## 1nc – Generic

#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,”2017 // sam

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### Removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing and incalculable under utilitarian logics.

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### The traces of the Indian haunt US empire – the naturalization of the imperial war machine occurs via the identification of the enemies of empire with the native – this creates a brutal, genocidal American regime that legitimizes itself through liberal projects of inclusion like the 1ac, coercing legitimate criticisms of the state and capital into the service of empire.

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Jodi Byrd, “The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism” pp. xvii-xix, UMN Press, 2011 // sam

There is more than one way to frame the concerns of The Transit of Empire and more than one way to enter into the possibilities that transit might allow for comparative studies. On the one hand, I am seeking to join ongoing conversations about sovereignty, power, and indigeneity—and the epistemological debates that each of these terms engender—within and across disparate and at times incommensurable disciplines and geographies. American studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, American Indian studies, and area studies have all attempted to apprehend injury and redress, melancholy and grief that exist in the distances and sutures of state recognitions and belongings. Those distances and sutures of recognitions and belongings, melancholy and grief, take this book from the worlds of Southeastern Indians to Hawai‘i, from the Poston War Relocation Center to Jonestown, Guyana, in order to consider how ideas of “Indianness” have created conditions of possibility for U. S. empire to manifest its intent. As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally include those people othered and abjected from the nation-state’s origins, it instead creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism that continue to make the United States a desired state formation within which to be included. That cacophony of competing struggles for hegemony within and outside institutions of power, no matter how those struggles might challenge the state through loci of race, class, gender, and sexuality, serves to misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism that made the United States possible as oppressor in the first place. As a result, the cacophony produced through U.S. colonialism and imperialism domestically and abroad often coerces struggles for social justice for queers, racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism. This book, on the other hand, is also interested in the quandaries poststructuralism has left us: the traces of indigenous savagery and “Indianness” that stand a priori prior to theorizations of origin, history, freedom, constraint, and difference.³ These traces of “Indianness” are vitally important to understanding how power and domination have been articulated and practiced by empire, and yet because they are traces, they have often remained deactivated as a point of critical inquiry as theory has transited across disciplines and schools. Indianness can be felt and intuited as a presence, and yet apprehending it as a process is difficult, if not impossible, precisely because Indianness has served as the field through which structures have always already been produced. Within the matrix of critical theory, Indianness moves not through absence but through reiteration, through meme, as theories circulate and fracture, quote and build. The prior ontological concerns that interpellate Indianness and savagery as ethnographic evidence and example, lamentable and tragic loss, are deferred through repetitions. How we have come to know intimacy, kinship, and identity within an empire born out of settler colonialism is predicated upon discourses of indigenous displacements that remain within the present everydayness of settler colonialism, even if its constellations have been naturalized by hegemony and even as its oppressive logics are expanded to contain more and more historical experiences. I hope to show through the juridical, cultural, and literary readings within this book that indigenous critical theory provides alternatives to the entanglements of race and colonialism, intimacy and relationship that continue to preoccupy poststructuralist and postcolonial studies. The stakes could not be greater, given that currently U.S. empire has manifested its face to the world as a war machine that strips life even as it demands racialized and gendered normativities. The post-/ national rhetorics of grief, homeland, pain, terrorism, and security have given rise to what Judith Butler describes as a process through which the Other becomes unreal. “The derealization of the ‘Other,’” Butler writes, “means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy, regardless of whether or not there are established grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims.”⁴ But this process of derealization that Butler marks in the post-/ grief that swept the United States, one could argue, has been functioning in Atlantic and Pacific “New Worlds” since . As Geonpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues, discourses of security are “deployed in response to a perceived threat of invasion and dispossession from Indigenous people,” and in the process, paranoid patriarchal white sovereignty manages its anxiety over dispossession and threat through a “pathological relationship to indigenous sovereignty.”⁵ In the United States, the Indian is the original enemy combatant who cannot be grieved. Within dominant discourses of postracial identity that depend on the derealization of the Other, desires for amnesty and security from the contradictory and violent occupations of colonialist wars exist in a world where, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, “metropolitan multiculturalism—the latter phase of dominant postcolonialism—precomprehends U.S. manifest destiny as transformed asylum for the rest of the world.”⁶ As a result, the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself. The Transit of Empire, then, might best be understood as a series of preliminary reflections on how ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself as settler imperialism at this crucial moment in history when everything appears to be headed towards collapse.

#### Their attachment to apocalyptic threat analysis is rooted in the fear of the end of Western futures only salvageable via the heroism of the white subject – reject their All Lives Matter politics.

