## Daily serotonin boost

#### Accidentally waking up drake:




## OFF

### 1NC

#### Interpretation: Debaters must post links to all previous constructive speech docs read at the tournament at least 30 minutes prior to the round. To clarify, this means you must include all analytics, full text, underlining, and highlighting of all cards as read in round.

#### Violation – they don’t



#### Standards –

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal framework justifications or cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //nick]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### 2] leads to higher quality engagement b/c I know exactly what the neg says which internal link turns the aff b/c it leads to net better discussion. This is especially true given that you did not disclose the offense of the AC—no way I can engage with it or contest it.

#### 3] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – full text doesn’t solve since you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

### 1NC

#### Interpretation: Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “suspend”

Reynolds 59 – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation: Vaccine waivers are temporary

#### Standards:

#### 1---Legal precision: it’s the best precedent within policy, shows how words are interpreted within the law

#### 2---Limits: it doubles the number of affs on the topic since every suspension is of different times, (ex: suspend IP protections for 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, etc.) makes it impossible to predict which turns clash and innovation

#### 3---Ground: decks link ground, all link cards are predicated on permanent changes because authors don’t care about temporary policies

#### 4---Aff shiftiness: no definition of how long suspension will be and how it happens allow affs to skirt out of DAs by changing their suspension periods, makes it impossible to be neg and decks clash

**D] Paradigm Issues –**

**1] T is DTD – A] their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start B] DTA is incoherent because we indict their advocacy**

**2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them**

**3] Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] only our interp sets norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention C] reasonability causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation**

### 1NC

#### The biotech industry is strong now---it’s weathered the COVID storm.

Cancherini et al. 21 – Consultant in M`cKinsey’s Brussels office

Laura Cancherini, Joseph Lydon, Jorge Santos da Silva, Alexandra Zemp, “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?,” McKinsey & Company, April 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/life-sciences/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide

Unlike most industries in these extraordinarily challenging times, biotech is experiencing a high. Executives in many other sectors are becoming more pessimistic about the outlook for their businesses as the global pandemic continues to spread.1 But the search to understand and find treatment or preventive solutions to COVID-19 has focused intense government, media, and public attention on science and medicine, reinforcing the perception that biotech acquisitions and partnerships represent a good investment.

In an effort to understand worldwide biotech financing in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, McKinsey analyzed the sector’s financial performance and interviewed 20 C-level executives from small and midsize biotechs and venture-capital (VC) firms.

The pandemic has had an enormous financial impact on many sectors, but biotech has weathered the storm: after a brief downturn early in the crisis, it recovered quickly (Exhibit 1). Between January 2020 and January 2021, the average share price for European and US biotechs increased at more than twice the rate of the S&P 500, and Chinese biotechs performed more than six times better, with their average share price more than doubling in a year. Overall, biotech is outperforming its sister industry, pharmaceuticals, as well as many household-name consumer-goods and technology companies.

With acquisitions, partnerships, IPOs, and fundraising still increasing, biotech’s star has, if anything, risen higher than it was before the pandemic. The industry’s response to the crisis, its record of innovation, and its reputation as a safe haven for investment have all served it well. But whether biotech can sustain this performance is open to question. This article looks at the industry’s record of growth, its resilience during the global pandemic, and the factors that could determine whether the biotech wave continues.

#### Biotech is key to climate change solutions---waiving IP rights decks it by setting a sweeping precedent that chills innovation.

Brand 21 – Assistant General Counsel and Director of Intellectual Property at the Biotechnology Innovation Organization

Melissa Brand, “TRIPS IP Waiver Could Establish Dangerous Precedent for Climate Change and Other Biotech Sectors,” IP Watchdog, May 2021, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/26/trips-ip-waiver-establish-dangerous-precedent-climate-change-biotech-sectors/id=133964/

While the discussions around waiving intellectual property (IP) rights set forth in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are currently (and somewhat amorphously) limited to COVID-19 related drug and medical products, it is probably shortsighted to ignore the implications for other technologies critical to sustaining our environment and advancing a more healthful world. In fact, if we want to ensure continued investment in these technologies, we should be very concerned about the message conveyed by the international political tide: if you overcome a challenging scientific problem and your solution has the potential to save lives, be prepared to be subjected to intense political pressure and to potentially hand over your technology without compensation and regardless of the consequences.

The biotech industry is making remarkable advances towards climate change solutions, and it is precisely for this reason that it can expect to be in the crosshairs of potential IP waiver discussions. President Biden is correct to refer to climate change as an existential crisis. Yet it does not take too much effort to connect the dots between President Biden’s focus on climate change and his Administration’s recent commitment to waive global IP rights for Covid vaccines (TRIPS IP Waiver). “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures.” If an IP waiver is purportedly necessary to solve the COVID-19 global health crisis (and of course we dispute this notion), can we really feel confident that this or some future Administration will not apply the same logic to the climate crisis? And, without the confidence in the underlying IP for such solutions, what does this mean for U.S. innovation and economic growth? United States Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai was subject to questioning along this very line during a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing. And while Ambassador Tai did not affirmatively state that an IP waiver would be in the future for climate change technology, she surely did not assuage the concerns of interested parties.

International Pressure May Be Influencing Domestic IP Policy

The United States has historically supported robust IP protection. This support is one reason the United States is the center of biotechnology innovation and leading the fight against COVID-19. However, a brief review of the domestic legislation arguably most relevant to this discussion shows just how far the international campaign against IP rights has eroded our normative position. The Clean Air Act, for example, contains a provision allowing for the mandatory licensing of patents covering certain devices for reducing air pollution. Importantly, however, the patent owner is accorded due process and the statute lays out a detailed process regulating the manner in which any such license can be issued, including findings of necessity and that no reasonable alternative method to accomplish the legislated goal exists. Also of critical importance is that the statute requires compensation to the patent holder. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act contemplates mandatory licensing of patents covering inventions of primary importance in producing or utilizing atomic energy. This statute, too, requires due process, findings of importance to the statutory goals and compensation to the rights holder.

