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#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” 2017 // sam

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### Removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing and incalculable within Western ethical frames.

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### The ethical dilemmas of settler civil society can only cohere themselves through the genocide of the Native – the grammars of suffering that shape Settler ontology are fundamentally incompatible with Native grammars because the grammars of the Settler are only possible via genocide.

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Frank Wilderson III, “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Struture of US Antagonisms” Duke University Press, 2010 // sam

Today the United States is no longer self-consciously fascistic but instead self-consciously democratic. Clearing is completely disavowed as a verb. Instead, clearing as a noun makes itself known through the narrative of sovereign gain, civil society, and its external threat (the “Savage”). The imaginary of “Savage” positionality more often than not articulates (dialogues) with this Settler imaginary. In other words, the “Savage” narrative of sovereignty (Rudy’s plot points in the film) is dialogic with the Settler narrative of sovereignty (the Western’s genuflection to the Little Baby Civil Society). The narratives are disparate at the level of manifest content but dependent rhetorically on the same semiotics of gain and loss. Thus, even the “Savage’s” semiotics of sovereign loss fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of the Settler’s disavowal of clearing as a verb. Ironically, they work hand in hand to crowd out the ensemble of questions, and thus the ethical dilemmas, of genocide’s ontological imperatives. A semiotics of loss cannot be reconciled with a semiotics of genocide (provided genocide could even be apprehended through a semiotics, and there is no evidence that it can) because semiotics implies the possibility of narrative; and narrative implies the possibility of both a subject of speech and a speaking subject. Genocide, however, has no speaking subject; as such it has no narrative. It can only be apprehended by way of a narrative about something that it is not—such as sovereignty. (This is why a number of Jewish Holocaust films end up—or begin—in Israel: the impossible semiotics of genocide must be compensated for by way of a gesture of coherence, even if that coherence distracts the spectator from the topic at hand.) No single film could represent the clearing of a hemisphere. And no hemisphere, let alone a country, could maintain egoic consolidation of its psychic coordinates under the weight of the number and kind of films that it would take to even attempt to represent clearing as a verb. Though it is precisely the impossible “narrative” of genocide that positions the “Savage,” ensembles of questions that could elaborate more or less coherent ethical dilemmas regarding genocide—even if a coherent story of genocide could not be told—are often managed, constrained, marginalized, and disavowed in political discourse, metacommentaries on ontology, and the cinema of Native Americans. Skins’s simultaneous elaboration of and uneasiness with Mogie Yellow Lodge is emblematic of how this management, constraint, marginalization, and disavowal are rendered cinematically. Mogie’s surrealist demand, “Send me a big . . . fat woman . . . [to] cover up all the cracks in my shack,” goes to the heart of the matter. Red flesh can only be restored, ethically, through the destruction of White bodies, because the corporeality of the Indigenous has been consumed by and gone into the making of the Settler’s corporeality. Mogie wants what he has lost, not just his labor power, not just his language or land, but the raw material of his flesh. And, like most “grassroots Indians,” he knows precisely where it went—into the Settler’s “body”—and thus he knows precisely from where to repossess it. Though Mogie’s shack is small, we know from earlier scenes that it has at least two rooms. Therefore, to stretch a woman across its interior, window to window, wall to wall, corner to corner, and then stretch her across the door, would be to reconfigure her body into grotesque and unrecognizable dimensions. There are serious doubts as to whether a woman, even as large an (implicitly White) woman as Mogie Yellow Lodge is demanding from the president, “the Great White Father in Washington,” would survive such an ordeal. Imagine such a demand being made, such wallpapering taking place, en masse, on a scale which even Mogie’s inÂ ebriated imagination has not yet grasped. [General Andrew Jackson] instructed his troops to cut the noses of the corpses so that no one would be able to challenge the body count. They had bushel baskets full of noses that they brought back. This [practice] got him elected President. [He] campaigned on the basis that he had never met a recalcitrant Indian that he had not killed and never killed an Indian that he had not scalped and that anybody who wanted to question the validity of what he was saying was invited to tea in his parlor that evening so he could display the scalps and prove his point. [He] rode with a saddle bridle made out of the skin of an opposing Indian leader. This is the President of the United States.14 The Pleasures of Parity 215 One begins to see how wallpapering or insulating one’s room not with “bushel baskets” of White female skin but with even one White woman is simply out of the question. Mogie’s demand, then, is laughed off—managed, constrained, marginalized—by the script. “Hey! You wanna see me piss in my pants?” are the words he is made to utter next. His words are thus portrayed as the surreal ruminations of an Indian who has reached the end of his inebriated tether, and not as the wisdom of a man who could lead his people. The film is nervous in the face of Mogie’s demand not because of its absurdity but because of its authority. But Mogie is demanding no more of the Great White Father, no more of civil society, than he has already given. In fact, he is demanding less. His surrealism indicates a qualitatively similar ontological relationship between the Red and the White as exists between the Black and the White. The Middle Passage turns, for example, Ashanti spatial and temporal capacity into spatial and temporal incapacity—a