## Setcol

#### Land acknowledgement – I acknowledge that right now I currently occupy the land belonging to Akokisa, Karankawa, and Sana tribes who occupied Houston for thousands of years prior to Settlers taking over. The Karankawa people were eliminated by Settlers and considered to be extinct. And the Akokisa and Sana tribes were forcefully removed from the land to Kansas where they lived with the Tonkawa tribe. I acknowledge that right now as a settler I live and stand on stolen land.

#### Settler colonialism is a structure of elimination, not an event, upheld by legal moves by settlers.

**Rifkin 14** (Settler Common Sense Mark Rifkin Published by University of Minnesota Press Rifkin, M.. Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/.)

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settlercolonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func - tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix). These accounts are differently configured, but in all of them, the contours of settlement appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality. What, though, might be lost in an analytical investment in tracing settlement as a structure or ontology—a somewhat self-generating, uniform whole? The ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as an embodied set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials can slide from view, deferring discussion of how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian nonnative sensations, dispositions, and lived trajectories. Holland notes of discussions of antiblack racism that “when we return to [racist] practice, we can only see something produced by the machinations of large systems like the university or the state. We often only have eyes for the spectacularity of racist practice, not its everyday machinations” (27), later observing, “[W]e might come to think differently about the historical—we might find a grounding for racist practice that acknowledges both systemic practices and quotidian effects that far exceed our patterned understanding of how history has happened to us” (52). When and how do projects of elimination, replacement, and possession become geographies of everyday nonnative occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler–Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? Quotidian forms of sensation—processes of routine happening—fade from view in the move away from the “everyday” and toward the “systemic.” In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour argues against kinds of analysis in which “the social” functions as an explanatory tool that exceeds and precedes the particular sets and sites of relations under discussion: “every activity—law, science, technology, religion, organization, politics, management, etc.—could be related to and explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them” (8).8 Doing so short-circuits the investigation by a priori positing an integrated set of connections that is then treated as a sufficient cause for the “activity” in question, which itself functions in the analysis as merely a bearer of that self-same “social aggregate”—not doing anything on its own. The dynamics by which legislative and administrative agendas come to function as an animating part of daily life, the differences such realization and localization make in the terms and trajectories of those explicit projects, and the possibilities for forms of disjuncture between the state apparatus and everyday experience are bracketed by the positing of a clear, direct, and inevitable relation characterized as “ontological.” Raymond Williams observes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. . . . In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular,” instead needing “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” (112), and he describes the tendency to speak and think in terms of systems as a “procedural mode” that emphasizes “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (128). Following this line of thought, accounts of settlement as always-already a “formed whole” leave aside the ways the institutions of the settler-state become “actively involved” in the daily life of nonnatives, serving as “formative” but in ways that cannot be understood as always taking the same shape and thus known beforehand. Moreover, this processual approach leans away from the tendency to look to a limited set of federal laws, cases, and policy determinations as the means of defining the legal terms (the structure) of settlement, particularly given the unevenness of the application of federal norms generally, the development of divergent patterns in states and territories, and the fact that states in the Northeast sought to present themselves as not bound by the terms of federal Indian affairs.9 The notion of settler common sense seeks to address how the varied legalities, administrative structures, and concrete effects of settler governance get “renewed” and “recreated” in ordinary phenomena by nonnative, nonstate actors, in ways that do not necessarily affirm settlement as an explicit, conscious set of imperatives/initiatives or coordinate with each other as a self-identical program. As a project of reading, then, it looks for the textual traces of quotidian ways of (re)producing the givenness of settler jurisdiction, placemaking, and personhood, attending to the means by which writings that feature neither Indians nor the expropriation of Native lands register the impression of everyday modes of colonial occupation.

#### Extinction is a psychic settler fantasy to infinitely defer action against colonialism.

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Settlers love to contemplate **the possibility of their own extinction**; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. **Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.**1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 **that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well.** The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10

#### Indigenous people are always barred from debate over climate change because their advocacy doesn’t mirror that of other groups who are able to provide economic and geopolitical incentives for their voices to be heard.

