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#### We are living in the age of the World Computer – logistical capitalism has perfected the assembly line, extracting ultimate value from both the laborer and the planet – medical and scientific advancements have been written in the code of the World Computer, all made possible via the overarching systems of communication and signification that underwrite computational, logistical capitalism.

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Jonathan Beller, “The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism”, Duke University Press, 2021 // sam :)

From this we understand that innovation, driven by the falling rate of profit due to the increasing proportion of fixed capital to the value of labor in production that pushes capital to pay less and less for labor, is effectively a devaluation of the worker, since the worker is paid for less and less of the working day. We also mark clearly that this relationship between the proportion of fixed capital and the amount of labor that results in a falling rate of profit that can only be combatted by driving down the price of labor converts innovation under racial capitalism into an arbitrage on human time. The simple math driving down the proportion of the worker’s necessary labor (necessary labor is the amount of working time necessary for a worker to reproduce themself given a certain level of social and technological development, which is what they are actually paid for and no more) with respect to their surplus labor (surplus labor is the amount of time the worker works for free and thus yields their productive power to capital) reminds us, as we regard the vast build-out that was once thought of as the human species, that Benjamin’s dialectical flash is still true: “Every document of civilization is simultaneously a document of barbarism.” We should recall this formulation when regarding the great scientific, cultural and technical achievements of our time—from the megacities to the cloudconnected microelectronics, to the great advances in capacity and efficiency such as the one that can be viscerally perceived as an F-35 fighter plane comes from nowhere and shatters the sky. Today, the vast communications infrastructure that links all together—an infrastructure which is at once computational in function and composed of fixed capital—requires massive amounts of input in exchange for minimal and often no direct remuneration to turn its profits at a competitive rate. Both point-and-shoot cameras and point-and-kill F-35s must provide ROI. Algorithms operating on phones, missiles, stock markets, and everywhere else manage the uptake as well as most of the payoffs such as they are, while states and other hegemonic formations—themselves managed by a business calculus—police the externalities and the malcontent. Migrants and those seeking reparations are incarcerated, left to die, executed; Jair Bolsonaro, practicing his own brand of investment genocide, burns the Amazon and its peoples in order to graze cattle. Financial balance sheets require daily settlements and therefore returns for the short-term benefit of owners and externalized costs to the denizens of the image and the inhabitants of the unrepresented and the unthought. Through these algorithms of extraction—machinic and embodied, increasingly formalized, sedimented, formatted, and absorbed into computational digital infrastructure—and the representational system they drive, we directly confront the instrumentalization of thought, perception, action, and event. This instrumentalization makes every act or expression into a wager of some consequence—a contingent claim on a share of the social product. It is characterized by a desperate war of each against all for access to income streams, to social currencies, to convertibility, to liquidity. Such is the derivative condition, where organization and expression are inexorably forms of a calculus that composes “positions” on value in conditions of global volatility. These positions are speculative and their claims are contingent on outcomes. Such a relentless globally integrated compute requires its data visualizations. Many formerly extra-economic activities— activities of “superintendence” otherwise to be understood as watching machines and making adjustments in accord with the protocols the machines put forth such that their operations may be valorized—are now value-productive for capital. Our superintendence has grown more complex since we were forced to supervise machines, arguably having come to encompass what today is called “visual culture.” Since the inauguration of what I called the cinematic mode of production and the bringing of the industrial revolution to the eye, we have been watching and are still watching, if not exactly watching over, machine-mediated production. Today we still are being extracted from; and we are being watched, by the very machines we watch and some we can neither watch nor see. In the interface we read and are written by social codes that allot rights and access that include forms of ownership and citizenship, and that also license violence, secure impunity, and enforce genocide by means of networks. In ten thousand or a million ways, we survey and are surveilled. All these control mechanisms—and their throughput—have a stake in violence, a violence that some may benefit from while others are forced to endure or die. They undertake an encoding of all appearance and engage in a writing on the world, turning being into a surface of inscription. They orchestrate what Kathryn Yusoff (2018: 2) calls, when referring to White geology in A Billion Black Anthropocenes, “colonial earth writing”—inscriptions on the materiality of the planet that include both the geo- and the bio-. Life and earth become surfaces of inscription, recording, and memory storage archiving capital’s wagers and facilitating its grand compute

#### Government pandemic and disease response cannot be disimbricated from the conditions of logistics – the valuation of bodies along financial lines shapes the distribution of medicine by manipulating the decision-making processes of agents of policy.

#### And, the context of intellectual property protections for medicines further proves the investment of medical systems in logistics – the enclosure of genetic codes for medicines, the financialization of information, and the colonial imposition of vaccine apartheid all write the bloody script of logistics across the bodies of those deemed incalculable.

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Denise Ferreira da Silva, Stefano Harney, and Fred Moten “All Incomplete: Foreword” pp 9-11, Minor Compositions, 2021 // sam :)

The undercommons is not, except incidentally, about the university; and the undercommons is crucially about a sociality not based on the individual. Nor, again, would we describe it as derivative of the individual – the undercommons is not about the dividual, or the pre-individual, or the supra-individual. The undercommons is an attachment, a sharedness, a diffunity, a partedness. Reading All Incomplete, over the past few months, as I followed the rising rate of infections and the growing numbers of persons being killed by COVID-19, the disease caused by Sars-CoV-2 (the new corona virus), I could not but wonder about how improvement is at work, in Brazil and in the USA, for instance. Improvement, we know, governs the decisions (by policy makers and algorithms) to let die that are made in view of numbers that show who (the economically dispossessed, “essential workers,” with “underlying conditions,” who happen to be, in the US, a large percentage of the country’s black, Indigenous, Latinx populations). It is the operating element behind what seems to be an accumulation of decisions that led to an increase in the number of infections and deaths. I cannot but wonder about how is that line of reasoning expressed, which words are used which words are avoided. Under other names, invention, progress, civilization, development, improvement is also at work in the previous decisions leading to their economic dispossession, to their underlying conditions, to their finding employment in the economic sectors most exposed during a global pandemic. Under this global pandemic, it becomes once more evident how improvement guides management of scarcity, in the economy and the polity. Given that which is corrupt or improper is expected to fail to thrive, the logical decision is to protect or preserve what can survive and thrive. Whatever this is, it is capable of improvement – on its own or through policy. What else accounts for the up-to-now unthinkable decision made by health care professionals which was to leave the elderly and underlying-conditions COVID-19 patients off the ventilators, in order to have these available to the ‘younger’ and ‘healthier,’ that is, the one who would improve with this treatment. Wasn’t it the same logic that, in the global economic crisis of 2007-2008, governments used to justify rescuing major corporations and banks, because they were ‘too big to fail’? Tough, in this latter case, they had already failed but they were (their share of the world economy is) too big to be let die. What does this mean to the rest of us? The ones too small to thrive? Too frail to live? Who do not count, who in the decision and in the algorithm (in the structure-procedure, algorithm that supports it, that gives it both an end and evidence) figure as null, nothing, nothing, no-bodies? What about them? How can they possibly exist and persist, knowing that their number is never called because it makes no sense, because it does not fit in the calculation, because it is out of sorts, and up-side-down? Them, who? since ain’t ‘nobody looking for us.’ So, we look for us with Husni-Bey, and wonder how we turned from, and will turn back to, the infinite rehearsal that turns study mad, or black, in standing with those who have no standing until we’ve fallen in with them. With us. The complicit. The damned. Ten, who determines? Existence as un-prehensible, undercommons sociality, All Incomplete offers us, is not about becoming or coming along. Without plot or plan, as/in flesh or the body approached as/in incessant de/re/composition, which is nothing more than earthly existence. That is not the force of law, of the line that connects, divides, and directs. Just generativity, which can be read as the quality and capacity to give – not in the context of an economy (as in the managing of scarcity) but as generosity (as in the abundance of the rain forest). That generosity I find in their militant practice of writing-with each other (as well as with all the) others they think-with. That is generosity to me, which is also the way of black sociality, in its impurity and complicity – thank you Fred and Stefano!

#### We are in desperate need of healing – colonial medicine, articulated across lines of logistics, severs our connections between each other by imposing healing as a pharmaceutical process – one more pill, one more shot, and we’ll all be okay. The trauma of colonialism and logistics can never be resolved by medicine, no matter how free the information is – what is needed is a method of collectivity and care that forms the basis of solidarity across movements and critical spaces.

