# 1AC JanFeb

#### Land acknowledgement – I acknowledge that right now I currently occupy the land belonging to Akokisa, Karankawa, and Sana tribes who occupied Houston for thousands of years prior to Settlers taking over. The Karankawa people were eliminated by Settlers and considered to be extinct. And the Akokisa and Sana tribes were forcefully removed from the land to Kansas where they lived with the Tonkawa tribe. I acknowledge that right now as a settler I live and stand on stolen land.

#### ****Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.****

### Advantage

#### Settler colonialism is a structure of elimination, not an event, upheld by moves by settlers.

**Rifkin 14** (Settler Common Sense Mark Rifkin Published by University of Minnesota Press Rifkin, M.. Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/. //aw)

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settlercolonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func - tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix). These accounts are differently configured, but in all of them, the contours of settlement appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality. What, though, might be lost in an analytical investment in tracing settlement as a structure or ontology—a somewhat self-generating, uniform whole? The ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as an embodied set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials can slide from view, deferring discussion of how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian nonnative sensations, dispositions, and lived trajectories. Holland notes of discussions of antiblack racism that “when we return to [racist] practice, we can only see something produced by the machinations of large systems like the university or the state. We often only have eyes for the spectacularity of racist practice, not its everyday machinations” (27), later observing, “[W]e might come to think differently about the historical—we might find a grounding for racist practice that acknowledges both systemic practices and quotidian effects that far exceed our patterned understanding of how history has happened to us” (52). When and how do projects of elimination, replacement, and possession become geographies of everyday nonnative occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler–Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? Quotidian forms of sensation—processes of routine happening—fade from view in the move away from the “everyday” and toward the “systemic.” In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour argues against kinds of analysis in which “the social” functions as an explanatory tool that exceeds and precedes the particular sets and sites of relations under discussion: “every activity—law, science, technology, religion, organization, politics, management, etc.—could be related to and explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them” (8).8 Doing so short-circuits the investigation by a priori positing an integrated set of connections that is then treated as a sufficient cause for the “activity” in question, which itself functions in the analysis as merely a bearer of that self-same “social aggregate”—not doing anything on its own. The dynamics by which legislative and administrative agendas come to function as an animating part of daily life, the differences such realization and localization make in the terms and trajectories of those explicit projects, and the possibilities for forms of disjuncture between the state apparatus and everyday experience are bracketed by the positing of a clear, direct, and inevitable relation characterized as “ontological.” Raymond Williams observes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. . . . In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular,” instead needing “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” (112), and he describes the tendency to speak and think in terms of systems as a “procedural mode” that emphasizes “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (128). Following this line of thought, accounts of settlement as always-already a “formed whole” leave aside the ways the institutions of the settler-state become “actively involved” in the daily life of nonnatives, serving as “formative” but in ways that cannot be understood as always taking the same shape and thus known beforehand. Moreover, this processual approach leans away from the tendency to look to a limited set of federal laws, cases, and policy determinations as the means of defining the legal terms (the structure) of settlement, particularly given the unevenness of the application of federal norms generally, the development of divergent patterns in states and territories, and the fact that states in the Northeast sought to present themselves as not bound by the terms of federal Indian affairs.9 The notion of settler common sense seeks to address how the varied legalities, administrative structures, and concrete effects of settler governance get “renewed” and “recreated” in ordinary phenomena by nonnative, nonstate actors, in ways that do not necessarily affirm settlement as an explicit, conscious set of imperatives/initiatives or coordinate with each other as a self-identical program. As a project of reading, then, it looks for the textual traces of quotidian ways of (re)producing the givenness of settler jurisdiction, placemaking, and personhood, attending to the means by which writings that feature neither Indians nor the expropriation of Native lands register the impression of everyday modes of colonial occupation.

#### Space colonization is tied with settlers desire to expand control over land and is inherently colonial.

**Smiles 20** (Deondre Ph.D. is a postdoctoral scholar at The Ohio State University. A citizen of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, his ongoing research agenda is situated at the intersection of critical Indigenous geographies and political ecology, centered in the argument that tribal protection of remains, burial grounds, and more-than-human environments represents an effective form of ‘quotidian’ resistance against the settler colonial state, 10-26-20, "The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space," Society+Space, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space . //aw)

Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.\S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994).

#### And – private entities urge to colonize is intertwined with colonial understandings of space and the world as well as the inevitable exploitation of indigenous people on Earth.

