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#### Settler colonialism is a power relation structured around the logic of elimination – the libidinal drive to eliminate the native, evidenced by centuries of smallpox blankets, boarding schools, bounties, pipelines, etc. This fundamental logic consistently articulates itself across time and space, seeking to remove native presence from the land by assimilation and genocide.

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Patrick Wolfe (2006) Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native, Journal of Genocide Research, 8:4, 387-409, DOI: 10.1080/14623520601056240 // sam :)

The question of genocide is never far from discussions of settler colonialism. Land is life—or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests for land can be— indeed, often are—contests for life. Yet this is not to say that settler colonialism is simply a form of genocide. In some settler-colonial sites (one thinks, for instance, of Fiji), native society was able to accommodate—though hardly unscathed—the invaders and the transformative socioeconomic system that they introduced. Even in sites of wholesale expropriation such as Australia or North America, settler colonialism’s genocidal outcomes have not manifested evenly across time or space. Native Title in Australia or Indian sovereignty in the US may have deleterious features, but these are hardly equivalent to the impact of frontier homicide. Moreover, there can be genocide in the absence of settler colonialism. The best known of all genocides was internal to Europe, while genocides that have been perpetrated in, for example, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda or (one fears) Darfur do not seem to be assignable to settler colonialism. In this article, I shall begin to explore, in comparative fashion, the relationship between genocide and the settler-colonial tendency that I term the logic of elimination.1 I contend that, though the two have converged—which is to say, the settler-colonial logic of elimination has manifested as genocidal—they should be distinguished. Settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal. As practised by Europeans, both genocide and settler colonialism have typically employed the organizing grammar of race. European xenophobic traditions such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Negrophobia are considerably older than race, which, as many have shown, became discursively consolidated fairly late in the eighteenth century.2 But the mere fact that race is a social construct does not of itself tell us very much. As I have argued, different racial regimes encode and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans coerced the populations concerned. For instance, Indians and Black people in the US have been racialized in opposing ways that reflect their antithetical roles in the formation of US society. Black people’s enslavement produced an inclusive taxonomy that automatically enslaved the offspring of a slave and any other parent. In the wake of slavery, this taxonomy became fully racialized in the “one-drop rule,” whereby any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance, makes a person Black. For Indians, in stark contrast, non-Indian ancestry compromised their indigeneity, producing “half-breeds,” a regime that persists in the form of blood quantum regulations. As opposed to enslaved people, whose reproduction augmented their owners’ wealth, Indigenous people obstructed settlers’ access to land, so their increase was counterproductive. In this way, the restrictive racial classification of Indians straightforwardly furthered the logic of elimination. Thus we cannot simply say that settler colonialism or genocide have been targeted at particular races, since a race cannot be taken as given. It is made in the targeting.3 Black people were racialized as slaves; slavery constituted their blackness. Correspondingly, Indigenous North Americans were not killed, driven away, romanticized, assimilated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the original owners of the land but as Indians. Roger Smith has missed this point in seeking to distinguish between victims murdered for where they are and victims murdered for who they are.4 So far as Indigenous people are concerned, where they are is who they are, and not only by their own reckoning. As Deborah Bird Rose has pointed out, to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home.5 Whatever settlers may say— and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element. The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that. In common with genocide as Raphael Lemkin characterized it,6 settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.7 In its positive aspect, elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence. The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others.

#### That removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam :)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### Their philosophy is built on genocide and exploitation of native bodies – metaphysical dualisms justify and inform settler colonialism by creating distinctions between the rational and irrational subject – this justifies colonialism because we will win indigenous people are never seen as rational subjects – they will be unable to answer how their framework binds settlers to treat indigenous people as agents which means you vote negative.

