## K

#### The Chinese Space Threat appears persuasive, but is constructed to justify the militarization of space and violent intervention against Chinese satellites

Cameron 18

Hunter Cameron, (PhD public policy), 2018, "The Rise of China in Space Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse," https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/183271194/Final\_Copy\_2018\_09\_25\_Hunter\_C\_PhD.pdf, // HW AW

Almost every American source that cares to mention China’s space program agrees that its recent surge to prominence constitutes a grave threat to the national security of the United States of America. A streak of technological determinism was a recurring feature of within these debates, particularly after 2000 (see Parts 2 and 3). **Chinese space technologies were instrumentalised as tools for the destruction of the US, contextualised with wider representations of China as a reckless and aggressive space power** (see Chapter 6). Coupled with the instrumentalisation of American space technology as essential, in an ontological sense, to the nation, **the “Chinese space threat” narrative became existential in scope**. According to many of the proponents of this discourse, China’s rising space power would inevitably entail a mix of fear, conflict and space (arms) racing. Yet the irrefutability of the “Chinese space threat” in US public policy **discourse conceals a multitude of tensions and inconsistencies**. Asking “how” the threat came to be has revealed its uneven construction, and thus by extension demonstrated how misguided technologically determinist arguments about the “rise” have been. Part 1 showed both how the “threat” has varied over time, in some instances becoming side-lined in favour of cooperation in space. It also demonstrated how space has inconsistently appeared in broader American debates about China’s “rise” more generally, sometimes cited as evidence of the “rise,” elsewhere obscured by other foreign policy concerns. Part 2 showed how advocates of the “Chinese space threat” differed in which aspects of American identity, and which corresponding technologies, they valued and portrated as imperilled by China’s “rise” in space. Finally, Part 3 underlined the appearance of unevenness by inquiring after the policies and procurements which were undertaken in the name of the “Chinese space threat.” Beyond the maintenance of the ITAR restrictions already in place at the start of the century and the limitations on NASA-China interaction imposed in 2011, no new policies were sanctioned in line with what by any other measure was an incredibly dominant discourse. This disjuncture is the most pressing evidence for the uneven construction of China’s “rise” in space, and sets up a puzzle for future research to address. Despite this puzzle, the lack of a technological response is itself is best understood as a part of **technopolitical contestation within American public policy discourse**. Viewed in this light, the 182 determinism of the “Chinese space threat” remained unmanifested. In other words, the “Chinese space threat” was a kind of “dog that didn’t bark” where the omission of response is itself evidence worthy of consideration. Contributions of the thesis Two main claims, corresponding to the two main contributions of this thesis, have been made by this thesis. The first is that the dominant discourse of the “Chinese space threat,” was unevenly socially constructed and historically contingent, and thus did not inevitably result in specific American responses such as arms races (Tellis 2007a: 7), spiralling security dilemmas (Handberg and Li 2012: 4) or Thucydides’ traps (Johnson-Freese 2017: 54). Ultimately, **American elites constructed US-China interaction in space differently to the rest of the relationship, focusing almost entirely on competition and threat. In doing so, this discourse even concealed historical cooperation between the two countries. It was this dominant discourse that actively made outer space an outlier in US-China relations**. The second main claim is that threat construction analysis requires a technopolitical lens in order to understand the role that technology plays in underpinning and imperilling identities. In this way, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to threat construction literature. Existing literature in this area has recognised the social construction of technology, but not the technological construction of technology. As the analysis throughout the thesis, but particularly in Part 3 demonstrates, occluding the co- of co-construction obscures political contests over technology and identity that are worthy of study. This section re-iterates how the various elements of the thesis supported these two main claims and contributions. The first Part of this thesis explored the context of the “rise” of China in space. A major component of this was researching the now mostly forgotten past of US-China relations. By establishing the precedents of both American alarm over China’s space program, and the subsequent instrumentalisation of American and Chinese space technology which helped curtail the first “Chinese space threat,” this thesis demonstrated how **threat and technology have historically been co-constructed in the relationship**. Importantly, however, this area of the project also highlighted how little of the historical precedents of the relationship figure into the 21st century policy debates. Instead, the rest of the thesis indicated that the contemporary American public discourse on China’s “rise” in space is almost totally ahistorical in nature, both in terms of recognising prior tensions but perhaps most crucially omitting the previous mutually cooperative character of the relationship only a few decades before. 183 The main theoretical contribution of this thesis was to engage insights from threat construction with those from STS. As the thesis progressed into Parts 2 and 3, the social force of existing technology was increasingly identified as a contributing factor to both the interpretation of Chinese space technology as a threat, but also as a contributing factor to why changing rhetoric did not automatically entail technological overhaul. On the first point, by engaging closely with what relationships were created between formulations of identity, threat, and technology, a picture emerged of an important role for technology in representational practices more generally. Specifically, some representational practices are predicated on the availability of certain technologies. Even though the function of these technologies, and the meaning and importance of the practices, are all socially relative, **the social reality which is constituted in these relations creates a complex and durable basis for the construction of threat.** Thus, American policymakers instrumentalised Chinese space technologies as functioning as destroyers of American satellites, or replicators of unique American lunar achievements. In doing so, they could then draw on powerful and widely recognised discourses of national identity and very specifically locate the threat that China posed to key elements of those identities. **The technological character of these threats then further girded these characterisations by appearing to be material, objective, and therefore all the more irrefutable.** Future threat construction research could benefit from exploiting this theoretical insight by exploring how key identity-producing practices are technologically enabled in other cases. The second element of the theoretical contribution of this thesis to threat construction literature was to identify how technology could “feedback” in a socially contingent manner to shape security politics. By under-theorising technology, prior threat construction literature may have over-stated the political significance of rhetoric and non-technological practices. In Chapter 6, this thesis identified the key technological systems that were supposedly under threat from China, and analysed which elements of American identity were invoked in these processes of threat construction. In becoming instrumentalised into American security practices, such as precision weapons guidance and global navigation, the technologies had become closely woven into the identity politics of sub-national identities but also formulations of national identity writ large. This is one form of technological “feedback,” because the empirical evidence indicates how identity and technology are constantly being co-constructed in American space policy debates. Further examples of technological feedback were explored in Chapter 7, but rather than in a productive capacity as in Chapter 6, the durability of existing technopolitical systems 184 helped to undermine calls for technical change. **The formulation of a “Chinese space threat” was both explicitly and implicitly a call to action, be it to acquire new space weapons,** Moon rockets, or defensive measures. In the case of the call for space weapons, one can point to the success of rhetorical opposition, which seems to have created sufficient controversy to defeat the proposals. Yet, for the calls to increase the number of satellites in existing constellations, or to split up capabilities across new systems, all official contributions to the discourse agreed that such technical changes were necessary. A key barrier which remained to technical change was the shape and qualities of the existing technologies, themselves products of an older arrangement of technopolitics. Orbiting hundreds of miles above the Earth, these systems were costly to modify or replace. The result was non-innovation and the continuation of the existing technopolitical status quo, even as the assumption of the “Chinese space threat” remained largely unquestioned within American public policy discourse.

