## T

#### A. Interpretation: medicine refers to treatments and cures only. Affirmatives must not reduce other medical IP protections.

**B. Violation: they do**

**vaccines are medical interventions, not medicines**

Elbe 10 [Stefan Elbe, director of the Centre for Global Health Policy and a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex. "Security and Global Health," ISBN 0745643744, accessed 8-10-2021, https://www.wiley.com/en-ee/Security+and+Global+Health-p-9780745643731] HWIC

Yet here too we must be careful not to overlook other types of medical intervention simultaneously pursued by the 'social' arm of modern medicine at the population level. Vaccines in particular continue to be particularly important medical interventions that repeatedly surface in a variety of different health security delib- erations. Strictly speaking, vaccines are not medicines because they consist of small concentrations of disease-causing microbes (or their derivatives) used to enhance a person's immuno-response to a future infection. As a public health measure, vaccines have therefore also been largely sidelined in the existing medicalization literature. Yet, generally speaking, vaccines too can be considered as medical inter- ventions. That is certainly how the World Health Organization views them, pointing out that 'vaccines are among the most important medical interventions for reducing illness and deaths' available today (WHO 2009a). Whereas pills and other therapies mark the tools of clinical medicine, vaccines play a crucial part in the arsenal of 'social' medicine and public health. Developing and rolling out of new vaccines against a range of current (and future) diseases therefore represents further evidence of how the rise of health security is also encouraging security to be practised through the introduction of new medical interventions in society.

**Vaccines are different from medicines in the context of intellectual property**

Garrison 04 [Christopher Garrison, Consultant Legal Advisor to WHO. "Intellectual Property Rights and Vaccines in Developing countries," 04-13-2004, accessed 9-2-2021, https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/events/en/Background\_paper.pdf?ua=1] HWIC

In the last few years, there has been a substantial debate about how intellectual property impacts medicines and in particular how the TRIPS Agreement impacts access to medicines in the developing world. Vaccines are different from medicines in a number of important respects however (at least from the small molecule ‘pill’ medicines if not the newer ‘biotech’ medicines). The issues raised in the access to medicines debate may therefore apply to a greater or lesser extent for vaccines, depending on these differences. This section examines a few of the different forms of intellectual property rights that are relevant in the context of vaccines and outlines the impact of some of the differences between vaccines and medicines.

#### C. Reasons to prefer

#### 1. Limits -- allowing any patented medical intervention includes testing and screening methods, surgery, contact tracing software etc. which takes away generics like innovation bc that applies to pharmaceutical development not distribution of preventative measures which explodes neg prep burden

#### 2. Precision -- we cite the WHO which proves common usage -- they add a whole new caselist based on social medicine which kills predictability -- that's k2 pre-tournament prep and deep clash around the core topic controversy. Reject counter-interps without a positive vision of the topic -- otherwise they can always shift the goalposts

#### D. Paradigm issues

#### 1. Drop the debater -- they skewed the debate from the 1AC and T indicts their advocacy

#### 2. Competing interps -- you can't be reasonably topical and reasonability invites judge intervention

#### 3. No RVIs -- forcing the 1NC to go all in kills substance education and discourages checking abuse

**4. TVA easily exists: anything about normal medication like insulin, even covid cures like ventilators and remdeservir, just not vaccines**

## DA

**The US is winning the biotech race, but strong domestic support and unilateral vaccine leadership are key**

**Moore 2-17** [Scott Moore, political scientist and administrator at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of a forthcoming book, “How China Shapes the Future,” on China’s role in public goods and emerging technologies.. "In Biotech, the Industry of the Future, the U.S. Is Way Ahead of China," Lawfare, 2-17-2021, accessed 8-25-2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/biotech-industry-future-us-way-ahead-china] HWIC