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Crispin Sartwell, “WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AS WHITE SUPREMACISM,” The Philosophical Salon, <http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/western-philosophy-as-white-supremacism/> // sam :) goddamn this card is so good

The 17th and 18th centuries were characterized by the consolidation of European colonialism over much of the world and the rise of the Atlantic slave trade. This period is known in philosophy as the “modern” era. Modern philosophy was characterized above all by its dualisms, which have their origins, like Western philosophy, in the Greeks: between body and mind, culture and nature, civilized and savage, state and anarchy, human and animal. Applied at different scales, these are all the same dualism. They exalt the intellectual over the physical, and use spirit, mind, and culture, understood in a particularly self-serving way, as standards of who counts as a moral agent—as a human being—and of what groups or cultures are worthy of respect. As philosophical concepts, these allegedly opposed pairs are excruciatingly problematic. But they are not only philosophical ideas: they were precisely the content of the alleged difference between European people and people of color, as Europeans understood it; the abstract metaphysics became an all-too-concrete ideology of exploitation. Sub-Saharan African peoples, as well as the indigenous peoples of the Americas, were pictured relentlessly, even in the Enlightenment philosophical texts themselves, as sheer bodies, while the European thinkers were, in their own view, minds. Indigenous peoples were understood to be still part of nature (and were devalued in that identification), whereas Europe had supposedly emerged from nature into culture. That was the fundamental way that Europeans justified to themselves the oppression they were inflicting and congratulated themselves on their own alleged superiority and suitedness to be rulers and exploiters. In other words, white supremacy lurks at the heart of Western metaphysics. This structure is formulated with crystal clarity by Descartes, who separates mind and body as two fundamentally different sorts of things and arranges them in a hierarchy of value. “Reason alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts,” he declares, echoing Plato and Pythagoras. “I am,” he argues, “precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason.” We might think of this as the imaginary construction of white identity, and if any person, even René Descartes, considers himself “nothing but a thinking thing,” he is profoundly self-deluded, and other people are probably servicing his physical needs. Relentlessly, Western political tradition values mind over body, intellectual over manual labor, reason over passion. And European philosophy of the modern era, also relentlessly, associates mind with the sort of people who came to think of themselves as “white men,” and body with the sorts of people they were oppressing around the world, with somewhat different flavors depending on whether the people they were talking about were women, or Africans, or Asians, or Native Americans. Descartes held that each of us was two things: an angel and an animal, as it were, a pure soul and a bestial body. Colonialism and the nascent “science” of race simply externalized this dualism, so that some people (educated Europeans, primarily) were supposed to be pure minds—and hence suited to rule—while others (the people that Europeans were encountering all over the world, and on whom they were imposing their dominance) were supposed to be mere bodies. It is ironic, however, that ruling requires massive use of physical force, implying that white supremacism does anything but transcend the physical plane. Modern political theory circled around the same set of distinctions. Thomas Hobbes, in the Leviathan, purports to observe that “the savage people in many places of America . . . have no government at all; and live at this day in [a] brutish [animalistic] manner.”[2] The ethics of Immanuel Kant, and of many others up to the present day, emphasizes that to be rational is to be free, and hence that to be irrational is to be enslaved. Reason is the faculty by which the mind controls the body; reason is suited to control the physical world. The body in the world, for Kant, must be distinguished from the ‘transcendental subject,’ the moral agent, who is outside of space and time, and who is the lawgiver of himself, that is, the appropriate center of power. Exercised internally, this is the drama of self-control; one becomes a good person by bringing one’s unruly bodily desires to heel by rational deliberation. (There is even a contemporary neurological version that purports to distinguish the “executive region” from the amygdala, the primitive or animal or emotive bit.) Exercised externally, it is quickly adaptable into white domination over the colored world. Kant famously argues that rational creatures must be treated as ends and not merely as means. He calls that “dignity” and holds it to be a (or the) most basic moral principle that persons with such dignity must be treated with “respect.” The complement of this doctrine is that irrational creatures can legitimately be treated as mere means, and with disrespect. To claim of some person or some culture that it is irrational and hence animalistic, opens them to the use of creatures who regard themselves as rational, such as Kant’s European readership. In the first European defense of the African slave trade (1444), a Portuguese courtier (Gomes Eanes de Zurara) argued that Africans were better off in slavery, and claimed that in Africa “They lived like beasts, without any custom of civilized beings. . . They were without covering of clothes, or the lodgement of houses; and worst of all, they had no understanding of good, but only knew how to live in bestial sloth.”