A TRIPS IP waiver would operate outside of these types of frameworks. There would be no due process, no particularized findings, no compensation and no recourse. Indeed, the fact that the World Trade Organization (WTO) already has a process under the TRIPS agreement to address public health crises, including the compulsory licensing provisions, with necessary guardrails and compensation, makes quite clear that the waiver would operate as a free for all.

Forced Tech Transfer Could Be on The Table

When being questioned about the scope of a potential TRIPS IP waiver, Ambassador Tai invoked the proverb “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” While this answer suggests primarily that, in times of famine, the Administration would rather give away other people’s fishing rods than share its own plentiful supply of fish (here: actual COVID-19 vaccine stocks), it is apparent that in Ambassador Tai’s view waiving patent rights alone would not help lower- and middle-income countries produce their own vaccines. Rather, they would need to be taught how to make the vaccines and given the biotech industry’s manufacturing know-how, sensitive cell lines, and proprietary cell culture media in order to do so.

In other words, Ambassador Tai acknowledged that the scope of the current TRIPS IP waiver discussions includes the concept of forced tech transfer. In the context of climate change, the idea would be that companies who develop successful methods for producing new seed technologies and sustainable biomass, reducing greenhouse gases in manufacturing and transportation, capturing and sequestering carbon in soil and products, and more, would be required to turn over their proprietary know-how to global competitors.

While it is unclear how this concept would work in practice and under the constitutions of certain countries, the suggestion alone could be devastating to voluntary international collaborations. Even if one could assume that the United States could not implement forced tech transfer on its own soil, what about the governments of our international development partners? It is not hard to understand that a U.S.-based company developing climate change technologies would be unenthusiastic about partnering with a company abroad knowing that the foreign country’s government is on track – with the assent of the U.S. government – to change its laws and seize proprietary materials and know-how that had been voluntarily transferred to the local company.

Necessary Investment Could Diminish

Developing climate change solutions is not an easy endeavor and bad policy positions threaten the likelihood that they will materialize. These products have long lead times from research and development to market introduction, owing not only to a high rate of failure but also rigorous regulatory oversight. Significant investment is required to sustain and drive these challenging and long-enduring endeavors. For example, synthetic biology companies critical to this area of innovation raised over $1 billion in investment in the second quarter of 2019 alone. If investors cannot be confident that IP will be in place to protect important climate change technologies after their long road from bench to market, it is unlikely they will continue to invest at the current and required levels.

Next on the Chopping Block

It is quite reasonable to be worried about the broad implications of a TRIPS IP waiver precedent. International campaigns to weaken IP rights seem to be taking hold in U.S. domestic policy. The TRIPS IP waiver discussions will not conclude in the near term and will not yield more shots in people’s arms. This is not even truly disputed, as our own administration acknowledges that the goal here is technology transfer abroad. Given the signaling that our Administration believes waiving IP rights is an appropriate measure to end global crises, it is proper to worry that facets of the biotech sector addressing climate change may be next on the chopping block.

#### Biotech innovation is uniquely key to combatting climate change.

McMurry-Heath 21 – Physician-scientist and the president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization

Michelle McMurry-Heath, “To help solve climate change, look to the biosciences,” STAT News, May 2021, https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/21/climate-change-solutions-from-biosciences/

President Biden’s pledge to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2030 is an admirable and ambitious undertaking. It’s nearly double the goal set by President Obama in 2015. And it establishes the United States as a world leader in battling climate change.

But reaching the president’s target in just under 10 years is a monumental task. It’s so big, in fact, that we’ll never get there by government action alone. No amount of vehicle efficiency standards, forest conservation efforts, or gas taxes can fully solve the problem.

We have to science our way out of it.

The biosciences, including biotechnology, will play a pivotal role in the fight against climate change. It is already leading the way on several fronts. According to a report from BIO, the organization I work for, the biotech industry’s green initiatives could mitigate the equivalent of 3 billion tons of carbon dioxide every year by 2030, or about half of the country’s annual CO2 emissions.

Take food, for example.

Food consumption — and production — is central to human existence. Global food production accounts for one-quarter of greenhouse gas emissions. A recent report from an international team of researchers concluded that even if all other fossil fuel emissions were eliminated, emissions from food production alone would prevent us from reaching a key goal of the climate change agreement signed in Paris: preventing the global temperature from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius.

Halting food production isn’t an option, so biotech companies are helping farmers become part of the climate solution. Take, for example, Boston-based Joyn Bio. It is engineering bacteria that pull nitrogen directly from the atmosphere. These microbes then pass the nitrogen to crops like wheat and corn, reducing the need to make, transport, and apply nitrogen fertilizers, which reduces greenhouse gas emissions.

Minnesota-based Acceligen is using a technique it calls precision breeding that improves the health of livestock while reducing their waste, greenhouse gas emissions, and water usage.

Biotechnology can also help protect food from climate change. As fungal and bacterial infections accelerated by human-driven environmental disturbances threaten to wipe out Cavendish bananas, Tropic Biosciences in the United Kingdom is using CRISPR gene-editing technology to engineer infection-resistant bananas.

Companies are also rethinking how food is packaged to reduce plastic pollution and open high-tech paths to broader adoption of biodegradables. This would be a game-changer in the interlinked fight to modulate climate change and protect the oceans.