body into flesh. This process begins as early as the 1200s for the Slave.15 By the 1530s, modernity is more self-conscious of its coordinates, and Whiteness begins its ontological consolidation and negative knowledge of itself by turning (part of) the Aztec body, for example, into Indian flesh.16 In this moment the White body completes itself and proceeds to lay the groundwork for the intra-Settler ensemble of questions foundational to its ethical dilemmas (i.e., Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis). In the final analysis, Settler ontology is guaranteed by way of a negative knowledge of what it is not rather than by way of its positive claims of what it is. Ontological Whiteness is secured not through its cultural, economic, or gendered identities but by the fact that it cannot be known (positioned) by genocide (or by accumulation and fungibility). As Churchill observed in a book tour speech in Berkeley, California on July 31, 2004, this negative knowledge has its pleasures. [Unlike Jackson’s army of the early nineteenth century, the sixteenthcentury Dutch] didn’t take the noses and they didn’t take the scalps. They took whole heads because they wanted to identify the fact that they had eradicated the entire leadership of the opposition. They brought the heads back to the central square in New Amsterdam [now Manhattan] where the citizenry began to celebrate. They turned it into a sport. People who had participated in the expedition had themselves 216 chapter eight a jolly game of kickball using the heads and the citizenry sat around and cheered. It has a sense of affilial inclusion and filial longevity. [In 1864, the Third Regiment of the U.S. Calvary] returned to Denver [Colorado] with their trophies [the vaginas of Native American women stapled to the front of their hats] and held a triumphal parade. [They] proceeded down Larimore Street . . . and the good citizenry stood up and cheered wildly. . . . The Rocky Mountain News [described it as] “an unparalleled feat of martial prowess that would live forever in the annals of the history and nobility of the race.” And it has a capacity for territorial integrity. Scalp bounties . . . were officially claimed bounties that were placed on Indians in every antecedent colony in the Eastern Seaboard—French, English, and Spanish. I don’t know about the Dutch. They killed all the Indians around before they had the chance to need a bounty. But from the antecedent colonies this law transferred to every state and territory in forty-eight contiguous states.” In other words, it has the capacity to transform clearing from a verb into clearing as a noun. Every [state in the union] placed a bounty on Indians, any Indians, all Indians. [For example in the] Pennsylvania colony in the 1740s, the bounty [was] forty pounds sterling for proof of death of an adult male Indian. That proof of death being in the form of a scalp or a bloody red skin. . . . Proof of death in that form got the bearer of the proof forty pounds sterling. Forty pounds sterling in the 1740s was equivalent to the annual wage of your average farmer. This is big business. Twenty pounds sterling would be paid for proof of death in the same form of an adult female. Ten pounds sterling for proof of death of a child, a child being defined as human being of either sex under ten years of age down to and, yes, including the fetus. In Texas this law was not rescinded until 1887, [when] the debate in the Texas legislature concluded that there was no reason to continue because there were no longer sufficient numbers of living Indians in the entire state of Texas to warrant the continuation of it. It had accomplished its purpose.17 The Pleasures of Parity 217 And just like that, the Little Baby Civil Society was walking on its own two feet. To Grown-Up Civil Society (Mogie’s “Great White Father in Washington”) Mogie Yellow Lodge submits his own “personal” genocide reparations bill. A bill that accounts for the perfect symmetry through which Whiteness has formed a body (from the genitals to the body politic) out of “Savage” flesh. The symmetry’s perfection becomes clear when one realizes that today’s 1.6 percent-to-80.6 percent “Savage”-to-Settler ratio is a pure inversion of the sixteenth century’s “Savage” to Settler ratio.18 “Send me a big woman. Big fat woman! So that when I sleep with her she’ll cover up all the cracks in my shack and stop the wind from blowing through.” This is a demand so ethically pure that the film finds it unbearable and, as such, is unable (unwilling?) to let Mogie state it without irony. And yet, Mogie’s outbursts like this—“outbursts” because they are generally infrequent and contained by pity or humor—are the few moments when the film engages the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” antagonism (genocide and its impossible semiotics) instead of the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” conflict (sovereignty and its semiotics of loss). Again, it is not that Mogie’s demand is absurd and unethical but rather that it is a demand so pure in its ethicality that it threatens the quotidian prohibitions which, in modernity, constrain ethics. The demand is far too ethical for the film to embrace and elaborate at the level of narrative. It is a demand that must be policed by sovereign powers. Exploring Skins’s cinematic strategies reveals this containment as an effort to manage the spectator’s interpellation by the dilemmas of Mogie’s ruination and by the demand that ushers forth from his “flesh.” Mogie’s surrealism seeks to cull power directly from the subjectivity of the Settler, what Churchill calls “the imperial integrity of the U.S. itself.”19 This idea of culling power, resources, and Human life directly from the imperial integrity of the United States, especially when we think that imperial integrity through the banality of White bodies (in other words, through the “innocence” of today’s citizen), is indicative of the kind of unflinching paradigmatic analyses which allowed Churchill to embrace the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center within forty-eight hours of its occurrence, a moment in time when Settler Marxists and Settler progressives either suddenly became mute or stumbled over their own tongues in half-hearted attempts to simultaneously condemn the attack 218 chapter eight and explain its political and historical rationale. Churchill’s embrace of the event is not synonymous with either