**Utrarta 21** (Alina Utrata, Alina Utrata is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, and a Gates-Cambridge and Marshall, 7-14-2021, "Lost in Space," Boston Review, https://bostonreview.net/articles/lost-in-space/ //aw)

For two entrepreneurs whose businesses have been lauded as exceptionally visionary, their celestial utopias stand out for their lack of political creativity and awareness. Bezos’s notion that imperial expansion is the only way to support an ever-growing population is an old colonialist appeal, now repackaged for the stars. The infinite need for resources, as well as the “poverty and pollution” that Bezos dismisses as short-term problems, are deeply enmeshed in capitalism’s cycles of extraction and are currently causing Earth’s climate crisis. Given the green-orientation of his enterprises, Musk is presumably aware of the climate crisis—or at least the opportunities it presents for government funding. Yet he has not explicitly named climate change as one of the potential “extinction events” that a Mars colony might protect against. Putting aside the question of whether terraforming Mars is actually feasible—for the record, a Nature Astronomy article suggests it is not—settling space won’t be cost-free to Earth. As science writer Shannon Stirone pointed out in The Atlantic, “Mars has a very thin atmosphere; it has no magnetic field to help protect its surface from radiation from the sun or galactic cosmic rays; it has no breathable air and the average surface temperature is a deadly 80 degrees below zero . . . . For humans to live there in any capacity they would need to build tunnels and live underground.” The environmental and human destruction necessary to make space habitable would dwarf any technological or political response needed to stop the climate crisis now. And—like capitalism and climate change—the impacts of colonizing space will be far worse for some rather than others, particularly in the Global South. For example, when Indonesian president Joko Widodo offered SpaceX the island of Biak in Papua, home to an ongoing secessionist campaign, local communities protested that the building of the launch station would cause vast ecological damage and community displacement. They had reason to worry. This is precisely what happened in Boca Chica, a small town on the southern tip of Texas where SpaceX had built a previous launch site. After SpaceX moved into town, residents of the Texas community were pushed out from their homes as the area became unsafe due to rocket activity, which has since damaged a wildlife refuge in the area. SpaceX has offered to purchase residents’ homes, but below the price many think is fair. An email from SpaceX to Boca Chica holdouts stated, “As the scale and frequency of spaceflight activities at the site continue to accelerate, your property will frequently fall within established hazard zones in which no civilians will be permitted to remain, in order to comply with all federal and other public safety regulations.” SpaceX’s impact on the area demonstrated little concern for its displacement and damage of the local community. While we all may use, explore, or research space, no state can claim to own it—though this does not mean states will not try. Musk and Bezos rely on the notion that colonizing space somehow differs from colonizing Earth. Implicit in their arguments is the belief that it was not the systems of colonial-capitalism, but rather the context surrounding their implementation, that wreaked havoc in the past. On this view, although previous colonization attempts often unleashed genocidal violence, that history cannot be repeated in space. After all, no one lives there. This perspective ignores the fact that colonial destruction was justified by a specific ideology that made a certain view of the world, and humanity’s role in it, appear natural and inevitable. The idea that space is open for the taking simply because “no one is there” finds root in the exact colonial logics that have justified settler genocide for centuries: that only certain people, using resources in certain ways, have a claim to land and ownership. Imperialist conceptions of ownership thus transform space into an “empty frontier” where certain individuals can project their political dreams, whether they be extractive manufacturing industries or settler colonies. In his recent book Theft is Property! (2019), Robert Nichols interrogates the recursive logic of colonial dispossession, which relies on the simultaneous processes of transformation and theft. As he puts it: Colonization entails the large-scale transfer of land that simultaneously recodes the object of exchange in question such that it appears retrospectively to be a form of theft in the ordinary sense. . . ‘dispossession’ may be coherently reconstructed to refer to a process in which new proprietary relations are generated but under structural conditions that demand their simultaneous negation. In one move, land is both transformed into property, and taken away. The same logic allows Musk and Bezos to claim that space is both “empty” and free for the taking. Of course, that we do not use space is a lie, even if no one owns or occupies a plot of land on the moon. Just as we all use waterways and air, “ownership” cannot