[4] The direct motivation for colonialism was economic, not metaphysical. But the structures mirror each other, and when Europeans came into contact with and conquered other peoples, they used the existing forms of thought, derived from figures such as Plato, to explain or rationalize the exploitation and even genocides that they were engaged in. “When soul and body are both in the same place,” wrote Plato in the Phaedo, “nature teaches the one to serve and be subject, the other to rule and govern.”[5] A couple of millennia later, the “place” where soul and body meet might be the Belgian Congo. Or for that matter South Carolina. This symbolic repertoire has been adapted to various issues and circumstances, but it is remarkably persistent. Through slavery and Jim Crow, lynching and mass incarceration, black people have been relentlessly regarded and treated as animal bodies by white people. That is not about black people at all, but about the hallucinatory self-image of people who regard themselves as white: it is an attempt to build and enforce a self-image for white people as being spiritual and intellectual beings, and hence suited to know and to rule, to command themselves and hence others, to manage everyone’s lives as one’s own mind should rationally control one’s body. Every white stereotype of black people, first, is relentlessly animalizing or physicalizing, and second, rests on a devaluation of the physical and an exaltation of the intellectual. The association of non-white people with violence and sexuality, with crime or laziness, and their economic exploitation as physical labor, are all rationalized by this application of basic metaphysical dualisms. This becomes a worldwide structure of oppression, in which rational Westerners, or “experts” of various sorts, are called upon to control unruly and irrational elements: the classic “white man’s burden.” Indeed, a pre-eminent issue in European philosophy at the end of the Modern period, around 1750-1850, was the relation of sheer material reality, conceived as a deterministic realm in which human beings were enslaved by physical causes, and the realm of Spirit or freedom. This was the fundamental dilemma of our lives and our world, as Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, for example, framed it. But it was also the shape of the political rhetoric justifying colonialism, for example. Astonishingly, the whole network of views persists. For example, John Martin Fischer fills his book The Metaphysics of Free Will with the sort of observation that appears at the outset of many a classic work of Western philosophy: “The possession of regulative control is precisely what distinguishes us from non-persons,” he says as he concludes. “After all, the behavior of an animal appears to be the product of strong instinctual urges. . . . Non-human animals . . . are not persons; they do not have strong rights to continue to exist,” and are beneath our moral approval or disapproval: beneath contempt, we might say.[6] They can legitimately be used for our purposes, while only persons deserve moral respect. Fischer’s account of moral agency indicates that it is anomalous in the order of nature. In various moments in the tradition, the “rational subject” is supposed to be outside that order entirely. Rarely has there been a more bizarre or thorough self-deception. Many philosophers, right up to the present moment, take the fundamental view that rationality or ‘mind’ distinguishes humans from other sorts of things, and that rational creatures have a superior sort of value. “Reason is a power we have in virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness,” says the contemporary moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard, taking up the point of view of Descartes and Kant. “This form of self-consciousness gives us a capacity to control our beliefs and actions that the other animals lack, and makes us active in a way they are not; this form of self-consciousness makes it necessary to take control of our beliefs and actions.” Projected outward, it seems to make it necessary to take control of animalistic people, in order to create a rational society. I am not suggesting that Plato, Descartes, or Kant, much less Fischer and Korsgaard, are white supremacists. Descartes was probably writing too early to engage that set of beliefs directly, and Plato certainly was. Kant’s liberal politics are in many ways incompatible with racism, and the same goes for Korsgaard’s (and, I assume, Fischer’s as well). But I am suggesting that the sort of metaphysics and ethics they all endorse grew up in connection with white supremacism and helped shape it. They are, as it were, isomorphic. And I suggest that this structure of thought lies beneath some of our ill treatment of other animals and the environment as well. The whole picture is subject, I think, to compelling philosophical objections. And its social applications have been self-serving and profoundly oppressive.

