# Competition

# 1nc

## 1

## 1nc

### 1nc – Framework

#### Our interpretation is that the negative should not be burdened with rejoinder against AFFs that defend anything other than the desirability of a topical action.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases ’64 (Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The WTO is the World Trade Organization – it regulates international trade and has 164 member nations.

**WTO** – The World Trade Organization

WTO, “What is the WTO: Overview” No date, [https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/wto\_dg\_stat\_e.htm //](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm%20//) sam :)

The WTO provides a forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all, thus contributing to economic growth and development. The WTO also provides a legal and institutional framework for the implementation and monitoring of these agreements, as well as for settling disputes arising from their interpretation and application. The current body of trade agreements comprising the WTO consists of 16 different multilateral agreements (to which all WTO members are parties) and two different plurilateral agreements (to which only some WTO members are parties). Over the past 60 years, the WTO, which was established in 1995, and its predecessor organization the GATT have helped to create a strong and prosperous international trading system, thereby contributing to unprecedented global economic growth. The WTO currently has 164 members, of which 117 are developing countries or separate customs territories. WTO activities are supported by a Secretariat of some 700 staff, led by the WTO Director-General. The Secretariat is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and has an annual budget of approximately CHF 200 million ($180 million, €130 million). The three official languages of the WTO are English, French and Spanish. Decisions in the WTO are generally taken by consensus of the entire membership. The highest institutional body is the Ministerial Conference, which meets roughly every two years. A General Council conducts the organization's business in the intervals between Ministerial Conferences. Both of these bodies comprise all members. Specialised subsidiary bodies (Councils, Committees, Sub-committees), also comprising all members, administer and monitor the implementation by members of the various WTO agreements. More specifically, the WTO's main activities are: — negotiating the reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade (import tariffs, other barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct of international trade (e.g. antidumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.) — administering and monitoring the application of the WTO's agreed rules for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights — monitoring and reviewing the trade policies of our members, as well as ensuring transparency of regional and bilateral trade agreements — settling disputes among our members regarding the interpretation and application of the agreements — building capacity of developing country government officials in international trade matters — assisting the process of accession of some 30 countries who are not yet members of the organization — conducting economic research and collecting and disseminating trade data in support of the WTO's other main activities — explaining to and educating the public about the WTO, its mission and its activities. The WTO's founding and guiding principles remain the pursuit of open borders, the guarantee of most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory treatment by and among members, and a commitment to transparency in the conduct of its activities. The opening of national markets to international trade, with justifiable exceptions or with adequate flexibilities, will encourage and contribute to sustainable development, raise people's welfare, reduce poverty, and foster peace and stability. At the same time, such market opening must be accompanied by sound domestic and international policies that contribute to economic growth and development according to each member's needs and aspirations.

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A substance, especially a drug, used to treat the signs and symptoms of a disease, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include: TRADE SECRETS Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder. Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies. When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information. [Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret. PATENTS As defined by the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter. When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product. COPYRIGHTS Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture. Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary. TRADEMARKS Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing. Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark. While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits---allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible by skirting a predictable starting point, which makes all our preparation and research useless.

#### Two impacts---

#### 1---Fairness---a predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance---radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything else structurally favors the aff.

#### That’s an intrinsic good---debate is a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg---the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate.

#### 2--- Clash---debates over a stasis point incentivize argumentative refinement and self-questioning. Defending our position against a well-prepared opponent is key---it makes us more persuasive, informed, and forces us to adjust our position to become more effective advocates.

#### Topical version of the aff –

#### All the aff literally says IP is bad – only the state can reduce IP since it was the one that granted IP in the first place – here’s evidence that shows the plan deconstructs profit drives

Ahmed 20 [Kavum; 6/24/20; Division Director for Access and Accountability at the Open Society Public Health Program in New York and teaches at Columbia University Law School; "Decolonizing the vaccine," Africa’s Country, <https://africasacountry.com/2020/06/decolonizing-the-vaccine>] Elmer Re-Cut Justin

Reflecting on a potential COVID-19 vaccine trial during a television interview in April, a French doctor stated, “If I can be provocative, shouldn’t we be doing this study in Africa, where there are no masks, no treatments, no resuscitation?” These remarks reflect a colonial view of Africa, reinforcing the idea that Africans are non-humans whose black bodies can be experimented on. This colonial perspective is also clearly articulated in the alliance between France, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy to negotiate priority access to the COVID-19 vaccine for themselves and the rest of Europe. In the Dutch government’s announcement of the European vaccine coalition, they indicate that, “… the alliance is also working to make a portion of vaccines available to low-income countries, including in Africa.” In the collective imagination of these European nations, Africa is portrayed as a site of redemption—a place where you can absolve yourself from the sins of “vaccine sovereignty,” by offering a “portion of the vaccines” to the continent. Vaccine sovereignty reflects how European and American governments use public funding, supported by the pharmaceutical industry and research universities, to obtain priority access to potential COVID-19 vaccines. The concept symbolizes the COVID-19 vaccine (when it eventually becomes available) as an instrument of power deployed to exercise control over who will live and who must die. In order to counter vaccine sovereignty, we must decolonize the vaccine. Africans have a particular role to play in leading this decolonization process as subjects of colonialism and as objects of domination through coloniality. Colonialism, as an expansion of territorial dominance, and coloniality, as the continued expression of Western imperialism after colonization, play out in the vaccine development space, most notably on the African continent. So what does decolonizing the vaccine look like? And how do we decolonize something that does not yet exist? For Frantz Fanon, “Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder.” Acknowledging that the COVID-19 vaccine has been weaponized as an instrument of power by wealthy nations, decolonization requires a Fanonian program of radical re-ordering. In the context of vaccine sovereignty, this re-ordering necessitates the dismantling of the profit-driven biomedical system. This program starts with de-linking from Euro-American constructions of knowledge and power that reinforce vaccine sovereignty through the profit-driven biomedical system. Advocacy campaigns such as the “People’s Vaccine”, which calls for guaranteed free access to COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics and treatments to everyone, everywhere, are a good start. Other mechanisms, such as the World Health Organization’s COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, similarly supports universal access to COVID-19 health technologies as global public goods. Since less than 1% of vaccines consumed in Africa are manufactured on the continent, regional efforts to develop vaccine manufacturing capacity such as those led by the Africa Center for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as the Alliance of African Research Universities, must be supported. These efforts collectively advance delinking and move us closer toward the re-ordering of systems of power. The opportunity for disorder is paradoxically enabled by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has permitted moments of existential reflection in the midst of the crisis. A few months ago, a press release announcing the distribution of “a portion of the vaccines” to Africans, may have been lauded as European benevolence. But in the context of a pandemic that is more likely to kill black people, Africa’s reliance on Europe for vaccine handouts is untenable, necessitating a re-examination of the systems of power that hold this colonial relationship in place. The Black African body appears to be good enough to be experimented on, but not worthy of receiving simultaneous access to the COVID-19 vaccine as Europeans. Consequently, Africans continue to feel the effects of colonialism and white supremacy, and understand the pernicious nature of European altruism. By reinforcing the current system of vaccine research, development and manufacturing, it has become apparent that European governments want to retain their colonial power over life and death in Africa through the COVID-19 vaccine. Resistance to this colonial power requires the decolonization of the vaccine.

