#### Violence should be understood as a continuum that affects women – Harassment, pressure to have sex, rape, assault, all of these forms of violence means that violence has been constructed as the norm in relationships between men and women.

**Ray in 1997**

A. E. Ray “The Shame of it: gender-based terrorism in the former Yugoslavia and the failure of international human rights law to comprehend the injuries.” The American University Law Review. Vol 46.

In order to reach all of the violence perpetrated against the women of the former Yugoslavia that is not committed by soldiers or other officials of the state, human lights law must move beyond its artificially constructed barriers between "public" and "private" actions: A feminist perspective on human rights would require a rethinking of the notions of imputability and state responsibility and in this sense would challenge the most basic assumptions of international law. If violence against women were considered by the international legal system to be as shocking as violence against people for their political ideas, women would have considerable support in their struggle.... The assumption that underlies all law, including international human rights law, is that the public/private distinction is real: human society, human lives can be separated into two distinct spheres. This division, however, is an ideological construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from the sources of power. 2 6 The international community must recognize that violence against women is always political, regardless of where it occurs, because it affects the way women view themselves and their role in the world, as well as the lives they lead in the so-called public sphere. 2 6 ' When women are silenced within the family, their silence is not restricted to the private realm, but rather affects their voice in the public realm as well, often assuring their silence in any environment. 262 For women in the former Yugoslavia, as well as for all women, extension beyond the various public/private barriers is imperative if human rights law "is to have meaning for women brutalized in less-known theaters of war or in the by-ways of daily life." 63 Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to reconsider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace. " " When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physically tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence. 2 5 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of human rights is not limited to violations based on gender." Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk factor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. 6 7 Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. 2 6 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality. 2 6 9 Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.Y Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prostitute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communicate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. 2 71 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communication among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." 7 2

#### Civil society is structured to maintain a patriarchal system in which women and their rage are silenced. The status quo exists to retain power structures while punishing marginalized groups.

Lonzano-Reich & Cloud 9

Nina M. and Dana, 4/30/2009. Nina M. Lozano-Reich, Ph.D. is a former Carnegie Fellow and an Associate Professor in the Communication Studies Department, at Loyola Marymount University. Dana L. Cloud is a professor of communication studies at Syracuse University. “The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,” Western Journal of Communication. // KD

Bone et al. acknowledge that historically, societal standards of decorum have often¶ been used to silence groups and keep them in their place. Nowhere is this truer than¶ in the case of women, told to play nice with their oppressors (Ehrenreich & English,¶ 2005). But the authors contradict this position when they argue, ‘‘When we adopt an¶ invitational approach and are civil [emphasis added], the potential for grief and¶ violence is minimized’’ (p. 457). Likewise, they write, ‘‘Civility ... can be understood¶ as an ... integral component of democracy’’ (p. 457). Based upon historical and contemporary¶ examples, we reject these claims; when theorizing as to how individuals¶ should deal with ‘‘difficult situations,’’ our authors’ call for adopting an invitational¶ paradigm grounded in civility is not only antithetical to the goals of invitational¶ rhetoric, but also in combating systems of oppression.

Historically, dominant groups have repeatedly enacted civilizing strategies to effectively¶ silence and punish marginalized groups (e.g., labor; women and people of¶ color; the poor; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] people). Indeed,¶ 19th-century notions of propriety and civility were used as cultural ideals to place¶ legal, political, and physical restrictions on women—whereby relegating women to¶ the private sphere (Oravec, 2003). Antifeminists frequently appealed to masculine¶ norms of ‘‘civilization’’ to ‘‘depict women as less civilized than men, less able to¶ contribute to the advancement of the race’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 121). Extending this¶ history, women of color have been silenced through civilizing strategies that deem¶ legitimately angry speech to be ‘‘uppity’’ ‘‘or ‘‘illiterate’’ (Anzaldu´ a, 1999; hooks,¶ 1989). It has taken decades of critical feminist scholarship to resist politics of civility and overcome oppressive stereotypes so that women of color can be viewed as¶ speaking subjects, and not as uncivilized subjects needing a firm hand.Similarly, LGBTQ sexual practices have also been vulnerable to oppressive charges¶ of indecorum. Culturally, dominant sexual ethics and decorous community standards¶ function to shame queer individuals, and stigmatize nonnormative acts of¶ sexuality (Morris & Sloop, 2006; Warner, 1999). One need only look to hate crimes¶ enacted upon gays or immigrants, or acts of femicide inflicted upon women who dare¶ to speak out. Clearly, a move towards civility in relation to oppressed groups may¶ potentially increase grief and violence.Bone et al. claim that civility fosters democracy. While voting is indeed civil,¶ radical social change has not occurred in voting booths, but results, instead, from¶ democratic grassroots tactics. Protestors inherently do not operate within the realm¶ of decorum. Indeed, political confrontations up to and including violence have been¶ perennial resources in struggles for justice (Kirkpatrick, 2008). The civility standard is¶ detrimental to this project. When measured by standards of civility, protesters are¶ framed as wild and riotous by dominant media, rendering their struggles illegitimate¶ (Gitlin, 2003). In a post-9=11 climate, moreover, ‘‘uncivil’’ protestors are equated¶ with terrorists (and terrorists cannot be ascribed any rationality whatsoever).¶ Bederman (1995) asks whether conforming to mainstream standards of civility¶ replaces one kind of exclusion with another. This paradox holds except in cases of¶ discourses among equals. Discourses of civilization ‘‘have proven [to be] a slippery¶ slope for those who dream of a more just society’’ (Bederman, 1995, p. 239).¶ Likewise, Mayo (2002) argues that ‘‘civility is a form of social discrimination, for¶ it is predicated on making distinctions that support accepted practices and values,¶ and entails enacting those distinctions to the detriment of the purportedly uncivil’’¶ (p. 82). In other words, we view Bone et al.’s argument for invitational civility in situations¶ of conflict as potentially perpetuating discrimination in the name of peace. Theorizing¶ resistance to oppression requires attention to both invitation and confrontation,¶ along with criteria enabling critics to evaluate both modes. Consequently, we believe¶ it is irresponsible to displace more confrontational models for social change in favor¶ of a politics of civility that has been proven to leave those already.

#### Women in debate have been dominated by masculine norms but will not tolerate its patriarchal ideology anymore. Like civil society, debate functions within dominant power structures to suppress the voice of the feminine.

