## NC

### T

#### Interp: Affirmatives may not defend only specific instances of outer space appropriation by private entities as unjust.

#### Violation: They only identify chinese appropriation

#### Moral statements are generic normative principles – necessitates the generic interpretation

McDonald 09 [Hugh P. McDonald, professor of philosophy at the New York City College of Technology. "Principles: The Principles of Principles." The Pluralist, vol. 4, no. 3, [University of Illinois Press, Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy], 2009, pp. 98–126, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20708996] HWIC

"Principle" has a great many meanings: origin, beginning, cause, rule, axiom, and so on.5 However, we cannot assume any necessary relation of these meanings. They may be distinct meanings without relations. Neverthe less we can trace some common roots and thereby interconnections of the meanings. I will concentrate here on certain meanings relevant to the prin ciple of principles, that principles are actual. One meaning is that principles are the "ultimate source, origin, or cause of something" or the "originating or actuating agency or force." Principles are connected with the origin and cause of any "something." Moreover, principles may cause the actuality of the something. A second meaning of principles is that they regulate change, whether internally, as the "method of operation of a thing," or as an external cause. That is, principles are regulative, especially including rules for opera tions, involving changes. As rules, they are universal for a kind, although there may be exceptions to them in certain modes. A principle, then, is an originating rule that universally regulates the formation, operation, or other changes of any actuality, which as universal applies to that kind of thing. Machines may be built according to a principle and operate on the same or even a different principle. Ships presume the principle of floatation but may be built according to principles of woodworking or those of other materials. The principle can have different modes?whether necessary, as in logical inference; general, as in scientific laws; or actualization of possibilities, as in machines or as in moral principles that we follow, but could do otherwise.6 I will cover modes below.

Principles are also a cause as regulative, combining cause and rule. The principle can be external, as in a chemical catalyst; or internal, as in geneti cally caused changes.7 Both kinds of causes involve relations. Internal prin ciples exhibit "tendencies," to borrow the word used in the dictionary. They continue to operate across time. Actions that come under principles may be of kinds whose causes are separate in time, since we may cease an action for a time and then take it up again; while genetic characteristics are tenden cies whose causes are connected by reproduction. As causal, principles may be originary for a kind. Especially in new technologies, for example, flying machines, the principle that organisms could fly (birds, bats, and insects) preceded the invention of the technology, although the principles of aero dynamics were discovered later. However, flying utilized and actualized the latter principles. In this sense, principles can be constitutive rules as the origin of a kind, whether generic or specific.

External principles are regulative and not attributes. They regulate change, such that change is not chaotic. Principles are not bodies, objects, or entities but are the basis of the judgment or evaluation that the latter will persist, since they follow or are regulated by principles. Moreover, there is another sense in which principles are not attributes, since the relation of bodies, ob jects, or other terms for actualities implies a common principle, an identity that is regulated and constituted by the same actual principle. "Object" is a principle uniting instances normatively, for example, that solids persist unless acted upon by heat, etc.

Scientific, engineering, and practical laws are cases of principles. The "law of gravity" is the principle of gravity. Rules of "right conduct" also exhibit laws. Principles form an identity of different instances that fall under the law, whether generally or invariably. Laws and rules are regulative identities, applicable to different instances, and whether originary, constitutive, or ex ternally regulative. Voluntary adherence to a rule is bringing actions in line with a principle or enacting a principle.

Since principles are general, the statement of a principle includes an abstraction of some identity element of the instance. Principles, then, can constitute the elements in any instance insofar as there are identical ele ments, such as matter, species, and genera. This abstraction both identifies the instance as alike with other instances in some respect and differentiates it from those that do not exhibit the principle. The instance may contain several principles conjointly, matter, the state of the matter, function, aes thetic element, and many others. Thus principles connect like instances in a very complex set of relations. A diamond and a painting may share aesthetic qualities but their material, functional, and cultural principles may be quite different. Since identity and difference are correlative terms, every identity is also a difference and this principle applies to actual principles in the world, one principle of principles. To identify a rock of a certain type as consisting in certain chemical combinations connects it with that kind of mineral in general but also certain chemical elements in general, their physical proper ties (such as consisting of a certain atomic number of protons, electrons, and the like), and other principles. However, it also differentiates the rock from other types with their own specific principles, although some generic prin ciples may overlap, namely, the physical properties of all chemical elements as consisting in protons, electrons, and other principles of atoms. Principles then mark both a difference and an identity. The principles identify a distinc tion, but such identifications differentiate from other identifying principles. The wavelengths for green light are identical at different times of emission from the sun but are not identical with those for red.

#### Negate –

**1] Precision:**

**A] Topicality is the most basic aff burden**

**B] Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed**

**C] It’s the only predictable stasis point**

**2] Limits: every specific instance of appropriation can be the aff of the week which kills our core generics and explodes our prep burden**

**T is DTD – our 1NC was influenced by the plantext and there’s no going back**

**Competing interps on T – topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical, only competing interps create norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention causing a race to the bottom**

**No RVIs – sandbagging, illogical**

### K

#### 40] Security is a psychological construct- the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other. Claims of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the good us and the evil them, ignoring our role in provoking the aggression.

Mack, MD @ Harvard, 91

(John, former Professor of Psychology at Harvard and Pulitzer Prize Winner, <http://johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/>) BW