It was supposed to be China’s moment of technological triumph—one that would show the world Beijing had not only conquered the coronavirus but also emerged as a biotechnology superpower. But when clinical data on China’s flagship CoronaVac vaccine finally flowed in, they showed it was barely more than 50 percent effective—just clearing the minimum standard set by the World Health Organization. In contrast, not one but two vaccines developed by U.S. firms have been found to be upward of 95 percent effective, a standard no other country’s vaccines have yet met in rigorous clinical trials. The United States’s overall track record in responding to the pandemic has been awful. Yet the success of its vaccine development efforts shows that when it comes to biotechnology, the industry of the future, the U.S. is way ahead of China and most of its other rivals. A continuing refrain from Washington in recent years has been that the United States is falling behind China in the development of critical emerging technologies. In some fields, this may be true. But not in biotechnology. To be sure, China’s biotech sector is growing at a torrid pace, and some of its firms are becoming leaders in certain areas, such as cancer treatment. Yet the U.S. retains a dominant position in research, development and commercialization, accounting for almost half of all biotech patents filed from 1999 to 2013. The triumph of its biotechnology industry during the coronavirus pandemic, producing two highly effective vaccines using an entirely new approach based on messenger RNA, and in record time, shows that the U.S.’s competitive edge in biotechnology remains largely intact. And that has important implications as Washington gears up for a sustained period of geopolitical competition with Beijing. Biotech is such a critical area for technological competition between the U.S. and China because it is transforming fields from medicine to military power. The great advances of the 19th century, like chemical fertilizers, resulted from mastering chemistry. In the 20th century, mastery of physics led to nuclear energy—and, more ominously, nuclear weapons. In the 21st century, biology offers a similar mix of peril and promise. This was illustrated dramatically by the award of the 2020 Nobel Prize for the discovery of an enzyme system known as CRISPR-Cas9, which allows an organism’s genomes to be edited with high precision. It is a transformational breakthrough. But while CRISPR shows great promise in the development of new cures for long-untreatable diseases, it could also lead to a whole new generation of deadly bioweapons. That’s a prospect that increasingly alarms U.S. intelligence officials. In 2016, then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned Congress that “[r]esearch in genome editing conducted by countries with different regulatory or ethical standards than those of western countries probably increases the risk of the creation of potentially harmful biological agents or products.” Although Clapper didn’t name specific countries, it soon became clear that he was referring mainly to China. Four years later, his successor, John Ratcliffe, issued a far more pointed warning that “China has even conducted human testing on members of the People’s Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with biologically enhanced capabilities. There are no ethical boundaries to Beijing’s pursuit of power.” Such capabilities are almost certainly only speculative—but they underscore why biotech leadership is so important for national security as well as economic competitiveness. Beijing has long envied the United States’s dominant position in biotechnology and spent heavily to overtake it. Biotech has been a priority sector for state investment since the 1980s, and by one estimate Beijing had poured some $100 billion into the sector by 2018. Nowhere did it lavish more attention or invest more of its propaganda power than in developing a coronavirus vaccine. State media have spent months crowing that “China is working around the clock for breakthroughs in COVID-19 vaccines.” Yet despite this push, China’s vaccine program quickly took on a Potemkin air. In February 2020, barely two months after the onset of the pandemic and after a supposedly crash vaccine effort, a military doctor stood in front of a Chinese flag to receive what was billed as an experimental vaccine dose but was widely suspected to be a staged photo op. Now, having spent months talking up its two primary vaccine candidates to developing countries like Brazil and Indonesia, both of which have entered into purchase agreements with Chinese biotech firms, Chinese officials face severe mistrust among their nation’s overseas partners. For China’s leaders, the disappointing returns on their big bet on biotechnology look likely to cause them more headaches at home as well as abroad—there are already signs that affluent Chinese place more trust in foreign-developed coronavirus vaccines than the homegrown ones produced at such great expense. For U.S. officials, though, China’s relative underperformance in vaccine development presents an opportunity to reassert the United States’s leadership in biotechnology and public health and bolster the nation’s depleted soft power in the process. The Biden administration has already signaled it will reengage in multilateral bodies such as the World Health Organization. Yet the U.S. shouldn’t stop there. Washington should begin thinking now about how to emulate the success of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—which, though imperfect, is widely regarded as one of the most successful single public health interventions in history—to address growing disparities in access to coronavirus vaccines between countries. At the moment, vaccine supplies are controlled largely by rich countries, creating the risk of moral and public health failure if the gap persists. While COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus, differs in many respects from AIDS, PEPFAR combined research, prevention, and access to therapeutics. Developing a comparable institutional structure to close the coronavirus vaccine access gap is the right thing to do—but it would also go a long way to restoring America’s battered global reputation. At the same time, the United States can’t afford to rest on its laurels in biotechnology, or any other field. Aside from China, other nations like Singapore and Israel have also invested heavily to develop their biotechnology sectors, with Israel in particular giving rise to a thriving biotech industry. U.S. public investment in basic scientific research and development has meanwhile been on the decline for decades, and there are worrying signs that America’s once world-beating innovation ecosystem is less productive, and less entrepreneurial, than it once was. Despite strengths in translational research, moreover, the frontiers of biology increasingly sit at the intersection with other disciplines like computer science, meaning that funding agencies, universities and other organizations need to break down disciplinary silos. Boosting support for biotechnology research, while reforming how that money is used, will go a long way toward shoring up the United States’s leading position in the global biotech sector. The U.S. biotechnology sector also faces other threats, not least growing espionage and intellectual property theft by foreign actors, especially those linked to China. Several high-profile cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice’s China Initiative have involved biotechnology researchers, and American biotech firms have been top targets for cyber theft and intrusion. Sustained outreach to researchers and research institutions is critical to preventing such theft. But efforts to clamp down on the threats posed by espionage and intellectual property theft can easily go too far and must preserve the researcher mobility and data-sharing that is essential to doing cutting-edge science. Beyond its shores, the United States should work with its partners and allies to enhance export controls on dual-use biotechnology—used for both peaceful and military gain—especially DNA templates. Many forms of genetic material and synthetic biology products are already subject to U.S. export controls, but gaps remain, and screening for genetic sequence orders relies primarily on voluntary regulation by biotech firms. Better coordinating export controls among major economies and U.S. allies can dramatically reduce the risk of sophisticated bioweapons development in the decades to come. When it comes to biotechnology, the industry of the future, the U.S. remains well ahead of its rivals, including China. That’s something Americans can, and should, take pride in. But the U.S. must make proactive investments and undertake significant reforms now to ensure that things stay that way.

