## Off

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#### Large and influential strikes are low now – their examples are outliers that don’t reflect the general trend

Nelson Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor in the Department of History at UCSB, where he directs the Center for the Study of Work, Labor, and Democracy, 10/28/21 – [“Are We Really Having a Strike Wave?”, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/are-we-really-having-a-strike-wave]//bread

Reports of a resurgent union movement and strike wave prompted by the pandemic are premature, argues Nelson Lichtenstein, a history professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He notes that about half the percentage of workers are unionized as 40 years ago—10%—when there were almost 20 times as many work stoppages in a year. There’s no doubt that millions of workers have hesitated to return to their old workplaces in a world where the Covid-19 pandemic still lingers. Wages are going up amidst this “labor shortage” and some unions have indeed chosen this season to bargain for better contracts and hit the picket line should employers prove recalcitrant. Things are a lot different today than a decade ago when a paltry government stimulus, mass unemployment, and a slow recovery made workers fear that any strike would just serve as an excuse for the employer to close the factory or import scabs. The current strike wave is not, in fact, very large by historical standards. In 1979 there were 235 work stoppages involving more than 1,000 workers. So far this year **there have been just 12**. There just aren’t that many people enrolled in a trade union, slightly over 10 percent of the working population today, down by half in the years since Ronald Reagan opened the door to contemporary management’s fierce anti-unionism by breaking a strike of air traffic controllers in 1981. A Mood Shift Forty years on, the public mood is much different. Last winter scores of eager young journalists descended upon Bessemer, Alabama to cover the union effort there to organize an Amazon distribution center. And today there is a palpable expectation that the uptick in strikes and organizing efforts will lead to a revival of the American labor movement. That’s not just because so many “essential workers"—from hospital staff to checkout clerks—have generated so much heartfelt support. It’s also because liberals know that something is missing from the body politic, and that something is a labor movement of sufficient strength to not only raise wages at the work site, but wield the kind of political power that once made Midwestern Republicans willing to raise the minimum wage, vote for civil rights laws, and even increase social spending. If West Virginia had the union density today that it did at the start of Joe Manchin’s career, the mountain state would be solidly Democratic and its senior senator far more of an enthusiast for the social programs and tax-the-rich proposals he now scorns. Both liberal pundits and union activists are therefore anxious to conjure up a strike wave out of the new-found militancy on offer. On the picket lines at John Deere, where 10,000 workers are on strike and among the[60,000 studio crew that just averted a strike](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/hollywood-studios-reach-new-labor-agreement-avoiding-strike-1), a radical, self-confident spirit has been unleashed. And from President Joe Biden on down, a lot of Democrats are finally saying, “We don’t want just free and fair collective bargaining, a balanced table. We want labor to win!” Employers Raise Wages, Resist Organizing The problem is that employers are not dumb. They have been raising wages all over the place to retain a workforce—you can get $19 an hour just by walking in the door at Amazon, and even Dollar General is paying more than minimum wage. But they resist the actual organization of their workers into a functional union. They deploy all the economic power, legal talent, and law-breaking [necessary to preserve managerial authoritarianism](https://www.engadget.com/amazon-union-labor-relations-settlement-alabama-141059373.html). In Buffalo, N.Y., when workers at four Starbucks made public their effort to win a National Labor Relations Board election, regional managers and “trainers,” all earning many times more than the embattled baristas, [poured into the stores](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/18/business/economy/starbucks-union-buffalo.html), intimidating by their very presence. Non-union workers, no matter how aggrieved, do not go on strike. They can quit their job, even walk out together for a shift or two, but in the absence of some independent organization, and that is almost always a trade union, their protest soon dissolves. Virtually every strike in today’s headlines, from that of the agricultural implement workers in Iowa, to the coal miners in Alabama, and the studio crews in Hollywood, are members of unions formed 80 years ago in the Great Depression. It does not matter if the union was once radical or conservative, **organization is essential** to any sustained and potent worker protest. And once the strike is over, that same organization does not fade away. It stays right there in management’s face, policing the contract, mobilizing the workers, lobbying politicians, and preparing for the next contract fight. Strikes Require Workers Who Are Organized So, **we aren’t having a strike wave**. We sorely need one, but that first requires the unionization of millions of new workers. Congress needs to pass the Protecting the Right to Organize Act. But even more important, the reawakening of an insurgent spirit requires much worker and citizen action. So, let’s therefore remember the words of Joe Hill, the radical troubadour, just before he was executed by a firing squad in 1915: “Don’t mourn – Organize!”