celebration or condemnation. It goes without saying that Churchill also refused to be interpellated by the pageantry of mourning that followed in the wake of 9/11. But Settler radicals and progressives assailed him for meditating on the attack from within the questions of the genocided “Savage” rather than from within an ensemble of questions allied with Settler’s grammar of suffering, exploitation, and alienation. People on the left tried to shame Churchill for embracing incoherent terror (suicide bombers) instead of morally and politically sanctioned revolutionary action (like the Zapatistas or the Sandinistas). Others chided him for advocating violence in any form. Many said that now is not the time for a scathing critique; “our” nation is in mourning. And others wagged their fingers and reminded him that members of the working class (not just police agents and investment bankers) died in the Twin Towers. These naysayers all made their arguments at the level of experience, and Churchill, rather handily, answered them at this level as well. But I am neither interested in his interlocutors’ chiding nor in his response. The Left’s attack on Churchill’s embrace of the 9/11 attacks is important not for the social issues it raises, the myriad of things it claims it is concerned about, but rather for the grammar of suffering shared across the board, those building blocks through which loss is conceptualized in such a way that makes it impossible for the “Savage” to function, grammatically, as their paradigm of suffering, and even less as its paradigmatic agent for change. Had Churchill’s interlocutors been more honest, they would have used fewer words—not draped their rejoinders with the veil of issues from the realm of experience (i.e., tactics)—and said, quite simply, “We will not be led by the ‘Savage’; death is not an element constituent of our ontology.” Unlike the narrative and cinematic strategies of Skins, Churchill’s meditation on 9/11 embraces, rather than contains, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand. Churchill’s work is authorized by Mogie’s grammar of suffering which, inter alia, forecloses on Churchill’s passing judgment on the tactical ethics of either the attack on the World Trade Center or, for that matter, Mogie’s attack on the body of White femininity. Churchill accepts this foreclosure and works off of it. He does not feel constrained by it but finds that it enables a quality of reflection otherwise inconceivable: The Pleasures of Parity 219 There can be no defensible suggestion that those who attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on 9/11 were seeking to get even with the United States. Still less is there a basis for claims that they “started” something, or that the United States has anything to get even with them for. Quite the contrary. For the attackers to have arguably “evened the score” for Iraq’s dead children alone, it would have been necessary for them to have killed a hundred times the number of Americans who actually died. This in itself, however, would have allowed them to attain parity in terms of real numbers. The U.S. population is about fifteen times the size of Iraq’s. Hence, for the attackers to have achieved a proportionally equivalent impact, it would have been necessary that they kill some 7.5 million Americans.20 Churchill reflects on the event of 9/11 in such a way as to make it impossible to talk about it as an event. This is a marker of the philosophical brilliance and rhetorical dexterity foundational to Churchill’s thirty-odd books, articles, and recorded speeches. This dexterity allows the work to be conversant with the actual details and “facts” of the event (as presented and cathedralized by White civil society). Yet instead of becoming mired in the bog of concerns which makes the event as “event” (details and common sense ethics), Churchill jettisons common sense and presses the details into service of an ensemble of questions animated by the ethical dilemmas of “Savage,” and not Settler, ontology. He can do this on behalf of those who are not even Native Americans (in this passage, Iraqis) because he provides them with the “Savage” as a lens through which they can do ethnographic and political work on the Settler as specimen. In other words, in his chapter on 9/11, his argument is made in such a way that, to be interpellated, the reader must adjust the logic of his or her political experience to fit the logic of “Savage” genocidal ontology—and not vice versa. The reader must be subordinated to, and incorporated by, Redness, or else the reader will experience the piece in the same way that the viewer is meant to experience Mogie Yellow Lodge: as a scandal, as a problem in need of fixing. Churchill continues to subordinate the “facts” of 9/11 to an ethical examination of Settlerism by reminding the reader that “the U.S. population is fifteen times the size of Iraq’s,” therefore 9/11 would have had to have killed “7.5 million Americans” in order to have “achieved a proportion- 220 chapter eight ately equivalent impact.” In the very next paragraph, Churchill corrects himself and insists that 7.5 million is the number of American children the attackers would have had to have killed in order to achieve parity. This is followed by a list of even more corrections, in which Churchill recalculates the meaning of parity based solely on the U.S. deracination of Iraq since 1990 (further down the correctives will lead him to the “Savage” and to the Slave). True parity would result in 7.5 million dead American children, 15 million dead American adults, the obliteration of “sewage, water sanitation and electrical plants, food production/storage capacity, hospitals, pharmaceutical production facilities, communication centers and much more.” The effects of which would be not just mass death but “a surviving population wracked by malnutrition and endemic disease.” “Indeed, applying such standards of ‘pay back’ vis-à-vis American Indians alone would require a lethal reduction in the U.S. population . . . of between 96 and 99 percent.” Suddenly, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand for parity (one big fat White woman “to cover up the cracks in [his] shack”) sounds downright generous. Mogie is demanding one Settler, a far cry from demanding parity for ontological death. Were he to demand parity the United States “would run out of people long before it ran out of compensatory obligation.”21