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Audra Mitchell and Aadita Chaudhury “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 309–332 // sam :)

Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Eurocentric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they recognize or construct as ‘white’4 and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not.5 Whiteness is also a form of property6 that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness. Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus.7 Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof.8 On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race9 as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler,10 continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’11 – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).12 The ‘habits’ of racism13 are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities. First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk, 14 which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and Humanprogress.org, are dominated by white men, with few exceptions.15 Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation16 that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant.17 As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017)18 work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer postapocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems. These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells19 contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown20 argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore21 demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded. Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff.22 Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon23 asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest24 – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies25 as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz26 proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture27 – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.28 In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley29 (italics ours) state, ‘if you are anything like we are, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing.30 Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds.31 At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’32 that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . . were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . including us’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic increase is in Caucasian girls’33 (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’34 in which responsibility for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important than figuring out how to. . . survive’,35 we argue that accurately attributing responsibility is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and chances for collective survival. Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological survival of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries.36 For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’.37 Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally,38 much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOC majority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’.39 Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations explode’.40 Drawing on Demeny’s work, HomerDixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico.41 In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’. BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’,42 and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance43 of over 6million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing.44 These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism.45 What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

**Henderson 15** – professor of political science at the University of Victoria

Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

### 1nc – Framing

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative should be responsible for their representations – you get to read the aff and weigh the consequences of the plan, but we get to weigh the consequences of the affirmative’s epistemology.

#### Prefer:

#### Accountability DA – truth testing in a vacuum is violent – their model of debate encourages irresponsible argumentation because it doesn’t allow for any engagement with the affirmative outside the fiated implications of the plan text – only our model ensures accountability.

#### Only the alternative can alter our subjectivities which is the only meaningful outcome of this debate – marginal fairness won’t matter in two years but the disruptions in settler colonial subjecthood the 1nc cultivates has the only risk of meaningfully impacting us long-term – that outweighs.

## Framing

### 1nc

#### Pain and pleasure fail as ethical starting points –

#### Ontology Outweighs – violence against the native is infinite and accumulates each day of occupation via the structural condition of sickness – the inevitable 1ar framing push won’t be able to account for or understand this violence – this means if we win our thesis claims we will win the framing debate.

#### Indigenous and black people are scientifically understood to experience less pain than white people – the evaluation of pain and pleasure is skewed by settler colonialism which means.

## Adv1

**IL doesn’t make sense – Israeli conflict earlier this year should’ve already triggered – if Iran really wanted to screw Israel over, it woud’ve done so during the moment of instability, not now.**

#### Analytic here

### IHL

#### This scenario is nonsensical – they haven’t read anything close to reverse causal evidence that indicates Egypt doing one thing to increase adherence to IHL solves for literal decades of internal conflict – there are literally hundreds of alt causes from economic inequality to other forms of political corruption that exists.

COVID isn’t a brink – it’s being going on for a year now. COVID + Israeli conlifct still not triggering the IL should make you very skep about how big this insurgent movement is going to be to destroy an entire government.

No insurgency – Egypt will just oppress them. No warranted ev that says that an upcoming insurgency will be successful

### Egypt Civil War

#### This is a terrible, contrived scenario with bad evidence – they haven’t read evidence that indicates state legitimacy is an internal link to counterterror – the aff flat out does not change Egypt counterterror. No explanation of the Israel-Iran war scenario – Silverstein is about Iran first striking Israel but they have not read evidence that Egypt civil war would cause that to happen.

#### No Israel-Iran war

Safaei 9/17 [(Sajjad, postdoctoral fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology) “Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran,” Foreign Policy, 9/17/2021] JL

To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.

To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.

This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography *My Country, My Life*. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.”

But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do.

Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.”

“I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time.

According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential.

Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak.

According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.”

As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces.

To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly.

But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch.

## Adv 2

### Russia

#### Their Russia threat evidence is a process of otherizing Russia that ensures a self-fulfilling prophecy

Jæger, 2k – Visiting Fellowship at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Øyvind Jæger, “SECURITIZING RUSSIA: DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF THE BALTIC STATES”, I would like to thank Lene Hansen, Grazina Miniotaite, Iver B. Neumann, Robert Geyer, Mare Haab, Zaneta Ozolina, Ole Wæver, Henrik Thune, Jan Risvik, Clive Archer, Helge Blakkisrud, Erik André Andersen and especially Pertti Joenniemi for discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this article, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/Jaeger72PCS.htm)