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the “enemy system”[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: “I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness”. This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one’s own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity”.[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: “War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy.”[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation’s leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war “The enemy is seen as less than human? He’s faceless. He’s an animal”.” Keen tries to answer his question: “The image of the enemy is not only the soldier’s most powerful weapon; it is society’s most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals”.[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. The image of the enemy as less than human may be hard to dislodge. For example, a teacher in the Boston area reported that during a high school class on the Soviet Union a student protested: “You’re trying to get us to see them as people”. Stephen Cohen and other Soviet experts have noted how difficult it is to change the American perception of the Soviet Union, despite the vast amount of new information contradicting old stereotypes.” Bernard Shaw in his preface to Heartbreak House, written at the end of World War I, observed ironically: “Truth telling is not compatible with the defense of the realm”. Nations are usually created out of the violent defeat of the former inhabitants of a piece of land or of outside enemies, and national leaders become adept at keeping their people’s attention focused on the threat of an outside enemy.[14] Leaders also provide what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called “suitable targets of externalization”[10] – i.e., outside enemies upon whom both leaders and citizens can relieve their burdens of private defeat, personal hurt, and humiliation.[15] All-embracing ideas, such as political ideologies and fixed religious beliefs act as psychological or cultural amplifiers. Such ideologies can embrace whole economic systems, such as socialism or capitalism, or draw on beliefs that imply that a collectivity owes its existence to some higher power in the universe. It was not Stalin as an individual whom Nadezhda Mandelstam blamed for the political murder of her poet husband Osip and millions of other citizens but the “craving for an all-embracing idea which would explain everything in the world and bring about universal harmony at one go”.[16] Every nation, no matter how bloody and cruel its beginnings, sees its origins in a glorious era of heroes who vanquished less worthy foes. One’s own race, people, country, or political system is felt to be superior to the adversary’s, blessed by a less worthy god. The nuclear age has spawned a new kind of myth. This is best exemplified by the United States’ strategic defense initiative. This celestial fantasy offers protection from attack by nuclear warheads, faith here being invested not in a god but in an anti-nuclear technology of lasers, satellites, mirrors, and so on in the heavens.

#### 45] Their scripts of escalation and threat in space are dangerous and ensures securitization to continue American space dominance – Advantage 3 is just a bunch of war hawks complaining about their precious early warning sats might get hit

Peoples 11

Peoples, Columba (PhD international politics & Critical Security Expert), 2011, “The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control” Contemporary Security Policy, 32(1), 76–98. doi:10.1080/13523260.2011.5568 // HW AW