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Kirsten E. Mundt, "(RE)INSURGENT ECOLOGIES: DWELLING TOGETHER BETWEEN QUEASY WORLDS”, pp ix-xv, 2019. <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/amst_etds/82/> // sam :)

Bounded individualism couched within liberal humanist hegemonies is a free radical, a cancer cell, destroying our collective bodies and shared ecosystems. This project toggles between human desires to heal and connect, and to name painful, particular ways that colonial oppression imprints upon bodies and lived histories. How can there be collectivity and solidarity when violence is ongoing and relentless, when displacement, global warming, and voracious and unequal economic growth, are intensifying precarity for most? Within this question, there is a both an animation of the particular and the universal: the desire to love and belong, to go on living and fighting for each other, despite colonial conditions that relentlessly consume and exploit. Within this question lies a productive tension around what it means to be a “self.” What does it mean to be fully embodied within one’s particular, racialized, gendered, and biopoliticized location, critically naming structures of injustice perpetuating violence, while understanding that we occupy permeable, dynamic worlds that can never be fully known, or fixed in place? Identity becomes fluid, always contextual, always in relation. A self that looks out and sees, having a singular experience, is not separate from the dynamic ecosystem in which it is embedded. Liberal capitalism relies upon individuation, individual rights, economic growth and security, conditioned by desires animated by collective agreements around liberal humanist constructions of “self,” or what it means to be singular within larger, shared, and dynamic eco-systems. Logic of “self” perpetuates what Aníbel Quijano would call coloniality, or the underlying logic binding together liberal humanist ways of thinking, being, and knowing. Walter Mignolo and Catherine Walsh build upon Quijano’s work to theorize decoloniality-as-praxis, or praxis that animates ways that coloniality imprints upon our bodies, social systems, institutions, and scholarly practices, as well as bringing forward its emergent opposite. Decoloniality becomes not about political independence as nation-states (reflecting original goals of decolonization), nor simply how the West colludes with capitalism, but how “modernity/coloniality implants in all of us, as worked and continues to work to negate, disavow, distort and deny knowledges, subjectivities, world senses, and life visions.”5 My task here is to confront coloniality that makes collectivity impossible, without reproducing the same logic. The extent to which there is a distinction between individual suffering and social suffering has much to do with how definitions of self are deployed and managed, advocating either for the rights of the individual, or acknowledging kinship far outside the boundaries of one’s own skin. There’s a reason why liberal humanist logic appeals to the individual, but we can’t pretend that the individual doesn’t matter. The topic of “healing,” then, is an interesting place to explore because it is a problem of the self that toggles between the personal and the political. It is mired within a minefield of conditions and discourses meant to manage what that means and how it is done. How do individuals and communities conceptualize the notion and practice of healing, and what does it mean when healing does not mean restoring ones-self to norms of neoliberal citizenship?6 At the same time, the pendulum has swung quite far from liberal multicultural politics of inclusion, and I’m not interested in swinging it back. Similar to Anna Tsing’s argument in Mushroom at the End of the World, I don’t believe in smooth flows of agreement. Every living organism has its own history of violence and dynamic position within their own fight to maintain life, so from what vantage point can there be a collective representation against power?7 Instead, dynamic relational spaces are the subject of this dissertation. In the lived space of the “in between,” there is no solid ground. In the ethnographic tradition of Joao Biehl, Kathleen Stewart, Paul Stoller, and Michael Taussig, I am interested in building upon a form of scholarship that “identifies crossroads and opens up possibilities”8 for what might emerge out of fraught and dynamic spaces. This is a shift away from deconstructive scholarship concerned with historic-socio-economic analyses of colonization9 . Instead, lived experiences and conversations emerge to illustrate painful tensions and realities at the heart of our colonial nightmare. Specifically, my research explores healing discourses as they circulate through literature, visual culture, and lived experience. For example, Didier Fassin argues that the floating signifier of “trauma” pervades western therapeutic practices, allowing liberal humanist constructions of “self” to circulate around the globe. While his goal is not to negate the healing work of humanitarian service providers, he argues that psychological language that disembodies affect can neutralize collective mourning and political action.10 Similarly, words such as “vulnerability,” “resilience,” “redemption,” and “mindfulness” circulate within environments related to healing, and are not neutral or innocent. These discourses often reinforce what Lauren Berlant calls the “cruel optimism” of neoliberal selfhood that seeks fulfillment in prosperity, ownership, and optimal functioning of self. Good citizenship means taking on responsibility for one’s self in order to not burden others: depression, anxiety, illness, motherhood, and old age are one’s personal responsibility. This cultural obsession with self responsibility charts a retreat from collective caregiving to the individual, and circulate within discourses, affects, and terms that carry loaded and multiple meanings. At the same time, the meaning of these terms, as well as what it means to “heal” are far from fixed. The ways these terms are re-conjugated often exceed the ways they are deployed by neoliberal discourses. I didn’t know what I was looking for when I began my research, other than a queasy affect that was animated by crossing between multiple and conflicting worlds on a daily basis. On any given day, I cross between roles as a somatic massage therapist, mother, American Studies Scholar, instructor at a tribal college, meditation instructor, writing teacher, student of traditional women’s medicine. The terms of “self” vary widely within these locations, and who I “am” within these locations—fluctuate based on the terms of various discourses. Inviting lived affects and bodies into the conversation—from shifting and multiple locations—means inviting grief, confusion, brokenness and liminality, that does not stop at “self,” because the terms of bounded selfhood no longer make sense. The ontological argument I’m building draws upon Donna Haraway’s notion of sympoiesis, performative actions of tentacular multiplicity, feeling their way against regulatory norms of being and recognition inherent to neoliberal citizenship. Sympoieis is related to Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s notion of hapticality, in which the pleasures of feeling with and for trump settler belonging. It has the possibility of speaking against liberal logic and multicultural self-reflexivity, when the individual self is displaced in favor of alterity. It is a process that acknowledges grief and dispossession as a process that writes against all subject formations. The goal is not to prove which subjects are the most injured, but rather to move and speak against conditions that render lives unlivable. Developing a generative, ethical framework for acting and “being” beside ourselves—means inhabiting both ontological disturbance and felt possibilities for acting in solidarity. What is that common commitment, if not based in race, class, ethnic, gender, or species identity? Thinking, writing, reading, and touching sympoietically, instead of auto-poietically, provide movement toward thick co-presence that challenges neoliberal, settler citizenship. There are dangers here. Scholars in Critical Indigenous Studies argue that there is no room in de-colonial scholarship for reinforcing settler logics. Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd argues that any impulse to “world” is always the work of the colonizer, even if that work is to make the world a kinder, gentler place.11 Similarly, Philip Deloria argues that forces of creation and destruction always exist in tension between Natives and settlers. To be American is to always be unfinished, to have the freedom to become “new,” to transform; and “although that state is powerful and creative, it carries with it nightmares all its own.”12 Given that there is always the danger of perpetuating settler logic, what does it mean to squarely face subjectivities related to settler belonging and the role of this subjectivity in perpetuating colonial violence? My goal is to get underneath settler subjectivity, not only to name structures of oppression, but to imagine possibilities for how bodies might mobilize situated difference in pursuit of equal justice. Candace Fujikane might call this “settler allyship,” or settler subjectivity that exists beside itself, not divorced from the grief of ongoing colonial violence.13 By inhabiting incommensurable tensions around narratives, images, and practices that circulate around what it might mean to “heal” and to de-colonize, possibilities emerge for confronting hierarchies of being conditioned by the colonial wound. While my dissertation is not about race or identity, it must necessarily dance with these issues within a post-multiculturalist moment in America. Lived embodiments are never neutral. Theoretical and incommensurable impasses related to de-colonization provide friction from which to uncover, inhabit, and explore the colonial wound which continues to wound. At the center of this hurt are frameworks and vocabularies that center the bounded individual, reinforcing existing power structures bound within colonial capitalism. Policy, scholarship, and healing practices concerned with protecting ownership, borders, and autopoietic14 selves are not equipped for contesting what Isabelle Stengers calls “barbarism,” or rapacious exploitation of land and bodies. By engaging Critical Indigenous, Chicana, and feminist science/capitalocene feminisms in an epistemic gathering,15 my intention is to animate a framework that, in detaching from the cruel optimism of self, makes space for border ecologies of overlapping relationalities and concerns. Critical Indigenous theory grates against affect and Chicana studies, critical race scholars rub up against anthropocene and object oriented ontologists, but there is something alive in the grating. Lauren Berlant might call this “lateral politics,” or the “embodied process of making solidarity through commitment to the senses.”16 What’s at stake are embodiments and solidarities that have creative political force and power for confronting empire and its endless hunger for accumulating power and resources (both human and non-human). What else can we not only imagine besides binary projects of construction and deconstruction, self and other? What kinds of projects can emerge out of this break for the offspring of colonial, imperial histories? I’m just alerting you in advance that I am not trying to trick you, but am writing my way through a framework that neither tears down Jenga towers nor builds with the same worn out blocks. Instead, my intention is to animate life prior to and within, in a move to displace bounded individualism and collective agreements around what it means to “heal:” to exist, belong, touch, and create. At stake here are possibilities for power and solidarity that reach beyond individual desires for possession, territory, safety, and rights.

