# NR

## Condo Good – Short

#### The neg gets [X] condo advocacies.

### Offense

#### 1. Logic- proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

#### 2. Neg Flex- we are inherently reactionary, we need in round flexibility to test the plan and have a fighting chance. If they had phenomenal answers to the CP the debate would be over after the 1AR which is educationally bankrupt.

#### 3. The 1AR should be hard- it’s the turning point in the debate. The aff doesn’t have to contradict themselves or undercover- they need to make tough choices.

#### 4. Key to research – unidimensional 1NCs discourage the neg from prepping multiple strategies against a case. Research outweighs – it’s the only portable skill we take into the real world.

### Defense

#### Our defense-

#### 1. We debate in both worlds too- no unique abuse for the affirmative, if we kick the CP the entire AC becomes offense.

#### 2. Straight turns and perms check – they can stick us with the net benefit and get infinite condo advocacies on each flow.

#### 3. No new 2AR args – we don’t get a 3NR to respond. Err neg on 1AR theory – it was so blippy in the 1AR that the 2AR will be totally new which makes negating impossible.

#### 6. Reasonability – good is good enough – I literally read 3 off case that are at the center of the literature and 1 of them (the DA) isn’t even conditional, it’s just a non issue that my opponent is exploiting for a theory arg

## AT Transition Wars

#### Their alarmist scenarios are hype and outdated – multiplexity creates sustainable balance

Acharya 18 - UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service, American University (Amitav Acharya; “The End of American World Order” Second Edition; pgs. 7-9; Accessed: July 8, 2018)//TS

The narrative underpinning the American World Order paints an unduly alarmist picture of the consequences of its decline. Most American commentators do not think its decline would be a good thing for anyone. Even those who do not dispute the signs of decline, and accept it as a fact of life, hope that the consequences would not be catastrophic for either America itself or the world. In this view, the end of the American World Order could result in acute multipolar rivalry and fragmentation of the world into competing regional blocs, as happened in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I dispute this alarmist view. While no one can predict the future, there are reasons to believe that the decline of the American World Order might even be good -both for America itself and for the rest of the world. The liberal hegemony narrative not only assumes that the emerging powers could be co-opted into the American World Order. It also regards some other foundations of global peace and stability, such as regionalism, in a negative light. Many liberal internationalists have generally been distrustful of regional orders. The United States has been quite selective or indifferent in its support for regionalism around the world. These fears may be exaggerated because the nature and role of regions and regionalism have changed considerably since World War II. As discussed in chapter 5, regionalism is less polarizing, and more open today than ever before. Thanks to inter-regionalism, the rise of alternative non-European forms of regionalism, and the proliferation of transnational issues that regional groups must contend with, regionalism has become more open, inclusive, and multidimensional. While regionalism alone is not a sufficient basis for constructing global order, it cannot be ignored in any meaningful discussion of the future of world politics and deserves serious attention in any discussion of what might take the place of the American World Order. This book argues that the future of world order lies not in a restored American hegemony. It does not rest on any or all of the emerging powers acting on their own or in concert with the established powers. At the same time, a regionalized system of security and economic cooperation alone will not satisfy the requirements of world order either. All of these elements, including a constrained but still significant US power, are likely to exist to varying degrees and shape the future world order. This result will be a different kind of world order: complex, decentered, but interdependent. I call this a multiplex world. A multiplex world may be defined as a world without a hegemon, culturally and politically diverse yet economically interconnected, where security challenges are increasingly transnational but the power to break and make order is dispersed and fragmented. Joseph Nye likens the current structure of world politics to a "complex three dimensional chess game." The chessboard has three layers. The top layer represents military power, which is largely unipolar and likely to remain so for some time. The middle layer is economic power, which has already become multipolar. The bottom layer consists of transnational or cross-border transactions in which non-state actors, ranging from global social movements to terrorist groups, operate largely outside of government control.14 In this bottom layer, "power is chaotically dispersed." 15 While Nye's metaphor is useful, it is also, as might be expected from a game of chess, mostly about power and its mechanics. Ironically, it does not even account for his much-vaunted notion of "soft power." (Do you use persuasion in a game of chess?) A better metaphor for visualizing world order, while looking beyond the language of hegemony or polarity, is that of a multiplex.