#### Settler colonialism embeds itself in structures of moral philosophy – winning that your ethical theory says racism is bad is insufficient – you need to articulate why it can disassociate itself from the implications of settler colonialism in every aspect of society.

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“Why Settler Colonialism?” Arena. 2012. https://arena.org.au/why-settler-colonialism/ JJN

Settler colonialism as a practice is a subset of colonial history, one where the colonial relationship converts into a very specific cultural practice. It is where the ‘settler culture’ seeks a permanent place in the colonial setting and, as such, enters an unrelenting cultural logic of misrecognition and blindness towards the cultural other, issuing in acts of objective cruelty and cultural destruction. Because this relationship is based in cultures, which are prior to the individual (while simultaneously forming the individual), it is a relationship that is especially difficult to put aside. Empirically speaking, there are many such examples in history, many arising in the period of Western Empire associated with modernity and expansionism in the New World. Settler colonialism as a field illuminates the history of these myriad examples while bridging into accounts of contemporary expressions of the settler phenomenon, from the continued cultural suppression arising out of nineteenth-century Empire (in Africa, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, for example) to twentieth-century expressions in Palestine. If settler colonialism is to develop as a field of critical study it needs to include but go far beyond empirical accounts simply framed by an ethic of cultural justice. To do this it is necessary to develop a theory and account of how settler colonialism as a practice is based culturally. And this will require a broader frame of reference than the specific localities of settler-colonial practice, a broader frame that shows how this phenomenon is an effect of power based in attitudes to other cultures more generally. For it is arguable that the settler-colonial attitude derives from a widespread cultural politics set within a larger frame, one which the world today assumes, rather than reflexively knows or seeks to reform. This is to speak of a continuing imperialist attitude expressed in a view of other cultures that has little respect for those cultures’ core assumptions. There are crude expressions of this lack of cultural empathy, but there are also ‘high’ expressions, such as those embodied in the universalist philosophy of the West. For high universalism, the emancipatory principle is argued to be beyond all specific cultures and, as such, superior to all of them. Recent US adventures in the Middle East come to mind, where the invocation of ‘freedom’ has become a sign of disrespect for the complex cultures of the region. Imposed ‘freedom’ has devastating effects. Common to these expressions is a deep cultural blindness associated with modernity that is unable to view other cultures empathically or engage them in informed, reciprocal cultural interchange. Rather, knowledge of such cultures has predominantly developed instrumentally as a means to domination. These relations of cultural power at a more general level both generate the settler colonial relationship and reflexively feed off its effects. As John Gray remarks in his Black Mass, the Enlightenment is responsible for many racist policies, especially towards colonized peoples. Enlightenment philosophers have a special responsibility, as is seen in the case of Locke: John Locke was a Christian committed to the idea that humans are created equal, but he devoted a good deal of intellectual energy to justifying the seizure of the lands of indigenous people in America.(8) Other philosophers, including Kant, are mired in much the same logic. The goal of equality within a universal civilization was the prospect, but this could only be achieved by the peoples of the colonies ‘giving up their own ways of life and adopting European ways’.(9) If they did not willingly give up their ways of life, extermination, an idea that was widespread, might be entertained. This was not merely a Nazi policy. When H. G. Wells asked himself about the fate of ‘swarms of black and yellow and brown people who do not come into the needs of efficiency’, he replied: ‘Well, the world is not a charitable institution, and I take it they will have to go’.(10) John Gray goes on: Nazi policies of extermination … drew on powerful currents in the Enlightenment and used as models policies in operation in many countries, including the world’s leading liberal democracy. Programmes aiming to sterilize the unfit were under way in the United States. Hitler admired these programmes and also admired America’s genocidal treatment of indigenous peoples: he ‘often praised to his inner circle the efficiency of America’s extermination — by starvation and uneven combat — of the “Red Savages” who could not be tamed by captivity’.(11) If there is any doubt about the crucial role of settler colonialism in the power effects of the West one should turn to the recent book by Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands.(12) Here the author confirms that the various plans constructed by Hitler and the Nazi regime for the mass starvation of the Slavs and the Final Solution of the Jews of Eastern Europe were based on settler-colonial assumptions, in particular as expressed in the example of the United States and the conquest of the Native American peoples. Hitler’s plan (the Generalplan Ost) to colonize the Ukraine breadbasket was one that sought to turn back the clock of industrialization in the Soviet Union, deliberately starve unwanted millions of people, introduce German settlers up to the Urals, enslave Slavs where they were deemed to be essential for economic production and push the Jews of Eastern Europe beyond the Urals into Asia. While the plan was quickly frustrated in its detail by the resistance of the Soviets, Hitler’s plan is nevertheless illustrative of crucial background assumptions and elaborations of notions of ‘development’. For Hitler, Colonization would make of Germany a continental empire fit to rival the United States, another hardy frontier state based upon exterminatory colonialism and slave labor. The East was the Nazi Manifest Destiny. In Hitler’s view, ‘in the East a similar process will repeat itself for a second time as in the conquest of America’. As Hitler imagined the future, Germany would deal with the Slavs much as the North Americans had dealt with the Indians. The Volga River in Russia, he once proclaimed, will be Germany’s Mississippi.(13) As suggestive as this material may be, the point is not that of equating the United States with the Nazis. Rather it is to make the more important ethical point about Western powers and Western culture: they are interwoven with practices that take settler colonialism for granted, practices that arguably define the underside of modernity.