**This is a study of a discourse of danger producing insecurity in pursuit of security.** In this article I will show how the Baltic security situation cannot be separated from the way the Balts themselves speak of security, that is, the Baltic security discourse. Moreover, I will point out how this security discourse is conducive in reproducing insecurity. Furthermore, this is a study of identity as I will demonstrate how Baltic **security issues are constituted by discourses of danger revolving around Russian Otherne**ss and European Sameness. The theme of danger, David Campbell (1992) claims, **is part and parcel of discursive practices delineating Self from Other, which in turn are instrumental in fixing (state) borders and ascertaining identity**. In this article, I will seek to establish that this is also the case in the Baltic states. First, through an analysis of security discourse in the Baltic states, I will identify how security is conceived of in these states, and, by implication, what conception of "security" they are about to apply. Second, the article focuses on the discursive practices of security in the Baltic states. That is, how issues are made security issues, with what purpose or function, and with what effect on the Baltic states’ domestic politics and international relations. Collective identity formation and (re)production of state identity are here taken to be a central, but neglected, feature of security discourse. Third, concluding along these lines, I will briefly look at the prospects for the coming together of East and West in the Baltic Sea Region – and the role of NATO’s enlargement in the process – and whether this process will come to ease with a parallel between sovereignty and regionality as organising principles for political space, or whether the one will succumb to the other in the course of a prolonged contest. Over the past few years, the three Baltic states have drafted and debated National Security Concepts. Lithuania and Latvia have recently adopted theirs through parliamentary motion. Estonia is still set to do so – in fact, is yet to produce a draft. In the meantime, Estonia has however adopted a Defence Doctrine. I will take these documents as samples of a narrative genre of writing whose rationale it is to spell out provisions and guidelines for the security policy of a given state.[3] A National Security Concept is a document on which a state will base its foreign and security policy in years to come. More important to this here study, however, is that National Security Concepts – as narrative representations of the way security, threat, defence, war, danger and countermeasures are conceived of – offer **empirical material for a study of how security is conceptualised and reproduced through discursive practices**. In other words, a National Security Concept is one particular written representation of discursive practice and can therefore be analysed as such. There are of course other representations of discourse. Other instalments in a security discourse underpinning, contesting and engaging the National Security Concept documents are made from academic quarters, journals and policy institutions producing publications on the subject of security. A third source of textual representations would be general public debate. In case of the Baltic states, it is hard to identify much of a public debate on security and hardly anything that is not represented in the two other main sources. What follows, then, is a comparative textual analysis of the National Security Concepts of the three Baltic states. The aim is not only to discern what security concept is at work, but also to understand how security is conceptualised in these particular countries. That is, what is the mode of going about one's security business in the Baltic states and what explains this particular mode. This article also looks at the friction between NATO and Russia over the enlargement issue, and it explores the possible effects thus generated on regional co-operation and the future of regionality as a principle for organising political space alternative to, or besides sovereignty. Taking that as a launching pad for a content analysis of key security documents of the Baltic states, this article aims at revealing why and how the Baltic states are still entangled in a state-centrist, modernist agenda when addressing their security concerns, thus colliding with the West when engaging in mutual endeavours to mitigate insecurity. The Name of the Game The Baltic Rim is one of several areas along Europe’s former Cold War demarcation line that are in the midst of regionalisation.[4] Within this region, the Baltic states make for a particularly interesting case because they seem to fall between the chairs of old and new brands of security thinking as well as between those of current security arrangements. On the one hand, they are strongly inclined towards a Western foreign policy orientation, and this quest is met with considerable support and sympathy in the West. However, when it comes to detailed commitment of a NATO-sponsored security guarantee, they are met with a cold shoulder. On the other hand, they are the only post-Soviet states that employ a fierce and unambiguous Westward orientation despite Russian opposition, and they are the only post-Communist states with a common border with Russia seeking NATO and EU membership. Thus, they are firmly in the grips of a security dynamic driven by NATO’s expansion, while at the same time exempted from membership because of geopolitical location and Russian sensitivities. This is likely to produce not only tension in relations between the Baltic states and Russia – and between Russia and NATO – but it also carries a potential for attributing unprecedented significance to the Baltic Sea Region. This potential dwells in the region­idea itself: Any region entails multilateral properties combined with an interaction and institutionalisation marked by modes of social organisation and political conduct that depart from traditional ones. Most regions, and certainly the Baltic Sea Region, also offers equal accessibility for once separated Eastern and Western countries. Thus far, security concerns have not been part of regional dealings. However, regional security arrangements become more probable as the rapprochement between Russia and NATO proceeds, because the rationale for seeking security by pitching the one against the other evaporates in the process. Moreover, one can as Pertti Joenniemi (1997, 1995, 1994a, 1994b, 1994d), see developments in the Baltic Sea Region as a contest between two principles for organising political space: The state centric and classical principle of sovereignty and a challenging principle of regionality. The claim is that the Baltic Sea Region is about what sovereign states and sovereign more-than-states (the EU) cannot or will not do, which is then left for the region to grapple with. Regionality is a principle that combines sub-national and international dynamics and thus transcends the entire modernist script in which the state is privileged as the dominant organising entity in politics. Regionality, Pertti Joenniemi (1995: 339) writes: violates uniformity, as contained in the call for a new world order or other such quite centralist configurations of a modernist design, but it also deviates from and breaks with the principle of organising political space according to the standard statist, territorially fixed logic. In this trend, Joenniemi sees a contest between two different security agendas aligning along the former East-West division line in Europe. In short, the Eastern agenda is still a modernist one privileging the state, attributing prime importance to sovereignty, military defence, security guarantees, and acts of war as the principal threat to security. The Western agenda on the other hand notes the recess of