#### We have all become the intellectual property of the World Computer – the financialization of thought means that each aspect of human activity is repackaged and sold, making our practice of genuine healing and medicine impossible – the affirmative is a reduction of those restrictions.

#### We affirm a reduction of intellectual property protections for medicines via the process of hapticality, which Harney and Moten define as “the capacity to feel through others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you.” This radical openness to touch unsettles static subjectivities created by colonialism by recognizing our being as always being defined by our relationships to each other and to the state. Our affective relationality shapes who we are as subjects and the iterative processes we engage in shape our relationality in turn – the 1ac functions as an invitation to join us in study and revolutionary planning and reconstruct ourselves in relation to each other.

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Kirsten E. Mundt, "(RE)INSURGENT ECOLOGIES: DWELLING TOGETHER BETWEEN QUEASY WORLDS”, pp 204-211, 2019. <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/amst_etds/82/> // sam :)

I included a large passage here from The Undercommons as an entry point for considering differences between “haptics" as a tool of neoliberalism and “hapticality” as a site that defies neoliberal management. If haptics is a neuroscientific discipline operating within agreements of what it means to be bound by skin, to be settled, to optimize human adaptation, hapticality is the feel of the political undercommons, where feeling with and for each other is the place of passage away from “self,” time, and space. Here, resilience, adaptation, and resettlement are not the point. Instead, hapticality refuses the terms of collective agreements that define who is a person, what it means to be a person, how to be a person: It’s a feeling, if you ride with it, that produces a certain distance from the settled, from those who determine themselves in space and time, who locate themselves in a determined history. Instead, dispossessed, affective selves—denied humanity—live within, between and among bodies, refusing terms a the liberal humanist “self” that is whole, settled, unified. This sympoietic state lives too far outside of bounded individualism and ways that western therapeutic technologies could possibly heal “selves” because these terms confound the goals of settler colonialism and neoliberal narratives. Not only does hapticality challenge colonial notions getting settled, of “making it” on settler terms, but life in the hold undermines all forms of bio and geo-political management: this feel of the shipped is not regulated, at least not successfully, by a state, a religion, a people, an empire, a piece of land, a totem.” By dislocating one’s body from all terms of coloniality—history as past, bodies bound by skin in present time, and private property ownership, hapticality becomes a lived feel that is simultaneously densely personal and vastly trans-personal, completely dislocated from bounded notions of place, home, and self: Though forced to touch and be touched, to sense and be sensed in that space of no space, though refused sentiment, history and home, we feel (for) each other.262 Touch, though it is a “sentiment with its own interiority,” is not born of “self,” or “soul,”263 but connected to shared histories and ancestral experiences that are heard and felt. For example, Soul music is an expression of lament for broken hapticality, created and enforced through slavery and forced separation from family, community, and land. Far from historical, these violences continue to live in the flesh as remembered ancestral violences living in our DNA. Facing the embodied legacy of violence is not merely accomplices through historicizing or naming, nor does it involve forgetting the violences of history in order to move on and adapt. Instead, (re)membering becomes a site that is so unbearable and painful that it must be shared, must be transmuted through trans-embodiments not bound by one’s skin: This is the feel that no individual can stand, and no state abide.264 The felt experience of sharing and enfleshing history becomes the field through which to forge connection and solidarity outside of colonial constructs of time, space, and “self.” It is not just the pain of this lifetime, but the felt acknowledgment of broken ancestral ties, geographies, and oppressions. The felt, living sense of history, then, becomes a crucial site for imagining self-hood beyond the confines of a body occupying a particular point in time. Instead of managing pain as personal trauma, as something to be “healed” in a lifetime, the felt sense of time stretches backward and forward, including ancestors and generations to come. From what vantage point, or what point in time, could we say that “healing” has been accomplished? And to what end? Bracha Ettinger’s The Matrixial Borderspace provides another entry point for considering hapticality, or ways that embodied, pre-verbal and non-verbal experiences of childhood, ancestral pain, and historical atrocities, continue to experience lives of their own in our flesh. She writes about the wounding of those who have come before us, who have left traces of wounded-ness on our own bodies and psyches. She argues that “the past is not past but is not present, but from scattered and animated remains of a continuing, though not continuous, trauma.”265 We access these traces not necessarily through language, but through lived intensities, embodiments, touch, and art. This embodiment often lives outside the realm of representation, and evades colonial capture that would demand wholeness, or a complete and cohesive healed “self.” By shifting attention from one’s individual knot of suffering to the shared, “matrixial web of borderlands,”266 subjectivity is enlarged and expanded beyond self. In her own embodied praxis, Ettinger uses the act of painting to access and transmute shared pain and suffering. Instead of pointing viewers toward an aesthetic experience of suffering, she considers the transmutation of trauma that happens in the border zone of endless touch and movement. “There is a transmutation of trauma that is not the same as its full and knowing articulation.”267 In other words, pain is not simply “worked through” to a logical end, but animated within co-poietic ecologies. Ettinger’s theories and painting practices provide a space to contemplate the fact that we are never fully individuated individuals.268 We can’t be, since we are connected on a psychic level that exists prior to individuation, unspeakable to the ‘I.’ “Only as broken up can the image appear.”269 Speaking of “I” or “we” is not possible here. Instead, subjectivity emerges as temporary, lived encounters within shared border spaces between partially-formed subjects, both connected and different. Instead of identity as a complete “I,” identification emerges within a space in which traumas and desires of others become our own. This view of encounter emerges as anti-oedipal; the relationships and selves that emerge are co-poietic, co-emergent and dependent instead of separate and “whole.” The matrixial borderspace is a space of matrixial difference that allows for conductive affect, able to give voice to body-psyche interacting and co-emergence with the world. Similarly, Erin Manning’s The Politics of Touch considers how touch as affect interrupts settler constructs of self-in-time and space, interrupts concrete boundaries between self and other, and the myth of secure borders. While constructivist scholarship assumes that the body is already signified, always bio-politicized, what happens when we think about touch as a political process of lived intensities between bodies as lived intensities? Manning argues that the problem of the body in western scholarship and policy is that we treat it like a distinct agent. Naturalization of the body by marking it as gendered and racialized, renders bodies recognizable and territorializable. Nation states rely on these markings to govern the larger body politic through multicultural politics of difference. A politic of touch, then, considers how bodies have agency within colonizing frames through refusing notions of the body as singular and concrete. Instead of a politic of the “narratively condemned,” bodies hold agency to shape democracy. Since bodies are simultaneously constructed, ephemeral, and changeable, the space between bodies is less an object of analysis than a gesture, a becoming-in-relation: The body is never its-self. We have several bodies, non of them “selves” in terms of subjectivity. Touch as reaching toward already alerts us to the downfall of discourses of subjectivity: if my body is created through my movement toward you, there is no “self” to refer back to, only a proliferation of vectors that emerge through contact.270 Within this co-poeitic space of becoming-in-relation, our senses reach beyond the security of what it means to be “whole,” to be human. Manning argues along with Brian Massumi and Baruch Spinoza that while we can’t know the full potential of bodies because bodies exceed our knowledge of them.271 Real sovereignty, or power, exists within this excess, or the “infinite abstract” in which a body seeks to touch what it does not yet understand but seeks to know, but cannot ever know. Instead, bodies are vectors of contact, senseurs, that are moved through affects that play on the surface of our senses. What are bodies, here, in relationship to the State? Bodies can only partially be made members (citizens) because they cannot be secured in place. In the interoceptive act of touch and being touched, of reaching for each other, we become a continuum of selves instead of a “self,” fundamentally altering settler space and time. Manning writes, “bodies are never completely enslaved to the state because bodies are never completely reducible to either Nature or the State. Bodies emerge on a continuum that evolves in relationship to pacts formed around institutions of power and compliance.”272 Within this continuum, hapticality as method and methodology provides a strong challenge to western knowledge production and the de-politicization of touch and healing. What possibilities emerge for language and scholarship of feeling with, both recognizing and evading colonial technologies? The degree to which neoliberal complicity is reinforced or undermined has much to do with conflicts that emerge when language attempts to define and manage the terms of suffering. Even the term “hapticality” is limited when attempting to access the feel of suffering since language has the power to separate experience, the actual feeling of pain, from the body. Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain argues that pain shatters language and the ability to speak. She argues that when pain does begin to speak, it tells a story, and yet, due to its inability to be grasped, it causes a split between one’s reality and the reality of others, making torture and structural violences effective tools of bio-political citizenship. Violence, when it is inflicted by war, torture, or structurally through institutions, affects how individuals either speak or remain in silence. Sandra Soto suggests that the process of naming, of defining, or using metaphors to “footnote the confounding manifold ways that our bodies, our work, our desires are relentlessly interpolated by inequivalent social processes,”273 is equally a trap. Instead, she suggests listening to what is not said in order to ward off “ontological impoverishment” and “epistemological disciplining”274 that comes from Western academic knowledge production. For many Indigenous and scholars of color, this is less a project of enfleshing selves in relationship to personal pain, but yoking haptical, ontological immediacy across bodies, space, time, and linguistic agreements in order to densify how histories and bodies coconstruct each other. The subject becomes not the personal self in pain, but how pain continues to be inflicted by tools of “civilization” such as scholarship and narratives of history that occlude colonial violence. For example, Ned Blackhawk’s Violence Over the Land (2006) performs a corrective to colonial versions of Native American history by rewriting history using violence as both subject and method. In other words, Blackhawk’s retelling of history through Western Shoshone eyes both reckons with the racialized violence upon which America was built, and uses language to perform violence to American historical narratives as places of comfort and innocence. Similarly, Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, argues that being and writing in the wake, from within the “continuous and changing present of slavery’s as yet unresolved unfolding,”275 means inhabiting history in ways that do not see the past as the past, but continuously unfolding within and around us. For these scholars, the felt sense of history, of the ancestral continuing into the present, and felt sense of responsibility for future generations, is a necessary corrective to bounded selfhood. Hapticality becomes the method, the means, and the goal of scholarship. In other words, yoking the past to the present to the future performs an ethic of care and repair within continued violences of history. If some of the more pernicious sites of epistemological disciplining rely on colonial hegemonies of language that reinforce agreements related to self, space, and time, Black and Indigenous Scholars have been at the forefront of challenging these colonial constructs. Necessarily, the question then becomes, what does hapticality look like for descendants and perpetrators of privileged colonial legacies: scientists, scholars, writers, White, mixed-race, and other orphans—for writing in the wake, embodying and employing hapticality as a challenge to neoliberal, settler subjectivities? Is it possible to imagine dispossessing ourselves of privileged positions and subjectivities associated with coloniality and whiteness to embody solidarity with de-colonial embodiments, ancestral histories, and ecological possibilities? In other words, if we consider hapticality as method, what possibilities exist for dialoguing across disciplinary/racial/ethnic/gender lines in order to imagine non-hierarchical, ecologically just futures?

