## NR

#### . Our interp doesn’t require a defense of the actor which would be saying the state is good, rather it’s just an defense of an ACTION – you don’t have to pretend to be the government to say the government should do something just like you don’t have to pretend to be the police to say the police shouldn’t shoot black people.

#### 2. Discussing policy doesn’t mean identifying with or defending the state, it means attacking it

Saul Newman 10, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

## FW vs K

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entites is unjust

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

**Unjust means unlawful**

**Waters 98** [H. FRANKLIN WATERS, Senior District Judge. Colonia Ins. Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 13 F. Supp. 2d 891 - Dist. Court, WD Arkansas 1998] TDI

3. Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiffs allege in the amended complaint that Coleman has been unjustly enriched by all amounts he received from Welch and AGA. "To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something of value, to which he was not entitled and which he must restore." Coleman's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 55 Ark.App. 275, 299, 935 S.W.2d 289, 302 (1996) (citing Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 288 Ark. 532, 536, 708 S.W.2d 67, 69 (1986)). "However, there must be some operative act, intent, or situation to make the enrichment unjust and compensable." Sparks Regional Medical Ctr. v. Blatt, 55 Ark.App. 311, 317, 935 S.W.2d 304, 306 (1996) (citation omitted). "One who is free from fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he has chosen to exercise a legal or contract right." Id. (citation omitted).

Arkansas law is clear on the issue that in the realm of unjust enrichment, the word **"unjust" means "unlawful."** "One is not unjustly enriched by receipt of that to which he is legally entitled. \* \* \* No recovery of money received can be based upon unjust enrichment when the recipient can show a legal or equitable ground for keeping it." Halvorson v. Trout, 258 Ark. 397, 403, 527 S.W.2d 573, 577 (1975) (quoting Whitley v. Irwin, 250 Ark. 543, 550-51, 465 S.W.2d 906, 910-11 (1971)). See also, Jackson County Grain Drying Coop. v. Newport Wholesale Electric, Inc., 9 Ark.App. 41, 46, 652 S.W.2d 638, 640 (1983) (no one shall be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another; the word "unjustly" means "unlawfully").

Coleman contends that because he was an employee of AGA, he was entitled to the money he received as remuneration for his services, and, as such, he was not unjustly enriched. The court believes that, based on the reasons set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Coleman knew that the source of the money he received from Welch and AGA, especially the bonuses and gifts, was plaintiffs' premiums. Therefore, Coleman is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Violation: They don’t meet because they read X

#### B. Fairness –

#### 1. Debate is a game – tournament results and ballot prove. Other impacts like political activism or education can be pursued in other arenas. Fairness is unique to debate, that makes it the most important impact.

#### 2. Not defending the topic is unfair –

#### a) Predictability –

#### Altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. reparation is better than thinking on your feet – research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training.

#### b) Limits –

#### There are a finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### c) Causality –

#### Debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### d) Exclusionary rule –

#### You can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

#### C. Engagement –

#### Aff’s interp destroys engagement – predictable stasis point research accessibility and neg ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

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#### Two impacts –

#### a) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### b) Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Drop the debater on T – their model ensures that the round is skewed from the beginning because their advocacy prevents me from generating 1NC offense.

#### Theory is competing interpretations – reasonability encourages arbitrary judge intervention and debaters playing to a particular judge’s questionable preferences

#### E. Aff cedes the political –outright rejection of hegemonic practices means the aff fails, coalitions break down, and hawks seize the political – only engagement solves

**Mouffe 2009**

(Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State”, *What is Radical Politics Today?*, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)