**A vaccine waiver gives China the edge in biotech and decks innovation in every sector**

**Duesterberg 6-3** [Thomas J., Duesterberg, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. "Biden says he wants to out-compete China — so why attack US medical innovation?," TheHill, 6-3-2021, accessed 8-25-2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/556043-biden-says-he-wants-to-out-compete-china-so-why-attack-us-medical] HWIC

Congress has been burning the midnight oil to pass legislation aimed at investing billions of dollars to out-compete China in critical sectors and champion American innovation. Yet at the very moment that value of the U.S. model of medical innovation is being most vindicated, that model has come under attack from our own government, as well as long-time critics in the developing world.

These critics are proposing to waive the intellectual property (IP) rights guaranteed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for vaccines and treatments for COVID-19 — a move that would undermine the [economic model of innovation](https://www.hudson.org/research/16609-will-the-biden-administration-support-global-us-leadership-in-the-innovative-medicines-industry) that produced the historically unprecedented effectiveness, and speed to market, of vaccines developed by major U.S. and British firms.

The assault — spearheaded by South Africa and India — is not only unlikely to help get more vaccines to the developing world in a timely manner, but **has the potential to unravel decades of progress in building an internationally agreed regime for IP rights**, which incentivizes and rewards fundamental research and long-term capital investment. This could harm not only the medical products industry, but also spill over to other high-technology sectors that require long years of research and huge, risky capital investments before bearing fruit.

Proponents of the waiver argue that it would facilitate more rapid production and distribution of much-needed shots for hard hit regions in South Asia and Africa. However, it’s well-established that any increased production — even in India, which is home to the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines — [would require at least a year of preparation and investment](https://www.ft.com/content/b0f42409-6fdf-43eb-96c7-d166e090ab99) to begin large-scale production of the newer vaccines.