Griffin and Raider (Women in High School Debate. J. Cinder Griffin and Holly Jane Raider 1989 – “Punishment Paradigms : Pros and Cons”<http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Griffin&Raider1989PunishmentPar.htm>)

Debate, unlike athletics, does not require physical skills which might restrict the participation of women. Additionally, debate is academically oriented and women tend to select extracurricular activities , that are more academic in nature than men.3 Based on these assumptions, one would expect proportional representation of the genders in the activity. Why then, are there four times more men in debate than women? Several explanations exist that begin to account for the low rate of female participation in debate. Fewer females enter the activity at the outset. Although organizational and procedural tactics used in high school debate may account for low initial rates of participation, a variety of social and structural phenomena, not necessarily caused by the debate community also account for these rates. Ultimately, the disproportionate attrition rate of female debaters results in the male dominated composition of the activity. There are more disincentives for women to participate in debate than for men. While entry rates for women and man may in some cases be roughly equal, the total number of women who participate for four years is significantly lower than the corresponding number of men. This rate of attrition is due to factors that can be explained largely by an examination of the debate community itself. Socially inculcated values contribute to low rates of female entry in high school debate. Gender bias and its relation to debate has been studied by Manchester and Freidly. They conclude, "[m]ales are adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations when they participate in debate because it is perceived as a masculine' activity. Female debate participants experience more gender-related barriers because they are not adhering to sex-role stereotypes and sex-role expectations.5 In short, 'nice girls' do not compete against or with men, are not assertive, and are not expected to engage in policy discourse, particularly relating to military issues. Rather, "nice girls" should be cheerleaders, join foreign language clubs, or perhaps participate in student government. It should be noted that many of these attitudes are indoctrinated at birth and cannot be directly attributed to the debate community. However, there are many activity specific elements that discourage female participation in high school debate. Structural barriers endemic to the forensics community dissuade female ninth graders from entering the activity.6 Recruitment procedures and initial exposure may unintentionally create a first impression of the activity as dominated by men. By and large, it is a male debater or a male debate coach that will discuss the activity with new students for the first time. Additionally, most debate coaches are men. This reinforces a socially proven norm to prospective debaters, that debate is an activity controlled by men. This male exposure contributes to a second barrier to participation. Parents are more likely to let a son go on an overnight than they are a daughter, particularly when the coach is male and the squad is mostly male. This may be a concern even when the coach is a trusted member of the community. While entry barriers are formidable, female attrition rates effect the number of women in the activity most significantly.7 Rates of attrition are largely related to the level of success. Given the time and money commitment involved in debate, if one is not winning one quits debating. The problem is isolating the factors that contribute to the early failure of women debaters. Even if equal numbers of males and females enter at the novice level, the female perception of debate as a whole is not based on the gender proportions of her immediate peer group. Rather, she looks to the composition of debaters across divisions. This may be easily understood if one considers the traditional structures of novice debate. Often it is the varsity debate team, composed mostly of males, who coach and judge novice. Novices also learn how to debate by watching debates. Thus, the role models will be those individuals already involved in the activity and entrenched in its values. The importance of female role models and mentors should not be underestimated. There is a proven correlation between the number of female participants and the number of female coaches and judges.8 The presence of female mentors and role models may not only help attract women to the activity, but will significantly temper the attrition rate of female debaters. Novice, female debaters have few role models and, consequently, are more likely to drop out than their male counterparts; resulting in an unending cycle of female attrition in high school debate. Pragmatically, there are certain cost benefit criteria that coaches on the high school level, given the constraints of a budget, must consider. Coaches with teams dominated by males may be reluctant to recruit females due to traveling and housing considerations. Thus, even if a female decides to join the team, her travel opportunities may be more limited than those of the males on the team. Once a female has "proven" herself, the willingness to expend team resources on her increases, assuming she overcomes the initial obstacles. Perceptually, women lack the levels of confidence present in males; their expectations of success are lower, and the pressures placed upon them are higher.

#### **Debate is unfair for women. Yi 20**

Aj Yi, Alyssa Nie, 10-20-2020, "An Empirical Study of Gender Differences in Competitive High School Debate," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3715996

Gender differences in competitive environments have been studied extensively; however, the majority of literature concerns activities with an objective winner. In this paper, we examine gender differences in high school Public Forum debate, a two vs. two activity where judges subjectively decide the winner. We constructed a dataset with 44 variables and 125,087 unique debate rounds during the 2014-2015 to 2019-2020 school years. Using logistic modeling, we document a large difference in win rates between teams of different gender compositions, with female-female teams 17.1% less likely and male-female teams 10.0% less likely to win a debate round against male-male teams. However, there is no gender gap in win rates for novice debaters, suggesting that the disparity does not occur from innate entry ability differences but rather appears alongside experience in debate. We also find a large difference in participation rates between female and male students, which begins at the 9th grade level and is exacerbated over time due to female debaters being 30.34% more likely to quit than male debaters. Finally, we find that a higher ratio of female to male debaters from the same school reduces attrition rates of female debaters.

Unlike the other competitive formats commonly researched, debate is a subjective activity where the implicit or explicit biases of a judge may play a strong role in determining the winner of a round. Spinna 2019 analyzed judge ballots from New York’s state debate tournament, finding that male debaters received significantly more feedback overall than female debaters. Lynn and Kawolics 2018 examine Public Forum debate judge ballots from 2017-2018 and find that female debaters receive criticism for being overly aggressive 50 percent more than their male counterparts, as well as criticism on speaking style and overuse of emotion at higher rates. Furthermore, females disproportionally lose the round in which they were subject to the aforementioned criticisms, compared to male debaters who won more frequently even when criticized. Additionally, they found a statistically significant difference in the proportion of wins assigned to female debaters between female and male judges, albeit only analyzing a single national tournament (Lynn et. al 18). In contrast, Tartakovsky (2016) analyzes Lincoln Douglas debate bid tournaments from 2015-2016 and finds that female debaters do not perform better when assigned female judges. This does not necessarily imply that the gender gap in performance is not due to judge bias; rather, the majority of biases against female debaters may be implicitly held by judges of all genders.

#### ROB: The role of the ballot is to vote for whichever debater better performatively utilizes and explains rages importance in disrupting systems of oppression against women, especially in debate.