## The way we envisage social criticism has very important consequences for radical politics. Radical politics today is often characterised in terms of desertion, exodus and refusal to engage with existing institutions. Whereas I believe that radical politics should instead be concerned with building political engagement, through developing competing, antagonistic political claims. My aim here is to highlight the main differences between these two characterisations. The first could roughly be described as ‘critique as withdrawal’; the second as ‘critique as engagement’. I will argue that, ultimately, the problem with the form of radical politics advocated by ‘critique as withdrawal’ is that it has a flawed understanding of the very nature of ‘the political’ itself. Critique as withdrawal The model of social criticism and radical politics put forward by Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri in their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) is a good illustration of ‘critique as withdrawal’. Empire is often referred to as the Communist manifesto for the twenty-first century in academic and activist conferences. In this book, the authors call for a total break with modernity and the elaboration of a postmodern approach. In their view such a break is required because of the crucial transformations of globalisation and the subsequent workers’ struggle experienced by our society during the last decades of the twentieth century. According to Hardt and Negri, these transformations can be broadly summarised in the following way: 1. Sovereignty has taken a new form: there is a new global sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri call ‘Empire’. They argue that this Empire is a new imperialism that replaces the attempt by nation states to extend their own sovereignty beyond their borders. In contrast to old-style imperialism, the current Empire has no territorial centre of power and no fixed boundaries; it is decentred and deterritorialised, progressively incorporating the entire global realm with open, expanding frontiers. 2. This transformation corresponds, they say, to the transformation of the capitalist mode of production. The role of industrial factory labour has been reduced. Priority is instead given to communicative, cooperative and affective labour. In the postmodernisation of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends towards regulating and mediating life itself. It permeates every aspect of our life. The scope of the rule of Empire is social life in its entirety. All aspects of our life are controlled – from the way we work and exchange ideas across international borders, through to how we think about our body image. 3. We are witnessing the passage from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ characterised by a new paradigm of power. In the disciplinary society, which corresponds to the first phase of capitalist accumulation, command is constructed through diffuse networks of apparatus. These produce and regulate customs, habits and productive practices with the help of disciplinary institutions like prisons, factories, asylums, hospitals, schools and others. The society of control, in contrast, is a society in which mechanisms of command are less obvious. The society of control is dominated by the many mechanisms of the globalised, postmodern capitalist society, which seek to directly organise the brain and body (from the internet, through to complex global systems of trade). What is directly at stake is the regulation of life itself. This is what they call ‘biopower’. 4. Hardt and Negri produce new terms to help explain this situation. These are ‘mass intellectuality’, ‘immaterial labor’ and ‘general intellect’. The central role previously occupied by the labour-power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus-value is today said to be increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial and communicative labour-power. For Hardt and Negri, the figure of immaterial labour involved in communication, cooperation and the reproduction of affects occupies an increasingly central position in the schema of capitalist production. 5. A new term is needed to refer to this collective worker that Hardt and Negri call the ‘Multitude’. They believe that the transition to Empire – where territorial state sovereignty is less important – has opened up new possibilities for the liberation of this Multitude. The Multitude have shaped a new form of globalisation, which means that previous systems and structures of exploitation and control, such as the state, are no longer needed. This is why their book Empire is so often referred to as the Communist manifesto of the twenty-first century. According to this manifesto, the creative forces of the Multitude are capable of constructing a counter-empire, of overthrowing the state apparatus of control. The present systems of control are no longer necessary. An alternative political organisation of the global flows of exchange now dominates in this era of globalisation. We can, therefore, get rid of territorial sovereignty because it only serves to oppress our creativity. Hardt and Negri therefore clearly illustrate what I previously called, in my introduction to this chapter, ‘critique as withdrawal’: a refusal to engage with existing institutions. At this point it is worth introducing the work of Paolo Virno to complement the picture. Virno’s analyses in his book Grammar of the Multitude (2004) dovetail in many respects with those of Hardt and Negri. But there are also some significant differences. For instance, he is much less sanguine about the future. While Hardt and Negri have a messianic vision of the role of the Multitude, which will necessarily bring down Empire and establish an ‘Absolute Democracy’, Virno does not. For Virno, the present conditions are not right for a communist future. It is unlikely that the sort of ‘Absolute Democracy’ that Hardt and Negri envisage will actually take place. Instead of seeing the generalisation of immaterial labour as a type of ‘spontaneous communism’ like Hardt and Negri, Virno tends to see post-Fordism as a manifestation of the ‘communism of capital’. Under post-Fordism, consumers pursue different goals, with services responding accordingly. This means that today, for Virno, capitalistic initiatives orchestrate material and cultural conditions for their own benefit. And the role of political action should be to create a sphere of common affairs – which he calls the ‘Republic of the Multitude’ – to challenge this situation. Virno proposes two key terms to describe the type of political action which he thinks is necessary. These are ‘exodus’ and ‘civil disobedience’. And for me, they again illustrate what I call ‘critique as withdrawal’: something which is an important and influential trend in radical politics today because exodus advocates mass defection from the state. This requires the development of a non-state public sphere and a radically new type of democracy. It involves experimenting in new forms of nonrepresentative and extra-parliamentary democracy, organised around leagues, councils and soviets. The Multitude never aspire to transform themselves into a majority. They develop a power that refuses to become government. This is why, according to Virno, civil disobedience needs to be emancipated from the liberal tradition. He does not just want to ignore specific laws if they do not conform to the principles of a given territorial constitution or state. For Virno, like Hardt and Negri, radical disobedience goes much further – it puts the existence of the state itself in question. In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and workers’ struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers’ struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word ‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or ‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about ‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’ struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from Fordism to postFordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to postFordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive potential. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to postFordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated. As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question – the specific states, international institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not ‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics

#### TVA – Affirm whole res with a Dalit advantage – they even said that space appropriation by private entities is anti-dalit like they concede the TVA works but are unwilling to use it solely to skirt engagement.

#### TVA is terminal defense – proves our models aren’t mutually exclusive - any response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation. Form over Content doesn’t take it out since we don’t restrict Form, just the substantive burden of the Aff.

## K

#### “Good for us” is an inappropriate metric- it fractures resistance into depoliticized “brands” that can never be effective

Alvarez, PhD Candidate, 17

(Maximillian, 3-8, https://thebaffler.com/blog/circulate-now-mobilize-later)

Leftist critics need to get out of their head right now (yesterday, in fact) the idea that more and different critique is an end in itself. There will always be opportunities to make newer and better critiques in the media market of communicative capitalism, but this doesn’t address the basic problem that there is now, by most measures, a glut of good criticism out there already. Did any of it secure a victory for Sanders over Clinton? Did it stop Trump? Did any of it stall the prison-industrial complex or stop ICE raids under Obama and now Trump? Lack of critique is not our problem—more and better will not alone be enough to strike back against these grim forces. And the more that we each individually entertain our egoistic desire to be distanced intellectual leaders of a movement through our criticisms, the less we’ll be able to see things as they really are, and to call them by their true names. For all the talk of growing resistance, there’s no serious connection between leftist critique and some consistent movement—yet. And, as of this moment, we critics are carrying on like thousands of Don Quixotes, all charging in different directions with no one behind us. (And, yes, I’m as guilty of operating under such delusions as the next person—that’s the point.) Once we’ve set aside the seductions of memeing, we must understand and take seriously that we are embarked on something far more momentous. We’re now plunged into the thick of a battle royale for the soul (and body) of the left. How do we contribute to summoning the actually-existing political bodies for which we can be vital organs? How do we begin to coax forth something solid, consistent, from the hazy and dispersed leftist non-body? How do we throw down forms of political criticism that actively refuse to be casually absorbed by permanently scattered individuals in an intellectual market of leftism that, under communicative capitalism, most resembles a thrift store where different brands can be mixed and matched to each consumer’s liking? For starters, we need more goal-oriented journalistic campaigns, campaigns that repeatedly fuse critical positions and political demands with clear and present visions for mobilization. Campaigns that collaborate with and harness existing mobilization efforts. As with political journalism of the past, which heavily featured local labor leaders, political actors, and imminent concerns, our campaigns should more collectively strive to summon forth an urgency in readers whose reading activity embroils them in a drastic political landscape that is unfolding right now (not just in abstract arguments or visions of a distant past or future). To capture the critical now-ness of our daily reading, for example, our campaigns should continue to make the work and positions of activists like Aly Wane, Lucas Benitez, and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor as much, if not more, of a recurring focus than Debord, Rorty, and Gramsci. At historical moments of extreme tension, like our own, such campaigns helped bring forth, starting with relatively small student protests in ’68 Paris, the mobilization of a general strike demanding worker and student rights, antiwar measures, and the potential resignation of a national leader. Such campaigns, which would eventually help relay and articulate demands for policy changes and community action, grew out of, and learned from, local grassroots efforts by black civil rights activists organizing the boycotts, sit-ins, “freedom rides,” etc. Regardless of how things changed drastically after WWII, such campaigns helped foment an American labor movement with considerable communist influence. Perhaps another byproduct of a revived on-the-ground focus for leftist political journalism will be the need for individual outlets to concretize actual schools of thought and strategy that can be differentiated from each other. Perhaps, in other words, people must be encouraged to take sides. This is not because our leftist infighting and jockeying for position is somehow more important than the larger battles we are collectively facing. Rather, we may very well recognize that the stakes are so high now that this is an unavoidable move, one of the few things we can actually do to draw ourselves and our readers out of the communicative capitalist haze, to summon ourselves into working, organized leftist bodies. It may be one of the only ways left to suit up and take leftist politics out of the neoliberal marketplace of circulating content and put it back onto the battlefield, where it belongs.