It is worth noting that the securitization of outer space – in terms of the identification of space with security – is, in itself, not a novel phenomenon or development. The extent to which **ostensibly civil uses of outer space have been linked implicitly and explicitly to national security** functions historically – or, as in the case of the space race between the United States and Soviet Union, have **acted as a surrogate for direct military engagement** – is well documented.50 Similarly, the characterization of the Sputnik launch in 1957 as placing the United States ‘in the greatest danger in its history’ suggests that the representation of space technologies as potential existential threats is not entirely new either.51 What is of significance, though, is the intensification, expansion and entrenchment of securitizing moves as features of national space policies. The Space Security Index report Space Security 2009, in its overview of national policies, explicitly noted that, on the one hand, ‘National space policies consistently emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space’, but on the other hand that there is a ‘Growing focus within national policies on the security uses of outer space’.52 The report cited as evidence: THE SECURITIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 83 Downloaded by [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] at 06:10 01 January 2015 Japan’s 2008 space law framework, which lifted its previous ban on national security and military space activities; China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper, which identifies national security as principle of China’s emerging space programme; France’s White Paper on Defense and National Security, which calls for an overhaul of its national space strategy; and the renewed priority on ‘space for security’ within EU policy.53 Within recent **United States space policy securitization has been most noticeably prevalent and institutionalized, which is significant given the continued preeminence of the United States as a space power**. As is noted in one recent assessment, around 50 countries, intergovernmental consortia, and nongovernmental organizations have at least one satellite in space, ‘mostly for reasons that have more to do with economic performance and Earth monitoring than with military applications.’54 However, in spite of the increasing diversity of interests in space and the increased range of functions space-based technologies now fulfil, the United States defence budget still remains the single largest source of investment in space technologies. In part this sustained investment arises out of American deployment and development of missile defence systems. Space and missile defences have been intimately connected issues historically and there are obvious technological overlaps between the two. Missile defence systems, including the ground-based system (Ground-Based Midcourse Defence or GMD) currently deployed by the United States at sites in Alaska and California, are dependent on satellite and space-based tracking technologies to detect and track incoming missiles, and there is a possibility that the future connection between missile defence and space will be even stronger if current plans for missile defence are pursued to their fullest extent. Two such systems are already in the early stage of their development: the Space-Based Laser (SBL), which, like the Strategic Defence Initiative or Star Wars proposals of the 1980s, envisages using lasers to shoot down missiles in flight;55 and the ‘NFIRE’ or Near Field Infrared Experiment, a proposal to launch interceptor missiles not from the ground, as in the currently deployed GMD, but from space.56 Even if the developmental status of space-based missile defence interceptors remains uncertain (not least due to the budgetary constraints involved), the currently deployed ground-based system also poses a complex issue in terms of arms control. Though ostensibly intended for defensive purposes, ground and sea-based components of American missile defence could theoretically be employed as an ASAT – Anti-Satellite attack – device, and the use of sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defence capabilities and its Standard Missile 3 (SM3) to shoot down the malfunctioning USA-193 spy satellite in February 2008 has done little to dispel concerns over the offensive applications of current missile defence capabilities.57 In addition, the United States also conducts research into more exotic forms of space weaponry, and funds a variety of technologies aimed at creating a force application capacity from space. The Department of Defense has reportedly explored several highconcept space weapons systems such as Hypervelocity Rod Bundles (tungsten rods dropped on targets from space that would theoretically use gravity as accelerant in a manner akin to a meteor, or Rods from God as they are also colloquially known), the Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) (a manoeuvrable microsatellite weighing 84 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY Downloaded by [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] at 06:10 01 January 2015 only 100 kilograms which could prospectively be used to attack other satellites), and the Common Aerospace Vehicle or CAV (this so-called Spaceplane would be unmanned and would orbit the earth, entering the atmosphere when needed to deploy precision guided munitions against selected targets). 58 Such programmes with possible space weapons applications (beyond ground-tospace ASAT capabilities) are still in their relative infancy, and the technical prospects for such technologies, as with the more exotic missile defence proposals outlined above, are far from certain.59 Yet **much of the rhetoric emanating from the United States in recent years has made expansive claims to space dominance far beyond existing capabilities.** In short, rather than seeking to control the means of violence in and from space, much of the military discourse on space has generally cast the United States as a trailblazer in this regard, with exotic systems cited as a necessity for future military dominance in and from space.60 Historically these claims have tended to emanate primarily from the Air Force and Air Force Space Command. In 1998, Space Command defined the control of space (‘space control’) as ‘The ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others use of space, if required’61, and space was also considered as part of the remit for ‘full spectrum dominance’ in Joint Vision 2020. 62 Space warriors within and beyond the United States military also make frequent reference to the ‘...importance of dominating space in peace and war’.63 Yet, ‘The **decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military** (seeking short-term military advantage in support of national security) **but at the higher level of national policy** (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values).’64 **Instances of the securitization of outer space within military circles are hardly surprising, given vested interests and the perceived utility of space support for American forces; what is more significant though is the extent to which national policy, though stopping short of explicit advocating of space weapons, has tended to similarly maintain the centrality of space for national security.** 65 As Moore’s ‘biography’ of the idea of unilateral space dominance in the United States attests to, this school of thought has long held a prominent place in American strategic circles.66 Of significance, though, is the extent to which this type of thinking has migrated into official policy, portraying American access to, and dominance of, outer space as key to national survival in the process. The tenure of the George W. Bush administration in particular saw military and policy discourse move much closer in terms of goals and language used, entrenching securitization within United States space policy as a whole. In the terms used above, **the views of space warriors made much greater inroads under the Bush administration, and this has had a significant bearing on how the United States has positioned itself in terms of arms control and how other states – particularly China and Russia – have subsequently defined their own positions**.67 The evolution of official American discourse on outer space over the past decade attests to this subtle shift. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (or Rumsfeld Space Commission as it is often referred to owing to Donald Rumsfeld’s position as chair) pointed out that a number of states hostile to the United States could attain ASAT capabilities, and, THE SECURITIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 85 Downloaded by [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] at 06:10 01 January 2015 infamously, warned that if the United States did not secure space it would face a Space Pearl Harbor. Members of the Bush administration subsequently went on to effectively endorse the space control concept, asserting the primacy of space for security by openly linking its potential civil and military uses (and thus suggesting only a minimal distinction between the two). Then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued in a 2002 speech on missile defence that ‘as we look ahead we need to think about areas that would provide higher leverage. Nowhere is that more true than in space. Space offers attractive options not only for missile defense but for a broad range of interrelated civil and military missions. It truly is the ultimate highground.’68 The culmination of this line of thinking in policy terms came with the release of the National Space Policy (NSP) in August 2006, which stated that: The United States considers space capabilities – including the ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either those rights or developing capabilities intended to so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.69 The framing of the arguments from those within the Bush administration thus **clearly aligns with the dynamics of securitization as identified by Buzan et al**. The idea of a Pearl Harbor from Space invokes the nightmare scenario of a surprise attack on American interests in or from space, and was accompanied in the Rumsfeld Commission’s report by the sense of urgency characteristic of securitizing moves: ‘the present extent of US dependence on space [and] the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that US national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority’.70 The Pearl Harbor analogy implied a focus on a surprise attack itself, but the rest of the report stressed the radical implications of such an attack, suggesting a **potential existential threat** to American commerce, society and, ultimately, way of life. As the report noted, ‘Space enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals and government offices through its applications for transportation, health, the environment, telecommunications, education, agriculture and energy. Much like highways and airways, water lines and electric grids, services supplied from space are already an important part of the US and global infrastructures.’71 In turn, the NSP of 2006 repeated many of these same securitizing moves. It elevated national security functions of United States space policy, declaring these as vital to national interests, and national security as ‘critically dependent upon space capabilities... this dependence will grow.’ Similarly, the NSP described United States space systems as critical to ‘...a wide range of civil, commercial, and national security users’, identifying the wider security implications of space as well as its more direct military uses.72 **Crucially, this securitization of space was then used to justify exceptional measures with regards to arms control and the previous era of multilateral space agreements**. Among the ‘actions necessary’ to protect space capabilities the NSP declared that: 86 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY Downloaded by [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] at 06:10 01 January 2015 The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations of other activities in space for US national interests.73 This sentiment had effectively been put into practice even before its formalization in the NSP 2006, with the United States abstaining from votes on the UN General Assembly PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) resolution in 2000 and an amended version in 2003, and then voting against it in 2005.74 In this sense the 2006 NSP functioned as a kind of retrospective justification of the exceptional stance adopted – on security grounds – by the Bush administration in relation to space law and arms control. In addition, and moving away from a purely textualist understanding of securitization, the destruction of the USA-193 satellite in 2008 might be seen to constitute an extra-discursive instance of securitization. Although this action was not defined explicitly in terms of a military security rationale (government agencies stressed the rationale for the shoot-down in terms of preventing the malfunctioning satellite from crashing to Earth), it left clear room for interpretation, intended or not, of American willingness to display military space capabilities and further embellished the connection between space and (military) security.75

#### The Chinese Space Threat as in Cohen and Zivitski, but is constructed to justify the militarization of space and violent intervention against Chinese satellites

Cameron 18

Hunter Cameron, (PhD public policy), 2018, "The Rise of China in Space Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse," https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/183271194/Final\_Copy\_2018\_09\_25\_Hunter\_C\_PhD.pdf, // HW AW