What’s more, opponents to the waiver — led by European countries, home to the world’s second leading medicines industry — can delay the waiver approval for months at the WTO, if not bury the idea altogether. And with plans in place to ramp up production of approved vaccines in the U.S., Europe and India, there will be sufficient [surplus production](https://www.airfinity.com/insights/how-much-surplus-vaccine-will-the-us-have) to start exporting to the global South later this summer.

Any forced transfer of the new vaccines technologies [**almost certainly will benefit China**](https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17393/biden-giving-china-vaccine-tech), with its growing manufacturing prowess and ambitions to spend whatever is required to offset the damage to its reputation resulting from its attempt to mask the severity of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the early days of the pandemic.

A closer look at the South Africa-India waiver proposal, which is supported by some 100 other nations, gives insight into the longer-term and broader danger of the reversal of IP rights protections for advanced technologies. Their language tabled [at the WTO](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/backers-wto-vaccine-waiver-ask-opponents-join-talks-document-2021-05-17/) in late May calls for waiving not only the fundamental patents behind COVID-19 vaccines but extending the waiver to products including “diagnostics, therapeutics, medical devices, personal protective equipment” and to the raw materials and “means of manufacture” of anything used to contain this virus. It is not a huge leap of logic to speculate that **such broad waivers, in the future, could be suggested for any severe threat to world health**, with the example of treatments for AIDS as a reminder.

The proposed waiver would extend for a period of “at least three years,” and could be lifted only by agreement in the General Council of the WTO, which requires unanimous consent of all 164 members and rarely has been achieved since its inception in 1995. It is hard to imagine that once the long-sought goal of removing IP rights protection for medical technologies — supported by developing countries and by progressive groups in developed countries alike — is achieved, it can be reversed easily.

Other high-technology industries characterized by the need for long-term investments in basic research and the development of new manufacturing technologies such as semiconductors, medical equipment or aerospace, or nascent industries such as quantum computing, robotics or 3D printing, would be wise to pay attention to the debate over waiving IP rights for COVID-19 vaccines.

While the acute and existential issues arising from a pandemic represent a perhaps unique set of circumstances, one can conceive of arguments to justify the social goal of sharing some newer technologies. For example, if innovations in “green hydrogen,” more powerful batteries, or more efficient photovoltaic cells are achieved and promise early returns to combat climate change, the advantages of sharing the technologies for the global common good could be adduced to justify waivers in the appropriate enabling technologies. Or, would a waiver be considered for the advanced semiconductors and computers required for artificial intelligence and needed to find cures for cancer and to perfect climate mitigation strategies?

[U.S. support](https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/biden-administration-backs-vaccine-intellectual-property-waiver-68751#:~:text=May%2010%2C%202021&text=In%20a%20sharp%20reversal%20of,protections%20around%20COVID%2D19%20vaccines.) for the vaccine IP rights waiver is especially baffling because it **affects one of its most successful industries in terms of global technology leadership and market share**, responsible for so many advances of enormous benefit for global health. It is not a mystery why the rapid discovery and ramping up of production for new vaccines came from the unique U.S. innovation ecosystem, in contrast to the more highly regulated and centrally controlled health care sectors in much of the rest of the world.

[Graham: Biden 'has signed the death warrant for thousands of Afghans...](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/569437-graham-biden-has-signed-the-death-warrant-for-thousands-of-afghans-who-helped?utm_source=thehill&utm_medium=widgets&utm_campaign=es_recommended_content)

[The Hill's Morning Report - Presented by Facebook - Biden sticks to...](https://thehill.com/homenews/morning-report/569290-the-hills-morning-report?utm_source=thehill&utm_medium=widgets&utm_campaign=es_recommended_content)

There are better ways to achieve the goal of eradicating COVID-19, and U.S. actions would be more effective if directed toward expanding production and assisting in the distribution of vaccines. This includes the use of foreign aid and help with purchasing agreements for countries in the global South, as well as facilitating licensing agreements. (For example, Johnson & Johnson is [arranging a major project](https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/us-news/us-looking-at-johnson-and-johnson-vaccine-production-in-india-in-talks-with-serum-institute.html)with Indian manufacturers, which has the support of the other Quad countries, Japan, Australia and the U.S.)