#### The left fetishizes stylistic resistance to paper over crushing political defeats- the demand for academic difference is at root the imperative of the marketplace – Theyyam isn’t a radical political movement, it’s micropolitics to separate Dalit strugger from broader class struggle

Alvarez, PhD Candidate, 17

(Maximillian, 3-8, https://thebaffler.com/blog/circulate-now-mobilize-later)

Basically, it’s crowded “in here,” which is not, on its own, a bad thing. The more leftism the merrier, and it’s all the better that there are distinct flavors and ideological shadings to choose from. But something sticks in the teeth when you look at lists like these; there seems to be an inverse relation between how well the left is doing in the journalism world and how much we’re getting our asses kicked everywhere else. There’s a host of different and intersecting reasons for this, but I want to talk about the one that is most present, the one that has to do with you reading this article right now. Here’s my first claim: for too long, we’ve collectively and individually allowed leftism to become a loose cluster of critical positions orbiting around a general sense of intellectual and consumeristic self-satisfaction as opposed to pressure-cooking it down to a core of concerted political actions and commitments. The market for leftist ideas and criticism is something akin to a concentrated mist: refreshing in the moment, but ungraspable, and perhaps hazardous over the longer term. Second claim: this has largely been the result of fundamental changes to the ways we write, share, act, and think that have occurred under the system called “communicative capitalism”—a system that encourages us to communicate more even as the rapid proliferation of new platforms and outlets sucks away the potential for our communications to have any sort of political impact. Third claim: while the writing and publishing left may be “succeeding” by the standards set by communicative capitalism, we’re actively feeding the mechanisms by which communicative capitalism makes us obsolete. The left has always relied on “organs” for basic functions of its many political bodies (here we’ll stick to print and typed media, but this also includes radio, video, illustrations, art, etc.). There’s a beautiful and dusty history to publications like New Masses, The Militant, The Daily Worker, and The Partisan Review in the days of the “Old Left, succeeded by the New Left Review (itself the product of a 1960 merger between The New Reasoner and Universities and Left Review), politics, Dissent, Socialisme ou Barbarie, The Socialist Register, Monthly Review, The National Guardian, In These Times, Mother Jones, etc., to say nothing of anarchist zines and liberal pillars like The Nation and The New Republic. Take a cursory glance at some of the older issues of these and many more publications, and note our recent intellectual lineage. Some of the writing is incredible, some of it sucks, but one thing stands out immediately. These media outlets, representing different ideological factions and causes, never let you forget how impressively goal-oriented they are. Their communicative goals include, but aren’t limited to: introducing a working left agenda to moldable “publics”; cultivating ways of viewing the world consistent with core leftist principles; providing a public forum for key arguments and strategies to be debated; organizing targeted readerships (specific geographic, class, employment-based, etc. demographics) and mobilizing resistance movements with urgent objectives (strikes, unionization, congresses, positions to take on elections and wars, “the revolution,” etc). Please resist the urge to write this question off as the ignorant burbling of an idealistic wag: What are the goals of the typing and publishing left today? If we are, independently or collectively, organs of a political body, what is our function? Even as a minor participant in written leftism, I have the same knee-jerk responses to this question that most would have. Our function is to critique: to expose the unseen workings of unjust power, to enlighten and “sway public opinion.” Our organs take in the world’s faults and explain them through a mode of political criticism that, for all its variations, is informed by more-or-less shared notions of anti-capitalist resistance. We in the left publishing world largely agree that the capitalist political economy is far-reaching, evil, and violent, and that forms of injustice (like discrimination, persecution, exploitation, etc.) are perpetuated by broad social-historical forces whose traces are present in many institutions and traditions today. This core critique feels pretty consistent with the work done by radical publications of the past. But this hard work, the work of critique, doesn’t really qualify us as organs. Even if they were entirely unrealistic, the critiques from organs in bygone eras were oriented toward targeted groups achieving tangible goals. Today, by contrast, it’s seemingly a given that critique is an end in itself. The implied, intangible goal of “raising public awareness” is enough, and we generally assume all the conventional measures of media success—popularity, traffic, virality, circulation boosts—are a useful stand-in metric for attaining that goal. And with an abundantly supplied market for left critique, achieving this goal inherently depends on strategies of product differentiation—or, to borrow an ever-apt phrase from the Freudian lexicon, the narcissism of small differences. The leading venues for political criticism all seek to differentiate themselves through rhetorical style, layout aesthetic, and, to some extent, theoretical affiliations. And they have every market incentive to push these second-order distinctions over the advancement of any clear and overarching visions of what the world should be and how to go about changing it. And as producers and consumers in this marketplace of political criticism, we’re encouraged not to tie ourselves down to one look, but to explore and cherry-pick arguments from all over in a way that expresses the depth and variation of our leftism while confirming that leftism itself has become just that—a marketplace. The function of an organ is defined by the body it serves. Without a body, it’s just greasy tissue. So, perhaps the better question is: what body (or bodies) are we serving? Is there a body at all, or has that question become, in an all-too literal sense, immaterial to us? Behind the thousands of faceless “likes” and “favorites” and shares and subscriptions, is there a thunderous thing with teeth and fists? Is there, at this moment, for instance, a discernible body of and for socialism that we, as organs, are helping to sustain? I suspect not. Almost all twenty-first-century evidence suggests, instead, that the bodies we like to think we’re commanding are disjointed, dispersed, and shapeless. In fact, they’re not bodies at all, just a thousand points of light trying to outshine each other in cold, dead space. Which means we are not organs. At best, we’re organs in vitro, suspended on our own, connected to nothing, taking in raw material through one rubbery ventricle and passing through another some smart, different-looking sludge that falls on the floor, splotch.