Almost every American source that cares to mention China’s space program agrees that its recent surge to prominence constitutes a grave threat to the national security of the United States of America. A streak of technological determinism was a recurring feature of within these debates, particularly after 2000 (see Parts 2 and 3). **Chinese space technologies were instrumentalised as tools for the destruction of the US, contextualised with wider representations of China as a reckless and aggressive space power** (see Chapter 6). Coupled with the instrumentalisation of American space technology as essential, in an ontological sense, to the nation, **the “Chinese space threat” narrative became existential in scope**. According to many of the proponents of this discourse, China’s rising space power would inevitably entail a mix of fear, conflict and space (arms) racing. Yet the irrefutability of the “Chinese space threat” in US public policy **discourse conceals a multitude of tensions and inconsistencies**. Asking “how” the threat came to be has revealed its uneven construction, and thus by extension demonstrated how misguided technologically determinist arguments about the “rise” have been. Part 1 showed both how the “threat” has varied over time, in some instances becoming side-lined in favour of cooperation in space. It also demonstrated how space has inconsistently appeared in broader American debates about China’s “rise” more generally, sometimes cited as evidence of the “rise,” elsewhere obscured by other foreign policy concerns. Part 2 showed how advocates of the “Chinese space threat” differed in which aspects of American identity, and which corresponding technologies, they valued and portrated as imperilled by China’s “rise” in space. Finally, Part 3 underlined the appearance of unevenness by inquiring after the policies and procurements which were undertaken in the name of the “Chinese space threat.” Beyond the maintenance of the ITAR restrictions already in place at the start of the century and the limitations on NASA-China interaction imposed in 2011, no new policies were sanctioned in line with what by any other measure was an incredibly dominant discourse. This disjuncture is the most pressing evidence for the uneven construction of China’s “rise” in space, and sets up a puzzle for future research to address. Despite this puzzle, the lack of a technological response is itself is best understood as a part of **technopolitical contestation within American public policy discourse**. Viewed in this light, the 182 determinism of the “Chinese space threat” remained unmanifested. In other words, the “Chinese space threat” was a kind of “dog that didn’t bark” where the omission of response is itself evidence worthy of consideration. Contributions of the thesis Two main claims, corresponding to the two main contributions of this thesis, have been made by this thesis. The first is that the dominant discourse of the “Chinese space threat,” was unevenly socially constructed and historically contingent, and thus did not inevitably result in specific American responses such as arms races (Tellis 2007a: 7), spiralling security dilemmas (Handberg and Li 2012: 4) or Thucydides’ traps (Johnson-Freese 2017: 54). Ultimately, **American elites constructed US-China interaction in space differently to the rest of the relationship, focusing almost entirely on competition and threat. In doing so, this discourse even concealed historical cooperation between the two countries. It was this dominant discourse that actively made outer space an outlier in US-China relations**. The second main claim is that threat construction analysis requires a technopolitical lens in order to understand the role that technology plays in underpinning and imperilling identities. In this way, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to threat construction literature. Existing literature in this area has recognised the social construction of technology, but not the technological construction of technology. As the analysis throughout the thesis, but particularly in Part 3 demonstrates, occluding the co- of co-construction obscures political contests over technology and identity that are worthy of study. This section re-iterates how the various elements of the thesis supported these two main claims and contributions. The first Part of this thesis explored the context of the “rise” of China in space. A major component of this was researching the now mostly forgotten past of US-China relations. By establishing the precedents of both American alarm over China’s space program, and the subsequent instrumentalisation of American and Chinese space technology which helped curtail the first “Chinese space threat,” this thesis demonstrated how **threat and technology have historically been co-constructed in the relationship**. Importantly, however, this area of the project also highlighted how little of the historical precedents of the relationship figure into the 21st century policy debates. Instead, the rest of the thesis indicated that the contemporary American public discourse on China’s “rise” in space is almost totally ahistorical in nature, both in terms of recognising prior tensions but perhaps most crucially omitting the previous mutually cooperative character of the relationship only a few decades before. 183 The main theoretical contribution of this thesis was to engage insights from threat construction with those from STS. As the thesis progressed into Parts 2 and 3, the social force of existing technology was increasingly identified as a contributing factor to both the interpretation of Chinese space technology as a threat, but also as a contributing factor to why changing rhetoric did not automatically entail technological overhaul. On the first point, by engaging closely with what relationships were created between formulations of identity, threat, and technology, a picture emerged of an important role for technology in representational practices more generally. Specifically, some representational practices are predicated on the availability of certain technologies. Even though the function of these technologies, and the meaning and importance of the practices, are all socially relative, **the social reality which is constituted in these relations creates a complex and durable basis for the construction of threat.** Thus, American policymakers instrumentalised Chinese space technologies as functioning as destroyers of American satellites, or replicators of unique American lunar achievements. In doing so, they could then draw on powerful and widely recognised discourses of national identity and very specifically locate the threat that China posed to key elements of those identities. **The technological character of these threats then further girded these characterisations by appearing to be material, objective, and therefore all the more irrefutable.** Future threat construction research could benefit from exploiting this theoretical insight by exploring how key identity-producing practices are technologically enabled in other cases. The second element of the theoretical contribution of this thesis to threat construction literature was to identify how technology could “feedback” in a socially contingent manner to shape security politics. By under-theorising technology, prior threat construction literature may have over-stated the political significance of rhetoric and non-technological practices. In Chapter 6, this thesis identified the key technological systems that were supposedly under threat from China, and analysed which elements of American identity were invoked in these processes of threat construction. In becoming instrumentalised into American security practices, such as precision weapons guidance and global navigation, the technologies had become closely woven into the identity politics of sub-national identities but also formulations of national identity writ large. This is one form of technological “feedback,” because the empirical evidence indicates how identity and technology are constantly being co-constructed in American space policy debates. Further examples of technological feedback were explored in Chapter 7, but rather than in a productive capacity as in Chapter 6, the durability of existing technopolitical systems 184 helped to undermine calls for technical change. **The formulation of a “Chinese space threat” was both explicitly and implicitly a call to action, be it to acquire new space weapons,** Moon rockets, or defensive measures. In the case of the call for space weapons, one can point to the success of rhetorical opposition, which seems to have created sufficient controversy to defeat the proposals. Yet, for the calls to increase the number of satellites in existing constellations, or to split up capabilities across new systems, all official contributions to the discourse agreed that such technical changes were necessary. A key barrier which remained to technical change was the shape and qualities of the existing technologies, themselves products of an older arrangement of technopolitics. Orbiting hundreds of miles above the Earth, these systems were costly to modify or replace. The result was non-innovation and the continuation of the existing technopolitical status quo, even as the assumption of the “Chinese space threat” remained largely unquestioned within American public policy discourse.