#### An unconditional right to strike would encourage workers to utilize extreme strikes, hurting industries across the board.

Ahmed White, University of Colorado Law School, 2018 – [“Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles]//bread

As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have expected to be able to strike under **a broad array of circumstances** and yet be **restored to their jobs no matter the outcome**. But precisely because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the rule in Congress in the early 1990s.304 A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on Taft Hartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.”305 This is unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on the fields of industrial conflict. Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do.

#### Violent and longer strikes hurt the stock market, investors perceive them to be significantly important

John Dinardo and Kevin F. Hallock, 2002 – [“When Unions "Mattered": The Impact of Strikes on Financial Markets, 1925-1937”, \*John Dinardo is Professor of Economics and Pub- lic Policy, University of Michigan, and Kevin F. Hallock is Associate Professor of Economics and of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2696206]//bread

Concluding Comments The primary aim of this work has been to investigate the effect of strikes on industry stock prices at a time when unions were rapidly evolving. In contrast to recent work on the subject that has used data from the recent past, we have examined a period of time when changes in the level of unionization were more important. One advantage of this focus is that it is easier to measure the effect of "large changes" than it is to detect small changes in the current era of declining unionization. The time between the World Wars was particularly important in the history of unionization. Unlike most recent strikes, during that earlier period many strikes were an attempt by workers to change the "terms of trade" between workers and employers. Our empirical approach melds two previous literatures: in one, the effects of strikes on industry-wide measures of out- put, such as inventories, are studied, and in the second, a standard "event study" approach is used to examine the relationship between strikes and individual firm stock valuations. We develop a data set with an unusually rich set of characteristics for each of the strikes for the time period 1925-37 and combine this information with stock return data. We use a very parsimonious model that helps provide one consistent interpretation of our results. On a descriptive level, we find that strikes had large negative effects on industry stock valuation. In addition, longer strikes, violent strikes, strikes won by the union, strikes leading to union recognition, industry-wide strikes, and strikes that led to wage in- creases affected industry stock prices more negatively than strikes with other characteristics. We also examine industry stock price movements around the start and the end of the strike. It seems that "news" about the strike was revealed early and, in fact, there is some evidence that investors were able to predict strike outcomes. How- ever, we do find larger reactions to some news that could only be completely revealed at the end of the strike (for example, worker wage changes). The generally asymmetric response of stock prices to wins and losses is consistent with our expectations. Our analysis suggests that financial markets viewed union victories in the interwar period as **very important determinants** of the share of firm profits going to stockholders.

#### Stock market collapse leads to full recession.

Miao et al. 12 (Jianjun Miao† , Pengfei Wang‡ , and Lifang Xu§. †Department of Economics, Boston University ‡Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, §Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, “Stock Market Bubbles and Unemployment”, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/51ee/14529d89b630638b0ca428e929f56d7f3b48.pdf)