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In 1992, **nation states around the world signed an international treaty known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change** (UNFCCC) **to begin addressing the problem of climate change.** Since 1995, parties to the convention have met annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess and strategize around the issue. The UNFCCC is generally understood to be more open to NGO participation than most other international issues, however, as Caniglia, Brulle and Szasz, observe in Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives, **a hierarchy within climate change’s civil society** nonetheless **persists.** The authors refer to Peter Newell’s classification, a table of which has been reproduced here (emphases added): As the table demonstrates**, indigenous activists** (as well as indigenous organizations, governments, and their representatives) **are categorized as “Outside-Outsiders**.” Beyond a label that indicates their marginalization, the table reveals broader implications for the type of access that Indigenous Peoples have to the negotiations. **Compare this to “Inside-Insiders,” who not only get access to and support from delegations, but they are also granted an ability to directly influence the negotiations**, and form collaborative relationships with governments and the private sector. **“Inside-Outsiders,”** meanwhile, **are able to make ample use of the media and can reasonably expect some response from** international and regional **institutions. These are the partnerships that allow civil society to exercise power in the public sphere, and for “Outside-Outsiders,” they are unavailable.** Moreover, as Caniglia et al point out**, the structure of international conferences is biased to favor northern, industrialized norms**. In order to understand the repercussions of this outsider squared status, we ought to turn to intersectionality theory and deliberative politics. In Women’s Rights in Democratizing States: Just Debate and Gender Justice in the Public Sphere, Denise Walsh uses a definition of **civil society** that **is limited to social movements,** organizations and associations that are **engaged in public debate, with an emphasis on public debate. Thus, those areas of civil society that provide opportunities for debate are most important**. As Neera Chandhoke argues, “global civil society actors engage in practices that can possibly reshape the ‘architecture’ of international politics by denying the primacy of states or of their sovereign rights.” To put the two together: **public debate can subvert, to an extent, states’ monopolies on international policy. But Indigenous Peoples have limited access to civil society due to the very nature by which it is constructed**. This is where intersectionality comes into play. Intersectionality is a concept from feminist theory that “treats social positions as relational, and it makes visible the multiple positioning that constitutes everyday life and the power relations that are central to it.” It is about “the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axes of differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experimental – intersect in historically specific contexts” (Dhamoon quoting Brah and Phoenix, 231). Thus, “where the roads intersect, there is a double, triple, multiple, and many-layered blanket of oppression.” Dhamoon goes on to cite Foucault, explaining that ultimately the focus of analysis is about “techniques of power” (Dhamoon 231). Therefore, **we need to think of Indigenous Peoples’ relationship to the climate change agenda in terms of multiple outsider statuses**: collective versus individual rights, minority versus majority, ethnicity, race, class, regional location, rural versus urban, etc. I would like to push this even further and emphasize that **the outsider status to which Indigenous Peoples and civil society actors are relegated within international policy-making creates yet another piece of the intersectionality puzzle, contributing to a complex and multi-layered system of oppression**. To return then to Chandhoke, the question is how **these multiple systems of oppression prevent Indigenous Peoples from engaging in practices to reshape the architecture of international politics.** Or, to draw on Walsh’s theory, in what ways are Indigenous Peoples refused the opportunity to participate in public debate? **The way in which we conceptualize the climate change debate reinforces the dominance of both the state and the market: it ensures that we continue to think of power inequalities in terms of national boundaries**, and it defines these inequalities in terms of economics; at COP21, the main concern with regards to inequality usually had to do with the division of “developed” versus “developing” countries. Which countries will be allowed to emit? Which ones must reduce? These are primarily market-driven questions that reinforce a system that is categorized on the basis of capitalism and nationhood. **Because climate change is discussed in terms of state responsibility and market effects, this international relations rhetoric sustains both the state and the market as the two most powerful and important avenues for change and accountability.** And as discussed, the most open channel **for Indigenous Peoples to secure change** at national, regional, and international **levels is through civil society – which is distinct from both state and market. This is less of a problem for other interest groups that use civil society as only one avenue to advance their agendas**; some of their other needs may in fact be met by the state or the market. For example, someone who pushes for radical environmental politics through an Outside-Outsider NGO receives human rights guarantees from her state in other areas. Yet **for Indigenous Peoples, this is infrequently, if ever, the case; their rights in all areas are tied to climate change policy**. There was no nation to advance the indigenous agenda at COP21. **There was no private corporation to ensure that their economic interests were safeguarded**, and capitalism is one of the primary causes of poverty for indigenous populations. When we understand these dynamics from the perspective of intersectionality, it makes more sense to insist that all participants in the climate change debate are aware of these forces. Policymakers who decide the future of climate change are not only making decisions with economic and environmental repercussions, but also with human rights outcomes for some 5000 distinct societies in 90 countries around the world. **The recourses for managing the interests of indigenous nations and peoples are fewer and more challenging given the nature of a system that is biased to respond to nation-states and the free market**. As a result, the stakes at the international level for these groups are much higher than policy makers, scientists, and other actors either recognize or are willing to admit. How do we address this problem of compounding inequality? At the very least, In**digenous Peoples’ obstacles should be formally recognized and given priority so that they are not always kept within the margin as “Outside-Outsider” members of civil society.** Countries must adopt and legislate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and actively refer to it in future COP documents and negotiations. On May 10, 2016, Canada formally adopted the declaration, bringing an end to years of official opposition. This, combined with Canada’s renewed and powerful commitment to climate change should provide a precedent for other countries such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand to do the same. Finally, **instead of thinking of climate change inequality in terms of north-south, we need to instead “examine the processes of globalization that have produced groups in different places all over the world with unequal access to political, economic or social resources**.” This means re-examining the processes of the climate change debate at the international and regional levels, which I explore in my interview with Tom Goldtooth. Actors are no strangers to needing to revise the process; failures at previous COPs have necessitated this, and I would contend that COP21 was a failure in this regard, the effects of which will be realized in years to come unless change comes to the climate change regime. The system needs to adjust accordingly. Because Indigenous Peoples are uniquely placed in society, experiencing a range of overlapping inequalities, they are in fact great advocates to combat climate change not only in terms of their traditional knowledge and propensity towards conservation, but also because of their unique political status. When our system treats a large sector of society that holds 65% of the Earth’s land area as Outside-Outsiders, it is the system that must change.