Halberstam, 1993

[Jack/Judith Halberstam, Imagined Violence/Queer Violence: Representation, Rage, and Resistance Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Text, No. 37, A Special Section Edited by Anne McClintock Explores the Sex Trade (Winter, 1993), pp. 187-201]

The eruption of rebellion in the streets of L.A. and its representations in hip hop culture indicate very clearly that violent law demands violent resistance. Tactics of nonviolent resistance developed in the sixties and used nowadays seem to have become dangerously hegemonic rather than disruptive. In political demonstrations, indeed, outrage often takes a back seat to organized, formal, and decorous shows of disapproval. In San Diego, for example, shortly after the L.A. uprising of spring 1992 in the wake of the Rodney King decision, people filled the streets to sing, give speeches, and march upon the police station. What might have been an outpouring of rage and anger and frustration directed at the racist, violent tactics of the local police was transformed rather quickly into a passive and indifferent meeting. The group of "protesters" actually followed a route laid out for them by a police escort and arrived finally at a deserted police building. After some chanting and shouting, the crowd quietly dispersed. Local newspa- pers indeed were able to report that in the case of San Diego, the city remained relatively calm in the aftermath of the King verdict.5 The failure of nonviolent resistance to register anything but the most polite disap- proval, I suggest, is the effect of a glaring lack of imagination on the part of political organizers, and an overemphasis on "organization" itself, which often produces determined efforts to eradicate[s] expressions of rage or anger from political protest. Such expressions, after all, might lead to something spontaneous, something that spills across the carefully drawn police lines, something threatening. When and why and how did rage disappear from the vocabulary of organized political activism? In what follows, I will not attempt a historical or ethnographic answer to this question; rather, using literary and cine- matic examples of imagined violence and articulated rage, I elaborate a theory of the production of counterrealities as a powerful strategy of revolt emanating from an increasingly queer postmodern political culture. I use the word "queer" here to denote a postmodern, postidentity politics focused on but not limited to sexual minorities.6 Postmodernism has been accused of not being political enough but in fact it is political activism that often fails to be postmodern in America in the 1990s. Power and conflict no longer only spring from the domain of politics, and resistance has become as much an effect of popular culture, of videos, films, and novels, as of direct action groups. Postmodernism invites new and different conceptions of violent resistance and its repre- sentations. As Michael Taussig writes, we live in a "nervous system," a system characterized as "illusions of order congealed by fear."7 The fear, the order, the nerves are all produced precisely as illusions, fantasies which govern and discipline the self. However, it is also in the realm of fantasy and representation that we make the system nervous, and that we can control and use our illusions. Imagination, in other words, goes both (or many) ways. So, what if we imagine a new violence with a different object; a post- modern terror represented by another "monster" with quite other "vic- tims" in mind? "What if" denotes a potentiality, a possible reality that may only ever exist in the realm of representation but one which creates an "imagined violence" with real consequences and which corresponds only roughly to real violence and its imagined consequences. Recently, queer activism has revived an emphasis on loud and threat- ening political demonstration, and groups like Queer Nation and ACT UP regularly create havoc with their particular brand of postmodern terror tactics. ACT UP demonstrations, furthermore, regularly marshall renegade art forms to produce protest as an aesthetic object. As Douglas Crimp writes in AIDS DEMO-GRAPHICS: AIDS activist art is grounded in the accumulated knowledge and political analysis of the AIDS crisis produced collectively by the entire movement. The graphics not only reflect that knowledge but actively contribute to its articulation as well.8 Protest in the age of AIDS, in other words, is not separate from represen- tation; and "die-ins," "kiss-ins," posters, slogans, graphics, and queer pro- paganda create a new form of political response that is sensitive to and exploitive of the blurred boundaries between representations and realities. Meanwhile in the arena of popular representation, in popular film and video, the lines between representation and reality continue to be starkly drawn. Liberals continue to complain about the violent subject matter that especially kids are exposed to on TV and in cinema. But, I suggest, represented violence takes many forms and some still ha[s]ve the power to produce change. Conventional TV and movie violence, of course, consists of violence perpetrated by powerful white men usually against women or people of color. Such violence is a standard feature of the action genre, of the rock video, of almost every popular form of enter- tainment, and to a degree it is so expected that audiences may even be immune to it. On the other hand, violence against whitemen perpetrated by women or people of color disrupts the logic of represented violence so thoroughly that (at least for a while) the emergence of such unsanctioned violence has an unpredictable power. In recent years, popular texts that prominently feature violence against white men have been thoroughly analyzed by the popular media. So, for example, Ridley Scott's Thelma and Louise created an unprecedented wave of discussions around the issue of violence and women.9 Suddenly, violence, and particularly female revenge fantasy vio- lence, was tagged as "immoral," "extravagant," "excessive," or simply "toxic feminism."10 Debates raged about whether we really want to condone a kind of role reversal that now pits female aggressors against male victims. But role reversal never simply replicates the terms of an equation. The depiction of women committing acts of violence against men does not simply use "male" tactics of aggression for other ends; in fact, female violence transforms the symbolic function of the feminine within popular narratives and it simultaneously challenges the hegemonic insistence upon the linking of might and right under the sign of masculinity. Women with guns confronting rapists has the potential to intervene in popular imagin- ings of violence and gender by resisting the moral imperative to not fight violence with violence. Films like Thelma and Louise suggest, therefore, not that we all pick up guns, but that we allow ourselves to imagine the possi- bilities of fighting violence with violence. Women, in other words, long identified as victims rather than perpe- trators of violence, have much to gain from new and different configura- tions of violence, terror, and fantasy. Within the "nervous system" women are taught to fear certain spaces and certain individuals because they threaten rape: how do we produce a fear of retaliation in the rapist? Thelma and Louise is an example of imagined violence that produces or may produce an unrealistic (given how few women carry and use guns) fear in potential rapists that their victims are armed and dangerous. Of course, there is no direct and simple relationship between imagined vio- lence and real effects: just as it is impossible to judge the ways in which pornographic representation interacts with male sexual violence, it would only restabilize the relationship between the imagined and the real to claim that representing female violence quells male attacks. The "place of rage" where expression threatens to become action is of course that tightly patrolled and highly ambiguous space that we call "fantasy." The power of fantasy in the realm of erotic desire has been theo- rized variously by feminist, psychoanalytic, and postmodern critics. In feminist theory, for example, fantasy constitutes a problematic site for various contests over representation and politics-the pornography debates have posed the question of whether rape and violence against women are in part produced by the objectifying dynamics of porno- graphic fantasy. Such questions about the relationship between desire and representation have proven to be unanswerable since this relationship is constantly being refigured. In an essay titled "The Force of Fantasy," however, Judith Butler proposes that we rethink the relationship between the "real" and fantasy by refusing to grant the "real" an a priori stability. She suggests that the "real" is "a variable construction which is always and only determined in relation to its constitutive outside: fantasy, the unthinkable, the unreal."1 What happens when we make imagined violence-as opposed to erotic fantasy-the object of critical scrutiny? What is at stake in this question is the way that sexual fantasies might or might not intersect with violent fantasies to force into visibility the constructed nature of the real. If imagining violent women does nothing else for example, it might shift the responsibility for articulating the relationship between fantasy and reality from women to men. In other words, power lies in the luxury of not needing to know in advance what the relationship is between repre- sentations of violence or sexuality and acted violence or sexuality. The burden of stabilizing this relationship in the arena of sexuality has for too long fallen to women and to feminism and has, of course, produced unproductive alliances between antipornography feminists and the reli- gious Right. Texts like Thelma and Louise create anxiety about fantasy and reality in a very different group of spectators. "Imagined violence" is obviously an adaptation of Benedict