# 1NC R5 NSD

## K

#### Land acknowledgement – I acknowledge that right now I currently occupy the land belonging to Akokisa, Karankawa, and Sana tribes who occupied Houston for thousands of years prior to Settlers taking over. The Karankawa people were eliminated by Settlers and considered to be extinct. And the Akokisa and Sana tribes were forcefully removed from the land to Kansas where they lived with the Tonkawa tribe. I acknowledge that right now as a settler I live and stand on stolen land.

#### Settler colonialism is a structure of elimination, not an event, upheld by legal moves by settlers.

**Rifkin 14** (Settler Common Sense Mark Rifkin Published by University of Minnesota Press Rifkin, M.. Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/.)

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settlercolonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func - tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix). These accounts are differently configured, but in all of them, the contours of settlement appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality. What, though, might be lost in an analytical investment in tracing settlement as a structure or ontology—a somewhat self-generating, uniform whole? The ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as an embodied set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials can slide from view, deferring discussion of how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian nonnative sensations, dispositions, and lived trajectories. Holland notes of discussions of antiblack racism that “when we return to [racist] practice, we can only see something produced by the machinations of large systems like the university or the state. We often only have eyes for the spectacularity of racist practice, not its everyday machinations” (27), later observing, “[W]e might come to think differently about the historical—we might find a grounding for racist practice that acknowledges both systemic practices and quotidian effects that far exceed our patterned understanding of how history has happened to us” (52). When and how do projects of elimination, replacement, and possession become geographies of everyday nonnative occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler–Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? Quotidian forms of sensation—processes of routine happening—fade from view in the move away from the “everyday” and toward the “systemic.” In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour argues against kinds of analysis in which “the social” functions as an explanatory tool that exceeds and precedes the particular sets and sites of relations under discussion: “every activity—law, science, technology, religion, organization, politics, management, etc.—could be related to and explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them” (8).8 Doing so short-circuits the investigation by a priori positing an integrated set of connections that is then treated as a sufficient cause for the “activity” in question, which itself functions in the analysis as merely a bearer of that self-same “social aggregate”—not doing anything on its own. The dynamics by which legislative and administrative agendas come to function as an animating part of daily life, the differences such realization and localization make in the terms and trajectories of those explicit projects, and the possibilities for forms of disjuncture between the state apparatus and everyday experience are bracketed by the positing of a clear, direct, and inevitable relation characterized as “ontological.” Raymond Williams observes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. . . . In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular,” instead needing “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” (112), and he describes the tendency to speak and think in terms of systems as a “procedural mode” that emphasizes “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (128). Following this line of thought, accounts of settlement as always-already a “formed whole” leave aside the ways the institutions of the settler-state become “actively involved” in the daily life of nonnatives, serving as “formative” but in ways that cannot be understood as always taking the same shape and thus known beforehand. Moreover, this processual approach leans away from the tendency to look to a limited set of federal laws, cases, and policy determinations as the means of defining the legal terms (the structure) of settlement, particularly given the unevenness of the application of federal norms generally, the development of divergent patterns in states and territories, and the fact that states in the Northeast sought to present themselves as not bound by the terms of federal Indian affairs.9 The notion of settler common sense seeks to address how the varied legalities, administrative structures, and concrete effects of settler governance get “renewed” and “recreated” in ordinary phenomena by nonnative, nonstate actors, in ways that do not necessarily affirm settlement as an explicit, conscious set of imperatives/initiatives or coordinate with each other as a self-identical program. As a project of reading, then, it looks for the textual traces of quotidian ways of (re)producing the givenness of settler jurisdiction, placemaking, and personhood, attending to the means by which writings that feature neither Indians nor the expropriation of Native lands register the impression of everyday modes of colonial occupation.

#### Settler workers are still settlers – the 1ac grounds their politics in a defense of indigenous dispossession and necessitates settler expansion.

Englert 20 Sai Englert (lecturer @ Universiteit Leiden), 2020, “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession,” Antipode, Vol. 0, No. 0, doi:10.1111/anti.12659

The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society ... In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine.

#### Kant’s oppositions to colonialism encourage it to continue today because of it’s prestalished and “peaceful” nature.

**Ypi 14**Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (eds.), Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2014, 254pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 0199669627.(2) The second main theme concerns the way in which the critical perspective on colonial practices that Kant arrived at in his last writings is rooted in his philosophy of right. As Arthur Ripstein points out, Kant distinguishes three distinct wrongs of colonialism: (i) the wrongfulness of colonial conquest, (ii) the wrongfulness of the status of a colony and (iii) the wrongfulness of the ways in which colonial rule is typically carried out. The first wrong (i) is based on the fact that colonial conquest amounts to a "way of acquiring territory through the use of force" (148) and is hence continuous with forms of aggressive war, which Kant considers illegitimate. Colonial wars are especially problematic, as they are inconsistent with the continued existence of both belligerents, a requirement to be respected by any rightful type of warfare. (ii) Even in cases where colonial rule might come about as a consequence of a defensive and hence legitimate war, colonial rule is still objectionable as a post bellum mode of governance. Colonial rule entails that one nation continually rules over another and is thus at odds with the right of the inhabitants of the colony to govern themselves through their own institutions. In this regard, even annexation would seem to be a better solution as this at least allows the inhabitants of the colony to enjoy full membership in the newly extended state, a status whereby they are able to rule themselves. The inhabitants of the colony by contrast remain merely passive citizens. (iii) Finally, the third wrong in colonialism concerns the specific way in which colonial rule is exerted. Granted that colonial rule as such is wrong, it still allows for an internal normative standard: if we hold colonial rule to what it itself claims to be doing, we should require that proper colonial rule should operate on behalf of the inhabitants of the colony and should not work to realize the private purposes of the colonizers. According to Kant's characterization, European colonial practices are guilty of all three wrongs of colonialism. Given these wrongs, it might seem natural to expect Kant to articulate a specific right to resist colonial rule and an immediate obligation to compensate colonies for the wrongs they have endured. As Ripstein, Anthony Pagden and Peter Niesen make clear, however, Kant's position on these issues is more complicated. On Kant's account, illicit means of acquisition can still give rise to good title. Even though a state might have extended its territory by means of an aggressive war and therefore through illegitimate means, we must respect the integrity of the new territory once peace has been established. The obvious danger in this regard is that Kant thereby opens the possibility of an ex post facto justification of war and colonial rule (Ripstein: 153) and seems to block the right to "any kind of struggle for independence" (Pagden: 41). Regarding the possibility of restorative justice, Kant is "on record as opposing the rectification of historical wrongs" (Niesen: 183) as he demands that historical grievances be laid to rest in order to allow for a true peace. As Niesen tries to argue, there is, however, still room to formulate principles of restorative justice regarding colonial practices on the level of international and cosmopolitan law that Kant could endorse (see also Pagden: 40).