#### 50] State-centric security frames ensure that the aff’s benign attempt to resist insecurity reproduces the biopolitical imperative that compels liberal regimes to make catastrophic war on difference – the impact is extinction. Evans 16

Brad Evans is a senior lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics & International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol, UK, “Liberal Violence: From the Benjaminian Divine to the Angels of History,” Theory & Event > Volume 19, Issue 1, 2016

Liberal War as Divine Violence Despite universal claims to peaceful co-habitation, liberal regimes have been compelled to make war on whatever threatens it40 . This is why the liberal account of freedom has depended upon a lethal principle, which discursively wrapped in the language of rights, security and justice, inaugurated planetary state of warfare and siege. It has promoted an account of freedom that, in the process of taking hold of the problem of the planetary life of political subjects, linked human potentiality to the possibility of its ruination. If liberal violence has then produced a necessary lethal corollary in its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species in order to alleviate unnecessary suffering; so it has also needed to foster a belief in the necessity of violence in the name of that suffering and vulnerability to which it continually stakes a claim. The Liberal wars of the past two decades in particular have revealed a number of defining principles41 . Aside from relying upon technological supremacy and universal claims to truth, they have been overwhelmingly driven by a bio-political imperative, which has displaced concerns with Sovereign integrities with forms of violence carried out in the name of an endangered humanity. In this regard, they have destroyed the Westphalia pretence, seeing the catastrophes of our global age in fact as a condition of possibility to further the liberal will to rule. Since incorporation in this setting has proceed on the basis that all life should necessarily be included within its strategic orbit, the veritable evisceration of any sense of “the outside” (as conceived in terms of its political imaginary) has led to the blurring of all conventional demarcations between friends/enemies, citizens/soldiers, times of war/times of peace. What is more, as life itself became increasingly central to questions of security, issues of development as broadly conceived would no longer be regarded as peripheral to the war effort. It would in fact become a central motif as most notably articulated in the strategic mantras “War by Other means” and “War for Hearts and Minds”. Not only would this point to new forms of de-politicisation which, less about Schmittean exceptionalism, were more explicable in terms of the fundamental political and social transformation of societies. It would also lead to the production of violent subjects, as the recourse to violence became sure testament to a conception of humanity realised through the wars fought in its name. Liberal violence, in other words, proved to be unbounded, unlimited and without conventional Sovereign warrant – namely revealing of the fundamental principles of what Benjamin once elected to term “the divine”. Diagnosing the liberal wars of the past two decades as a form of divine violence offers a more disturbing reading of the violence of the liberal encounter. If the violence of political realism, at least in theory, appreciated the value of limits and boundaries, what seems to define the lethality of liberal freedom has been a commitment to war without boundaries, hence limitless. As Dillon and Julian Reid acutely observed: [L]iberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary corollary of the aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species ... There is, then, a martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war ... Liberalism is therefore obliged to exercise a strategic calculus of necessary killing, in the course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough... [However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live, than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing’42 . This brings us to Steven Pinker’s Better Angels of Our Nature43 . Reworking the well-rehearsed liberal peace thesis, for Pinker, the reason we have become less warlike today can be account for in terms of our liberal maturity. Leaving aside the evident theological undertones to Pinker’s work, along with the numerous empirical flaws in his thesis, his not so original thesis at least accredits its all too Euro-centric sources of inspiration on matters of civility: ‘The reason so many violent institutions succumbed within so short a span of time was that the arguments that slew them belong to a coherent philosophy that emerged during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. The ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill coalesced into a worldview that we can call Enlightenment humanism’. John Gray has been rightly suspicious of the entire project and claims being made here: The idea that a new world can be constructed through the rational application of force is peculiarly modern, animating ideas of revolutionary war and pedagogic terror that feature in an influential tradition of radical Enlightenment thinking. Downplaying this tradition is extremely important for Pinker. Along with liberal humanists everywhere, he regards the core of the Enlightenment as a commitment to rationality. The fact that prominent Enlightenment figures have favoured violence as an instrument of social transformation is—to put it mildly—inconvenient... No doubt we have become less violent in some ways. But it is easy for liberal humanists to pass over the respects in which civilisation has retreated. Pinker is no exception. Just as he writes off mass killing in developing countries as evidence of backwardness without enquiring whether it might be linked in some way to peace in the developed world, he celebrates “re-civilisation”... without much concern for those who pay the price of the re-civilising process44 . Gray showed his evident concerns here with the promissory nature of liberal violence. Indeed, what he elsewhere terms the violence of the liberal missionary, reposes Nietzsche’s further instance that ‘god is dead and man has killed him’ with a devastating humanistic critique45 . Such violence, in the end, however has proved to be politically, ethically and economically narcissistic. Just as liberal advocates in the zones of crises now increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world46 , this has been matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence which also takes place almost exclusively at a distance. Indeed, as liberal actors increasingly give up on the idea that the world may be transformed for the better, new modalities of violence are emerging which seem to be more logically in fitting with the new politics of catastrophe that increasingly defines our terrifyingly normal times. As the promise of violence and catastrophe now appears inescapable, insecurity is becoming normalised, dystopian realism becoming the prevailing imaginaries for political rule, and once cited claims to emancipation, unending progress and lasting security for peoples all but abandoned47 . The politics of catastrophe and its relationship to “end of times” narratives adds another layer to our theological enquiry. As Jacob Taubes once noted48 , there is perhaps something theologically different at work here between the pre-modern apocalyptic movements and the catastrophic reasoning now defining the contemporary moment. For all their nihilism and monotheistic servitude, at least the apocalyptic movements of yesteryear could imagine a better world than already existed. There is therefore a vast difference between the subjects which names its disaster ‘apocalypse’ to that which reads disaster in terms of ‘catastrophe.’49 Unlike apocalypse, there is no beyond the catastrophic. Its mediation on the “end of times” is already fated. Catastrophe denies political transformation. It demands instead a forced partaking in a world that is deemed to be insecure unto the end. The upshot being, as all things become the source of endangerment, the human becomes the source of our veritable undoing. Angels of History Every war produces its casualties. Some of these stand out in terms of the sheer body count. The horror of mass warfare reduced to the most banal forms of inhuman quantification. Others, no less important, are its political and philosophical losses. What is increasingly clear is that the past two decades of liberal warfare, punctured but not initially determined by the tragedy of the events of September 11th 2001, ultimately put the very concept of war into question. The reluctance to officially declare war, even when our involvement in the politically motivated violence appears to be all too evident, now demands a move beyond the dominant frames which have shaped discussions for the past two decades. There is an important caveat to address here. What happened during last decade of the Global Wars on Terror cannot simply be inserted into a post 9/11 frames for analysis. Much of what passed for post 9/11 justice or military excessiveness was slowly maturing in the global borderlands for some considerable time. If there is a departure it needs to be accounted for against this broader post-Cold War humanitarian sensibility through which liberalism absorbed local crises into its political fabric to further condition its violent interventions. It has been all too easy for political and social theorists to put the blame for the violence and atrocities of the Global Wars on Terror onto the shoulders of George Bush and Dick Cheney. This has allowed liberals to appropriate Schmitt as one of their own, hence reducing the entire war effort to the reductionist measures of “US hegemony/exceptionalism”. Such retreats back into state centric models have not only proved unhelpful in terms of questioning the normalization of violence, they have failed to grasp the complexity of war – especially how questions of universality, economy, power and the formation of political subjectivities can be rethought through violent encounters. What is more, the limits of these analyses have been further evidenced by the complete lack of engagement with political theology, failing to recognize the violence of universal ambitions, along with the need to put the contemporary legacy of Kant on trial. Let us not forget Tony Blair and Barack Obama have embodied the liberal Kantian idea of political leadership better than any others throughout the history of liberalism. Any change in liberal fortunes must be understood in this context. We have witnessed in recent times profound changes in the violent cartography of what is a post-Iraq liberal influence. Instead of actively and one-sidedly engaging the world, humanely, violently or otherwise, what we are now encountering are new political arrangements shaped by forms of distancing and technological realignment. Just as liberal agents in the dangerous borderland areas increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world, this is matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence that also take place at a distance. The political and philosophical significance of this should not be underestimated. The technological and strategic confluence between the remote management of populations (notably surveillance) and new forms of violence are indicative of the narcissism of a liberal project that reeks of the worst excesses of technological determinism. Instead of looking with confidence towards a post-liberal commitment to transforming the living conditions of the world of peoples, what has taken its place is an intellectually barren landscape offering no alternative other than to live out our catastrophically fated existence. This is instructive regarding how we might envisage “the end of liberal times” as marked out and defined by this incommensurable sense of planetary siege. It also demands new thinking about the relationship between violence, technology and theology in these uncertain times. The liberal wars of the past decade have been premised on two notable claims to superiority. The first was premised on the logic of technology where it was assumed that high-tech sophistry could replace the need to suffer casualties. The second was premised upon a more humanitarian ethos, which demanded local knowledge and engagement with dangerous populations. The narcissistic violence of the Global War on Terror has put this secondary vision into lasting crises as the violence of liberal encounter has fatefully exposed any universal commitment to rights and justice. Not only did we appear to be the principle authors of violence, thereby challenging the notion that underdevelopment was the true cause of planetary endangerment, populations within liberal societies have lost faith in worldly responsibilities. Metaphysical hubris displaced by a catastrophic reasoning that quite literally places us at the point of extinction.