#### Competing interps – anything else invites judge intervention absent a clear brightline and this will be a debate about models of debate – if you have no idea what debates would look like in the world of the aff you should vote negative.

#### Drop the debater – the entirety of the aff is being criticized which means drop the argument is incoherent.

## 2

### 1nc – Cap

#### We are in the era of late-capitalism – neoliberalism has subordinated the role of identity politics in support of cultural commodification.

Eagleton 16 – Visiting Professor of Cultural Theory at Yale [Terry, “The Hubris of Culture: And the Limits of Identity Politics,” *Commonwealth*, 15 Apr 2016, p. 19-22, Emory Libraries]

The conventional postmodern wisdom is that this system has now taken a cultural turn. From the rough-spoken old industrial world, we have now evolved to capitalism with a cultural face. The role of the so-called “creative” industries, the power of the new cultural technologies, the prominent role of sign, image, brand, icon, spectacle, lifestyle, fantasy, design, and advertising: all this is taken to testify to the emergence of an “aesthetic” form of capitalism, in transit from the material to the immaterial. What this amounts to, however, is that capitalism has incorporated culture for its own material ends, not that it has fallen under the sway of the aesthetic, gratuitous, self-delighting, or self-fulfilling. On the contrary, this aestheticized mode of capitalist production has proved more ruthlessly instrumental than ever. “Creativity,” which for Karl Marx and William Morris signified the opposite of capitalist utility, is pressed into the service of acquisition and exploitation.

There is no clearer example of the way capitalism is intent on assimilating what once seemed its opposite (“culture”) than the global decline of the universities. Along with the fall of Communism and the Twin Towers, it ranks among the most momentous events of our age, if somewhat less spectacular in nature. A centuries-old tradition of universities as centers of humane critique is currently being scuppered by their conversion into pseudocapitalist enterprises under the sway of a brutally philistine managerial ideology. Once arenas of critical reflection, academic institutions are being increasingly reduced to organs of the marketplace, along with betting shops and fast-food joints. They are now for the most part in the hands of technocrats for whom values are largely a matter of real estate. A new intellectual proletariat of academics is assessed by how far their lectures on Plato or Copernicus boost the economy, while unemployed graduates constitute a kind of lumpen intelligentsia. Students who are currently charged fees by the year will no doubt soon find their tutors charging by the insight. In moving some of its academic staff to new premises, one British university recently issued an edict severely restricting their ability to keep books in their minuscule offices. The dream of our universities’ boneheaded administrators is of a bookless and paperless environment, books and paper being messy, crumply stuff incompatible with a gleaming neo-capitalist wasteland consisting of nothing but machines, bureaucrats, and security guards. Since students are also messy, crumply stuff, the ideal would be a campus on which no such inconvenient creatures were in sight. The death of the humanities is now an event waiting on the horizon.

What ought finally to have discredited the faith that capitalism has shifted to a new cultural mode was the financial debacle of 2008. One consequence of such upheavals is that, for an inconvenient moment, they strip the veil of familiarity from a form of life that has ceased to be regarded as a specific historical system. By throwing its inner workings into relief, they allow that life-form to be framed, objectified, and estranged. As such, it ceases to be the invisible color of everyday life and can be seen instead as a historically recent mode of civilization. Significantly, it is in the throes of such crises that even those who are supposed to run the system begin for the first time to use the word “capitalism,” rather than to speak more euphemistically of Western democracy or the Free World. They thus steal a march on some sectors of the cultural left, which in their zeal for a discourse of difference, diversity, identity, and marginality ceased to use the word “capitalism” – let alone “exploitation” or “revolution” – some decades ago. Neoliberal capitalism has no difficulty with terms like “diversity” or “inclusiveness,” as it does with the language of class struggle.

It is imprudent for the Masters of the Universe to talk of capitalism, since in doing so they acknowledge that their form of life is simply one among many, that like all other such life-forms it has a specific origin, and that what was born can always die. It may be that capitalism is simply human nature, but it is hard to deny that there was a time when there was human nature but not capitalism. What the crisis of 2008 put most embarrassingly on show, however, was how little the system had fundamentally changed, for all the excited talk of lifestyle and hybridity, flexible identities and immaterial labor, rhizome-like organizations and CEOs in opennecked shirts, the disappearance of the working class and the shift from industrial labor to information technology and the service industry. Despite these innovations, the momentary crackup of the system revealed that we were still languishing in a world of mass unemployment and obscenely overpaid executives, gross inequalities and squalid public services, one in which the state was every bit as obedient a tool of ruling-class interests as the most resolutely vulgar of Marxists had ever imagined. What was at stake was not image and icon but gargantuan fraud and systemic plunder. The true gangsters and anarchists wore pinstripe suits, and the robbers were running the banks rather than raiding them.

The idea of culture is traditionally bound up with the concept of distinction. High culture is a question of rank. One thinks of the great hautbourgeois families portrayed by Marcel Proust and Thomas Mann, for whom power and material wealth are accompanied by a lofty cultural tone and bear with them certain moral obligations. Spiritual hierarchy goes hand in hand with social inequality. The aim of advanced capitalism, by contrast, is to preserve inequality while abolishing hierarchy. In this sense, its material base is at odds with its cultural superstructure. You do not need to proclaim your superiority to other peoples in order to raid their natural resources, as long as by doing so you maintain the material inequalities between them and yourself. Whether Americans regard themselves as superior to Iraqis is really neither here nor there, given that it is political and military control over an oil-rich region they have in their sights. Culturally speaking, late capitalism is for the most part a matter not of hierarchy but hybridity – of mingling, merging, and multiplicity – while, materially speaking, the gulf between social classes assumes ultra-Victorian proportions. There are plenty of exponents of cultural studies who take note of the former but not the latter. While the sphere of consumption is hospitable to all comers, the domain of property and production remains rigidly stratified. Divisions of property and class, however, are partly masked by the levelling, demotic, spiritually promiscuous culture in which they are set, as they were not in the era of Proust and Mann. In contrast to that stately milieu, cultural and material capital now begin to split apart. The brokers, jobbers, operators, and speculators who float to the top of the system in their spiritual weightlessness are hardly remarkable for their aesthetic wisdom.

The breaking down of cultural hierarchies is clearly to be welcomed. For the most part, however, it is less the upshot of a genuinely democratic spirit than an effect of the commodity form, which levels existing values rather than contesting them in the name of alternative priorities. Indeed, it represents an assault less on cultural supremacism than on the notion of value as such. The very act of discrimination becomes suspect. Not only does it involve exclusion, but it must inevitably imply the possibility of a superior vantage point, which seems offensive to the egalitarian spirit. Those who prefer Billie Holliday to Liam Gallagher (and what right have they to judge in any case?) are simply being elitist. Since nothing is more common than evaluation in pubs and sports stadiums, this aversion to ranking is itself an elitist posture. Distinctions give way to differences. The cuisine of Florence, Arizona, is neither better nor worse than that of Florence, Italy – simply different. To discriminate is unjustly to demean one thing while falsely absolutizing another. To judge that Donald Trump has less humility than Pope Francis is to thrust Trump self-righteously into the outer darkness, thereby flouting the absolute value of inclusivity; and who am I to arrogate such authority? From what odiously Olympian standpoint has one the right to pontificate that feeding a gerbil is preferable to microwaving it?

The bogus populism of the commodity – its warm-hearted refusal to rank, exclude, and discriminate – is based on a blank indifference to absolutely everyone. Careless for the most part of distinctions of class, race, and gender, impeccably even-handed in its favors, it will yield itself, in the spirit of a whorehouse, to anyone with the cash to buy it. A similar indifference underlies the historic advance of multiculturalism. If the human species now has a chance, for the first time in its history, to become thoroughly hybrid, it is largely because the capitalist market will buy the labor-power of anyone willing to sell it, whatever their cultural origins. There are, to be sure, some transitional tensions at work here. At present, it is the economy that is promiscuously open to all comers, and a certain current of racist culture that wishes to discriminate. A capitalist market accustomed to being culturally embedded in the nation state, whose military firepower and social homogeneity served it well over the centuries, now pitches different ethnic groups together; and the racist and neo-fascist forces that this unleashes threaten to splinter the national cohesion on which a globalized economic system continues to depend.

For the moment, then, culture and the economy are in some sense out of synchrony. While the latter can go global, it is not so simple for the former to wax cosmopolitan. One can, to be sure, hang around polyglot cafés or enjoy the music of a score of nations, but culture in this sense of the term lacks the depth in which values and convictions need to be rooted. There are indeed international allegiances for which men and women have been ready to die, not least in the socialist tradition; but culture, as Edmund Burke was aware, draws much of its resilience from local loyalties. It is hard to imagine the citizens of Bradford or Bruges throwing themselves on the barricades crying “Long live the European Union!” Far from producing citizens of the world, transnational capitalism tends to breed parochialism and insecurity among a large swathe of those subject to its sway; and it is toward racism and chauvinism, not into cosmopolitan cafés, that this insecurity is likely to impel them.

While some forms of culture have increased in significance, others have diminished. Nobody believes any longer that art can fill the shoes of the Almighty. Culture as a critique of civilization has been increasingly eroded, undermined among other things by the postmodern prejudice that any such critique must address itself to an illusory social totality from an equally illusory standpoint of absolute knowledge. It has also come under siege from the intellectual treason of the universities. The critical or utopian dimensions of the concept of culture are rapidly declining. If culture signifies a corporate way of life, as it does when we speak of deaf culture, beach culture, police culture, café culture, and so on, then it is hard for it to serve at the same time as a yardstick by which to assess such forms of life, or to evaluate social existence in general. So-called identity politics are not remarkable for their self-critical spirit. The point of engaging in, say, English folk culture is to affirm English folksiness, not to question it. Nobody becomes a Morris dancer in order to satirize the whole sorry business.

At the same time, there are political cultures (gay, feminist, ethnic, musical, and so on) that are indeed deeply critical of the status quo. They inherit the dissenting impulse of Kulturkritik while jettisoning its spiritual elitism. They also reject its abstract utopianism for a specific way of life. If they challenge the patrician remoteness of the tradition that passes from Friedrich Schiller to D. H. Lawrence, with its disdain for modernity, they also differ from those corporate life-forms that exist simply to affirm a particular social identity, rather than to cast a cold eye on the social order as a whole. Nobody but the most sorely misguided of citizens becomes a Morris dancer in order to overthrow capitalism, whereas many a feminist has greeted the prospect with acclaim. Political cultures of this kind combine critique with solidarity in something like the style of the traditional labor movement.

Yet though identity politics and multiculturalism can be radical forces, they are not for the most part revolutionary ones. Some of these political currents have largely abandoned their hopes in this regard, while others never entertained them in the first place. They differ in this respect from the powers that drove the British from India and the Belgians from the Congo. Those campaigns were quite properly a matter of expulsion and exclusion, not in the first place of plurality and inclusivity. They also envisaged a world beyond the horizon of capitalist reality, even if those visions were to be for the most part thwarted. Today’s cultural politics, by contrast, is not generally given to challenging those priorities. It speaks the language of gender, identity, marginality, diversity, and oppression, but not for the most part the idiom of state, property, class-struggle, ideology, and exploitation. Roughly speaking, it is the difference between anti-colonialism and postcolonialism. Cultural politics of this kind are in one sense the very opposite of elitist notions of culture. Yet they share in their own way that elitism’s overvaluing of cultural affairs, as well as its distance from the prospect of fundamental change.

What, finally, of the so-called War on Terror? Is it not here that we should look for the persistence of cultural questions in political society? Perhaps one might see the collapse of the World Trade Center as a surreal explosion of archaic cultural forces at the very heart of modern civilization. The clash between Western capitalism and radical Islam, however, is primarily a geopolitical affair, not a cultural or religious one, rather as the recent conflict in Northern Ireland had little to do with religious conviction. There has been much talk in the region of the need for an amicable encounter between what is blandly known as “the two cultural traditions,” Unionist and nationalist. It is thus that a history of injustice and inequality, of Protestant supremacy and Catholic subjugation, can be converted into an innocuous question of alternative cultural identities. Culture becomes a convenient way of displacing politics.

As in the case of revolutionary nationalism, culture may supply some of the terms on which material and political battles are joined, but it does not constitute their substance. By and large, fundamentalism is the creed of those who feel abandoned and humiliated by modernity, and the forces responsible for this pathological state of mind, like those that give birth to multiculturalism, are far from cultural in themselves. In fact, the central questions that confront a humanity moving into the new millennium are not cultural ones at all. They are far more mundane and material than that. War, hunger, drugs, arms, genocide, disease, ecological disaster: all of these have their cultural aspects, but culture is not the core of them. If those who speak of culture cannot do so without inflating the concept, it is perhaps better for them to remain silent.

#### Their use of singular micropractices to create resistance precludes effective organizing and obscures structures of power.

Jodi Dean 15, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2015, “Red, Black, and Green,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 396-404

A defining characteristic of capitalism is the differentiation between state and economy.2 More than an economic system for the production and circulation of value, capitalism refers to a form of society (Marx 2008, 14). In contrast with, say, feudalism, capitalist society relies on the differentiation of the economic system from the political system. That state and economy are differentiated does not mean that they are separate from one another. States are deeply involved in economic life: they issue and maintain currencies, create and preserve property and markets, devise and extend the policy infrastructure of global trade, and so on. The differentiation between state and economy also does not imply complete independence, as if states themselves were not economic actors with, for example, massive purchasing, employing, and investing power. Rather, under capitalism the differentiation between state and economy points to different relations to capital accumulation, with the state focused generally on the terms and conditions of accumulation and the economy focused on the circulatory processes of accumulation itself. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012, 4) speak of the “relative autonomy” of capitalist states. Political logics, rationalities, or governmentalities (to use Foucault’s term) are irreducible to economic considerations. Capitalist states have capacities to act on behalf of the system as a whole—capacities anchored in an array of institutions, laws, and policies. At the same time, they are constrained by their dependence on capital accumulation. States secure and reproduce capitalism, whether by protecting capitalists from themselves through taxes and regulatory oversight, protecting capitalists from the people through aggressive policing and surveillance, or protecting people from capitalists in those increasingly frequent emergency responses that have taken the place of planning and social welfare. The state—particularly in its contemporary extended, decentralized, and networked form—gives capitalism its durability. It responds to capitalism’s inevitable crises, keeping the system running even when its components break down. Under globalized capitalism, an international policy architecture aimed at securing capital flow provides massive advantages to multinational banks and corporations. The structural adjustment policies and austerity measures imposed by the IMF, World Bank, European Central Bank, and U.S. Treasury determine (although not fully or exclusively) the lives of billions of people, impacting basic social structures such as education and medical care, property, markets for agricultural products, transportation, currency value, energy, and the availability of potable water. The viability of communism, as an egalitarian political and economic arrangement anchored in the sovereignty of the people and in production based on need, depends on seizing, dismantling, or redirecting this system. Naomi Klein (2014, 66–9) tells a story that illustrates the limits the global trade architecture imposes on local actors. In 2009, the Canadian province of Ontario announced the Green Energy and Green Economy Act. Its goal was to shift Ontario away from dependence on coal. As Klein explains, “The legislation created what is known as a feed-in tariff program, which allowed renewable energy providers to sell power back to the grid.” A key element of the plan was ensuring that “local municipalities, co-ops, and Indigenous communities could all get into the renewable energy market” (67). This was to be achieved by a provision requiring that a certain percentage of materials and workforce come from Ontario. Although there were various setbacks and complications, after several years the legislation seemed to have been largely successful. That’s when Japan and the EU went to the World Bank with the complaint that the local materials and workforce requirement discriminated against equipment producers outside Ontario. The World Bank agreed; the buy local provisions were illegal. The absence of a powerful Left enables the political Right (in part by shifting what had been the center). The intensified inequality of the last forty years of neoliberalism testifies to the impact of left political defeat.3 Neoliberalism’s subjection of all of society to its economic criteria of efficiency and competitiveness has been carried out as a political project.4 The political system has been the instrument through which neoliberalism has dismantled the achievements of the welfare state, installed competition in ever more domains, expanded the finance sector, and imposed austerity. This is the setting, then, for my appeal to the Left to assemble itself into a party. Key determinants of our lives occur behind our backs—currency valuations, monetary policies, trade agreements, energy concessions, data harvesting. To insist on a politics focused on isolating and archiving singular micropractices abstracted from their global capitalist context obscures the workings of state and economy as a capitalist system, hinders the identification of this system as the site of ongoing harm (exploitation, expropriation, and injustice), and disperses political energies that could be more effective if concentrated. More fundamentally, in treating economic practices as the primary locus of left politics, such an insistence effaces the gap between politics and economics such that questions of strategy, of how to win, are displaced. Morrow and Brault supply a striking example of this effacement when they ask, “What is communism for, if not to improve our everyday lives?” Communism, which previous generations rendered as the world-historical struggle of the proletariat, diminishes into yet another option for individual self-improvement; the abolition of exploitation, expropriation, and injustice replaced by economic determinations of immediate satisfaction. As Ramsey rightly notes, Healy similarly substitutes economic alternatives for political antagonism. Two ideas voiced in the present discussion impress the urgency of the need for a left party oriented toward communism: racism (Buck 2015) and the Anthropocene (Healy 2015). Given anthropogenic climate change, the stakes of contemporary politics are almost unimaginably high. They range from the continued investment in extractive industries and fossil fuels constitutive of the carbon-combustion complex (see Oreskes and Conway 2014), to the dislocations accompanying mass migration in the wake of floods and droughts to the racist response of states outside what Christian Parenti (2011, 9) calls the “Tropic of Chaos” (the band around the “belt of economically and politically battered post-colonial states girding the planet’s mid-latitudes,” where climate change is “beginning to hit hard”), all the way to human extinction. That one city, state, or country brings carbon emissions under control—while certainly a step in the right direction—may be irrelevant from the standpoint of overall warming. Perhaps its carbon-emitting industries were shipped elsewhere. Perhaps another country chose to expand its own drilling operations. Climate change forces us to acknowledge that we can’t build new worlds (Helepololei). We live in one world, the heating up of which threatens humans and other species. Not all communities, economies, or ways of life are compatible. Those premised on industries and practices that continue to contribute to planetary warming have to change significantly, and soon. Forcing that change is the political challenge of our time. Given the persistence of racialized violence and the operation of the state as an instrument for the maintenance not only of capitalist modes of production but also and concomitantly of racialized hierarchy, the challenges of organizing politically across issues and identities are almost insurmountably daunting. No wonder the Left resorts to moralism and self-care instead. It’s easier to catalog difference than it is to build up a Left strong enough to exercise power, especially given the traversal of state power by transnational corporations, trade, and treaties. It’s also easier to go along with the dominant ideology of individualism, which enjoins us first and foremost to look after ourselves, than it is to put ourselves aside and focus on formulating a strategy for using collective power to occupy, reconfigure, and redirect institutions at multiple levels. Here again, not every vision of community is compatible with every other. Those premised on fantasies of racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic purity directly oppose those premised on diversity. Those premised on reproducing structures of class hierarchy directly oppose those insisting on equality. If something like a party of the radical Left can stretch beyond Greece and Spain, if it can be imagined in North America, it will only be possible as a combination of communism, antiracism, and climate activism. I use “red, black, and green” as a heuristic for the coalition of concerns necessary for such a party. I invoke the heuristic here to double down against critics who prefer a thousand alternatives to the party form. A thousand alternatives (see Healy 2015) is no alternative. It leaves the political system we have—the one that puts all its force behind the preservation of capitalist class interests—intact. Some ideas need to be chosen, systematized into a program, and defended.

#### Capitalism culminates in extinction---warming, inter-state conflict, social unrest, resource wars, and lack of expansion ensures the system *can’t recover* and the system is on the brink now.

Robinson 19, February 2019, William I. Robinson, “Into the Tempest: Essays on the New Global Capitalism”, <https://www.powells.com/book/into-the-tempest-9781608469666/62-0> // dbw

Eighth, deep contradictions in emergent world society make entirely uncertain the very survival of our species, much less the mid- to long-term stabilization and viability of global capitalism, and portend prolonged global social conflict. The structure of global production, distribution, and consumption increasingly reflects the skewed income pattern. For instance, under the new global social apartheid, tourism is the fastest growing economic activity and even the mainstay of many Third World economies. This does not mean that more people are actually enjoying the fruits of leisure and international travel; it means that 20 percent of humanity has more and more disposable income simultaneous to the contraction of consumption by the remaining 80 percent. This 80 percent is forced to provide all sorts of ever more frivolous services to, and to orient its productive activity toward, meeting the needs and satisfying the sumptuous desires of that 20 percent." By the turn of the century, private security forces and prisons had become the number one growth sector in the United States and the other Northern countries." Social apartheid spawns decadence. Militarized fortress cities and spatial apartheid are necessary for social control under a situation in which an ever-smaller portion of humanity can actually consume the essentials of life, much less luxury goods." As national capitalism matured in the late nineteenth century in the North, the tendency inherent in capital accumulation toward a concentration of income and productive resources, and the social polarity and political conflict this generates, was offset by two factors. The first was the intervention of states to regulate the operation of the free market, to guide accumulation, and to capture and redistribute surpluses. This intervention was itself the outcome of mass working class struggles from below that forced reform on the system. The second was the emergence of modern imperialism to offset the polarizing tendencies inherent in the process of capital accumulation in the North, thereby transferring global social conflict to the South. Both these factors therefore fettered, in the core of the world system, the social polarity generated by capitalism. But by reducing or eliminating the ability of individual states to regulate czsapital accumulation and capture surpluses, globalization is now bringing (at a worldwide level) precisely the polarization between a rich minority and a poor majority that Karl Marx predicted. Yet this time there are no "new frontiers," no virgin lands for capitalist colonization that could offset the social and political consequences of global polarization. Endemic to unfettered global capitalism, therefore, is intensified social conflict, which in turn engenders constant political crises and ongoing instability, both within countries and between countries. In the post-World War 11 period, the North was able to shift much social conflict to the South as a combined result of an imperialist transfer of wealth from South to North and the redistribution of this wealth in the North through Keynesian state intervention. No fewer than 160 wars were fought in the Third World from 1945 to 1990. However, globalization involves a distinct shift in global strife from interstate conflict (reflecting a certain correspondence between classes and nations in the stage of national capitalism) to global class conflict. The UNDP's 1994 report underscores a shift from "a pattern of wars between states to wars within states." Of the eighty-two armed conflicts between 1989 and 1992, only three were between states. "Although often cast in ethnic divisions, many have a political or economic character," states the report. Meanwhile, global military spending in 1992 was $815 billion ($725 billion of which corresponded to the rich Northern countries), a figure equal to the combined income of 49 percent of the world's people in that same year." By 2015, military spending worldwide had more than doubled, to nearly $1.7 trillion.28 The period of worldwide political instability we face ranged from the late twentieth into the early twenty-first centuries from civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and in numerous African countries to simmering social conflict in Latin America and Asia; major transnational wars in the Middle East; endemic civil disturbances, sometimes low-key and sometimes high profile, in Los Angeles, Paris, Bonn, Athens, and most metropoles of the Northern countries. Uncertain survival and insecurities posed by global capitalism induces diverse forms of fundamentalisms, localisms, nationalisms, and racial and ethnic conflict. These themes will be discussed in detail in later chapters. As the worldwide ruling class, the transnational bourgeoisie has thrust humanity into a crisis of civilization. Social life under global capitalism is increasingly dehumanizing and devoid of any ethical content. But our crisis is deeper: We face a species crisis. Well known structural contradictions analyzed a century ago by Marx, such as overaccumulation, underconsumption, and the tendency toward stagnation, are exacerbated by globalization, as many analysts have pointed out. However, while these "classic" contradictions cause financial turmoil, social crisis and cultural decadence, new contradictions associated with twenty-first-century capitalism-namely, the incompatibility of the reproduction of both capital and of nature-is leading to an ecological [disaster] ~~holocaust~~ that threatens the survival of our species and of life itself on our planet." Yet "most analyses of the environmental problem today are concerned less with saving the planet or life or humanity than saving capitalism -the system at the root of our environmental problem," note Foster and his colleagues. "Not only has this generated inertia with respect to social change-indeed a tendency to fiddle while Rome burns-but it has also led to the belief that the crisis can be managed by essentially the same social institutions that brought it into being in the first place."

#### Vote negative to endorse the form of the Party---our method is distinct and exclusive with the method of the 1AC---a negative ballot foregrounds political organization and commonality against capital.

Jodi Dean 16, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2016, “Crowds and Party.”

Crowds and Party comes out of this moment of collective de-subjectivation. Occupy Wall Street foundered against a contradiction at its core. The individualism of its democratic, anarchist, and horizontalist ideological currents undermined the collective power the movement was building. Making collective political action dependent on individual choice, the “theology of consensus” fragmented the provisional unity of the crowd back into disempowered singularities.3 The movement’s decline (which began well before Occupiers were evicted) exposes the impasse confronting the Left. The celebration of autonomous individuality prevents us from foregrounding our commonality and organizing ourselves politically. At the same time and together with the global wave of popular unrest, the collective energy of Occupy at its height nevertheless points to an “idea whose time has come.” People are moving together in growing opposition to the policies and practices of states organized in the interest of capital as a class. Crowds are forcing the Left to return again to questions of organization, endurance, and scale. Through what political forms might we advance? For many of us, the party is emerging as the site of an answer. Against the presumption that the individual is the fundamental unit of politics, I focus on the crowd. Across the globe, crowds are pressing their opposition and rupturing the status quo, the actuality of their movement displacing the politics of identity. Bringing together thinkers such as Elias Canetti and Alain Badiou, I highlight the “egalitarian discharge” of the crowd event as an intense experience of substantive collectivity. I make fidelity to this event the basis for a new theory of the communist party. Because global movements are themselves pushing us to consider the possibilities in and of the party form, we have to recommence imagining the party of communists.4 Who might we be and become as an international revolutionary party again, in our time? To think clearly about these questions, we need to consider the party form unfettered by the false concreteness of specific parties in the contingency of their histories. Liberals and democrats are not the only political theorists who can reflect on their modes of association in the abstract. Communists must do this as well. As a means of breaking out of the binaries of reform or revolution, mass or vanguard party that historically have inflected discussions of the party form, I approach the function and purpose of the communist party psycho-dynamically. I draw from Robert Michels and Jacques Lacan to think through the affects the party generates and the unconscious processes it mobilizes. The role of the party isn’t to inject knowledge into the working class. Nor is it to represent the interests of the working class on the terrain of politics. Rather, the function of the party is to hold open a gap in our setting so as to enable a collective desire for collectivity.5 “Through such a gap or moment,” Daniel Bensaïd writes, “can arise the unaccomplished fact, which contradicts the fatality of the accomplished fact.”6 The crowd’s breach of the predictable and given creates the possibility that a political subject might appear. The party steps into that breach and fights to keep it open for the people. Canetti makes a point I return to throughout the book: crowds come together for the sake of an absolute equality felt most intensely in a moment he refers to as the “discharge.” Akin to Lacan’s notion of “enjoyment” (“jouissance,” the only substance known to psychoanalysis), the discharge provides a material ground for the party. The party is a body that can carry the egalitarian discharge after the crowds disperse, channeling its divisive promise of justice into organized political struggle.

## 3

#### 我们同意你所说的。我们应该减弱专利保护法。歧视华人行为或者语言都是很不好的。辩论是通往未来生活的路径。

Wǒmen tóngyì nǐ suǒ shuō de. Wǒmen yīnggāi jiǎnruò zhuānlì bǎohù fǎ. Qíshì huárén xíngwéi huòzhě yǔyán dōu shì hěn bù hǎo de. Biànlùn shì tōng wǎng wèilái shēnghuó de lùjìng.

#### The 1NC’s translation is linguistic activism that reclaims cultural agency and critiques stereotypes.

Duan 15 Duan, Carlina. " The Space Between: An analysis of code-switching within Asian American poetry as strategic poetic device"(English Honors) AND" Here I Go, Torching"(Creative Writing Honors). Diss. 2015. (BA in Honors English from the University of Michigan)//Elmer recut Nato

In an interview with Women’s Review of Books literary magazine, Hong further discussed **the strategic role of translation as a form of linguistic activism** within her poetic work. When asked why she does not include translations from Korean to English within her own poetry, **Hong said: “I wanted to open up these schisms, to emphasize that memory, the filtering of human experience into poetry, is often fractured and not transparent, especially experiences which have always been bisected and undercut by two languages.**” She added, “I think I want to debunk the idea of **easy translation—whether it be the idea of literal translation or, as I said before, the translating of one’s experience into poetry**” (Hong 2002a, 15). Hong’s intentional decision to leave out English translations in her poetry creates a power dynamic between speaker and reader of the poem. Not only are “easy” translations dismantled and withheld from the reader, but, according to Hong, **codeswitching — without translation — also more accurately reflects her personal experiences of cultural and linguistic movement. Hong points out that human experiences and the world of memory, especially for bilingual speakers, are “not transparent” — not captured neatly by one language, but rather, “bisected” by the complexities of belonging to two (or more) languages, implying a movement between multiple spaces. Scholars describe poetic code-switching in this way as a navigation of power**. Literary scholar Benzi Zhang argues that code-switching makes apparent different levels of cultural knowledge for speaker and reader: **“[T]he insertion of […] foreign words effectively renders Asian sensibilities into English and signifies different positions of cultural agency” (Zhang 131). Building upon this idea of cultural agency, I argue that Hong uses Korean to consciously expose themes of exoticism and racial stereotyping that readers themselves may be (consciously or unconsciously) participating in. As a result, Hong creates agency for her speaker through critiquing culturally appropriative behavior, in addition to an agency in knowledge**; Hong’s speaker can access cultural understanding that her readers do not have. Yet, Hong does more than negotiate questions of audience access; **she uses code-switching to reflect her speaker’s lived experiences of Korean-American identity, grappling with multiple languages and cultural codes**. In “An Introduction to Chinese-American and Japanese American Literatures,” Jeffrey Chan et al. writes, “**The minority experience does not yield itself to accurate or complete expression on the white man’s language” (qtd. Zhang 137**). As Chang et al. suggest, code-switching embeds itself as a natural part of the “minority experience,” and is documented as such in Hong’s poems. **Thus, the poems not only act as social critique of exoticization, but further inhabit the embodied experiences of Korean-American female identities living in the U.S. — which, as Hong reveals, are complicated experiences of rage, agency, celebration, and shifting power dynamics.** Critics who have reviewed Hong’s work, such as Jan Clausen, have raised questions about the effect of Hong’s play with translation. Clausen, in a review titled “The poetics of estrangement,” published through the Women’s Review of Books, writes of Hong’s collection Translating Mo’um: “Hong deftly dismantles the romance of language as homeland, with results especially unnerving for the non-Korean-speaking reader” (Clausen 15). **According to Clausen, Hong’s work with code-switching** subverts traditional notions of the ‘native tongue’ as representative of “homeland**,” dismantling what a reader may expect of a Korean American author: that she use Korean language to specifically discuss her ethnic culture as a hyphenated American**. In other words, Hong’s code-switches function as intentional poetic protest against the reader’s expectations of the relationship between multilingual text and ethnic identity. As Clausen points out, such readings may anticipate that mother tongue is only introduced to speak about cultural difference or history, rather than used additionally as formal poetic device. **In this chapter, I reveal Hong’s awareness of Korean language and code-switching as tools in identity-construction. Rather than allow others to shape her identity for her, she remains dominant in shaping her identity — and her agency — for herself.**

#### Cross-linguistic testimony is key to transformative advocacy that avoids colonial cooption.

McWilliams 09 \*TW: sexual assault\*– Montclair State University

Sally E. McWilliams, “Intervening in Trauma: Bodies, Violence, and Interpretive Possibilities in Vyvyane Loh's Breaking the Tongue,” Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40783478.pdf

This cross-temporal, cross-linguistic testifying does not reproduce the rape as an artefact to be consumed by readers, but rather presents it as a collective memory to fuel resistance to domination. Loh's narrative strategy is neither a straightforward historicizing account of the rape by the victim nor a direct retelling by a witness. Instead Loh produces a merger of event and insidious traumas that is simultaneously descriptive and inexplicable: visually distinctive through the inclusion of Chinese characters; verbally hybrid through disruptive shifts between Chinese and English passages or between narrators; and interpretively challenging through the text's assertion of control beyond certain readers' knowledge and experience. The narrative of Ling-li's rape is epitomized by the Chinese characters that control access to her experience as Claude pays witness to the perpetrators; such a counter-narration invokes a different linguistic and cultural world.27 Han Ling-li speaks in Mandarin with the textual passages reflecting a story non-Mandarin readers can't readily understand. While we hope that Ling- li will tell us her story, we quickly realize that the act of translation falls to Claude alone. His contributions, however, do not enact our desire for a definitive translation of Ling-li's words. Trauma is neither readily assimilated nor silenced by readers, and the text insists on our remembering and feeling this pivotal contradiction. Thus, the novel gives "pain a place in the world," to quote Scarry (p. 50), rendering momentarily indistinguishable the private and the public aspects of trauma while insisting that trauma can never be positioned as always already understood in abstraction. "By transporting pain out onto the external world," writes Scarry, "that external environment is deprived of its immunity to, unmindfulness of, and indifference toward the problems of sentience" (p. 285). And yet accessing the corporeal experience of the female body's exploitation is never completely transparent, never fully intelligible in discursive or sentient terms. Whereas we are given English- language descriptions of Claude's torture, English-only readers are precluded from easily grasping the intricacies of Ling-li's rape and deathly assault. This opacity in the representation disallows us any space in which to invoke a sentimentalized or pre-programmed response to militaristic rape, a reaction that we may typically invoke in our current era of state- sponsored sexual violence.28 The mixture of English and Chinese in this section (including three-quarters of a page written exclusively in Chinese characters) gives visual and linguistic evidence to the jarring, separate reality of Han Ling-li's experience of rape. In doing so it reveals rape to be an inherently gendered and traumatic weapon of war, an example in which event and insidious trauma become indistinguishable. By denying the English-only reader direct access to both sides of the hybridized narration of this trauma, Loh's text leaves a void only partially filled by Claude's translation and the reader's own empathetic leaps. The chilling impact of Han Ling-li's torture and death is underscored by the English-only reader's incomplete comprehension of her final hours.

## Case

1. Aff’s model of debate can’t resolve the structural problems with debate – one ballot doesn’t spillver or changes subjectivity – turn: only incentivizes people to innovate better arguments
2. Their methodology gets co-opted by state institutions – ceding the political causes right wing flood that amplifies anti-asian rhetoric
3. Opening Asian study towards the west causes capitalist infiltrations – especially since the aff is read in English, allows for a swifter cooption
4. Symbolic resources bad – mode of survivability ptx

Forcing Asian people to debate against anti-Asian politics is bad – forces me to read arguments that I obviously don’t agree with and creates the same violence the 1ac talks about

#### Presumption –

#### 1] They have no intrinsic benefit to specifically reading the aff within the debate space and thus no reason to affirm their strategy

#### 2] Movements don’t spill up – competition means you ally yourself with people who vote for you and alienate those who are forced to debate you ensuring the failure of the movement

#### 3] The regurgitation of knowledge from the 1ac proves that it is not a departure from the status quo, but rather gets coopted by academia

#### 4] Tying ballots to survivability or the aff is violent as it forces the judge to determine whether their method was “good enough” to get the ballot, which causes self hatred given losses

#### 5] Allows judges to dissuade their guilt by voting aff instead of participating in actual movements.

#### 6] All the 1ac does is talk about problems – don’t let them fiat or somehow gain access to revolutionary planning – that assumes they can convince other people and that their model is effective but they’ve read zero evidence about that

#### Self-formulation alone lapses into total individualism that demolishes collective action.

Myers ’13 (Ella; Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Utah, 2013, “Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World”, p. 44-45) \*Edited for reading clarity

Unfortunately, Connolly is inconsistent in this regard, for he also positions Foucauldian self- artistry as [is] an “essential preliminary to,” and even the necessary “condition of,” change at the macropolitical level.104 That is, although Connolly claims that micropolitics and political movements work “in tandem,” each producing effects on the other,105 he sometimes privileges “action by the self on itself” as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change. This approach not only avoids the question of the genesis of such reflexive action and its possible harmful effects but also indicates that collective efforts to alter social conditions actually await proper techniques of the self. For example, in a rich discussion of criminal punishment in the United States, Connolly contends that “today the micropolitics of desire in the domain of criminal violence has become a condition for a macropolitics that reconfigures existing relations between class, race, crime and punishment.”106 Here and elsewhere in Connolly’s writing the sequencing renders these activities primary and secondary rather than mutually inspiring and reinforcing.107 It is a mistake to grant chronological primacy to ethical self-intervention, however. How, after all, is such intervention, credited with producing salient effects at the macropolitical level, going to get off the ground, so to speak, or assuredly move in the direction of democratic engagement (rather than withdrawal, for example) if it is not tethered, from the beginning, to public claims that direct attention to a specific problem, defined as publicly significant and changeable? How and why would an individual take up reflexive work on the desire to punish if she were not already attuned, at least partially, to problems afflicting current criminal punishment practices? And that attunement is fostered, crucially, by the macropolitical efforts of democratic actors who define a public matter of concern and elicit the attention of other citizens.108 For reflexive self- care to be democratically significant, it must be inspired by and continually connected to larger political mobilizations. Connolly sometimes acknowledges that the arts of the self he celebrates are not themselves the starting point of collaborative action but instead exist in a dynamic, reciprocal relation with cooperative and antagonistic efforts to shape collective arrangements. Yet the self’s relation with itself is also treated as a privileged site, the very source of democratic spirit and action. This tendency to prioritize the self’s reflexive relationship over other modes of relation defines the therapeutic ethics that ultimately emerges out of Foucault’s and, to a lesser degree, Connolly’s work. This ethics not only elides differences between caring for oneself and caring for conditions but also celebrates the former as primary or, as Foucault says, “ontologically prior.” An ethics centered on the self’s engagement with itself may have value, but it is not an ethics fit for democracy