If Congress truly cares about protecting American innovation, it ought to assert its constitutional authority over international trade to block this danger to domestic high-technology industries.

**China is a revisionist power and rise triggers war with the U.S. – history, rhetoric, and values**

**Choi, PhD, 18**

(Ji Young, IR@Purdue, DirectorEastAsianStudies+AssocProfInternationalStudies@OhioWesleyan, Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China’s Ascent, Asian Perspective, 42(1), 61–84)

I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, **historical and theoretical lessons** reveal that a rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former’s economic and other major capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter’s leadership and the international rules it created. This means that **the rise of China could produce intense hegemonic competition** and even a **global hegemonic war**. The **preventive motivation** by an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the case of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A **historical lesson** is that “incomplete catch-ups are **inherently conflict-prone**” (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that **even though it falls short of surpassing the system leader**, the rise of a new great power can produce **significant instability** in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these **regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war** in which the two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied **sixteen historical cases** in which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China’s domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing’s diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a **revisionist power** in the future. Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine: “hide one’s capabilities, bide one’s time, and seek the right opportunity.” Since 2003, China’s motto has been “Peaceful Rise” or “Peaceful Development,” and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a **severe threat** by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China’s foreign minister publicly stated, “China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact” (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words “struggle and achieve results,” emphasizing the importance of China’s territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek “de facto control over the resource rich waters and islets” claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China’s strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These **new developments** and rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China’s foreign policies and signify that **China’s peaceful rise seems to be over**. A rising great power’s consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the **significant signs** of the rising power’s dissatisfaction with the existing order and its **willingness to do battle** if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), “arms buildups and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage.” Werner and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger’s military expenditures are increasing faster than those of a system leader, parity can be **very dangerous** to the international political order. China’s GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet. China’s military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the United States. In addition to its air force, China’s strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers {Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military, particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015). Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy’s rapid growth requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers. Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic order and take actions that could potentially **change this order**. The Chinese economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a **starting point for significant changes** in global economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi 2015). China’s **historical legacies** reinforce the view that China has a willingness to become a global hegemon. From the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century to the start of the first Opium War in 1839, China enjoyed its undisputed hegemonic position in East Asia. “Sino-centrism” that is related to this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China’s neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign minister’s recent public statement that I quoted previously: “China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact” (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese people’s ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its economic standing at least in most Chinese people’s mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by “the Century of Humiliation,” a period between the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China’s economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation and shame and **recover its traditional position and old glory** (Choi 2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an ultimate objective of China. Rather, **its final goal is to return to its traditional status** by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition (Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow 2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are needed. Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan’s goal was to create the Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era. Twentieth century history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose **significant challenges** to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that **economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony**. Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011), A relatively peaceful relationship or transition is possible when economic interdependence is supported by a solid democratic alliance between a rising great power and an existing or declining one. Some scholars such as Ikenberry (2008) emphasize nuclear deterrence and the high costs of a nuclear war. Power transition theorists agree that the high costs of a nuclear war can constrain a war among great powers but do not view them as “a perfect deterrent” to war (Kugler and Zagare 1990; Tammen et al. 2000). The idea of nuclear deterrence is based upon the assumption of the rationality of actors (states): as long as the costs of a (nuclear) war are higher than its benefits, an actor (state) will not initiate the war. However, even some rationalists admit that certain actors (such as exceedingly ambitious risk-taking states) do not behave rationally and engage in unexpected military actions or pursue military overexpansion beyond its capacity (Glaser 2010). The state’s behaviors are driven by its values, perceptions, and political ambitions as well as its rational calculations of costs and benefits. Especially, national pride, historical memories, and territorial disputes can make states behave emotionally. The possibility of a war between a democratic nation and a nondemocratic regime increases because they do not share the same values and beliefs and, therefore, the level of mistrust between them tends to be very high. China and the United States have enhanced their cooperation to address various global issues like global warming, international terrorism, energy issues, and global economic stability. But these **issues are not strong enough to bring them together** to overcome their mistrust that stems from their **different values**, beliefs, and perceptions (Friedberg 2011). What is more important is whether they can set mutually agreeable international rules on traditional security issues including territorial disputes.

