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## WTO

#### The aff is the final chance for WTO credibility – the plan creates momentum for reforms, including resuming its role as mediator for US-China trade conflicts and approval of new Appellate Body judges, but only if the WTO is seen as instigating the solution.

**Meyer 21** - David Meyer is the Editor of CEO Daily and a senior writer on Fortune’s European team.

David Meyer, “The WTO’s survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn” Fortune Magazine, June 18, 2021, <https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/> // sam :)

The World Trade Organization knows all about crises. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the fairness of the global trade rulebook. The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has a lot to fix. However, one crisis is more pressing than the others: the battle over COVID-19 vaccines, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later. According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—the WTO's future rests on what happens next. "The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO. "Final nail in the coffin" The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO's founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. It's a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole, say waiver advocates. "If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, I think it could be the final nail in the coffin" for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. "If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems." Those problems are legion. Reform needs Top of the list is the WTO's Appellate Body, which hears appeals in members' trade disputes. It's a pivotal part of the international trade system, but Trump—incensed at decisions taken against the U.S. —blocked appointments to its seven-strong panel as judges retired. The body became completely paralyzed at the end of 2019, when two judges' terms ended and the panel no longer had the three-judge quorum it needs to rule on appeals. Anyone who hoped the advent of the Biden administration would change matters was disappointed earlier this year when the U.S. rejected a European proposal to fill the vacancies. "The United States continues to have systemic concerns with the appellate body," it said. "As members know, the United States has raised and explained its systemic concerns for more than 16 years and across multiple U.S. administrations." At her confirmation hearing in February, current U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reiterated those concerns—she said the appellate body had "overstepped its authority and erred in interpreting WTO agreements in a number of cases, to the detriment of the United States and other WTO members," and accused it of dragging its heels in settling disputes. "Reforms are needed to ensure that the underlying causes of such problems do not resurface," Tai said. "While the U.S. [has] been engaging [with the WTO] it hasn't indicated it would move quickly on allowing appointments to the Appellate Body," says Bryan Mercurio, an economic-law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who opposes the vaccine waiver. "This is not a good sign. In terms of WTO governance, it's a much more important step than supporting negotiations on an [intellectual property] waiver." It's not just the U.S. that wants to see reform at the WTO. In a major policy document published in February, the EU said negotiations had failed to modernize the organization's rules, the dispute-resolution system was broken, the monitoring of countries' trade policies was ineffective, and—crucially—"the trade relationship between the U.S. and China, two of the three largest WTO members, is currently largely managed outside WTO disciplines." China is one of the key problems here. It became a WTO member in 2001 but, although this entailed significant liberalization of the Chinese economy, it did not become a full market economy. As the European Commission put it in February: "The level at which China has opened its markets does not correspond to its weight in the global economy, and the state continues to exert a decisive influence on China's economic environment with consequent competitive distortions that cannot be sufficiently addressed by current WTO rules." "China is operating from what it sees as a position of strength, so it will not be bullied into agreeing to changes which it sees as not in its interests," says Mercurio. China is at loggerheads with the U.S., the EU and others over numerous trade-related issues. Its rivals don't like its policy of demanding that Chinese citizens' data is stored on Chinese soil, nor do they approve of how foreign investors often have to partner with Chinese firms to access the country's market, in a way that leads to the transfer of technological knowhow. They also oppose China's industrial subsidies. Mercurio thinks China may agree to reforms on some of these issues, particularly regarding subsidies, but "only if it is offered something in return." All these problems won't go away if the WTO manages to come up with a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies, Wallach concedes. "But," she adds, "the will and the good faith to tackle these challenges is increased enormously if the WTO has the experience of being part of the solution, not just an obstacle." Wallach points to a statement released earlier this month by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade ministers, which called for urgent discussions on the waiver. "The WTO must demonstrate that global trade rules can help address the human catastrophe of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate the recovery," the statement read in its section about WTO reform. Okonjo-Iweala's role The WTO's new director general, whose route to the top was unblocked in early 2021 with the demise of the Trump administration, is certainly keen to fix the problems that contributed to the early departure of her predecessor, Brazil's Robert Azevedo. "We must act now to get all our ambassadors to the table to negotiate a text" on the issue of an IP waiver for COVID vaccines, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director general of the World Trade Organization, has said. Dursun Aydemir—Anadolu/Bloomberg/Getty Images Earlier this week, when the U.S. and EU agreed a five-year ceasefire in a long-running dispute over Boeing and Airbus aircraft subsidies, Okonjo-Iweala tweeted: "With political will, we can solve even the most intractable problems." However, Mercurio is skeptical about her stewardship having much of an effect on the WTO's reform process. "Upon taking [over she] stated it was time for delegations to speak to each other and not simply past each other, but at the recent General Counsel meeting delegations simply read prepared statements in what some have described as the worst meeting ever," he says. "On the other hand, Ngozi is very much someone who will actively seek solutions to problems, and in this way different to her predecessor. If the role of mediator is welcomed, she could have an impact not in starting discussions but in getting deals over the finish line."

#### Only WTO mediation can reset US-China trade relations that kill cooperation now – that requires new Appellate Body judges.

**Krueger 21** - Anne O. Krueger, a former World Bank chief economist and former first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, is Senior Research Professor of International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Development at Stanford University.