#### Securitization of the ASAT threat creates unbalanced responses

Pomeroy 15 (Caleb, “Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & US Security,” June 06, 2015, E-International Relations Students, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/>. // EMS).

In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned of the threat of a possible “space Pearl Harbor,” outlining the U.S. as the most space-dependent country in the world and suggesting that the U.S. Department of Defense establish an “Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence, and Information” (Rumsfeld Commission, 2001, pp. 8, 32-33). In 2003, China launched its first astronaut into orbit and, in 2007, tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that destroyed a decommissioned Fengyun-1C weather satellite and caused the most severe orbital debris cloud in space flight history (CRS, 2014). In January of 2014, General William Shelton, commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, explained that while electronic jammers and laser attacks could reduce satellite capabilities, “direct attack weapons, like the Chinese anti-satellite system, can destroy [U.S.] space systems” (“U.S. military satellites,” 2014, para. 5). General Shelton reiterated that mankind has consistently created conflict in every medium at its disposal, from land to sea, undersea to air, and now cyber and outer space.¶ There are few instances in history where an emerging power did not enter conflict with an existing power (Karabell, 2013). As China reemerges as an international power, it is natural to question whether or not the U.S. and China will engage in conflict. However, asking if China’s reemergence is a threat to U.S. security interests may not be the best way to approach this issue. In fact, even defining U.S. security interests could cause an inherent threat to those supposed interests. This essay will argue that defining U.S. security interests can threaten the U.S., and this question’s discursive construction increases the risk of a U.S.-China conflict. A wide range of case studies could be used to illustrate these arguments to approach the question of U.S.-China conflict; this essay will look at the contemporary issue of space security as it is currently receiving historically high levels of attention in Beijing and Washington.¶

#### **US-China space competition rhetoric fails – constructs the threat**

Pomeroy 15 (Caleb, “Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & US Security,” June 06, 2015, E-International Relations Students, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/>. // EMS).

Defining a set of U.S. security interests can bias U.S. perception of Chinese activities. Once the U.S. outlines specific security interests, Chinese activities are interpreted and evaluated by the U.S. relative to those outlined interests. A lucid example of this has unfolded over the past decade; the summary of the Congressional Research Service’s 2014 report entitled *Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal* explains that the growing population of space debris “threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial.” The U.S. criticized the 2007 Chinese ASAT test; National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe states that the “U.S. believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area” (Kaufman & Linzer, 2007, para. 4). With U.S. satellite assets defined as a security interest, it was only natural that many American analysts interpreted this test as a deliberate step made by the Chinese towards a counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority as well as an attempt to force the U.S. into space arms treaty negotiations. However, Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis (2008) conducted interviews with Chinese officials who were close to the anti-satellite program and found American commentators tended to place too much importance on the U.S. as a driver in China’s test. This ASAT test, coupled with NASA Administrator Michael Griffin being denied access to the Shenzhou launch facility in 2006, caused the U.S. to sever cooperative ties with the Chinese National Space Agency. Griffin, in turn, had to resort to claiming the prospect of competition with China to obtain U.S. Congressional support for NASA’s cooperative initiatives (Kulacki and Lewis, 2008). Therefore, the U.S. defining security interests, such as its satellite assets, encourages the U.S.’s interpretation of China’s actions, such as the 2007 ASAT test, as a threat. In this example, the result was a further distancing of Washington from Beijing and a severing of space ties between two of the most space active nations in the world.¶