determined by whose territory these resources reside in. For example, the increased light pollution (or “light graffiti”) caused by the thousands of orbiting satellites has affected many communities on Earth, from astronomers and their scientific research to indigenous communities who rely on celestial navigation for cultural practices and survival. But because these communities aren’t “properly” using or appropriating space’s resources, they aren’t considered its rightful owners—and therefore have no claim to space. But these communities have no less of a claim to the skies than Musk and Bezos, according to international law. The Outer Space Treaty states that the “exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the province of all mankind.” While we all may use, explore, or research space, no state can claim to own it—though this does not mean states will not try. For example, in 2015 President Barack Obama signed the SPACE Act. The law allowed private U.S. citizens to claim ownership of resources extracted from space and defend their property rights in U.S. courts. International legal experts have pointed out that the SPACE Act may theoretically violate the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits states from claiming sovereignty over any celestial body. The law, however, specifically notes that the United States is not claiming sovereignty over any extraterrestrial territory, only ownership of resources. Critics dismiss this defense; states cannot claim ownership unless they first claim sovereignty over territory. Territoriality, after all, makes states. Even in the stars, it is difficult to imagine any other principle as a basis for governing. Yet territorial borders have never acted as a hard limit to the exercise of power. The United States frequently exerts power over people and property outside of its own(ed) territory. Akin to Benedict Anderson’s logo map, territoriality operates as an imagined associational identity: it legitimates state power, but it does not really create or limit it. Tech entrepreneurs often envision ways to cede from the state, both territorially and politically. Still, utopian visions of political communities—as Philip Steinberg, Elizabeth Nyman and Mauro Caraccioli pointed out—from Plato’s solitary city-state to Martian colonies, often fail to imagine any method beyond territorial sovereignty as a way to escape the state and start afresh. For example, the Seasteading Institute is a “sister project” of Bezos’s and Musk’s space colonization projects, spearheaded by another tech billionaire Peter Thiel. Thiel, Musk’s co-founder at Paypal, and Patri Friedman, a former Google engineer (and Milton Friedman’s grandson), established the Seasteading Institute in order to “further the establishment and growth of permanent, autonomous ocean communities, enabling innovations with new political and social systems” through floating ocean platforms. Like the space colonizers, seasteaders imagine that human engineering will be able to create new, virgin territories—in the sea or stars—which will provide the “space” to solve political problems. “If we can solve the engineering challenges of seasteading, two-thirds of the Earth’s surface becomes open for these political start-ups,” Friedman explained. Thiel has referred to these floating island nations as using a “space colonies model”—but, closer to Earth, the technology to build them is more feasible. For some Silicon Valley elites, the point of these “start-up nations” is that states will not be able to control them. Tech entrepreneurs often envision ways to cede from the state, both territorially and politically. For example, venture capitalist Balaji Srinivasan briefly achieved notoriety for his manifesto “Silicon Valley’s Ultimate Exit” in which he advocated the region cede from the United States to become its own corporate city-state. Moreover, Mark Zuckerberg was asked at a staff meeting during the start of the pandemic whether Facebook could buy a COVID-free island to shelter its employees. Silicon Valley executives are also notorious offshore doomsday preppers, with figures such as Thiel and Y Combinator’s Sam Altman buying and building extravagant apocalypse shelters in New Zealand. But these visions of state secession are not ideologically unmoored. While techno-utopian predictions about the demise of the territorial state are often associated with John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), another political manifesto predicting the end of sovereign nations is also highly influential among Silicon Valley elites—The Sovereign Individual (1997), co-authored by William Rees-Mogg and James Dale Davidson. Despite his reputation for failed political predictions in the United Kingdom, Rees-Mogg has dedicated tech entrepreneur fans, including Thiel, Srinivasan, and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen. It is easy to see why the book appeals to Silicon Valley types; it predicted the rise of cryptocurrency, as well as the death of the nation-state due to technological innovation. But the demise of the state is no cause for concern, Rees-Mogg contends, as it will “liberate individuals as never before.” He states that the new Sovereign Individual “will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically.” As Bezos and Musk extol the virtues of using public money to move humanity into the stars, we should ask: Who are these colonies for? Not everyone on Earth will become a Sovereign Individual, however, according to Rees-Mogg. Only the “cognitive elite . . . persons of superior skills and intelligence” will be so fortunate. On this view, as modern states decline due to dwindling tax revenues, these superior individuals will cede from states entirely to form their own micro-enclaves, causing “a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty.” Most ominously, Rees-Mogg notes, “The lower classes will be walled out. The move to gated communities is all but inevitable.” As Bezos and Musk extol the virtues of using public money to move humanity into the stars, we should ask: Who are these colonies for? The ideals guiding billionaires’ race to space are not new. Lofty utopian visions have often obscured violent processes that prioritize abstract visions of “human civilization” over some human lives. For his part, Bezos looks at this as a utilitarian calculation, a numbers game. If humanity expands into space, he urges, “trillions of humans” can prosper, “which means thousands of Einsteins or Mozarts.” He fails to acknowledge that the genius of those future Einsteins and Mozarts exists now, on Earth, but unrealized and unrecognized in the very cycles of poverty Bezos dismisses as a short-term problem. Furthermore, and more importantly, the value of human life should not be based on some arbitrary utilitarian calculation of humans’ intellectual contribution to “civilization” or their ability to replicate the legacies of two white men. Lofty utopian visions have often obscured violent processes that prioritize abstract visions of “human civilization” over some human lives. Musk is more explicit about his willingness to sacrifice human life. Mars is “not for the faint of heart,” he has pronounced. There’s a “good chance you’ll die. And it’s going to be tough, tough going. But it’ll be pretty glorious if it works out.” In fact, his belief in the necessity of human sacrifice for this glorious future was openly celebrated in his Saturday Night Live skit “Chad on Mars” in which a Martian settler embarks on a suicide mission after a technical malfunction in the colony’s oxygen distribution systems. In the clip Musk remains safely in command back on Earth, thanking the doomed settler on behalf of humanity as his demise is broadcast live worldwide. When the settler perishes at the end of the skit, Musk shrugs his shoulders and walks away, nonchalantly reminding his team, “Well, I did say people were going to die.” While Bezos and Musk are right that colonizing space will not result in the genocide of nonexistent extraterrestrial populations, the colonial destruction of indigenous communities was but one component in a global regime of racial violence. Indeed, the labor needed to support the system of colonial-capitalism in the United States fueled the atrocities of the Atlantic slave trade. In pursuit of America’s “manifest destiny” along the Western frontier, white railroad company owners brutally exploited Asian migrants. One in ten Chinese laborers died building the transcontinental railroad. It is no coincidence that casual discussions of colonization are happening in an industry that is still dominated by white men. Bezos has said that he first became obsessed with space when he was five years old, watching the Apollo moon landing on television exactly fifty-two years before his plans to launch himself into space. Listening to Bezos and Musk speak about their childhood obsession with rocket ships to adoring crowds, one perceives another reason why two of the richest men on Earth are spending billions in public money to get to space: they think it’s cool. One wonders what the five-year-old Bezos would have thought upon learning that Wernher von Braun, whose work was foundational to the Apollo program, was a former Nazi, or that he used slaves to build his rockets in wartime Germany—20,000 of whom died in his factory. Utopian dreams, even in space, always have a human cost. Utopian dreams, even in space, always have a human cost. Remember that the labor needed to support colonial-capitalism in the United States fueled the atrocities of the Atlantic slave trade. Bezos and Musk’s technological visions of becoming an “interplanetary species” do not answer the political question of what kind of future awaits us (whoever “us” is) in space. Will we find, like the British East India Company, that SpaceX and Blue Origin’s space colonies are ultimately incorporated into an arm of the state, inadvertently transforming the United States into an intergalactic empire? Will space corporations, following the Virginia or Massachusetts Bay Companies, break free of their home states (and planets) and become independent governing entities on the moon or Mars? Or will Bezos and Musk, in the image of King Leopold’s horrifically violent Belgian Congo, wrangle their way into becoming personal kings of princely celestial estates? And will states be able to stop them? The language of inevitability that proponents of space colonization deploy obscures another, better option: that we do not colonize space at all.