This paper provides a theoretical study that links unemployment to the stock market bubbles and crashes. Our theory is based on three observations from the U.S. labor, credit, and stock markets. First, the U.S. stock market has experienced booms and busts and these large swings may not be explained entirely by fundamentals. Shiller (2005) documents extensive evidence on the U.S. stock market behavior and argues that many episodes of stock market booms are attributed to speculative bubbles. Second, the stock market booms and busts are often accompanied by the credit market booms and busts. A boom is often driven by a rapid expansion of credit to the private sector accompanied by rising asset prices. Following the boom phase, asset prices collapse and a credit crunch arises. This leads to a large fall in investment and consumption and an economic recession may follow.1 Third, the stock market and unemployment are highly correlated.2 Figure 1. plots the post-war U.S. monthly data of the price-earnings ratio (the real Standard and Poor’s Composite Stock Price Index divided by the ten-year moving average real earnings on the index) constructed by Robert Shiller and the unemployment rate downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).3 This figure shows that, during recessions, the stock price fell and the unemployment rate rose. In particular, during the recent Great Recession, the unemployment rate rose from 5.0 percent at the onset of the recession to a peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009, while the stock market fell by more than 50 percent from October 2007 to March 2009. [Insert Figure 1 Here.] Motivated by the preceding observations, we build a search model with credit constraints, based on Blanchard and Gali (2010). The Blanchard and Gali model is isomorphic to the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and matching model of unemployment (Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985)). Our key contribution is to introduce credit constraints in a way similar to Miao and Wang (2011a,b,c, 2012a,b).4 The presence of this type of credit constraints can generate a stock market bubble through a positive feedback loop mechanism. The intuition is the following: When investors have optimistic beliefs about the stock market value of a firm’s assets, the firm wants to borrow more using its assets as collateral. Lenders are willing to lend more in the hope that they can recover more if the firm defaults. Then the firm can finance more investment and hiring spending. This generates higher firm value and justifies investors’ initial optimistic beliefs. Thus, a high stock market value of the firm can be sustained in equilibrium. There is another equilibrium in which no one believes that firm assets have a high value. In this case, the firm cannot borrow more to finance investment and hiring spending. This makes firm value indeed low, justifying initial pessimistic beliefs. We refer to the first type of equilibrium as the bubbly equilibrium and to the second type as the bubbleless equilibrium. Both types can coexist due to self-fulfilling beliefs. In the bubbly equilibrium, firms can hire more workers and hence the market tightness is higher, compared to the bubbleless equilibrium. In addition, in the bubbly equilibrium, an unemployed worker can find a job more easily (i.e., the job-finding rate is higher) and hence the unemployment rate is lower. [Insert Figure 2 Here.] After analyzing these two types of equilibria, we follow Weil (1987), Kocherlakota (2009) and Miao and Wang (2011a,b,c, 2012a,b) and introduce a third type of equilibrium with stochastic bubbles. Agents believe that there is a small probability that the stock market bubble may burst. After the burst of the bubble, it cannot re-emerge by rational expectations. We show that this shift of beliefs can also be self-fulfilling. After the burst of the bubble, the economy enters a recession with a persistent high unemployment rate. The intuition is the following. After the burst of the bubble, the credit constraints tighten, causing firms to reduce investment and hiring. An unemployed worker is then harder to find a job, generating high unemployment. Our model can help explain the high unemployment during the Great Recession. Figures 2 and 3 plot the hires rate and the job-finding rate from the first month of 2001 to the last month of 2011 using the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data set.5 These figures reveal that both the job-finding rate and the hires rate fell sharply following the stock market crash during the Great Recession. In particular, the hires rate and the job-finding rate fell from 4.4 percent and 0.7, respectively, at the onset of the recession to about 3.1 percent and 0.25, respectively, in the end of the recession.

#### Economic crisis causes nuke war---strong statistical support

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

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#### Global tech innovation high now.

Mercury News et al 6/4 [Mercury News and East Bay Times Editorial Boards, June 4, 2021, “Editorial: How America can Win the Global Tech War” <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill/> //gord0]

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech’s impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China has been closing the tech gap in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose. It’s imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016. Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill’s final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. Khanna would like Congress to authorize $100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies. The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to $50 billion or $75 billion. They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang’s March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025. The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending $612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China’s $514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending $33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount. The bill would authorize 10 technology hubs throughout the nation designed to help build the infrastructure, manufacturing facilities and workforce needed to help meet the nation’s tech goals. Building tech centers throughout the United States should also create more support for the industry across the country. Tech’s image has taken a beating in recent years — the emergence of the term “Big Tech” is hardly a positive development — and the industry will need all the support it can muster in Congress. The United States continues to have a crucial tech edge over its competitors, most notably China. The only way we can hope to win the 21st century is to make significant investments in research and development that will spark the next wave of innovation.

