from around the world, the ‘slow violence’ 6 of colonisation exists alongside violent assaults and fatal neglect. There is also a growing realisation of the impossibility of justice through the law,7 of reconciliation,8 or of any answers at all from within settler-colonial states.9 Even in scholarship focused on contemporary manifestations of settler colonialism, the broader conditions of modernity10 are often neglected. These include the fact that 60% of people globally live on less than $5 a day, eight people have more wealth than half the world’s population,11 1.6 billion people are without adequate housing,12 one in four children worldwide are stunted from malnutrition, real Gross Domestic Product has tripled since 1980 while a billion more people now live in poverty,13 devastating wars and brutal dictatorships continue unchecked,14 an epidemic of loneliness is sweeping the Western world,15 and the United States is experiencing the longest consecutive decline in life expectancy for a century,16 with similar trends in the United Kingdom.17 Today, modern nation states, especially in the ‘West’, have become hyper-individualist, atomised, securitised societies existing within a deepening crisis of climate change and the sixth mass extinction.18 This includes toxic chemicals in everything from Antarctic ice19 to human breast milk;20 microplastics throughout our bodies and environments; rising sea levels; extreme wildfires; super-typhoons; global pandemics; a 60% decline in vertebrate numbers since 1970;21 grave concern for insect populations;22 indiscriminate deforestation; extensive soil erosion; acidic oceans; toxic air; fresh-water shortages; and catastrophic global warming that will likely reach 4 degrees Celsius by century’s end.23 This is a consumptive world of rapidly dwindling fossil-fuel resources in which many human societies are dependent on highly vulnerable just-in-time global supply chains.24 Despite this, there exists scant political will to steer away from civilisational collapse, an outcome now more certain than any alternative.25 In such a world, truth telling means telling the unsettling26 truth about the dangers of modernity for global life, including its deeply atrophied capacity to provide people with a collective existential purpose.27 If ‘truth is about the future as much as it is about the past’, 28 then it is also equally about the present. Like most Indigenous political activists, I will consider the past, present and future as nested and folded together, encircling linear goal-centred dissected ‘clock’ time29 through rhythmic, cyclical, spiral sensing30 that necessitates ‘a careful remembering of the future’. 31 An understanding of modernity’s wrongs means not only knowledge of its past impacts but also apprehending how it continues to destroy our present/futures, and then acting to prevent this in ways that are more than merely metaphorical.32 Only 500 years ago, almost half the world’s land remained unclaimed by nation states.33 Since then, modernity has grown near-ubiquitous through the creation of national(ised) territory. This was achieved through the creation of property by the violent enclosure of peasants’ land in Europe (i.e. the commons) as well as colonial usurping of Indigenous land throughout the world. It also involved concentration of the means of production into the hands of a small minority and the extraction of resources from the majority via industrialisation and wage labour. This process was also characterised by the development of, for example, fossil capitalism, bureaucracy,34 monogamy and the nuclear family, unrealistic beauty35 and success ideals,36 and further enclosure of many individuals within hermeneutically sealed buildings, often to undertake ‘bullshit jobs’. 37 Over longer timescales, the origins of modernity can be traced back to the formation of sovereign states (e.g. chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires) and the invention of institutions (e.g. religious, legal, military), patriarchy,38 slavery and debt. These events, which I take as the birth of modernity, occurred in what is now the Middle East predominantly around 5000 years ago,39 with the earliest trends evident up to 10,000 years ago.40

### 1nc – Framing

#### Our interpretation is that the 1ac is an epistemological project – before you evaluate the consequences of the plan text you should weigh its ideological underpinnings.

#### Accountability DA – “weigh the aff” is a settler ruse to ensure a lack of accountability for anti-native representations – only our model of debate ensures we can challenge violent representations which internal link turns fairness because it makes debate unsafe for black, brown, and native debaters. Psychological violence outweighs – your role as an educator is to prioritize a model of debate that makes debate safer for students.

#### University DA – the university’s investment in land theft structures its political possibilities – academic spaces are always already pursuing genocide. Absent a politics that engages with the settler colonial nature of the university the 1ac’s politics replicate that genocidal ideology.