#### And this colonization excludes Indigenous voices and erases cultural land practices

**Smiles 20** (Deondre Ph.D. is a postdoctoral scholar at The Ohio State University. A citizen of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, his ongoing research agenda is situated at the intersection of critical Indigenous geographies and political ecology, centered in the argument that tribal protection of remains, burial grounds, and more-than-human environments represents an effective form of ‘quotidian’ resistance against the settler colonial state, 10-26-20, "The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space," Society+Space, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space . //aw)

Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics?

#### The erasure through space colonization furthers Indigenous slow death -that’s a threat multiplier

Nixon 11 Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison,” Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor”, pgs. 2-3 https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072343//rm

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

### Framing

#### The ROTB is to vote for the team who best acknowledges their position in the empire and centers indigenous voices into the conversation.

**Byrd 11** (Byrd, Jodi A. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. NED - New edition ed., University of Minnesota Press, 2011. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv97j.)

Although the United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have resisted defining “indigenous peoples” in order to prevent nation-states from policing the category as a site of exception, Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee) and Taiaiake Alfred (Kahnawake Mohawk) provide a useful provisional definition in their essay “Being Indigenous”: Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped, and lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism. The communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies and states that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this oppositional, placebased existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world.³² In their definition there emerges a contentious, oppositional identity and existence to confront imperialism and colonialism. Indigenousness also hinges, in Alfred and Corntassel, on certain Manichean allegories of foreign/native and colonizer/colonized within reclamations of “placebased existence,” and these can, at times, tip into a formulation that does not challenge neoliberalism as much as it mirrors it. But despite these potential pitfalls, indigenous critical theory could be said to exist in its best form when it centers itself within indigenous epistemologies and the specificities of the communities and cultures from which it emerges and then looks outward to engage European philosophical, legal, and cultural traditions in order to build upon all the allied tools available. Steeped in anticolonial consciousness that deconstructs and confronts the colonial logics of settler states carved out of and on top of indigenous usual and accustomed lands, indigenous critical theory has the potential in this mode to offer a transformative accountability. From this vantage, indigenous critical theory might, then, provide a diagnostic way of reading and interpreting the colonial logics that underpin cultural, intellectual, and political discourses. But it asks that settler, native, and arrivant each acknowledge their own positions within empire and then reconceptualize space and history to make visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and diasporas have sought to obscure. Within the continental United States, it means imagining an entirely different map and understanding of territory and space: a map constituted by over sovereign indigenous nations, with their own borders and boundaries, that transgress what has been naturalized as contiguous territory divided into states.³³ “There is always,” Aileen Moreton-Robinson writes of indigenous peoples’ incommensurablity within the postcolonizing settler society, “a subject position that can be thought of as fixed in its inalienable relation to land. This subject position cannot be erased by colonizing processes which seek to position the indigenous as object, inferior, other and its origins are not tied to migration.”³⁴

#### It outweighs

#### A] extinction calculus fails

#### **Reject extinction impacts – normalizes violence and ongoing destruction**

Mitchell ’19

(Audra Mitchell, Chapter 4: Can International Relations Confront the Cosmos, Routledge Handbook of Critical International Relations, Accessed 10/14/2019, PIA).