hegemonic power, state centrism and sovereignty, and in this development finds reason to shift focus onto societal, environmental, and economic security. The Western security agenda thus departs from the state centric emphasis on military means for security ends and advocates "softer" security. In this sense it is post-modern. These two security agendas are at odds in the Baltic Sea region (Joenniemi 1995; Knudsen and Neumann 1995). Security, to be sure, is about the sovereignty and survival of the state as such – the state as an independent political unit. That does not, however, necessarily imply a privileging of the military sector of the state as is the case with classical security. Following Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994), what pertains to security should be looked at as the speech-act of politics the discursive practice of doing by saying which is at work when states, not least the Baltic ones, are seeking to secure state formations. What is an issue of security, and what not, is delineated through speech-acts in a performative discursive practice coined by Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994) as securitisation, making security issues of what is spoken of as security: One speaks security, and therefore it is a matter of security. As with sovereignty (cf. Walker 1993), **security has no ontological basis outside of discourse. An army is not a threat in and of itself – it is merely an army – but becomes one when denoted in terms of danger.** Conceiving of security as a speech-act, Wæver argues that security is not something "out there" with an objective existence and a priori ontology, something that one should strive to acquire as much of as one possibly can. On the contrary, security is an act that comes into play by the very utterance of the word security. Tell A Bigger Tale Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. **By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security.** In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.[5] The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat-defense sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. **This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dila: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence**, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). **A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem.** As Wæver (1994: 8)[6] puts it: "Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"[7] – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post­modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post-Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in­security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy. An example of exclusionary practices of this kind is found in the Latvian National Security Concept (p. 2) in which it is stated explicitly that [s]ince the external threat of [to] Latvia can be related to efforts of neighbouring countries to destabilise internal situation in Latvia, it is impossible to shift external threat from internal one clearly. And the Lithuanian National Security Concept (Ch. 1, Sc. 1) cites under a rubric labelled "Specific", "incitement of ethnic groups to disloyal behaviour or disintegration" as "[p]otential risks and foreign threats to Lithuania’s security". The document Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia busies itself strictly with military threats, but Mare Haab (1997), an Estonian International Relations (IR) scholar involved in counselling on the drafting of a National Security Concept, notes that "[f]earing a "fifth column" is a distinct part of Estonia’s threat perception". And indeed, a recent proposal by the Estonian Defence Ministry to draft residents-yet-not-citizens for alternative, non-military national service provoked an outcry in the Estonian Parliament casting the proposal as tantamount to creating a "fifth column" within Estonian Armed Forces (Clesen 1997). In neither Estonia nor Latvia are Russian speakers (or others) in citizenship limbo allowed to serve even in the volunteer Home Guards (Clesen 1997). Ethnic Statehood by Insistence on Historical Continuity The ritualised independence-memory and the scenario of possible provocations soon cast the substantial Russian speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia as potential vehicles for the dirty deeds of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. Despite cross-ethnic support of the Baltic state projects shown during the struggle for independence and after, the loyalty of entire populations was, and still is, questioned on grounds of subversive activity of marginal groups (Moshes and Vushkarnik 1997: 92; Stranga 1996: 164-7; Asmus and Nurick 1996:129-30). Relations between the ethnic majority and minority in Estonia and Latvia soured as Russia linked the issue of troop withdrawal to the status of the Russian minority in these states. In fact, it can be argued that negotiations with Russia actually inflated the enemy image of the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Russia’s minority linkage was persistently resisted by Estonia and Latvia, but the Russian stance, together with out of context official statements from Russian politicians to the effect that Russia’s national interest would be served by actively coming to rescue of Russians in the "near abroad" (Stranga 1996: 142-61; Stamers 1996: 193-8), caused apprehension to the Balts and fuelled the essentialist notion embedding political loyalty in ethnicity (cf. Anderson 1983; Tilly 1990; Campbell 1992). This is the brand of Herderian romantic nationalism that takes the nation to be an eternal, essential and organic unity of genetic proportions, and where language, community and culture are treated as faculties of a population’s kinship and bonds of blood. These notions and this kind of nationalism is prevalent in the Baltic states (see Jurgaitiene 1993; Clesen 1997). It can be traced for instance in the legislation on citizenship in Estonia and Latvia, in property restitution and ownership to land in all three states,[8] and in the stressing of ethnic and cultural nationality in the National Security Concept (NSC) of Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, Latvia. When the Lithuanian National Security Concept casts "national demographic decrease", "dangerous infections", and "the spreading of inhuman, violence-propagating pseudo-culture" as potential internal threats to national security (NSC, Lithuania Ch. 10, Sc. 2), it rings like ethnic nationalism. The Latvian National Security Concept (Sc. 1) is more moderate in tone but states in the very beginning that "(t)he goal of Latvian security policy is to maintain and develop (...) the language, (and) national identity...". In a following section the link between internal and external threats are made explicit in terms of "(e)thnic situation and execution of Citizenship Law can cause political, economical and social problems." This, the paragraph goes on, might then act as a pretence for "neighbouring countries to interfere (with) Latvian internal affairs or to carry out aggressive actions." (NSC, Latvia, Sc. 4.9). Through this discourse of danger, facilitated and often fuelled by Russian remarks and policies, mere heterogeneity is cast as danger by the coupling of perceived external threats (Russia) to the possibility – and hence creation – of an enemy within (i.e. Russian-speakers in general). And, unfortunately, by denouncing the zero option in the question of citizenship (extending citizenship to everyone with legal residence within state borders at a given date) and thereafter enacting austere (and belated) legislation regulating the matter, state authorities in Estonia and Latvia made them selves protagonists of ethnic essentialism. In the process, mutual suspicion and distrust between minority and minority in these countries increased,