#### Hegemonic decline will be peaceful

Fettweis 2017 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University   
Christopher, "Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace," Security Studies, 26:3, 423-451, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394

Why has armed conflict declined to historically low levels? What accounts for the post-Cold War peace, and how long is it likely to last? Surely no questions are more important for either the theory or practice of international relations, and few are harder to answer. Only by understanding the causes of the New Peace can we extrapolate its likely future, however, and plan accordingly. Of the many possible independent variables, none is more controversial than the suggestion that hegemonic stability is at work. The possibility that the United States, wittingly or not, has essentially established a global Pax Americana is generally overlooked by the major scholarly works on the subject. This stands in stark contrast to the policy world, where the many positive aspects of unipolarity and/or US hegemony are articles of faith, rarely discussed and never seriously questioned. Scholar and public intellectual Michael Lind spoke for many when he wrote, “in my experience, most members of the U.S. foreign policy elite sincerely believe that the alternative to perpetual U.S. world domination is chaos and war.” 4 One of those is certainly Robert Kagan, who noted, “Pinker traces the beginning of a long-term decline in deaths from war to 1945, which just happens to be birthdate of the American world order. The coincidence eludes him, but it need not elude us.”5

This paper examines the theoretical, empirical, and psychological foundations of that widespread belief. The first section discusses the New Peace and its potential explanations; the second explains the difference between unipolarity and hegemony, and examines the logic of the hegemonic-stability argument; the third turns to the evidence, comparing both US power and grand strategy to conflict levels; the fourth examines the political psychology of hegemony and reviews some major findings that provide insight into how international order can be misperceived. Insights from that field are crucial in any discussion of the relationship between US power and global stability, which is built far more on belief and perception than evidence.

The New Peace does not appear to be the result of unipolarity or US hegemony. While that conclusion might not sit well with many US analysts, the news is not all bad, for if the current generation of declinists is right and unipolarity’s days are numbered, the odds are good that the world will not descend into the atavistic chaos that haunts the neoconservative imagination. The United States can adjust its grand strategy without fear in the Trump years, perhaps even letting the “unipolar moment” expire, because the New Peace may well be unrelated to its dominance.6

# 1NC

## CP

### 1NC Text

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government [opponent’s plan]

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

### 1NC Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

## Vaccine Diplomacy CP

#### Text: The People’s Republic of China should offer Chinese developed vaccines and medical technology related to COVID-19 to the world for free

#### The CP massively ramps up Chinese “vaccine diplomacy” which solves the case

Juecheng and Yuwei 8-13-21

(Zhao and Hu, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231387.shtml)

One of China’s most valued contributions to the global fair accessibility to COVID-19 vaccines is to enable more developing countries to hone their ability to produce vaccines by themselves, Zha Daojiong, professor of International Political Economy from Peking University, who closely studies the global vaccine equitable allocation framework, told the Global Times in a recent exclusive interview. Sharing his insights on widely discussed “vaccine nationalism,” “wavering vaccine intellectual property,” and “COVAX operation challenges,” Zha believes that China is advocating negotiations among countries on equitable global distribution of vaccines from a humanitarian, and global perspective. China has vowed to make efforts to provide the world with 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines this year and donate $100 million to COVAX to promote global vaccine provision. This commitment comes amid the rampaging Delta variant, which is bringing more challenges for developing countries to access vaccines and combat the pandemic while the West continues to drag its heels in fulfilling its promises. The promise was made at the first meeting of a forum on international cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines held on August 5. Zha suggested that the forum, alongside the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation, reflect China’s efforts to support long-term cooperation in the vaccine industry globally. However, some Western media have labeled China and Russia as the pioneers of the global "vaccine diplomacy" campaign. The choice of vaccines by countries has become the epitome of global geopolitics.   Foreign comments on China using "vaccine diplomacy" in a narrow geopolitical sense reflect the real competition among COVID-19 vaccine providers, Zha told the Global Times. Due to China’s mature vaccine technologies, longer shelf life and lower requirement for storage and transportation, Chinese made vaccines are a more preferable choice for many developing countries with relatively weak vaccination infrastructure . This has been reflected in the approval of Chinese vaccines in more than 100 countries. But the phenomenon of “vaccine nationalism” was never absent in the decision by governments to choose vaccines, Zha suggested. “For example, some countries and regions would include geopolitical factors in choosing vaccines. These countries would reject certain vaccines. Moreover, some media outlets refuse to accept the fact that the professional assessment of vaccine efficacy is also a scientific process. Instead, they made comments on potential vaccines based on their geopolitical interests. This is also a kind of “vaccine nationalism”. Voices blaming “vaccine nationalism” have long been present in developed countries. For instance, Zha recalled how, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 which affected more than 200 countries and regions for more than a year, certain developed countries bought out entire stocks of vaccines against H1N1 once they were developed. Though some of those countries had promised to donate vaccines to others after they met their vaccination needs, the virus had long disappeared before their donations were made. Therefore, many in other nations lost the opportunity of a timely vaccination. Providing assistance from one country to another in the field of infectious or non-infectious diseases is often referred to as "health diplomacy." Some international public health research literature support "health diplomacy" because cooperation in this field is conducive to the improvement of political, economic and diplomatic relations, Zha said. China has taken important steps to close the global vaccine gap, including the acceleration of large-scale production, boosting fair distribution, and licensing local production in more countries.