#### Their preempt card flows neg – it specifically says “capitalism in india was super-imposed”, not that it was inherent. It concedes the caste system was a consequence of a materialist society, and not the opposite

#### they have no defense for why caste analysis can solve cap everywhere else, b/c it can’t most other places don’t have a caste system

#### Neoliberalism and violence are inextricably intertwined—violence and the caste system is a reflection and expression of capitalism

Springer, assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)// JJN from file

The existing relationship between neoliberalism and violence is directly related to the system of rule that neoliberalism constructs, justifies and defends in advancing its hegemonies of ideology, of policy and programme, of state form, of governmentality and ultimately of discourse. Neoliberalism is a context in which the establishment, maintenance and extension of hierarchical orderings of social relations are re-created, sustained and intensified. Accordingly, neoliberalisation must be considered as an integral part of the moment of violence in its capacity to create social divisions within the constellations of experiences that delineate place and across the stories-so-far of space ([Massey 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2012.01084.x/full#b30)). Violence has a distinctive ‘reciprocity of reinforcement’ ([Iadicola and Shupe 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2012.01084.x/full" \l "b25" \o "Link to bibliographic citation), 375), where not only may inequality lead to violence, but so too may violence result in inequality. In this light, we can regard a concern for understanding the causality of violence as being a consideration that posits where neoliberalism might make its entry into this bolstering systematic exchange between inequality and violence. The empirical record demonstrates a marked increase in inequality under neoliberalism ([Wade 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2012.01084.x/full#b41)), encouraging Harvey (2005) to regard this as neoliberalism's primary substantive achievement. Yet to ask the particular question ‘does neoliberalism cause violence?’ is, upon further reflection, somewhat irrelevant. Inequality alone is about the metrics and measuring of disparity, however qualified, while the link between inequality and violence is typically treated as an assessment of the ‘validity’ of a causal relationship, where the link may or may not be understood to take on multiple dimensions (including temporally, spatiality, economics, politics, culture, etc.). However, the point is that inequality and violence are mutually constitutive, which is precisely what [Galtung (1969](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2012.01084.x/full#b14)) had in mind when he coined the term ‘structural violence’. Inequality begets violence, and violence produces further inequalities. Therefore, if we want to disempower the abhorrent and alienating effects of either and rescind the domination they both encourage, we need to drop the calculative approaches and consider violence and inequality together as an enclosed and resonating system, that is, as a particular moment. As [Hartsock](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2012.01084.x/full#b20) argues [t]hinking in terms of moments can allow the theorist to take account of discontinuities and incommensurabilities without losing sight of the presence of a social system within which these features are embedded. (2006, 176) Although the enduring phenomenon of violence is riven by tensions, vagaries and vicissitudes as part of its fundamental nature, within the current moment of neoliberalism, violence is all too frequently a reflection of the turbulent landscapes of globalised capitalism. Capitalism at different moments creates particular kinds of agents who become capable of certain kinds of violence dependent upon both their distinctive geohistorical milieu and their situation within its hierarchy. It is in this distinction that future critical inquiries could productively locate their concerns for understanding the associations between violence and neoliberalism. By examining the contingent histories and unique geographies that define individual neoliberalisations, geographers can begin to interpret and dissect the kaleidoscope of violence that is intercalated within neoliberalism's broader rationality of power. It is critically important to recognise and start working through how the moment of violence and the moment of neoliberalism coalesce, to which I now turn my attention.