Does life on earth have a long-term future? Increasingly influential discourses of ‘existential risk’ argue that states and international institutions need to pay more attention to developments that ‘threaten the existence of our entire species’ (CSER, 2015). They examine a range of possible threats to the survival of homo sapiens, from those raised by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, nano-technology and synthetic biology to climate change, global pandemics, nuclear terrorism and even cosmic events such as asteroid strikes and gamma-ray bursts (Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008). Although the probability of these events varies considerably, they each present a non-zero possibility that homo sapiens might be eliminated. For this reason, existential risk researchers seek to shift the register in which threat and the possibilities of survival are understood and governed globally. As Martin Rees (2013) has suggested, IR, global politics and international policy-making should focus less on the ‘minor hazards of everyday life’, such as car accidents and carcinogens, and more on events that ‘have not yet happened but which, if they occurred even once, could cause worldwide devastation’ (Rees, 2013). Homo sapiens, however, is not the only life form thought to be facing the possibility of extinction. Since the 1980s, biologists and ecologists have warned that sharply accelerating rates of extinction may mark the beginning of a new ‘mass extinction event’. This term refers to an earth-wide pattern of extinctions – which Western science defines as death of every member of a species – that eliminates 75 percent or more of extant life forms. Unlike the previous five mass extinctions experienced by earth, which had diverse causes such as the emergence of cyanobacteria and an asteroid strike, the potential ‘sixth mass extinction crisis’ is thought to be driven by ‘anthropogenic’ change. In particular, Western scientists identify four main drivers: climate change, habitat destruction, direct killing and the transfer of life forms across the planet. Although these drivers are attributed to the activities of ‘humanity’, they are predominantly associated with Western political formations such as industrialization, colonization and extractive capitalism (Mitchell, forthcoming). In combination, these phenomena have driven the extinction rates of recorded species well above the ‘background rate’, or the presumed standard rate of extinctions before ‘human’ activities became a determinant factor. This has produced significant decreases in the diversity of life forms globally and across all major taxa. For instance, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, 2016) recently reported a 58 percent decrease in species diversity between 1970 and 2012 alone. Anthony Barnosky and his colleagues (2011) claim that current extinction rates could produce – within just three centuries – a magnitude of extinction last seen in the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction event, which eliminated the dinosaurs (see also Régnier et al., 2015). Several prominent scientists and science journalists working in the area of mass extinction have offered dismal pictures of the implications of these trends for human security. They envision an ‘uninhabitable earth’ (Wallace-Wells, 2017) wracked by global crises in food security, economic collapse (Barnosky, 2014), authoritarian governance, global warfare over dwindling resources (Oreskes and Conway, 2014) and even the forced exile of humans to other planets (Newitz, 2013). Written in overtly securitizing tones intended to shape international governance and policy, these framings of radical finitude have the potential to shape IR and global theory and discourses in problematic ways. In the style of Western disaster or horror films (Colebrook, 2014), they adopt a position of voyeurism that borders on apocalypse porn: it exposes privileged Western readers to thrilling images of sublime destruction, while masking the inequalities of threat and responsibility, and normalizing the violences, that produce these ruptures (Mitchell and Theriault, 2018). For instance, by framing ‘humanity’ as a unitary subject and future victim of ‘extinction’, these narratives obscure the disproportionate effect of global patterns of extinction on worlds in the global south. Moreover, by imagining the destruction of worlds as a future hypothetical, they ignore the modes of world-ending violence enacted by colonization and survived by Indigenous peoples (Whyte, 2016). However, these narratives also confront IR and global theory with irruptions of radical negativity (and possibility) with which it is ill-equipped to contend. Specifically, extinction narratives delineate the boundary conditions of IR, a discipline concerned with, and limited by, its specific concepts of survival. Despite its preoccupation with survival, no branch of IR has directly theorized extinction. In the rare cases where the actual term ‘extinction’ appears in IR discourses, it is used solely as a metaphor for the dissolution of states (see Wight, 1960; Morgenthau, 2005) and should not be interpreted literally. Some major concepts in IR and global theory have flirted with the concept of radical finitude raised by extinction narratives. For instance, the idea of ‘nuclear winter’ popularized by Carl Sagan (1983) predicted that a full-scale nuclear war would destroy life on a massive scale, and undermine the conditions for its regeneration. Remaining humans – and of course, other life forms – would face starvation, viral epidemics and a global-scale deluge of deadly toxins and ultraviolet flux (Sagan, 1983: n.p.). In a similar sense, John Somerville’s (2012 [1983]) concept of ‘omnicide’ suggests that nuclear warfare or ecological collapse could threaten the survival of all modes of life on Earth. Both of these concepts suggest the large-scale destruction of life almost to the point of total extinction. Nonetheless, they treat extinction as a non sequitur, and offer no insights on how awareness of radical finitude might reshape IR thinking. More recently, legal activists have proposed a law of ecocide (see Higgins, 2010) which seeks to extend international laws for the prevention and punishment of genocide to