Anne Krueger “Resetting US-China Trade Relations,” Project Syndicate, February 24, 2021, [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-trade-relations-reset-must-be-via-wto-by-anne-o-krueger-2021-02 //](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-trade-relations-reset-must-be-via-wto-by-anne-o-krueger-2021-02%20//) sam :)

US President Joe Biden’s administration is reassessing America’s China strategy. Donald Trump’s modus operandi was to bully China on trade, foreign investment, cyberspace, e-commerce, intellectual property, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and other issues. Making matters worse, the Trump administration chose to deal with China bilaterally, neglecting European, Australasian, and Latin American allies who shared many of America’s concerns and would have strengthened the United States’ bargaining position. Trump’s bombastic, go-it-alone approach was fundamentally flawed. He seems to have assumed that his policies would harm China to the point that it could not effectively compete with the US economically, politically, or militarily. But no American actions can stop Chinese growth. Moreover, at the same time that his administration was trying to diminish China, it was negotiating with it bilaterally, thereby sending a very confusing signal to the Chinese and the rest of the world. Trumpian policies no doubt damaged China, but they hurt the US, too. Although Sino-American rivalry is inevitable, both governments know that war is unthinkable. Given China’s desire to be a respected member of the international community, a more satisfactory US approach would involve seeking cooperation and mutual gain when possible and limiting confrontation to vital issues. When confrontation is necessary, it will often be preferable for the US to work through multilateral forums. Moreover, strengthening US capabilities in research and development, investment in human capital, and boosting productivity would achieve far more satisfactory results than attempting to curtail Chinese development. Pressing issues requiring cooperation include climate change and other environmental concerns, developing countries’ indebtedness, and international financial stability. Perhaps most important, an open multilateral trading system – underpinned by World Trade Organization rules – benefits the entire global economy, and certainly China and the US. Until the early 1980s, China was very poor, and economic growth was anemic, because the government discouraged foreign trade and sought to produce all goods domestically, mostly in state enterprises. But the country then reversed its trade policies and allowed private enterprise. Its opening to the world triggered a remarkable economic transformation. Exports and imports both grew quickly and became major growth engines, leading to rapidly rising living standards. China’s international trade increased much faster than its real GDP. By the 1990s, it was evident that both China and the global economy would benefit from Chinese accession to the WTO. Membership, many argued, would assure other countries that China would follow the global trade rules that had contributed much to strong global economic growth since World War II, while the WTO would provide a forum for resolving disputes. Accordingly, China lowered its average tariff rate from 40% in 1992 to 15% by 2000 (and still further subsequently) and removed other trade barriers in order to conform to the WTO’s rules, before joining the organization in 2001. China celebrated its accession, and thereafter abided by rulings against it by the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism better than many other countries did. The US took many of its trade grievances with China to the WTO, and won most of its cases. Meanwhile, Chinese exports and GDP continued to grow rapidly. By 2009, China became the the world’s largest exporter and had the largest trade balance by 2013. But America’s trade deficits with the world and with China continued to widen. After Trump took office, his administration attacked China and its trade policies without using WTO processes. In 2018, Trump launched a trade war. He made nonnegotiable demands – including that China close the bilateral trade deficit by importing vastly more US goods – and dramatically increased US tariffs on imports from China in an attempt to get his way. Economists pointed out that the US trade deficit with China was a macroeconomic phenomenon and not something that could be reduced by tariffs. Moreover, forcing China to commit to import more US commodities such as soybeans would require “managed trade,” especially by Chinese state-owned enterprises whose behavior the Trump administration was complaining about. And other countries developed large bilateral trade surpluses with the US: following Trump’s tariff increases, US imports from countries such as Vietnam replaced some of those from China. The US and China signed a “phase one” trade agreement in January 2020, but it fell far short of meeting Trump’s demands. Even the agreed provisions were not fulfilled. His trade war was thus ultimately a failure that harmed both China and the US. Today, US-China trade relations are openly hostile, and America is by no means the innocent party. But both countries could begin to reset relations with an agreement to restore the WTO’s dispute-settlement role through US approval of new Appellate Body judges. The Biden administration could make a further goodwill gesture by offering to rescind Trump’s tariffs on condition that China reciprocates. And because disputes on issues such as intellectual-property rights and e-commerce can and should be resolved multilaterally, the US should raise these at the WTO instead of making bilateral demands. With luck, healthy US productivity growth could then enable the Chinese-American rivalry to proceed along less confrontational lines.

#### China and the US want to work together on climate, but unresolved trade disputes kill cooperation.

**Stanway 21** – David Stanway is a senior correspondent for industry and environment at Thomson Reuters

David Stanway, “China-U.S. climate cooperation inseparable from wider trade issues – official,” Reuters, September 8, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/china-us-climate-cooperation-inseparable-wider-trade-issues-official-2021-09-08/> // sam :)

China and the United States have common ground in the area of climate change and cutting carbon emissions, but cooperation cannot be separated from wider trade issues between them, a senior Chinese trade official said on Wednesday. Vice-commerce minister Wang Shouwen told a China-U.S. trade event in Xiamen that strengthening green and low-carbon cooperation would not only help the two sides achieve their emission reduction targets, but would also boost overall economic and trade cooperation. Amid simmering trade and political tensions with Beijing, Washington has sought to treat joint actions to combat climate change as a standalone issue. However, during a meeting with visiting U.S. climate envoy John Kerry last week, senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi said the "oasis of climate cooperation" could not be kept apart from the wider bilateral relationship between the world's two biggest producers of greenhouse gases. Kerry acknowledged last week that broader geopolitical disputes between China and the United States could have a potentially adverse impact on climate cooperation. Talking to journalists after two days of talks with his Chinese counterpart Xie Zhenhua, Kerry cited U.S. sanctions imposed on solar panel manufacturers with ties to the region of Xinjiang, where Washington accuses China of committing human rights abuses

#### Only US-China climate cooperation can meaningfully combat global warming – attempts are futile without bilateral communication.