#### Successful vaccine diplomacy is key to overall Chinese Soft Power

Huang, PhD, 3-11-21

(YANZHONG HUANG is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations, and Director of the school’s Center for Global Health Studies. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china )

Vaccines have had a place in diplomacy since the Cold War era. The country that can manufacture and distribute lifesaving injections to others less fortunate sees a return on its investment in the form of soft power: prestige, goodwill, perhaps a degree of indebtedness, even awe. Today the country moving fastest toward consolidating these gains may be China, under President Xi Jinping, who proclaimed last May that Chinese-made vaccines against COVID-19 would become a “global public good.” Since that time, top officials have promised many developing countries priority access to Chinese vaccines, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced that the country is providing free vaccines to 69 countries and commercially exporting them to 28 more. China’s competitors worry that where Beijing’s inoculations go, its influence will follow. But the field of COVID-19 vaccination is still a largely uncharted one and scattered with barriers, whether logistical, scientific, psychological, or geopolitical. China’s path through this labyrinth is neither obvious nor assured. The country faces stiffening competition from Russia and India. Now the United States, too, has entered the global stakes for equitable distribution of safe and effective vaccines. China has yet to prove that it can fulfill the role it has taken on or win the trust of those it has offered to aid. CHINA'S STAKE The Chinese government dislikes the term “vaccine diplomacy.” The implication that China would distribute vaccine doses in order to broaden its global political influence is a “sinister” one, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. Rather, the Chinese government contends that “in promoting cooperation in combating the pandemic, China does not seek any geopolitical goals or have any economic interest considerations, and it has never attached any political strings.” Xi has further stressed that by distributing necessary goods in a crisis, China is merely acting as a responsible great power should. In this regard, China may seek to succeed with vaccines where it failed with masks: last spring, quality-control issues and clumsy propaganda tarnished the country’s efforts to supply medical products to the developed world. Now China is looking to showcase its global health leadership to lower- and middle-income countries, where it is distributing vaccines. But Beijing surely has additional foreign policy objectives in mind. China began its vaccine development projects early last spring, and state media made quite clear that through them, China hoped to demonstrate its technological prowess and the superiority of its authoritarian model of governance. “We are not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” a Chinese virologist told the state-backed Global Times. Another scientist highlighted China’s “system advantages”: “The United States is no match for China in terms of concentrating power to accomplish big things.” Indeed, unlike in the United States, vaccine development in China was a highly state-driven process. The Chinese government simultaneously pushed several technological approaches, including inactivated vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and adenovirus vector vaccines. It mobilized at least 22 institutes and firms to work on 17 vaccine development projects. And until last summer, China was leading the global race in vaccine development. It developed a vaccine (Ad5-nCoV) as early as February 2020, started Phase 1 clinical trials on March 16, and published results of the trials in late May. General Chen Wei, the face of China’s vaccine development operation, celebrated such achievements as “an embodiment of our country’s S&T progress, an embodiment of China’s great-power image and responsibility, and, even more, a contribution to humankind.” Behind such lofty goals lie commercial objectives, too. Health-related development assistance has long offered Chinese pharmaceutical companies a low-cost means of expanding their market share in the developing world. In March 2020, President Xi explicitly linked the shipment of medical supplies overseas to the “Health Silk Road,” now an important component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xiaofeng Liang, a former deputy director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, has publicly called for prioritizing BRI countries for access to Chinese vaccines. But the opportunity hardly ends there. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, few Chinese pharmaceutical companies had received World Health Organization prequalification to supply medical products to international organizations and donor funds. In 2019, China’s share in the value of UN-procured medical products was only 1.9 percent, compared with 21.9 percent for India. Chinese media lamented that of the 155 WHO-prequalified vaccines, only four were from China, compared with 44 from India. Indeed, Indian pharmaceutical firms produced more than 60 percent of the vaccines sold worldwide. The huge global demand for COVID-19 vaccines and “vaccine nationalism” in wealthy nations have created a great opportunity for China to break into a market that Indian and Western pharmaceutical firms have long dominated. If the vaccine were priced at $10 per dose with a 40 percent net profit margin, even a 15 percent share of the vaccine market in lower- and middle-income countries would generate total sales of $10.8 billion and a profit of $4.32 billion for the Chinese economy. In reality, Chinese vaccines are often priced higher than $10.