Globally, 100 million tons of plastic are produced every year, 8 million of which ends up in the oceans. The production of plastic requires at least 8% of the world’s petroleum. Greenhouse gas emissions from plastic production and incineration could rise from the current 850 million tons a year to 3 billion tons a year by 2050. And discarded plastic that ends up in the ocean slowly breaks down in sunlight, releasing greenhouse gases and toxic microplastics.

Georgia-based Danimer Scientific — partnering with the Mars Wrigley candy company — is working on biodegradable packaging that uses plant oils to manufacture “plastic” that dissolves in soil and water. Bioplastics and biopolymers can reduce greenhouse gas emissions reductions by up to 80% more compared to their petroleum-based counterparts.

Fuel is another target for biotechnology. Transportation accounts for the highest percentage of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. While electric cars are gaining popularity, and the $174 billion allocated to support the transition to electrics in Biden’s American Jobs Plan is important, biofuels — which are carbon neutral — will be needed to help reduce emissions in transportation and need comparable support.

The biotech company Synthetic Genomics, for instance, is utilizing saltwater algae, which convert sunlight and carbon dioxide into biomass, to make sustainable auto fuel. By 2025, 10,000 barrels of the algal biofuel could be produced per day for commercial use.

Biofuels will also play an important role in air travel. While flying accounts for less than 3% of global CO2 emissions a year, on a per-mile calculation it’s the least green form of travel. With the number of air travel passengers expected to double by 2040, the Biden administration is upping the financial incentives — through tax credits — for companies that produce sustainable aircraft fuels.

Biotech firms are already stepping up. Companies like Neste, Gevo, and World Energy are using everything from algae to used or wasted cooking oil to create sustainable jet fuels. LanzaTech recycles carbon from industrial emissions and other sources and turns it into aviation fuel — and has recently partnered with other corporations to bring that fuel to market for commercial airline use.

With help from biotechnology, the U.S. can achieve the climate change goals outlined by the Biden administration and the Paris Agreement. Human progress and technology got us into this mess. That same ingenuity can help get us out.

#### Global warming is an existential threat.

Tonn 21 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennesse Knoxville

Bruce E. Tonn, “Anticipation, Sustainability, Futures and Human Extinction: Ensuring Humanity’s Journey into The Distant Future,” Routledge, May 2021, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003000105/anticipation-sustainability-futures-human-extinction-bruce-tonn

Unfortunately, unlike the aftermath of the Black Plague in the Middle Ages, human population continued to slide, or it should be said that the number of Havenots continued to decrease. Next up was climate change. For aforementioned reasons, the countries of the world had not stemmed the use of fossil fuels and, therefore, had not reduced the emissions of GHG into the atmosphere. Few technologies had been put in place to reduce GHG in the atmosphere or sequester the carbon elsewhere. It was as if the planet extracted revenge through withering droughts in Central China, Northern Africa, and North Central North America, deadly heat waves in Western and Central Europe, implacable sea-level rise in the Asia Pacific region, and apocalyptic storms worldwide. People were literally washed away down rivers and into oceans. Agricultural systems collapsed outside of the wealthy areas of the Haves, which were quickly becoming self-sufficient and hermetically sealed to the world of the Havenots. The built environment and urban infrastructures were pummeled. Another round of diseases, mostly mosquito-borne this time, ravaged the world’s population. The developed world offered no safety net for the rest of the world. The largest losses of population were in Asia and Africa, closely followed by Central and South America. Within another thirty years, another billion people perished.

During the next handful of decades, the remaining humans failed to bond together to rebuild human civilization. In fact, just the opposite happened. Instead of conflicts between nations or even ‘clashes of civilizations’, deadly and widespread violence arose between the Haves and Havenots. At the outbreak of the unrest, the militaries of the world had been deployed to protect the wealth and property of the Haves. First as pandemics roiled the world and then as major economic systems collapsed, the viciousness and desperateness of the attacks of the Havenots against the Haves increased.

The military leaders had a choice: defend the Haves or become allies of the Havenots. The Haves had all the technological advantages (not only their life-prolonging technologies, useful if they could survive the chaos, but also their nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, limited but developing renewable energy technologies, and information technologies). The Havenots had strength in numbers. The majority of the military leaders whose forces were equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry and other advanced technologies made a devil’s bargain with the Haves, security in exchange for the promised long-life and luxury.

A protracted period of violence ensued. Both the Haves and Havenots suffered substantial casualties. Eventually, the Haves and their superior military forces ended up in approximately 5,000 heavily defended enclaves (or lifeboats, from their point of view), with about 1,000 humans in each enclave. Most enclaves were former military bases, although many were former resort islands and other easily defensible haunts of the Haves. The enclaves brought to mind the walled cities of the Middle Ages. Unlike their feudal ancestors, they did not rely upon serfs living outside the walls for their food and materials. Because of their technological prowess, they were, after a period of transition, mostly self-sufficient. The poor and otherwise ‘useless’ and ‘excessive’ inhabitants of the enclaves, mostly lower ranking soldiers but also some weak Haves, were quickly evicted so as not to stress the resources of their systems, which would need to last for centuries.

During this period of violence, the Haves and the military systematically destroyed all advanced technologies outside of the enclaves. This was done so that the Havenots could not develop the capabilities to conquer the remaining enclaves. The military effectively destroyed the remaining energy-producing facilities (including the nuclear power plants), the electricity infrastructure, the worldwide telecommunications infrastructure, shipping and transportation facilities, and even dams and irrigation systems. The result of these attacks was that the Havenots on the outside had little or no technology, no concentrated energy resources, no information technology, no electricity, no water systems, and no advanced weapons. Agricultural productivity approached pre-industrial levels. Plants stressed by heat and drought failed to produce crops. Farm animals and plants regularly fell to agricultural diseases that had previously been preventable. Wild animal stocks were slaughtered with no thought about tomorrow. Accessible stocks of fish in the lakes and oceans were depleted. Leadership and new government structures never re-evolved; anarchy reigned. New pathogens circled the globe with astonishing speed. It was every man, woman, and child for themselves. Over the next century, the reduction in population was steady, and another two billion perished.