#### The China-Taiwan dispute is the result of flawed American policies driven by fears over an “aggressive” China. US meddling will only perpetuate the conflict.

Pan 04 (Chengxin, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (June-July 2004), Sage Publications, Inc. via JSTOR// EMS).

In the eyes of many U.S. China watchers, China's approach to the Taiwan question is a microcosm of its grand strategy to dominate Asia. The argument is that nowhere is the threatening ambition more palpable than in China's saber-rattling missile tests near Tai- wan's coast in 1995-1996, in addition to its long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force as a last resort to settle the dispute.72 While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening pic- ture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Sim- ply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of wide- spread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively pre- venting the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. com- mitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed.73 This confrontational policy serves not only to shore up Taiwan's defense capabilities but also to induce its independent ambition and further complicate cross-strait relations. As former U.S. defense official Chas Freeman remarked, "U.S. arms sales to Taiwan no longer work to boost Taipei's confidence that it can work out its dif- ferences with Beijing. Instead, they bolster the view that Taiwan can go its own way."74 For instance, amid growing sympathy from the Republican-dominated Congress and the elite media as well as the expanded ties with the United States, Taiwan responded coolly to Beijing's call for dialogue in January 1995. In June 1995, Taiwan's flexible diplomacy, designed to burnish its independent image, cul- minated in its president Lee Teng-hui's high-profile visit to the United States. This in turn reinforced Beijing's suspicion that the real U.S. intention was to frustrate its reunification goal, leaving it apparently no other choice but to prepare militarily for what it saw as a worst-case scenario. All this constituted the major context in which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile exercises took place. For most Chinese, the carrying out of these military exercises, well within their own territory, had little to do with attacking Tai- wan, much less with challenging U.S. security interests in the west- ern Pacific. Rather, it was about China's long-cherished dream of national unity, with its "sabre rattling" tactics serving merely as a warning to the United States, as well as to Taiwan. However, inter- preting such exercises as China's muscle-flexing with direct security implications for the region, with "an almost 19th-century display of gunboat diplomacy,"75 the United States dispatched two nuclear- powered aircraft carriers to the region of Taiwan. While not denying the potential security repercussions of China's missile tests for the region, I suggest that the flashpoint of Taiwan says as much about the danger of this U.S. approach to China as about the threat of Beijing's display of force itself. "Had Bill Clinton projected a constancy of purpose and vision in China policy ... in 1993-1994," David M. Lampton argues, "he might not have been challenged in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996 with missile exercises."76 Indeed, it was primarily in the context of this U.S. intervention that Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (China can say no), one of the most anti-U.S. books ever produced in China, emerged and quickly became a best-seller in the Chinese reading world.77 Mean- while, some Chinese strategic thinkers were so alarmed by the U.S. show of strength that they told Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of Henry Kissinger's close associates, that they were rereading the early works of George F. Kennan because "containment had been the basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union; now that the United States was turning containment against China, they wanted to learn how it had started and evolved."78

#### **China threat discourse is a tool of the violent military industrial complex used to justify genocide- it creates the threats it seeks to avoid.**

Clark 06 (Gregory, “No Rest for ‘China Threat’ Lobby,” The Japan Times Opinion, January 07, 2006, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2006/01/07/commentary/no-rest-for-china-threat-lobby/#.V27qiJMrKRs> Gregory Clark is vice president of Akita International University and a former Australian diplomat. // EMS).