**Shuo 21** - Li Shuo is a Senior Climate and Energy Policy Officer at Greenpeace China

Rhett A. Butler interviewing Li Shuo, “An Interview with Li Shuo,” Mongabay, September 2, 2021, <https://news.mongabay.com/2021/09/there-is-no-climate-solution-without-china-and-america-says-li-shuo/> // sam :)

Mongabay: What inspired your interest in the environment? And how did your career path unfold? Li Shuo: I grew up watching Discovery Channel and National Geographic. My interest really started from these documentary films. As a city boy from Beijing, sadly there’s not much easy access to nature, but these films brought me far. I was in awe of nature. In college, I studied international relations and law. I always wanted to combine my academic interest with my interest in nature. So in 2011, when Greenpeace was looking for someone to cover the UN climate negotiations and China’s environmental politics, I thought that’s the dream job. I jumped on board fresh out of college. The next ten years proved to be a rewarding journey. I had the privilege of being on the frontline of international climate diplomacy and witnessing its ups and downs. In the meanwhile, the 2010s is a dynamic period for China’s domestic environmental politics. We started with the airpocalypse and huge environmental deficits. To be at the center of these challenges and work towards their improvements is what makes me proud. Mongabay: What is Greenpeace’s focus in China? And how does Greenpeace engage with the government? Li Shuo: Greenpeace is one of the largest NGOs in China. We started our presence here 16 years ago and have more than 80 colleagues now in our Beijing office. We work on almost all the pressing environmental challenges in China. Climate change, air and water pollution, forest, ocean are some of our priority areas over the last decade. Policy advocacy is a big part of our job. For that, we need to engage regularly with the government. A big part of how we do it in China is actually not too different from elsewhere, but it certainly requires more time and effort. It is an art and craft to build trust, and trust is the most essential ingredient in our business – it is what brings the other side closer to you, a state that even if others disagree they respect where you come from. Mongabay: In a recent presentation you mentioned that opposition to transitioning away from fossil fuels is emerging in China. Is this akin to the sort of campaigns and lobbying we’ve seen for the past few decades in the U.S.? And how powerful is this movement? Li Shuo: If one sees through the different ways that politics manifests itself in different countries, the core is not that different. There are industries that will lose out in the low carbon transition in the U.S. and they create political resistance. There are similar forces in China. They may not employ exactly the same tactics of the Koch brothers, but what they want to achieve is essentially the same. The Chinese industrial opposition is actually a sign that the country’s effort of decarbonization is steering into deep water, that the interests of certain industrial groups are being touched. So in a way, it represents progress. The question that needs to be solved is how to balance divergent interests. In the west, there is the “just transition” discussion. In its own ways, China is getting to that discussion too. It can learn from the experience elsewhere and contribute back. Mongabay: In March, bilateral talks between China and the United States took place. The conversation was reportedly frosty and it does not appear that there was much progress on climate. Do you see climate as an area of potential collaboration, where the two superpowers put aside their differences to address what could be a very significant threat to both? Li Shuo: There is no climate solution without the G2 rolling towards the same direction. That’s certainly not what we saw during the Trump administration. With the Biden administration, the U.S. and China are rhetorically both for climate action, but my concern is what they are doing in practice is still a far cry from what’s needed to keep 1.5C in sight. Both countries have put relatively strong targets on paper. The U.S. wants to cut 50-52% emissions by 2030. China wants to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. But neither side has so far put concrete policies behind these goals. The climate will not be fooled by big targets if they remain only on paper. As for US-China climate cooperation, people need to recognize that the bilateral relationship has changed significantly in recent years. That will limit the space for working together. I believe the minimum that needs to be secured is “engagement”. This means no matter how the relationship unfolds, Beijing and Washington will keep the line of communication open for climate change and separate it from the toxic bilateral dynamics. Leaders on both sides need to understand a simple idea, that unlike other issues on the bilateral agenda, climate change is an issue that they could truly not decouple with each other. The U.S. can do all it can to reduce emissions. It won’t solve the problem as long as China doesn’t comply, and vice versa.