**paperson 17** – la paperson, or K. Wayne Yang, is a professor and scholar in Indigenous organizing and critical pedagogy. He is a professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego and Provost of John Muir College.

la paperson, “Land. And the University Is Settler Colonial” from “A Third University is Possible, UMN Press, 2017, <https://manifold.umn.edu/read/7ba69a54-7131-4598-9fec-815890725d91/section/561c45d2-9442-42d5-9938-f8c9e2aafcfc#ch02> // sam :)

Land accumulation as institutional capital is likely the defining trait of a competitive, modern-day research university. Land is not just an early feature in the establishment of universities. Land is a motor in the financing of universities, enabling many of them to grow despite economic crises. In my own university context during the subprime loan bust of 2008, California campuses expanded facilities construction even while classes were closed, staff furloughed, enrollments frozen, and tuition and fees hiked.[1] One common joke is that “UC” means “Under Construction” rather than “University of California”; similar satirical acronyms exist throughout the research university world. The irony of continued property expansion and revenue generation while enrollments are capped and tuitions balloon has characterized the twenty-first-century university. Land is the keystone of the university, yet land is least likely to be discussed in any critical treatment of it. Universities do not exist in some abstract academic place. They are built on land, and especially in the North American context, upon occupied Indigenous lands. From where I write, the California public university system is a land-grant institution. This means that stolen land was (and is) the literal capital used to buy and build one of the largest university systems in the world; the tripartite of California community colleges, California state universities, and the University of California system constitute the largest such public institution in the world (and, arguably, the largest public institution of any sort). Land-grant institutions were legally born in 1862, when Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act into law. The passage of the Morrill Act is often narrated as a quiet, civilian accomplishment during the U.S. Civil War. Nonetheless, it was truly intimate to war and to the production of a Yankee North American empire. In 1862, seven Southern states seceded from the Union and thus removed from Congress the dissenting votes that had previously blocked the Morrill Act from becoming law. The act gave federal public lands to (Union) states, allotting thirty thousand acres of recently appropriated Indigenous lands for each senator and representative to stake out. States were encouraged to sell these “land grants” to raise money for new public universities that would research and educate American settlers in agriculture, science, and mechanical arts. Land is turned into capital for constructing universities for the principal goal of growing industry:[2] That all moneys derived from the sale of the lands aforesaid by the States to which the lands are apportioned . . . the moneys so invested shall constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which shall remain forever undiminished, . . . and the interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college. (Morrill Act, section 4, para. 7) Land as capital and not as campuses is an innovation of the land-grant university. That is, states are able to trade, develop, and sell land to fund the construction of public universities. Land as capital incentivized land speculation. For example, New York State acquired its Morrill Act lands in 160-acre denominations, or “scrip,” which could be traded privately, even for lands in other states. Most notably, Ezra Cornell, cofounder of Cornell University and of the Western Union Company, traded 532,000 acres of scrip in New York to acquire timber-rich lands in Wisconsin. The “Western Lands,” as they were appropriately dubbed, fueled Cornell University from 1865 until the last scrip was finally liquidated in 1935.[3] Therefore land-grant universities are built not only on land but also from land. Morrill Act universities are also charged with the research and development of land, particularly for agribusiness. Thus the university system, especially in the westward-expanding empire of the United States, is intimately underwritten as a project of settler colonialism—the seizing of Native land, the conversion of land into capital, the further domestication of “wilderness” into productive agricultural estates, and the research mandate to procure profitable plants from around the world to colonize North American soil. The public university, with its charge to underwrite industry and agribusiness, literally changed the landscape of the Americas: The leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, . . . in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes. (Morrill Act, section 4, para. 1) The prioritization of settler colonial technologies—agricultural and mechanical engineering, not to mention military tactics—reflects how land-grant universities were commissioned as part of the empire-self-making project of the United States. The year 1862 also saw the passage of the Homestead Act, which allowed for settlers to apply directly for landownership. Between 1862 and 1934, the federal government granted 1.6 million homesteads, distributing more than 270 million acres—10 percent of all land in the United States—into private (settler) ownership. Homesteading was only officially discontinued in 1976 in the mainland United States and in 1986 in Alaska. The year 1862 also saw the establishment of the Department of Agriculture, and one can see the alchemy of capitalism at work: accumulation of land, conversion of land into capital, conversion of capital into institutions, conversion of land into agribusiness. In my own University of California context, the state legislature established an Agricultural, Mining, and Mechanical Arts College in 1866,[4] the same year of the Three Knolls Massacre, where settlers killed forty Yahi, including the father of “Ishi, the last Yahi.” Also that year, the College Homestead Association purchased 160 acres of Ohlone land in hopes of selling new homesteads to settlers to fund the private College of California. Those lands, along with the Agricultural, Mining, and Mechanical Arts College, would become present-day UC Berkeley. Ironically, “Ishi” became a well-known spectacle for Berkeley anthropologists. After his death, his body was autopsied at the University of California medical school. His body was cremated at a cemetery in Colma, while his brain was shipped to and stored at the Smithsonian in Washington, D.C.