## Vaccine Diplomacy CP

#### Text: The People’s Republic of China should offer Chinese developed vaccines and medical technology related to COVID-19 to the world for free

#### The CP massively ramps up Chinese “vaccine diplomacy” which solves the case

Juecheng and Yuwei 8-13-21

(Zhao and Hu, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231387.shtml)

One of China’s most valued contributions to the global fair accessibility to COVID-19 vaccines is to enable more developing countries to hone their ability to produce vaccines by themselves, Zha Daojiong, professor of International Political Economy from Peking University, who closely studies the global vaccine equitable allocation framework, told the Global Times in a recent exclusive interview. Sharing his insights on widely discussed “vaccine nationalism,” “wavering vaccine intellectual property,” and “COVAX operation challenges,” Zha believes that China is advocating negotiations among countries on equitable global distribution of vaccines from a humanitarian, and global perspective. China has vowed to make efforts to provide the world with 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines this year and donate $100 million to COVAX to promote global vaccine provision. This commitment comes amid the rampaging Delta variant, which is bringing more challenges for developing countries to access vaccines and combat the pandemic while the West continues to drag its heels in fulfilling its promises. The promise was made at the first meeting of a forum on international cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines held on August 5. Zha suggested that the forum, alongside the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation, reflect China’s efforts to support long-term cooperation in the vaccine industry globally. However, some Western media have labeled China and Russia as the pioneers of the global "vaccine diplomacy" campaign. The choice of vaccines by countries has become the epitome of global geopolitics.   Foreign comments on China using "vaccine diplomacy" in a narrow geopolitical sense reflect the real competition among COVID-19 vaccine providers, Zha told the Global Times. Due to China’s mature vaccine technologies, longer shelf life and lower requirement for storage and transportation, Chinese made vaccines are a more preferable choice for many developing countries with relatively weak vaccination infrastructure . This has been reflected in the approval of Chinese vaccines in more than 100 countries. But the phenomenon of “vaccine nationalism” was never absent in the decision by governments to choose vaccines, Zha suggested. “For example, some countries and regions would include geopolitical factors in choosing vaccines. These countries would reject certain vaccines. Moreover, some media outlets refuse to accept the fact that the professional assessment of vaccine efficacy is also a scientific process. Instead, they made comments on potential vaccines based on their geopolitical interests. This is also a kind of “vaccine nationalism”. Voices blaming “vaccine nationalism” have long been present in developed countries. For instance, Zha recalled how, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 which affected more than 200 countries and regions for more than a year, certain developed countries bought out entire stocks of vaccines against H1N1 once they were developed. Though some of those countries had promised to donate vaccines to others after they met their vaccination needs, the virus had long disappeared before their donations were made. Therefore, many in other nations lost the opportunity of a timely vaccination. Providing assistance from one country to another in the field of infectious or non-infectious diseases is often referred to as "health diplomacy." Some international public health research literature support "health diplomacy" because cooperation in this field is conducive to the improvement of political, economic and diplomatic relations, Zha said. China has taken important steps to close the global vaccine gap, including the acceleration of large-scale production, boosting fair distribution, and licensing local production in more countries.