include ecological damage that destroys unique ecosystems and forms of human life. However, the concept of ecocide is designed to fit within the constraints of existing international law. As a result, it only applies to instances in which individual culprits can be identified and accused with prosecutable crimes. Although, as mentioned above, they can be attributed predominantly to capitalist modes of organization, accelerating patterns of extinction are driven by the convergence of multiple forces and systemic patterns. As such, a law of ecocide would do little to address them. Meanwhile, in contemporary security discourses, extinction is understood as a problem of biopolitical management. Over 150 international conventions govern the management of ‘biodiversity’, most notably the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) which does not even mention the term extinction. Instead, it focuses on means of monitoring and managing the ‘diversity’ of species and mitigating – rather than critiquing, let alone dismantling – the structural political-economic drivers of extinction. Other major treaties, such as the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the World Heritage Convention, contain instruments for managing species and biodiversity, such as restrictions on trade and targets for population numbers. Each of these projects assumes that extinction can be allayed by managing biopolitical economies of birth, reproduction and death. The same assumption underpins contemporary security discourses where they intersect with the threat of extinction. In such discourses, human extinction is often framed as a ‘hyperbole of insecurity’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 3) – that is, as an intensification of existing, governable threats. This has helped to generate modes of biopolitical governance that entrench the structural drivers of extinction while producing ‘resilient’ citizens capable of living in its wreckage (Evans and Reid, 2014). Meanwhile, having framed catastrophe as inevitable, states and other security actors increasingly renege on their responsibilities to act to prevent it (Evans and Reid, 2014). In these ways, IR and global theory refuses to address the possibility of radical finitude raised by accelerating patterns of extinction. Apocalyptic rhetorics of total destruction may contribute to this issue by inuring Western subjects to the imagery of the destruction, masking the inequalities and violences that generate it, and arresting ethical response through over-exposure to the sublime. At the same time, IR and global theory is rooted in cosmological assumptions that preclude critical engagement with the possibility of radical finitude. Simply put, IR and global theory has made this possible condition unthinkable by suggesting that the extinction of humans is literally beyond human cognition. This form of unthinkability is based on what Quentin Meillassoux (2009) calls ‘correlationism’: the assumption that existence coincides with the presence of human subjects. For many Indigenous thinkers, engagement with Ancestral presences that long pre-date homo sapiens – and who may be long ‘extinct’ or never ‘alive’ in Western terms – is an integral part of daily life and survival, making the notion of correlationism absurd (Sheridan and Longboat, 2006; Benton-Banai, 2010; Borrows, 2010; Povinelli, 2016). Meillassoux points out that it is nonsensical even within a positivist perspective: after all, Western scientists regularly debate the date of the formation of the earth, the lives of dinosaurs and, indeed, the emergence of homo sapiens – all of which preceded and created the conditions for the existence of modern Western subjects. From these perspectives, it is possible – and common – to think beyond the existence of these subjects, and to theorize their extinction. However, within dominant Western culture, extinction is made unthinkable in a second sense: there is a taboo against discussing it. Such discussions are often understood to be antihuman and misanthropic. As Claire Colebrook (2014) points out, these taboos preclude discussion of whether or not ‘humanity’ – in particular the universalist, exclusive subject of ‘human security’ and ‘humanitarianism’ (Mitchell, 2014) – should exist. This, in turn, entrenches dominant norms of ‘humanity’ as an individualized, rigidly gendered and racialized, economically motivated being reducible to biological functions and ontologically separate from other beings (Mitchell, 2014). These narratives ignore the existence of, and preclude the emergence of, postor other-than-human life forms that transcend these boundaries (Braidotti, 2013), or other kinds of human existences, subjectivities and ways of relating to earth (Alfred, 2005). As a result, IR and global theory remains preoccupied with constructing and ensuring the survival of a ‘humanity’ incapable of transformation and exclusive of pluralities. In these conditions, existing IR and global theory’s engagements with radical finitude – constructed as the ultimate threat to this form of survival – are likely to entrench this subject of humanity and the structures that produce it, while ignoring the radical challenges to it raised by the earthly rupture of extinction. All of this suggests that mainstream IR and global theory, and the global politics it sustains, are not capable of addressing extinction or the condition of radical finitude it foregrounds. On the contrary, they are constructed to be unreceptive to the material, ecological and cosmological critiques of its theories, structures and practices raised by escalating patterns of extinction. An IR and global theory more attuned to the pluralities of expressions of ‘humans’ and other life forms, or for their potential emergence, would loosen the grip of dominant norms and open up space for alternative ideas of survival and flourishing. By rejecting the demand for the survival and security of ‘humanity’ at all costs, this future IR might embrace forms of flourishing and well-being that do not imply or assume permanence but rather embrace fluidity. It might also involve creating space for posthuman futures enabled by the nourishing of links with other life forms or technologies (see Braidotti, 2013; Colebrook, 2014; Evans and Reid, 2014).