#### Chinese leadership stops global secessionist conflict

Griffiths 16 **-** Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan, States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628)

I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where territorial stability is concerned. Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process.73 Given the politics and conflicting principles of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.”74 Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for key actors, and increase the chance of conflict. Secessionist civil war is a common feature of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of violence in the world today.75 Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent.76 Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation.78 This is where Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order.

#### B. IP Protections are vital to innovation and economic growth-reject myopic moralizing about human rights

Bacchus, JD, 20

(James, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, a professor of global affairs at the University of Central Florida, An Unnecessary Proposal A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-12/FTB_78.pdf>, 12-16)

At the heart of this emerging trade debate is a belief by many people worldwide that all medicines should be “global public goods.” There is little room in such a belief for consideration of any rights to IP. As one group of United Nations human rights experts expressed: “There is no room for . . . profitability in decision-making about access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies that are at the heart of the right to the highest attainable standard of health for all.”16 This view is myopic. Subordinating IP rights temporarily to pressing public needs during a pandemic or other global health emergency is one thing. Eliminating any consideration of “profitability” in all policymaking relating to “access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies” is quite another.17 To be sure, there is a superficial moral appeal in such a view. But does this moral appeal hold up if such a “human rights” approach does not result in meeting those urgent public needs? With the belief that medicines should be “public goods,” there is literally no support in some quarters for the application of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to IP rights in medicines. Any protection of the IP rights in such goods is viewed as a violation of human rights and of the overall public interest. This view, though, does not reflect the practical reality of a world in which many medicines would simply not exist if it were not for the existence of IP rights and the protections they are afforded. Technically, IP rights are exceptions to free trade. A long-standing general discussion in the WTO has been about when these exceptions to free trade should be allowed and how far they should be extended. The continuing debate over IP rights in medicines is only the most emotional part of this overall conversation. Because developed countries have, historically, been the principal sources of IP rights, this lengthy WTO dispute has largely been between developed countries trying to uphold IP rights and developing countries trying to limit them. The debate over the discovery and the distribution of vaccines for COVID-19 is but the latest global occasion for this ongoing discussion. The primary justification for granting and protecting IP rights is that they are incentives for innovation, which is the main source for long-term economic growth and enhancements in the quality of human life. IP rights spark innovation by “enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.”18 The knowledge from innovations inspired by IP rights spills over to inspire other innovations. The protection of IP rights promotes the diffusion, domestically and internationally, of innovative technologies and new know-how. Historically, the principal factors of production have been land, labor, and capital. In the new pandemic world, perhaps an even more vital factor is the creation of knowledge, which adds enormously to “the wealth of nations.” Digital and other economic growth in the 21st century is increasingly ideas-based and knowledge intensive. Without IP rights as incentives, there would be less new knowledge and thus less innovation. In the short term, undermining private IP rights may accelerate distribution of goods and services—where the novel knowledge that went into making them already exists. But in the long term, undermining private IP rights would eliminate the incentives that inspire innovation, thus preventing the discovery and development of knowledge for new goods and services that the world needs. This widespread dismissal of the link between private IP rights and innovation is perhaps best reflected in the fact that although the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 aspire to “foster innovation,” they make no mention of IP rights.19 As Stephen Ezell and Nigel Cory of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation wrote, “A fundamental fault line in the debate over intellectual property pertains to the need to achieve a reasoned balance between access and exclusive rights.”20 This fault line is much on display in the WTO rules on IP rights. These rules recognize that “intellectual property rights are private rights” and that rules and disciplines are necessary for “the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights.”21 Yet, where social and economic welfare is at stake, WTO members have sought to strike a balance in these rules between upholding IP rights and fulfilling immediate domestic needs.

## WTO DA

#### A. WTO threatens CCP stability.

Mariam **Milsom**, January 26, **2003**, China-Political and Regulatory Systems, www.sixsmart.com/SSPapers pmw10.htm

Another threat to the stability of the Chinese government is the pressure to conform to the world’s demand for a more open market. Friedman, in his book “The Lexus and the Olive Tree,” describes a ‘golden straightjacket.’ This straightjacket is an analogy for the rules and regulations that a country must adhere to in order to attract and retain foreign investment. Many of these rules and regulations are overtly demanded by the World Trade Organization and national treaties while others are silently mandated by a collective group of private investors seeking a safe place to invest. The Chinese government, in an effort to attract foreign funds, is taking appropriate steps to put on this ‘Golden Straightjacket.’ This imaginary straightjacket, however, is putting pressure on the Chinese culture and way of life. Gordon Chang, author of the book "The Coming Collapse of China” suggests that the Chinese Communist party may be unable to solve the problems inherent to adhering to the World Trade Organization’s requests. The cause of the collapse “would be the stress of conforming to WTO norms and other tensions inherent in the broader impact of globalization” (Sutter, R. 10/25/01. Par 2). “The supertanker is headed for the rocks, and the committee of captains is not ready to turn the helm hard in any direction. The country's apparent stability gives a false sense of security” (Jackson, S. 8/13/2002. Par 10).