#### Computational, logistical capitalism has expropriated each aspect of human activity such that even revolutionary thought becomes subsumed as simply another subroutine of the World Computer – communication cannot be separated from logistics. However, this system isn’t invincible – starting at the point of logistics allows the possibility for a system glitch. If even our sociality is subsumed by its communicative form, we must revolutionize sociality, because this goes both ways – while media technology is a primary site of financialization, so too is it the primary site of resistance.

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Jonathan Beller, “The Fourth Determination” e-flux #87, 2017 // sam :)

Analogous to the land- and water-based commons that was planet earth, the cognitive-linguistic, the visual-poetic, and the imagination have undergone massive colonial expropriations, following immediately upon their separation and “liberation” from traditional ties to the body, and have entered directly into capitalist servitude. Bernard Stiegler refers to this phenomenon of cognitive collapse and short-termist thinking, organized by what he refers to as mnemotechnologies (technologies of memory that include print, cinema, and computation), as the “proletarianization of the senses.” This follows upon and overlaps with the proletarianization of the masses by the long industrial revolution and the capture and unspeakable violation of designated bodies by the slave trade. These aggressive and oftentimes annihilating encroachments on corporality, the senses, and the linguistic commons, achieved by cybernetic means, are mediological and technical phenomena as much as they are sociopolitical ones. Put another way, the mediological and the technical have been sociopolitical all along—to such an extent that with the level of technical saturation present today, “the political” has been lost. The “loss of the political” is an acknowledgement of the subsumption of policies and programs by capitalized financial calculus that chains representation to the process of accumulation. What indeed can “political” mean in a world increasingly characterized by algorithmic governance and platform sovereignty, that is, where capitalist power is increasingly automated, and discursive and affective labor is posited as a mere subroutine of capitalized computational processes—as engines of value creation? What of the political when “politics” has become a subroutine of computational capital and its discourses and actions are a modality of value extraction? It is an old lesson but it still applies (and we can see it from Israel to Burma): if subalterns use the same media and therefore modes of value extraction as oppressors in their struggles, then politics is simply a war over who will get the spoils of exploitation. The expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic by capital reduces discursive production—including the discourse of politics—to the subroutine of an abstract machine. This “machine,” though abstract, is nonetheless functional and material—we recognize it as the increasingly ubiquitous, increasingly networked computer or discrete state machine, but we must not see it as mere technology. The universal Turing machine, which when unified posits what I call the World Computer (“the invisible hand” codified as AI), has become the preeminent form of fixed capital. Machinic enslavement, whether to the assembly line, to the “media,” or to the computer, is indeed enslavement by other means, though we must insist that many of the “older” methods of extraordinary servitude stubbornly persist and the pain, like the profit, remains unevenly distributed. Following a backlash, in August 2017 the popular “FaceApp” removed a series of racially themed filters it had issued. The app had allowed digital blackface, yellowface, brownface, and a Caucasian setting to be added to selfies. Inequality, now sedimented into institutions and machines as materialized abstractions and designed into apparatuses, operationalizes historically variegated injustice, to produce and reproduce a planetary culture that at bottom is founded upon racism, gender inequality, national and cultural codifications, modern slavery, and a near total dispossession for billions. Machines, too, must be understood as racial formations. Given the data-logical nature of financialized systems underpinning “cultural” expression and iterated in and as machines, it is no surprise that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm “Deep Face” imaged the minimally recognizable human face as that of a white man. Converting social life and social history into digital information and digital machines facilitates the as yet un-transcendable program of quantification that runs parallel to social-historical processes of social differentiation for the purpose of accumulation. The social emerges not as an abstract idea, but as a concrete substrate of computation. Sociality is posited then programmed as a series of leveraged accumulation strategies operating above or below or explicitly in and through everyday consciousness. Public faces are forms of data visualization and, circulating as images, are both programs and programmable. Bodies become “necessary media” of machinic digital operations that require from us (us bodies) attention, cognition, neuro-power, virtuosity, and sheer survival. As the auto-enthnography that is critical theory in the West might indicate, the remainders—interiorities and isles of awareness that fall away from informatic throughput—are in large part melancholic, cynical, disaffected, and abject laments. The rise of actually existing digitality thus appears as inseparable from the development and intensification of capitalism, that is, of media technologies as media of capital, which is also to say as media for the leveraging of agency and representation, such that decisions are made hierarchically and systemically while many aspects of life become almost unrepresentable and thus also unknown and unknowable. The ordinary taxonomies of social history continue to index zones and inflection points of this total and in certain definitive respects totalitarian process of digital enclosure. Our situation is effectively one of platform totalitarianism in which (the social) metabolism itself is captured by a leveraged exchange with capital and our media and machines are not only social relations but racial formations. This leveraged exchange of metabolism for forms of currency at rates set by platform capitalism is managed by ambient and ubiquitous computation, an electro-mechanical network that is composed primarily of fixed capital. The skeins of accumulation by means of informatic uptake lay closely upon body, mind, and time, and what value is extracted are the products of these. Thought and feeling are rendered quantifiable, computable, and indeed programmable. However, it is always a mistake to imagine that the impact of technology flows only in one direction: technical form emerges in a dialectics of domination and struggle. The global, technical evolution in the scale and granularity of the metabolic capture of what was once called labor power and social cooperation—a capture that fragments and cellularizes populations as well as bodies, minds, and neural networks—is not without its emancipatory potentials, as a Benjamin or a Brecht might remind us were they alive today. “The bad new things” are built out of and in response to new forms of struggle, and as Antonio Negri has always emphasized, the innovations of capitalist techné come from below, from the ways that the oppressed outflank domination and persist in living. A survey machine for customer feedback on the "immigration experience"—as long as the feedback is expressed in the form of smiley or frowny emojis. Towards a Reclamation of Value How then to investigate the capture and neutralization of the political domain and its uncountable longings by media-interfaced Computational Capitalism? How to transform and reprogram the failing powers of analysis, sensibility, and action such that they may function beyond the horizon of capitalist control? Four main hypothesis can guide us: 1) Computational Capitalism is an ambient financial calculus of value extraction working through any and all media. 2) Computational Capitalism is a development of Racial Capitalism and is thus also Computational Colonialism: vectors of race, gender, nation, sexuality, and other forms of social difference have been configured by and as strategies of value extraction and, like “structural racism,” have been sedimented into the operating systems and machine architectures of our machines. 3) The specter of revolution is everywhere visible if one knows how to see it. 4) For the first time in history a thoroughgoing revolution is possible that does not replicate the failed strategies of the radical break so tragically characteristic of twentieth-century revolutionary movements, but instead works to decolonize computation by transforming the money-form from within. I take it as axiomatic that the items telegraphically listed in the previous paragraph have become inseparable. What we thought of simply as computation is in fact computational capital—a supple and adaptive machine-mediated calculus on the social metabolism, one that can be gleaned through a deeper reflection on the notion of convergence. To illustrate aspects of convergence, we note that racialization and nationalization, along with regimes of gender, sexuality, borders, and incarceration, are part and parcel of the overall process of corporeal inscription, codification, and programmatic control endemic to digitization. Niche marketing and profiling are but two of the ways in which our bodies and practices are coded for capitalist and state-capitalist processing. One could add here the attempted subsumption of entire demographics under codifications indexed by “thug” and “terrorist.” Historical codes, including but not limited to race, gender, nation, class, and sexuality, are inscribed on our bodies, read, written, and rewritten by informatic machines. This functionalization of social difference (representational, biometric), to say nothing of the branding and scarring of bodies that is both past and present at so many levels, serves both as a means and a medium of capitalization and value extraction and as a necessary substrate to the development of computation. Within and at the scenes of inscription, the code works us and we work the code—again with historically overdetermined statistical variance. This is how it is at both the micro and the macro levels of struggle and organization. IBM’s role in the Holocaust, to give but one example, must also be understood as the Holocaust’s role in IBM and in the development of Hollerith punch cards and computational architectures, including search engines. Sociality and global lifetimes themselves have become the conditions of possibility for what, writ large, is the totalitarian emergence of the World Computer. That is why no existing political discourse can approach this horizon because current concepts and the activities of thought itself are fully circumscribed by it—ideas themselves have become operators (media) fully functionalized by and in the matrix of information. Understanding the transformation of semiotic process by information functioning as a form of capital, we can take the general formula for capital M-C-M’ (where M is money, C is commodity and, M’ is a greater quantity of money) and rewrite it as M-I-C-I’-M’, where I is image and C is code. The commodity as a distributed social relation has, with computation, become both produced and distributed in nonlinear networked operations that, unlike the assembly line, depend upon digital forms of attention, cognition, images, and codes for full valorization. This dependence on transformed conditions of labor germane to the social factory is (now) true even of older forms of production (e.g., automobiles) inasmuch as they are also networked in the world of information, advertising, Instagram, and the like. The valuation of a commodity requires a calculus of the image that modifies code, as does any interaction that transfers rights and value to said commodity (what used to be called sales). Production, circulation, valuation are all mediated by image and code, and that mediation occurs on a global scale. As the Anthropocene and its derivative concepts might testify, little or nothing remains untouched by this process of computational capital that penetrates down to the level of atoms. Here I want to propose further that this formula can be further modified to read M-I-M’, where I is information. To put this modification simply, money becomes more money through the movement of discrete state machines, the motor force of which is ultimately the bios (what was once thought of as the human life-world) struggling to survive its informatic capture. Labor becomes informatic labor and, as I endeavor to show in The Message is Murder, M-I-M’ means less that the commodity is one form of information, and more that the domain of intelligibility known as “information” directly emerges in the footprint of the value-form. Data visualization by computational processes screen-interfaced with the bios is a fundamental condition of the current regime of accumulation sometimes called post-Fordism. In generating M’ from M, it also effects what Paolo Virno calls “the communism of capital.” The programmable image as a worksite transforms and colonizes nearly all mental, sensual, and neuronal process while submitting them to interoperable regimes of background monetization. This financialization of everyday life, where everyone is forced to continuously throughput information in order to manage volatility and risk, facilitates a machinic enslavement profoundly enabled by and integrated with inherited forms of oppression. Navigating the matrix of capital-information is not an option, it is a matter of survival. Somewhere along the way, “consumer society” and “conspicuous consumption” became a semiotic game of survival. In the dominant order, these encodings are among the terms of wealth and power and only those who strive to organize in accord with a different order (or disorder) altogether have more than an inkling that there are better ways to be. We are dealing with the failure of revolutions, the overcoding of bodies and practices, and the absorption of political energy by strategies of accumulation. Computational capital names the integration of discrete state machines with fixed capital and sociality such that Marx’s “vast automaton” has become a global financialized socio-cybernetic system. “Politics” has been operationally reduced to a mere subroutine in the encroachment of this computationally integrated system on planetary life, and as Harney and Moten have pointedly underscored, “politics” and “policy” are today always on the side of the state—and the state is a state of capital.

#### Thus, we must struggle to find new forms of communication and sociality that cannot be subsumed by the media platforms we use – in the age of digital communication, the affirmative carves out spaces of genuine sociality that aim to create communist algorithms by fostering revolutionary culture.

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Jonathan Beller, “The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism”, Duke University Press, 2021 // sam :)