Ander- son's well-known conception of the nation as "an imagined political com- munity."12 Anderson explains that "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imag- ined." While nationalism, like national identity, is one of the most power- ful effects of imagining community, there are many other identities that are mobilized by the power of fantasy. Furthermore, imagined communi- ties allow for powerful interventions: they allow for the transformation of imagined fear into imagined violence. One example of such a transformation is the Queer Nation/Pink Pan- thers slogan "Bash Back." In response to homophobic violence, this group mobilized around the menace of retaliation. In an essay on "Queer Nationality," Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman explain the affectiv- ity of this strategy: "Bash Back" simply intends to mobilize the threat gay bashers use so effec- tively-strength not in numbers but in the presence of a few bodies who rep- resent the potential for widespread violence-against the bashers themselves. In this way, the slogan turns the bodies of the Pink Panthers into a psychic counter threat, expanding their protective shield beyond the confines of their physical "beat."'3 The power of the slogan, in other words, is its ability to represent a vio- lence that need not ever be actualized. There is no "real" violence neces- sary here, only the threat of real violence. The violence of Queer Nation in this example is the moment when what Foucault calls the "reverse dis- course" becomes something else, something more than simply "homo- sexuality beginning to talk on its own behalf."'4 The reverse discourse gathers steam, acquires density until it is in excess of the category it pur- ports to articulate. The excess is the disruption of identity and the vio- lence of power and the power of representation; it is dis-integrational; the excess is QUEER. Imagined violence disintegrates the power of what Audre Lorde calls "the mythic norm"'5 and what David Wojnarowicz describes as the "ONE TRIBE NATION." It challenges, in other words, hegemonic definition and even the definition of hegemony itself. In Close to the Knives: A Memoir of Disintegration, Wojnarowicz writes about being queer in the age of AIDS: "We're supposed to quietly and politely make house in this killing machine called america and pay taxes to support our own slow murder and I am amazed that we're not running amok in the streets" (108). Wojnarowicz writes of murderous desires and desires for murder; he calls for bloody and violent change and he does so in what he calls "the language of dis- integration." For Wojnarowicz, language itself becomes a weapon, a tool, and a technology and the act of imagination becomes a violent act. In Wojnarowicz's essays, he imagines a violence generated by HIV+ bodies and transforms the AIDS-stricken body into a symbol of postmodern pol- itics. The Person With AIDS, the junkie, the homeless person, the queer in America have the power, as Wojnarowicz says, "to wake you up and wel- come you to your bad dream" (82), or the power to completely and utterly alter the contours of the real and to reshape them into realized nightmares. Wojnarowicz's "memoir of disintegration" counters the slow decline of the body with speed, physical and mental speed. Life speeds up as time winds down and the car traveling across an open landscape becomes a symbol for Wojnarowicz of desire without an object and of a kind of masturbatory pleasure in self-propulsion or auto-mobility. The automo- bile here signifies precisely the movement of the self, the multiplicity of the self as it disintegrates within the realm of the bodily and proliferates in the realm of fantasy. Fantasy, the safest sex of all, avoids physical conta- mination but it contaminates nonetheless. It contaminates by making information viral; information, in other words, is transmitted via images which enter language and mutate. "Americans can't deal with death unless they own it" (35), says Woj- narowicz in reference to a museum of the atomic bomb. Death, in this memoir, is stasis, the banality of arriving at one's destination; it is a full stop, an end to language and speed. Wojnarowicz's heroes with AIDS attempt therefore to stave off death with technology, writing, or photog- raphy. In one scene, the hero films his friend's dead body-here the video camera, like the King tape, like the Ice-T song, records a dangerous tech- novision of reality in the making. The "real" now is precisely a reel of tape, a memory that can be cut, edited, replayed, rewound, paused, or fast-forwarded. "There is no enlarged or glittering new view of the nature of things or existence," writes Wojnarowicz. "No god or angels brushing my eyelids with their wings. Hell is a place on earth. Heaven is a place in your head" (28-29). Wojnarowicz's language of disintegration, his effort to rewind or fast- forward the real, destroys the America he calls the ONE TRIBE NATION and transforms it into the many tribes. Of course, the political tactics of ACT UP have involved the disintegration of discrete identities into the many identities united in coalition against the "virus which has no morals." The ONE TRIBE NATION, Wojnarowicz shows us, is a particularly powerful imagined community, but it is one that cannot withstand the impact of a disease which, in the geography of its transmissions, maps out the limits of identity, the murderous effects of inadequate health care systems, the ide- ological investments of medical institutions, and the breakdown of even the unity of the Right. This transformation can be capitalized on through imagining a violence that shatters the complacency that prevents people from immediate and spontaneous revolution. "I'm amazed," writes Woj- narowicz, "that we are not running amok in the streets." Here Wojnarow- icz echoes June Jordan's poem titled "Poem about My Rights": "We are the wrong people/of the wrong skin on the wrong continent and what/in the hell is everybody being so reasonable about."'6 Wojnarowicz's answer to his frustration at what he sees as a passive nonresponse to the totalitarianism of the ONE TRIBE NATION is to imagine: I'm beginning to believe that one of the last frontiers left for the radical ges- ture is the imagination. At least in my ungoverned imagination I can fuck somebody without a rubber, or I can, in the privacy of my own skull, douse Helms with a bucket of gasoline and set his putrid ass on fire .... (120) Hell is a place on earth and heaven is a place in your head and I too believe that "one of the last frontiers left for the radical gesture is the imagination." I believe that it is by imagining violence that we can harness the force of fantasy and transform it into productive fear. Wojnarowicz's memoir participates in AIDS activism because it confronts the Jesse Helms of America with the possibility of violent retaliation; it threatens precisely in its potentiality. It is with the potential for violent response from the so-called other that June Jordan ends her poem: "I am not wrong: wrong is not my name/My name is my own my own my own/and I can't tell you who the hell set things up like this/but i can tell you that from now on my resis- tance/my simple and daily and nightly self-determination/may very well cost you your life." This is the return of the gaze in cinematic terms, thethreat of the return of the repressed, an always bloody and violent re-entry into the realm of signification. This is the articulation that smashes bina- rism by refusing the role of peaceful activism and demands to be heard as the voice that will violate-the damage, again, lies in the threat rather than in any specific action. My resistance may cost you your life; my answer may silence your question; my entry into representation may erase your control over how I am represented. Jordan's "self-determination" takes place within rage, not the rage that explodes mindlessly and carelessly, but a quiet rage, tightly reined,ever so precise and intent upon retribution. "Rights" in the poem signify not simply legal rights but the right to exist,the right to walk at night, the right to write, the right not to be raped, the right to reply, the right to be angry, the right to respond with violence, the right to lawfully inhabit and populate a place of rage: Even tonight and I need to take a walk and clear my head about this poem about why I can't go out without changing my clothes my shoes my body posture my gender identity my age my status as a woman alone in the evening... "Poem about My Rights" turns legal rights into a fiction of power: rights do not change wrongs and Jordan is "the wrong sex the wrong age the wrong skin," but the poem, her exquisitely tuned anger, threatens to trans- form wrongs into violent and powerful resistance. Both Wojnarowicz's and Jordan's poetic threats constitute postmodern revolt-revolt in the arena of representation. This is the postmodern tac- tic of ACT UP-the burning of effigies, the carnival protests of art and images that drive the scientists and religious creeps into panic mode. ACT UP chooses symbolic weapons that reconstitute the shape and contours of the real. The rage of David Wojnarowicz and June Jordan allows each artist to express fantasies of violence in ways that make queer and black rage palpable and terrifying. Perhaps more than any other recent writers, Wojnarowicz and Jordan use poetic expression as a scare tactic, as the enunciation of a threat. This is the poetics of rage, expression that sug- gests that retribution in some form is just around the corner. Of course, this sounds like catharsis, a purging of emotion afforded by drama or lit- erary expression. Jordan and Wojnarowicz, however, give no such assur- ance that their expressions are safely channeled by finding expression in art. Like the activist art of ACT UP demonstrations, Jordan's and Woj- narowicz's writings are more like wake-up calls and active protest than cathartic outlets. As the distinctions between the real and fantasy collapse upon each other, as representation