and Russia’s insistence on linking troop withdrawal to minority issues and the Balts’ refusal reinforced antagonism. Lithuania, by contrast, went for the zero option as early as in 1989 (admittedly with smaller but still substantial minority groups within its borders, and subsequently tightened in 1991), and consequently reached a concluding agreement on troop withdrawal with Russia in August 1993, a year earlier than Estonia and Latvia.[9] Relations between Russia and Lithuania have been considerably less strained and minority issues have not been brought to bear negatively on internal stability, as is the case in Estonia and Latvia (Nekrasas 1996: 60; Stamers 1996: 197-8). Conflation of state and nation as one inseparable entity is also evidenced in the Baltic states’ practices of inscribing historical memory in state foundations (cf. Haab 1997; Raid 1996; Lejins 1996; Ozolina 1996; Miniotaite 1997; Haab and Vares 1996). A case in point is the Estonian insistence that Russia recognise the Tartu-agreement of 1920 between the Soviet Union and Estonia as the basis upon which to reach an interstate agreement between the two of today, a claim impeding significantly on the issue of fixing the current interstate border (cf. Moshes and Vushkarnik 1997: 95). Another case in point is the re-enactment of pre-war legislation on citizenship in both Estonia and Latvia. The newly independent states conferred citizenship (and hence political rights and duties) automatically to legal residents of the inter-war states and their descendants. All other residents had to apply. Typically for the ethnic tint of legislation, foreigners that could prove their ancestors to be ethnically Estonian or Latvian were granted citizenship even if they had never set foot in the Baltics. Consistently, residents without proper ethnicity or forefathers with legal pre-war residence were deprived of citizenship and subjected to naturalisation, despite the fact that many of them had lived their entire life in the Baltic. A period of fifty years under Soviet subjugation is thus sought rendered legally null and void, erased, as it were, to facilitate the restoration of pre-war independence. The policies of restoration imply that the inter-war republics are taken as an anchoring point for the new states when defining territory, sovereignty, nation and citizenry. In turn, this linkage spills over to colour the meaning of security for the present state formation. And surely, since there is an unavoidable difference between pre-war and post-Soviet republics – for instance in territory and citizenry – security is bound to seem at stake. The restoring of historical continuity by sorting Soviet times into parenthesis character is a performance almost invariably undertaken in Baltic literatures on security, as well as in the National Security Concepts. Thereby the Self (the state, the nation, the people) is depicted as European, and the Other is delineated to the East of Europeanness, that is to the east of the Baltic: Asia, Russia, Chaos. The introductory provisions guiding the Lithuanian Seima (Parliament) in adopting a National Security Concept (Lithuania, Introduction), illustrate this: many centuries ago, having incepted itself the Lithuanian State, resting on the Christian cultural grounds unifying Europe, is an integral part of the community of European nations; having through many centuries accumulated its historical statehood experience, the traditions of concord with its historically adjoining ethnic communities, fostered the oldest living Indo-European language, unique culture and world outlook, the Lithuanian nation can with these values enrich the community of European nations; the Lithuanian nation has never agreed to any occupation and subjugation it has resisted by all possible means and sought to free itself, and this resolution of the nation is unchangeable; [..]; the Lithuanian nation’s aspiration has been and continues (to be) to safeguard its liberty, to create and ensure guarantees for secure and free development of its ethnic land, to foster its national identity, to bring up its natural creative potential and to contribute to the advancement of the world; [..]. Apart from the touch of pathos and the slight circumscription of historical facts, this quotation should suffice to illustrate the point made of inscribing a historical continuity. The preamble also provides an illustrious example of the discursive practices of delineating Self as European Sameness. And by implication, as the document continues with an extensive list of threats and risks to national security, it spells out what is Other to the Lithuanian Self, namely: ".. the fragile democracies, militarised states in the vicinity (of Lithuania) with highly unpredictable evolution options." (NSC Lithuania, Ch. 10, Sc. 1). By the same token "fragile democracies and militarised states in the vicinity (of Lithuania) with highly unpredictable evolution options" is also what is Otherness to European Sameness. This rehearsal is reiterated time and again in official statements and in scholarly literature. The former Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Povilas Gylys, stated in 1996 that integration with the EU is "a logical continuation of the history of an European Nation whose statehood dates back to the 13th century." (Grobel and Lejins 1996: 15). And a passage from the speech by the current Foreign Minister, Algirdas Saudargas, given before the Danish Institute of International Affairs on 3 February 1997, reads: For centuries, Lithuania has sought to become an equal partner of European Affairs (the coronation of King Mindaugas in July 1253, the failed coronation of Grand Duke Vytautas in 1430 were actually steps in that direction), fulfilling its duty to the Continent by stopping incursions form the East and assuming a balancing position at times of peace (Print handed out on the occasion). Lithuania’s plight and current danger, one is led to understand, is that the division line between an European Self and an Asian/Russian Other be inscribed to the West of the Baltic, leaving the Baltic states once again on the "wrong" side, as it were, and thereby prey to the Other. The talk of "a new Yalta" or "a new Munich" is rife in Baltic security discourse (Nekrasas 1996; Miniotaite 1997). It certainly invokes not only the collective memory of historical continuity, but also danger. Here is the reasoning of Evaldas Nekrasas (1996: 23), a prominent Lithuanian specialist in security policy: In Lithuania at least, it is a common understanding that the most eminent danger to Lithuania’s security is not so much Russia itself with all its instability, messianic zeal, problems with redefining past identities and difficulties in defining and calculating present interest, but Western hesitation about where "to place" the Baltic states – among the "successor states of the Soviet Union" or in the group of the Central European states. The first alternative is quite perilous. On this, the Latvian security scholar Aivars Stranga (1996: 162) seems to agree when he notes that the main threat to Baltic security interests stems from Russia’s "unwillingness ... to permit the establishment of a security system in Europe which would give the Baltic states true military and political security guarantees;" then he goes on to stress that the crucial point in this respect is "the pressure Moscow wages against the West" and "the readiness of Western Europe and the United States to yield to such pressure." In Stranga’s mind, considering the forecasted scope of NATO enlargement, it is apparently an excessive readiness.