Given the sea change in the nature of languages and images themselves—their wholesale transposition and transformation from a means of representation to a means of production— the difficulty here is both with the substrate of communication (its bits) and with the us-versus-them perspective:, we want to ban advertisers but today we must also confront the disturbing possibility that we are them. Remember, “they” program “our” language and “our” imagination, “we” speak “their” thought—indeed, that is our work, or rather our labor. What to do with the fact that “we have seen the enemy and he is us?” One could say, one could want to say, “I don’t care who you are: if you live in the first world, if you live in the Global North, then fuck you! You ain’t no victim, even if you’re sick.” But who would be saying that? Probably some other Northerner, writing about how culture or the Venice Biennale, as if it were, could or should be more than a lavish spectacle of global suffering staged for a cosmopolitan elite. As capital’s nations, banks, armies, schools, languages, newspapers, and films did to its colonies and colonial subjects, the current institutions from states to computer-media companies do to “us”: they command us to make ourselves over in capital’s image for their own profit through networked strategies of expropriation and dispossession. “We” do it to ourselves, and our representations of self and other are designed to sell a version of ourselves back to ourselves so that we can perform further work on what is now the raw material for the next iteration of images. Therein lies our ontological lack, an ontological lack of solidarity and of even the possibility for solidarity. Therein lies the desire for and indeed necessity to become a plantation manager—the word is overseer. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay, this digital neocolonialism that practically commands global Northerners to in one way or another accept Nazism and genocide with their cappuccino could be understood as being on a continuum with the internal colonization of Europe by the German banks—which depends of course on the distributed production of a kind of neoliberal “realism” that Mark Fisher (2009) called “capitalist realism,” and was only ever a hair’s breadth away from fascism. This fact of our investment in and by advertising, the conversion of the sign to what I call the “advertisign,” poses a genuine problem for theory— indeed an unprecedented one. This problem is particularly evident considering the material conditions (class, nationality, education, race, language, etc.) of the participants in the would-be counterhegemonic theoretical discussions of culture and policy that presuppose the books, computers, schools, and institutions that sustain these. Those within the circuit of these discussions have already passed through a homogenization process which programs them in compatible systems languages. Without submitting ourselves and our own aspirations to radical critique, without conducting a Gramscian inventory of our ostensibly internal constitutions, we run the risk of merely trying to set up a competing corporation with a new business model. The revolution will not be televised; decolonization will not be a brand. Any would-be anticapitalist “we” runs this risk of coopting and cooptation from the get-go, particularly if it does not think about the materiality of social production from top to bottom: class, yes, but also race, nation, gender, sexuality, ability, geolocation, historical stratification. The world’s postmodern poor, the two billion–plus living on two dollars a day, also labor to survive in the material landscape organized by the post-Fordist social factory its anti-Blackness, its Islamophobia, its endless and mutating racism and imperialism. However, from the standpoint of capital, the role of those at the bottom is to serve as substrate for image-production and semiosis; not only in factories, cottage-industries, subsistence farming, and informal economies, but also as starving hordes; “irrational,” criminalized or surplused populations; subject-objects for policing, encampment, and bombing; desperate refugees; and even as voids in the idea of the world—as sites of social death. Forgive me, but I’d wager that no one capable of understanding these words can claim full exemption from the indictment they issue regarding structural complicity with the production and reproduction of everyday life. Humans are troped (via discourse and the screen) to organize military production, national policy, internment camps and prisons, bourgeois imaginations, museum shows, corporate strategy, and market projections. Let us clearly state here that any program that does not admit this excluded planet into dialogues that vitiate the monologues imposed by capitalist informatics and advertisigns is still floating in the realm of the ruling ideas and therefore participant in murder. These ruling ideas are the ones whose density and weight, whose material support and very machinery, threaten to further crush the late-capitalist poor out of not just representation but out of existence. This erasure and disposability, imposed by systems of informatic inscription designed to absorb every output of sense, is the achievement of the advertisarial relations endemic to computational racial capitalism. When information is an advertisement for itself that presupposes the operating system of the world computer as virtual machine, banning what we recognize as advertising on the internet, even if an excellent beginning, is just not adequate to address these issues of representation, social justice, planetary and climate racism, and emancipation. To summarize: the forms of sociality which are the conditions of possibility for the online, informatically organized relations—best characterized as advertisarial—run through every sector and register of planetary life. The internet, while recognizable as an effect and a cause of the current form of planetary production and reproduction, cannot be considered in isolation as a merely technical platform or set of platforms if its historical role is to be properly understood. To take the internet as an autonomous technological force results in a species of platform fetishism that disavows both the histories and material conditions of its emergence, conditions that are, in short, those of screen culture and racial capitalism; this is to say that it, the internet, is the very means by which the capitalist suppression of global democracy (which is emphatically, economic democracy as well) has been accomplished and continues. If the internet is autonomous, it is because it expresses the autonomization of the value form. As noted previously, with the hijacking of communications and semiotic infrastructures by racial capitalism, the medium is the message and the message is murder. To ban advertising on the internet would be a good start —but what if the whole thing is advertising? One reading of what I have said thus far might suggest that, given the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic, our volition is overtaken by capital logic; and given our inability to cogitate in any way that is genuinely resistant to capitalist expropriation, coercion, strictly speaking, is no longer necessary to impose cooperation for capitalist production. We “want” to cooperate productively, our desire—which, from the dispossession of even language and mind constitutes ourselves as subjects in the media ecology of the capitalist technical image, that is, in and through the organization of digital information—is itself an iteration of capital, a script of becoming predestined to become capital. The old language scored by the new image machines and their extractive algorithms locally organizes cooperative subjects who want to cooperate with vectoral capitalization. We want to provide content in order to derive currency and survive. Our solidarity on the internet produces more internet. Thus, in a certain way—and particularly since we no longer properly have any thoughts of our own—we all collaborate in a world organized by images and screens, thereby participating more or less mindlessly in the seamless realization and triumphant apotheosis of the programming business. However, I am sorry to have to report that the dystopian vision here is not quite as bucolic as even this already dreary picture of unwitting and irredeemable pulverization and servitude. While I do see that representation and semiotics have been increasingly flattened à la Orwell and Marcuse by a vast internalization of the apparatuses of oppression (in which “thought” is the [productive] thought of the [capitalist] Party and “repressive desublimation” is an engine of capitalist-fascist production) the “old problems” like the hierarchy of class have not gone away; neither have racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and fascist nationalisms ceased playing their roles to create vectors of privilege for white male–identifying aspiration. Indeed, most thought today, such that it is, is all about maintaining hierarchical society. The thinking runs thus: capital is nature, capital is eternal, capital is information is nature. Or, in a more pedestrian mode: human beings are naturally acquisitive and competitive, economic growth and technological advancement mean progress, this tech provides, or almost provides, a color-, gender-, and religion-blind society, and so on—and one must advance one’s place in it by any (crypto- or not-so-cryptofascist) means necessary. Of course, there exists better thinking out there. Mia Mingus: “As organizers, we need to think of access with an understanding of disability justice, moving away from an equality based model of sameness and ‘we are just like you’ to a model of disability that embraces difference, confronts privilege and challenges what is considered ‘normal’ on every front. We don’t want to simply join the ranks of the privileged; we want to dismantle those ranks and the systems that maintain them” (Mingus 2011, cited in Puar 2017: 16). However, there is broad-band, ambient programming that facilitates assuming neo-liberal and full-on fascist subjective sovereignty. This programming seeks triumphant brushes with plenitude (communion with the big Other, as distinct from the racial or otherwise other, becomes the ego-ideal), and this same programming is violent, competitive, hateful, mean-spirited, and alienating when embraced —at the same time that it is also cooperative, simpering, and abject. Servitude, even when automatic and mostly unconscious, is unhappy and, as we can see any day from the daily news, utterly pathological and sick. Of course, this diagnosis represents a huge generalization, but despite its broad-brushing lack of subtlety we may find that such a schizoid oscillation between entitled adjudicator and abject supplicant sums up the contours of your average reality television show or comments section on YouTube. It is Bateson’s (2000) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1977) schizophrenic, caught in the double-bind, who has become the capitalist norm—the one who struggles to negotiate in the form of contradictory signals the aporias of hierarchical society, while reproducing it, and all the while experiencing their own psychic dissolution as an injunction to create.3 With this schizoid capture in mind, let me then develop my question about the internet—“What if it is all advertising?”