*I recognize that it (China) is becoming a considerable threat.”*¶ *– Foreign Minister Taro Aso*¶ For as long as I have been in the China-watching business (more than 40 years now), there has always been a China “threat.” It began with the 1950-53 Korean civil war, which initially had nothing to do with China.¶ Even so, Beijing was blamed and, as punishment, the United States decided to intervene not only in Korea but also in China’s civil war with Taiwan, and later threaten a move against China by sending troops close to China’s borders with Korea. When China reacted to that move by sending in its own troops, the China-threat people moved into high gear.¶ The next China threat was supposed to operate via the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Coping with it meant the West had to prop up a range of incompetent, corrupt rulers in the area, and intervene cruelly to suppress revolts by local Chinese against discrimination in Malaya and then in Sarawak.¶ It also meant that the U.S., Britain and Australia had to work very hard and covertly to prevent the 1959 election of an intelligent Chinese, Lee Kwan Yew, to the Singapore premiership. Lee was then seen, amazingly, as a front for those dreaded Chinese Communists.¶ The China-threat lobby moved into overdrive over Vietnam in the early 1960s. There a clearly nationalist-inspired civil war supported more by Moscow than by Beijing was denounced by Washington and Canberra as the first step in planned Chinese “aggression” into Asia.¶ In Moscow in 1964, I had to accompany an Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, in a foolish, U.S.-instigated bid to persuade the Soviet Union to side with the West against those aggressive Chinese. Hasluck gave up only after a bemused Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, told him point-blank that Moscow was doing all it could to help North Vietnam, would continue to give help, and that it would like to see Beijing doing a lot more.¶ In 1962, as China desk officer in Canberra, I had to witness an extraordinary attempt to label as unprovoked aggression a very limited and justified Chinese counterattack against an Indian military thrust across the Indian-claimed border line in the North East Frontier Area. Threat scenarios then had China seeking ocean access via the Bay of Bengal.¶ The London Economist even had Beijing seeking to move south via Afghanistan.¶ Then came the allegations that China was seeking footholds in Laos, northern Thailand and Myanmar — all false. U.S., British and Australian encouragement for the 1965 massacre of half a million leftwing supporters in Indonesia was also justified as needed to prevent China from gaining a foothold there.¶ So too was the U.S. and Australia’s 1975 approval for Indonesia’s brutal takeover of East Timor.¶ Since then we have seen Beijing’s claims against Taiwan condemned as aggressive, despite the fact that every Western nation, including the U.S., has formally recognized or accepted China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. China’s efforts to assert control over Tibet are also branded as aggression even though Tibet has never been recognized as an independent entity.¶ And so it continues to the present day. With the alleged Soviet threat to Japan having evaporated, we now have an army of Japanese and U.S. hawks — Foreign Minister Aso included — ramping up China as an alleged threat to Japan and the Far East.¶ Much is made of Beijing’s recent increases in military spending. But those increases began from a very low level; until recently its military were more concerned with running companies and growing their own vegetables.¶ And Beijing faces a U.S.-Japan military buildup in East Asia that is avowedly anti-China and that spends a lot more than China does.¶ Of course, if the Chinese military were placing bases and sending spy planes and ships close to the U.S. coast, and were bombing U.S. embassies, the U.S. role in that buildup might be justified. But so far that has not happened.¶ Tokyo’s claims to be threatened by China in the East China Sea are equally dubious. So far, the only shots fired in anger in that area have been Japan’s, in a legally dubious huntdown and sinking of a North Korean vessel.¶ Tokyo makes much of China’s challenge to Japan’s claimed EEZ (exclusive economic zone) median line of control in the East China Sea (Beijing says the EEZ border should be based on the continental shelf extending close to the Ryukyu islands and proposes joint development between the two claim lines).¶ But international law on EEZ borders still does not firmly support Japan’s median line position. And the recent Australia-East Timor agreement on joint development of continental shelf oil/gas resources in the Timor Sea, and the 1974 Japan-South Korean agreement for joint development in the East China Sea continental shelf, both strongly suggest that Beijing’s joint development proposal is not entirely unreasonable.¶ But no doubt these details will be dismissed as irrelevant. Our powers-that-be need threats to justify their existence. As we saw during the Cold War, and more recently over Iraq, once they declare that such and such a nation is a threat, it becomes impossible to stop the escalation. The other side naturally has to show some reaction. The military-industrial- intelligence complex then seize on this as the pretext further to expand budgets and power. Before long the media and a raft of dubious academic and other commentators are sucked into the vortex.¶ Then when it is all over and the alleged threat has proved to be quite imaginary, the threat merchants move on to find another target. But not before billions have been spent. And millions have died.¶

#### Vote negative to refuse the single, authoritative understanding of China. Attempting to securitize and control the globe is a colonialist and impossible practice. Instead, embrace the uncertainty, unknowability and fluidity of international politics.

Turner 13 (Oliver, “’Threatening’ China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity,” Review of International Studies, First Published February 8, 2013. **Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming). He is interested in US foreign policy especially with regards newly influential global actors, as well as how American-led power steers the dynamics and future of the developing world. // EMS).**