#### Violent strike efforts are increasing – they slow innovation, specifically in the tech sector.

Hanasoge 16 [Chaithra; Senior Research Analyst, Market Researcher, Consumer Insights, Strategy Consulting; “The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” Supply Wisdom; April/June 2016 (Doesn’t specifically say but this is the most recent event is cites); https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/]//SJWen

The result: Verizon conceded to several of the workers’ demands including hiring union workers, protection against outsourcing of call-center jobs, and employee benefits such as salary hikes and higher pension contributions, among others and thus bringing an end to the strike in June.

The repercussion: The strike witnessed several instances of social disorder, violence and clashes, ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, as a result of the strike, Verizon reported lower than expected revenues in the second quarter of 2016.

Trade unions/ labor unions aren’t just this millennia’s product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. Unions, to ensure fairness to the working class, have gone on strike for better working conditions and employee benefits since the industrial revolution and are as strong today as they were last century. With the advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today’s work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable?

As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government departments across Australia went on a series of strikes over failed pay negotiations, disrupting operations of many government departments for a few days.  Besides such direct effects, there are many indirect effects as well such as strained employee relations, slower work processes, lesser productivity and unnecessary legal hassles.

Also, union strikes can never be taken too lightly as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the Verizon incident that was a crucial example of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as ‘anti-working class’. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

However, aside from employee concerns, such incidents are also determined by a number of other factors such as the country’s political scenario, economy, size of the overall workforce and the unions, history of unionization, labor laws, and culture. For example, it is a popular saying that the French are always on strike as per tradition (although recent statistics indicate a decline in frequency). In a communist government like China, strikes have steadily risen in number. In 2015, China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based workers’ rights group recorded 2,700 incidents of strikes and protests, compared to 1,300 incidents in 2014. Most of them have stemmed out of failure by the government to respect the basic rights of employees and address labor concerns.

Interestingly, unions have not been able to gain a strong foothold in the IT-BPO industry. While many countries do have a separate union to represent workers from the sector, incidents of strikes like Verizon have been relatively low.  However, workplace regulations, in addition to other factors mentioned could be a trigger for such incidents, even if on a smaller scale. For example, a recent survey that interviewed several BPO employees in India revealed that while forming a union in the BPO sector was difficult, irksome workplace regulations such as constant surveillance, irregular timings and incentives have prompted employees to express their resentment in smaller ways such as corruption of internal servers and so on.  Such risks are further enhanced in a city like Kolkata, which carries a strong trade union culture.

#### Victories like the aff mobilizes unions in the IT sector.

Vynck et al 21 [Gerrit De; Carleton University, BA in Journalism and Global Politics, tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News; Nitashu Tiku; Columbia University, BA in English, New York University, MA in Journalism, Washington Post's tech culture reporter based in San Francisco; Macalester College, BA in English, Columbia University, MS in Journalism, reporter for The Washington Post who is focused on technology coverage in the Pacific Northwest; “Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech,” The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/]//SJWen

In response to tech company crackdowns and lobbying, gig workers have shifted their strategy to emphasize building worker-led movements and increasing their ranks, rather than focusing on employment status as the primary goal, says Veena Dubal, a law professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. The hope is that with President Biden in the White House and an even split in the Senate, legislators will mobilize at the federal level, through the NLRA or bills such as the PRO Act, to recognize gig worker collectives as real unions.