—in the framework of post-Fordist production. The argument is that, in the context of virtuosity and the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic by computational racial capital, sociality itself has become advertisarial, a ceaseless waging of capitalized exploits designed to garner attention and value for oneself and one’s capitalists. This situation represents—indeed imposes—a derivative logic, a logic in which every action is a hedge, a kind of risk management devoted to maximize a return. In addition to the fractalization of fascism, in which agency is manifest as a profile that has aggregated the attention of others, advertising has worked its way into the sign itself, into the image, and into data visualization, and it has generated the advertisign. All signs become points of potential cathexis, derivative positions on the underlier that is social currency and ultimately value. This new type of sign is not simply the brand but also an element of vectoral language (Wark 2007): functionalized words in a production channel, engaging in the micromanagement of desire, the production of new needs, and the capturing of the imagination, all in order to induce linguistic and behavioral shifts in the attention of others while aggregating their attention for oneself—turning their heads with an interface. This combination of the manipulation of market conditions (that is, everyday life) through techniques of risk management is no longer merely the province of advertising but of so- called human interactivity (what was once just communication and before that culture), now become advertisarial through and through. From Smythe’s claim in the “Blindspot” essay (1977) that all leisure time has become labor time, to Virno’s (2004) notion of virtuosity, we have seen aspects of this model for the capitalist overdetermination of apparently unremunerated time before. However, here—with the financialization of expression—we clearly grasp that the financialization of everyday life means also the convergence of semiotics and financial derivatives. Given the thoroughgoing intensification of vectoral, and in fact matrixial, signs, we need to investigate its implications in the context of a discussion of radical media practice. I will make two additional points here before shifting gears and turning at the end of this chapter to what I identify as an aesthetics of survival—an aesthetics that emerges from within the matrix of advertisarial, schizoid capture. The final chapter of this volume will endeavor to extend aspects of such socioaesthetic forms, those resistant to computational racial capitalism, to new notions of radical finance and the possibility of platform communism. If, as was already becoming true in the cinematic mode of production, the dominant means of representation have become the dominant means of production, the questions of and models for political agency are radically transformed, and the urgent need to decolonize communication and decolonize finance presents itself. Future communication will require a cybernetic approach, and, as we shall argue, this cybernetic approach will necessarily be financial, though it will be reaching toward a different order and different mode of production. Like communism, because it will need to be communist, it will see economic transformation of the material relations of production and reproduction as essential to the revolution. It will draw on the repressed and extracted cognitive-linguistic resource of the racialized and otherwise marginalized and configure ways to make our voices matter both as meaning and as tools for the reorganization of the material world and the social relations therein prescribed. Language and images are neither inside nor outside; they are part of the general intellect—currently they are at once media of thought and of capital. We also know that languages and images are not isolable, meaning that they are not and have never been stand-alone entities but rather exist in relation to their media, their platforms, which are again inseparable from society and its institutions. Furthermore, each platform relates to another platform. Paraphrasing McLuhan, we could even say that the “content” of a media platform is another platform. Thusly the general intellect is inseparable from its media platforms and their financials. We see that the general intellect, once largely held in common, is increasingly being privatized; the very media of our thought belong to someone else. This expropriation of the media commons is precisely the precondition of the real subsumption of society by capital. It is an extension of the ongoing expropriation begun by primitive accumulation and money as capital, and it has been accomplished through the financialization of media as platforms of extraction. The ramification of mediation by computation and information has resulted in its convergence into formats offering derivative exposure to underliers that are the expressive vitality and futurity of our communication. We therefore no longer have any organic relation to the materials for thought itself (sincerity has become a myth, at least in the medium-term of most circles)—the words, images, and machines we require to think, to express ourselves, to interact, and to know have been ripped from the species and privatized via the longue durée of dissymmetrical exchange. We work on the words and images, but as numbers they belong to someone else. The media themselves have become forms of capital—forms of racial capital—and our usage of these media means that we work to add value that valorizes capital, for the capitalist and within a relation designed as much as possible to guarantee that our creative acts necessarily occur as dissymmetrical exchange with capital. I write this book in a discourse that does not just not belong to me because it is shared, but in a discourse that is increasingly the property of a set of institutions— publishers, journals, universities—that all have their eye on the bottom line. The means by which we most intimately know the world, ourselves, and our desires (our images and words) are themselves vectors of capitalization intent upon converting our very life-process into surplus value (which is to say value for capital). We need strategies that will seize the means of production and create a reverse subsumption of affect, intellect, knowledge, capability, communication, and community. When all media have converged as economic media, it is economic media that must be re- engineered. Again, I think this subsumption of cognitive and affective capacity, the quasi-automating (scripting) of productive labor for capital, is what Stiegler means by the proletarianization of the nervous system—which would include the proletarianization of the pathways of feeling and thought. Our affective capacities are put to alienated and alienating work in the social factory, and their product too is alienated, producing ever-intensifying and ever-accumulating dispossession and disempowerment as the dialectical antithesis of its simultaneous production of unprecedented wealth and power for the cyborg avatars of the great media conglomerates. Intellect and emotional intelligence, the product of thousands of years of species- becoming, is being strip-mined so that extraction machines may continue their furious innovation to further discount people. I write this book aware of the pressure to think it just right, to at once extend thinking in order to command attention and produce new needs, but also to delimit it, to control myself, and to put the reins on whatever counterpower may rage within my body, because academia can tolerate only so much “bullshit” and no more. Yes sir, I’ll be careful not to cross that line, but a word to the woke: the bullshit is the best part. From a historical perspective, this encroachment on the means of representation—that Banksy and I and a billion others join the silenced majority in opposing—indicates that the individual subjective agent, itself a platform for sociality that developed with the rise of capitalism (as the subject who relates to other subjects in the market, the bearer of the commodity and thus its thought), is nearly defunct. As has been noted previously, in a world where life processes are stripped, ripped apart, rebundled, and sold as derivative exposures, the individual subject is an outmoded technology despite the fact that it still appears as a skeuomorph in certain updated technosocial apparatuses—like the latest forms of films, games, influencers, and versions of national politics that proffer invitations to momentary individualistic identification for the dividual purpose of providing a sense of familiarity and orientation. While palliative for some in small doses, such individuality is no longer a viable (which is to say, sustainable) fantasy. The real thought is that of the infrastructure, of the AI that codes our meat and scripts our sheets. Sure I take up the mantle for a few moments each day to appear as the agent of this text, suiting up as the operator of an intellect that might be adequate to the informatic shit-storm of racist, capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, for-profit assaults, but then I drop off into an ocean of petty concerns, food shopping, and home repairs. And even when I say “I,” to perform as the nexus of all this insight, I also know that it’s hardly me talking. I’m just curating at the gates of shit that needs to be said, and hopefully titrating to let the right stuff through. That’s part of my politics though Dog knows that I could create a more lucrative named-professor type profile with just a little more discipline, a bit more self-interested adherence to the protocols of the academy’s factory code. Instead, there is the effort to overturn, to be or at least to live something beyond being the scribe of the world computer, to at once witness the drama of the emergence of the intelligence of commodification, testify to its outrage, and intimate the possibility of its overthrow. Such would be the art of this text, practiced at the limits of disciplinarity and of subjectivity, guaranteed by nothing and no one. The expiration of the subject form, imminent since the subject’s first intimation of