#### The brink is now – climate change causes extinction and turns every other impact.

**Ramanathan et al. 17 -** (Veerabhadran Ramanathan is Victor Alderson Professor of Applied Ocean Sciences and director of the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, Dr. William Collins is an internationally recognized expert in climate modeling and climate change science. He is the Director of the Climate and Ecosystem Sciences Division (CESD) for the Earth and Environmental Sciences Area (EESA) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Prof. Dr Mark Lawrence, Ph.D. is scientific director at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Örjan Gustafsson is a Professor in the Department of Environmental Science and Analytic Chemistry at Stockholm University, Shichang Kang is Professor, Cold and Arid Regions Environmental and Engineering Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); CAS Center for Excellence in Tibetan Plateau Earth Sciences, and Molina, M.J., Zaelke, D., Borgford-Parnell, N., Xu, Y., Alex, K., Auffhammer, M., Bledsoe, P., Croes, B., Forman, F., Haines, A., Harnish, R., Jacobson, M.Z., Lawrence, M., Leloup, D., Lenton, T., Morehouse, T., Munk, W., Picolotti, R., Prather, K., Raga, G., Rignot, E., Shindell, D., Singh, A.K., Steiner, A., Thiemens, M., Titley, D.W., Tucker, M.E., Tripathi, S., & Victor, D., authors come from the following 9 countries - US, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, China, Germany, Australia, Mexico, India, “Well Under 2 Degrees Celsius: Fast Action Policies to Protect People and the Planet from Extreme Climate Change,” Report of the Committee to Prevent Extreme Climate Change, the CPECC is a global think tank made up of scientists, policy makers, and military experts, September 2017, http://www.igsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Well-Under-2-Degrees-Celsius-Report-2017.pdf)