#### 30] The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08

(Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

**30] Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove or challenge the representations and discourse the AC engages in prior to consequential analysis.**

**Plan focus restricts the debate to a ten second statement and leaves the rest of the aff unquestioned. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic which is a unique education net benefit to our interpretation**

**Debate doesn't pass policies but it does alter the way we think about the world and about systems of power – turns their policy research standards because it's a question of how their research is oriented and whether it's for an ethical purpose – only our model of engagement accesses that education**

**Begs the question – if we win their justifications are repugnant that necessarily implicates the conclusion which means defense of their research model is a prior question to weighing the material consequences of the aff – also solves plan focus because the links necessarily implicate aff solvency**

**EVEN IF WE LOSE FRAMING AND EXTINCTION CONSEQUENTIALISM COMES FIRST THEY STILL HAVE TO PROVE THAT EXTINCTION HAPPENS – DON’T GIVE THEM THE DUB JUST FOR WINNING FRAMING**

#### Interrogations of the discourse around the Chinese Space Threat must come first – the threat is discursively constructed

Cameron PhD 18

Hunter Cameron, (PhD public policy), 2018, "The Rise of China in Space Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse," https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/183271194/Final\_Copy\_2018\_09\_25\_Hunter\_C\_PhD.pdf, // HW AW

The central theoretical and methodological starting point of this thesis is the contention that **discourses constitute social reality**. Norman Fairclough (1993: 3-4) argues that **discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or “constitute” them** … any discursive “event” (i.e. any instance of discourse) is seen as being simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice. As such, discourse analysis can be said to be both theory and method, ‘intertwined’ to such an extent that the method cannot be used without accepting a set of ‘basic philosophical premises’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 4). As per Fairclough in the excerpt above, a discursive approach rejects the need to find “real” social entities “out there.” Instead, social categories like “American,” “Chinese” and “threat” can be nothing more than the discourses which constitute them. This approach is inherently critical in that it begins from a position of scepticism about the fixed-ness of social reality. This is important for the scope of the research question as it means we cannot “discover” whether China is genuinely a threat to the United States in any objective sense (as might be meant in realist foreign policy analysis, for example). Instead, **this research project can only discover how China’s “rise” in space came to be understood as a “threat” to the US in a socially contingent, intersubjective sense.** As an influential group of critical constructivists argued in their work (Weldes et al 1999: 12), this perspective does not intend to convey the sense that threats are ‘purely a fabrication’ or that they ‘did not in fact exist,’ but rather that **threats do exist, albeit specifically that their existence is discursively constituted**.

### Case – Dominance

#### Top level – they don’t limit any activity in China – their text specs private entities but China doesn’t have any private entities

#### Chinese companies aren’t “private”- receive government subsidies

Waidelich 21

(Brian, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/13/chinas-commercial-space-sector-shoots-for-the-stars/>, 3-13)

China’s space startups are hardly commercial, compared to countries like the United States where commercial space ventures are meaningfully supported by private capital. Some of China’s commercial space companies are directly state-owned, such as Expace and China Rocket. Other nominally private companies have received substantial investment from provincial and local governments. The lack of private capital at risk diminishes these companies’ motivation to innovate or lower costs.

