# 1NC R5 CY BAY AHB JW v Heights AW

## K – Land Acknowledgment

#### Land acknowledgement – I acknowledge that right now I currently occupy the land belonging to Akokisa, Karankawa, and Sana tribes who occupied Houston for thousands of years prior to Settlers taking over. The Karankawa people were eliminated by Settlers and considered to be extinct. And the Akokisa and Sana tribes were forcefully removed from the land to Kansas where they lived with the Tonkawa tribe. I acknowledge that right now as a settler I live and stand on stolen land.

#### As settlers, we must acknowledge that our presence is violence. The performance of giving a land acknowledgement works to break down settler colonialism. If you care about settler colonialism then vote neg –all that matters is our personal relationship to set col which means all impacts of the aff neg bc only we do something to resolve the violence. VOWEL

[Chelsea Vowel. “Beyond Territorial Acknowledgements.” *apihtawikosisan,* <https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/>] LHP BT & JW

When working on or within the traditional territory of a First Nation there is protocol to follow. It can be customary between one First Nation and another to acknowledge the host First Nation Peoples and their traditional territory at the outset of any meeting…it follows then, that if you want to [work] with a First Nation, one of the best ways is to show respect to the Nation by following traditional territory protocol.”[[4]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn4) In the first two quotes, it is clear that the intended purpose of territorial acknowledgments is recognition as a form of reconciliation. Kairos goes a bit deeper in the intention to also acknowledge the violent relationships between churches who ran residential schools, and Indigenous peoples, so what is being “recognized” is not merely Indigenous presence. Nonetheless it seems to me that when territorial acknowledgments first began, they were fairly powerful statements of presence, somewhat shocking, perhaps even unwelcome in settler spaces. They provoked discomfort and centered Indigenous priority on these lands. The third quote by Bob Joseph suggests that territorial acknowledgments can also be a way of honouring traditional Indigenous protocol. I disagree that these acknowledgements can accomplish such a thing, as such statements of thanks to hosts barely even scratch the surface of such traditional protocols. In fact, I think it is dangerous to even suggest that territorial acknowledgments alone satisfy protocol in any way unless concrete actions accompany the words spoken. I will return to this when I discuss moving beyond acknowledgments. Another purpose of territorial acknowledgements, related to emphasizing continuous Indigenous presence, is the way in which many spaces feel unsafe for Indigenous peoples. For example, at the University of McGill, asking for territorial acknowledgment was part of a wider attempt by student groups to “[create] a more welcoming environment for Indigenous students. The proposal called for McGill to publicly acknowledge on its website and in email signatures that McGill is built on traditionally Kanien’kehá:ka land.”[[5]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn5) I personally experienced McGill as an incredibly alienating and invisibilizing environment, and that institution certainly has a lot of work to do in terms of acknowledging Indigenous presence (and Indigenous students) compared to other some universities. As a newer practice in such environments, territorial acknowledgments continue to have the power to disrupt and discomfit settler colonialism. It should also be emphasized that these territorial acknowledgments flow from the work of Indigenous peoples themselves, who are resisting invisibilization. When they are crafted, they are usually done so in consultation with local Indigenous peoples. However, it is also interesting to geographically track the criticisms of territorial acknowledgements, as a way of tracing their lineage. The strongest Indigenous critiques of these acknowledgments tend to come from the west coast, suggesting they have been happening there the longest, whereas in places like Montreal, territorial acknowledgments are still being introduced and are legitimately “cutting edge” in that political milieu. That’s not to say that strong Indigenous critique cannot exist absent of a tradition of territorial acknowledgments! We are almost certainly importing the practice into the United States, and it will not necessarily be welcomed there by Indigenous peoples for reasons unrelated to the rendering of such statements meaningless through repetition. I believe territorial acknowledgments can have numerous purposes, and in fact can be repurposed, so merely examining the stated intentions of these invocations is insufficient. What may start out as radical push-back against the denial of Indigenous priority and continued presence, may end up repurposed as “box-ticking” inclusion without commitment to any sort of real change. In fact, I believe this is the inevitable progression, a situation of familiarity breeding contempt (or at least apathy). Practice  The way in which territorial acknowledgments are delivered must matter. Are they formulaic recitations that barely penetrate the consciousness of the speaker and those listening? Are they something that must be ‘gotten through’ before the meeting or speech can begin? Can we escape dilution through repetition? “…at a conference: a speaker acknowledged that we were on the traditional territory of the Musqueam peoples – and that was it. Yes, there was an acknowledgement, and yes, that is better than no acknowledgment at all. However, the speaker failed to situate themself – by that I mean, they did not locate themself as a guest who is actively working against colonialism. In failing to do so, the speaker revealed their complacency in ongoing settler colonialism.” “Oftentimes, when non-Indigenous organizers make a territory acknowledgment, it is done hastily (*weacknowledgethatwearegatheredonuncededcoastsalishterritory)*, and then discarded *(now on with the show!