Climate change is **becoming an existential threat** with warming in excess of 2°C within the next three decades and 4°C to 6°C within the next several decades. Warming of such magnitudes will expose as many as **75% of the world’s population** to **deadly heat stress** in addition to **disrupting** the climate and **weather worldwide**. Climate change is an urgent problem **requiring urgent solutions**. This paper lays out urgent and practical solutions that are ready for implementation now, will deliver benefits in the next few critical decades, and **places the world on a path to achieving** the **longterm targets** of the Paris Agreement and near-term sustainable development goals. The approach consists of four building blocks and 3 levers to implement ten scalable solutions described in this report by a team of climate scientists, policy makers, social and behavioral scientists, political scientists, legal experts, diplomats, and military experts from around the world. These solutions will enable society to decarbonize the global energy system by 2050 **through efficiency and renewables**, drastically reduce short-lived climate pollutants, and stabilize the climate well below 2°C both in the near term (before 2050) and in the long term (post 2050). It will also reduce premature mortalities by tens of millions by 2050. As an insurance against policy lapses, mitigation delays and faster than projected climate changes, the solutions include an Atmospheric Carbon Extraction lever to remove CO2 from the air. The amount of CO2 that must be removed ranges from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons if the carbon lever is not pulled and emissions of climate pollutants continue to increase until 2030. There are numerous living laboratories including 53 cities, many universities around the world, the state of **California**, and the nation of Sweden, who have **embarked on a carbon neutral pathway**. These **laboratories** have already created 8 million jobs in the clean energy industry; they have also shown that emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants **can be decoupled** from economic growth. Another favorable sign is that growth rates of worldwide carbon emissions have reduced from 2.9% per year during the first decade of this century to 1.3% from 2011 to 2014 and near zero growth rates during the last few years. The carbon emission curve is bending, but we have a **long way to go and very little time** for achieving carbon neutrality. We need institutions and enterprises that can accelerate this bending by scaling-up the solutions that are being **proven in the living laboratories**. We have less than a decade to put these solutions in place around the world to preserve nature and our quality of life for generations to come. The time is now. The Paris Agreement is an historic achievement. For the first time, effectively all nations have committed to limiting their greenhouse gas emissions and taking other actions to limit global temperature change. Specifically, 197 nations agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,” and achieve carbon neutrality in the second half of this century. The climate has already warmed by 1°C. The problem is running ahead of us, and under current trends we will likely reach 1.5°C in the next fifteen years and **surpass the 2°**C guardrail **by mid-century** with a 50% probability of **reaching 4°C by end of century**. Warming in excess of 3°C is likely to be a global catastrophe for three major reasons: • Warming in the range of 3°C to 5°C is suggested as the threshold for several tipping points in the physical and geochemical systems; a warming of about 3°C has a probability of over 40% to cross over multiple tipping points, while a warming close to 5°C increases it to nearly 90%, compared with a baseline warming of less than 1.5°C, which has only just over a 10% probability of exceeding any tipping point. • Health effects of such warming are emerging as a major if not dominant source of concern. Warming of 4°C or more will expose more than 70% of the population, i.e. about 7 billion by the end of the century, to deadly heat stress and expose about 2.4 billion to vector borne diseases such as Dengue, Chikengunya, and Zika virus among others. Ecologists and paleontologists have proposed that warming in excess of 3°C, accompanied by increased acidity of the oceans by the buildup of CO2 , can become a major causal factor for exposing more than 50% of all species to extinction. 20% of species are in danger of extinction now due to population, habitat destruction, and climate change. The good news is that there may still be time to avert such catastrophic changes. The Paris Agreement and supporting climate policies must be strengthened substantially within the next five years to bend the emissions curve down faster, stabilize climate, and prevent catastrophic warming. To the extent those efforts fall short, societies and ecosystems will be forced to contend with substantial needs for adaptation—a burden that will fall disproportionately on the poorest three billion who are least responsible for causing the climate change problem. Here we propose a policy roadmap with a realistic and reasonable chance of limiting global temperature to safe levels and preventing unmanageable climate change—an outline of specific science-based policy pathways that serve as the building blocks for a three-lever strategy that could limit warming to well under 2°C. The projections and the emission pathways proposed in this summary are based on a combination of published recommendations and new model simulations conducted by the authors of this study (see Figure 2). We have framed the plan in terms of four building blocks and three levers, which are implemented through 10 solutions. The first building block would be fully implementing the nationally determined mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, several sister agreements that provide targeted and efficient mitigation must be strengthened. Sister agreements include the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs, efforts to address aviation emissions through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), maritime black carbon emissions through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the commitment by the eight countries of the Arctic Council to reduce black carbon emissions by up to 33%. There are many other complementary processes that have drawn attention to specific actions on climate change, such as the Group of 20 (G20), which has emphasized reform of fossil fuel subsidies, and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). HFC measures, for example, can avoid as much as 0.5°C of warming by 2100 through the mandatory global phasedown of HFC refrigerants within the next few decades, and substantially more through parallel efforts to improve energy efficiency of air conditioners and other cooling equipment potentially doubling this climate benefit. For the second building block, numerous subnational and city scale climate action plans have to be scaled up. One prominent example is California’s Under 2 Coalition signed by over 177 jurisdictions from 37 countries in six continents covering a third of world economy. The goal of this Memorandum of Understanding is to catalyze efforts in many jurisdictions that are comparable with California’s target of 40% reductions in CO2 emissions by 2030 and 80% reductions by 2050—emission cuts that, if achieved globally, would be consistent with stopping warming at about 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Another prominent example is the climate action plans by over 52 cities and 65 businesses around the world aiming to cut emissions by 30% by 2030 and 80% to 100% by 2050. There are concerns that the carbon neutral goal will hinder economic progress; however, real world examples from California and Sweden since 2005 offer evidence that economic growth can be decoupled from carbon emissions and the data for CO2 emissions and GDP reveal that growth in fact prospers with a green economy. The third building block consists of two levers that we need to pull as hard as we can: one for drastically reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) beginning now and completing by 2030, and the other for decarbonizing the global energy system by 2050 through efficiency and renewables. Pulling both levers simultaneously can keep global temperature rise below 2°C through the end of the century. If we bend the CO2 emissions curve through decarbonization of the energy system such that global emissions peak in 2020 and decrease steadily thereafter until reaching zero in 2050, there is less than a 20% probability of exceeding 2°C. This call for bending the CO2 curve by 2020 is one key way in which this report’s proposal differs from the Paris Agreement and it is perhaps the most difficult task of all those envisioned here. Many cities and jurisdictions are already on