seems already saturated with realism, as reality is reconstituted by acts of imagination, the effect, I have suggested, is to pro- duce a crisis of spectatorship. We simply do not know how to read imag- ined violences: all too often representations of the pernicious effects of homophobia, racism, and sexism are collapsed by the viewer into homo- phobia, sexism, and racism themselves. So, for example, a film about a racist white character might be interpreted as a racist film that produces racial hatred. Or a film about a sexist and homophobic police department that is challenged by outlaw lesbians might be interpreted as a homopho- bic film about murderous dykes. It is not hard in my last example to find the plot of the controversial film Basic Instinct and it is this film that I want finally to concentrate on because Basic Instinct actually foregrounds the relationship between reality and representation, imagined violence and the maintenance of law and order as major themes. Disagreements about Basic Instinct tore through queer communities. While the film seemed to some people to move female heroism and cine- matic lesbianism to a new and exciting place, others viewed Basic Instinct as a dangerous vision of lesbianism as a network of lesbian murderers. The film therefore drew outraged responses from some members of the gay community who read it as homophobic and as part of a general smear campaign that Hollywood has long maintained against queers."17 Basic Instinct is indeed a film which weaves a tale of desire and destruction around a web of lesbian killers, but it is not at all clear that this makes it a homophobic film. It became clear rather quickly in the debates around Basic Instinct that not everyone had the same stakes in attacking the film. The protests were led by gay men, for example, and many les- bians involved in the protests changed their minds after actually viewing the film. Many of the gay protesters of Basic Instinct assumed or theorized that homophobia was intricately woven through any and all depictions of gays and lesbians as killers. The psychopathic queer, they claimed, was a homophobic standby in Hollywood cinema and they tried to repress the film by "giving away" the ending of the film and distributing "Catherine Did It" buttons. The buttons, however, merely underlined the miserable failure of this distinctly traditional and civil disobedience. Viewers of the film will know that there is no ending to give away-the film's conclusion is precisely a question, a question about homophobia, heterosexism, and a question about the possibility that female violence will disrupt once and for all the compulsory heterosexual resolution of narrative. The ending, moreover, is mirrored by the film's beginning scene, literally. The film opens with a shot of a couple having sex on a bed as seen in the mirror over the bed. The camera slowly moves down to fix upon the actual instead of the mir- rored scene and as we enter the filmic "real" the sex play turns to murder and the male partner climaxes as his lover ice-picks him. This intricate scene introduces the viewer to both the vexed relationship between fan- tasy, image, and reality and to the narrative trajectory of the film: what begins in bed will end in bed and what begins in compulsory heterosexu- ality ends in murder. The beginning of the film gives away the ending, but in case there is any doubt, Catherine herself destroys all narrative suspense. Catherine, we find out, writes novels that mirror perfectly her life and its violences. Her first book, The First Time, tells of a young boy who murders his parents by rigging a boating accident. Catherine's parents were killed in a boating accident. Her second book, Love Hurts, tells of an aging rock 'n' roll star who is ice-picked to death by his mistress. The book that she is working on when she meets Michael Douglas's character, Nick, is called Shooter (Nick's nickname, although there is obviously a pun here so maybe the film asks us to read "Shooter" as the "real" name and "Nick" as the nick- name) and tells of a cop who falls for the wrong woman. "How does it end?" asks Douglas nervously. "She kills him," answers Catherine. Catherine, indeed, did it, but to give away that fact about the film is to give away nothing because narrative resolution is not the focus of the film. Like any good detective mystery, this film is interested in interpreta- tion and the twists and turns of the relationship between crime and pun- ishment, criminal and detective, violence and order. The evidence, in this film, is always textual evidence-Catherine's writing-and the work of detection is always the sorting of fact from fiction and the inevitable blur- ring of the two. The gay protesters with their "Catherine Did It" buttons obviously failed to incorporate the kind of postmodern readings of culture that have invigorated many queer protests. As C. Carr wrote in the Village Voice: Gay or straight, the critics were amazingly dense about the film. They saw date rape where there was mutual, exciting, rough sex. They saw "senseless thrill killings" triggered by lesbian sex when, in fact, the murder of a lover, husband, brother, or father is always overdetermined.1sIndeed, murder was no accidental or gratuitous subplot in this film; mur- der was central not only to the action but also to the character identifica- tions. Every main character in the film is a murderer and murder comes to define relations between the characters and their jobs, their families, their lovers. The murderers however are differentiated by gender: the men in the film who kill do so professionally or in the line of duty; theirs are sanctioned murders. The women-Catherine, her lover Roxie, her ambiguous friend Hazel, the psychiatrist Beth-all kill, as C. Carr pointed out, husbands, lovers, brothers, or fathers: they kept their killing in the family, they disowned their families through violent outbreaks. Roxie killed her brothers, Hazel her whole family, and the police are stumped as to why they would have done so. The police's inability to find motives for female murder corresponds to their inability to figure out the relation between Catherine's fiction and her life. Female aggression is defined therefore as unreadable, irrational, insane, motiveless, but it is clear that the film suggests a kind of sorority of empathy among the female murderers. They can read each other's murders and the chances are that at least female audiences are all too willing to fill in the blanks when it comes to establishing a motive for the murder of brothers or hus- bands. But Catherine also knows what the relationship is between novels and reality-ambiguous, undecidable, negotiable. The very fact that Basic Instinct thematizes the relationship between representation and reality should defend against linear readings of the film when it comes to the characters' sexuality or their criminality. And furthermore, mirroring relationships are continually emphasized through- out the film: each female character is mistaken for every other, one dresses up as and impersonates another, one is killed when Douglas confuses her and Catherine. Also, Douglas is played as a distorted mirror image of Catherine: he slides ever more clearly into a criminal relation to the law and she masters and manipulates his movements as if he were simply a character in a scene she has scripted. Catherine calls attempts to collapse life into art and art into life "stu- pid." She knows the difference but is not beyond manipulating the blurred line between them for her own freedom of movement. Similarly, the crit- ics of Basic Instinct who read it as homophobic and misogynist fall victim to the kind of facile reading of right and wrong, real and imagined that in this film only the police are prone to. Collapsing real and imagined is a totalizing activity, it refuses to read difference, it refuses the interpretabil ity of any given text, and it freezes meaning within a static dynamic of true or false. This, of course, is not to say that texts may never be read as sexist or racist or homophobic-of course they are and can be, but to read homophobia where homophobia and sexism are the targets of an elaborate and prolonged critique is to misread the power of an imagined violence and the violence of imagined power. Imagined violence, as conceptualized in this paper, is the fantasy of unsanctioned eruptions of aggression from "the wrong people, of the wrong skin, the wrong sexuality, the wrong gender." We have to be able to imagine violence and our violence needs to be imaginable because the power of fantasy is not to represent but to destabilize the real. Imagined violence does not stop men from raping women but it might make a man think twice about whether a woman is going to blow him away. Imagined violence does not advocate lesbian or female aggression but it might com- plicate an assumed relationship between women and passivity or feminism and pacifism. The imagined violence of lesbians against men in Basic Instinct also recasts the relationship between gay men and lesbians since gay men may well have been threatened by the representation of female violence that empowered lesbians. In this way, imagined violence fractured the fiction of an identity politics. But unity is not necessarily to be desired, unity is Wojnarowicz's one tribe, an imagined consensus that always covers up difference with plati- tudes. Let politics be postmodern and queer, postidentity and posthuman. Imagined violences create a potentiality, a utopic state in which conse- quences are imminent rather than actual, the threat is in the anticipation, not the act. From Ice-T's controversial rock song "Cop Killer" to the feminist killing spree in Thelma and Louise, from the lesbian ice-picker in Basic Instinct to the AIDS-infected junkie in Wojnarowicz's Close to the Knives and the self-determined black woman who talks back in June Jor- dan's poem, imagined violences challenge white powerful heterosexual masculinity and create a cultural coalition of postmodern terror.

