## Word PIC

#### We will endorse the entirety of the 1AC - minus their usage of the term ‘developing’ countries, nations or otherwise.

#### (Insert 1AC example here)

#### The term is outdated, unnecessary, and Eurocentric, There is no consistent criteria to determine development, which means the aff has no reason to include it

**Abrahams ‘19**

(Jessica Abrahams, December 05, 2020, Abrahams received her grad degree in journalism from City University London and IR from Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. She was a writer, researcher and editor for multiple news sources including Prospect magazine, The Telegraph and Bloomberg News, is now an editor of Devex Pro, “Is it time to retire the term “developing country”?”, [https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/is-it-time-to-retire-the-term-developing-country-wto-united-nations-global-inequality //](https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/is-it-time-to-retire-the-term-developing-country-wto-united-nations-global-inequality%20//) HM)

Is South Korea—[the 12th biggest economy in the world](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?most_recent_value_desc=false)—a developing country? It is according to its status at the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganisation, which entitles the country to certain benefits in trade negotiations. Under pressure from the US, it announced in late October that it will no longer seek to make use of those benefits, though it declined to give up its . Other economic powers that still identify as developing, including China, are so far refusing to budge. It might seem surprising that some of the **richest countries** in the world are still **classified as developing**. But then again, pinning down the details of this nebulous term can be a challenge. Although most intergovernmental organisations use it as an official classification, few define what it means. And without a clear definition, it is arguably a term that has outlived its purpose. It might seem odd that the WTO relies on countries to self-designate. But the UN, which identifies 159 countries as developing, explains that “there is [**no established convention**](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc) **for** [this] **designation**… in the United Nations system.” It is largely based on the regional designations adopted as part of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, under which North America, Europe, Japan and Australia are considered “developed”—everyone else is developing. With a focus on the economic elements of developments, the International Monetary Fund is the most specific, [taking into account](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b) a country’s per capita income level, export diversification and degree of integration into the global financial system. But even then, it notes, its **classification system “is not based on strict criteria**, economic or otherwise” and offers only “a reasonably meaningful method of organising data.” Part of the issue is that most of these classifications were set decades ago, and much about **the world has changed.** If these categorisations were ever fit for purpose, it is not clear that they still are.

#### Development discourse forced by the West imposes ecocentrism, leading to over-exploitation of resources.

Irfan and Lamichhane 20

M.I Mohamed Irfan and Pukar Lamichhane; Faculty of Islamic Studies and Arabic Language South Eastern University of Sri Lanka, Central Department of Public Administration Tribhuwan University Nepal and World Health Organization Project Manager; “Understanding Development: Changing Concept and Impact on Developing Countries”; Kalam International Research Journal, Faculty of Arts and Culture at South Eastern University of Sri Lanka; April 13, 2020; <http://ir.lib.seu.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/123456789/5650/12.%20K2020%20-%2013(4)%20(114-128).pdf?sequence=1>; EMJ

In a retrospective look at the construction of Third World, it is explicit to understand how the language of Development has been used by the West for legitimizing its interventions over the Third World. Further these countries have been referred to in a variety of forms. Before they gained independence, they were called Backward countries and upon the gaining of independence, they became Emergent or New States. Afterwards they became Developing Countries in order to fit into the Western notion of universal development or alternatively as Underdeveloped countries in the terminology of dependency critiques. Accordingly, the concepts Third Word and Development are inventions of the economically rich nations of the West and thus, Escobar (1995) argued development has become a discourse; a particular mode of thinking and a source of practice designed to instill in underdeveloped countries the desire to strive towards industrial and economic growth. Even though the broad meaning of development is the promotion of the creativity of humans, economic growth is the primary criterion by which development is determined. That is why economics has become the master discipline of theory-building and policy formulation. In his retrospective look at development anthropology at the World Bank, Michael Cernea referred to the econocentric and technocentric conceptual biases of development strategies as profoundly damaging. These paradigmatic biases largely neglect history of civilization and the associated values. The latter were the essential elements of social harmony and the balance between man and nature. Econocentrism does not tolerate the equivalence of nature with man. Therefore, it attempts to surrender nature by means of destruction and over-exploitation. Material accumulation has been the primary goal of the econocentric and techno centric development approaches.