—until his remains were finally repatriated back to the Redding Rancheria and Pit River tribe in 2000. Such stories of land appropriations built upon Indigenous vanishings directly haunt the histories of all the UC campuses, whose birth dates march right through the twentieth century: UCLA (1927), UC Santa Barbara (1958), UC Davis (1959), UC Riverside (1959), UC San Diego (1960), UC San Francisco (1964), UC Santa Cruz (1965), UC Irvine (1965), and UC Merced (2005). There is nothing ancient about this history. On its 2012 sesquicentennial, the Morrill Act was heavily commemorated throughout the U.S. university system, but perhaps the single organization with the most reason to cheer was the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU), “a research, policy, and advocacy organization representing 219 public research universities, land-grant institutions, state university systems, and related organizations.” On January 4, 2014, the APLU Executive Committee issued a statement to “strongly oppose the boycott of Israeli academic institutions supported by certain U.S. scholarly organizations,” in direct response to the Association for Asian American Studies’s (AAAS) April 2013 and the American Studies Association’s (ASA) December 2013 resolutions to support the call for boycotts, divestments, and sanctions (BDS) by Palestinian civil society—although neither the scholarly organizations nor Palestine nor the exact boycott is mentioned in the statement.[5] BDS is built around three demands, specifically, “1. Ending Israel’s occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall [built around the West Bank and Gaza]; 2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; 3. And respecting . . . the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.”[6] According to Palestinian American scholar J. I. Albahri, BDS “is designed to intervene on the specific settler colonial practices of Israel” by exerting international pressure on Israeli institutions.[7] Shirking the actual words in BDS is the APLU’s refusal to engage public debate—the very cornerstone of free speech. The APLU’s statement nonspecifically refers to “this boycott” as detrimental to equally nonspecific “critical projects that advance humanity, develop new technologies, and improve health and well-being across the globe.”[8] Some of the discourses deployed by the APLU and other academic voices quick to condemn BDS were that “boycotts are bad” because “free speech is good.” Ironically, the very ineffability of Palestine reflects a national policy of boycotting open dialogue about Palestine. U.S. foreign policy already looks like a boycott of Palestine. The United States has boycotted the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) assembly since November 2011, when Palestine was allowed membership into UNESCO. The United States was by far the largest funder of UNESCO; by withholding dues of $80 million a year—22 percent of UNESCO’s overall budget—it sent UNESCO into budgetary crisis.[9] Unlike the AAAS and ASA resolutions, this boycott—the boycott of Palestine—literally defunds critical projects that “improve health and well-being across the globe.” This boycott is not submitted for vote or discussion but operates at the level of default policy—a policy that includes refusals even to name Palestine, similar to the APLU statement, which would not even name BDS. Unlike the AAAS and ASA resolutions, the APLU’s “boycott of the boycott” was quickly drafted and signed by six people.[10] It did not solicit votes, feedback, or discussion from its member campuses, which, by the APLU’s own claim, “enroll more than 3.8 million undergraduates and 1.2 million graduate students, award over 1 million degrees, employ nearly 1 million faculty and staff, and conduct more than $37 billion in university-based research.”[11] The APLU’s action perfectly captures how the settler colonial university’s investments do not just stem from land seizures of a settler past but are active investments in the very future of settler colonialism. This chapter cannot deconstruct the complex American desires surrounding Israel and Palestine. However, relevant to this discussion are the similar yet divergent trajectories of the APLU and ASA as university formations—and thus as technological formations that can be repurposed toward decolonizing goals. The APLU was founded in 1887 as a direct consequence of the Morrill Act. The ASA was founded in 1951 as a project of Cold War cultural politics through financial support from the U.S. government—which also endowed multiple professorships in European universities, particularly in Germany and Britain. The dominant origin story of American studies is that it was established as a tool of U.S. jingoism and imperialist apology.[12] From a deterministic view of technology as recapitulating ideology, one might not expect a resolution to support the BDS to emerge from the ASA. That the ASA became a lightning rod for BDS politics was perhaps something never predicted by the Cold War machinery that created it. However, from its inception, American studies arguably has had a decolonial tooth in its gear of empire.[13] The politics of land-grant institutions directs us to think about the work of school beyond curriculum and pedagogy, beyond knowledge production. Universities are land-grabbing, land-transmogrifying, land-capitalizing machines. Universities are giant machines attached to other machines: war machines, media machines, governmental and nongovernmental policy machines. Therefore the terms of the struggle in the university are also over this machinery—deactivating its colonizing operations and activating its contingent decolonizing possibilities. A decolonizing university is not just about decolonizing the “representational” work of knowledge production that we associate with universities, nor about “decolonizing” the treatment of currently enrolled students in its courses of study. It is about the steam and pistons, the waterworks, the groundworks, the investments, the emplacements, the institutional–governmental–capitalistic rhizomatics of the university. What can we do with this hulking mass of ruins, conduit, fibroids, workhouses, and research facilities built on Indigenous land? What would it take for universities to rematriate land? What would it take for universities to clean water? What would it mean for universities to counteract war making? What would it mean to hotwire the university for decolonizing work? To these machines of decolonial desire, the desire for a third university, this book now turns.