*).”[[6]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn6) What do territorial acknowledgments mean for people who have heard them ad nauseam? (I mean, how carefully do frequent flyers listen to safety presentations during their flight?) On the other hand, rituals and repetition are not necessarily bad things. Establishing a practice of acknowledgment can be part of wider attempts to address settler colonialism and build better relationships with Indigenous peoples. The Toronto District School Board (TDSB) has just begun announcing a daily territorial acknowledgment across all 588 schools (ironically delivered after students are asked to stand for O Canada).[[7]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn7) As a TDSB vice-principal puts it “the important thing is we don’t just read the acknowledgment and check it off on a list, and say, ‘OK, we’re doing our job… what our next step is, is working with students and staff to make sure we understand what it really means, and help support that learning.” (It’d be great if the TDSB could deal with its anti-Blackness at the same time.) Khelsilem offers some suggestions for territorial acknowledgement practice that take us beyond merely “do it”. His first suggestion addresses an issue that often bothers me; the widespread misunderstanding that the bulk of land was legally given over to the Canadian state through treaty. For acknowledgments that identify territories as “unceded”: “Unceded” is language to use with the Crown/Settler State. There is a misconception that BC is mostly *unceded* due to a lack of treaties – which implies those in areas with treaties are what? Ceded territories?… Elevate Indigenous polity…Use the brief moment of acknowledgement to elevate Indigenous society, governance, and jurisdiction.”[[8]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn8) Khelsilem also brings up the importance of being aware of the fact territorial acknowledgments are not always cut and dry, particularly when there are competing Indigenous claims to a specific area. “In Vancouver, for example, many are told that “Vancouver is Musqueam territory!!!! The Squamish only moved in here in the 1850’s”. That’s one perspective. And by going with and elevating that single perspective, you’re inserting yourself into the process that the local Indigenous communities are going through to address historical grievances (mostly caused by the imposition of colonial boundaries and dispossession).”[[9]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn9) Simply because there is a standardized guide available should not mean that people do not have to continue to ask questions and work on these acknowledgements. In fact, as Jennifer Matsunaga puts it, “I worry about the work that has been done *for us*, here. I take issue with the institutional standardization and expectation of these acknowledgments. It is important for people to do their own searching and learning.”[[10]](https://apihtawikosisan.com/2016/09/beyond-territorial-acknowledgments/" \l "_ftn10) Merely mouthing the names of local Indigenous nations does not automatically confer understanding. Best practices must evolve over time through deeper engagement with the purpose and impact of territorial acknowledgments. Spaces I have been talking about territorial acknowledgements as though they are ubiquitous, when in fact they are very limited to specific kinds of spaces. Again, more common in western Canada than in the east or north, territorial acknowledgments tend to happen in urban institutional and activist settings (an interesting juxtaposition). They also tend to be limited to those institutions and groups with leftist politics. It is interesting to note where territorial acknowledgments are absent; namely rural spaces. Rural counties throughout Canada, where there is arguably the most tangible Indigenous presence, do not tend to open council meetings or publish notices acknowledging the traditional territories on which they reside. Within the boundaries of these counties, you will generally find more than one First Nation, but because of Constitutional division of powers, First Nations are ‘holes’ in county governance. Yet these would be the spaces in which territorial acknowledgments have the potential to be the most powerful; the settler rural/First Nations divide is huge and plays out in deeply problematic (and all too often violent) ways. Private property ownership in rural counties is settler colonialism writ large, yet overshadowed by the overwhelming pull of large urban centres. Relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in rural and remote areas tend to be strained, when not entirely non-existent. The issue of “whose territory are we farming/ranching/cottaging” on becomes much more uncomfortable and immediate than “on whose territory is this shwank hotel, where we are having our union AGA”. That level