#### The universal human is built around conceptions of western humanity – its structurally inaccessible to the native.

**Johnston and Edmons 16** Anna Johnston - University of Tasmania where she was the Graduate Research Coordinator in the School of Humanities and Director of the Centre for Colonialism and its Aftermath. She has expertise in colonial and post-colonial studies, Victorian studies, and Australian Literature and Penelope Edmonds is ARC Future Fellow, and Associate Professor, School of Humanities, University of Tasmania. She has qualifications in history and heritage studies, including a PhD from the Department of History, University of Melbourne.

“Empire, Humanitarianism and Violence in the Colonies.” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2016. JJN

Talal Asad has traced the emergence of a cluster of concepts such as “humanismus” from the fifteenth-century German, the medieval “humanitas” and the nineteenth-century secular “humanism”: “humanity, humanism, humanitarianism belong to a tangled and shifting history,” he argues.9 The term humanitarianism and its associated concepts and practices specifically “emerged in the nineteenth century with the consolidation of the European nation states, the expansion of European colonial empires and the global development of capitalism,” argues Asad. The theological connotations of humanitarianism are associated with ideas of redemption, reaching out, and the language of sentiment and affect.10 There is a general consensus that what Charles Taylor calls a “moral imperative to reduce suffering” emerged from Enlightenment thought and Christian (and especially Protestant) roots.11 As Asad argues, with this came an associated and assumed narrative about the elimination of human suffering: that moral progress is advanced when the violence of military conflict and dictatorship gives way to the nonviolence of international diplomacy and democratic politics, when harsh physical punishment of convicts gives way to humane confinement, when war gives way to peace.12 Likewise Tusan has surveyed humanitarianism and the notion of interventions to alleviate suffering as both an “idea and a practice.” She notes that early modern monarchs controlled potential external intervention on behalf of their dispossessed subjects. With the Enlightenment, “broad claims of a universal humanity offered new ways of understanding the obligation to act. By the nineteenth century, an activist sensibility found voice in campaigns that looked to undo long-held practices like slavery through pressuring governments to abolish slavery on humanitarian grounds.”13 The simultaneous rise of humanitarianism and imperialism in the modern period has been noted by a number of scholars, including Joel Quirk, who delineates the ways that colonialism and antislavery were viewed as compatible in the nineteenth century.14 Quirk argues that the antislavery campaigns marked an important moment in the development of paternalistic colonialism, and abolitionism was less concerned with human equality than with “colonial priorities,” with legal abolition thus enabling other forms of unfree and exploitative labour worldwide.15 Indeed, the other “colonial priorities” of the period were the expansion of empire in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions in sites of British settlement such as North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. It was in these colonies of settlement that the entwined projects of liberal humanitarianism and empire took on a particular and potent character. An apparent paradox saw the rise of British humanitarianism in the 1830s amidst these aggressively expanding colonies marked by intense violence against Indigenous peoples; Lester and Dussart begin their new book by articulating this conceptual riddle.16 After the abolition of the slave trade (1807) and later of slavery in the British settlements (1833), abolitionist humanitarians began to turn their attention to the fate of Indigenous peoples in the colonies of settlement, and questions of moral empire and the possibility of humanitarian governance grew to prominence.17 By this time humanitarian precepts had gained influence throughout the British colonies, resulting in the establishment of the Aborigines Protection Society in 1837. In both metropolitan and colonial governing circles, humanitarians generally did