### 1nc – Util

#### Pain and pleasure fail as ethical starting points –

#### Ontology Outweighs – violence against the native is infinite and accumulates each day of occupation via the structural condition of sickness – the inevitable 1ar framing push won’t be able to account for or understand this violence – this means if we win our thesis claims we will win the framing debate.

#### Indigenous and black people are scientifically understood to experience less pain than white people – the evaluation of pain and pleasure is skewed by settler colonialism which means weighing is invested in settler colonialism.

#### Util is a form of disposability politics – the common good always justifies indigenous fungibility – they have to explain why different lives matter more or less in the settler imaginary – otherwise calc fails.

Mignolo 7, Walter D. "The de-colonial option and the meaning of identity in politics." (2007). (Professor at Duke)//Elmer

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—**the perpetuation of** the logic of **coloniality**, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human livesfrom the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

## Case

### AT: Solvency

#### Squo solves.

Crosby et al. 6-8, Daniel Crosby specializes in international trade, investment and matters related to public international law. A partner in our International Trade practice and the manager of our Geneva office, Daniel helps sovereign and business clients to achieve practical economic objectives around the world by applying and negotiating international agreements. JDSUPRA, June 8, 2021. “Update on the Proposed TRIPS Waiver at the WTO: Where is it Headed, and What to Expect?” <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/update-on-the-proposed-trips-waiver-at-8411942/> brett

Proponents have advanced the proposed TRIPS waiver in the name of meeting global vaccine demand. But even in the absence of a waiver, pharmaceutical manufacturers have continued efforts to expand global production and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and therapies, with a focus on expanding access to developing countries. For example, Pfizer announced its plan to deliver two billion doses to developing nations over the next 18 months, with one billion doses coming this year.8 One forecast estimates that, by the end of 2021, total global COVID-19 vaccine production may exceed 11 billion doses – an amount potentially sufficient to achieve global herd immunity.9

Several pharmaceutical industry groups have also proposed a five-step plan to “urgently advance COVID-19 equity,” including: (1) increasing dose sharing among countries through COVAX and other mechanisms; (2) optimizing production of vaccines and raw materials; (3) eliminating trade barriers for critical raw materials; (4) supporting country readiness to deploy vaccination programs; and (5) driving further innovation.10

Manufacturers have also continued to partner with other companies in efforts to scale up global production. For example, Moderna recently engaged Samsung Biologics to provide fill-and-finish manufacturing for Moderna’s vaccine.11 Merck and Gilead also each entered into or expanded voluntarily licensing programs with manufacturers in India to produce the companies’ respective COVID-19 antiviral agents molnupiravir and remdesivir.12

Some WTO members have also considered using the existing TRIPS flexibilities to expand their vaccine access. For example, Bolivia has continued to pursue its effort to import the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine from Canadian company Biolyse Pharma, under a compulsory license pursuant to TRIPS Article 31bis (if one could be obtained).13

#### The issue is lack of resources, not IPR -- they disrupt the ability of existing companies to scale up production

Brown 21, Delphine Knight Brown is a Partner in the firm’s Litigation Practice Group, and Intellectual Property Litigation Group. With over twenty years of trial experience, Delphine’s practice focuses on complex intellectual property and technology cases, with extensive experience in the life sciences industry. Freeborn Attorneys at Law, Summer 2021. “Will TRIPS Waiver of IP Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines Serve Global Need?” <https://www.freeborn.com/sites/default/files/downloads/Powerhouse%20Points_Newsletter_Summer%202021%20Final.pdf> brett