#### Settler workers are still settlers – the 1ac grounds their politics in a defense of indigenous dispossession and necessitates settler expansion.

Englert 20 Sai Englert (lecturer @ Universiteit Leiden), 2020, “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession,” Antipode, Vol. 0, No. 0, doi:10.1111/anti.12659

The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society ... In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine.

#### The alternative is to decolonize

**Tuck and Yang** (Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society 1.1 (2012). //aw)

Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym. Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants.

#### The ROTB is to vote for the team who best acknowledges their position in the empire and centers indigenous voices into the conversation.

**Byrd 11** (Byrd, Jodi A. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. NED - New edition ed., University of Minnesota Press, 2011. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv97j.)

Although the United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have resisted defining “indigenous peoples” in order to prevent nation-states from policing the category as a site of exception, Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee) and Taiaiake Alfred (Kahnawake Mohawk) provide a useful provisional definition in their essay “Being Indigenous”: Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped, and lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism. The communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies and states that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this oppositional, placebased existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world.³² In their definition there emerges a contentious, oppositional identity and existence to confront imperialism and colonialism. Indigenousness also hinges, in Alfred and Corntassel, on certain Manichean allegories of foreign/native and colonizer/colonized within reclamations of “placebased existence,” and these can, at times, tip into a formulation that does not challenge neoliberalism as much as it mirrors it. But despite these potential pitfalls, indigenous critical theory could be said to exist in its best form when it centers itself within indigenous epistemologies and the specificities of the communities and cultures from which it emerges and then looks outward to engage European philosophical, legal, and cultural traditions in order to build upon all the allied tools available. Steeped in anticolonial consciousness that deconstructs and confronts the colonial logics of settler states carved out of and on top of indigenous usual and accustomed lands, indigenous critical theory has the potential in this mode to offer a transformative accountability. From this vantage, indigenous critical theory might, then, provide a diagnostic way of reading and interpreting the colonial logics that underpin cultural, intellectual, and political discourses. But it asks that settler, native, and arrivant each acknowledge their own positions within empire and then reconceptualize space and history to make visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and diasporas have sought to obscure. Within the continental United States, it means imagining an entirely different map and understanding of territory and space: a map constituted by over sovereign indigenous nations, with their own borders and boundaries, that transgress what has been naturalized as contiguous territory divided into states.³³ “There is always,” Aileen Moreton-Robinson writes of indigenous peoples’ incommensurablity within the postcolonizing settler society, “a subject position that can be thought of as fixed in its inalienable relation to land. This subject position cannot be erased by colonizing processes which seek to position the indigenous as object, inferior, other and its origins are not tied to migration.”³⁴