#### B. Lashout and nuclear war results.

**The Epoch Times**, August 3, **2005**, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weaponsin **its attempt to postpone its life**. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold **one billion people hostage** and gamble with their lives.

## Case

#### Existing *compulsory licensing* exemptions are sufficient to solve

Bacchus, JD, 20

(James, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, a professor of global affairs at the University of Central Florida, An Unnecessary Proposal A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-12/FTB_78.pdf>, 12-16)

What we have not heard in the waiver debate is any clear explanation from waiver advocates of why they believe that the right to compulsory licensing that they already possess will prove insufficient to ensuring access to COVID-19 vaccines. In requesting a broad waiver of IP rights to COVID-19 vaccines, India and South Africa maintained that “many countries especially developing countries may face institutional and legal difficulties when using flexibilities available” under existing WTO rules. They also noted that a “particular concern for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity” is that the 2017 amendment that permits countries that produce generic medicines under compulsory license to export all of those medicines to least-developed countries that lack their own manufacturing capabilities will lead to a “cumbersome and lengthy process.”14 India and South Africa did not offer any further explanation or any evidence to support these assertions. In an effort at an explanation, two Canadian university professors contended, “The TRIPS flexibilities are important policies but they are not perfect. Rules allowing compulsory licensing apply only on a case-by-case and product-by-product basis. This slows down the ability of countries to scale up production of needed COVID-19 products.”15 But this is advocacy, not evidence. At the time, this point was purely prospective; it was a prejudgment before any COVID-19 vaccine had been given final approval or reached the market. Before such a sweeping waiver of IP rights is taken up, it should first be demonstrated that the option of compulsory licensing and other flexibilities under the current trade rules will not suffice. At this point, the developed countries that have opposed the waiver are correct. There is no evidence of the need for such a waiver. Action by the WTO should be contemplated only if, and when, the current flexibilities in WTO rules prove to be inadequate. Should that happen, any such action should be no broader than necessary to address the global medical need.

#### Weakening IP is insufficient- multiple other barriers to equity

Bonadillo and Chandler 21

(Enrico, Reader in Intellectual Property Law, City, University of London, Dhanay M. Cadillo, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of Turku, https://theconversation.com/intellectual-property-and-covid-19-medicines-why-a-wto-waiver-may-not-be-enough-155920)

One argument against the waiver is that the TRIPS Agreement already contains flexibilities. These include the freedom to use parallel imports and compulsory licences that help countries get access to medicines. Yet such flexibilities are not always easy to use. Take compulsory licences. Since 2003 a mechanism has been made available which in principle allows countries with no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical field to use and benefit from compulsory licences. But the system is riddled with levels of complexity that render it useless and not fit for purpose. It’s only been used once in 17 years – in 2007, when Canada issued a compulsory licence to meet Rwanda’s need for AIDS drugs. Other arguments against the waiver are that it would not alleviate the burden of access to effective and affordable medicines and vaccines because of poor healthcare provision and infrastructure in some countries. And that it could potentially hamper R&D and innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. There are other barriers that the waiver wouldn’t address. One is that some developing countries have entered into bilateral agreements, especially with the US, the EU and other industrialised nations. These have limited the ability of generics producers to manufacture and distribute cheap medicines. One example is that this has limited the freedom to rely on parallel imports. These usually guarantee the importation of cheaper medicines purchased in countries where the drugs are sold at a lower price. Also, certain free trade agreements have introduced provisions which prevent national drug regulatory authorities from registering and allowing the sale of generics if the medicine is still patented. This is the so-called “patent linkage”. Among the countries that have signed these agreements are those who are part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. They include Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam. Other trade and partnership agreements have also obliged certain developing countries to provide an absolute protection of clinical test data submitted to regulatory agencies to demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of new medicines. This strong exclusivity stops the manufacturers of generics from using such data while applying for their own marketing authorisation. This inevitably slows down the availability of cheaper drugs. Countries like Morocco, Jordan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua do protect such data as a consequence of trade agreements concluded with the US. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson have recently pushed for plans to share vaccines instead.