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### This turn outweighs the case- voting affirmative only creates *privileged marginals*

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As might be expected, given my approving citation of Joan Scott’s work in the previous chapter, I am extremely wary of the recent tendency in gay and lesbian studies to deploy largely untheorized notions of autobiography and expcricnce. I am particularly suspicious of the eagerness with which the liberal academy has lent its benevolent ear to our stories as of late. Replacing the psychiatrist’s couch with, for example, the podium at an academic conference or the pages of a dissertation seems to leave too much the same.1 I am less certain than some of my colleagues that the casting of ourselves as an object of knowledge for the disciplines of English or film studies is necessarily a gain, political or otherwise. The rapidity with which “queerness” in particular **has become grist for the academic mill**—evidenced, for example, in the current plethora of “queer” panels and papers at the recent annual meetings of both the Modern Language Association and the Society for Cinema Studies—should at the very least invite us to examine the facility with which the academy manages to **interpolate allegedly oppositional cultural practices**.2 In the wake of the work of such theorists as Foucault and Derrida, it is difficult to cling to the idealist precept that knowledge (in this particular instance, knowledge of the Other) is simply made available by the academy for an unproblematic and disinterested use, benevolent or otherwise, even under the guise of the “appreciation” of difference. Add to this questions of the relationship between the humanities and broader political and economic concerns, and it becomes increasingly impossible to maintain a happy outlook concerning the liberal academy’s continued pursuit of knowledge of the Other.3 Additionally, in the current historical moment, practitioners of gay and lesbian studies seems particularly **vulnerable to being seduced by the academic star system**. The relative newness of the discipline, combined with the liberal academy’s desperate attempts to **contain the threat of difference by** creating and celebrating privileged marginals, has allowed a handful of highly visible scholars in the field to claim their place in the academic pantheon. Unfortunately, as mighr be expected, the logic of scarcity still prevails, suggesting that the discipline will tolerate only a certain small number of scholars in the field. Although most universities claim, falsely or otherwise, to have nothing like the financial resources necessary to begin programs in gay and lesbian studies in these times of programmatic cutbacks, there are already rumors of an impending turf war between various factions in the emerging discipline. Autobiographical narratives in particular unfortunately make possible, given both this current state of academic affairs as well as U.S. culture’s fantasies concerning the lures and powers of the individual personality, a kind of **fetishization** of the gay and lesbian academic body.4 They might unwittingly contribute to the continued production of gay and lesbian subjects as marginalized by privileging the personal experiences of only a handful of the **chosen few**. As Spivak might have it, this placing of token gay and lesbian subjects within the academic star system necessarily **obscures the shifting differences and distinctions between representation as proxy and representation as portrait**, the gay academic representing, in both his corporeal body and the body of his work, an image that is perhaps unwittingly but necessarily also a politically and economically interested proxy.5 Gay academic stars perhaps roo readily **stand in** for the interests of an often unspecified otherness (or, rather, an otherness specified exclusively by sexual orientation), an otherness that, if more carefully plotted, would necessarily be crossed by competing interests of class, gender. and racc, to name only the most obvious. The token presence of highly visible gay and lesbian scholars **might obscure the question of in whose politi cal interests they speak** when they claim to be speaking as gay and lesbian.6 Thirdly, for reasons outlined in the preceding chapter, I am uncomfortable with the continued reliance by identity politics on a **strategy of visibility,** a strategy that sometimes privileges experiential, testimonial accounts of oppression over intellectual interrogations of positioning, and that **seems particularly susceptible to being embraced by the most recent wave of antiintellectual, antitheorctical academicians.** The continued holding of the body of “experience” over the head of “theory,” as if experience were some kind of self-evident answer to the difficult questions posed by poststructuralism, particularly around questions of identity, agency, and the political, is a strategy shared {although shared unevenly) by certain academic critics on the Left as well as the Right. I would only want to add here that such testimonial accounts necessarily rely for their political force on an **unproblematized conflation of the two senses of representation**, a conflation of which Spivak reminds us to be wary. The testimonial necessarily stands in for an experience of oppression “larger” than the individual, the native informant acting as the vocal and visible representative of the (largely silent, largely invisible) collective. **The testimonial is thus an individual and privileged representation of experience** (portrait) that works to represent (by proxy) the political interests of the group to which the informant claims to belong. This seems a fairly apt description of, say, a work like Riggs’s Tongues Untied. Although it is impossible to separate cleanly and finally these two senses of representation, it is perhaps possible to be (scrupulously) ethically attuned to the problematics engaged in the act of representing. As I have suggested in previous chapters, perhaps only a continuously unfolding deconstruction of one’s privileged position as native informant might complicate and undercut the claims of one’s own experiential account of oppression (representation as portrait} to represent adequately (as proxy) the interests of the Other.