#### Technological innovation solves every existential threat – which outweighs.

Matthews 18 Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

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The United States federal government should

1. Make employment voluntary for prisoners
2. Create a minimum wage for prisoners
3. Create automatic wage deductions for taxes
4. Create a wage deposit system outside of prison

#### Solves recidivism best – we read blue

#### Fulcher 15

Patrice A. Fulcher [Associate Professor at The John Marshall Law School], 15 - ("," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, Winter 2015, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1759&context=jcred)//ML>

B. Reallocate Greater Wealth To Working Prisoners and Decrease Recidivism ¶ Working for slave wages or as a slave without compensation is the harsh economic reality for millions of prisoners in the U.S. Then after succumbing to living a life as a slave for the duration of their sentence, these prisoners are released back to society, without any means of financial support from their labors. Often indigent, homeless, and unable to overcome the challenge of obtaining employment with a conviction, many former inmates reoffend.192 Moreover, for those who do secure jobs, their earnings are greatly limited by their criminal records. A recent PEW study revealed "past incarceration reduced subsequent wages by 11 percent, cut annual employment by nine weeks and reduced yearly earnings by 40 percent."1 93 As a result, U.S. recidivism rates will remain high unless former prisoners have economic resources immediately upon release. Thus, the FLSA should be emancipated from the constraints imposed, not by Congress, but by rigid and unsupported judicial interpretation that wrongly exclude working prisoners from its provisions. Free the FLSA and compensate working inmates; allow prisoners to accumulate capital while they are incarcerated, so they will have a means of support to help them rebuild their lives, and not have to commit crimes to survive. ¶ Hence, I propose the following basic guidelines in providing FLSA coverage to working inmates: (1) employment should be voluntary; those who do not wish to work must take vocational classes for their entire prison sentence, (2) working inmates should be paid at least minimum wage, (3) automatic wage deductions shall be allowed for taxes and other previous court ordered obligations only, and (4) a forced 80 percent wage deduction will be deposited into an outside interest bearing bank account, accessible only upon release. In adopting this payment scheme, the economic reality for working prisoners will be greatly improved.¶ Utilizing the total PIE quarterly statics from 2012 mentioned above in section III(B)(1)(only subtracting family costs and taxes), each of the, 4,700 inmates working in PIE programs would have received approximately $356.00 a month instead of $70.00.194 This figure represents net wages after an 80 percent deduction of $1,427.00 is transferred into an interest bearing account.1 95 Additionally, since today's prisoners serve an average of 5.2 years in prison, 196 each of the 4,700 inmates under the proposed new FLSA guidelines would have at least $3,567.50 upon his or her release if the 80% were placed in an account with an interest rate of at least a 3%. Granted, this amount may not seem significant, but it is better than expecting that a bus ticket and a knapsack of clothes will be enough to enable a person who has been incarcerated to build his life in free society. ¶

## Case

### Adv

#### Union activity is on the decline now, and it’s not because of company hostilities.

Richard Berman, president of Berman and Company, a public affairs firm in Washington, D.C*,* 11/2/2021 – [“Five myths perpetuated by labor unions”,https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/nov/2/five-myths-perpetuated-by-labor-unions/]//bread