#### Heg is ineffective – no empirical data supports their assumptions

Fettweis 13 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University (Christopher J. Fettweis; “The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy”; Cambridge University Press; pgs. 212-216)//TS

There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument displays the classic symptom of hubris: it overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global peace. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in history, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The 5 percent of the world's population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling 95 percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. For U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not proven eager to enforce rules on a consistent basis. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has at times not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be affecting their calculations.87 Stability exists today in many places to which U.S. hegemony does not extend. It is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one magnified by hubris: rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. Ego-centric biases suggest that while it may be natural for U.S. policy makers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. If U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment, and wisdom of another that would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naivete and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed, it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat the United States does. If dangers really exist, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, allies of the United States were not always convinced that they could rely on its security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting, since Europeans could never be completely sure the United States would indeed prove willing to sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower, if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction. Furthermore, if hegemonic stability logic is to account for restrained allied behavior, it is not enough for these states to be convinced about the capability and benevolent intentions of the United States. They must also trust its judgment. As discussed earlier the allies do not appear to believe that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, unable to explain why Washington so often finds it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in its adventures, but minimally and reluctantly. Finally, while proponents of hegemonic stability have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is no connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the Cold War, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in igg8 than it did in Cold War, a 25 percent reduction.89 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace," argued Kristol and Kagan."9° If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, the world would not have experienced an increase in conflict and violence. The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: the empirical studies cited in Chapter I should be more than adequate to demonstrate that the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state appeared to believe that its security was endangered by less capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action suggesting such a belief. No defense establishments outside of the Pacific rim have been enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred as the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military waned. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was simply not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton and kept declining as the Bush administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena were unrelated. These figures will not convince skeptics. One could presumably argue that military spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the Cold War, its relative advantage never wavered. However, it is surely worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would note that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have reveals no relationship between U.S. power and international stability, and suggests that the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God's gladiator on earth. Basic inertia affects calculations in this matter, as Jervis has said. While "it is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war," he argued, nonetheless he admits that he is "cautious enough not to want to run the experiment."9 1 There is good reason to believe that such an experiment would not end badly, however, and at the very least it would certainly be cheaper than the status quo

#### Focus on vaccine equity obscures vaccine “rollout” issues

Adler 7-20-21

(David Adler is the author of The New Economics of Liquidity and Financial Frictions and co-editor of the anthology The Productivity Puzzle: Restoring Economic Dynamism, both published by the CFA Institute Research Foundation. He is also an adviser on industrial strategy at the Common Good Foundation in the United Kingdom. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/20/wto-trips-waiver-vaccine-equity-distribution-covid-pandemic/)