#### The affirmation of American democratic legitimacy and its redeemability via the 1ac is rooted in the active disavowal of the genocidal foundations of American democracy. Their democratic utopia is grand, but the question remains: democracy for who?

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Adam Dahl “Empire of the People: Settler Colonialism and the Foundations of Modern Democratic Thought” pp. 1-7 Kansas University Press, April 2018 // sam

American democracy owes its origins to the colonial settlement of North America by European colonists. Since the birth of the republic, observers have emphasized how American democratic thought and identity arose out of the distinct pattern by which English settlers colonized the new world. Empire of the People shows how dominant interpretive and historical currents of modern democratic theory have neglected the other side of this equation: the constitutive role of colonial dispossession in shaping democratic values and ideals.1 By placing the development of American political thought and culture in the context of nineteenth-century settler colonialism, this book reveals how practices and ideologies of indigenous dispossession have laid the theoretical foundations of American democracy. Discussions of colonial America seldom take place in the context of broader debates about the legacies of European colonialism. As the literary critic Michael Warner states, “Very few sentences about colonial America would be significantly altered if the word ‘colonial’ were simply replaced by the word ‘early.’”2 If colonialism and empire entail the imposition of political rule and dependency status on colonized subjects, then American development is anticolonial to the extent that it was born out of revolt against empire. Yet by placing American democratic thought in the context of settler colonialism—a distinct form of colonialism aimed at the expropriation of native land rather than he exploitation of native labor—its colonial tendencies come into more direct focus. Colonial settlement and colonial dispossession are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, colonial settlement refers to the movement of people to a new political space in order to create a new socio-political order. “Settlement” and the related terms “colony” and “plantation” thus refer to the process by which settlers plant a colonial base that marks the origins of that society and establishes further dynamics of social, political, and cultural development. Rooted in the thinking of English theorists Sir Thomas More and Richard Hakluyt, English colonizers understood colonial settlement in agricultural terms as the planting of a seed from which self-perpetuating political communities would flourish. In its familiar etymology, the term “colonus” connotes both inhabitation and cultivation, combining processes of agriculture and settlement of foreign territories into a single process.3 On the other hand, colonial dispossession entails the displacement of preexisting social and political forms to constitute a new political community. The spatial movement of settlers from metropolitan centers to colonial peripheries most often entails the dispossession of indigenous communities by divorcing them from their territorial and cultural foundations. Despite the dual character of colonization, dominant narratives of American democracy rely on a bifurcated understanding that emphasizes the formative role of colonial settlement while neglecting colonial dispossession. Nowhere is this more evident than in one of the urtexts of American democratic identity, J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur’s Letters from an American Farmer (1782). In this seminal text of American political theory, Crèvecœur emphasizes the role of agricultural settlement in shaping key principles of democratic thought—pluralism, the rule of law, social equality, and popular sovereignty. For Crèvecœur, the novelty of American identity derives from the natural conditions of new world geography that prevent the formation of feudal institutions. Bound together by the common project of settlement, regardless of ethnic and religious differences, Americans are a “race of cultivators.” In highlighting the centrality of land and nature in shaping this new American identity, Crèvecœur asks, “What should we American farmers be without the distinct possession of that soil?”4 Although he emphasizes the process of colonial settlement, Crèvecœur disavows the centrality of colonial dispossession to the construction of democratic thought and culture. In characterizing the process of colonizing the island of Nantucket, Crèvecœur wrote, “This happy settlement was not founded on intrusion, forcible entries, or blood. . . . Neither political nor religious broils, neither disputes with the natives, nor any other contentions, have in the least agitated or disturbed its detached society. Yet the first founders knew nothing either of Lycurgus or Solon, for this settlement has not been the work of eminent men or powerful legislators.” When it comes to explaining “the political state of the natives,” he noted that they “were not extirpated by fraud, violence, or injustice as hath been the case in so many provinces” but were naturally “hastening towards a total annihilation.”5 While