of removal from the land allows territorial acknowledgments to occur in a more theoretical way. Rural Canada personifies ‘the two solitudes’ of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in a way that is difficult to understand from urban settings. These two solitudes exist on lands that supply the bulk of resources extracted to support the urban south, meaning they also experience the effects of resource extraction in ways urban residents do not. When gravel aggregate is strip mined, when fracking exploration is undertaken, when large scale pig feedlots are proposed, rural Indigenous and non-Indigenous people are living with the direct consequences including clouds of silica dust, damage to aquifers, smell, noise, run-off, and increased presence of shift workers unaffiliated with local communities (and the violence that brings). Rather than being a situation that unifies Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples however, each community is accustomed to working in isolation from the other. The decision by counties to allow such developments only rarely takes into account local First Nations, and only when legislation demands it (i.e. when development occurs adjacent to a reserve). What I am trying to get at here is that ignoring First Nations presence in rural areas is normalized, deeply ingrained, and central to rural settler governance. Urban centres take up relatively little physical space in this country; it is easy to even unconsciously justify that space and the density of the population compared to say, owning 160 acres of land on which one family lives. I do not think that territorial acknowledgement in these areas could exist as merely theoretical frameworks as they can in more urban settings because ANY acknowledgment implicates the land in an inescapable way. This brings me back to the question of…why are people acknowledging territory in the first place? When mostly urban institutions and circles are making these acknowledgments, who are they thinking of? Urban Indigenous populations? Rural and remote First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities? Is there a feeling of reaching out to or desiring partnerships with these communities? What of the non-Indigenous communities also found in rural and remote spaces? Are they implicated in urban-based territorial acknowledgments, or are they as ignored by their urban counterparts as they in turn ignore local Indigenous communities? I have a lot more to say on this, but for now, I want to note that I think rural/Indigenous alliances have the potential to be the most transformative relationships in this country, even as they remain the least likely to occur. Into the beyond If we think of territorial acknowledgments as sites of potential disruption, they can be transformative acts that to some extent undo Indigenous erasure. I believe this is true as long as these acknowledgments discomfit both those speaking and hearing the words. The fact of Indigenous presence should force non-Indigenous peoples to confront their own place on these lands. I would like to see territorial acknowledgments happening in spaces where they are currently absent, particularly in rural and remote areas and within the governance structures of settlers. However as we are already seeing, territorial acknowledgments can become stripped of their disruptive power through repetition. The purpose cannot merely be to inform an ignorant public that Indigenous peoples exist, and that Canada has a history of colonialism. I wanted to come back to Bob Joseph’s suggestion that territorial acknowledgements are a part of Indigenous protocol. I think if we understand that to be true, at least to some extent, then we must also understand that the protocols he invokes are much deeper than verbal acknowledgments. This can perhaps guide us into the ‘beyond’; the space beyond acknowledgment. Stopping at territorial acknowledgments is unacceptable. Often, territorial acknowledgments characterize non-Indigenous peoples as ‘guests’. Are guests only those people who are invited? Or they anyone who finds themselves within the physical territory of their hosts? Why guests and not invaders? To what extent was permission actually sought to be in these territories, and conduct the affairs that Indigenous nations are thanked for ‘hosting’? What if an Indigenous person stood up and revoked that assumed permission? I think we need to start imagining a constellation of relationships that must be entered into beyond territorial acknowledgments. Great, that’s awesome you know you’re on (for example) Treaty 6 territory. That’s great you acknowledge that perhaps the Indigenous view of that treaty, that the land was not surrendered, is correct.  Perhaps you understand the tension of your presence as illegitimate, but don’t know how to deal with it beyond naming it. Maybe now it is time to start learning about your obligations as a guest in this territory. What are the Indigenous protocols involved in being a guest, what are your responsibilities? What responsibilities do your hosts have towards you, and are you making space for those responsibilities to be exercised? To what extent are your events benefiting your hosts? I’m not saying Indigenous people want to be at your AGA, or your university lecture, or your Dean’s meeting (maybe they do though). What I am saying is that all Indigenous nations have specific expectations of guests, and of hosts, and so far non-Indigenous peoples have not been very good at finding out what those are.