#### Multispecies exploitation heightens extinction pathways and rushes the inevitable extinction timer.

Thurner et. al 8-15-21

Stephanie D. Thurnera, Sarah J. Converseb, and Trevor A. Brancha; a School of Aquatic Fishery Sciences at University of Washington, bU.S. Geological Survey, Washington Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit, School of Environmental and Forest Sciences & School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences; “Modeling opportunistic exploitation: increased extinction risk when targeting more than one species”; *Ecological Modelling* Vol. 454; August 15, 2020; <http://ir.lib.seu.ac.lk/bitstream/handle/123456789/5650/12.%20K2020%20-%2013(4)%20(114-128).pdf?sequence=1>; EMJ

Although extinction itself may ultimately be inevitable, the rate at which it is occurring has been exacerbated by human activity (Bascompte, 2003). Compelling evidence shows that Earth's biota is amid its sixth mass extinction, and recent extinction rates are both unparalleled in human history and highly unusual in Earth's history (Baillie et al., 2004; Ceballos et al., 2015). Many major processes driving an increase in extinction rates are anthropogenic, including direct human exploitation, habitat loss, climate change, and introduced species (Diamond et al., 1989; Ichii et al., 2019; Keith et al., 2008; Purvis et al., 2000; Thomas et al., 2004). The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services identifies direct exploitation as the second most important driver of change in the global state of nature (Ichii et al., 2019), and biological resource use is listed as a threat for all 189 species listed as “extinct” or “extinct in the wild” on the IUCN Red List (IUCN, 2020). When exploitation is directly targeted on a single species, extinction is expected to be relatively uncommon (e.g. Grafton et al., 2007). This is because as population size decreases, search costs nearly always begin to outweigh revenue, except in obvious cases where species are extraordinarily valuable or can be easily exploited (e.g., dodos). Nevertheless, extinction and serious depletion have been reported for many exploited species, resulting in a variety of hypotheses that provide explanations for high extinction risks under single-species exploitation, including tragedy of the commons (Feeny et al., 1990, 1996; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999), economics of overexploitation (Clark, 1973; Grafton et al., 2007), the Allee effect (Allee, 1931; Stephens et al., 1999), and the anthropogenic Allee effect (Courchamp et al., 2006). Intrinsic biological factors that decrease mean individual fitness at low population sizes can also increase extinction risk, collectively termed the Allee effect (Allee, 1931; Stephens et al., 1999). Reproduction and survival can be diminished in small populations through numerous mechanisms, which include mate shortage, lack of cooperation, and genetic Allee effects such as inbreeding depression. In such cases, species can suffer reproductive failure at low densities, resulting in rapid extinction once the population falls below a minimum population size. This phenomenon has been blamed for the demise of passenger pigeons (e.g., Stephens and Sutherland, 1999). An allied hypothesis is the anthropogenic Allee effect, where instead of lower survival at low numbers, income from exploitation increases markedly at low numbers (Courchamp et al., 2006). The classic case is when rare products such as beluga sturgeon caviar become disproportionately valuable because of their rarity, allowing for profitable overexploitation. Examples of species experiencing anthropogenic Allee effects include spectacular butterflies sought by collectors, goat-antelopes (family Caprinae) sought by trophy hunters, geckos (Goniurosaurus luii) captured to be exotic pets, large game birds (Tetrao urogallus) impacted by ecotourism, and the Chinese bahaba exploited for its perceived medicinal value (Courchamp et al., 2006; Holden and McDonald-Madden, 2017). In short, sometimes people are prepared to pay exorbitant prices to hunt, collect, or own specimens of the rarest species. All preceding explanations assume single-species exploitation, but when exploitation directly targets more than one species, the number of extinction pathways expands. For example, when many species are exploited together (e.g., through fisheries trawling gear), attempting to maximize overall revenue causes some species to decline to low levels (e.g., Hilborn et al., 2012; Ricker, 1958). Three modes of exploitation can be distinguished depending on the relative value of the various species: accidental exploitation, where there is accidental by-catch while targeting a species with economic value (Hall et al., 2000; Rasmussen et al., 2011); incidental exploitation, in which a less-desirable species with lower economic value is exploited while pursuing a higher-value target species (Megalofonou, 2005); and opportunistic exploitation, where a rare species with high monetary value is stumbled upon during targeted exploitation of a more abundant, less valuable target species (Branch et al., 2013). Opportunistic exploitation allows for valuable, yet scarce, species (hereafter, rare species) to be exploited while profitably targeting another more common species, because there are reduced (or zero) search costs associated with exploitation of the rare species. Thus, in multispecies exploitation scenarios there is a continuum of extinction pathways from accidental exploitation to incidental exploitation to opportunistic exploitation as value of the vulnerable species increases relative to other targeted species. Of these three pathways, opportunistic exploitation is most problematic since this mode involves the greatest economic incentive to continue exploitation of the species most at risk (Branch et al., 2013). Consider the case where black rhinoceroses (Diceros bicornis) were hunted to extinction in the Luangwa Valley, Zambia, even though illegally poaching rhino alone was not profitable due to their rarity (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992). Hypotheses assuming only single-species systems cannot fully explain this extinction event. In this case, illegal poaching was profitable when elephants and rhinos were hunted together, and as rhinos became rare, elephants became the main target (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992). Thus, opportunistic exploitation contributed to the extinction of black rhinoceros in Zambia in the 1990s (Chomba and Matandiko, 2011).