not oppose colonisation, but increasingly promoted a benevolent or “Christian colonisation,” a civilising mission of moral enlightenment.18 In the southeastern Australian colonies, while humanitarians emphasised the moral imperatives of a humane colonisation, pastoralists and agriculturalists insisted on access to cheap labour and land. Many expatriate Britons challenged the model of a humane or Christian colonisation through an emerging assertion of “settler” rights and entitlements. A strong doctrine of supercessionism—that settlers should rightly replace Indigenes—was promoted, based on claims of British moral and racial superiority, and Lockean principles of civilisation, property and the imperative to cultivate land.19 Colonial governors could articulate broad humanitarian precepts, yet condone violence both retributive and disciplinary and effectively outsource it to settlers, militia and other groups. So too the amelioration of violence could be left to partly formed and messy plural legal codes, government missionaries and other humanitarians entirely independent of the state. In colonial New South Wales, for example, as settlers crossed the Blue Mountains onto the Bathurst Plains they faced resistance from Wiradjuri warriors who killed or wounded both stock and their keepers. Martial law was proclaimed by Governor Thomas Brisbane (1822–25) on the Bathurst Plains on 14 August 1824 following the killing of seven stockmen by Aborigines in the ranges north of Bathurst, and the murder of Aboriginal women and children by settler-vigilantes in what the Sydney Gazette on 14 October 1824 called “an exterminating war.”20 Brisbane also established a mounted police force whose first frontier deployment to “pacify” Aboriginal peoples was in the upper Hunter Valley in 1826.21 Despite popular and permissive claims that the frontier was a place of lawlessness, instead, as Julie Evans has argued, the declaration of martial law served to formalise the frontier as a legal space of violence and was thereby crucial to the furtherance of the settler project.22 Within a year Governor Brisbane granted 10,000 acres (4047 ha) to the London Missionary Society for an Aboriginal reserve at Lake Macquarie.23 The resident missionary, the Reverend Lancelot Threlkeld, used his privileged position to witness and publicise settler violence against Aborigines in graphic terms.24 Some scholars have described Brisbane’s policy towards Aboriginal people as ambivalent, on the one hand imposing martial law and on the other seeking to compensate lost Aboriginal land through humanitarian measures. Yet this seeming ambivalence rather reflected the growing tensions of colonisation, where retaliatory and offensive state-sanctioned violence sat alongside an emergent humanitarianism that sought to conciliate, civilise, compensate and protect Aboriginal peoples.25 By the mid-nineteenth century, the rise of self-governing settler states often permitted and enabled new forms of organised legal violence (martial law, native police corps, and child removal) against Indigenous peoples deemed non-sovereign in their own lands. Since settlers came to stay, questions of universalism versus difference had to be worked out on the ground in highly specific ways, and differently from those of other colonies. Settler colonial dynamics would come to exhibit a civilising mission at the heart of which was an organising grammar that represented invasion in terms of benevolence and White civility.26 The Whig humanitarian promise of liberal empire in the Age of Reform offered a sacred covenant, Pax Britannica, a conciliatory agreement or settlement which proffered civilisation and uplift for Indigenous people, as they in turn exchanged their sovereignty in the bargain. Yet liberal universalism’s high tenets, including ideas of the brotherhood of man, would manifest in these settler colonies through a thoroughly hierarchised and brutal means of operation.27

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

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Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam :)

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

#### The role of the ballot is to adopt an ethic of incommensurability – political movements inevitably invest themselves in structures of settler innocence absent a total ideological commitment to decolonization.