he briefly acknowledges the colonial violence involved in other settlements, Crèvecœur masks the constitutive effects of colonial conquest on American democratic identity. In taking Nantucket as a microcosm for the settlement of the nation, Crèvecœur asserted that, in contrast to Europe, here “everything is modern, peaceful, and benign. Here we have had no war to desolate our fields.”6 Rather than a political process involving war and conquest, Crèvecœur presents settlement as a natural process. By colonizing the land, settlers become the corporeal incarnation of nature, subsuming the democratic characteristics of the landscape into the organic body politic. The basic features of American democratic peoplehood thus emerge from the land. In treating the American founding as a natural process of colonial settlement rather than an act of “powerful legislators,” Crèvecœur short-circuited what William Connolly calls “the paradox of political founding.” Found most forcefully in Book II of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, the paradox of political founding illustrates the problems by which a people become a political people capable of ruling themselves: “For an emerging people to be capable of appreciating the sound maxims of politics and to follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause . . . men would be, prior to the advent of laws, what they ought to become by means of laws.” For Rousseau, the “true constitution” of republics is “not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens.”7 Yet citizens cannot develop the proper habits, customs, and opinions of republican self-rule without first having a system of good laws. To dissolve the chickenor-egg type paradox, Rousseau introduced the figure of the legislator, who uses extra-legal means to establish the foundation of law. For Connolly, this points to a larger problem besetting all democratic governments—the fact that any political order is founded on extra-legal violence that stands outside of democratic legitimacy. In a manner emblematic of American political thought more generally, Crèvecœur’s account of colonial settlement dissolved the paradox by disavowing colonial dispossession. This book traces the conceptual and theoretical lineages of this disavowal throughout the course of American democratic theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In a material sense, colonial dispossession involves the construction of a new society on top of expropriated land. Conceptually, it entails the construction of a spatial imaginary that empties the territorial ground of democracy of its prior inhabitants by disavowing the presence of indigenous orders. I treat colonial dispossession less as a policy or institution than as a theoretical mechanism that allows settlers to ideologically obscure the foundational violence of colonial conquest. Colonial dispossession is a form of what Walter Benjamin calls “founding violence” or “law-making violence,” a process by which the elimination of native life-forms enables the constitution of new legal, cultural, and political norms.9 Such foundational violence establishes the basis of democratic sovereignty. As James Tully writes of settler colonial dispossession, “the ground of the [colonial] relation is the appropriation of the land, resources, and jurisdiction of the indigenous peoples, not only for the sake of resettlement and exploitation . . . but for the territorial foundation of the dominant [i.e., democratic] society itself.”10 Thus, to uphold the legitimacy of American settler democracy, settler political thought must disavow the origins of democracy in colonial dispossession and in turn erase the political and historical presence of native peoples. It is important to clarify, however, that by focusing on the foundational disavowal of native dispossession, I do not mean a “politics of forgetting” or a form of “national amnesia.”11 Disavowal in ordinary language is a “refusal to acknowledge” and in psychoanalytic terms is “the refusal to recognize the reality of traumatic perception.”12 Disavowal is not simply a passive ignorance of native life-forms in the historical archive of colonial violence. It is an active refusal to historically and ethically grapple with the presence and political claims of indigenous peoples as well as the colonial violence that paved the way for the emergence of modern American democracy. While amnesia and forgetting are passive and might be noted merely by registering the silences in a text, disavowal implies the active and interpretive production of indigenous absence. In settler democratic thought, the absence of native conquest is not assumed or forgotten; it is discursively produced.13 Consequently, the traces of disavowed colonial violence remain in historical and textual memory. Focusing on the theoretical disavowal of colonial dispossession in democratic thought sheds light on the familiar problem of the relationship between race and democracy. To explain the persistence of slavery in colonial Virginia and its centrality to emergent notions of political liberty, Edmund Morgan famously argued that slavery and freedom in the American political imagination, rather than being mutually exclusive, developed in relation to one another. In so doing, Morgan resisted the temptation