## K – Cap

#### Their project of knowledge production allows them to wander in endless circles, missing their goal. Their method turns activity into passivity and forecloses analysis of the way drive shapes our goals – this recreates communicative capitalism and turns the aff.

**Dean 12** (Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, The Communist Horizon, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 65-67)

For the Left, democracy is the form the loss of communism takes. Rather than fighting for a collective ideal, engaging in a struggle on behalf of the rest of us, the Left repetitively invokes democracy, calling for what is already there. These invocations of democracy take on a pattern that Lacan describes via the psychoanalytic notion of drive. Like desire, drive refers to a way that the subject arranges her enjoyment (jouissance). With respect to desire, enjoyment is what the subject can never reach, what the subject wants but never gets – oh, that's not it. Drive differs in that enjoyment comes from missing one's goal; it's what the subject gets, even if she doesn't want it.22 Enjoyment is that little extra charge which keeps the subject keeping on. The subject's repeated yet ever failing efforts to reach her goal become satisfying on their own. Left appeals to democracy take on the structure of the drive insofar as they circle around and around. We perpetually miss our goal and get satisfaction through this very missing. Or we don't even have an actual goal, and we take the absence of a goal to be a strength. We talk, complain, and protest. We make groups on Facebook. We sign petitions and forward them to everyone in our contact list. Activity becomes passivity, our stuckness in a circuit, which is then mourned as the absence of ideas or even the loss of the political itself and then routed yet again through a plea for democracy, although it doesn't take a genius to know that the real problem is capitalism. What leftists call the loss of the political is the fog they wander through because they've lost sight of the communist horizon. Some contemporary theorists commend drive's sublimation, its substitution of partial objects and the bits of enjoyment accompanying repetitions of a process for the impossible object of desire. Multiple voices in networked and digital media circuits, for example, celebrate communicative capitalism for its provision of opportunities for small victories and momentary pleasures. Millions die in war and poverty, but at least we have the internet. Others admire drive's creative destruction, the way its dissolution of the old is the opening to the new. Admittedly, repeating the same act over and over can shift from order to chaos-it's one thing to scratch an itch a couple of times; it's something else entirely to claw through to the bone. The reiterations that fail to respond to changes in their setting themselves change the setting. But the embrace of drive as destruction, like the view of drive as sublimation, treats a feature of our setting as an alternative without drawing the necessary separation: what makes it a feature of a different formation, a different politics, or even a critique? In the contemporary networks of communicative capitalism, drive is a feedback circuit that captures our best energies. Invigorating communism as a political alternative requires amplifying the collective desire that can cut through these affective networks.

#### Colonialism is fundamentally a mode of capitalist accumulation, only breaking down capitalism can we solve for the ongoing colonization.

**Goldstein 17** (Goldstein, Alyosha. "On the reproduction of race, capitalism, and settler colonialism." Race and Capitalism: Global Territories, Transnational Histories (2017): 42-51. //aw)