### Extra T

#### Interpretaion – the affirmative must defend the right to worker strikes, that excludes students

#### Violation – they stop climate strikes which is through students –

**NEVES** Climate Strikes DO work - they bring media attention to climate change and influence policy makers. Neves 20, Felipe Schaeffer Neves, Leaders For Climate Action, "Climate Strikes: how effective is it to participate in them? - Leaders for Climate Action", 1/9/2020, https://lfca.earth/strikes/. Accessed 6/23. [AV] // recut aw)

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when workers refuse to come to work as a form of protest in response to some sort of employee grievances. They gather outside the factory or company (or at another strategic location) and make their demands heard. These demands could be for labor rights or policy change, as the embodiment of class struggle. Without workers, the company can not function and therefore faces losses, with bosses being forced to engage in dialog with the strikers. Climate strikes are a little different. So far students have been the protagonists driving this movement forward. In this case, they protest by not going to school and, united, demand action against climate change and its consequences for their future. Their demands are objective, ambitious, and carry an enormous sense of urgency.

#### Standards

#### 1]Extra t is a voter – a) makes engagement impossible on their entire second advantage because the topic constrains us to workers strikes which means that’s the only prep we do kills fairness and edu since we cant learn if we cant engage and we always auto lose to a2 – even if you defend the whole res your entire second adv is labeled “climate strikes”

#### 2] Aspec – must spec an actor a) k2 education since it’s the only way we can have narrow debates since every political climate is different b) k2 fairness since you can shift the actor partway through the round based on answers and we have a 1ar restart.

#### Fairness and education

#### Fairness is a constitutive part of debate and the only basis we have to make arguments.

and edu

1] its why schools fund debate

#### **2] it’s the only portable skill from debate**

#### And competing interps on T

#### 1] no way to be reasonably topical – you either meet or you don’t

#### Dtd

#### 1] dropping the debater deters any future abuse bc when you lose the round you learn and stop doing it

#### 2] substance has already been skewed, the only logical option is to drop the debater because substantive is impossible to evaluate fairly

#### No rvi

#### 1] Rvis just encourage the whole debate to become a theory debate and we never get back to substance

#### 2] logic- you shouldn’t win just because you were fair and didn’t break a rule

#### 3] chilling effect -- rvis encourage good theory debaters to be really unfair and either a] they don’t get theory read on them and they are abusive so they can win on substance or b] they do get theory read on them and they a win on an rvi, it encourages ppl to b super unfair on substance so you read a theory shell and they can win on an rvi

### New Affs Bad

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't

#### 1] clash a) neg prep— I can’t put together a cohesive 1nc with 4 minutes of prep – preround disclosure is k2 to to learn about the aff and make a 1nc b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn't inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature. Key to fairness. I can’t engage if I have no prep or clash to engage with.

## Case

### FW

#### Top level ov to util –

#### 1] prioritization of death and extinction ignores that indigenous tribes right now are unable to a) have a life because of genocide b) have access to land/culture and thus are unable to ever truly have value to life and c) indigenous people are not even being considered in death ow args as people with meaning because they are so often footnoted – this takes out death ow and extinction args

#### 2] indigen diff meaning of life and pain – util’s meaning of life is settler centered and only supposes people want to live

#### 3] lex prereq 1) no because we’ll win it’s a fantast 2) just bc something first =/ priority

### A1

### Impact D

#### [1]Negative feedback loops check for warmiing

[Singer](https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/12-04-15_why_scientists_disagree.pdf) et al 15. (Dr. Siegfried Fred Singer is an Austrian-born American physicist and emeritus professor of environmental science at the University of Virginia. Dr. Robert Merlin Carter was an English palaeontologist, stratigrapher and marine geologist. Dr. Craig D. Idso is the founder, former president and current chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming. December 4, 2015. https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/12-04-15\_why\_scientists\_disagree.pdf)

A doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial levels (from 280 to 560 ppm) would likely produce a temperature forcing of 3.7 Wm-2 in the lower atmosphere, for about ~1°C of prima facie warming. # IPCC models stress the importance of positive feedback from increasing water vapor and thereby project warming of ~3–6°C, whereas empirical data indicate an order of magnitude less warming of ~0.3–1.0°C. # In ice core samples, changes in temperature precede parallel changes in atmospheric CO2 by several hundred years; also, temperature and CO2 are uncoupled through lengthy portions of the historical and geological records; therefore CO2 cannot be the primary forcing agent for most temperature changes. Atmospheric methane (CH4) levels for the past two decades fall well below the values projected by IPCC in its assessment reports. IPCC’s temperature projections incorporate these inflated CH4 estimates and need downward revision accordingly. # The thawing of permafrost or submarine gas hydrates is not likely to emit dangerous amounts of methane at current rates of warming. # Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are expected to fall as CO2 concentrations and temperatures rise, indicating it acts as a negative climate feedback. # Other negative feedbacks on climate sensitivity that are either discounted or underestimated by IPCC include increases in low-level clouds in response to enhanced atmospheric water vapor, increases in ocean emissions of dimethyl sulfide (DMS), and the presence and total cooling effect of both natural and industrial aerosols.

#### [2]Best Science confirms no extinction

Idso et al, PhDs, 18

(Craig, Geography@ArizonaState, David Legates, Climatology@Delaware, ProfClimatology@Deleware, Fred Singer, Physics@Princeton, ProfEnviroScience@Virginia, Climate Change Reconsidered II: Fossil Fuels, NIPCC, Ch.2, p. 108-109, Chapter Contributors: Joseph Bast, FormerPresident@HeartlandInstitute, Patrick Frank, PhD Chemistry@Stanford, Kenneth Haapala, MS Econ, President@Science+EnvironmentalPolicyProject, Jay Lehr, PhD Hyrdrology@Arizona, Patrick Moore, Co-Founder@Greenpeace, PhD Ecology@UniversityBrittishColumbia, Willie Soon, PhD AerospaceEngineering@USC, Chapter Reviewers: Charles Anderson, PhD Biology@Stanford, AssocProfBiolofy@PennState, Dennis Avery, DirectorFoodSecurity@Hudson, FormerUSDeptAg, Timothy Ball, PhD Climatology@QueenMary, FormerProfGeography@Winnipeg, David Bowen, PhD Geology@UCBoulder, ProfGeology@MontanaState, David Burton, MA CompSci@UTAustin, Mark Campbell, PhD Chemistry@JohnsHopkins, ProfChemistry@USNavalAcademy, David Deming, PhD PublicPolicy@Harvard, ProfPublicPolicy@Harvard, Rex Fleming, PhD AtmosphericScience@Michigan, Lee Gerhard, PhD Geology@Kansas, François Gervais, PhD Physics@UniversityNewOreleans, ProfPhysics@FrançoisRabelaisUniversity, Laurence Gould, ProfPhysics@UniversityHatford, PhD Physics@Temple, Kesten Green, PhD Managment@VictoriaManagmentSchool, Hermann Harde, PhD Engineering@UniversityOfKaiserslautern, Howard Hayden, PhD Physics@DenverUniversity, Ole Humlum, PhD GlacialGeomorphology@UniversityCopenhagen, ProfGeography@Oslo, Richard Keen, PhD Climatology@Colorado, ProfAtmosphericScience@Colorado, William Kininmonth, MSc@Colorado, FormerHead@AustralianBureauOfMeteorologyNationalClimateCenter, Anthony Lupo, PhD AtmosphericScience@Purdue, ProfAtmosphericScience@Missouri, Robert Murphy, PhD Chemistry@MIT, ProfPharmacology@Colorado, David Nebert, MD@UniversityOregon, ProfEnvironmentalHealth@Cincinati, Norman Page, PhD Geology@Illinois, Frederick Palmer, JD@Arizona, Gath Paltridge, PhD AtmosphericPhysics@UniversityMelbourne, ChiefResearchScientist@CSIRODivisionAtmosphericResearch, Jim Petch, PhD Geography@KingsCollegeLondon, Jan-Erik Solheim, MA PoliSci@Oslo, FormerExecDirectorUNEnvironmentProgram, Peter Stilbs, PhD Chemistry@RoyalInstituteTechnology, Roger Tattersol, BA History+PhilosophyOfScience@Leeds, Frank Tipler, PhD Physics@Maryland, ProfPhysics@Tulane, Ftitz Vahrenholt, PhD Chemistry@Munster, Art Viterito, PhD Climatology@Denver, ProfGeography@Maryland, Lance Wallace, PhD Physics@CUNY)