In March 2011 US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper informed the American Senate that, of all sovereign nations, China represented the most imminent ‘mortal threat’ to the United States. While China’s intentions were not necessarily malicious, he argued, it had the capacity to present such a danger. Russia was also cited but quickly dismissed as Clapper observed that China’s ‘strategic nuclear weapons’ arsenal in particular made it an issue of the foremost concern.1 China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is estimated at around 240 warheads. Russia’s stands at around 12,000.2 Yet, and despite the clear superiority of the latter’s nuclear armament, Clapper repeatedly emphasised that it was China’s capabilities and not its intent which were central in its elevation to such an extreme category of threat.¶ Director Clapper’s assertions are reflective of the so-called China Threat Theory which now attracts considerable Western attention, especially within the United States. In the International Relations (IR) literature authors including John Mearsheimer examine US policy options towards a real or potential China threat. Mearsheimer argues that China’s growth will almost inevitably cause tensions with the United States, presenting a ‘considerable potential for war’.3 Warren Cohen predicts that China will continue to ‘brutaliz[e] the weak’, and follow great powers of the past by seeking regional dominance before expanding its influence further.4 Certainly, much of the recent literature is less foreboding of China’s ‘rise’ and authors question the extent to which it endangers international security. Gordon Chang, for example, argues that China’s economic model – and hence its capacity to become a true global superpower – is flawed.5 Brown et al. are broadly positive about China’s development, with engagement rather than containment the preferred US policy response.6 Others reject the conflation of a ‘rising’ China with a ‘dangerous’ China.7 What protagonists of both sides of the argument demonstrate in equal measure, however, is the tendency to assume that a single physical reality about China can be determined. This aim of classifying China as a threat (or indeed a non-threat) is a legacy of the historical dominance within IR of the overtly positivist neorealist and neoliberal schools.8 Positivist approaches to the discipline rely upon testable theory and empirical analysis with the expectation that the world can be definitively understood. The traditional influence of these approaches has precluded a more widespread appreciation of how, in fact, a single authoritative understanding about China is unachievable. The inherent contestability and subjectivity of judgments about that country was once noted by John King Fairbank who argued that ‘[a]t any given time the ‘‘truth’’ about China is in our heads’.9 From this understanding the existence (or absence) of a China threat cannot be satisfactorily explained with reference to material forces alone. The ‘threat’ described by Director Clapper can never be dispassionately observed through assessments of an external world, as he seemingly claimed to be able to do. The purpose of this article is not to speculate as to whether China ‘is’ or ‘is not’ a threat to the United States. It does not concern itself with China’s nuclear arsenal nor dispute the existence and expansion of its capabilities, or the possibility of there being a cause of future violence. It argues that while the material realities of China are important, the nature and extent of their importance is, and has always been, regulated by ideas. Of course, the understanding that international affairs are guided by more than the distribution of state capabilities is not original; it has long been a¶ primary contestation of the ‘critical’, or post-positivist, IR movement that the world is mutually constitutive of material and ideational forces.10 Moreover, authors including Evelyn Goh emphasise the centrality of ideas within Sino-US relations and to the formulation of US China policy at key moments.11 Chengxin Pan specifically examines the China ‘threat’ as a discursive construction and its importance to Washington’s relations with Beijing.12 Beyond these important works the discipline remains relatively quiet on the salience of ideational forces in producing a fantasised China ‘threat’ and in enabling US policies in response.13 It also broadly fails to explain how those policies themselves reinforce the understandings which make them possible in the first place. This is the arena of enquiry towards which the article is directed. It contributes to a small but growing literature which challenges the contours of the modern day China Threat Theory, exposing it as fundamentally flawed and even potentially dangerous. It does this by demonstrating that, in many respects, today’s China ‘threat’ to US security conforms to those which have emerged before. It shows how, across the duration of Sino-US relations, China ‘threats’ have always emerged in part from representation and interpretation and thus how fears about that country today continue to be manufactured and engineered in a way not unique from those of the (sometimes distant) past. In late 2011 the Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Asia Pacific.14 To a significant extent this ‘pivot’, as it is commonly described, is motivated by the growth of China. Accordingly, as increasing concentrations of US political, economic, and military recourses are diverted to the Asian region, American perceptions of China and their significance to the enactment of Washington’s foreign policies there have once more become increasingly pertinent. The first part of the article has two purposes. First, it explicates how it can be argued that the China ‘threat’ to US security is a subjective representation of American¶ society. It is explained that while the ‘dangers’ have an undeniable material base, China’s capabilities are attributed ideas which produce a threatening identity regardless of Beijing’s intentions. Second, it examines the significance of American representations to US China policy. It is asserted that particular discourses have always made true a threatening China and enabled and legitimised policy performances in response. It is also argued that those performances themselves have reaffirmed the identities of both China and the United States. As such, it is shown that US China policies function to protect the (equally imagined and socially constructed) American identity from which the ‘threat’ is produced. The second part of the article applies these arguments to three case studies: the mid-to-late nineteenth century when an influx of Chinese immigrants entered the United States; the early Cold War period following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and the modern day period when a ‘rising’ China is increasingly powerful and influential. These are the temporal moments at which ‘dangers’ from China to American security have been interpreted as the most immediate and acute. The article concludes with an overview of the findings and their implications for our understandings of, and potential approaches towards, the modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States.¶

#### Interrogations of the discourse around the Chinese Space Threat must come first – the threat is discursively constructed

Cameron PhD 18

Hunter Cameron, (PhD public policy), 2018, "The Rise of China in Space Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse," https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/183271194/Final\_Copy\_2018\_09\_25\_Hunter\_C\_PhD.pdf, // HW AW