Yet in places such as what is now the United States, colonialism and the legacies of racial slavery remain actively constitutive for capitalist accumulation. Colonialism in this context is not or not only a process of expansion and incorporation, but is a primary social, economic, and political feature of the United States itself; a retrospective and prospective feature that works in tandem with U.S. imperial exploits globally. Thus, Native dispossession is not one historical moment in a teleology of capitalist development, but continues and changes over time in ways that operate in conjunction with other forms of expropriation and subjection and the differential devaluation of racialized peoples.13 Chattel slavery and its afterlives similarly shape both the historical conditions and present-day dynamics of racialized dispossession. The fractionation of landed property for Native peoples in the wake of the allotment policy era (1887-1934) and the partition of heirs’ property not limited to but disproportionately affecting African Americans since Reconstruction are signiicant for the ways in which they link past and present dispossession. For the wealthy, inheritance provides a genealogical distance from conquest, genocide, and colonial slavery that offers a cover of ostensible innocence and launders accumulated fortunes. For Native peoples, the descendants of enslaved Africans, and other racialized peoples dispossessed by colonization, inheritance endures as struggle and demand. Inherited wealth contributes to racially overdetermined economic inequality and advantage far more than present-day income.14 Thus, as problems arising from protracted dynamics of inheritance, fractionation and the partition of heirs’ property have directly to do with the conditions of racial capitalism and colonial calculations of reproducing dispossession. Both participate in the production of property and the reproduction of differential dispossession today.

#### Capitalism causes war, mass exploitation, violence, environmental destruction, and extinction.

Robinson 18 (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State” Critical Sociology)

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging.

First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature.

Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism.

Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented.

Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state.

#### We should orient our political and social struggle towards a communist horizon – only this redirection from fixation on identity politics and individuals can redefine political futures and lead to concrete steps of change.

Dean 12 (Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 1-12)