mortality—and made structurally mandatory by Freud and especially, with the full-blown rise of the sign at the moment of it radical marginalization by visuality, by Lacan—is not necessarily a cause for lament, despite the increasingly intense fading of its incalculable beauty, its sad reduction to cliché. From a political perspective, it means that within each concrete individual body the presumed continuity of the individual is riddled with contradictory and indeed unassimilable indicators; it means also that there exists in differing quantities and qualities capitalist and noncapitalist striations or sectors. Hallways of emptiness, but also hallways of love. Like bundled assets, the mind-body is tranched by executable logics organized by a calculus of risk available to investors. There are, to be a bit simplistic, aspects of desire that are programmed (indeed farmed) to produce practices that function in perfect accord with capitalist accumulation strategies (individualizing or schizoid) and aspects of desire that are atavistic or collectivist, utopian, communist, or maybe even just plain lonely, and, in short, subprime. In reality, of course, desire is more singular than even such formalizations might indicate. Insert your favorite snippet of poetry here. Hortense Spillers in “All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother” (1997) invokes “the Dozens” and the music of and like that of Charles Mingus (152–3), to make present an “interior intersubjectivity”(140) testifying to the rich unaudited psychic life of what might today be called Blackness. There are vast resources beyond the easy resolution of hegemonic hermeneutics whether deployed by institutionally validated psychoanalysis or compressed by current systems of informatic extraction. In agreeing with Freud that consciousness makes up a small part of mental life when compared to the preconscious, the unconscious, dreams, and so on, but in rejecting the normative assumptions and disavowals (including his own Jewishness) that situate Freud and the psychoanalytic discourse that will become part of European and U.S. bourgeois society, Spillers recognizes a vast store of mental life and the possibility of listening anew. However, when speaking of politics now, we therefore necessarily speak of the abstract forms available for the conceptualization and deployment of concrete emergences whether referring to haecceities that are innumerable or collective forms of existence and psychic life actively mediating between “the one” and “the ‘masses’ ” (141). Let us listen anew. Acknowledging that we ultimately and if possible immediately want to “marry our thought” (Wynter 1994b: 65) to the wealth of subaltern forms of life and the care of the bios, allow me then to put the situation of the post- Fordist subject thusly: in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin (1939) showed how imperialist dividends complicated class issues in England, since many people, otherwise part of the working class, got a share of the dividends of imperialism by clipping the coupons of their investments in racist, exploitative British enterprises across the globe. Today this race-based class fractionalization is fully internalized in the Global North; on our iPads built by Chinese slaves from blood metals extracted from the Congo, we may momentarily feel like biomorphically unmarked nobles in the global cosmopolis; while on the job market or when simply seen in our raced and gendered embodiments, we are abjects. Materially and intellectually we are nodal points on a global network. The signal oscillates between narcissistic megalomania and utter abjection and can be affected by a billion parameters taking us from melancholia to outrage. Thus, even the concrete individual is composed of class fractions, race fractions, gender fractions. In the form of signs, we clip coupons that validate our investments. The language of object-identification, we observe here, cannot really keep up with the fluctuations resulting from the throughput of code as we work to identify and disidentify our agency. Can we audit a different mode of emergence, a different futurity than one inexorably overcoded by capital? Of course this is still somewhat simplistic and also class-specific, as many (billions even) never get to participate as an enfranchised global citizen in any aspect or moment of life, even if the lived experience of these same billions is radically overdetermined by the class(es) from which they are excluded.4 The gilded poverty of the enfranchised, as opposed to the mere poverty of the rest, is now a measure of connectivity. A more complete view is that we are the product of the world system and thus everything we are has been produced vis-à-vis globalization, and therefore everything bears the trace of the system in its entirety (again, in varying proportions). This conceptualization of concrete individuals (bodies) as global communitarian products forced to varying degrees into templates of individualized risk by capitalist states, is not to erase class; however, it suggests that, just as Fanon saw the great European metropoles as the product of third world labor, we are all products of the worst conditions prevailing in the Global South and around the planet. Global inequality is internal to our being. It is us. How then does one (such a one who is relatively enfranchised by the derivative language of texts such as this one) inventory those relations and produce them as formations of solidarity rather than as disavowed residuum? Is there another data-sphere, a communist one? Can we build communist interfaces, networks, and finance? How would we register, track, amplify, and render actionable the communitarian affinities, solidarities, obligations, and debts, the resources in the wake of too many genocides to count, that in actual practice underpin the official economy, collective life, and whatever authentic hope is left to our species? Perhaps we have arrived at a question worthy of theory: Is there, could there be communist algorithms? Communist derivatives? Derivative communism? We are looking for that path. To add to my point about the shifting, distributed character of political actors—that goes so far as to suggest that we can no longer think only of actors but rather must think of vectors and fields in addition to thinking of the resources developed in cultures of survival—I will make a second observation. A political intervention in the advertisarial relations that have this planet heading toward environmental doomsday requires not only revolutionary policy but revolutionary culture. (I defer further discussion of a third requirement, revolutionary finance, to the final chapter.) This culture must take into account that, for many on this planet, Armageddon is not the future but an ongoing constant. My call here (which should not be entirely unfamiliar, as it gives petit bourgeois intellectuals something important to do) is to (re)politicize semiotic and affective structures and practices, including and perhaps especially those we might control, for example our own utterances—our expression. Of course, to call them “our own” seems to contradict what I’ve said about the expropriation of the cognitive- linguistic and the intensification of aphanisis by visual, verbal, and digital media derivatives, but it is here precisely that we confront one of the significant material contradictions of our time: who or what speaks in us? This question, which I shorthand using the phrase the politics of the utterance and which you can experience palpably right now (as you endeavor to think), seems to me to insist that our idea-making must actively produce its solidarity with the dispossessed. We must struggle for the radical constellation. The question concerning the politics of the utterance, asked here in a strange passage of this text through a beyond-academic terrain, a moonless forest the traversal of which may or may not at this point lead us back to the plot, also raises the question of becoming, as well as the questions of agency and of action within the capitalist image— programmable images, racializing and racist images that, in the terms we have set out, are functionally omnipresent. Continuous media throughput has generated a capitalist imaginary structuring both language function and imaging processes, coordinated at scales and by calculative logics that exceed individual comprehension. Though the occasion is upon us, we must struggle for space and time to think. We must open a spread on which to bet against the dominant order. We glimpse, and we feel, that to insist upon the unremitting relevance of both culture-making and of cross-cultural transnational solidarity helps to avoid platform fetishism because it sees the internet and its machines not as a set or collection of autonomous technologies but as a historically emergent system of value-expropriative communication and organization, built directly upon older but nonetheless contemporaneous forms of inequality, including but not limited to historically emergent techniques of gendering, racialization, and imperialism, and embedded in the living flesh of the world. All of this calculative interconnectivity and networked agency implies, contradictorily, in fact, that the internet is not all advertising—but neither is advertising all advertising. It is also murder and struggle. Banksy knows that. The advertisarial relation is the programmatic relation encrypted in the apparatuses of capital: the war of each against all, taken all the way from finance, computation, and surveillance to the speech act and the imagination in accord with the autopoietic algorithm of the distributed Leviathan. Marx himself saw capitalism as vampiric, and today’s processes of capitalization are even more totalitarian, more widely distributed, and more blood-, life-, and indeed soul-sucking than even in prior eras—though such comparisons don’t do those killed by past iterations of capitalism any good. Despite the disavowals to the contrary, we recognize that capital needs labor, needs metabolic time more desperately and more voraciously than ever before (what else is biopolitics?) and, furthermore, that it wages war on life-time on all fronts, in order to secure labor power, its product and basis, at a discount. The pyramids of inequality become internal fractals, and even as the base broadens, the tip with the all-seeing eye (that is not a subject) ascends ever higher. We do not yet know what can be destroyed or indeed built with the massive appropriation of Banksy’s rocks, but we do know that at present there is total war against our using them to build anticapitalist, nonhierarchical, horizontal, solidary sociality. The refusal or détournement of capital’s encroachment is itself a creative act. Perhaps we have only begun to glimpse what a total refusal might achieve.