On July 20, the World Trade Organization holds another Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council meeting to consider waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines. But vaccinating the world will take more than just increasing supply. Vaccines need to be distributed and administered so they end up in people’s arms. Yet there is still limited global focus on this critical last mile problem. The United States is a perfect case study of the importance of rollout planning and what can go wrong. It led the world in COVID-19 vaccine development and manufacturing, accomplished by Operation Warp Speed, in record time. But vaccine rollout was another story: The United States lagged behind both Israel and the United Kingdom in getting shots into people’s arms. Now, as the United States and the world consider ways to vaccinate every country, there is every reason to believe this rollout problem will reappear on a global scale. Even if the world manufactures an adequate vaccine supply—a very big if—this doesn’t mean afflicted countries will be able to effectively administer vaccines. Given ongoing deaths from COVID-19 in countries experiencing outbreaks as well as the flourishing of new variants that could breach existing vaccines, the consequences will be deadly. The origins of this rollout problem are predominantly institutional: The U.S. government and multilateral institutions working on supplying vaccines to the world have less of a focus on getting shots into people’s arms. This is often left up to individual countries ill-equipped for this task. But there is also a domestic U.S. political problem. The U.S. government’s efforts to vaccinate the world are often driven by the agendas of activism-focused nonprofits. Activists are united in a righteous solution of “vaccine equity,” which focuses on ensuring vaccine supply is fairly distributed among all countries in the world. However, activists have not yet, at least en masse, turned their attention to the technical challenges surrounding global rollout, including the long-term planning required for distribution and actually getting shots into people’s arms. This lack of political pressure means these issues aren’t getting the attention required to effectively vaccinate the world. Some of these institutional and political fissures marked the original rollout of COVID-19 vaccines in the United States—and explain some of its initial shortcomings. Although it isn’t widely known, the rollout had two components: “distribution,” meaning getting the vaccine to a specific location, and “administration,” meaning shots in the arm. The federal government’s Operation Warp Speed oversaw the distribution of vaccines and the complex logistics involved, including the ultra-cold storage requirements for mRNA vaccines. The distribution aspect of the rollout was highly successful, with 99 percent of vaccines arriving on time and at the right temperature. You can support Foreign Policy by becoming a subscriber. SUBSCRIBE TODAY Administering shots in the arm was another story. This was primarily left up to the states. Initially, Operation Warp Speed planned to have the U.S. Defense Department administer shots in the arms, but state and local authorities complained of the militarization of vaccine administration and took over this function. For whatever the reason—lack of resources, lack of planning, poor communication from the federal government—the states had trouble administering the vaccines on time. As of Jan. 15, more than 31 million doses had been “distributed” but only around 12 million doses had been “administered.” Over time, and with bolstered support from the incoming Biden administration, rollout rapidly improved. Nonetheless, vaccine hesitancy remains a major point of resistance to more widespread immunization in the United States. These rollout problems found in the United States are amplified many times when it comes to global rollout. The Biden administration discovered this first hand when it attempted to donate 80 million doses from domestic U.S. supply to the rest of the world in June but fell well short of this target. White House press secretary Jen Psaki said, “what we found to be the biggest challenge is not actually the supply—we have plenty of doses to share with the world—but this is a herculean logistical challenge. And we’ve seen that as we’ve begun to implement.” She pointed to the distributional challenges associated with storing vaccines at the proper temperature as well as the need for needles and syringes. As Psaki’s comments show, there is more to vaccinating the world than just increasing supply. Even if there are vaccine shortages at this moment, limited vaccine supply may not be a binding constraint by year end. Serum Institute of India, the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, has announced it will begin exporting later this year, implying India should have adequate vaccine supply by then. Pfizer/BioNTech has pledged to deliver 2 billion doses to low- and middle-income countries. AstraZeneca is continuing to scale up production. Nonetheless, the Biden administration’s signature international COVID-19 policy, the TRIPS waiver, is a supply side move—but one unlikely to lead to any actual increase in supply. This waves intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines to further foreign production. The U.K. and German governments have viewed it skeptically and can block it. Also, as has been widely noted, manufacturing involves trade secrets and supply chain issues that go well beyond intellectual property (IP) rights. Less widely noted is the fact that the Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca, and Novavax vaccines have already been licensed to Indian manufacturers, so it is not clear to what degree IP rights are really hindering additional foreign production. Therefore, the TRIPS waiver can be seen as essentially a political or even theatrical gesture, well removed from the messy world of vaccine distribution and administration. It appealed to a domestic audience hostile to Big Pharma and an international audience of countries like India and South Africa whose industrial policies have long called for limitations on IP rights.

#### Aff doesn’t attack all of the root causes of disease spread- lack of materials, equipment, and facilities when faced with skyrocketed demands means solving IP protections alone isn’t enough

Brant & Burns 7-29 [Jennifer Brant, CEO and Founder of Innovation Insights, and Thaddeus Burns, Head of Life Science Government & Public Affairs at Merck and served in senior positions at the US Department of Commerce and the White House Office of the US Trade Representative, served as a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee charged with preparing a report on the science and technology capabilities of the U.S. Department of State. “Trade restrictions are delaying the COVID response. The WTO must act.” July 29, 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/07/wto-members-must-launch-new-work-to-reinforce-the-covid-response-in-november/>] AL

The COVID-19 pandemic hit at a time when bio-manufacturing was undergoing a process of democratization. Technological progress had enabled growing capacity in many countries including Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Tunisia, Argentina, and Egypt. By 2020, the business model for bio-manufacturing had fundamentally changed and it was becoming the norm for companies to distribute research, development and manufacturing across geographies and work with partners. As recently as 15 years ago, building a facility to produce biologics such as monoclonal antibodies or vaccines could require an investment of as much as €500m, and it would take up to 3 years to bring that facility online. New manufacturing technologies have made it cheaper and easier to build new facilities and to scale up existing ones. Today, an investment of €20m can get a bio-manufacturing plant up and running. Such changes are part of the reason the global community was able to launch production of new COVID-19 vaccines so quickly. The urgency of COVID-19 accelerated further innovations in bio-manufacturing equipment and processes, and compressed production time in a way that will have positive impacts in the future. But the pandemic also revealed major weaknesses in global value chains. It was difficult for manufacturers to keep up with the sudden surge for demand for raw materials and equipment, as many new research and development and manufacturing partnerships rapidly took off. To extend capacity, new employees, intensive training and collaboration, and more infrastructure were needed. The global community was faced with the reality that facilities cannot be built everywhere in an instant, and that there are bottlenecks in the supply chain. Government action in some cases made things worse. Some countries enacted export restrictions on COVID-related products, which made it extremely difficult to run a global supply chain. Another difficult issue has been the tariffs applied on biologics and the products needed for their manufacture. Eighteen months into the pandemic, biologics manufacturers are still trying to cope with a range of challenges. There is still surging demand for equipment and raw materials. In some cases, they have expanded manufacturing capacity to produce more equipment such as filters and bioreactors. This continues to require time and significant investments.