The term "horizon" marks a division. Understood spatially, the horizon is the line dividing the visible, separating earth from sky. Understood temporally, the horizon converges with loss in a metaphor for privation and depletion. The "lost horizon" suggests abandoned projects, prior hopes that have now passed away. Astrophysics offers a thrilling, even uncanny, horizon: the "event horizon" surrounding a black hole. The event horizon is the boundary beyond which events cannot escape. Although "event horizon" denotes the curvature in space/time effected by a singularity, it's not much different from the spatial horizon. Both evoke a fundamental division that we experience as impossible to reach, and that we can neither escape nor cross. I use "horizon" not to recall a forgotten future but to designate a dimension of experience that we can never lose, even if, lost in a fog or focused on our feet, we fail to see it. The horizon is Real in the sense of impossible-we can never reach it-and in the sense of actual (Jacques Lacan's notion of the Real includes both these senses). The horizon shapes our setting. We can lose our bearings, but the horizon is a necessary dimension of our actuality. Whether the effect of a singularity or the meeting of earth and sky, the horizon is the fundamental division establishing where we are. With respect to politics, the horizon that conditions our expe1ience is communism. I get the term "communist horizon" from Bruno Bosteels. In The Actuality of Communism, Bosteels engages with the work of Alvaro Garcia Linera. Garcia Linera ran as Evo Morales's vice presidential ru1ming mate in the Bolivian Movement for Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP). He is the author of multiple pieces on Marxism, politics, and sociology, at least one of which was written while he served time in prison for promoting an armed uprising (before becoming vice president of Bolivia, he fought in the Tupac Kataii Guerrilla Army). Bosteels quotes Garcia Linera's response to an interviewer's questions about his party's plans following their electoral victim)': "The general horizon of the era is communist."1 Garcia Linera doesn't explain the term. Rather, as Bosteels points out, Garcia Linera invokes the communist horizon "as if it were the most natural thing in the world," as if it were so obvious as to need neither explanation nor justification. He assumes the communist horizon as an ineducible feature of the political setting: "We enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the communist horizon." For Garcia Linera, communism conditions the actuality of politics. Some on the Left dismiss the communist horizon as a lost horizon. For example, in a postmodern pluralist approach that appeals to many on the Left, the economists writing as J. K . Gibson-Graham reject communism, offering "post-capitalism" in its stead. They argue that descriptions of capitalism as a global system miss the rich diversity of practices, relations, and desires constituting yet exceeding the economy and so advocate "reading the economy for difference rather than dominance" (as if dominance neither presupposes nor relies on difference).2 In their view, reading for difference opens up new possibilities for politics as it reveals previously unacknowledged loci of creative action within everyday economic activities. Gibson-Graham do not present Marxism as a failed ideology or communism as the fossilized remainder of an historical expe1iment gone horribly wrong. On the contrary, they draw inspiration from Marx’s appreciation of the social character of labor. They engage Jean-Luc Nancy's emphasis on communism as an idea that is the "index of a task of thought still and increasingly open." They embrace the reclamation of the commons. And they are concerned with neoliberalism's naturalization of the economy as a force exceeding the capacity of people to steer or transform it. Yet at the same time, Gibson-Graham push away from communism to launch their vision of postcapitalism. Communism is that against which they construct their alterative conception of the economy. It's a constitutive force, present as a shaping of the view they advocate. Even as Nancy's evocation of communism serves as a horizon for their thinking, they explicitly jettison the term "communism," which they position as the object of "widespread aversion" and which they associate with the "dangers of posing a positivity, a nonnative representation." Rejecting the positive notion of "communism," they opt for a te1m that suggests an empty relationally to the capitalist system they ostensibly deny, "post-capitalism." For Gibson-Graham, the term "capitalist" is not a term of critique or opprobrium; it's not part of a manifesto. The term is a cause of the political problems facing the contemporary Left. They argue that the discursive dominance of capitalism embeds the Left in paranoia, melancholia, and moralism. Gibson-Graham's view is a specific instance of a general assumption shared by leftists who embrace a generic post-capitalism but eschew a more militant anticapitalism. Instead of actively opposing capitalism, this tendency redirects anticapitalist energies into efforts to open up discussions and find ethical spaces for decision-and this in a world where one bond trader can bring down a bank in a matter of minutes. I take the opposite position. The dominance of capitalism, the capitalist system, is material. Rather than entrapping us in paranoid fantasy, an analysis that treats capitalism as a global system of appropriation, exploitation, and circulation that enriches the few as it dispossesses the many and that has to expend an enormous amount of energy in doing so can anger, incite, and galvanize. Historically, in theory and in practice, critical analysis of capitalist exploitation has been a powerful weapon in collective struggle. It persists as such today, in global acknowledgment of the excesses of neoliberal capitalism. As recently became clear in worldwide rioting, protest, and revolution, linking multiple sites of exploitation to narrow channels of privilege can replace melancholic fatalism with new assertions of will, desire, and