The central theoretical and methodological starting point of this thesis is the contention that **discourses constitute social reality**. Norman Fairclough (1993: 3-4) argues that **discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or “constitute” them** … any discursive “event” (i.e. any instance of discourse) is seen as being simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice. As such, discourse analysis can be said to be both theory and method, ‘intertwined’ to such an extent that the method cannot be used without accepting a set of ‘basic philosophical premises’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 4). As per Fairclough in the excerpt above, a discursive approach rejects the need to find “real” social entities “out there.” Instead, social categories like “American,” “Chinese” and “threat” can be nothing more than the discourses which constitute them. This approach is inherently critical in that it begins from a position of scepticism about the fixed-ness of social reality. This is important for the scope of the research question as it means we cannot “discover” whether China is genuinely a threat to the United States in any objective sense (as might be meant in realist foreign policy analysis, for example). Instead, **this research project can only discover how China’s “rise” in space came to be understood as a “threat” to the US in a socially contingent, intersubjective sense.** As an influential group of critical constructivists argued in their work (Weldes et al 1999: 12), this perspective does not intend to convey the sense that threats are ‘purely a fabrication’ or that they ‘did not in fact exist,’ but rather that **threats do exist, albeit specifically that their existence is discursively constituted**.

## Case

#### All links on the K are independent DAs to the case—they ensure we can never find a peaceful solution to space militarization and US-China arms race and make conflict inevitable.

#### P5 is terminal defense to great power war

Lendon and Yeung 1-4-22

Brad Lendon and Jessie Yeung, 1-4-2022, "China, US, UK, France and Russia pledge to avoid nuclear war," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/04/world/p5-nations-nuclear-pledge-intl-hnk/index.html, // HW AW

Hong Kong (CNN)Five of the world's largest nuclear powers pledged on Monday to work together toward "a world without nuclear weapons" in a **rare statement of unity amid rising East-West tensions**. "**A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought**," said the joint statement, which was issued simultaneously by the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France. "As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons -- for as long as they continue to exist -- should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war." The statement also stressed the **importance of preventing conflict between nuclear-weapon states from escalating, describing it as a "foremost responsibility**." The statement comes as tensions between the world powers have risen to heights rarely seen in recent decades. In Europe, [Russia is massing troops along its border with Ukraine](http://www.cnn.com/2021/12/03/europe/ukraine-russia-2021-tensions-explainer-cmd-intl/index.html), raising alarms in Washington, London and Paris. And in Asia, increased [Chinese military activity around the self-governed island of Taiwan](http://www.cnn.com/2021/11/28/asia/taiwan-china-warplane-flights-intl-hnk-ml/index.html) has spiked tensions between Beijing and Washington and [its Pacific allies](http://www.cnn.com/2021/12/28/asia/japan-china-military-hotline-intl-hnk/index.html). The statement released by the five powers, also known as the P5, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, called on all states to create a security environment "more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all." US Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson, center, speaks during a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) conference in Beijing January 30, 2019. **The five pledged to adhere to the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which obligates them "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."** Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said Monday the five-nation statement was initiated by Moscow with the intention of it being released in coordination with a review of the NPT that was to begin on Tuesday in New York but has been pushed by the coronavirus epidemic in the US. "Given the importance and self-sufficiency of this joint statement, the nuclear powers decided not to delay its publication," Zakharova said, according to the official TASS news agency. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told TASS the statement "was **negotiated through diplomatic channels" and "comprehensively reflects the positions of the parties and the leaders.**" Top US general issues stark warning on China's hypersonic missile 02:06 Some of the text of the statement, including the pledges to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons, echoes a statement issued by the five nations after a December conference in Paris that laid the groundwork for the since delayed review of the treaty. And the statement that a nuclear war cannot be won was identical to language that the US and Russian Presidents, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, used after [their June summit in Switzerland](http://www.cnn.com/2021/06/16/politics/takeaways-from-biden-and-putin-summit/index.html). It was also the same language used by then-US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after their 1985 summit in Geneva. Russia is believed to have the world's biggest stockpile of nuclear warheads, with 6,255, followed closely by the United States at 5,550, according to the Arms Control Association (ACA). China (350), France (290) and the UK (225) round out the top five. Pakistan (165), India (156), Israel (90) and North Korea (40-50) also have nuclear weapons, according to the ACA, but are not party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The director-general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's arms control department, Fu Cong, said that Beijing remained committed to a policy of no first use and deterrence, despite modernizing its nuclear capabilities. "Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrence. They are not for war fighting. By saying that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought shows that this is an understanding shared by all the P5. So it is important that we have this in mind while we talk about the tension," said Fu when asked about tensions over Taiwan. "This applies everywhere and it applies with our bad relations with the US ... This is something that we hope could reduce tension, and it would help clarify certain misunderstandings," he added.