#### This criticism isn’t just of society generally, it’s a direct failure of the space we are in that needs to be deconstructed and raged against. Fang 22

Abigail Fang, 4-9-2022, "Debating debate practices: Sexual harassment in debate," Northwood Howler, https://thehowleronline.org/4651/viewpoint/debating-debate-practices-sexual-harassment-in-debate/

However, debate has evolved to form its own unique traditions and norms as well. The intense commitment that thousands of high schoolers across the country pour into this activity and community only magnifies this. For example, well-known, competitively successful (and often male) debaters are revered in what is known as the Good Debater Syndrome, which creates power dynamics amongst high schoolers that leave young women vulnerable to potential abuse. Speech and Debate Stories ([@speechanddebatestories](https://www.instagram.com/speechanddebatestories/)), an Instagram account that posts anonymous submissions regarding stories of discrimination and violence in high school debate, has over 400 posts regarding pedophilia, gaslighting, manipulation and more that happen both inside and outside of tournaments.

Even worse, adults can and often do contribute to such abuse rather than preventing it. Judges can not only provide the feedback that reinforces sexist standards (as mentioned above), but can also make young, underage debaters feel uncomfortable and unsafe when they are left alone in a room at a tournament with no supervision. Coaches, who are constantly teaching and advising underage debaters, can also abuse their own power. For example, prominent [debate coach Jon Cruz was arrested in 2015](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/nyregion/bronx-science-coach-sentenced-to-7-years-in-child-pornography-case.html) for asking for sexually explicit photographs from teenage boys around the country.

However, while such awareness is encouraging, adults in charge of competitions need to do more to make debate a safe space. Reforms focused on regulating other adults have been offered numerous times by people within the debate community, such [as a petition for a new ethics code from the National Speech and Debate Association (the institution that governs most of the Speech and Debate activity nationwide), a system to report sexual misconduct and a process of accredition for coaches and judges.](https://harvardpolitics.com/bro-culture-is-debate-culture/)The National Speech and Debate Association has [already committed to some](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/high-school-debate-me-too_n_5f7217fcc5b6f622a0c2ab94), such as judge training for its judges and anti-harassment training for its employees.

#### The judge has a responsibility to fight against this debate specific problem as that’s what we have control over.

#### To fight, we must rage against sustained signs of the partriarchy.

**Ahmed in 10**

Sara Ahmed. “Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects). The Barnard Center for Research on Women – the Scholar and Feminist Online. Issue 8.3. Summer 2010.