collective strength. The problem of the Left hasn't been our adherence to a Marxist critique of capitalism. It's that we have lost sight of the communist horizon, a glimpse of which new political movements are starting to reveal. Sometimes capitalists, conservatives, and liberal democrats use a rhetoric that treats communism as a lost horizon. But usually they keep communism firmly within their sight. They see communism as a threat, twenty years after its ostensible demise. To them, communism is so threatening that they premise political discussion on the repression of the communist alternative. In response to left critiques of democracy for its failure to protect the interests of poor and workingclass people, conservatives and liberals alike scold that "everybody knows" and "history shows" that communism doesn't work. Communism might be a nice ideal, they concede, but it always leads to violent, authoritarian excesses of power. They shift the discussion to communism, trying to establish the limits of reasonable debate. Their critique of communism establishes the political space and condition of democracy. Before the conversation even gets going, liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives unite to block communism from consideration. It's off the table. Those who suspect that the inclusion of liberals and democrats in a set with capitalists and conservatives is illegitimate are probably democrats themselves. To determine whether they belong in the set of those who fear communism, they should consider whether they think any evocation of communism should come with qualifications, apologies, and condemnations of past excesses. If the answer is "yes," then we have a clear indication that liberal democrats, and probably radical democrats as well, still consider communism a threat that must be suppressed-and so they belong in a set with capitalists and conservatives. All are anxious about the forces that communist desire risks unleashing. There are good reasons for liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives to be anxious. Over the last decade a return to communism has re-energized the Left. Communism is again becoming a discourse and vocabulary for the expression of universal, egalitarian, and revolutionary ideals. In March 2009, the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities hosted a conference entitled "On the Idea of Communism." Initially planned for about 200 people, the conference ultimately attracted over 1 ,200, requiring a spillover room to accommodate those who couldn't fit in the primary auditorium. Since then, multiple conferences-in Paris, Berlin, and New York-and publications have followed, with contributions from such leading scholars as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Bruno Bosteels, Susan Buck-Morss, Costas Douzinas, Peter Hallward, Michael Hardt, Antonio Neg1i, Jacques Ranciere, Alberto Toscano, and Slavoj Zizek. The conferences and publications consolidate discussions that have been going on for decades. For over thirty years, Antonio Negri has sought to build a new approach to communism out of a Marxism reworked via Spinoza and the Italian political experiments of the 1970s. The Empire trilogy that Negri coauthored with Michael Hardt offers an affirmative, non-dialectical reconceptualization of labor, power, and the State, a new theory of communism from below. Alain Badiou has been occupied with communism for over forty years, from his philosophical and political engagement with Maoism, to his emphasis on the "communist invariants"-egalitarian justice, disciplinary tenor, political volunteerism, and trust in the people-to his recent appeal to the communist Idea. Communism is not a new interest for Slavoj Zizek either. In early 2001 he put together a conference and subsequent volume rethinking Lenin. Where Negri and Badiou reject the Party and the State, Zizek retains a certain fidelity to Lenin. "The key 'Leninist' lesson today," he writes, is that "politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics."4 In short, a vital area of radical philosophy considers communism a contemporary name for emancipation)', egalitarian politics and form part of the communist legacy. These ongoing theoretical discussions overlap with the changing political sequences marked by 1968 and 1989. They also overlap with the spread of neoliberal capitalist domination, a domination accompanied by extremes in economic inequality, ethnic hatred, and police violence, as well as by widespread militancy, insurgency, occupation, and revolution. The current emphasis on communism thus exceeds the coincidence of academic conferences calling specifically for communism's return with the new millennium's debt crises, austerity measures, increased unemployment, and overall sacrifice of the achievements of the modern welfare state to the private interests of financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Already in an interview in 2002, p1ior to his election to the Bolivian presidency, Evo Morales had announced that "the neoliberal system was a failure, and now it's the poor people's turn."·' Communism is reemerging as a magnet of political energy because it is and has been the alterative to capitalism. The communist horizon is not lost. It is Real. In this book, I explore some of the ways the communist horizon manifests itself to us today. As Bosteels argues, to invoke the communist horizon is to produce "a complete shift in perspective or a radical ideological turnabout, as a result of which capitalism no longer appears as the only game in town and we no longer have to be ashamed to set our expecting and desiring eyes here and now on a different organization of social relationships."6 With communism as our horizon, the field of possibilities for revolutionary theory and practice starts to change shape. Barriers to action fall away. New potentials and challenges come to the fore. Anything is possible. Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the form of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle-in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (party, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves.