to flip the script by casting slavery and oppression as dominant trends in colonial thought and advances in liberty and equality as the exception. In Morgan’s account, racial slavery was not antithetical to American liberty, but laid the conceptual and economic foundation of freedom for white settlers. In a conceptual sense, American colonists developed their notions of freedom not despite but because of slavery by contrasting their own status as freemen with that of their slaves. In a material sense, individual freedom rested on the economic independence afforded by the profits from slave labor. At the political and collective level, then, the vast economic growth produced by slave labor enabled the emergence of a free American state and citizenry. The central problem for American colonists prior to the Revolution was the “struggle for a separate and equal station among the nations of the earth.”14 Slavery constituted freedom at both an individual and collective level, allowing colonists to develop their notions of political and individual liberty. According to Morgan, slavery and liberty existed not in an oppositional or even identical relationship to one another, but in a web of contradictions, giving rise to what he calls “the American paradox of slavery and freedom, intertwined and interdependent, the rights of Englishmen supported on the wrongs of Africans.”15 While Morgan made these claims through analysis of literature in colonial Virginia, his emphasis was on slavery rather than indigenous dispossession. Empire of the People recasts the paradox of race to focus not just on the relationship between slavery and freedom, but also on the relationship between democracy and dispossession. Dispossession was not an unfortunate by-product of modern democracy, nor was settler colonial ideology an entirely separate political tradition from democratic thought. The two surged alongside each other and reinforced each other in their historical development. This pushes historically oriented scholars of race and politics in a different direction to bring questions of land and indigeneity back into the fold in studies of American political thought. Institutions and ideologies of conquest and colonization, as well as those of slavery and racial exclusion, were closely linked to the development of democratic ideals and institutions. For all Morgan did to advance our understanding of the complex relationship between race and democracy, he neglected crucial dynamics of colonial America. By adhering to a periodization of “colonial America” as pre-republican and pre-independence, Morgan ignored the colonial dynamics of America that persisted not only into the republican period but also into the present. I thus propose to shift the meaning of “colonial America” to a theoretical register away from an exclusively historical register that casts the qualifier “colonial” in terms of temporal periodization. In its theoretical register, the idea of “colonial America” centers on the constitutive role of settler colonialism in shaping American democratic thought. Understood in this way, “colonial America” names not a phase of American intellectual and political development, but the settler colonial foundations of American democracy that continue to structure the basic features of modern democratic thought and politics. The critical indigenous theorist Jodi Byrd helpfully highlights why political theorists have not sufficiently appreciated the centrality of settler colonialism to the making of modern democracy. Indigenous politics tend to get framed through a politics of race and racialization. As Byrd writes, “When the remediation of the colonization of American Indians is framed through discourses of racialization that can be redressed by further inclusion into the nation-state, there is significant failure to grapple with the fact that such discourses further reinscribe the original colonial injury.”16 By framing processes of colonization in terms of a politics of exclusion (the solution to which inclusion into the constitutional, multicultural state) rather than a politics of dispossession and sovereignty (the solution to which is the reclamation of indigenous governance), discourses of racialization in turn reinforce structures of settler sovereignty through the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the imperial state as the remedy for conquest. In a related way, treating the problem of colonization in terms of “internal colonialism” tends to cast indigenous peoples as “minorities within” settler states rather than as conquered and dispossessed populations. The idea of internal colonialism thus feeds “the construction of the United States as a multicultural nation that is struggling with the legacies of racism rather than as a colonialist power engaged in territorial expansion since its beginning.”17 If we are to properly understand the settler colonial foundations of American democratic thought, we need alternative frameworks of analysis that capture the history of native communities in the United States as a process of colonization and dispossession. Recovering and contesting these historical elisions is essential because the enduring legacies of colonial dispossession and their disavowal counteract native claims to selfgovernance in the present.18