I’ve made a career of revealing myths, exaggerations, and twisted statistics offered in pursuit of public policy agendas. I’m annoyed by liars, and I often say so. Anyone can be wrong from time to time. But a correction, or at a minimum not repeating falsities, is expected. Inside this group of relentless liars, labor union officials are Exhibit A. I’ve recapped several of their promoted myths that are continuously on display. Myth One: Unions are growing in popularity. The latest Gallup polling does reveal labor union “approval” among Americans hit 68 percent earlier this year—the highest level since 1965. Yet, in the private sector, fewer than seven percent belong to a union. What gives? In the same Gallup polling, only 28 percent of poll respondents have high confidence in unions. Translation: A majority of Americans like the concept of labor unions but would never join one. And most of that modest group never voted for their union. It came with the job. As a percent of the workforce, union membership has steadily declined since the 1980s. Workers are realizing the promised benefits don’t outweigh the guaranteed baggage associated with membership. Labor unions and their allies consistently fail to grasp this concept. Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, recently tweeted, “Elon Musk increased his wealth by $36.2 billion in one day this week, but Tesla can’t afford to let auto workers unionize?” It’s not a question of whether a company can afford a union. It’s simply whether a majority of informed employees want to join the corrupt UAW. Myth Two: Union activity is exploding in 2021. The media even nicknamed last month “Striketober.” But is there really an uptick in employee strikes, or is it a case of media exaggeration? Fact check: Over the last twenty years, there has been an average of 16 major work stoppages (over 1,000 employees) annually. So far, in 2021, the Labor Department counts fewer than a dozen. Myth Three: The reason for low interest in unions is that companies have become more militant toward organizing. That one is ludicrous. Modern “anti-union” education campaigns waged by today’s businesses are decidedly less strident than some Presidential elections. Compare these to the historic warfare battles between management and labor. The River Rouge strike at Ford or the Homestead strike in the steel industry come to mind. A clash between protesters and strikebreaker Pinkerton guards and other private security teams ended in 17 fatalities. The tension between businesses and unions today is more civil than at any time in the past. But labor organizers promote a “them versus you” mindset to boost their claimed relevance and importance. Myth Four: Labor law has become increasingly tilted against unions. In reality, labor law has remained little changed for decades. It’s true that political appointees at the National Labor Relations Board continually reinterpret the law. However, the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935 and amended in 1947, is mostly unchanged. That law governs labor organizing to this day. The union lament reminds me of the trial lawyer’s admonition, “when the facts are against you, argue the law.” But neither the facts nor the law are supportive of the union position. The reason why people aren’t joining has nothing to do with either (see Myth 1). Chief among union complaints is that they can’t win elections when employees vote via the well-established secret ballot. They want law changes to obviate the need for private voting. But changing that rule throws the door wide open for voter intimidation. What would Stacy Abrams say? Myth Five: Right-to-work laws harm employees and block the unionization of workplaces. False again. Unions already successfully recruit members in 27 right-to-work states when they can effectively convey value and confidence to employees. As of 2019, more than two million members are voluntarily supporting unions in those states. The state protections allow employees to join a union or not without being forced to pay union dues. The union position is upside down. Progressives, who claim to champion employee rights, should support right-to-work laws in the other 23 states. Today, union leaders face a workforce that has little interest in unionization as long as management provides a workplace that is operated safely and provides market wage rates and benefits. Recently, big union organizing campaigns at Amazon, Nissan, Volkswagen (twice), and Boeing all witnessed a majority of employees voting NO. Yet the unions still claim foul, and the need for voting rule changes whenever employees leave them at the altar.

#### Unions are ineffective, 3 warrants:

#### Unions reaffirm the right of management to control labor – only breeds conservatism that hurts the working-class struggle

Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and a former head steward for UAW Local 2865, 2020 – [“Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough”, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing]

In unionized shops, they argued that union bureaucrats served as a junior partner to management, trading worker gains in wages, benefits, and representation in exchange for reaffirming the company’s right to manage. This was not a result of personal corruption or moral failings but a structural feature of the bureaucracy. Postwar labor relations, with full-time union representatives tasked with negotiating and administering complex, technical contracts with management representatives, meant that unions’ bureaucratic layer had a day-to-day experience closer to their management counterparts than the workers they represented. Likewise, they saw apathy and conservatism among the ranks not as a result of ignorance, but a rational response to the boss’s power and the union’s inability to counter it. The Johnson-Forest perspective found an audience in France, where the Socialisme ou Barbarie? group translated many of their pamphlets, as well as in Italy, where partisans [elaborated](http://www.plutobooks.com/9780745399904/storming-heaven-second-edition/) the ideas into a perspective known as *operaismo*, or workerism. By then, it had veered far from its Trotskyist roots, its strident skepticism of bureaucracy making it resemble more the syndicalism that Trotsky criticized. Other tendencies developed the “workerist” analysis of the workplace, unions, and worker consciousness, but without rejecting the role of leaders or parties as leading inevitably to bureaucratic domination. In the United States, the “Cochranite” [tendency](https://www.amazon.com/American-Labor-Midpassage-Bert-Cochran/dp/B005ICMFOY) was an early proponent of this perspective. One of its leaders, metal worker Harry Braverman, wrote one of the most penetrating analyses of how and why work had changed under capitalism in the twentieth century, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. Observing that a key source of workers’ power was their practical knowledge of the production process, Braverman showed how management appropriated that knowledge through a process of “deskilling,” separating production, conception, and execution in blue-collar factory, white-collar office, and service work.