## Abolish WTO CP

#### Text: The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government [opponent’s plan]

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

## Pharma DA

**Pharma profits are up from COVID vaccines, patent waivers threaten this**

**Buchholz 5-17-21**

(Katharina, https://www.statista.com/chart/24829/net-income-profit-pharma-companies/)

The profitability of coronavirus vaccines has been in the spotlight since U.S. President Joe Biden come out in support of temporarily lifting vaccine patents to make the production of the life-saving inoculations more financially feasible for poorer countries. EU leaders meanwhile remain divided over such a move. Company financial reports show that COVID-19 vaccine makers and developers like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca and BioNTech have seen their profits increase since the vaccine rollout, at times majorly. In early May, stocks of several companies that benefit from COVID-19 vaccine sales **took a nosedive on the news of Biden’s reversal**. Moderna stocks, for example, were still down more than 6 percent at close on May 5, the day of the announcement. Stocks recovered somewhat as German chancellor Angela Merkel came out against patent waivers the following day. While fluctuations in the stock market price have hurt drug makers in the **short term**, patent waivers would diminish the bottom line of companies involved with the development and production of COVID-19 **vaccines in the long term**. Pharma giants like Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer bring in billions of dollars of income every quarter from diverse sources, so the COVID bump was smaller for them. In the case of Pfizer, which has been a bigger producer than J&J, the year-over-year profit increase was a handsome 44 percent, however. For smaller AstraZeneca, the COVID year meant that its profits doubled. In the case of Moderna, the past year has turned a Q1 loss into a profit. The case is similar for German company BioNTech, which collaborated with Pfizer on its COVID vaccine. While Q1 2021 brought in a profit of $1.1 billion, the company ran a deficit since its founding in 2008 up until Q4 2020, when it posted a profit for the first time. The $446 million earned stood in contrast to losses of almost $428 million accrued in the first nine months of the year.

**Strong IP protection spurs innovation by encouraging risk-taking and incentivizing knowledge sharing -- prefer statistical analysis of multiple studies**

**Ezell and Cory 19** [Stephen Ezell, vice president & global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally] HWIC

IPRs Strengthen Innovation

Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that countries with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46

IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts.

Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.