#### Extinction is a psychic settler fantasy to infinitely defer action against colonialism.

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Settlers love to contemplate **the possibility of their own extinction**; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. **Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.**1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 **that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well.** The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10

#### B] Any other theory fails insofar as indigenous voices are excluded from the conversation to start

#### Western academia historically excludes native people from their theories.

**Tuck and Yang** (Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. "Decolonization is not a metaphor." Decolonization: Indigeneity, education & society 1.1 (2012). //aw)

This settler move to innocence is concerned with the ways in which Indigenous peoples are counted, codified, represented, and included/disincluded by educational researchers and other social science researchers. Indigenous peoples are rendered visible in mainstream educational research in two main ways: as “at risk” peoples and as asterisk peoples. This comprises a settler move to innocence because it erases and then conceals the erasure of Indigenous peoples within the settler colonial nation-state and moves Indigenous nations as “populations” to the margins of public discourse. As “at risk” peoples, Indigenous students and families are described as on the verge of extinction, culturally and economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy. Even though it is widely known and verified that Native youth gain access to personal and academic success when they also have access to/instruction in their home languages, most Native American and Alaskan Native youth are taught in English-only schools by temporary teachers who know little about their students’ communities (Lomawaima and McCarty, 2006; Lee, 2011). Even though Indigenous knowledge systems predate, expand, update, and complicate the curricula found in most public schools, schools attended by poor Indigenous students are among those most regimented in attempts to comply with federal mandates. Though these mandates intrude on the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, the “services” promised at the inception of these mandates do little to make the schools attended by Indigenous youth better at providing them a compelling, relevant, inspiring and meaningful education. At the same time, Indigenous communities become the asterisk peoples, meaning they are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets, many of which are conducted to inform public policy that impact our/their lives (Villegas, 2012). Education and health statistics are unavailable from Indigenous communities for a variety of reasons and, when they are made available, the size of the n, or the sample size, can appear to be negligible when compared to the sample size of other/race-based categories. Though Indigenous scholars such as Malia Villegas recognize that Indigenous peoples are distinct from each other but also from other racialized groups surveyed in these studies, they argue that difficulty of collecting basic education and health information about this small and heterogeneous category must be overcome in order to counter the disappearance of Indigenous particularities in public policy. In U.S. educational research in particular, Indigenous peoples are included only as asterisks, as footnotes into dominant paradigms of educational inequality in the U.S. This can be observed in the progressive literature on school discipline, on ‘underrepresented minorities’ in higher education, and in the literature of reparation, i.e., redressing ‘past’ wrongs against nonwhite Others. Under such paradigms, which do important work on alleviating the symptoms of Decolonization is not a metaphor 23 colonialism (poverty, dispossession, criminality, premature death, cultural genocide), Indigeneity is simply an “and” or an illustration of oppression. ‘Urban education’, for example, is a code word for the schooling of black, brown, and ghettoized youth who form the numerical majority in divested public schools. Urban American Indians and Native Alaskans become an asterisk group, invisibilized, even though about two-thirds of Indigenous peoples in the U.S. live in urban areas, according to the 2010 census. Yet, urban Indians receive fewer federal funds for education, health, and employment than their counterparts on reservations (Berry, 2012). Similarly, Native Pasifika people become an asterisk in the Asian Pacific Islander category and their politics/epistemologies/experiences are often subsumed under a pan-ethnic Asian-American master narrative. From a settler viewpoint that concerns itself with numerical inequality, e.g. the achievement gap, underrepresentation, and the 99%’s short share of the wealth of the metropole, the asterisk is an outlier, an outnumber. It is a token gesture, an inclusion and an enclosure of Native people into the politics of equity. These acts of inclusion assimilate Indigenous sovereignty, ways of knowing, and ways of being by remaking a collective-comprised tribal identity into an individualized ethnic identity

#### C] education – only realizing our complicities helps us learn and grow as people that ow fairness a] it’s a portable skill b] fairness skewed

### Underview

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory a] neg can be infinitely abusive and we cant check back b] times skew – it’s a 4-7, 3-6 skew c] reciprocity – neg gets 1nc theory to check abuse

#### 2] 1ar theory comes first – a] time skew the 1ar is already really hard u being abusive makes it harder

#### 3] No neg RVI because you have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3-minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew.

#### 4] aff gets reasonability on spec - substance crowd out caused by bidirectional shells on must spec and must not spec create at least 2 minutes of substance crowd out in the 1NC and 1AR, if not the entire debate—this outweighs a] prescripted debates make judge decisions already arbitrary, b] bidirectional shells means there is no norming power since it is always strategic to find a way to split the 1AR c] its full res all prep links – stop whining

#### 5] no spec – a] infinitely regressive, never know what I should and shouldn’t spec and you can always pick something I don’t b] cx checks

#### 6] AFC A] strat skew you can invalidate the entire aff by only contesting the fw B] best for topic edu C] no neg abuse, read fw u want when you affirm, if my fw is unfair you can just read theory on my fw