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### voting aff doesn’t do anything but show you outdebated HW AW

#### Dalit violence will still occur at the everyday post aff and their one win can’t change the debate space; we’re two teens in a debate round

#### They read this aff against another HW debater who told me about it – no uq education offense

#### They conceded voting aff doesn’t solve dalit violence in CX! but only provides a survival strategy and:

#### Focus on survival strategy stops collective resistance to oppression – survival is inherently privatized and feeds off the myth of the self interested individual surviving on their own which fails to create communal struggles key to overturn larger structures of oppression and is redeployed by conservative ideology to justify structural violence

Giroux 3 – McMaster University, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies

(Henry A, Pedagogies of Difference, Race, and Representation: Film as a Site of Translation and Politics Pedagogies of Difference: Rethinking Education for Social Change, edited by Peter Pericles Trifonas, pg. 95-96)

Any attempt to address Baby Boy as a form of public pedagogy would have to analyze the largely privatized and individualized analysis that shapes this film and how it resonates with the ongoing privatization and depoliticization of the public sphere. As neoliberalism has gained momentum since the 1980s, one of its distinguishing features has been an assault on all those public spheres that are not regulated by the language of the market. Under the onslaught of neoliberal ideology and its tum toward free market as the basis for human interaction, there is an attempt to alter radically the very vocabulary we use in describing and appraising human interest, action, and behavior. Individuals are now defined largely as consumers, and self-interest appears to be the only factor capable of motivating people. Public spaces are increasingly displaced by commercial interests, and private utopias become the only way of understanding the meaning of the good life. It gets worse. As public life is emptied of its own separate concerns -importance of public goods, civic virtue, public debate, collective agency, and social provisions for the marginalized-it becomes increasingly more difficult to translate private concerns into public considerations. The Darwinian world of universal struggle pits individuals against each other while suggesting that the misfortunes and problems of others represent both a weakness of character and a social liability. Within such a system, the state gives up its obligations to provide collective safety nets for people and the ideology of going it alone furthers the myth that all social problems are the result of individual choices. Unfortunately, Baby Boy not only refuses to challenge the myth of individual motivation and pathology as the source of unemployment, violence, welfare dependency, bad housing, inadequate schools, and crumbling infrastructures, it actually reinforces this well rehearsed stable of conservative ideology. It does so by suggesting that collective problems can only be addressed as tales of individual survival, coming of age stories that chronicle either selfishness, laziness, and lack of maturity or individual perseverance. By suggesting that Jody 's life is colonized by the private, cut off from larger social, economic, and political issues, Baby Boy both renders hope private and suggests that communities in struggle can only share or be organized around the most private of intimacies, removed in large part from the capacity to struggle over broader issues. Dependency in this film is a dirty word, and seems to ignore the ways in which it resonates with right wing attacks on the welfare state and the alleged perils of big government. Granted, Baby Boy is supposedly about the refusal of immature African-American youth to grow up, but the film 's attack on dependency is so one-sided that it reinforces the myth that social safety nets simply weaken character, and it supports this ideology, in part, by refusing to acknowledge how dependency on the welfare state has worked for those millions for whom it has "made all the difference between wretched poverty and a decent life."41 Similarly, if Jody 's dreams are limited to the demands of the traditional family structure and the successes associated with the market ideology, there is no room in Baby Boy to recognize democracy, not the market, as a force of dissent and a relentless critique of institutions, as a source of civic engagement, or as a discourse for expanding and deepening the possibilities of critical citizenship and social transformation. In the end, Baby Boy fails to offer a space for translating how the private and public mutually inform each other; consequently, it reinforces rather than ruptures those racially oppressive trends in American society that disfigure the possibility of racial justice, democratic politics, and responsible citizenship.