#### **China is not a threat- seven warrants.**

Dibb 15 (Paul, “Not So Scary: This is Why China’s Military is a Paper Tiger,” October 15, 2015, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/not-so-scary-why-chinas-military-paper-tiger-14085>. Paul Dibb is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian National University // EMS).

It’s becoming commonplace to drum up the military threat from China and belittle America’s military capabilities. Much of this commentary reminds me of statements in the mid-1980s that the former Soviet Union was poised to outstrip the U.S. in military power. This isn’t to argue that China is in the final stages of disintegration like the USSR, but it is to assert that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) demonstrates all the brittleness and paper-thin professionalism of a military that has never fought a modern war and whose much-vaunted military equipment has never been tested in combat.¶ With a slowing economy, and with structural economic and social tensions becoming worse rather than better, China is a large but fragile power ruled by a vulnerable party that can’t afford any economic or foreign policy disasters, let alone war with the U.S. Its economy is fundamentally interdependent with that of free international trade and global supply chains. War for China would be an economic and social disaster.¶ Moreover, Beijing has very few powerful or influential friends in the region and suffers from strategic isolation, which is growing worse the more it throws its weight around.¶ Beijing has no experience whatsoever of modern war. Its last experience of armed conflict was in 1979 when it abysmally failed to teach Vietnam a so-called ‘lesson’. Border scuffles with India and the USSR in the 1960s and sending peasant armies into the Korean War in the 1950s scarcely rate as modern combat.¶ The PLA’s power depends crucially on keeping the Communist Party in power, which is what its oath of allegiance declares, and not the defense of China as a country. PLA officers still waste inordinate amounts of time learning irrelevant communist dogma, rather than giving priority to military training. Then there’s the issue of corruption at the highest levels of the PLA and the buying of favors and promotions.¶ It’s true that in the last several decades the PLA has made some impressive strides technologically. But despite President Xi Jinping proclaiming that China must become a powerful maritime power, geography is against it. When was the last time a large land power really made it as a naval power? Certainly not the USSR, France or Germany.¶ Commentators in Australia repeat a lot of breathless assertions about China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities. And there can be no doubt that operating in the approaches to China is becoming more dangerous, particularly given the sort of military mass that China can accumulate close to home. But do we actually think that the Americans are sitting on their hands doing nothing technologically in areas such as hypersonic vehicles, railguns, stealth, drones and cyber-attack?¶ In key areas of military technology China is still a good 20 years behind the U.S. Its anti submarine warfare capability is marginal and many of its submarines are noisy. China lacks the necessary quieting and propulsion technologies to build anything remotely comparable to an U.S. or Russian nuclear submarine. Even the newest Chinese Jin-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines are louder than the 1970s era Soviet Delta III SSBN. And the forthcoming type 95 nuclear submarine will be louder than the late-1980s Soviet titanium-hulled Akula, according to U.S. sources.¶ China’s air defence capabilities have gaping deficiencies against any technologically advanced enemy. Moreover, China still relies heavily on Russia for military reverse engineering and supply of high-performance military jet engines, which it has failed to master for 30 years.¶ Beijing has made important strides with ballistic missile technologies, [but the DF-21 has never destroyed a naval target moving at battle speed](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-carrier-killer-really-threat-the-us-navy-13765). Moreover, [it relies crucially on intelligence satellites and long-range over-the-horizon radar for target acquisition](http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/17/breaking-the-kill-chain/). Those are soft targets and vulnerable to preemptive U.S. military strikes.¶ It isn’t clear in any case, according to the Pentagon, whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes against distant targets at sea.¶ As for China’s ICBM capabilities, such as the DF-5B with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), this is hardly a breakthrough nuclear technology. In 1974, as Head of the National Assessments Staff, I was briefed by the CIA about MIRVs on the Soviet Union’s SS-18 ICBM. That was remarkable technological advance 40 years ago.¶ There are some Chinese military officers and academics who are starting to brag about China’s nuclear war-fighting capabilities. While China has a reasonably secure second-strike capability, it’s one of the most vulnerable large powers to all-out nuclear war because of its population density and its distribution along the eastern seaboard. Just because China has a population 1.4 billion people doesn’t mean that it would survive a massive nuclear attack.That’s a strong argument, in my view, for the U.S. to keep a large nuclear attack force, both operational and in active reserve, of several thousand strategic warheads.¶ All this is to argue that we need to put China’s emerging military capabilities into some sensible comparative analysis with those of the U.S. and in historical context. We need to remember that the U.S. is the most innovative country in the world and isn’t standing still in the face of Chinese military advancements, many of which are seriously deficient.¶

#### No solvency – China’s ASAT program is a venture of China’s General Armaments Department

Fisher 7

Richard Fisher (senior fellow in Asian military affairs at the international assessment and strategy center), 1-11-2007, "China’s Direct Ascent ASAT," Strategy Center, https://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.142/pub\_detail.asp, // HW AW