Methodology The Scientific Method is a series of requirements imposed on scientists to ensure the integrity of their work. The IPCC has not followed established rules that guide scientific research. Appealing to consensus may have a place in science, but not as a means of shutting down debate. Uncertainty in science is unavoidable but must be acknowledged. Many declaratory and predictive statements about the global climate are not warranted by science. Observations Surface air temperature is governed by energy flow from the Sun to Earth and from Earth back into space. Whatever diminishes or intensifies this energy flow can change air temperature. Levels of carbon dioxide and methane in the atmosphere are governed by processes of the carbon cycle. Exchange rates and other climatological processes are poorly understood. The geological record shows temperatures and CO2 levels in the atmosphere have not been stable, making untenable the IPCC’s assumption that they would be stable in the future in the absence of human emissions. Water vapor is the dominant greenhouse gas owing to its abundance in the atmosphere and the wide range of spectra in which it absorbs radiation. Carbon dioxide (CO2) absorbs energy only in a very narrow range of the longwave infrared spectrum. Controversies Reconstructions of average global surface temperature differ depending on the methodology used. The warming of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has not been shown to be beyond the bounds of natural variability. General circulation models (GCMs) are unable to accurately depict complex climate processes. They do not accurately hindcast or forecast the climate effects of human-related greenhouse gas emissions. Estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity (the amount of warming that would occur following a doubling of atmospheric CO2 level) range widely. The IPCC’s estimate is higher than many recent estimates. Solar irradiance, magnetic fields, UV fluxes, and cosmic rays are poorly understood and may have greater influence on climate than general circulation models currently assume. Climate Impacts There is little evidence that the warming of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has caused a general increase in severe weather events. Meteorological science suggests a warmer world will see milder weather patterns. Arctic ice is losing mass, but melting commenced before there was a human impact on climate and is not unprecedented. Antarctica is either gaining ice mass or is unchanged. Best available data show sea-level rise is not accelerating. Local and regional sea levels continue to exhibit typical natural variability. The link between warming and drought is weak, and by some measures drought decreased over the twentieth century. Changes in the hydrosphere of this type are regionally highly variable and show a closer correlation with multidecadal climate rhythmicity than they do with global temperature. Plants have responded positively to rising temperatures and carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, a trend that is likely to continue beyond the twenty-first century. Why Scientists Disagree Climate is an interdisciplinary subject requiring insights from many fields of study. Very few scholars have mastery of more than one or two of these disciplines. Fundamental uncertainties arise from insufficient observational evidence and disagreements over how to interpret data and how to set the parameters of models. Many scientists trust the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to objectively report the latest scientific findings on climate change, but it has failed to produce balanced reports and has allowed its findings to be misrepresented to the public. Climate scientists, like all humans, can have tunnel vision. Bias, even or especially if unconscious, can be especially pernicious when data are equivocal and allow multiple interpretations, as in climatology. Appeals to Consensus Surveys and abstract-counting exercises that are said to show a “scientific consensus” on the causes and consequences of climate change invariably ask the wrong questions or the wrong people. No survey data exist that support claims of consensus on important scientific questions. Some survey data, petitions, and peer-reviewed research show deep disagreement among scientists on issues that must be resolved before the man-made global warming hypothesis can be accepted. Some 31,000 scientists have signed a petition saying “there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate.” Prominent climate scientists have said repeatedly that there is no consensus on the most important issues in climate science.