[10] To the same effect, Ronald D. Asmus and Robert Nurick (1996: fn3) note that "Estonian President Lennart Meri has gone so far as to insist that any attempt by NATO to differentiate between the Baltic states and other East-Central European countries would be tantamount to a new form of 'appeasement'". As mentioned earlier, the Latvian National Security Concept makes no efforts -- except naming Russia -- to veil the sources from which it takes threats to emanate. On the contrary, the Latvian National Security Concept posits as an established fact that "neighbouring states" are harbouring ill will and evil intentions against Latvia. Rhetorically, the Latvian National Security Concept is held in a more sober and pragmatic tone than the Lithuanian one, and there is nothing of the introductory passages invoking a glorious past of the Latvian nation. However, the minority issue and the fear of a "fifth column" of Russian residents disloyal to the Latvian state – a threat perception addressed frequently elsewhere in Latvian literatures on security – is alluded to in the paragraph following immediately after the one identifying the main source of external threat. In the paragraph outlining "Threat" the Latvian National Security Concept states that "(i)f (the) political situation in a neighboring country is completely unstable, different political or military formations may try to seize power in Latvia even without approval or support of the government of this neighboring country." (NSC Latvia Ch. 3: 2). Estonia is perhaps the one Baltic state that most consequently has pursued a policy of inscribing historical continuity to the current Estonian Republic. Mare Haab (1997) notes this policy not only in the restitution of pre-war ownership to land and real estate, and in the initial pre-war design to an Estonian Defence force,[11] but also in the fact that on 6 November 1991 the Supreme Council of Estonia (the still Soviet type Parliament preceding the Riigikogu) re-enacted the 1938 Law on citizenship (cf. also Wæver 1997b). She (Haab 1997) also points out that the new Parliament, elected in September 1992, took as its urgent business to declare "on 7 October 1992 that the present Republic of Estonia was identical to the Republic that had existed in 1918-1940" (added emphasis). This, she (Haab 1997) observes, was "… utterly unproductive as to the Estonian-Russian relations." She concludes that Estonia’s relations with Russia in the period between recognition of independence (20 August 1991) to the withdrawal of Russian troops (31 August 1994) were primarily determined by impacts of historical legacy. Estonia expected Russia to: first, condemn the 1940 aggression against Estonia and apologise for Stalinist mass repression against the Estonian people; second, acknowledge of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty between Estonia and Russia; third, immediately withdraw all the Russian troops from the territory of independent and sovereign Estonia (Haab 1997).[12] These practices of inscribing historical continuity in state foundations are in themselves a kind of securitisation inasmuch as they cast the entire state project as precarious if not firmly connected to the historic one. This held together with the way the minority issue is handled in Latvia and Estonia and the prominence of the "fifth column" theme in these state’s discourse on security (Haab 1997, Ozolina 1996; Stranga 1996; Stamers 1996; Ozolins 1996; cf. Clesen 1997), a fairly explicit conflation of external and internal threats emerges in the Campbellian sense of "exclusionary practices" (Campell 1992: 239). To Campbell (1992), this practice has to do with the construction of state identity, part and parcel of the whole security business. And surely, the ritualising of collective memory, the evoking of historical continuity, and delineating the Baltic as European Sameness opposed to Russian Otherness is very much a discursive practices to (re)produce identity by defining territory, citizenry, and sovereignty – in short, inscribing borders. So are the righting of historical wrongs: Not only a source of legitimacy in the struggle for secession from the USSR, but a discursive pursuit to link pre-war independence and post-Soviet current statehood. This move is seeking to exempt, as it were, the middle part to facilitate a coherent narrative of the state. Naturally, there is no room for a foreign disjunction in a monological narrative of historical continuity. "The result", Erik Ringmar (1996: 456) contends, is an occasion when not only our interests, but also our identities are called into question; when we suddenly will be presented to ourselves as a new kind of character participating in a different kind of plot. In case of an individual, perhaps we could call such a time an "identity crisis"; in case of a society, perhaps we could call it a "formative moment". Consequently, the "formative moments" of state independence in Estonia and Latvia left the Russian minorities there in a political as well as a judicial limbo.[13] In both Estonia and Latvia only those who were legal residents of the pre-war republics on the date of 17 June 1940 (the date of Soviet annexation) and their descendants were granted citizenship, a regulation leaving 90% of the Russian minority in Estonia and 70% in Latvia without citizenship and subject to naturalisation in order to get a Baltic one (Stamers 1996: 192).[14] The minority policy and legislation on citizenship in Estonia and Latvia were met with harsh responses from Russia, alleging gross violations of minority rights and rattling the sabre of Russia’s obligation to protect the interests of Russians abroad.[15] As the issue of minority status and citizenship in the Baltic states is legally settled, monitored by a Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner and a Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Representative (sometimes denoted "Ombudsman"), and accepted by the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Russia has, however, lessened its critique (Stranga 1996: 193-7), except for an outburst in early 1998, which led to concessions in Latvian naturalisation requirements. When legislation on citizenship in Latvia was finally adopted in 1994 (in Estonia 1992, revised in 1995), residents without citizenship were at least conferred a "aliens with legal resident permit" status, but the legislation did not mitigate the judicial limbo they found themselves in. Those not yet eligible for naturalisation are de jure stateless persons, since the state of which they used to be citizens (the Soviet Union) ceased to exist in 1991 (Moshes andVushkarnik 1997: 91). Many find the threshold for naturalisation too cumbersome or too distant to be worth climbing. Instead they opt for Russian citizenship,[16] which is subsequently securitised by representatives of the majority as evidence of Russia’s evil schemes to once again subjugate the Baltic states by establishing and exploiting a "fifth column" of Russian-speaking minorities (cf. Ozolina 1996a; Haab 1997). Tension in minority­majority relations is thus reproduced and continues to sour Estonia’s and Latvia’s interstate relations with Russia. In Pursuit of Self Reading Baltic literatures on security, one is not left in much doubt that Russia is the organised political power, (i.e. the representation of an anthropomorphic collective will). The Russian state is the danger to the Baltic. The danger of Russia is primarily seen as one of encroachment – be it by ways of political or economic subversion, or by downright military aggression – on their state sovereignty. Conflating state and nation, everything Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian is thereby also threatened. The sheer size and might of Russia, and the asymmetric power relations between Russia and the Baltic states itself is inscribed with danger. The prevalent economic and political instability in Russia is denoted as a threat in terms of uncertainty and unpredictability, that is, installed as one link in a discursive chain of equivalence casting Russia as anarchy, the binary opposition to state sovereignty. Baltic state sovereignty is thus underpinned by a discourse of danger securitising culture, crime, diseases, alleged smear campaigns and possible invasions alike. **In this discourse of danger, the current thaw and policy of liberal reform in Russia is interpreted as a mere parenthesis in a brutal history of Russian imperialism, her true nature, as it were.