It can now be concluded that the longstanding concern of many in the U.S. defense and intelligence community about China’s development of military space capabilities has been proven correct. Beginning with the first 1998 Congress-mandated Department of Defense report to the Congress on Chinese military modernization, the U.S. intelligence community has warned of Chinese interest in using high-power lasers to damage or even destroy U.S. satellites. However, none of the Pentagon reports acknowledged what was disclosed in September 2006 by the U.S. publication Defense News: China has actually fired lasers at U.S. satellites, amounting to "several tests over the past several years."[13] This report then says, "’The Chinese are very strategically minded and are extremely active in this arena," said one senior former Pentagon official. ‘They really believe all the stuff written in the 1980s about the high frontier and are looking at symmetrical and asymmetrical means to offset American dominance in space.’"[14] Indeed, Chinese analysts have long noted the deep dependence upon, and thus vulnerability of United States to attacks against its military space assets.[15] There is also an extensive Chinese literature on space warfare.[16] As the recent ASAT test demonstrates, China is actively preparing to contest military control of outer-space. Apparently, in recent years there has been some debate within the PLA over which service should control military-space[17], with recent reporting tending toward the future formation of anew and independent "Space Force" directly subordinate to the PLA’s leading body, the Central Military Commission.[18] Such an independent Space Force, according to these reports, would favor the CMC’s General Armaments Department, which currently controls all of China’s space activities, from manned Shenzhou space capsule missions to the January 11 ASAT test. The PLA Air Force has also been bucking for the space warfare job. It is worthwhile to consider what other systems China may employ for a future "Space Force." Inasmuch as China has used all of its unmanned and manned missions of its six Shenzhou manned space capsules to perform both civil and military missions, one has to consider that future Chinese space stations may also be outfitted to perform military missions.[19] At the 2006 Zhuhai show China revealed the most detailed model of its proposed Space Lab, about the size of the former Soviet era Salyut space station, some of which the Soviets armed with cannon and used for military missions. It would logical to expect that when China launches its space lab, and subsequent larger space stations, they could either initially fly with military equipment, or be given new module that could contain weapons or surveillance equipment when needed. China’s successful ASAT test also points toward another potential interest: developing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities. Many of the technologies needed to track target satellites and then kill them are applicable to shooting down faster intercontinental ballistic missile warheads. Indeed, China’s first ABM program dates back to the 1950s, when China started its ballistic missile program. China even developed prototype ABM missiles similar in configuration to the first generation U.S. Sprint ABMs. The ABM mission might be another for a potential PLA Space Force.

**Heg leads to endless war, prolif, terror, and authoritarianism.**

**Mearsheimer, PhD, 18**

(John, Government@Cornell, ProfPoliSci@UniversityOfChicago, The Great Delusion, 1-2, Yale University Press)

This **conventional wisdom is wrong**. Great powers are rarely in a position to pursue a full-scale liberal foreign policy. As long as two or more of them exist on the planet, they have little choice but to pay close attention to their position in the global balance of power and act according to the dictates of realism. Great powers of all persuasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in a bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great power. In these circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard-nosed behavior with liberal rhetoric. They talk like liberals and act like realists. Should they adopt liberal policies that are at odds with realist logic, they invariably come to regret it. But occasionally a liberal democracy encounters such a favorable balance of power that it is able to embrace liberal hegemony. That situation is most likely to arise in a unipolar world, where the single great power does not have to worry about being attacked by another great power since there is none. Then the liberal sole pole will almost always abandon realism and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Liberal states have a **crusader mentality** hardwired into them that is hard to restrain. Because liberalism prizes the concept of inalienable or natural rights, committed liberals are deeply concerned about the rights of virtually every individual on the planet. This universalist logic creates a powerful incentive for liberal states to get involved in the affairs of countries that seriously violate their citizens’ rights. To take this a step further, the best way to ensure that the rights of foreigners are not trampled is for them to live in a liberal democracy. This **logic leads straight to an active policy of regime change**, where the goal is to topple autocrats and put liberal democracies in their place. Liberals do not shy from this task, mainly because they often have great faith in their state’s ability to do social engineering both at home and abroad. Creating a world populated by liberal democracies is also thought to be a formula for international peace, which would not just eliminate war but greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the twin scourges of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. And lastly, it is an ideal way of protecting liberalism at home. This enthusiasm notwithstanding, **liberal hegemony will not achieve its goals, and its failure will inevitably come with huge costs**. The liberal state is likely to end up fighting endless wars, which will increase rather than reduce the level of conflict in international politics and thus aggravate the problems of **prolif**eration **and terrorism**. Moreover, the state’s militaristic behavior is almost certain to end up threatening its own liberal values. **Liberalism abroad leads to illiberalism at home.** Finally, even if the liberal state were to achieve its aims—spreading democracy near and far, fostering economic intercourse, and creating international institutions—**they would not produce peace**.

#### Cross-apply all case responses to the K—prove the China threat is constructed to justify US militarism.ß