When the IP waiver concept was first proposed last October, Moderna agreed not to enforce its COVID-19 related patents during the pandemic. But despite Moderna’s voluntary waiver of its IP rights, no other company has stepped up to manufacture the Moderna vaccine. The most significant obstacle to COVID-19 vaccine supply is not just the IP rights that companies have obtained, or are pursuing, but rather the lack of raw materials and manufacturing facilities to produce the vaccines. Currently, there are shortages of raw materials and equipment used to make vaccines and biological products.

Unlike drug manufacturing, vaccine production processes are extremely complex and difficult to develop without support from current manufacturers. Additional manufacturers would need to have or acquire skilled expertise in mRNA technology and create or reconfigure manufacturing sites. Manufacturing vaccines requires additional processing steps and testing to assure quality and consistency. Manufacturing vaccines will also likely use the patented technology of other companies, who have not waived their IP rights. Investment in manufacturing is also an important piece of the solution. Whether existing companies can retool facilities and jump start manufacturing or new facilities need to be created through investment will be outcome determinative.

There is little doubt that the waiver proposals would at the very least up-end the existing incentives, including the prospect of future pharmaceutical innovation and development of products, that resulted in the rapid development and approval of COVID-19 vaccines. Moreover, the TRIPS waiver proposals may not have the desired effect of boosting COVID vaccine production and availability of mRNA vaccines. On the other hand, recent attempts at voluntary licensing and technology transfer agreements related to adenovirus vector technology have resulted in increased vaccine production and availability. A TRIPS waiver may not be as effective for more complex vaccine production.

Scaling up COVID-19 vaccine production is not a one-size-fits -all proposition. Ensuring equitable availability and delivery complicates the matter further.

### AT: COVID war

#### COVIDs gone on for a year now -- no escalation means it’s extremely unlikely to trigger.

#### No war from COVID.

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi [microeconomist PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.], 10-15-2020, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/15/does-covid-19-raise-risk-violent-conflict-not-everywhere/> EH

The situation in Iraq illustrates how the coronavirus threat and policy responses to the pandemic could lead to an increase in violent conflict. But elsewhere in the world, researchers who tally conflict-event counts see stagnant or even falling numbers. And in some countries, conflict trends don’t appear to be responding to covid-19 at all. My research with Jeff Bloem documents considerable differences in the frequency of conflict events across several countries in recent months. Our findings suggest that the pandemic-conflict relationship seen in Iraq does not appear to exist in many other countries. How we did our research We used the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a database that counts the number of conflict events daily around the world. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. The relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear. In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if market disruptions and reduced global demand are driving down the value of natural resources such as oil wells, then we may see less conflict over control of such resources. We then conducted case studies based on our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before covid-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly Worldwide, we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict. If anything, conflict has decreased, as the figure below shows.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Violent conflict between March and August 2020 was 23 percent lower than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally. Do these results suggest that covid-19 is fueling reductions in conflict? Probably not — in Syria, for instance, other factors may explain the declines. On March 5, Turkey and Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement covering the Idlib province in Syria. Idlib is the final front of the Syrian government campaign, so this cease fire led to a dramatic decline in violent events nationwide. But the Idlib cease fire wasn’t motivated by covid-19, and would have taken place anyway, pandemic or no pandemic. So even when violence is falling in the covid-19 era, we have to recognize that declines could be driven by events that happened to take place around the same time as the pandemic’s arrival. The same could be true in cases where violent conflict increased — these upticks in violence could have little to do with covid-19. In the ongoing war between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the number of violent events rose steadily in the first half of 2020. The trend line does not change at all when Libya started to respond to covid-19 in March. Libya’s daily violent-incident counts began to fall in late spring, which corresponds with the GNA’s successful seizure of critical holdings from the LNA militia. These results suggest that the GNA and LNA continued their campaigns relatively undeterred by the pandemic. Conflict eventually declined — but this largely reflects the LNA’s retreat. What about other countries? In places with active rebel groups and militias, such as the Philippines and Iraq, we find mixed results. Reports from both countries suggest that rebel groups and government officials (in the Philippines, but not Iraq) are increasing attacks to take advantage of the opportunities in the covid-19 climate. We see little if any change in the number of violent-conflict events per day in the Philippines. But we do see evidence of escalating conflict in Iraq (see figure), much of it attributed to a rise in Islamic State activity. What happens in the Philippines is not an exception. While violent conflict rose in Nigeria for some time, trends are relatively unchanged in Somalia and Congo. These mixed outcomes suggest that there’s still much to learn about pandemics and conflict.