To be unseated by the table of happiness might be to threaten not simply that table, but what gathers around it, what gathers on it. When you are unseated, you can even get in the way of those who are seated, those who want more than anything to keep their seats. To threaten the loss of the seat can be to kill the joy of the seated. How well we recognise the figure of the feminist killjoy! How she makes sense! Let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. One feminist project could be to give the killjoy back her voice. Whilst hearing feminists as killjoys might be a form of dismissal, there is an agency that this dismissal rather ironically reveals. We can respond to the accusation with a "yes." The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, of how happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods (a social good is what causes happiness, given happiness is understood as what is good). As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely "it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]."[[4](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end4)] Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. Even if we are struggling for different things, even if we have different worlds we want to create, we might share what we come up against. Our activist archives are thus unhappy archives. Just think of the labor of critique that is behind us: feminist critiques of the figure of "the happy housewife;" Black critiques of the myth of "the happy slave"; queer critiques of the sentimentalisation of heterosexuality as "domestic bliss." The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon.To be willing to go against a social order, which is protected as a moral order, a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose "the right path" is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of being unhappy about the child being unhappy.[[5](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end5)] Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. To be willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other.So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject "in the room" hence "brings others down" not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but by exposing how happiness is sustained by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do kill joy in a certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others.We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angry or dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognized as a feminist is to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, that we may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists because they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of just how much there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as about the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy about.Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described as unhappy. We must learn.The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar.Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and other others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project.

#### Rage is critical to the extinction of patriarchy – it provides women agency in challenging power and materially grounds our resistance.

**Kaplow in 1973**

Susi Kaplow. “Getting Angry” Radical Feminism. 1973.

Two scenarios: An angry man: someone has infringed on his rights, gone against his interests, or harmed a loved one. Or perhaps his anger is social--against racism or militarism. He holds his anger in check (on the screen we can see the muscles of his face tighten, his fists clench) and then, at the strategic moment, he lets it go. We see him yelling, shouting his angry phrases with sureness and confidence--or pushing a fist into his opponent's stomach with equal conviction. In either event, the anger is resolved; our hero has vented it and is content with success or accepts what he knows to be unmerited defeat. Dissolve to scene two. An angry woman: angry at her man for cheating on her or (more likely) at the other woman. If we're in the good old days, she stomps up to her man and begins to scream wildly, he holds her down with his pinky, her anger melts in his embrace. After the fade-out, we find a puzzled heroine wondering how she could have been angry at such a good man. Or she marches over to the local saloon, hurls a few choice epithets at her rival, and then the hair-pulling begins. This ludicrous scene is always broken up by the amused and slightly scandalized gentlemen on the sidelines. In modern dress the same episode would be played differently. Discovering her hsuband's or lover's infidelity, the woman would smolder inwardly until the anger had burned down to a bitter resentment or becomes such a pressurized force that it could only come out in a rage so uncontrollable that the man (and the audience) can dismiss it as irrational. "I can't talk to you when you're like this." Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned. For a woman in our society is denied the forthright expression of her healthy anger. Her attempts at physical confrontation seem ridiculous; "ladies" do a slow burn, letting out their anger indirectly in catty little phrases, often directed against a third party, especially children. A woman has learned to hold back her anger: It's unseemly, aesthetically displeasing, and against the sweet, pliant feminine image to be angry. And the woman fears her own anger: She the great conciliator, the steadier of rocked boats, moves, out of her fear, to quiet not only others' anger but also her own. Small wonder that when the vacuum-sealed lid bursts off, the angry woman seems either like a freaked-out nut or a bitch on wheels. Her frenzy is intensified by the shakiness of her commitment to her own anger. What if she's really wrong? What if the other person is right? --Or worse (and this is the greatest fear) hits back with, "You're crazy, I don't know what you're so mad about." Why can't women allow themselves the outlet of their contained anger? Why do those around them find an angry woman so frightening that they must demoralize and deflate her into a degraded, inauthentic calm? Healthy anger says "I'm a person. I have certain human rights which you can't deny. I have a right to be treated with fairness and compassion. I have a right to live my life as I see fit, I have a right to get what I can for myself without hurting you. And if you deprive me of my rights, I'm not going to thank you, I'm going to say 'fuck off' and fight you if I have to." A person's anger puts him or her on center stage. It claims attention for itself and demands to be taken seriously, or else. (Or else I won't talk to you, I won't work with you or be friendly toward you, or else, ultimately, our association is over.) Expressing anger means risking. Risking that the other person will be angry in return, risking that he or she will misunderstand the anger or refuse to deal with it, risking that the anger itself is misplaced or misinformed. So you need strength to say you're angry--both the courage of your convictions and the ability to accept that your anger may be unwarranted without feeling crushed into nothingness. You must not have your total worth as a person riding on the worth of each individual case of anger. Thus anger is self-confident, willing to fight for itself even at the jeopardy of the status quo, capable of taking a risk and, if necessary, of accepting defeat without total demise. Above all, anger is assertive. The traditional woman is the polar opposite of this description. Lacking confidence in herself and in her own perception, she backs away from a fight or, following the rules of chivalry, lets someone else do battle for her. Strong emotions disturb her for the disruption they bring to things-as-they-are. So shaky is her self-image that every criticism is seen as an indictment of her person. She is a living, walking apology for her own existence--what could be more foreign to self-assertion? Although the reality has changed somewhat, most women will recognize themselves somewhere in this description. And society clings to this model as its ideal and calls an angry woman unfeminine. Becauseangertakes the woman out of her earth mother role as bastion of peace and calm, out of her familial role as peacemaker, out of her political role as preserver of the status quo, out of her economic role as cheap labor, out of her social role as second-class citizen. It takes her out of roles altogether and makes her a person. It is no accident, then, that the emotion which accompanies the first steps toward liberation is, for most women, anger. Whatever sense of self-worth you have been able to emerge with after twenty or thirty years of having your mind messed with, gives you the vague feeling that your situation is not what it should be and sends you looking tentatively at the world around you for explanations. Realizations are, at first, halting, and then begin to hit you like a relentless sledge hammer, driving the anger deeper and deeper into your consciousness with every blow. Your fury focuses on the select group of individuals who have done you the most damage. You are furious at your parents for having wanted a boy instead; at your mother (and this fury is mixed with compassion) for having let herself be stifled and having failed to show you another model of female behavior; at your father for having gotten a cheap bolster to his ego at your and your mother's expense. You are furious at those who groom you to play your shabby role. At the teachers who demanded less of you because you were a girl. At the doctors who told you birth control was the woman's responsibility, gave you a Hobson's choice of dangerous and ineffective devices, then refused you an abortion when these failed to work. At the psychiatrist who called you frigid because you didn't have vaginal orgasms and who told you you were neurotic for wanting more than the unpaid, unappreciated role of maid, wet nurse, and occasional lay. At employers who paid you less and kept you in lousy jobs. At the message from the media which you never understood before: "You've come a long way, baby" -- down the dead-end, pre-fab street we designed for you. Furious, above all, at men. For the grocer who has always called you "honey" you now have a stiff, curt "don't call me honey." For the men on the street who visit their daily indignities on your body, you have a "fuck off," or, if you're brave, a knee in the right place. For your male friends (and these get fewer and fewer) who are "all for women's lib" you reserve a cynical eye and a ready put-down. And for your man (if he's still around), a lot of hostile, angry questions. Is he different from other men? How? And when he fails to prove himself, your rage explodes readily from just beneath the surface. This is an uncomfortable period to live through. You are raw with an anger that seems to have a mind and will of its own. Your friends, most of whom disagree with you, find you strident and difficult. And you become all the more so because of your fear that they are right, that you're crazy after all. You yourself get tired of this anger--it's exhausting to be furious all the time--which won't even let you watch a movie or have a conversation in peace. But from your fury, you are gaining strength. The exercise of your anger gives you a sense of self and of self-worth. And the more this sense increases, the angrier you become. The two elements run in a dialectic whirlwind, smashing idols and myths all around them. You see, too, that you can get angry and it doesn't kill people, they don't kill you, the world doesn't fall apart. Then this anger, burning white hot against the outside world, suddenly veers around and turns its flame toward you. Sure, they fucked you up and over, sure, they oppressed you, sure they continue to degrade and use you. But--why did you let it happen? Why do you continue to let it happen? All of a sudden you are up against the part you played in your own oppression. You were the indispensible accomplice to the crime. You internalized your own inferiority, the pressing necessity to be beautiful and seductive, the belief that men are more important than women, the conviction that marriage is the ultimate goal. Seeing this, you are violent against yourself for every time you were afraid to try something for fear of failing, for all the hours lost on make-up and shopping, for every woman you missed because there was a man in the room, for getting yourself stuck as a housewife or in a job you hate because "marriage is your career." This phase of anger turned inward is terrifying. You are alone with your own failed responsibilities toward yourself, however much you can still blame others. It is this phase that some women find unbearable and flee from, returning to the first phase of anger or dropping out altogether. Because this inturned anger demands action--change--and won't let go until its demands begin to be satisfied. You can fall back on your inability to control others and their behavior toward you. But you can't comfortably claim powerlessness over your own conduct. Nor can you, at least for long, go on being furious at others (the forty-five-year-old who still blames mommy, flounders) if you don't even try to get yourself together. This inturned anger is a constructive or rather reconstructive catalyst. For what you can do under its impetus is to restructure yourself, putting new images, patterns and expectations in place of the old, no longer viable ones. As you use your anger, you also tame it. Anger becomes a tool which you can control, not only to help you make personal changes but to deal with the world outside as well. You can mobilize your anger to warn those around you that you're not having any more bullshit, to underscore your seriousness, to dare to drive your point home. Through the exercise of your anger, as you see its efficacy and thus your own, you gain strength. And the growing feeling that you control your anger and not vice versa adds to this strength. As you gain this control, become surer of yourself, less afraid of being told you're crazy, your anger is less enraged and, in a sense, calmer. So it becomes discriminating. You reserve it for those individuals and groups who are messing with your mind--be they men or other women. This progression of anger finds its ultimate meaning as an experience shared with other women. All striving to understand their collective situation, women in a group can help each other through the first, painful phase of outward-directed anger. Through consciousness-raising each woman can (at least ideally) find sufficient confirmation of her perceptions to be reassured of her own sanity--and can find growing strength to do without such confirmation when necessary. In the second phase of inturned anger, women can support one another in their attempts at self-definition and change, change which others will try to forestall. And, at the same time, they can start to move together to create new social forms and structures in which individual changes can come to fruition. Controlled, directed, but nonetheless passionate, anger moves from the personal to the political and becomes a force for shaping our new destiny**.**