#### They only exist to mitigate the negative impacts of the system instead of overthrowing it

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Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to **mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it**.

#### Their prioritization of bureaucracy makes any militancy impossible

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Regardless, despite the radically changed political and economic landscape, labor unions and movements will continue to face challenges similar to those unions have faced since Marx and Engels’s time. These stem from unions’ fundamental contradiction: they are necessary but insufficient vehicles for workers to achieve their goals. This is further complicated by the tightrope that unions must walk between militancy and bureaucracy. If self-preservation led unions to prioritize maintaining their bureaucratic organizations in recent decades, the escalating state and employer offensive has made that response increasingly untenable. Renewed militancy is key to labor’s future. The apparent recent rise in worker protest holds promise, but history suggests that it is nowhere near the scale necessary for reversing labor’s declining fortunes. Although it is impossible to know if and when a large enough upsurge will arrive, history also suggests that the direction the upsurge takes, and what gains or losses result from it, will depend on the patient, day-to-day work that unions do in forging the key agent of social change — the working class.

#### Refusal to specify the agent of the 1ac is a voting issue – it skews prep because we don’t know what branches of governments do the aff – especially true given they haven’t articulated what countries are just governments which means they can infinitely shift in the 1ar. That’s a voting issue for fairness – debate is a game which requires fair conditions to function – the debate is irreparably skewed in their favor.

### Framing

#### Extinction outweighs – any risk is a reason to err neg.

Seth D. Baum and Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### Prefer utilitarianism – moral judgement isn’t rational.

Greene 10 (Joshua, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf))

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.¶ It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).¶ Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Prefer extinction 4 reasons

#### Reversibility – We can’t come back from extinction but we can solve structural violence only if were alive

#### Future lives – Extinction kills an infinite amount of future lives which means it kills a bunch of innocent people and turns their impact because it takes away any chance future generations have at solving problems

#### Cognitive Bias – We don’t prepare for extinction because we don’t truly understand how big it will be

#### Policy Making – Util is the only way a logical policy maker can make decisions because anything else prefers one group over another

#### Multiple DAs to their method –

#### Arbitrary DA – their framing weighs certain sufferings as more important than others – that’s immoral and irresponsible

#### Tunnel Vision DA – moral ethics create intentions of goodness that make other populations disposable and ignores consequences

#### Complexity DA – moral theories collapse under intricate scenarios – util accounts for all factors

#### Illusion DA – small, ineffective “moral steps” actually make the problem worse because they create the illusion that the problem has been solved

#### discourages search for effective reform. Aff’s strategy cleans their conscience but relinquishes responsibility for finding a policy that solves.

#### AT: Ethics – policies are not just good or bad – we can recognize that a policy would reduce inequality but still not do it because the consequences are too great – don’t arbitrarily deflate the risk of the disad, force them to do actual internal link debating.

#### AT: Compound Probability – its not slippery slope – we have read specific and statistically backed evidence that indicates the internal links of the disads are true

#### AT: Causal Direction – its not a tiny probability link – none of this substitutes for actual debating on the disad

#### AT: Complexity – people won’t back down in a world of economic decline – Tonnesson is more specific and says it makes conflict more likely.

#### AT: Decision Gridlock – that’s not the aff – if there was an 0.0001% chance of extinction we obviously should still do the aff but the disad is much higher probability – their framework means ignoring high risk disads which is arbitrary and guarantees extinction.