this pathway, thus demonstrating its scalability. Achieving carbon neutrality and reducing emissions of SLCPs would also drastically reduce air pollution globally, including all major cities, thus saving millions of lives and over 100 million tons of crops lost to air pollution each year. In addition, these steps would provide clean energy access to the world’s poorest three billion who are still forced to resort to 18th century technologies to meet basic needs such as cooking. For the fourth and the final building block, we are adding a third lever, ACE (Atmospheric Carbon Extraction, also known as Carbon Dioxide Removal, or “CDR”). This lever is added as an insurance against surprises (due to policy lapses, mitigation delays, or non-linear climate changes) and would require development of scalable measures for removing the CO2 already in the atmosphere. The amount of CO2 that must be removed will range from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons, if CO2 emissions continue to increase until 2030, and the carbon lever is not pulled until after 2030. This issue is raised because the NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) accompanying the Paris Agreement would allow CO2 emissions to increase until 2030. We call on economists and experts in political and administrative systems to assess the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of reducing carbon and SLCPs emissions beginning in 2020 compared with delaying it by ten years and then being forced to pull the third lever to extract one trillion tons of CO2 The fast mitigation plan of requiring emissions reductions to begin by 2020, which means that many countries need to cut now, is urgently needed to limit the warming to well under 2°C. Climate change is not a linear problem. Instead, we are facing non-linear climate tipping points that can lead to self-reinforcing and cascading climate change impacts. Tipping points and selfreinforcing feedbacks are wild cards that are more likely with increased temperatures, and many of the potential abrupt climate shifts could happen as warming goes from 1.5°C in 15 years to 2°C by 2050, with the potential to push us well beyond the Paris Agreement goals. Where Do We Go from Here? A massive effort will be needed to stop warming at 2°C, and **time is of the essence**. With unchecked business-as-usual emissions, global **warming has a 50% likelihood of exceeding 4ºC** and a 5% probability of exceeding 6ºC in this century, **raising existential questions for most**, but especially the poorest three billion **people**. A 4ºC warming is likely to expose as many as 75% of the global population to deadly heat. Dangerous to catastrophic impacts on the health of people including generations yet to be born, on the health of ecosystems, and on species extinction have emerged as major justifications for mitigating climate change well below 2ºC, although we must recognize that the uncertainties intrinsic in climate and social systems make it hard to pin down exactly the level of warming that will trigger possibly catastrophic impacts. To avoid these consequences, we must act now, and we must act fast and effectively. This report sets out a specific plan for reducing climate change in both the near- and long-term. With aggressive urgent actions, we can protect ourselves. Acting quickly to prevent catastrophic climate change by decarbonization will save millions of lives, trillions of dollars in economic costs, and massive suffering and dislocation to people around the world. This is a global security imperative, as it can avoid the migration and destabilization of entire societies and countries and reduce the likelihood of environmentally driven civil wars and other conflicts. Staying well under 2°C will require a concerted global effort. We must address everything from our energy systems to our personal choices to reduce emissions to the greatest extent possible. We must redouble our efforts to invent, test, and perfect systems of governance so that the large measure of international cooperation needed to achieve these goals can be realized in practice. The health of people for generations to come and the health of ecosystems crucially depend on an energy revolution beginning now that will take us away from fossil fuels and toward the clean renewable energy sources of the future. It will be nearly impossible to obtain other critical social goals, including for example the UN agenda 2030 with the Sustainable Development Goals, if we do not make immediate and profound progress stabilizing climate, as we are outlining here. 1. The Building Blocks Approach The 2015 Paris Agreement, which went into effect November 2016, is a remarkable, historic achievement. For the frst time, essentially all nations have committed to limit their greenhouse gas emissions and take other actions to limit global temperature and adapt to unavoidable climate change. Nations agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” and “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” (UNFCCC, 2015). Nevertheless, the initial Paris Agreement has to be **strengthened substantially** within fve years if we are to prevent catastrophic warming; **current pledges** place the world on **track for up to 3.4°C** by 2100 (UNEP, 2016b). Until now, no specifc policy roadmap exists that provides a realistic and reasonable chance of limiting global temperatures to safe levels and preventing unmanageable climate change. This report is our attempt to provide such a plan— an outline of specifc solutions that serve as the building blocks for a comprehensive strategy for limiting the warming to well under 2°C and avoiding dangerous climate change (Figure 1). The frst building block is the full implementation of the nationally determined mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and strengthening global sister agreements, such as the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs, which can provide additional targeted, fast action mitigation at scale. For the second building block, numerous sub-national and city scale climate action plans have to be scaled up such as California’s Under 2 Coalition signed by 177 jurisdictions from 37 countries on six continents. The third building block is targeted measures to reduce emissions of shortlived climate pollutants (SLCPs), beginning now and fully implemented by 2030, along with major measures to fully decarbonize the global economy, causing the overall emissions growth rate to stop in 2020-2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Such a deep decarbonization would require an energy revolution similar to the Industrial Revolution that was based on fossil fuels. The fnal building block includes scalable and reversible carbon dioxide (CO2 ) removal measures, which can begin removing CO2 already emitted into the atmosphere. Such a plan is urgently needed. Climate change is not a linear problem. Instead, climate tipping points can lead to **self-reinforcing**, **cascading** climate change **impacts** (Lenton et al., 2008). Tipping points are more likely with increased temperatures, and many of the potential abrupt climate shifts could happen as warming goes from 1.5°C to 2°C, with the potential to push us well beyond the Paris Agreement goals (Drijfhout et al., 2015). In order to avoid dangerous climate change, we must address these concerns. **We must act now**, and **we must act fast**. Reduction of SLCPs will result in fast, near-term reductions in warming, while present-day reductions of CO2 will result in long-term climate benefts. This two-lever approach—aggressively cutting both SLCPs and CO2 –-will slow warming in the coming decades when it is most crucial to avoid impacts from climate change as well as maintain a safe climate many decades from now. To achieve the nearterm goals, we have outlined solutions to be implemented immediately. These solutions to bend down the rising emissions curve and thus bend the warming trajectory curve follow a 2015 assessment by the University of California under its Carbon Neutrality Initiative (Ramanathan et al., 2016). The solutions are clustered into categories of social transformation, governance improvement, market- and regulation-based solutions, technological innovation and transformation, and natural and ecosystem management. Additionally, we need to intensely investigate and pursue a third lever—ACE (Atmospheric Carbon Extraction). While many potential technologies exist, we do not know the extent to which they could be scaled up to remove the requisite amount of carbon from the atmosphere in order to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, and any delay in mitigation will demand increasing reliance on these technologies. Yet, there is still hope. Humanity can come together, as we have done in the past, to collaborate towards a common goal. We have no choice but to tackle the challenge of climate change. We only have the choice of when and how: either now, through the ambitious plan outlined here, or later, through radical adaptation and societal transformations in response to an ever-deteriorating climate system that will unleash devastating impacts—some of which may be **beyond our capacity to fully adapt** to **or reverse** for thousands of years. 