**Tuck and Yang 12** (Eve Tuck is a professor at SUNY New Paltz. Wayne K Yang is a professor at the University of California San Diego) “Decolonization is not a metaphor” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017 // sam :)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

## Case

### Framing

AT Reason: their interpretation of reason relies on a Western understanding, which always paints the indigenous peoples as irrational or unreasonable – you should reject this interpretation

But we don’t have to win the FW debate:

1. Genocide is bad under their fw and should be rejected, means we access or impact

AT Universalizability: decol is universalizable

AT: EPsit bankrupt:

1. Doesn’t trigger skep – it’s a competing claim of ethics, not a belief that morality doesn’t exist
2. AT universalizable above
3. Yes it’s a problem with ethical theory – it’s not like it’s a one off instance – western phil has been the justification for colonization of the Americas, exploitation of labor and slavery, spread of freedom in the ME – these are all major historical events that have been sjaped by your moral theory – begs the question of its desirability
4. Ideal theory can’t solve real world problems – indig people aren’t agents in their phil

ONeil: sure, but it never happens – look at the link debate proves that theory is diff from praxis

AT consequences fail:

1. They should be responsible for the consequences of their reps, otherwise it allows people to say racist shit in round and get away with it
2. Logic of ignoring consequences is the same reasoning settlers have for refusing to take accountability for their spread of diseases to indigenous communities. You should reject that kind of thinking as it’s a settler drive towards innocence and a refusal to acknowledge the violent history towards indigenous people that exits.

### 1nc – Farr

#### The farr evidence is under highlighted and underwarranted – literally all it says is that exclusion is bad – new 1ar extrapolations are not based in their evidence and force them to draw a line between 1ar extensions and highlighted 1ac evidence.

### turn

#### Our thesis---accumulation of excess energy and the problem of its expenditure makes transgression of law an inevitability of the human experience---traditional moral codes which discourage violence and encourage repression of these violent urges ultimately only result in more harmful violent outbursts.

Itzkowitz 99 – Associate professor of philosophy at Marietta College

Kenneth Itzkowitz, “To Witness Spectacles of Pain: The Hypermorality of Georges Bataille,” College Literature, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 1999, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25112426?seq=1#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents

I. A SACRIFICE OF ETHICS: BATAILLE'S SQUANDERING SELF

It would be pointless to deny that most illegal violence is abhorrent or immoral. At the same time, however, given the violence of the life of our culture, we need to understand immoral violence more deeply than any blanket condemnation of it will allow. Beyond our condemnations, we need to recognize that the acts we most prohibit are paradoxically also the very ones we most celebrate.

A foremost proponent of this need is the French philosopher and writer Georges Bataille. Relying on a notion of excess energy and the problem of its expenditure, Bataille argues that the transgression of law is what he calls an accursed yet ineluctable part of our lives. We make laws in the name of prohibiting acts of violence, yet the problem of the expenditure of an excess of energy requires behaviors that violate the very same rules we cherish and intend to uphold.

The commentator Jean Piel took note of how Bataille managed "to view the world as if it were animated by a turmoil in accord with the one that never ceased to dominate his personal life" (1995, 99). Here, the fact of an individual in-turmoil reflects the surplus of energy disturbing life in general, rather than a moral deficiency for which an individual can be held accountable. For Bataille, an individual's wasteful behaviors are ultimately reflections of the problem of the surplus of solar energy. Piel put it this way: "The whole problem is to know how, at the heart of this general economy, the surplus is used" (1995, 103).