## Case

#### Method fails

#### 1] Settler colonialism is a structure of elimination, not an event, upheld by legal moves by settlers.

**Rifkin 14** (Settler Common Sense Mark Rifkin Published by University of Minnesota Press Rifkin, M.. Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/.)

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settlercolonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func - tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix). These accounts are differently configured, but in all of them, the contours of settlement appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality. What, though, might be lost in an analytical investment in tracing settlement as a structure or ontology—a somewhat self-generating, uniform whole? The ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as an embodied set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials can slide from view, deferring discussion of how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian nonnative sensations, dispositions, and lived trajectories. Holland notes of discussions of antiblack racism that “when we return to [racist] practice, we can only see something produced by the machinations of large systems like the university or the state. We often only have eyes for the spectacularity of racist practice, not its everyday machinations” (27), later observing, “[W]e might come to think differently about the historical—we might find a grounding for racist practice that acknowledges both systemic practices and quotidian effects that far exceed our patterned understanding of how history has happened to us” (52). When and how do projects of elimination, replacement, and possession become geographies of everyday nonnative occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler–Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? Quotidian forms of sensation—processes of routine happening—fade from view in the move away from the “everyday” and toward the “systemic.” In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour argues against kinds of analysis in which “the social” functions as an explanatory tool that exceeds and precedes the particular sets and sites of relations under discussion: “every activity—law, science, technology, religion, organization, politics, management, etc.—could be related to and explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them” (8).8 Doing so short-circuits the investigation by a priori positing an integrated set of connections that is then treated as a sufficient cause for the “activity” in question, which itself functions in the analysis as merely a bearer of that self-same “social aggregate”—not doing anything on its own. The dynamics by which legislative and administrative agendas come to function as an animating part of daily life, the differences such realization and localization make in the terms and trajectories of those explicit projects, and the possibilities for forms of disjuncture between the state apparatus and everyday experience are bracketed by the positing of a clear, direct, and inevitable relation characterized as “ontological.” Raymond Williams observes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. . . . In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular,” instead needing “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” (112), and he describes the tendency to speak and think in terms of systems as a “procedural mode” that emphasizes “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (128). Following this line of thought, accounts of settlement as always-already a “formed whole” leave aside the ways the institutions of the settler-state become “actively involved” in the daily life of nonnatives, serving as “formative” but in ways that cannot be understood as always taking the same shape and thus known beforehand. Moreover, this processual approach leans away from the tendency to look to a limited set of federal laws, cases, and policy determinations as the means of defining the legal terms (the structure) of settlement, particularly given the unevenness of the application of federal norms generally, the development of divergent patterns in states and territories, and the fact that states in the Northeast sought to present themselves as not bound by the terms of federal Indian affairs.9 The notion of settler common sense seeks to address how the varied legalities, administrative structures, and concrete effects of settler governance get “renewed” and “recreated” in ordinary phenomena by nonnative, nonstate actors, in ways that do not necessarily affirm settlement as an explicit, conscious set of imperatives/initiatives or coordinate with each other as a self-identical program. As a project of reading, then, it looks for the textual traces of quotidian ways of (re)producing the givenness of settler jurisdiction, placemaking, and personhood, attending to the means by which writings that feature neither Indians nor the expropriation of Native lands register the impression of everyday modes of colonial occupation.

#### 2] Moves by the settler and state produce forms of engagement with the land that are inherently colonial.

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Such “templates” are efficacious not because of an ideological hold they have over consciousness, which can be broken through falsification or deconstruction. They are not logical propositions or beliefs that can be disposed of by being shown to be incorrect. Rather, “plug-ins” are integrated into everyday life via the material “techniques” and networks through which they circulate, and those templates and techniques function as part of quotidian, nonconscious processes of orientation, (re)producing a phenomenological sense of givenness and projecting it as the horizon of future possibility.20 In this sense, nonnatives need not function directly as agents of the state or as conscious purveyors of state aims in order to rematerialize state-effects by drawing on extant geographies, discourses, and normative frames as anchors in processes of affective sense-making and “reckon[ing] with [their] environment.” Moreover, these actualizations and enactments of “familiarity” may not be identical or congruent with each other. Multiple histories of state action that inhabit, orient, and stimulate the present “impress” in ways that might produce different (even incommensurate) forms of engagement. Comfort in the Lockean privatized autonomy of one’s home(stead) (chapter 2), an inclination toward “nature” as a space of escape from the extant regime of property ownership (chapter 3), and immersion in the obscure anonymities of urban dwelling (chapter 4) do not resemble one another and arise out of disparate affective—and perhaps ethical—commitments. Yet, all of them iterate, to varied effects, the geopolitical self-evidence and security of the state whose unquestioned endurance anchors and animates them. The point, then, is not what nonnatives consciously think or believe about Native people(s), and the critical task is not to disprove, refute, or replace such conscious commitments. I am not making claims about Hawthorne’s, Thoreau’s, or Melville’s attitudes toward Indians or their conscious principles with respect to Indian policy. Instead, what is at issue is how the juridical dimensions and dynamics of settlement impress upon and are lived and reconstituted as the material animating ordinary nonnative experience: how settlement is actualized, stabilized, and extended through modes of settler sensation and how such sensation serves as the context from which textual representation emerges. In addition, though, texts provide an archive of available templates, how those templates are mobilized in projects of representation, and the material conditions of possibility (the modes of everyday sense-making) through which the texts’ terms become intelligible. When engaged from a perspective that disorients the givenness of settler phenomenologies—that does not take for granted the familiarity of, in Apess’s terms, “the way our fathers first brought us up”—those same texts (such as those on which I focus) can be read in ways that track the process of template making and circulation, drawing on them as a resource in thinking back toward everyday forms of normalization so as to open increased possibilities for imagining otherwise.21