#### The aff’s agonism flattens considerations of power dynamics, elides discussions of colonialism, and reinforces colonial power dynamics---deliberative democracy is inaccessible to anyone other than elites, which independently turns case.

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Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, “Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives from Below,” Journal of Business Ethics, October 2021, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5.pdf

Merely acknowledging differences and inequalities does not make them disappear. Rather than seek an authoritarian consensus, a truly deliberative framework would need to accommodate conflict and dissent as well. Mouffe (1999) argues that a preoccupation with procedural issues relating to consensus depoliticizes the public sphere and that a robust and vibrant public sphere needs to embrace conflict and dissent. A more radical and progressive democratic politics would transform antagonism into ‘agonistic pluralism’ where political contestations reflect not ‘antagonism between enemies but agonism between adversaries’ (Mouffe, 1999, p. 754). The aim is to ‘domesticate’ destructive antagonism into a constructive agonism where democratic decisions may or may not be fully consensual but can also respectfully accept unresolvable disagreements’ (Hillier, 2003, p. 42). Or as Foucault (1984, p. 379) puts it ‘one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.’

Deliberative democrats have acknowledged these critiques and attempted to broaden the scope of deliberative democracy to accommodate exclusions and inequalities. For instance, consensus—the desired outcome of deliberation—was seen as not always desirable even when possible (Gutmann & Thompson, 2018). Habermas’s later work also adopted a more flexible approach, acknowledging that ‘in the case of controversial existential questions arising from different worldviews even the most rationally conducted discursive engagement will not lead to consensus’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 43). The task then of a successful deliberative politics is to institutionalize appropriate procedures that can enable rational discourse among informed publics. This ‘public sphere’ is the institutionalized discursive space where ordinary citizens could deliberate about politics, the economy, and other issues that afected their lives. Habermas’s notion of a public sphere was based on a historical analysis of the emergence of new forms of public interaction that took place in coffee houses, salons, and public squares during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, feminist and postcolonial scholars have critiqued Habermas’s notion of public sphere as being exclusionary and lacking in open access, participation and social equality that are key to democratic deliberation. If the public sphere was the space where consensus was being manufactured it becomes a new site of hegemonic domination (Fraser, 1990). The merchants and intellectuals who deliberated in cafes and salons about the weighty political and social issues of their time would in all probability have not appreciated the fact that the coffee they consumed was produced by slave labor in the colonies (Eze, 1997). Moreover, as Fraser (1990) points out, opinion forming in the public sphere does not translate into actual decision-making in the political sphere, and even if such an extension were possible it would entrench existing hegemonies and reinforce existing structural inequalities and exclusions.

While ideal conditions of deliberative discourse may exist and enable rational consensus among wealthy residents of suburban Frankfurt or Princeton deliberating about the installation of additional streetlights in their neighborhood, it is difficult to imagine how Indigenous communities in the Brazilian Amazon can engage in deliberative discourse as equal citizens with powerful market and state actors intent on expanding mining and logging on Indigenous lands. Even in urban contexts it would be naïve to expect that citizens can participate as equals, respectfully, and exercise their reason freely given the realities of structural inequalities and discriminations based on race, class, gender and sexual orientation.