#### Survival strategies rely on a false distinction between practical and strategic concerns

Escobar, PhD, 95

(Arturo, Anthropology@UNC, Encountering Development)

The reach of state policies vis-à-vis gender subordination is generating important debates among Latin American researchers. In discussing the Nicaraguan experience during the 1980s, Paola Pérez Alemán, for instance, distinguished among three kinds of situations: the incorporation of women ªinto the world of men,º say, in agrarian cooperatives or predominantly male peasant organizations; the organization of women along the lines of traditional gender roles (that is, in the sphere of ªreproductionº); and the creation of organizations, particularly in communal and educational areas, that allowed for greater questioning of traditional gender roles. Although the first two types may have been important in creating spaces for women to discuss their problems and share experiences as women, only in the third type of situation could practical gender interests (those directly linked to questions of survival and quality of life, in areas such as food, water, and health) and strategic gender interests (those derived speci®cally from gender subordination) be articulated (Pérez Alemán 1990). The distinction between practical and strategic gender interests, originating in the work of Maxine Molyneux (1986), although helpful at some levels, is also problematic. As Amy Lind (1992) maintains, implicit in this approach is the assumption that women's “basic needs” are separate from their “strategic needs,” and that a “practical” or a “survival strategy” cannot simultaneously be a political strategy that challenges the social order. This scenario also tends to assume that most poor women are concerned only with their “daily survival” and therefore have no strategic agenda beyond their immediate economic struggles. This type of analysis overlooks the critical contributions and challenges that organized poor women represent to the social order. Like Behar (earlier), Lind reminds us that poor women also negotiate power, construct collective identities, and develop critical perspectives on the world in which they live. Women's (and others') struggles to “put food in their mouths” might entail cultural struggles. In the 1990s, most feminists accept that the division between practical and strategic gender interests is not so easily perceived. Two new strategies are being pursued: to replace ªwomen in developmentº by ªgender in development º as the organizing principle for women's efforts within development; and to complement the productivist approaches that are in vogue with empowerment strategies. The ®rst goal re¯ects the continued assumption on the part of states that macroeconomic policies are gender neutral; it is intended to mainstream women's issues into the conception and design of economic policy as a wholeÐto push states into recognizing the real differences that exist between women and men as social subjects, and the need to consider the effect of macro policies on the sexual division of labor. The empowerment approach seeks ªto transform the terms under which women are linked to productive activities in such a way that the economic, social and cultural equality of their participation is insuredº (León 1993, 17). The result would be public policies with a gender perspective that does not subordinate empowerment to the goals of productivity. It is a question of making sure that biological differences cease to entail gender subordination. (186-7)

#### This frames their survival as contingent on winning or losing debate arguments - the ballot shouldn’t be a referendum on psychic violence – that makes debate impossible since the judge will inevitably have to attack one side – instead we should view debate as a constructive deliberative forum to come up with political strategies to fight oppression

#### They have a higher priority to prove solvency since they have to prove that the benefits of voting aff o/w not being topical