#### Recna is speculative at best, no scenario of how war happens

## India

### India card

#### The Somos card is not good –three points

#### Its from December 2020 – its been almost a year since then and conflict has not escalated – no 1ac articulation of brightline means even if COVID emboldens insurgents in Kashmir, those conflicts do not escalate because their evidence says it was happening in December.

#### “some evidence that Pakistan sponsors insurgents” is not a link for escalation because Pakistan has been sponsoring insurgents in Kashmir for twenty years and its never come near escalating – their evidence straight up does not say that insurgency in Kashmir is increasing as a result of the pandemic.

#### The Howell evidence isn’t specific to indopak and has no scenarios – where would Modi divert? What risker behavior will Modi or Pakistan pursue? No articulation of any of this means our defense is more specific and econ decline doesn’t escalate.

#### Toon evidence – it doesn’t warrant escalation – all it says is that the presence of nuclear weapons means the conflict could go nuclear which isn’t an internal link – even if China draw in happens they haven’t read evidence that indicates that would go nuclear – there are no lines about miscalc or first strike, which means the only impact to this scenario is a vague “increased risk of nuclear war” which we’ve said should have happened already

### Indo pak

#### *Zero risk* of India-Pakistan conflict---*deterrence*.

S. Paul Kapur & Sumit Ganguly 16, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi AND Professor of Political Science at University of Indiana-Bloomington, “India, Pakistan and the Unlikely Dream of a Nuclear-Free South Asia,” Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, edited by Nik Hynek & Michal Smetana, pp. 273-274, Google Books

This minimalist approach is changing, however. Today, India is increasing all aspects of its nuclear weapons capability. For example, India is expanding fissile material production: India and Pakistan are the only countries in the world that are currently believed to be doing so (Crail 2011). India probably possesses enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce 100—130 nuclear warheads. It is increasing its production capacity with projects such as an unsafeguarded fast breeder reactor under construction near Kalpakkam (Kristensen and Norris 2012). The Indians are also improving their weapons-delivery capabilities. For example, the Agni V intermediate range ballistic missile, which the Indians recently tested, will have a range of approximately 5000 km, enabling it to reach targets anywhere in China. The BRAHMOS cruise missile, jointly developed with Russia, will be able to strike targets at ranges of 300—500km with conventional or nuclear warheads at supersonic speeds (Rahyuhin 2012). The Indians are also working to acquire sea-based launch capabilities, in addilion to land- and air-based platforms, to ensure that they are able to field a full nuclear triad (Davenport 2012; Kristensen and Norris 2012: 96). India is doing this mainly for security-related reasons — reasons largely unconnected with its oft-cited nemesis, Pakistan. Although analysts tend to focus their attention on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the Pakistanis do not pose a serious, long-term strategic threat to India. The rivalry between the two countries is, of course, real. They have fought four wars against each other and they continue to battle one another over the territory of Kashmir, where Pakistan supports an anti-Indian insurgency; they have also trained sizable nuclear arsenals on one another.10 Nonetheless, Pakistan suffers from too many handicaps to pose a significant strategic threat. These include economic stagnation, sectarian and ethnic violence, a relatively small territorial and population base, and a dysfunctional government that is increasingly unable to provide its people with basic public goods (Lieven 201 1: 3—40; Bajoria 2009). In the military realm, Pakistan possesses highly capable conventional and nuclear forces. These forces, however, are mainly defensive and seek to prevent India from leveraging its superior conventional military capabilities to attack Pakistan." In addition to its strategic nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is developing a battlefield nuclear capacity consisting of small, short-range weapons stationed close to the Indo-Pakistani border. This will increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation in the event of any Indo- Pakistani conventional confrontation and may discourage India from undertaking aggressive military action against Pakistan (Khan 2011: 279; Basrur 2011). There is little likelihood, however, even with the addition of a battlefield capability, that Pakistan will be able to use its nuclear weapons to capture significant portions of Indian territory, to erode India's nuclear second-strike capability, or otherwise to achieve coercive leverage over India.