Another significant shortcoming in deliberative theories is its lack of a sophisticated analysis of power, which seems to be treated almost like an exogenous variable. The liberal quest for legitimacy seemingly elides notions of power and authority because a key assumption of the deliberative ideal is the absence of coercive power. Legitimacy of a consensus produced by communicative rationality can also be hegemonic because one cannot assume that legitimacy always exists without domination (Clegg, & Haugaard, 2009; Mouffe, 1999). Some scholars argue that deliberative democracy has a ‘nuanced view of power’ because it acknowledges that coercive power can exist in deliberative practice (Curato et al., 2017, p. 31). However, they claim it is possible to limit coercive power through good ‘procedural design’ involving selection of ‘less partisan’ participants, using independent facilitators or making deliberations public. Such an approach to power is patently unsatisfactory because it elides relationships between power, legitimacy and authority. How does ‘procedural design’ handle dissent or conflict? And if there is no dissent or conflict in deliberations then has there been an elite capture of the process by excluding or marginalizing dissenting stakeholders?

Deliberative democrats also assume that power, and sometimes coercion, is needed in a deliberative process, especially when implementing decisions contested by certain groups even if the deliberative process was fair and reasoned (Curato et al., 2017). So the assumption is that the state, the only ‘legitimate’ source of coercive power, can and should use coercion to implement decisions arrived at in deliberative forums. As we shall see later when we discuss conflicts over natural resources, this is clearly an untenable argument because it legitimizes the use of state violence to implement decisions made in deliberative forums characterized by vastly structurally unequal conditions that disempower marginalized populations. Debates about deliberative democracy elide power dynamics in the broader political economy in which deliberative processes are embedded (Dryzek, 2016). In cases where there are significant power asymmetries and where actions can have serious economic, social and environmental impacts on communities as is the case with extractive industries, procedural design, however carefully designed, cannot accommodate divergent and sometimes incommensurable views on land use. Rather institutional, material, and discursive power that constitute the global political economy determine governance structures and processes of natural resource extraction. These forms of power somehow remain ‘outside’ of deliberative discourse but create particular forms of legitimacy that deny pluralism of values and rationalities thus marginalizing the legitimate struggles of populations whose values do not conform to the ‘norm’ (Banerjee, 2018, p. 804).

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

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Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative should be responsible for their representations – you get to read the aff and weigh the consequences of the plan, but we get to weigh the consequences of the affirmative’s epistemology.

#### Prefer:

#### Accountability DA – truth testing in a vacuum is violent – their model of debate encourages irresponsible argumentation because it doesn’t allow for any engagement with the affirmative outside the fiated implications of the plan text – only our model ensures accountability.

#### Academy DA – the academy is built on land theft and exploitation – whether via land grants or biopiracy, academic spaces are constructed and solidified via the technologies of settler colonialism – this origin ensures investment in genocide absent direct engagement with the violent origins of the university the academy will never be capable of meaningful change.

#### You need to adopt an ethics of incommensurability that steps away from the endless “what abouts” of the settler and unconditionally commit to decolonization instead of moves towards settler innocence.

**Tuck and Yang 12** (Eve Tuck is a professor at SUNY New Paltz. Wayne K Yang is a professor at the University of California San Diego) “Decolonization is not a metaphor” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017 // sam <3

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

## Case

### Mouffe 1

#### We are impact turning pluralism – the desire to “respect difference” never works for the native because the relationship between the native and the settler is irreversibly antagonistic – they are right that antagonisms shape society but wrong that agonistic pluralism can shift political identity – we will win that the only to shift the structural antagonism of settler colonialism is via the picking of a side and endless commitment to decolonization.

#### We’ll also win you have an ethical obligation to forefront indigenous perspectives – ethics is founded on the genocide of the native which is Wilderson – that means we need a grammar that can understand violence against the native which only comes from a commitment to decolonization.

### Impact Calc

#### Simply saying agonism would be a better framework than antagonism can not resolve the structural antagonism of settler colonialism – you have said antagonisms are bad but only the alternative offers a method for resolving that. No truth hijack – settler colonialism controls the conditions under which agonism can function which means we hijack their hijack.