#### Debate is always implicated in the context of propaganda – switch side debate and iterative clash are an attempt at deradicalization.

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[Ronald Greene, former Chair of the Critical and Cultural Studies Division of the National Communication Association, and Darrin Hicks, communication studies at the University of Denver. 2006. “Lost convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens,” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502380500040928>] pat

Concurrently, the Army Information and Education Group, which would become the core of the Hovland-Yale Communication and Persuasion Group, led by Carl Hovland, was conducting experiments testing the relationship between inducement and internalized attitude change. In 1953, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley published their highly influential book Communication and Persuasion, which established a positive relation between verbalization and the intensification of belief and predicted that being forced to overtly defend a position discrepant from one’s own private beliefs would result in the internalization of the overtly defended position. This prediction was further supported by the forced-compliance and cognitive dissonance studies of Festinger (1957) and his colleagues at Stanford. For decades, the ability to understand the merits of opposing arguments had been championed as one of the prime pedagogical benefits of intercollegiate debate training. However, in the fall of 1954, Hovland’s and Festinger’s studies coupled with the anti- Communist rhetoric of Schlesinger, which would, much to Schlesinger’s dismay, come to underwrite McCarthy’s witch hunts, would be articulated in such a way that debate’s ability to train students to take the other’s perspective might be framed as a threat to national security. The fear that defending the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ would turn American youth into Communist sympathizers saturated the debating both sides controversy with an anxiety over the virility of ‘democratic faith’. Those choosing to defend the virtues of intercollegiate debate and the practice of debating both sides were careful not to question the basic tenets of the anti-Communism that constituted the ideological core of Cold War liberalism. Democracy, if it were to survive the seductive appeal of totalitarianism, had to become a fighting faith, a faith born out of and tested in social and political conflict. Debate, in particular the format of debating both sides of controversial issues embodied the sort of political conflict that could engender sound conviction, rational decisions, and a committed youth impervious to Communist propaganda. Moreover, debate provided the antidote to communist propaganda. Baird concluded, ‘[c]ollege debate teams are the last groups in this nation where Communist propaganda has any chance of making headway’ (1955, p. 7). No student wishing to win the debate, Burns argued, ‘would take the affirmative on the grounds that we must love the Chinese or that they are merely agrarian radicals’ (p. 7). Burns, so confident in the anti-Communist sentiment of the majority of students, contended that no student would dare argue in favour of Communism but ‘pitch his [sic ] case on the argument that recognition might help pull China out of the Moscow orbit, that it might help build a firmer anti-Communist alliance, that it might make peaceful coexistence possible. He [sic ] would, in short, be directing our attention to the very questions that all American’s might well be debating’ (p. 7). For Schlesinger, however, the ground of the anti-Communist consensus Baird believed to be evident in ‘the majority of students’ was unstable.