** It is widely held among the Balts that the imperial traditions in Russian foreign policy might resuscitate at any time and imminently pose a threat to the Baltic states. The bottom line of Baltic threat perception and assessment is one of Russian coercive aggression. The Baltic states increasing vocal quest for Western integration after 1991 have excluded alternatives to a security policy based on "hard" NATO guarantees. As the Baltic states realise that they will not be the first to join NATO, their foreign policy orientation is becoming disparate, and Baltic unity is cracking as Lithuania woos Poland, Estonia looks to the Nordic countries and Latvia still pins its hopes on the USA (cf. Foreign Policy Concept, Latvia, p. 11). Indeed, the West (i.e. NATO), notwithstanding the Partnership for Peace, is reluctant to project its power to the Baltic states. Rather, the West stresses other means of security, other types of security, and other modes of going about issues of a political nature that not in and of themselves have to be treated as security problems. This is pretty much in accordance with the post-modern security agenda. Although elements of the post-modern security agenda are paid attention to in the Baltic states – even in the National Security Concept documents – and there certainly are dissonant voices to the dominant discourse of danger, the modernist security agenda is still dominant. Albeit, as indicated, it is under increasing pressure because Baltic securitisation no longer seem to have the same effect on the West as it once did. Conclusion Could it be that NATO’s enlargement and the prospect of an EU expansion are inaugurating an opportunity – indeed, an imperative – of shifting discourse from securitisation to integration? And could it be that one is facing the presence and contest between two different discourses of an entirely incompatible nature? One which essence it is to "other" Russia through persistent securitisation? Another which crux it is to engage and involve Russia in a heterologue among East and West (or at least a dialogue between NATO and Russia)? If this is the case, the NATO enlargement summit in July 1997 will most likely be a watershed point after which the enlargement issue will be out of the way, so to speak, enabling a further rapprochement between Western Europe and Russia – politically as well as economically. This dynamic of engaging rather than "othering" Russia certainly carry repercussions for the way "the Lands between" Russia and current-scale-NATO are dealing with both. A NATO-Russia modus vivendi on the enlargement issue and subsequently increased co­operation between Russia and Western Europe surely undermines some of Eastern Europe’s rationale for "othering" Russia. The paramount objective of countries in Eastern and Central Europe is Western integration, which already requires them to solve whatever border and minority disputes they may have with their neighbours. It is likely that a further NATO-led integration, not least an integration of the states further East (those with closer proximity, even common borders, with Russia) will require these states to engage Russia constructively in addition to solving actual disputes. Certainly, many East Europeans themselves underscore their possible role as a bridge between the West and Russia. Sadly, however, the vigorous discourse of danger and the practices of overly securitisation interrupts the bridging. This will have to change if integration is to continue. Moreover, the second tire in the coming together of the European continent is prospectively constituted by the EU and the plans for an EU expansion. Since Russia welcomes an EU expansion and there is little reason to expect the EU to overtake NATO in issues pertaining to European security, the discourse of EU-driven integration is certainly not one of danger and securitisation. On the contrary, a discourse of danger, particularly one securitising Russia, is disqualifying almost per se in the EU. There are indications that at least some influential Balts now understand this, and that they have come to regard the success of multilateralisation (their successful strategy of internationalising concerns by staging a sense of security drama and practising high-pitch securitisation) as exhausted. It is a strategy of yesteryear that no longer will increase the prospects for a rapid Western rescue. Many are yet not convinced. Convincing them might prove to be a difficult process precisely because of the hitherto successful securitisation. Rather, it is now time to pick up the old bridge-vision and take it further, to envision a extended, united "Europe of difference" – no less. That would be a "Europe" including Russia. This, of course, is an elaboration in concord with the notion of the two contending security agendas. And, it is a (perhaps wishful) scenario envisioning the end of power-politics, hard-ware security, state-centrist, and enemy-producing security discourse. And, it will be surely ironic, if it holds to be true, that a change of this magnitude and significance is being spearheaded by NATO – a former hard-ware military alliance of the Cold War. However, this article maintains that the Westward thrust of the Baltic states to date **has been part and parcel of a Baltic discourse of danger delineating Russia as Other and Europe as Self**. With few exceptions the discourse on Baltic security identifies an array of dangers emanating from Russia and threatening the entire gamut of Baltic security from sovereignty to ethnicity. The conflation of state and nation and the invoking of historical memory as legitimisation of state-building enterprises reproduces the perception of threat and perpetuates the discourse of danger. A rationale for widespread securitisation is provided, and a precarious Baltic state identity is (re)produced. Precisely because identity is precarious and elusive and because state institutions are weak, faltering or lacking, the entire state project is perceived as vulnerable. The discourse of danger is instrumental in propping up state institutions, borders and identity to mitigate the sense of vulnerability. Only firmly anchored to "the West" can the Baltic countries ascertain their state identity, it is held. **This, however, implies that the division line between East and West must be reinscribed between Russia** and the Baltic states, **which in turn perpetuates insecurity, permits securitisation, and bolsters identity by "othering" difference. In short, Russia is the Baltic states’ constituting Other** (cf. Neumann 1993; 1996b; Knutsen and Neumann 1995: 31). Rather, the discourse of danger should be substituted with one of difference; the mode of discourse should shift from one of threat-defence sequences to one of discord-mediation sequences, allowing difference to meet and discord to be resolved without the conjuring up of existential threats, danger and in-security. Otherness need not be invoked to ascertain and (re)produce identity – difference will suffice. A struggle of speak is now waged against the continuos re-inscription of the division line between East and West in Europe. This is performed not only by the Balts but also by those elements in the West subscribing to classical, hard-ware, enemy-producing security, as well as in the entire belt of states currently separating NATO and Russia. This is the struggle between the modernist and the post-modernist security agenda – in a sense also a struggle between East and West. The question is not which will prevail – but how to get together.