## Underview

#### Role of the ballot and judge come before theory – (a) determines what we should read in debate which constrains things like theory and (b) controls the strongest internal link to inclusion – theory forces debate into abstract rules to escape hard conversations which creates an exclusionary debate space where only wealthy theory debaters can participate, and accessibility is a multiplier, your impacts don’t matter if they only apply to a privileged elite. And *(c) it determines what it means to be the better debater, which means it contextualizes what fairness is.*

1. **Don’t buy interps about the aff being bound to the resolution, two reasons**
2. **debate should widen our thinking, especially on critical issues**. **Wider range of types of arguments are good. Shanahan 93**

William Shanahan (Ft. Hays State University, Kansas) “kritik of thinking” Debater's Research Guide, Health Care Policy, 1993<http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Shanahan1993HealthCare.htm>

Policy has a stranglehold on debate worthy of any NYC transit cop. Argument must conform to rigid policy prescriptions - not only are particular types of arguments deemed unacceptable whole ways of thinking are excluded also. A caveat must follow on the heels of these seemingly scathing denunciations of current debate practices: debate is excellent! Debate opens paths of thinking that compulsory statist education maliciously denies. Intellectual obedience to authority is schooled, beginning in kindergarten and continuing throughout the remainder of the students' captivity (3). Debate teaches students to question the dogma spewed forth daily in their classrooms, to inquire into the matter at hand rather than simply accept the intellectual authority of their teachers. Students initially are protected from the stultifying effects of educational institutionalization by the argument and thinking skills learned in and brought from debate. Unfortunately, debate cannot resist its own calls to "face reality," cannot resist its own dogma. In debate though, those calls rally around the policy pole, demanding allegiance to the real world. Debate has opened many paths for its participants and helped them to travel extraordinarily far. This article attempts to open additional pathways for debaters, not shut down the current ones.

1. There are 0 fair rounds in a biased debate space, we have to work on rupturing those biases first to have a chance of fairness. Vote for the K if they run a T shell impacting to fairness as the best way to make debate more fair is to force judges and opponents to analyze their internal biases and rupture the debate space so people stop losing because they are women or other minority groups.