The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

**Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror**

**Marjanovic and Feijao 20** [Sonja Marjanovic Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] HWIC

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

**That causes extinction, which outweighs.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of**state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

## Case

#### The WTO is a useless organization—any impacts triggered by its effective collapse should have already happened.

Okonjo-Iweala, 20

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The World Trade Organization is in the news mostly for the wrong reasons nowadays. Many people regard it as an ineffective policeman of an outdated rulebook that is unsuited for the challenges of the twenty-first-century global economy. And WTO members generally agree that the organization urgently needs reforming in order to remain relevant. Recent months have brought further challenges. The WTO’s appellate body, which adjudicates trade disputes among member countries, effectively [ceased functioning](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/world-trade-organization-revive-appellate-body-by-shang-jin-wei-and-xinding-yu-2019-12) last December amid disagreements regarding the appointment of new judges to the panel. And in May 2020, Director-General Roberto Azevêdo [announced](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/business/wto-chief-roberto-azevedo.html) that he would step down at the end of August, a year before his current term was due to end. Whoever Azevêdo’s successor is will face a major challenge. Since its establishment in 1995, the WTO has failed to conclude a single trade-negotiation round of global trade talks, thus missing an opportunity to deliver mutual benefits for its members. The Doha Development Round, which began in November 2001, was supposed to be concluded by January 2005. Fifteen years later, WTO members are still debating whether the Doha process should continue. Some think it has been overtaken by events, while others want to pursue further negotiations. The WTO has so far delivered disappointingly few other notable agreements as well, apart from the [Trade Facilitation Agreement](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm), which entered into force in February 2017, and the 2015 [decision](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/briefing_notes_e/brief_agriculture_e.htm) to eliminate all forms of agricultural export subsidies. Meanwhile, some of its members have worked together on a raft of much broader regional trade deals that cover pressing issues such as the digital economy, investment, competition, the environment, and climate change. The Doha Development Round, which was intended to modernize the WTO’s rulebook, covers very few of these topics. And even some of the organization’s existing rules can easily be circumvented, thereby upsetting the balance of rights and obligations among members. During the current COVID-19 crisis, for example, some countries have imposed questionable export controls on medical supplies and food products in order to mitigate shortages.

#### The economy is recovering now- it’s consistent with previous post-recession rebounds

Myles Udland·**Ancho**r, 8-2-20**21**, "Why an atypical recession has seen a typical recovery," No Publication, https://news.yahoo.com/a-typical-recovery-to-an-atypical-recession-morning-brief-090108479.html

The first look at [second quarter growth figures out last week](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/q2-2021-us-gross-domestic-product-economic-activity-163209383.html) had some good news and bad news. The bad news was that the economy grew slower than expected in the second quarter. The good news was that gross domestic product (GDP) — for the first time — eclipsed pre-pandemic levels. But in a note to clients published Friday, Oxford Economics' senior economist Bob Schwartz argued that this rebound to pre-COVID levels isn't exactly the flattering economic data point that it might seem at first blush. "The rapid first-half growth lifted the level of GDP above its pre-COVID level," Schwartz wrote. "That, in turn, underscored the attention-getting headlines that the economy has recovered all of its pandemic-related output losses, leading some to laud this as a V-shaped recovery. As important as that development may seem, we have to point out that there is nothing special about how fast the economy returned to its previous peak," the economist added. Schwartz noted that a 6-quarter period between the beginning of a recession and the recovery to pre-recession output is merely the average of the 9 prior recessions the U.S. economy has seen since 1953. It took the U.S. economy six quarters to recover its pandemic-related decline in output, a recovery that is on par with the average seen over the last 70 years. (Source: Oxford Economics) Moreover, Schwartz noted that real GDP, as of the second quarter of 2021, still remains below where potential GDP suggests output would be had there not been an economic downturn. And as Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell [said in his post-FOMC press conference last week](https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20210728.pdf), with just under 7 million fewer Americans working than in February 2020, "the labor market has a ways to go." Real GDP surpassed pre-pandemic levels for the first time in the second quarter, but total output is still below estimated trend growth for the economy had there been no recession in 2020. (Source: FRED) Of course, comparing this recovery to prior recessions does dull the senses a bit to how extraordinary the last 18 months of economic activity have been. As we learned last month, the pandemic-induced recession lasted just two months, according to the NBER, [the shortest downturn on record](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-us-economy-officially-exited-the-recession-in-april-2020-174103503.html). Additionally, the drop in real GDP stemming from the pandemic sent total economic output recorded in the second quarter of 2020 back to 2014 levels. Prior to the pandemic, the post-Financial Crisis drop in GDP — in which 2009 output fell to 2005 levels at the recession's nadir — had served as the deepest recession in modern times. In other words, the economy was set back 6 years by COVID-19; previously, we'd never seen the economy lose more than 4 years of growth. And as we've [previously noted in The Morning Brief](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/everything-is-happening-faster-now-morning-brief-091330925.html), when you deconstruct GDP by S&P 500 sectors, and look at how many are growing faster than before the pandemic, we see a recovery that is several years ahead of a typical schedule. And when one considers that an almost overnight shutdown of the global economy was followed by trillions of dollars in government support — which resulted in a consumer and corporate demand crush unlike any that investors or operators have seen in their careers — it is obvious that no one will get in trouble for calling this economic moment "unprecedented."