2. Major Climate Disruptions: How Soon and How Fast? “Without adequate mitigation and adaptation, climate change poses unacceptable risks to global public health.” (WHO, 2016) The planet has already witnessed nearly 1°C of warming, and another 0.6°C of additional warming is currently stored in the ocean to be released over the next two to four decades, if climate warming emissions are not radically reduced during that time (IPCC, 2013). The impacts of this warming on extreme weather, droughts, and foods are being felt by society worldwide to the extent that many think of this no longer as climate change but as climate disruption. Consider the business as usual scenario: 15 years from now: In 15 years, planetary warming will reach 1.5°C above pre-industrial global mean temperature (Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; Shindell et al., 2012). This exceeds the 0.5°C to 1°C of warming during the Eemian period, 115,000– 130,000 years ago, when sea-levels reached 6-9 meters (20-30 feet) higher than today (Hansen et al., 2016b). The impacts of this warming will affect us all yet will disproportionately affect the Earth’s poorest three billion people, who are primarily subsistence farmers that still rely on 18th century technologies and have the least capacity to adapt (IPCC, 2014a; Dasgupta et al., 2015). They thus may be forced to resort to mass migration into city slums and push across international borders (U.S. DOD, 2015). The existential fate of lowlying small islands and coastal communities will also need to be addressed, as they are primarily vulnerable to sea-level rise, diminishing freshwater resources, and more intense storms. In addition, many depend on fsheries for protein, and these are likely to be affected by ocean acidifcation and climate change. Climate injustice could start causing visible regional and international conficts. All of this will be exacerbated as the risk of passing tipping points increases (Lenton et al., 2008). 30 years from now: By mid-century, warming is expected to exceed 2°C, which would be unprecedented with respect to historical records of at least the last one million years (IPCC, 2014c). Such a warming through this century could result in sea-level rise of as much as 2 meters by 2100, with greater sea-level rise to follow. A group of tipping points are clustered between 1.5°C and 2°C (Figure 2) (Drijfhout et al., 2015). The melting of most mountain glaciers, including those in the Tibetan-Himalayas, combined with mega-droughts, heat waves, storms, and foods, would adversely affect nearly everyone on the planet. 80 years from now: In 80 years, warming is expected to exceed 4°C, increasing the likelihood of irreversible and catastrophic change (World Bank, 2013b). 4ºC warming is likely to expose as much as 75% of the global population to deadly heat (Mora et al., 2017). The 2°C and 4°C values quoted above and in other reports, however, are merely the central values with a 50% probability of occurrence (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). There is a 5% probability the warming could be as high as 6°C due to uncertainties in the magnitude of amplifying feedbacks (see Section 4). This in turn could lead to major disruptions to natural and social systems, threatening food security, water security, and national security and fundamentally affecting the great majority of the projected 11.2 billion inhabitants of the planet in 2100 (UN DESA, 2015). 3. What Are the Wild Cards for Climate Disruption? Increasing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increases radiative forcing (the difference between the amount of energy entering the atmosphere and leaving) and thus increases the global temperature (IPCC, 2013). However, climate wild cards exist that can alter the linear connection with warming and anthropogenic emissions by triggering abrupt changes in the climate (Lenton et al., 2008). Some of these wild cards have not been thoroughly captured by the models that policymakers rely on the most. These abrupt shifts are irreversible on a human time scale (<100 years) and will create a notable disruption to the climate system, condemning the world to warming beyond that which we have previously projected. These climate disruptions would divert resources from needed mitigation and upset mitigation strategies that we have already put in place. 1. Unmasking Aerosol Cooling: The frst such wild card is the unmasking of an estimated 0.7°C (with an uncertainty range of 0.3°C to 1.2°C) of the warming in addition to mitigating other aerosol effects such as disrupting rainfall patterns, by reducing emissions of aerosols such as sulfates and nitrates as part of air pollution regulations (Wigley, 1991; Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). Aerosol air pollution is a major health hazard with massive costs to public health and society, including contributing to about 7 million deaths (from household and ambient exposure) each year (WHO, 2014). While some aerosols, such as black carbon and brown carbon, strongly absorb sunlight and warm the climate, others refect sunlight back into space, which cools the climate (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). The net impact of all manmade aerosols is negative, meaning that about 30% of the warming from greenhouse gases is being masked by co-emitted air pollution particles (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). As we reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement policies to eliminate air pollution, we are also reducing the concentration of aerosols in the air. Aerosols last in the atmosphere for about a week, so if we eliminate air pollution without reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases, the unmasking alone would lead to an estimated 0.7°C of warming within a matter of decades (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). We must eliminate all aerosol emissions due to their health effects, but we must simultaneously mitigate emissions of CO2 , other greenhouse gases, and black carbon and co-pollutants to avoid an abrupt and very large jump in the near-term warming beyond 2°C (Brasseur and Roeckner, 2005). 2. Tipping Points: It is likely that **as we cross the 1.5°C** to 2°C thresholds we will **trigger so called “tipping points”** for **abrupt and nonlinear changes** in the climate system with **catastrophic consequences** for humanity and the environment (Lenton, 2008; Drijfhout et al., 2015). Once the tipping points are passed, the resulting impacts will range in timescales from: disruption of monsoon systems (transition in a year), loss of sea ice (approximately a decade for transition), dieback of major forests (nearly half a century for transition), reorganization of ocean circulation (approximately a century for transition), to loss of ice sheets and subsequent sea-level rise (transition over hundreds of years) (Lenton et al., 2008). Regardless of timescale, once underway many of these changes would be irreversible (Lontzek et al., 2015). There is also a likelihood of crossing over **multiple tipping points simultaneously**. Warming of close to 3°C would subject the system to a 46% probability of crossing multiple tipping points, while warming of close to 5°C would increase the risk to 87% (Cai et al., 2016). Recent modeling work shows a “cluster” of these tipping points could be triggered between 1.5°C and 2°C warming (Figure 2), including melting of land and sea ice and changes in highlatitude ocean circulation (deep convection) (Drijfhout et al., 2015). This is consistent with existing observations and understanding that the polar regions are particularly sensitive to global warming and have several potentially imminent tipping points. The Arctic is warming nearly twice as quickly as the global average, which makes the abrupt changes in the Arctic more likely at a lower level of global warming (IPCC, 2013). Similarly, the Himalayas are warming at roughly the same rate as the Arctic and are thus also more susceptible to incremental changes in temperature (UNEP-WMO, 2011). This gives further justifcation for limiting warming to no more than 1.5°C. While all climate tipping points have the potential to **rapidly destabilize climate, social, and economic systems**, some are also **self-amplifying** feedbacks that once set in motion increase warming in such a way that they perpetuate yet even more warming. Declining Arctic sea ice, thawing permafrost, and the poleward migration of cloud systems are all examples of self-amplifying feedback mechanisms, where initial warming **feeds upon itself** to cause still more warming acting as a **force multiplier** (Schuur et al., 2015).

## Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the relative benefits of the hypothetical implementation of the resolution or a competitive policy option.

#### Its really simple – if the aff materially reduces suffering vote aff

#### Prefer it:

#### First, debate should focus on material solutions to violence – reject ethical theories that ignore material consequences of actions on real people.

Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014. IB

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### Second, scenario planning – its good in the context of the resolution – future pandemics will happen and COVID proves we are ill-prepared – means even if they win futurism is bad generically we’ll win its good in the context of the resolution.

#### Third, it hijacks truth testing – truth can only be determined through empirical analysis of a resolutional question – absent discussion of what would happen in implementation we can’t know the moral truth of a statement which makes material implementation a prerequisite.

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### First, evaluating consequences is key to ethics – contingency trumps certainty.

Runciman 17,(David) Politics, Cambridge University, “Political Theory and Real Politics in the Age of the Internet,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2017, Pages 3–21

Contemporary political realism carries echoes of this line of argument and of Bentham's shift from the weaker to the stronger version of it, even though Bentham's direct influence is rarely in evidence. Critics of the current ubiquity of the language of human rights often point out that in the absence of a robust account of the power relations that are needed to underpin any rights regime—in particular, an answer to the question of who does the enforcing—all such talk is a massive distraction from the real business of improving the situation on the ground to which human rights are meant to apply.9 But for more radical critics the emptiness of human rights talk is too convenient to be merely a confusion: it serves as the perfect cover for the sinister interests of those engaged in neo-colonial projects of exploitation and expropriation.10 However, these two poles of the Benthamite case against moralism—from inadvertent confusion to deliberate deception—do not exhaust the range of explanations for what is wrong with it. There is another answer, drawn from an alternative intellectual tradition, which appears more frequently in the current realist literature. This is the Weberian idea that moralism does not so much obscure what politicians are really up to, as conceal the truth about their personal motives from political actors themselves. In other words, political moralism is less a form of deception than of self-deception: it lets politicians avoid looking political reality squarely in the face because it allows them to believe they have their eyes set on something higher**.** Conviction politicians think they can transcend the messy reality of politics. That belief is dangerous because their response when they encounter the messy reality is to deny it, or to ignore it, or to insist they can mould it to their higher purposes, whichonly makes the mess worse. Weber's case against allowing an ethic of conviction to trump an ethic of responsibility in politics—which requires, among other things, that politicians face up to the unintended consequences of what they do—remains compelling.11 But it does not map onto any sharp distinctions between realism and moralism. That is because the convictions that can breed self-deception are not necessarily moralistic beliefs; they can be beliefs about anything, including beliefs about how contingency trumps moral certainty. On the Weberian account it is not what you believe but how you believe it that makes the difference.

#### Second – only pain and pleasure are intrinsically good or bad – everything else collapses.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Third, experience is good – only way to understand ethics because people come to different conclusions but we all experience pain and pleasure as good and bad – it’s the only universalizable morality.

#### Fourth – reject ‘consequentialism fails’ arguments – they ignore empirical reality and devalue violence – i.e. if I put my hand over a hot stove I immediately pull it away not because of any moral truth about my hand being burnt but the simple fact that it hurts – global warming is killing people right now and ignoring it is violent – you should refuse to evaluate their arguments.

#### Fifth – no act-omission distinction – choosing to not act is an act in and of itself – the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### Sixth – no intent-foresight distinction – foreseeable consequences of an action are intrinsic to an action – i.e. if I give an apple to you knowing its rotten then I’m responsible for you getting sick because I knew the consequences would happen and therefore intended them to happen but I didn’t know the apple was rotten them I’m not. That means that voting neg despite foreseeing the consequences of the affirmative is intrinsically bad.

#### Seventh – introspection – the fact that humans have historically disagreed about almost everything proves that no normative truth can be reached besides universal introspective conclusions – i.e. just like I can tell that my computer is purple I can know that my happiness is good and that your happiness is good which proves util.

#### Eighth – only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness – i.e. if I lie to you about liking your hair that is clearly not as bad as lying to you about whether there’s a serial killer behind you. Only consequentialism explains why the first lie is less bad then the second one.

#### Ninth – util is lexically prior – in order for agents to be able to engage in complex moral deliberations they must first be safe and not in danger of death – that means materially reducing violence has to come first.

#### Tenth – actor specificity – side constraints make action impossible because government policies always require trade-offs—the way to resolve those conflicts is by benefiting everyone. Different agents have different ethical obligations – even if they win their theory of personal moral imperatives its fundamentally different then the state.

#### Impact calc –

#### First – extinction first –

#### **It’s a unique ontological phenomenon that outweighs under every ethical theory.**

Burke et al., Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, ‘16

(Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

#### Reversibility – once we all die that’s it – it eliminates the possibility for future value and forcing everyone on earth to die because the 1ac wasn’t ideologically perfect is horrible and denies agency.

#### Future live - the scale is incomprehensible – you should weigh all the billions of people that would die plus all the future people who are being denied the possibility to live.

#### Cognitive bias – extinction hasn’t happened yet which makes you less likely to view it as a distinct possibility – you should overcorrect.

#### Structural violence – even if not everyone dies war and pandemics create massive violence primarily directed at minorities – that is bad.

#### Second – epistemic modesty – evaluate probability of framework times probability of impact

#### A point its substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### B point philosophers care about different frameworks – i.e. they recognize intent but also recognize what happens as a result of that intent

#### C point is clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it's important to talk about contention-level offense