#### Private entities don’t get any government money

UpCounsel ND

UpCounsel, (), xx-xx-xxxx, "Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know," https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity, // HW AW

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is **not government-affiliated.** Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

#### They concede this in Patel – the space industry is based in government investment – we read green

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](http://www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

#### Chinese-Russian space alliance is NOT based in space -it’s one out of hundreds of causes for partnership – first of which is US Heg itself – turns case

Jennings 12-3-21

Ralph Jennings (UC berkeley graduate, has covered china since 1988), 12-3-2021, "China Deepens Informal Alliance With Russia," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-deepens-informal-alliance-with-russia/6338773.html, // HW AW

SAN FRANCISCO — China and Russia have strengthened their political, economic and military relations this year, despite their uneasy history in the past, as both countries say they resent what they call growing pressure from the West. So far this year, the two have held a series of military exercises and issued joint diplomatic statements aimed at Western countries. On November 27, for example, an essay by both countries’ ambassadors to Washington protested the upcoming U.S.-led [Summit for Democracy](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211127-in-joint-op-ed-china-and-russia-decry-us-democracy-summit) for creating divisions in the world. Neither Russia nor China appeared on the list of 110 invitees. Russia depends on China’s massive industrial economy for oil and gas exports as environmental rules in the European Union complicate energy imports there, said Vassily Kashin, senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He said two-way relations were at their strongest since the 1950s. “Most importantly, we have a common position concerning the global order, which is that we don’t like the U.S. global order, so this close partnership is based on common opposition to the U.S.-led global order,” Kashin said. Western democracies from the United States to Australia and throughout Europe have strengthened their own ties this year at a time of concern about China’s policies. Western governments have signaled opposition to Beijing’s aggressive language on Taiwan, its crackdown on dissenters in Hong Kong and its policies targeting a Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang region. Countries, including the West and some in Southeast Asia, further resent China’s [“wolf warrior diplomacy”](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/sino-asean-relations-and-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/) approach that has seen China’s Communist Party become more vocal about promoting its views among overseas audiences. In foreign relations, experts say Beijing has been using [“increasingly assertive tactics”](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-use-and-abuse-twitter/) to “aggressively defend their home country,” often in the cyber world. China and Russia in turn hope to stop a return to U.S.-driven soft power of the Barack Obama-George W. Bush presidencies, when smaller countries saw the United States as “more acceptable leaders” among great powers, said Alan Chong, associate professor at the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Chinese soft power, Chong said, “has taken a hit” because of President Xi Jinping's comments that make him sound strong at home at the expense of solidarity and friendship overseas. China sees U.S. President Joe Biden as “a very tough opponent,” he added. Western governments have called out China this year particularly over its perceived aggression toward Taiwan, a self-ruled island that Beijing calls its own. A U.S. official also warned Russia last month about troop buildup near Ukraine. Evidence of stronger Sino-Russian ties With the world’s second-strongest military, after the United States, Russia holds occasional military exercises with China — five made public to date — while selling arms to its giant neighbor to the south. In October, China and Russia held their 10th annual "Maritime Interaction” naval drills with the Russian Pacific Fleet’s anti-submarine ship Admiral Panteleyev, the Moscow-based [Sputnik](https://sputniknews.com/20211019/tokyo-closely-watching-naval-activities-near-japan-in-wake-of-russia-china-joint-drills-1090034240.html) news service reported. China's People's Liberation Army Navy sent several destroyers and a diesel submarine. The two navies drill together to strengthen “combat capabilities” in case of “seaborne threats,” Sputnik said. Russia and China held five days of military exercises in a remote region of central China in August, drawing more than 10,000 service personnel, aircraft, artillery and armored vehicles. **China and Russia also began operating a space weather center** this month in Beijing and Moscow, the Chinese state-run China Daily reported. In June, they agreed to extend their 20-year-old Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation to strengthen relations by respecting each other’s interests and sovereignty, the Daily said. Russia looks to China for support of its goal in occupying parts of Ukraine, as well as a conduit to show Moscow can “still play a role” in Asia, in the region,” said Andrew Yang, secretary-general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies think tank in Taiwan. China needs Russian weapons, energy and support against Western pressure, Yang said. Russia agreed in 2015 to sell China 24 combat aircraft and four S-400 surface-to-air missile systems for about $7 billion. On the economic side, China became Russia’s [No. 1 trading partner](https://www.rt.com/business/452281-china-top-russia-partners-rating/) in 2017. Two years ago, Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to fuse each side’s efforts to open trade routes by [building infrastructure in other countries](https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals). “I think this is the traditional, old-fashioned balance of power,” Yang said. “They consider if China and Russia can join together, they can also regulate the regional security issues.” Limits to Sino-Russian cooperation Cold War-era distrust between China and Russia is likely to limit cooperation to broad or informal actions rather than a signed pact, analysts say. Sino-Russian relations faded in the 1960s when the two Communist parties split over ideology and border conflicts ensued. The two sides could set up a military technology sharing deal like the AUKUS pact involving Australia, Britain and the United States, said Nguyen Thanh Trung, a faculty member at Fulbright University Vietnam. Earlier goals haven't been met, he told VOA. “Over the last two years, China and Russia have signed a lot of agreements, but I don’t see a lot of concrete progress in their agreements,” Nguyen said. Western allies need not worry about China-Russia cooperation unless the two powers sign a formal agreement, Chong said. "If you see an MOU [memorandum of understanding] where they would state, explicitly, [that] they would stage X number of military exercises, they would establish some sort of integrated military command or something, then there’s cause for worry, but as they go at the moment, I don’t think there’s anything to worry about,” he said. This week the Pentagon announced as part of a regular review of its forces around the world that it would reinforce deployments and bases directed at China and Russia, while still maintaining forces in the Middle East to deter terrorist groups and Iran.