How should the surplus of solar energy be used? Bataille contends that this surplus is never extinguished and that its expenditure always leads towards the commission of violence. The surplus of energy is accursed and finally cannot serve us productively. The accursed excess confronts us with the problem of how to expend energy when this results in usages that cannot made be useful. Thus the production of violence has a value for us as those condemned to the realm of non-productive expenditures. We undoubtedly deny this value, as Bataille notes, when "Under present conditions, everything conspires to obscure the basic movement that tends to restore wealth to its function, to giftgiving, to squandering without reciprocations" (1988, 38). Nonetheless, as Bataille puts it, "the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for squander" (1988, 29). When this impossibility of useful expenditure is ignored, then we fail to recognize ourselves on the deepest level, as who we most fundamentally are.

Against this failure and in the name of a kind of inverted Hegelian self recognition, Bataille calls for the transgression of our prohibitionist moral values. We need an ethics of squandering goods, of squandering what is good, in recognition of an overabundance over and beyond all others, i.e. an over abundance that can only, at best, be squandered. He writes,

life suffocates within limits that are too close; it aspires in manifold ways to an impossible growth; it releases a steady flow of excess resources, possibly involving large squanderings of energy. The limit of growth being reached, life . . . enters into ebullition: Without exploding, its extreme exuberance pours out in a movement always bordering on explosion. (Bataille 1988, 30)

As living lives that must enter into ebullition, we find ourselves fundamentally committed no more to moral righteousness than to immoral out-pourings of energy, to sudden and violent outbursts exceeding all rational considerations. The protests of moralism are secondary and never responsive to Bataille's questioning of morality: "Supposing there is no longer any growth possible, what is to be done with the seething energy that remains?" (1988, 31). We are told by reason and morality to do what is best, which is to prohibit behaviors that are nonproductive or harmful. Our morality identifies the right with the useful and productive, with whatever makes us better. Bataille, however, argues against this morality and for the requirement of useless, non-productive, violent outpourings of energy—a requirement for what he calls "a draining-away, a pure and simple loss, which occurs in any case" (1988, 31). These violent, nonproductive outpourings, according to Bataille, are required of us all as living beings regardless of whether or not we take the responsibility to manage and arrange their occurrence in our lives. At issue, for Bataille, is energy in excess, energy as an excess. As an excess, such energy must be discharged explosively in outpourings that, in the end, are inevitable.

#### The alternative is a morality of evil that accepts the inevitability of violent outbursts and eschews moral prohibitionism in favor of accepting and encouraging those acts of violence that are least unacceptable---the alternative tactically expends energy to avoid those expenditures which are most harmful.

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Does it make a difference how an excess of energy is squandered if, in the end, the results will have to be violent, if we cannot avoid taking actions that must be acknowledged as wrong? Bataille proposes that we face up to the value of the choices that remain, rather than continue to shrink from the available options, especially those moral prohibitionism would regard as either dirty or simply unacceptable. All expenditures, even acts of squandering, cannot be equally unacceptable; our available options lie with respect to the contrasting degrees of unacceptability of various acts and the various amounts of waste each entails. He states that "in no way can [an] . . . inevitable loss be accounted useful . . . [but there remains] a matter of an acceptable loss, preferable to another that is regarded as unacceptable ..." (1988, 31).

The key to the possibility of an ethics for Bataille is that beyond the naive hopes of our prohibitionist morality, we can see that some acts of violence are preferable to others. He contends in this vein that we need something counterintuitive, a kind of morality of evil, a morality able to face up to what he refers to as "a question of acceptability, not utility" (1988, 31). This distinction between the acceptable and the useful transforms the idea of a moral project to where it becomes right to enact those wrongs that would constitute the best (i.e., least damaging) uses of energy given the requirements of expenditure in situations of limited growth. For Bataille, it is "right" to "constructively" suspend moral prohibitions in order to substitute less damaging acts for the more violent alternatives. Our prohibitionist morality is an inevitable failure in even imagining how a surplus of energy may best be discharged. By default, this morality results in more violent discharges of energy, in lives that are, as a consequence, made worse.