#### The alternative is to decolonize, not as a metaphor but literally.

**Tuck and Yang** (Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society 1.1 (2012). //aw)

Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym. Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants.

#### The ROTB is to vote for the team who best acknowledges their position in the empire and centers indigenous voices into the conversation.

**Byrd 11** (Byrd, Jodi A. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. NED - New edition ed., University of Minnesota Press, 2011. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv97j.)

Although the United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have resisted defining “indigenous peoples” in order to prevent nation-states from policing the category as a site of exception, Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee) and Taiaiake Alfred (Kahnawake Mohawk) provide a useful provisional definition in their essay “Being Indigenous”: Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped, and lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism. The communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies and states that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this oppositional, placebased existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world.³² In their definition there emerges a contentious, oppositional identity and existence to confront imperialism and colonialism. Indigenousness also hinges, in Alfred and Corntassel, on certain Manichean allegories of foreign/native and colonizer/colonized within reclamations of “placebased existence,” and these can, at times, tip into a formulation that does not challenge neoliberalism as much as it mirrors it. But despite these potential pitfalls, indigenous critical theory could be said to exist in its best form when it centers itself within indigenous epistemologies and the specificities of the communities and cultures from which it emerges and then looks outward to engage European philosophical, legal, and cultural traditions in order to build upon all the allied tools available. Steeped in anticolonial consciousness that deconstructs and confronts the colonial logics of settler states carved out of and on top of indigenous usual and accustomed lands, indigenous critical theory has the potential in this mode to offer a transformative accountability. From this vantage, indigenous critical theory might, then, provide a diagnostic way of reading and interpreting the colonial logics that underpin cultural, intellectual, and political discourses. But it asks that settler, native, and arrivant each acknowledge their own positions within empire and then reconceptualize space and history to make visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and diasporas have sought to obscure. Within the continental United States, it means imagining an entirely different map and understanding of territory and space: a map constituted by over sovereign indigenous nations, with their own borders and boundaries, that transgress what has been naturalized as contiguous territory divided into states.³³ “There is always,” Aileen Moreton-Robinson writes of indigenous peoples’ incommensurablity within the postcolonizing settler society, “a subject position that can be thought of as fixed in its inalienable relation to land. This subject position cannot be erased by colonizing processes which seek to position the indigenous as object, inferior, other and its origins are not tied to migration.”³⁴

## Case

### Fw

#### 1] Natives arent able to access agency because they are erased – three implications a) means kant cant possibly be universalizable until native sovereignty is restored and the k comes first b) kants fw is empirically untrue since even universalizable actions don’t account for indigenous people c) ideal theory is bad for natives because it justifies them continuing to not have agency – since there’s no agency for them absent land being returned which kant stops

#### 2] don’t buy Farr or Holmstrom – a) colonialism is not the same as racism – infact the conflation between them is often used to misdirect decolonial work and misses the root of the oppression which is the US being a settler, don’t let them conflate the too or ext the farr card or it becomes a separate link

#### b) the perm is impossible – tuck and yang

**Tuck and Yang** (Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society 1.1 (2012). //aw)

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurabilit

#### 3] A2 Inclusion – a) its impossible to be inclusionary for everyone if it just completely disregards natives as erased groups of people b) not best for inclusion since phil args are consistently paywalled so theres no way to access it

### Offense/turns

#### Kant negates

#### [1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### [2] Uses others as a mere means to an end

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

#### [3] as long as we are winning some link or thesis to setcol then we have offense under kant since taking native land is a violation of their freedom

### Underview

#### 1] AFC – the negative can test aff fw choice a) predictability – theres no way to have every possible phil ac prepped out b) ground – most fw’s are abitary and exclude offense for one side – means allowing aff to pick fw will just mean everyone reads phil that auto affirms – and at best its dta since the only part of the debate that actually gets skewed is fw

#### And on lbl 1] a) no ground ow insofar as sometimes its impossible to strategically test the aff absent answering the fw b) strat skew non uq 2] a) Phil edu ow topic ed since it teaches us how to analyze the world b) topic ed impossible to debate since there isn’t offense for both sides under every fw 3] neg ground turns insofar as some affs have literally no authors writing under [x] phil for a topic – disclosure doesn’t solve that