#### Successful vaccine diplomacy is key to overall Chinese Soft Power

Huang, PhD, 3-11-21

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Vaccines have had a place in diplomacy since the Cold War era. The country that can manufacture and distribute lifesaving injections to others less fortunate sees a return on its investment in the form of soft power: prestige, goodwill, perhaps a degree of indebtedness, even awe. Today the country moving fastest toward consolidating these gains may be China, under President Xi Jinping, who proclaimed last May that Chinese-made vaccines against COVID-19 would become a “global public good.” Since that time, top officials have promised many developing countries priority access to Chinese vaccines, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced that the country is providing free vaccines to 69 countries and commercially exporting them to 28 more. China’s competitors worry that where Beijing’s inoculations go, its influence will follow. But the field of COVID-19 vaccination is still a largely uncharted one and scattered with barriers, whether logistical, scientific, psychological, or geopolitical. China’s path through this labyrinth is neither obvious nor assured. The country faces stiffening competition from Russia and India. Now the United States, too, has entered the global stakes for equitable distribution of safe and effective vaccines. China has yet to prove that it can fulfill the role it has taken on or win the trust of those it has offered to aid. CHINA'S STAKE The Chinese government dislikes the term “vaccine diplomacy.” The implication that China would distribute vaccine doses in order to broaden its global political influence is a “sinister” one, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. Rather, the Chinese government contends that “in promoting cooperation in combating the pandemic, China does not seek any geopolitical goals or have any economic interest considerations, and it has never attached any political strings.” Xi has further stressed that by distributing necessary goods in a crisis, China is merely acting as a responsible great power should. In this regard, China may seek to succeed with vaccines where it failed with masks: last spring, quality-control issues and clumsy propaganda tarnished the country’s efforts to supply medical products to the developed world. Now China is looking to showcase its global health leadership to lower- and middle-income countries, where it is distributing vaccines. But Beijing surely has additional foreign policy objectives in mind. China began its vaccine development projects early last spring, and state media made quite clear that through them, China hoped to demonstrate its technological prowess and the superiority of its authoritarian model of governance. “We are not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” a Chinese virologist told the state-backed Global Times. Another scientist highlighted China’s “system advantages”: “The United States is no match for China in terms of concentrating power to accomplish big things.” Indeed, unlike in the United States, vaccine development in China was a highly state-driven process. The Chinese government simultaneously pushed several technological approaches, including inactivated vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and adenovirus vector vaccines. It mobilized at least 22 institutes and firms to work on 17 vaccine development projects. And until last summer, China was leading the global race in vaccine development. It developed a vaccine (Ad5-nCoV) as early as February 2020, started Phase 1 clinical trials on March 16, and published results of the trials in late May. General Chen Wei, the face of China’s vaccine development operation, celebrated such achievements as “an embodiment of our country’s S&T progress, an embodiment of China’s great-power image and responsibility, and, even more, a contribution to humankind.” Behind such lofty goals lie commercial objectives, too. Health-related development assistance has long offered Chinese pharmaceutical companies a low-cost means of expanding their market share in the developing world. In March 2020, President Xi explicitly linked the shipment of medical supplies overseas to the “Health Silk Road,” now an important component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xiaofeng Liang, a former deputy director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, has publicly called for prioritizing BRI countries for access to Chinese vaccines. But the opportunity hardly ends there. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, few Chinese pharmaceutical companies had received World Health Organization prequalification to supply medical products to international organizations and donor funds. In 2019, China’s share in the value of UN-procured medical products was only 1.9 percent, compared with 21.9 percent for India. Chinese media lamented that of the 155 WHO-prequalified vaccines, only four were from China, compared with 44 from India. Indeed, Indian pharmaceutical firms produced more than 60 percent of the vaccines sold worldwide. The huge global demand for COVID-19 vaccines and “vaccine nationalism” in wealthy nations have created a great opportunity for China to break into a market that Indian and Western pharmaceutical firms have long dominated. If the vaccine were priced at $10 per dose with a 40 percent net profit margin, even a 15 percent share of the vaccine market in lower- and middle-income countries would generate total sales of $10.8 billion and a profit of $4.32 billion for the Chinese economy. In reality, Chinese vaccines are often priced higher than $10.

#### Chinese leadership stops global secessionist conflict

Griffiths 16 **-** Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan, States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628)

I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where territorial stability is concerned. Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process.73 Given the politics and conflicting principles of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.”74 Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for key actors, and increase the chance of conflict. Secessionist civil war is a common feature of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of violence in the world today.75 Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent.76 Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation.78 This is where Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order.