Catastrophic changes in the world’s ecosystems coincided with the violence and also plagued the Havenots. In a mad scramble to keep themselves fed, the Havenots severely depleted the world’s stocks of birds and mammals, big and small. This reduction in the number of insect predators led to an explosion in the numbers of destructive insects. Locusts and grasshoppers devastated remaining agricultural crops. In a particularly gruesome twist of fate, the depletion of mammals and birds also reduced the food supplies for mosquitoes around the world. As their predators were eliminated and as their food supplies dwindled, they began to viciously swarm individual humans who lacked shelter. Many did not survive the onslaught.

The Havenots and the Haves alike were killed by immense fires. The dramatic rise in CO2 in the atmosphere and the expansion of ranges of temperate and tropical ecosystems promoted the accelerated growth of plant life all over the planet. Megatons of increased biomass respirated increasing levels of oxygen into the atmosphere. The bacteria that consumed the remaining oil and natural gas reserves also emitted substantial amounts of oxygen into the environment. Indeed, the level of oxygen in the atmosphere quickly began to approach 30%, from a level of about 21% at the turn of the twenty-first century. More plant materials, drought, and oxygen-rich air led to truly horrific conflagrations in North America, Europe, Northern Asia, Southern Africa, and Central and South America. Humans died directly in the fires and also died of asphyxiation if they were in the vicinity of the most massive fires.

Life in the enclaves became decidedly dystopian. The main problem was that no enclave possessed the critical mass of people, knowledge, and materials to maintain their technological base. Technology failed. In most cases, it was impossible to replace and/or fabricate new specialized chips and parts. Because the enclaves had destroyed the globe’s telecommunications infrastructure to deny the Havenots the ability to easily organize, they were unable to communicate with other enclaves. The Haves continued to perceive the Havenots and the ‘outside’, disease-ridden world, to be a threat, although had they left their enclaves they would have known otherwise. This perception kept the Haves sequestered in their enclaves. Over the next 100 years, most of the enclaves collapsed from starvation or were eventually overrun by the Havenots, having failed like the Utopian communities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

A few enclaves, however, took a different path to extinction. This is because some Haves did achieve part of their vision of Utopia during the hell storm that surrounded them. They did achieve some measure of immortality. In a handful of enclaves, there were Haves who were actually a couple of hundred years old. But they had not planned on the destruction of the rest of the world and their technologies were riddled with bugs.

It was imperative that these Haves strictly control their population. Despite their weaponry, they were essentially trapped in their enclaves. The outside world was disease ridden, chaotic, dangerous, and empty of valuable resources. They had no survival skills beyond their advanced technologies. They could not survive outside of the enclaves. Controlling their population meant that the births needed to be well planned and limited in number, especially since their numbers had been swollen with the ranks of the military.

The major flaw in this strategy is that these Haves, who desperately wanted to be immortal, basically achieved this goal. Through enhanced nutrients, key replacement organs, and medical nanotechnologies, they were able to keep their bodies in excellent condition. They were not afflicted with heart disease or cancer or obesity or diabetes. Their lives within the enclaves were rather safe because Havenots found the risks not worth the effort of confronting these small but deadly enclaves. The Haves did not travel at all nor have many on-site accidents. They were not murdered in the streets, although inevitably some were killed during disputes in their enclaves. They did not commit suicide; they were constitutionally incapable of taking their own lives, having committed themselves to immortality. After a while, the turnover in the enclaves fell to close to zero. No one died. And the enclaves could not afford to allow new births. These Haves were not too worried. After all, they had time on their side, right?

However, as time went on, these super-elders lost the ability to reproduce naturally. The eggs in the female’s ovaries aged and could not be rejuvenated. Also, frozen eggs and sperm turned out to have much shorter shelf lives than had been thought. To reproduce, that left cloning. Although advances in cloning had been impressive, problems with human cloning had not been overcome simply because the practice had been banned by most countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century and had been taboo in the enclaves for most of the time. However, these Haves decided to try to clone humans though they lacked skilled scientists to oversee this process. The results were disastrous. Miscarriages were the most common results. Many fetuses that came to term died shortly after birth. Most were aborted, those that were allowed to go to term died minutes after being born. The very few that lived further were afflicted with cognitive deficiencies, deformed limbs, and, tragically, were infertile. The attempts at cloning were rapidly abandoned.

Another problem that these Haves did not anticipate was the psychological aspects of aging. The minds of these very old people were slowly becoming completely dysfunctional. Of course, they did not suffer from Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s or Parkinson’s diseases. They had genetic tests for these maladies and could prevent or treat these diseases without much effort or risk. What they did suffer from was system overuse and overload. Too many memories over too many years were leading to inefficiencies in memory retention and organization. Sleep no longer was sufficient to help keep their minds organized. As their collective capabilities were eroding at about the same rate, these Haves were unable to recognize what was happening to them. Because of this creeping functional senility, they were also increasingly unable to maintain their other technologies in tip-top shape. Plans to move out of the enclaves vanished. Pictures of health, they were going mad down the path to extinction. Eventually, even these more resilient enclaves perished as their diminished mental capabilities proved insufficient to keep themselves alive.