### Case – Space War

#### The dual-use ASAT threat as in Bowman and Thompson is constructed through a logic of “capabilities as intentions” that infects US security policy – ensures unbalanced military response – this card is so fire and they conceded in CX that their author’s warrant is that “since china has it, they’ll use it”

Cameron 18

Hunter Cameron, (PhD public policy), 2018, "The Rise of China in Space Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse," https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/183271194/Final\_Copy\_2018\_09\_25\_Hunter\_C\_PhD.pdf, // HW AW

The logic of “capabilities as intentions” was most pronounced in the United States Congress. It was rarely qualified or even made explicit, strong evidence itself that its **validity was truly taken for granted knowledge.** **Claims tended to be unsupported with evidence, and where it was offered, capabilities were often offered up to those listening as prima facie evidence that China was a threat in space, and since these claims usually went unchallenged, it is clear that these explanations were uncontroversial.** The content of the arguments which articulated the meaning of the Chinese space program stayed remarkably consistent both before and after the events of 2003 and 2007, and many of the **Chinese anti-satellite tests** went unnoticed in the Congressional record.34 This may be in part because some discussions took place in closed hearings, but it is still remarkable that the public congressional statements on China’s space program remained so consistent throughout the Bush and Obama administrations, despite the various shifts in the composition of Congress and the leaders of the executive branch. The State Department was also a powerful contributor to the logic of “capabilities as intentions,” specifically in its important regulatory role in defining the legal boundaries of military and non-military space technology. Although far less bombastic than congressional rhetoric, the technopolitics espoused by the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) provided no grounds for Chinese intentions to be taken into account in American space policy. Once again, this state of affairs was consistent through both the Bush and Obama administrations.

**China has no demonstrated co-orbital capabilities**

Todd **Harrison et al**, Director of Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at International Security Program at CSIS, MS MIT Aeronautics, Kaitlyn Johnson, Associate Fellow and Associate Director, Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, MA National Security American U, Thomas Roberts, adjunct fellow at the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, BA Astrophysics Princeton, April 20**18**, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, pp. 12-13, https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison\_SpaceThreatAssessment\_FULL\_WEB.pdf

China has also developed and launched several satellites for testing technologies which could be used as co-orbital counterspace capabilities, however **none of these tests have resulted in a verifiable destructive incident**. Co-orbital satellite capabilities can serve a dual-purpose role as both on-orbit servicing and inspection satellites for peaceful purposes and as counterspace threats—and it is difficult to distinguish between the two.

For example, in 2008 a Chinese spacecraft deployed a miniature imaging satellite, called BX-1, that was jettisoned from its mother spacecraft. The satellite was unable to be actively controlled until after it had passed near the International Space Station (ISS).71 However, many reports in the United States claimed that this was the first co-orbital ASAT test from China. While the BX-1 did fly dangerously close to the ISS, **the maneuver appears to be unintentional**.72

#### And Russian RPOs are too slow to conduct space stalker operations

- Rendezvous and Proximity Operations

Weeden 19 (Brian - PhD in Public Policy and Public Administration from George Washington University in the field of Science and Technology Policy & Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” p. 2-8, April 2019, *Secure World Foundation*, https://swfound.org/media/206408/swf\_global\_counterspace\_april2019\_web.pdf)

The most likely military utility for the Cosmos 2499, Cosmos 2504, and Luch satellites is for on-orbit inspection and surveillance. Although the program appears to share some heritage with the Naryad program, their actual behavior on orbit has been different than that of the IS kinetic co-orbital interceptor. The operational pattern of the Cosmos 2499, Cosmos 2504, and Cosmos 2521 satellites is consistent with slow, methodical, and careful approaches to rendezvous with other space objects in similar orbits. The other space objects they approached were in largely similar orbits to their own, and only involved changes in altitude or phasing and not significant changes in inclination. This behavior is similar to several U.S. RPO missions to test and demonstrate satellite inspection and servicing capabilities, in particular XSS-11 and Orbital Express (See U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT; section 3-1). Such inspection or surveillance could be used to support target identification and tracking for attack by other counterspace capabilities. Luch’s approach to the other satellites in GEO was consistent with the way other active satellites in the GEO belt relocate to different orbital slots. It is also not unusual for satellites to be co-located within several tens of kilometers to share a GEO slot, although it is rare for them to approach within the 10 km that Luch eventually did. The evidence strongly suggests Luch is intended for a surveillance or intelligence mission. Documents from Russian industry indicate links to a military satellite communications program, and possible heritage to the Luch series of relay satellites. The on-orbit behavior of Luch indicates a potential mission to intercept broadcasts aimed at other GEO satellites, and possibly also to inspect other GEO satellites. Likely examples of the former are the activities of the U.S. PAN satellite (35815, 2009- 047A) between 2009 and 2014 (see – U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, section 3-1) and the Chinese SJ-17 satellite (40258, 2014- 058A) in 2017 (See Chinese Co-Orbital ASAT; section 1.1). However, another plausible theory is that Luch is serving as a relay satellite for the Russian Navy, as its changes in orbit are somewhat linked to Russian Naval deployments in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. While the known on-orbit activities of Cosmos 2499, Luch, Cosmos 2504, or Cosmos 2521 did not include explicit testing of offensive capabilities or aggressive maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they tested could be used offensively or aggressive in the future. One potential offensive use would be to get a radio-frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly amplifying its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. While possible, to date there is no direct public evidence of such systems being tested on orbit by Russia. The onboard tracking and guidance systems used for rendezvous could be used to try and physically collide with another satellite to damage or destroy it. However, the approach would have to involve much higher relative velocities than Russian RPO satellites have demonstrated to date, and potentially involving higher velocities and distances than what these satellites are capable of. Furthermore, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction with the target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already in place to detect accidental close approaches. Warning time of such a close approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO), unless the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.

**Stalkers are peaceful – your guy**

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China’s ASAT developments are comprehensive. In addition to the emerging space stalkers, it continues to develop jammers against communications satellites; powerful lasers to dazzle, blind, or damage space sensors; and cyber capabilities to hack or spoof the control and functioning of satellites. China has also been expanding its space diplomacy. Its space programs have included international cooperation with countries other than Russia. China and the European Space Agency (ESA) are cooperating on a space-weather observatory. ESA personnel have visited Chinese human spaceflight training facilities, with the longterm goal of flying a European astronaut aboard a Shenzhou spacecraft to a Chinese space station.20 These activities help project China as a peaceful and friendly space power. Thus, under the current ambiguity about whether configuring multiple space stalkers or exercising preemptive self-defense is the first act of aggression, the international community might well be on China’s side in a conflict