### A2

#### Reject democratic peace – 52 years of analysis and newest models

Grabmeier ’15 (Jeff; 9/3/15; Senior Director of Research and Innovation at Ohio State University, citing a 52-year study; Phys.org, “'Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict,” <https://phys.org/news/2015-09-democratic-peace-international-conflict.html)>

Using a new technique to analyze **52 years of international conflict**, researchers suggest that there may be **no such thing** as a "democratic peace." In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model. Democratic peace is the widely held theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other than countries with other types of government. In the new study, researchers found that economic trade relationships and participation in international governmental organizations play a strong role in keeping the peace among countries. But democracy? Not so much. "That's a startling finding because the value of joint democracy in preventing war is what we thought was the closest thing to a law in international politics," said Skyler Cranmer, lead author of the study and The Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. "There's been empirical research supporting this theory for the past 50 years. Even U.S. presidents have touted the value of a democratic peace, but it **doesn't seem to hold up**, at least the way we looked at it." The study appears this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Cranmer's co-authors are Elizabeth Menninga, assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa and recent Ph.D. graduate in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Mucha, professor of mathematics in the College of Arts and Sciences at UNC-Chapel Hill. Along with casting doubt on democratic peace theory, the study also developed a new way to **predict levels** of international conflict that is **more accurate than any previous model**. The researchers used a new technique to examine all violent conflicts between countries during the period of 1948 to 2000. The result was a model of international conflict that was 47 percent better than the standard model at predicting the level of worldwide conflict five and even 10 years into the future. "The Department of Defense needs to know at least that far in advance what the world situation is going to be like, because it can't react in a year to changes in levels of conflict due to bureaucratic inertia and its longer funding cycle," Cranmer said. "Being able to have a sense of the global climate in five or 10 years would be extremely helpful from a policy and planning perspective." The researchers started the study with a famous idea posed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant back in 1795: that the world could enjoy a "perpetual peace" if countries would become more interconnected in three ways. The modern interpretation of those three ways is: Through the spread of democratic states, more economic interdependence through trade, and more joint membership in international governmental organizations, or IGOs. (Modern examples range from regional agricultural organizations to the European Union and NATO.) Many studies have looked at how these three elements, either together or separately, affect conflict between countries. But even when they were considered together, the impact of the three individual factors were considered additively. What makes this study unique is that the researchers were the first to use a new **statistical measure** developed by Mucha - called multislice community detection—to analyze **all three of these components** collectively. They were able to examine, for the first time, how each component was related to each other. For example, how membership in IGOs affected trade agreements between counties, and vice versa. "When we looked at these networks holistically, we found communities of countries that are similar not only in terms of their IGO memberships, or trade agreements, or in their democratic governments, but in terms of all these three elements together," Cranmer said. The separation between such communities in the world is what the researchers called "Kantian Fractionalization." "You might think of it as the number of cliques the world is split up into and how easy it is to isolate those cliques from one another," Cranmer said. But the deeper the separation between communities or cliques there are in the world at one time, the more dangerous the world becomes. By measuring these communities in the world at one specific time, the researchers could predict with **better accuracy** than ever before how many violent conflicts would occur in one, 5 or 10 years in the future. This study had a broad definition of conflict: any military skirmish where one country deliberately kills a member of another country. Many of the conflicts in this study were relatively small, but it also includes major wars. Predicting one year into the future, this new model was 13 percent better than the standard model at predicting levels of worldwide conflict. But it was 47 percent better at predicting conflict 5 and 10 years into the future. "We measured how fragile these networks are to breaking up into communities," Mucha said. "Remarkably, that fragility in a mathematical sense has a clear political consequence in terms of increased conflict." The linear relationship between higher levels of Kantian fractionalization and more future conflict was so strong that Cranmer couldn't believe it at first. "I threw up my hands in frustration when I first saw the results. I thought we surely must have made a mistake because you almost never see the kind of **clean, linear relationship** that we found outside of textbooks," Cranmer said. "But we confirmed that there is this strong relationship."

### Underview

#### 1ar theory lower level