When the last enclave fell, there were around 500 million Havenots left on earth. Then, what was once referred to as northwest Wyoming exploded in the largest volcanic eruption the earth had witnessed in the past 20 million years. The eruption was 10,000 times the size of the St. Helens eruption. The soot pushed up into the atmosphere severely blocked out the sun everywhere on the earth for several years. Plant life suffered due to the reduction in photosynthesis. Much like what happened several million years ago to the dinosaurs, the number of humans on the earth dropped down to the mere thousands.67

The remaining hunter-gatherer Havenots were exceedingly resourceful. Many were able to scrape by, living in caves, or building shelter from rubble and scavenging for food and water. They had been able to deal with the hell of climate change and seemed poised to deal with this new round of precipitous cooling. Unfortunately, a final sequence of events on a geological scale would soon seal their fate.

The Havenots were a very unlucky lot. Weakened from disease, malnutrition, and inbreeding, they were also becoming very lethargic, light-headed, and disoriented. The shortness of breath was the key symptom explaining this new malady. You see, they were beginning to suffocate because the oxygen levels in the atmosphere had dropped below 20%.

What had happened to the oxygen? The conflagrations had drawn a great deal of oxygen out of the atmosphere. The remnants of civilization were also oxidizing. Old bridges, steel buildings, and especially billions of metal automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, and signs were rusting and rapidly sucking oxygen out of the atmosphere. As the Havenots did not have the technologies in place to produce their own oxygen, they suffered from oxygen deprivation en masse.

Cooling continued to worsen. All the negative feedback effects were in place: severe reduction of sunlight, loss of plant life, reductions in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, increased radiative cooling, further loss of plant life, further reductions in greenhouse gases, etc. The Arctic Ocean, already refrozen, started its march southward. The Antarctic ice fields rapidly expanded. Glaciers, which had reappeared on the mountain-tops, quickly moved toward the valleys. As a consequence, sea levels dropped precipitously worldwide.

As a result, enormous amounts of rock now stood bare to the elements. Land scrapped clear due to erosion from floods and storms was not revegetated and was also exposed to the elements. These rocks, along with the husk of human civilization, oxidized, drawing ever more oxygen out of the environment. Indeed, large areas of the earth began to resemble the Red Planet, Mars. All remaining aerobic species not only faced a life deprived of sufficient oxygen, but they now faced the prospect of asphyxiation. Within another couple of hundred years, the oxygen in the atmosphere dropped below 19.5%, on its way to a low of 15%. The last human took her last breath in Southern Africa, just like the last Gorgon did over 250 million years ago.68

#### Text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to mandate compulsory licensing for [the aff’s medicine].

#### Compulsory licensing is distinct from the aff and solves.

Chopskie 21 – Partner at Squire Batton Boggs

Greg Chopskie, “When Compulsory Licenses Apparently Just Won’t Do: The US Backs Waiver of Rights to IP Relating to COVID-19,” Global IP & Technology Law Blog, May 2021, https://www.iptechblog.com/2021/05/when-compulsory-licenses-apparently-just-wont-do-the-us-backs-waiver-of-rights-to-ip-relating-to-covid-19/

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) set the minimum standards for intellectual property protection in the world today. Relevant here, TRIPS permits WTO Member states to engage in compulsory licensing as part of the agreement’s overall attempt to strike a balance between promoting access to existing drugs and promoting intellectual property incentives.

The term “compulsory licensing” does not appear in TRIPS. Rather, Article 31 of TRIPS permits a Member State to “allow[] for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder” as long as “the following provisions [are] respected.”

Two provisions are particularly relevant here.

Article 31(b) generally requires that “such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder.” That requirement, however, “may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”

Second, Article 31(h) requires that, regardless, “the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”

TRIPS does not, however, purport to establish a “one size fits all” approach to intellectual property, a fact made clear by the 2001 Doha Declaration. In that Declaration, the WTO stated:

“Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.”

“Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”

Nonetheless, in October 2020, South Africa and India pushed the WTO for more, demanding that the Council essentially impose a ban on COVID-19 patents. Despite widespread support, that request has stalled. Likely not for much longer. The issue of a waiver—despite the compulsory license provisions of TRIPS—will certainly be the center of discussion at the June 8-9 meeting of the TRIPS Council. With the US backing and support of an India/South Africa-style “waiver” of TRIPS provisions relating to COVID-19, it may just pass.

#### Doesn’t link to the net benefit---compulsory licensing maintaining intellectual property protections.

Bacchus 20 – Member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida

James Bacchus, “An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines,” Free Trade Bulletin, No. 78, CATO Institute, December 2020, <https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines#balancing-ip-rights-access-medicines-not-new-wto>

Compulsory licensing of medicines is not popular with private drug manufacturers because it is a derogation from the customary workings of market-​based capitalism. However, as these actions by WTO members in 2001, 2003, and 2017 illustrate, compulsory licensing is not a derogation from the balance struck by the members of the WTO between protecting IP rights and ensuring access to essential medicines. Rather, it is a crucial part of that balance. The balance struck in the WTO treaty includes the option of compulsory licensing during health emergencies.

### 1NC

#### Text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to mandate compulsory licensing for medicines during a pandemic.

#### Compulsory licensing is distinct from the aff and solves.

Chopskie 21 – Partner at Squire Batton Boggs

Greg Chopskie, “When Compulsory Licenses Apparently Just Won’t Do: The US Backs Waiver of Rights to IP Relating to COVID-19,” Global IP & Technology Law Blog, May 2021, https://www.iptechblog.com/2021/05/when-compulsory-licenses-apparently-just-wont-do-the-us-backs-waiver-of-rights-to-ip-relating-to-covid-19/

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) set the minimum standards for intellectual property protection in the world today. Relevant here, TRIPS permits WTO Member states to engage in compulsory licensing as part of the agreement’s overall attempt to strike a balance between promoting access to existing drugs and promoting intellectual property incentives.

The term “compulsory licensing” does not appear in TRIPS. Rather, Article 31 of TRIPS permits a Member State to “allow[] for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder” as long as “the following provisions [are] respected.”

Two provisions are particularly relevant here.