#### B. IP Protections are vital to innovation and economic growth-reject myopic moralizing about human rights

Bacchus, JD, 20

(James, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, a professor of global affairs at the University of Central Florida, An Unnecessary Proposal A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-12/FTB_78.pdf>, 12-16)

At the heart of this emerging trade debate is a belief by many people worldwide that all medicines should be “global public goods.” There is little room in such a belief for consideration of any rights to IP. As one group of United Nations human rights experts expressed: “There is no room for . . . profitability in decision-making about access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies that are at the heart of the right to the highest attainable standard of health for all.”16 This view is myopic. Subordinating IP rights temporarily to pressing public needs during a pandemic or other global health emergency is one thing. Eliminating any consideration of “profitability” in all policymaking relating to “access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies” is quite another.17 To be sure, there is a superficial moral appeal in such a view. But does this moral appeal hold up if such a “human rights” approach does not result in meeting those urgent public needs? With the belief that medicines should be “public goods,” there is literally no support in some quarters for the application of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to IP rights in medicines. Any protection of the IP rights in such goods is viewed as a violation of human rights and of the overall public interest. This view, though, does not reflect the practical reality of a world in which many medicines would simply not exist if it were not for the existence of IP rights and the protections they are afforded. Technically, IP rights are exceptions to free trade. A long-standing general discussion in the WTO has been about when these exceptions to free trade should be allowed and how far they should be extended. The continuing debate over IP rights in medicines is only the most emotional part of this overall conversation. Because developed countries have, historically, been the principal sources of IP rights, this lengthy WTO dispute has largely been between developed countries trying to uphold IP rights and developing countries trying to limit them. The debate over the discovery and the distribution of vaccines for COVID-19 is but the latest global occasion for this ongoing discussion. The primary justification for granting and protecting IP rights is that they are incentives for innovation, which is the main source for long-term economic growth and enhancements in the quality of human life. IP rights spark innovation by “enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.”18 The knowledge from innovations inspired by IP rights spills over to inspire other innovations. The protection of IP rights promotes the diffusion, domestically and internationally, of innovative technologies and new know-how. Historically, the principal factors of production have been land, labor, and capital. In the new pandemic world, perhaps an even more vital factor is the creation of knowledge, which adds enormously to “the wealth of nations.” Digital and other economic growth in the 21st century is increasingly ideas-based and knowledge intensive. Without IP rights as incentives, there would be less new knowledge and thus less innovation. In the short term, undermining private IP rights may accelerate distribution of goods and services—where the novel knowledge that went into making them already exists. But in the long term, undermining private IP rights would eliminate the incentives that inspire innovation, thus preventing the discovery and development of knowledge for new goods and services that the world needs. This widespread dismissal of the link between private IP rights and innovation is perhaps best reflected in the fact that although the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 aspire to “foster innovation,” they make no mention of IP rights.19 As Stephen Ezell and Nigel Cory of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation wrote, “A fundamental fault line in the debate over intellectual property pertains to the need to achieve a reasoned balance between access and exclusive rights.”20 This fault line is much on display in the WTO rules on IP rights. These rules recognize that “intellectual property rights are private rights” and that rules and disciplines are necessary for “the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights.”21 Yet, where social and economic welfare is at stake, WTO members have sought to strike a balance in these rules between upholding IP rights and fulfilling immediate domestic needs.

#### Odds of indo-pak war going nuclear are ZERO. Their high probability assessment is media hype

**Enders 02** [David Enders, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” Michigan Daily, January 30th, 2002, pg. <http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely>.

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. "**Odds are close to zero**," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted." The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. "The decision makers **are aware of what nuclear weapons are**, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is **committed to a no-first-strike policy,"** Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands." But the low probability of nuclear war does not mean tensions between the two countries who have fought three wars since they were created in 1947 will not erupt. "The possibility of conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways out of the current tension," Lieberthal said.