#### Ceding Egypt to Russia doesn’t matter and there’s no impact.

Dunne & Miller 18 – Nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program; Nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program

Michele Dunne, Andrew Miller, “Losing Egypt to Russia Isn't the Real Problem—but Collapse Is,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/20/losing-egypt-to-russia-isn-t-real-problem-but-collapse-is-pub-76918

But what if the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship did fall apart for whatever reason, and Sisi sought to compensate by openly allying with Russia? On the surface, this would look like another retreat of the United States from its once-dominant position in the region. But on a practical level, the impact on U.S. interests would be much less than it once would have been.

Due to years of internal erosion of the Egyptian state, it is a less capable regional actor than it was several decades ago and its military is a poor reflection of the force that acquitted itself well in 1973. The Jordanian and Emirati militaries, for example, are now far more capable of projecting power within the region and are more interoperable with U.S. forces than are the Egyptians. Excepting Libya, which is more important to European than U.S. interests, Egypt has been unwilling to deploy its forces abroad. Power in the region has shifted to the Gulf, as economic influence has become increasingly important, while other Arab and North African countries have come to eclipse Egypt in areas such as human development. And, while the Trump administration seems to believe Egypt is key to Israeli-Palestinian peace, neither Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is likely to move off of avowed redlines at Sisi’s request.

The Israeli-Egyptian Treaty of Peace is on firm footing and the bilateral relationship, warm at the official level and cool at the popular level, is no longer dependent on U.S. encouragement or management. Egypt would most likely continue to allow U.S. ships access to the Suez Canal, for which the U.S. Navy pays handsomely. Egypt might deny overflight and landing rights to U.S. military aircraft, but those are much less valuable than they once were as the United States continues to entrench its position in Qatar. Arab states’ more relaxed attitude towards Israel also could open up new routes for civilian and military aircraft alike. Finally, it is hard to assess the net value of Egyptian counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Washington, but we know that Egyptian policies are in some ways making the terrorism problem worse and it is in Cairo’s interest to maintain its own CT operations, whatever the state of relations with the United States.

The real danger for the United States is not that it might lose Egypt, but that this nation of nearly one hundred million could sink into obscurity or even state failure due to poor governance, rapid population growth, and economic fragility. That would be unfortunate because a strong Egypt could serve as an important source of stability in the Middle East. But competing with Moscow for Egypt’s fealty is not going to reverse the country’s decline. Indeed, by pandering to Sisi and his misguided policies out of fear that he might turn to Russia, the United States would only be increasing the likelihood of such dark outcomes.

Egypt is no longer a strategic prize for the United States or Russia to win. It is a challenge to be managed through careful, and where necessary coercive, diplomacy.