Article 31(b) generally requires that “such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder.” That requirement, however, “may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”

Second, Article 31(h) requires that, regardless, “the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”

TRIPS does not, however, purport to establish a “one size fits all” approach to intellectual property, a fact made clear by the 2001 Doha Declaration. In that Declaration, the WTO stated:

“Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.”

“Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”

Nonetheless, in October 2020, South Africa and India pushed the WTO for more, demanding that the Council essentially impose a ban on COVID-19 patents. Despite widespread support, that request has stalled. Likely not for much longer. The issue of a waiver—despite the compulsory license provisions of TRIPS—will certainly be the center of discussion at the June 8-9 meeting of the TRIPS Council. With the US backing and support of an India/South Africa-style “waiver” of TRIPS provisions relating to COVID-19, it may just pass.

#### Doesn’t link to the net benefit---compulsory licensing maintaining intellectual property protections.

Bacchus 20 – Member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida

James Bacchus, “An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines,” Free Trade Bulletin, No. 78, CATO Institute, December 2020, <https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines#balancing-ip-rights-access-medicines-not-new-wto>

Compulsory licensing of medicines is not popular with private drug manufacturers because it is a derogation from the customary workings of market-​based capitalism. However, as these actions by WTO members in 2001, 2003, and 2017 illustrate, compulsory licensing is not a derogation from the balance struck by the members of the WTO between protecting IP rights and ensuring access to essential medicines. Rather, it is a crucial part of that balance. The balance struck in the WTO treaty includes the option of compulsory licensing during health emergencies.

## Case

### AT: Solvency

#### Squo solves.

Crosby et al. 6-8, Daniel Crosby specializes in international trade, investment and matters related to public international law. A partner in our International Trade practice and the manager of our Geneva office, Daniel helps sovereign and business clients to achieve practical economic objectives around the world by applying and negotiating international agreements. JDSUPRA, June 8, 2021. “Update on the Proposed TRIPS Waiver at the WTO: Where is it Headed, and What to Expect?” <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/update-on-the-proposed-trips-waiver-at-8411942/> brett

Proponents have advanced the proposed TRIPS waiver in the name of meeting global vaccine demand. But even in the absence of a waiver, pharmaceutical manufacturers have continued efforts to expand global production and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and therapies, with a focus on expanding access to developing countries. For example, Pfizer announced its plan to deliver two billion doses to developing nations over the next 18 months, with one billion doses coming this year.8 One forecast estimates that, by the end of 2021, total global COVID-19 vaccine production may exceed 11 billion doses – an amount potentially sufficient to achieve global herd immunity.9

Several pharmaceutical industry groups have also proposed a five-step plan to “urgently advance COVID-19 equity,” including: (1) increasing dose sharing among countries through COVAX and other mechanisms; (2) optimizing production of vaccines and raw materials; (3) eliminating trade barriers for critical raw materials; (4) supporting country readiness to deploy vaccination programs; and (5) driving further innovation.10

Manufacturers have also continued to partner with other companies in efforts to scale up global production. For example, Moderna recently engaged Samsung Biologics to provide fill-and-finish manufacturing for Moderna’s vaccine.11 Merck and Gilead also each entered into or expanded voluntarily licensing programs with manufacturers in India to produce the companies’ respective COVID-19 antiviral agents molnupiravir and remdesivir.12

Some WTO members have also considered using the existing TRIPS flexibilities to expand their vaccine access. For example, Bolivia has continued to pursue its effort to import the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine from Canadian company Biolyse Pharma, under a compulsory license pursuant to TRIPS Article 31bis (if one could be obtained).13

#### The issue is lack of resources, not IPR -- they disrupt the ability of existing companies to scale up production

Brown 21, Delphine Knight Brown is a Partner in the firm’s Litigation Practice Group, and Intellectual Property Litigation Group. With over twenty years of trial experience, Delphine’s practice focuses on complex intellectual property and technology cases, with extensive experience in the life sciences industry. Freeborn Attorneys at Law, Summer 2021. “Will TRIPS Waiver of IP Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines Serve Global Need?” <https://www.freeborn.com/sites/default/files/downloads/Powerhouse%20Points_Newsletter_Summer%202021%20Final.pdf> brett

When the IP waiver concept was first proposed last October, Moderna agreed not to enforce its COVID-19 related patents during the pandemic. But despite Moderna’s voluntary waiver of its IP rights, no other company has stepped up to manufacture the Moderna vaccine. The most significant obstacle to COVID-19 vaccine supply is not just the IP rights that companies have obtained, or are pursuing, but rather the lack of raw materials and manufacturing facilities to produce the vaccines. Currently, there are shortages of raw materials and equipment used to make vaccines and biological products.

Unlike drug manufacturing, vaccine production processes are extremely complex and difficult to develop without support from current manufacturers. Additional manufacturers would need to have or acquire skilled expertise in mRNA technology and create or reconfigure manufacturing sites. Manufacturing vaccines requires additional processing steps and testing to assure quality and consistency. Manufacturing vaccines will also likely use the patented technology of other companies, who have not waived their IP rights. Investment in manufacturing is also an important piece of the solution. Whether existing companies can retool facilities and jump start manufacturing or new facilities need to be created through investment will be outcome determinative.

There is little doubt that the waiver proposals would at the very least up-end the existing incentives, including the prospect of future pharmaceutical innovation and development of products, that resulted in the rapid development and approval of COVID-19 vaccines. Moreover, the TRIPS waiver proposals may not have the desired effect of boosting COVID vaccine production and availability of mRNA vaccines. On the other hand, recent attempts at voluntary licensing and technology transfer agreements related to adenovirus vector technology have resulted in increased vaccine production and availability. A TRIPS waiver may not be as effective for more complex vaccine production.