#### No great power competition or war – numerous factors.

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(Michael J., PublicPolicy@Maryland, Prof&MASecurityStudies@Gtown, SeniorAnalyst@RAND, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-05-29/not-great-power-competition, May 29) BW

The current structure of the international system is not fundamentally multipolar. It does show growing signs of multipolarity, in the reduced degrees of U.S. predominance and as several regional powers have become more assertive. Yet it also retains many elements of the post–Cold War period of unipolarity. Washington remains the predominant power for many reasons: its overall military superiority, its leading role in so many international organizations, its formidable set of treaty allies, and its ownership of the world’s dominant reserve currency are chief among them. At the same time, the emerging system has important elements of bipolarity: the United States and China are clearly first among equals, and their rivalry is likely to play a disproportionate role in shaping the course of world politics. Today’s world thus reflects a complex mixture of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar elements that does not match the classic vision of a colliding set of roughly equivalent great powers. Moreover, when states compete today, they do so mediated by institutions, rules, and norms that differ starkly from the conditions during most periods of true great-power competition. Most major powers today are firmly established industrial democracies that want stability and prosperity and harbor no meaningful territorial ambitions. A dense network of organizations, treaties, informal processes, and many other constraints regulates their relations. The postwar order, although imperfect, has produced the most highly institutionalized and norm-bound international system in history. Critically, this order is not imposed on an unruly set of troublemakers—it reflects deeply embedded economic preferences for peace, stability, and prosperity. The resulting relations between most leading powers look very little like the typical pattern during classical eras of great-power competition. Japan, for example, does not fear India. (Indeed, they are collaborating to balance Chinese power.) The European Union does not fear Brazil, which does not fear Mexico. Many of the world’s most powerful states belong in military alliances and political unions with one another; even those that do not are collaborating extensively in areas such as trade, information security, climate, and global development. The security problems of the emerging era come not from a set of mutually suspicious great powers but from a handful of partly revisionist states, led by Russia and China, unsatisfied with their status in the international system. The way those states express that dissatisfaction, moreover, differs significantly from the classic predominance of political-military forms of great-power competition. Because of the nuclear revolution, victorious wars of conquest are simply not a realistic option. No modern Russian Napoleon could imagine seizing the whole of Europe, because to do so would be to court nuclear annihilation. Beyond the effect of nuclear weapons, several factors—including the role of democracy, prosperity, and economic interdependence—have ushered in an age when military adventurism is strikingly rare. Today’s versions of rivalry and competition almost always play out in the economic, political, cultural, and informational spheres—not on the battlefield. This is not to say military power plays no role in current competitions. It surely does, as a means of coercion and a backdrop to other efforts. But this is a vastly different role than military power played, for example, for France, the Habsburg dynasty, Japan, or Prussia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Anyone seeking evidence need look no further than defense-spending levels of most major powers today, which have remained stubbornly low. The strategy of the United States’ leading rival—China—is therefore to advance its interests primarily through economic, geopolitical, and informational means. Military power certainly backs up some of China’s ambitions, such as in the South China Sea and in its belligerent posture toward Taiwan. But China’s activities today pale in comparison with earlier forms of great-power military aggression, which often involved existential threats to homelands—Germany’s fleet threatening the United Kingdom’s survival before World War I, Napoleonic France invading its neighbors, and the like. Whatever China’s objectives are today, they will not be served by a direct attack on other great powers.