Scaling up COVID-19 vaccine production is not a one-size-fits -all proposition. Ensuring equitable availability and delivery complicates the matter further.

### AT: COVID war

#### COVIDs gone on for a year now -- no escalation means it’s extremely unlikely to trigger.

#### No war from COVID.

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi [microeconomist PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.], 10-15-2020, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/15/does-covid-19-raise-risk-violent-conflict-not-everywhere/> EH

The situation in Iraq illustrates how the coronavirus threat and policy responses to the pandemic could lead to an increase in violent conflict. But elsewhere in the world, researchers who tally conflict-event counts see stagnant or even falling numbers. And in some countries, conflict trends don’t appear to be responding to covid-19 at all. My research with Jeff Bloem documents considerable differences in the frequency of conflict events across several countries in recent months. Our findings suggest that the pandemic-conflict relationship seen in Iraq does not appear to exist in many other countries. How we did our research We used the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a database that counts the number of conflict events daily around the world. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. The relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear. In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if market disruptions and reduced global demand are driving down the value of natural resources such as oil wells, then we may see less conflict over control of such resources. We then conducted case studies based on our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before covid-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly Worldwide, we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict. If anything, conflict has decreased, as the figure below shows.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Violent conflict between March and August 2020 was 23 percent lower than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally. Do these results suggest that covid-19 is fueling reductions in conflict? Probably not — in Syria, for instance, other factors may explain the declines. On March 5, Turkey and Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement covering the Idlib province in Syria. Idlib is the final front of the Syrian government campaign, so this cease fire led to a dramatic decline in violent events nationwide. But the Idlib cease fire wasn’t motivated by covid-19, and would have taken place anyway, pandemic or no pandemic. So even when violence is falling in the covid-19 era, we have to recognize that declines could be driven by events that happened to take place around the same time as the pandemic’s arrival. The same could be true in cases where violent conflict increased — these upticks in violence could have little to do with covid-19. In the ongoing war between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the number of violent events rose steadily in the first half of 2020. The trend line does not change at all when Libya started to respond to covid-19 in March. Libya’s daily violent-incident counts began to fall in late spring, which corresponds with the GNA’s successful seizure of critical holdings from the LNA militia. These results suggest that the GNA and LNA continued their campaigns relatively undeterred by the pandemic. Conflict eventually declined — but this largely reflects the LNA’s retreat. What about other countries? In places with active rebel groups and militias, such as the Philippines and Iraq, we find mixed results. Reports from both countries suggest that rebel groups and government officials (in the Philippines, but not Iraq) are increasing attacks to take advantage of the opportunities in the covid-19 climate. We see little if any change in the number of violent-conflict events per day in the Philippines. But we do see evidence of escalating conflict in Iraq (see figure), much of it attributed to a rise in Islamic State activity. What happens in the Philippines is not an exception. While violent conflict rose in Nigeria for some time, trends are relatively unchanged in Somalia and Congo. These mixed outcomes suggest that there’s still much to learn about pandemics and conflict.

### AT: LIO

1. WTO not key to LIO – WHO, UN and other international institutions all check
2. No reverse causal ev that vaccine agreement will increase lio again
3. LIO dead – trump’s rhetoric towards alliances permanent ruined the lio
4. No IL between vaccine diplomacy and LIO as a whole – tons of alt causes: military, democracy, economic interests all cause Latin American countries to stay with the US

#### International order is resilient, the U.S. isn’t key – it adapts and self-corrects

Deudney and Ikenberry 18 - \*Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University \*\*G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (“Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world)

Decades after they were supposedly banished from the West, the dark forces of world politics—illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism—have reasserted themselves. China and Russia have dashed all hopes that they would quickly transition to democracy and support the liberal world order. To the contrary, they have strengthened their authoritarian systems at home and flouted norms abroad. Even more stunning, with the United Kingdom having voted for Brexit and the United States having elected Donald Trump as president, the leading patrons of the liberal world order have chosen to undermine their own system. Across the world, a new nationalist mindset has emerged, one that views international institutions and globalization as threats to national sovereignty and identity rather than opportunities. The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics. The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit been hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. The order will endure, too. Even though the United States’ relative power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. As long as interdependence—economic, security-related, and environmental—continues to grow, peoples and governments everywhere will be compelled to work together to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. By necessity, these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order. THE LIBERAL VISION Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the0 triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal. The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested, pragmatic accommodation. Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster. Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering. Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE In many respects, today’s liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order’s success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winner-take-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences. Today’s dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today’s illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements. THE RESILIENT ORDER After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order’s institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism. Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith’s case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers. This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist. The international order is also likely to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal regimes such as China and Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for the liberal international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not uniquely liberal in character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key participants in these institutions are anything but liberal or democratic. Consider the Soviet Union’s cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order was primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even so, the Soviet Union often worked with the democracies to help build international institutions. Moscow’s committed antiliberal stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington

to create a raft of arms control agreements. Nor did it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which succeeded in completely eliminating the disease by 1979. More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to guard against environmental destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such autocracies as China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot address on their own. Most institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only require that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not challenge the Westphalian system; they codify it. The UN, for example, enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international cooperation has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things liberal are in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The persistence of Westphalian institutions provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and democratic institutions can be erected in the future. Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The last two and a half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible competitor. During the rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist competitors created strong incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and band together. And after World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism. The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the components of the existing order that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends up competing with the liberal democracies, they will again face pressure to champion their values. As during the Cold War, they will have incentives to undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a great milestone in the annals of the advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of solidarity. The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international order. CORE MELTDOWN In challenging the U.S. commitment to NATO and the trading rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization, Trump has called into question the United States’ traditional role as the leader of the liberal order. And with the vote to leave the EU, the United Kingdom has launched itself into the uncharted seas of a full withdrawal from Europe’s most prized postwar institution. In an unprecedented move, the Anglo-American core of the liberal order appears to have fully reversed course. Despite what the backers of Trump and Brexit promise, actually effecting a real withdrawal from these long-standing commitments will be difficult to accomplish. That’s because the institutions of the liberal international order, although often treated as ephemeral and fragile, are actually quite resilient. They did not emerge by accident; they were the product of deeply held interests. Over the decades, the activities and interests of countless actors—corporations, civic groups, and government bureaucracies—have become intricately entangled in these institutions. Severing those institutional ties sounds simple, but in practice, it is devilishly complicated. The difficulties have already become abundantly clear with Brexit. It is not so easy, it turns out, to undo in one fell swoop a set of institutional arrangements that were developed over five decades and that touch on virtually every aspect of British life and government. Divorcing the EU means scrapping solutions to real problems, problems that haven’t gone away. In Northern Ireland, for example, negotiators in the 1990s found an elegant solution to the long-running conflict there by allowing the region to remain part of the United Kingdom but insisting that there be no border controls between it and the Republic of Ireland—a bargain that leaving the EU’s single market and customs union would undo. If officials do manage to fully implement Brexit, it seems an inescapable conclusion that the United Kingdom’s economic output and influence in the world will fall. Likewise, the initial efforts by the Trump administration to unilaterally alter the terms of trade with China and renegotiate NAFTA with Canada and Mexico have revealed how intertwined these countries’ economies are with the U.S. economy. New international linkages of production and trade have clearly produced losers, but they have also produced many winners who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Farmers and manufacturers, for instance, have reaped massive gains from NAFTA and have lobbied hard for Trump to keep the agreement intact, making it politically difficult for him to pull off an outright withdrawal. The incentives for Washington to stay in international security institutions are even greater. Abandoning NATO, as candidate Trump suggested the United States should do, would massively disrupt a security order that has provided seven decades of peace on a historically war-torn continent—and doing so at a time when Russia is resurgent would be all the more dangerous. The interests of the United States are so obviously well served by the existing security order that any American administration would be compelled to sustain them. Indeed, in lieu of withdrawing from NATO, Trump, as president, has shifted his focus to the time-honored American tradition of trying to get the Europeans to increase their defense spending to bear more of the burden. Similarly, major pieces of the nuclear arms control architecture from the end of the Cold War are unraveling and expiring. Unless American diplomatic leadership is forthcoming, the world may find itself thrown back into a largely unregulated nuclear arms race. The Trump administration’s initiatives on trade and alliance politics have generated a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty, but their actual effect is less threatening—more a revisiting of bargains than a pulling down of the order itself. Setting aside Trump’s threats of complete withdrawal and his chaotic and impulsive style, his renegotiations of trade deals and security alliances can be seen as part an ongoing and necessary, if sometimes ugly, equilibration of the arrangements underlying the institutions of the liberal world order. On the issues that matter most, Trump’s foreign policy, despite its “America first” rhetoric and chaotic implementation, continues to move along the tracks of the American-built order. Moreover, despite Trump’s relentless demeaning of the international order, he has sometimes acted in ways that fulfill, rather than challenge, the traditional American role in it. His most remarkable use of force so far has been to bomb Syria for its egregious violations of international norms against the use of chemical weapons on civilians. His policy toward Russia, while convoluted and compromised, has essentially been a continuation of that pursued by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations: sanctioning Russia for its revisionism in eastern Europe and cyberspace. Perhaps most important, Trump’s focus on China as a great-power rival will compel him or some future administration to refurbish and expand U.S. alliances rather than withdraw from them. On the issues that matter most, Trump’s foreign policy, despite its “America first” rhetoric and chaotic implementation, continues to move along the tracks of the American-built order. In other areas, of course, Trump really is undermining the liberal order. But as the United States has stepped back, others have stepped forward to sustain the project. In a speech before the U.S. Congress in April, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke for many U.S. allies when he called on the international community to “step up our game and build the twenty-first-century world order, based on the perennial principles we established together after World War II.” Many allies are already doing just that. Even though Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the trade deal lives on, with the 11 other member states implementing their own version of the pact. Similarly, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement has not stopped dozens of other countries from working to implement its ambitious goals. Nor is it preventing many U.S. states, cities, companies, and individuals from undertaking their own efforts. The liberal order may be losing its chief patron, but it rests on much more than leadership from the Oval Office. THE LONG VIEW It is easy to view developments over the last few years as a rebuke to the theory of liberalism and as a sign of the eclipse of liberal democracies and their international order. But that would be a mistake. Although the recent challenges should not be underestimated, it is important to recognize that they are closer to the rule than the exception. Against the baseline of the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War seemed to signal the permanent triumph of liberal democracy and the “end of history,” the recent setbacks and uncertainties look insurmountable. In the larger sweep of history, however, Brexit, Trump, and the new nationalism do not seem so unprecedented or perilous. The liberal democracies have survived and flourished in the face of far greater challenges—the Great Depression, the Axis powers, and the international communist movement. There is every reason to believe they can outlive this one.

#### Best data disproves heg impact

Benjamin H. Friedman et al 13, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There are three reasons to reject this logic: security competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States.¶ an increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3¶ A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”: its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5¶ Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7¶ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.8¶ managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9¶ These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint. Offensive realist security paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them.10 Nonsecurity preferences are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly credible.¶ The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist and prestige-oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state has only moderately dovish interests.14¶ In other words, the cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S. allies are those in which Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests, which will create domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short, if states are insensitive to the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global security will be doubtful. Third-party security competition will likely ensue anyway.¶ costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today.¶ Brooks et al. argue that "China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote, even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions.