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#### “China Threat” representations are rooted in fear and fantasy, not objective reality – they presume a false Western understanding of knowledge, for example 1AC Xiu and Singer saying that China is “tech stealing”. Pan 12

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China Watching and Contemporary Geopolitics of Fear and Fantasy,” Elgarblog—Edward Elgar Publishing’s social sciences blog, December 12th, Available Online at <http://elgarblog.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/china-watching-and-contemporary-geopolitics-of-fear-and-fantasy-by-chengxin-pan/>, Accessed 10-03-2014)

In The Geopolitics of Emotion (2009), the French author Dominique Moïse describes how the world is being shaped and transformed by a host of emotions: fear, humiliation and hope, to name but a few. While the world has always been emotion-laden, the geopolitics of emotion has been particularly on vivid display in the twenty-first century. Climate change, the ‘September 11’ attacks, the lingering global financial crisis, the perceived unstoppable power shift from West to East, refugee and humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict and popular uprisings have together brought into sharp relief a mixture of anxiety, anger, frustration, disillusionment, hatred and fear in many parts of the globe. In the West in general, and the US in particular, a key source of anxiety has been China’s seemingly relentless rise. There is now ‘a cauldron of anxiety’ about this emerging giant, former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick proclaimed in 2005. To many Western observers, this fear, based on objective knowledge of China’s rise, is warranted. As an authoritarian state with the world’s fastest growing economy and one of the largest military forces, China seems to be nothing but a frightening giant on the horizon. Clearly, one cannot deny China’s vast size, enormous economic power and military potential. But the fact that the almost equally impressive rise of India has not attracted the same level of anxiety is revealing. If anything, India has been embraced with much enthusiasm and affection of late. In this sense, ‘objective’ knowledge, empirically grounded though it may seem, is nevertheless inseparable from emotion and desire. One might even say that what we know is often what we want to know. Thus, a significant portion of Western knowledge on China, gained apparently through the respected intellectual activity of China watching, has less to do with China and more with Western desire (a subject which has thus far attracted little attention). The familiar ‘China threat’ argument, for instance, is not so much an objectively verified fact as it is a fear-inspired speculation disguised as ‘knowledge’. To substitute for the lack of positive certainty about China’s trajectory, this knowledge is produced through fear, which helps provide a negative form of certainty, namely, threat. During the Cold War, an Australian China observer commented that ‘What we do not know we fear’. That habit did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Today, the Australian government vows to boost its China literacy in the Asian Century, but all the while it is acutely wary of China’s intention and military might, citing the usual reason that China is not yet transparent. Sharing this China anxiety with US policy-makers, Canberra has recently beefed up its military ties with Washington, as exemplified by allowing 2 500 US marines to train in Darwin and passing the US-Australian Defence Trade Treaty. There is nothing wrong with feeling anxious about China. After all, the Chinese themselves may have been caught by surprise by the speed of their country’s ascendancy on the world stage, and many are grappling with the meanings and implications of China’s new global role. Meanwhile, aware of unease felt by neighbouring countries, the Chinese leadership has tried to reassure the rest of the world that China’s rise will be peaceful. Yet, this ‘reassurance’ policy has done little to ease that fear, for the latter has become interwoven with the expert knowledge of the ‘China threat’ offered by some quarters of the China watching community. This fear-induced China knowledge, now compounded by the widespread anxiety about impending US/Western decline, has in part given impetus to the Obama administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ to Asia. Although the US constantly denies that this strategic move aims at containing China, its unease with Beijing’s perceived growing clout has been at least one of its main driving forces. Interestingly but not surprisingly, despite their belonging to the opposite sides of the American partisan politics, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney both share this latent fear about America’s future as well as China’s ambition. Neither wants to see the widely anticipated Asian (Pacific) Century become a Chinese, rather than American, century. Herein lies America’s new geopolitics of fear, following the decade-long ‘War on Terror’. But as the focus of this new geopolitical game turns to China and the Asia Pacific at large, fear is not the only emotion at play. Fantasy, as it may be called, is another, and perhaps even more enduring, emotional underpinning of the US’s Asia Pacific strategy. From the American business community’s ‘Bridge the Pacific’ campaign in the late nineteenth century through Ronald Reagan’s ‘America is a Pacific nation’ declaration to Bill Clinton’s ‘Pacific Century’ statement, the Pacific has long been envisaged as an American Lake and a new frontier in the US’s ‘manifest destiny’ to lead the world from darkness to light. At the heart of Oriental darkness has been China, marked by its backward civilisation, despotic political system, and deplorable human rights records. Therefore, the dream of transforming the Oriental Other in American image has run deeply through US China-engagement policy ever since the missionaries’ ‘Christ for China’ campaign, business executives’ ‘Oil for the lamps of China’ slogan, and more recently, the ‘constructive engagement’ policies of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Considering that modern China studies and, by extension, contemporary China watching, owe much to the missionary writings on China, it is clear that fantasy or a desire to see ‘a huge country with an ancient civilization transforming herself into a modern, democratic, Christian nation and following the lead of the United States’ has been part and parcel of contemporary China research agenda, although the terminology has been changed from religious conversion of China to economic and institutional integration as well as normative socialisation. Despite the intellectual, commercial and strategic efforts of engaging China, America’s China dream, now as then, proves to be elusive. As a result, a large part of the China fantasy has turned into disillusionment and even fear. In this context, the US’s ‘Rebalancing’ to Asia and its hedging against China represent a new and more sophisticated manifestation of the geopolitics of fear and fantasy. While no doubt many China observers are busy observing the fascinating new geopolitical manoeuvring in the Asia Pacific, they could do well to also critically observe the role of their China knowledge – strongly coloured by fear and fantasy – in the making of this strategic shift that is likely to profoundly shape global politics in the coming decades.

#### Energy security organizes the world as infinite violence being naturally deployed for finite resources—look at 1AC Magnuson saying that China “weaponizes rare earth” minerals

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In addition to considerations about "balance of power," the South China Sea is closely related to considerations of so-called energy security. This notion "energy security," as an important component of "economic security," **argues for using diplomatic/military means to secure access to energy**-resource deposits and transportation of energy, in particular, oil and gas. The significance of the South China Sea embodies oil-and-gas security concerns for two basic reasons. One, the South China Sea waters are a gateway for oil and natural gas transportation from the Persian Gulf and Indonesian islands to Japan, the United States, and increasingly China. Two, the South China Sea itself is an area with potential deposits of oil and natural gas in the seabed. For these two reasons, China, according to the realist logic, should rationally compete with the United States and other powers to influence the use, if not control, of the South China Sea waters. Hence, the concern about "energy security." [19] The significance of transportation was discussed in the preceding section. Suffice it to say here that what makes the South China Sea a security concern is the fear of having one power (China, in particular) influence/control access through the waterways than actual hazards for transportation. Regarding the potential deposits of oil and gas in the South China Sea seabed, Mark J. Valencia's summary of the politics of science is revealing. According to Valencia, China and the Philippines have in recent years made the most optimistic predictions about the oil and gas potential in the South China Sea. International oil companies, which conduct their own geological surveys of the area, are generally pessimistic, partly as a negotiation tactic; these negotiations are often geared to ex tract concessions from governments, and the governments, in turn, that wish to materialize their claims to territorial sovereignty by entering into joint exploration projects. [20] More and more scholars, after studying the history of exploration and comparing the "scientific" data presented, are coming to view the "oil rich Spratlys" as more a fiction than science. [21] For the governments that claim sovereignty over the South China Sea waters, however, it is important to keep the fiction alive. In East Asia and other parts of the world, through the granting of hydrocarbon concessions in disputed ocean areas to international oil corporations, a claimant state makes a declaration of its determination to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, by way of such "commercial" acts, such states make use of an international energy operator to assist in resisting diplomatic pressures from other claimant states. Clearly, the diplomatic/political posturing behind such joint exploration projects in part explains the huge gaps in "scientific findings" about oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea. Of the six claimant states, China and the Philippines are in re cent years most active in pursuing/reiterating their respective claims, and, naturally, predictions made by scientists associated with these two states are optimistic: they are politically significant. The predictions help to aid governments in justifying investing military/diplomatic resources to keep their claims alive, and, by extension, their claims to future access to whatever lies in the deepwater areas. The notion of "energy security" is at the same time a **powerful cognitive tool for realist researchers** to argue for guarding against military actions to solidify one government's claims (those of China, in particular) to ownership of the energy resources. Such reasoning departs from knowledge about the growth of the Chinese economy and its increasing dependence on "offshore" sources of oil and gas. That dependence, then, can be used as justification for modernizing the Chinese armed forces (the navy, in particular), which in turn are meant first to safeguard and then to defend Chinese claims to ownership of energy in the deep seabed. [22] Like wise, arms races by states in the region are either justified or understood **through the prism of energy security.** What the realist arguments about "energy security" in the area downplay in interpreting history and predicting the future is that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has opened up vast areas of oil deposits in the former Soviet republics for exploration. Expressed concerns about threats from China to global energy, mean while, are also but remotely related to realities. The Chinese government's oil-and-gas development strategy for the next twenty years is to focus on its interior regions and the area immediately off the Pearl River Delta. [23] More importantly, "geology-based assessments of the oil and gas resources of the world" have changed from the 1980s through the 1990s largely due to "an evolving understanding of world recoverable oil and gas resources rather than to procedural or philosophical changes." [24] That "philosophical" continuity refers to, more than anything else, an ideology to achieve as much "energy independence" as possible, lest oil, gas, and other forms of energy fall into "enemy hands." That same philosophy explains the Chinese government's choice of continuing to rely on domestic coal as the dominant fuel, in spite of coal's environmental costs. [25]

In short, the promotion of the South China Sea as a priority area where the world's "energy security" is under threat seems to be based less on facts than on preparing for the future unknown--the same logic used in arguments for military preparedness. It **serves to legitimate military strategies for maintaining/upgrading the arsenals of destruction in the region.**

#### Catastrophe scenarios program us affectively to accept violence and dehumanization

Evans And Reid, PhD’s, 14

(Brad, International Studies @ Bristol, Julian, International Politics @ Lapland, Resilient Life: The art of Living Dangerously)

Anybody who has experienced immunization will appreciate the violence of the encounter. The whole process begins with the awareness of some vaguely looming threat which promises in the worst case an extremely violent ending. To pre-empt this happening, the subject is physically penetrated by the alien body with a controlled level of the lethal substance which, although producing violent sickness, is a fate less than death. Such violence unto oneself offers to counter violence with violence such that life may carry on living in spite of the dangers we are incapable of securing ourselves against. It is to give over to a form of self-harm albeit in a way that is actively desired and positively conceived. How else may we live otherwise? Resilience follows a similar logic. It encourages that we partake in the violence of the world to keep death at bay. For in the process of learning to live through the insecurity of the times, the subject is asked to incorporate the catastrophic intellectually, viscerally and affectively, thereby providing certain immunization against a more endangering fate. Indeed, since the ultimate litmus test is to bring to question the worst case scenario, the future cannot appear to us as anything other than completely monstrous. What, however, is actually slain as the future is wagered by the violence of the present may only become revealed with the passage of time. None of this operates outside of the realm of power politics. We only have to consider here (a) the moral judgements and political stakes associated with HIV as a pandemic that is more than simply biological, and (b) the development of viral analogies to explain more generally the problems ‘infecting’ societies from terror to criminality to evidence the point. Immunization is precisely about exposing oneself to something that is potentially lethal, thereby raising the threshold level for existence such that violence is normalized on account of our vulnerabilities to that which may be tempered but remains undefeatable. We are drawn here to Stellan Rye's (1913) silent horror movie The Student from Prague (Der Student von Prag) which has inspired a number of compelling literary and cinematic classics. In this tragic tale of poverty and violence, the impoverished student, Balduin, makes a bargain with the Devil as he exchanges the reﬂection of image for more immediate compensations. Upon eventually seeing himself, however, the student is avenged by an angry double that begins to wreak havoc as it seeks out revenge in light of its betrayal. Following an eventual violent confrontation the student has with his double, Balduin shatters the mirror that is central to the plot, and invariably destroys the fantasy of endangerment which also became the source of his afflicted curse. Inevitably, however, since the double was an essential element of this Faustian agreement, in killing the violent double, so the student kills himself. Otto Rank famously related this to the narcissistic self whose very sense of loneliness and alienation is caused by an anguish of a fear of death; even though it is precisely the violence of the pact which pushes the subject further towards the precipice. Whilst it is tempting to read this in familiar dialectical terms, there is a more sophisticated double move at work here, as the violence is already encoded within the initial act of demonic violation before the tragic encounter. For the double merely highlights the self-propelling tendency, from the fantasy of endangerment to the reality of the catastrophic. There is also a semantic interchange at work in Rye's Doppelganger as it stakes out the choice between a violated/violent life and eventual death. Since reason or logic prove utterly incapable of explaining the condition of Balduin's existence, let alone offering any promise of salvation from the oppressive situation to which he is fatefully bound, the double serves as an important metaphor for the narcissism of the times, as the subject wilfully accepts a violation and all the violence this entails in exchange for an illusion or fantasy of security which proves in the end to have been imbued with the catastrophic from the outset. Our understanding of the fundamental tenets of violence is invariably transformed such that we are forced to think about forms of violation/ intervention prior to any sense of dialectical enmity. Premetic Violence René Girard's thesis Violence and the Sacred offers a theory of violence that is exclusively bound to the desire to ‘overcome’ tragedy. To develop this theory, Girard speciﬁcally relates to the classic Greek play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, which he uses to illustrate the relationship between tragic dispossession and violence. It is through the tale of Oedipus and his return to reclaim the realm from which he was abandoned that we uncover a genesis of sacriﬁcial violence that is linked to some ‘past tragedy’.3\_9 Oedipus thus epitomizes the motif of the lost prince whose modes of contestation can be understood through competing claims to the ‘same object of desire: The story follows that when two uncompromising entities vie over the same object of desire, violence necessarily erupts. Through Girard's decoding of the Oedipus myth, what we therefore ﬁnd is any attempt to re-possess the object of desire necessarily requires the guilt of those currently in possession - a sacriﬁcial victim. Thus, to overcome tragedy one must come from the ‘outside’ - a violently destined return that can only be justiﬁed by making a claim to the original sin, or what Girard terms a return to the ‘original scene: However, as Sophocles tells it, such violence is more than simply a reclamation of that which has been taken. The violence of the already dispossessed desires to re-establish the authentic order which has been falsely appropriated - the paradise lost. Importantly, for Girard, such violence is not a relation of difference but is more deﬁned by the logic of mimesis: ‘At ﬁrst, each of the protagonists believes that he can quell the violence; at the end each succumbs to it. All are drawn unwittingly into a violent reciprocity - which they always think they are outside of, because they all initially came from outside and mistake this positional and temporary advantage for a permanent and fundamental superiority.40 Plunging into an opposition which ‘reduces the protagonists into a uniform condition of violence’, all claims to ‘difference’ are effectively ‘eclipsed’ by ‘a resurgence of reciprocity.41 It has been common to read Rye's doubling as a clear example of mimetic behaviour. This has found clear applications from Hegelian-inspired revolutionary accounts of dialectical reasoning, to Frantz Fanon's theory of (post)colonial brutality, onto the exceptional violence of Schmitt's sovereign decisionism. While accepting how this logic has played a structural role in the demar- cation of certain regimes of violence which came to hallmark distinct marks of separation, we need to depart from this logic if we are to make sense of the violence of the catastrophic imaginary. What, in other words, becomes of violence once we reconceptualize the idea of the original scene and its logics of exposure such that violence itself becomes virtually ordained? That is to say, what becomes of violence once it begins to precede any dialectical arrangement? Mimetic violence, we have noted, is obj ectiﬁable. Based upon establishing various forms of mystical foundations, it has a distinct materiality to it that permits clear lines of demarcation and embodiment. These work both spatially and temporally. The object for violence is locatable, while the time of its occurrence offers clear (if sometimes contested) conceptions as to its beginning and ending. It beneﬁts, then, from the guarantees of identiﬁcation and the ability to represent that which must be vanquished at a given moment ‘in timei The virtual nature of the violence endured by the resilient subject offers no such guarantees. Collapsing the space-time continuum of mimetic rivalry, it is merely projected into the future without the prospect of bounce-back. Internalized, however, into the very living conditions of the subject now permanently under siege, the violence is no less real. As any author of horror ﬁction will tell, the mind can be a terrifying place to inhabit. Once the source of endangerment becomes unknowable by deﬁnition, everything becomes the potential source of a violent encounter. Resilience challenges the logic of mimetic violence, therefore, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it shows us that our only way of dealing with endangerment is to absorb its lethal tendencies. That which has the potential to destroy must become part ofsociety's make-up and its epistemic fabric. We too, in the process, become more lethally endowed as a result. Invariably, the more lethal we become, the more we end up embracing the biophysical conditions of our potential undoing as a principle form of human conditioning. The body accepts the lethality on account of preparedness. Secondly, there is an outward projection against that which could potentially threaten our existence. But this projection doesn't connect to any mimetic rival. We have no clear sense of what it is that so endangers in its particular guise, only a generalizable indication that something which is part of the integral whole will eventually bring about our ﬁnal demise. Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable mineﬁeld of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to detonate, along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic topography. But what does it mean to say that violence is now beyond representation? And what type of reality are we producing if we are calling into question the depths of ﬁeld that once gave qualitative and quantitative meaning to our relations to violence? For Paul Virilio, whose work we may connect to the premetic, this inaugurates ‘the futurism of the instant’ whose kairos shatters all metaphysical meaning: This spells disorientation in knowledge acquired over the course of millennia regarding the spatial environment and the cycle of seasons; an integral accident in knowledge of history as well as of the usual concrete geography that goes with it, the unity of place and time of a secular history. No doubt this is the fatal novelty of the historic tragedy befalling humanity and a progress that will no longer be exclusively technologistical and extra-planetary, but merely human, ‘all too human’. Masochism vis-a-vis an abhorred past that no longer passes muster is now symmetrically doubled with a masochism in relation to a future where, for want of fear, we will, this time, have space, all the space of a miniscule planet reduced to nothing, or as good as, by the progress of our discoveries.2 Nihilism Unbound Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.E Nietzsche's intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirabilityiﬁ Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of afﬁrming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reducible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the afﬁrmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselveaﬁ Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self- annihilation. Central to Nietzsche's thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.4i Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illusionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant's Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant's universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as ﬁnite beings - imperfections that signiﬁcantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more afﬁrmative form of meta- physics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this ﬁnite being that must think through the transcendental imaginationfﬂ In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant's thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of ﬁnitude, even though the ﬁnite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difﬁcult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject's existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our ﬁnite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life and death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded: For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament ﬁlters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency. (111-17)

#### The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08

(Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

#### Judges in debate are academics, not political scientists—plan desirability isn’t offense or even a relevant concern, you should prioritize epistemological interrogation. Zambernardi, 15

University of Bologna (Lorenzo, “Politics is too important to be left to political scientists: A critique of the theory–policy nexus in International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 1–21, April 2015, dml)

There are two main reasons why the notion of applied social science still appears to be unsound. The first one has to do with **the need for policymaking to rely on some degree of prediction** (Chernoff, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 436; Merton and Lerner, 1951: 304). As Herbert Simon (2001: 32, 60) explained, while ‘basic’ science describes the world and makes generalizations about collected phenomena, ‘applied’ science is grounded on the predictive power of the knowledge we possess.6 Indeed, choosing one policy rather than another means having some expectations about the effects of the policy itself. As Bueno de Mesquita (2009) rightly contends, **you can shape and engineer the future** only if you are able to make accurate predictions**.** However, **even if one overlooks the fact that IR scholars have** systematically tried (Gaddis, 1992–1993: 10)7 but failed **to predict major events** such as the Iranian Revolution, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the Arab Spring, **available studies show that experts are not much better at predicting future outcomes than common people**. In his Expert Political Judgment, Philip Tetlock (2005) has shown that experts, largely political scientists, area study specialists and economists working in academic and non-academic institutions, are not very good at predicting future developments. They are better than the ‘unwashed masses’ (i.e. Berkeley undergrads), but no better than relatively simple statistical procedures and attentive readers of newspapers. Moreover, Tetlock found that knowledge of a specific issue might make one a better forecaster, but **being a specialist can actually reduce the ability to predict future developments**: ‘we reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly’ (Tetlock, 2005: 59). That leads to a paradoxical situation in which **more knowledge means** a lower capacity of being a reliable forecaster. Tetlock’s conclusion is quite depressing for those scholars who wish to influence policymaking: In this age of academic hyper-specialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals — distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on — are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations. (Tetlock, 2005: 233)8 If the ability to predict is a necessary requirement for an applied science but IR scholars are only slightly better at predicting than the general public, why should they be credited with a privileged epistemological standpoint in the policymaking process? Here, I am not suggesting that policymakers can master political subjects better than scholars; as Henry Nau (2008: 636) points out, ‘neither profession can make a superior claim to social knowledge.’ Nor do I contend that prediction is impossible. In fact, some limited prediction is possible but, again, experts of international politics are not much better at forecasting than practitioners and laypeople. Although failure to predict might not pose any problems for a scientific study of politics — as explaining (Keil, 2010; Lepgold and Nincic, 2001: 89; Singer, 1990: 74) or scenario analysis (Bernstein et al., 2000) can be sufficient goals9 — it **does have** detrimental implications **for a social science that** aspires to advise, drive and change politics. Advising, designing and planning are all based on the assumption that social scientists are much better at prediction than the general public. Yet, such a claim is, at present, unsubstantiated. The second reason why the argument for an applied IR theory seems misguided is concerned with the issue of the knowledge generated within the discipline. In particular, there is no agreement among scholars about what we know and how international politics works. Even if we neglect the problems concerning prediction and go for a pragmatic attitude to political knowledge — an attitude by which the latter is simply what investigators agree upon (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009; Peirce, 1992[1878]: 138–139) — **scholars do not agree about what we know and about the best means to reach political goals**. Interestingly, disagreement on these important areas can be found not only between different epistemological approaches, but also among like-minded scholars working within the same theory of knowledge and even within the same school, tradition, research programme or paradigm. The problem lies not solely in the fact that there are several theories aiming to explain one and the same political phenomenon, but rather in the fact that it has become impossible to establish the scientific validity of the knowledge produced in the discipline. Despite the presence of agreed-upon rules to determine theory acceptance (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Christensen and Snyder, 1997; Elman and Elman, 2002; Hopf, 1998; Lake, 2013; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997), there is still sharp disagreement on the progress of IR. Indeed, the widespread (though not universal10) adoption of the criteria suggested by Imre Lakatos (1970) — the methodology of scientific research programmes — has not generated consensus on the progress in terms of knowledge achieved by the discipline. If some of the main theorists of some of the main schools of IR claim that their research programmes are all progressive (Di Cicco and Levy, 2003; Keohane and Martin, 2003; Lee Ray, 2003; Moravcsik, 2003) and, therefore, all scientific and cumulative, then one could infer that none of them is probably truly progressive, at least in Lakatos’s terms. For Lakatos, judgement on progress is not simply a contest between theory and empirical evidence, but rather a three-cornered contest between competing theories and empirical evidence. Moreover, besides awarding a promising future to their research programmes, some of these scholars have also claimed that their rivals’ theoretical programmes are ‘degenerative’ and, thus, outside the scope of science (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997). Thus, not only do meta-theoretical debates about epistemology and ontology appear irresolvable (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a: 417), but so are empirically testable questions rarely resolved. Indeed, there is no consensus on what causes war, on the economic and political sources of democracy, on when states should intervene abroad, and on other major issues concerning international politics. The debate over these questions seems interminable.11 The fact that strong disagreement also exists in the hard sciences is not good news for IR theory. Although scientific research always implies the assumption of fallibility and the knowledge produced is often subject to change, that does not mean that the natural and social sciences are essentially identical. Dismissing the differences in accuracy, prediction and control between the natural sciences and social sciences as ‘mere matters of degree’ is an old but untenable strategy in order to defend the scientific study of politics (Crick, 1959: 218). Indeed, **differences in degree might soon turn into differences in kind**. The modest success of IR theory in developing a body of policy-relevant knowledge barely comparable to the one generated by the natural sciences suggests that the so-called scientific method has not yet been able to produce remarkable results when employed in the study of international politics. Hayek’s and Morgenthau’s critiques of applied social science still appear to be valid, though many students of international politics think and write that such an unsuccessful record does not question the possibility of an applied political science. If no theory or method can deliver any truly predictive knowledge of international politics, then policy must be insensitive to theoretical and empirical findings. This is why, despite being concerned with relevant political issues and emphasizing any potential dangers and mistakes, **IR theory** should not directly inform policy. French statesman Georges Clemenceau famously remarked that ‘war is too important to be left to the generals.’ Paraphrasing Clemenceau, I would argue that politics is too important to be left to political scientists. Suggesting that policies are to ignore scientific conjectures, however, does not imply that there should be no role for IR theory and no point in theorizing about international politics and foreign policy. **Being practically relevant does not equate to directly affecting policy**. The argument developed here does not deny the importance of IR scholarship, which, far from claiming any direct influence of a scientist kind, can have practical relevance in two different functions. The first one refers to the role of theory in political judgement. In particular, I would argue that **theory is an important tool for** the intellectual development of policymakers. From this viewpoint, no broad line of demarcation should be drawn between the practitioner and the scholar. The second function, on the other hand, is concerned with IR scholarship as a whole and involves its unintended effects on policymaking. Such influence is indirect, yet no less important. Here, I contend that a broad line of demarcation should be drawn between decision-making and IR theory. Despite the fact that these two implications might appear to be inconsistent at first sight, as I will try to show in the next two sections, they tend to reduce the scholar’s role but not the function of scholarship. IR as a tool of self-education While, at present, point prediction appears impossible in international politics, what about the most common type of forecasting in social science — that is, probabilistic predictions? Apart from Bueno de Mesquita perhaps, no scholar would claim to have developed the right formula for forecasting future outcomes. Proponents of statistical models, for example, would argue that the predictions they make are probabilistic and the variables they employ are ‘probability-raisers’ (Grynaviski, 2013: 824). In relation to the theory–policy nexus, however, **facts and figures cast in probabilistic terms** cannot solve the dilemmas of policy. Although scholars might be content with knowing that there is a certain relationship between variables, policymakers cannot act according to probabilistic propositions in the particular, individual cases that they have to face. In matters of war and peace, for instance, where many lives may be at stake, **the error term is** something that cannot be ignored: ‘How, for example, can the cost of thinking rather too well of a particular speculation within pure theory be compared to the pain, sufferance and death which follow errors in the application of theory?’ (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 34). Practitioners are not interested in distinguishing between approximations and exact results not because they fail to understand the epistemological limits of the social sciences and the complex nature of political reality, but because they often face issues and circumstances that are unique. Since a variable ruled out of a theory on account of its rare or scarce influence on a particular phenomenon might have a major effect under specific circumstances, generalizations are of little help to practitioners. Likewise, knowledge of causal mechanisms and processes, highly valuable for understanding how variables are connected to one another, does not solve the problem of whether the case that a policymaker is facing is either a particular case of a general class of events or a contingency characterized by unique features.12 Thus, general propositions about causal chains and mechanisms are also of limited use for policymaking. As George and Bennett (2004: 277) acknowledge: ‘No theory or systematic generic knowledge can provide policy specialists with detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action in each contingency that arises. **Such policy-relevant theory and knowledge** does not exist **and** is not feasible.’ By clarifying the problems and risks involved in certain situations, theory can contribute to informing policy. However, scientific knowledge cannot replace political deliberation; many instances in international politics are so unique that the idea that generalizations can be employed to conduct foreign policy appears misguided.13 What ‘makes men foolish or wise, understanding or blind, as opposed to knowledgeable or learned or well informed’, writes Isaiah Berlin (1999: 24), ‘is the perception of these unique flavours of each situation as it is, in its specific differences.’ To these ‘unique flavours’, IR conceived as a scientific enterprise has not much to offer. Good political judgement might not be illusory; the illusion is to think that judgement can be replaced with rational calculation or probabilistic inference. Acting on the highest probabilities available, indifference to the ‘particular’ and blindness to the individual circumstances **is a very dangerous path to take** in international politics. Thus, **it is necessary to understand** the nature**,** the structure **and** the issues **of a particular context** regardless of universal formulas and general rules. As Isaiah Berlin (1999: 45) argued: What makes statesmen, like drivers of cars, successful is that they do not think in general terms — that is, they do not primarily ask themselves in what respect a given situation is like or unlike other situations in the long course of human history... Hence, every situation must be understood in its own distinctiveness and a particular decision should not be the rigid application of a mathematical formula, but rather **a deliberation** based on critical reflection **over the specific situation in which one needs to act.**

## Case

#### All the links are independent DAs to the case—they ensure that real, transformative solutions to international crises can never come to pass. They only ensure failed militaristic policies to serve US interests, which cause the impact scenarios they seek to prevent.

### Contention One

#### China links on the K turns case

Pan 4—prof school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in pol sci and IR. (Chengxin, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics,” 1 June 2004, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html, AMiles)

For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side." (94) And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

#### SCS and Taiwan won’t escalate – the greatest danger is threat inflation creating a self fulfilling prophecy. This takes out their advantage one and links back to the K. Tier 14

Tier 14 – (David Tier is a Major in the U.S. Army and serves as a strategic plans and policy officer. He is an Airborne Ranger-qualified graduate of Harvard, a three-time combat veteran of Iraq and commanded a cavalry troop in combat for 12 months; Spring 2014, Published in The Quarterly Journal, “The Waning Grand Strategy of Democratization: Why a Pivot to the Asia-Pacific Places the United States at Greater Risk of Terrorist Attack,” <http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/180011/ichaptersection_singledocument/c2e3ea94-2e66-463f-96f1-2557d3d48b2d/en/03.pdf>)

Unlike the fundamentally opposed interests between the former Cold War blocs, China's potential conflicts with the U.S. do not threaten each other's existence. They do not have the world teetering at the brink of nuclear war between superpowers holding competing ideologies. Most of China's potential conflicts are localized territorial disputes with its neighbors. Disputes with Taiwan may have existential implications for the two regimes directly concerned, but this dispute does not threaten vital U.S. national interests. Chinese developments such as the "carrier-killing" DF-21, anti-satellite technologies, and cyber capabilities are intended to support operations in these types of conflicts, not blue-water warfare on the high seas. Accordingly, future Chinese military efforts will focus on readiness for potential regional conflicts close to their borders as well as protecting commercial lines of communication. China's efforts to protect regional sea lanes will actually complement U.S. security efforts since the U.S. and China share trade routes. One example of these shared maritime security interests between the two nations is in the troubled waters near the Horn of Africa, where both countries could co-operate for mutual benefit to reduce the threat of piracy. Some have suggested that China has purchased significant amounts of U.S. debt to hold as a potential weapon against the U.S. As an investor, it is actually in China's interest to protect U.S. credit- worthiness rather than engage in activity that could destabilize the U.S. economy. China has little to gain in seeking a major conflict with the U.S. far from their homeland, nor do they have much prospect of increasing their potential reward if they were to win such a conflict. With little hope of breaking U.S. dominance of the sea, the primary consequence of a Chinese victory in some far-flung engagement would be to subject itself to the will of Washington's desires in the maritime domain. Granted, the possibility for Chinese military aggression is stronger in regional territorial disputes, as is evidenced by their aggressive behavior toward their near neighbors. However, China's regional aggression can be foiled by strengthening regional alliances and encouraging the military modernization of threatened countries. The most worrisome aspect of the focus on China is that exaggerating the potential threat could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Increased U.S. military deployments in the Asia-Pacific could heighten tensions and trigger escalation leading to accidental conflict, even when peaceful resolutions of these territorial disputes are within reach. Developments between China and Taiwan show greater prospects for a diplomatic resolution than in the past. China is a regional power whose military interests are regional. The threat of Islamist terrorists, however, remains a very real global threat to U.S. interests.

#### 1AC Chansoria never says it causes war, only that China wants to be combat-ready—another example of threat construction. It also says MCF has already happened, but then why haven’t the aff’s impacts been triggered yet?

1AC Xiu and Singer says tech stealing occurs in the squo—non-UQ.

#### 1AC Ford doesn’t have any warrants—and no-UQ since tech stealing happens in the squo.

#### 1AC Springer never says naval dominance causes war—the only example is China harassing US ships, which the card admits occurs in the squo and hasn’t led to war.

#### 1AC Beckley and Brands says China war will happen anyway—also non-UQ.

### Contention Two

#### Securitizing the environment produces ineffective, militarized policies—The K turns contention two

Burke, Koo, Mcdonald- PhDs, 14

(Anthony, Prof IR @UNSW Australia, Katrina, IR @Queensland, Matt, IR @Queensland, Ethics and Global Security)

Ethical questions and debates loomed large over such attempts to broaden the security agenda. The attempts to broaden this agenda to include issues such as environmental change were driven by normative commitments to addressing such problems, underpinned by the idea that with their designation as security threats would conic increased political profile, attention, funding and priority for these " neglected" issues. Indeed authors advocating the "broadening" of security in this way frequently emphasized the opportunity costs of the billions of dollars spent by states on armies and tools of war relative to more important priorities such as official development assistance or renewable energy (Mathews 1989). It is no coincidence, in this sense, that a range of authors arguing for the redefinition of security to include environmental concerns were affiliated with environmental NGOs or think-tanks aimed at mobilizing responses to environmental change (see Hartmann 2009; McDonald 2013a). There is much that is intuitively appealing about the attempt to lift issues such as environmental change onto the security agenda as a means of challenging the traditional association of security with the state and war, not least given the problematic priorities underpinning this discourse of security. Yet, while working from assumptions about the mobilizing power of security, these accounts failed to reflect on the politics of security itself. As Daniel Deudney (1990) asked, is it wise to assume that "security" has this progressive effect; that promoting environmental issues to the realm of security won't bring with it a militarization of such problems and logics of exceptionalism? Such a failure to systematically examine what security does is problematic: it opens "broadeners" up to the criticism that theirs is a project that potentially invites illiberal political practices and institutions to hold sway over the management of pressing transnational political problems like climate change and environmental degradation. In a more fundamental sense, the "broadening" agenda also risks leaving security power and legitimacy where it is. There is a danger that without redefining who security is actually for, issues such as environmental change might come to be seen as security threats to the extent that they are solely understood as threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state. Not only might we fail to challenge the statism of contemporary global politics, but we risk encouraging perverse responses to problems such as environmental change. States might recognize climate change as a threat, but if such a response is oriented towards realist strategic concerns, states with relative self-sufficiency may build physical barriers (even walls) around their borders to protect against an influx of so-called " environmental refugees" a scenario anticipated in a 2003 Pentagon report on the national security implications of climate change (Schwartz and Randall 2003). These issues are discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. In our view, security ethics is best honoured by more fundamentally questioning the meaning, structure, and ends of security. If we simply add poverty, environmental change, or disease to the list of challenges to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, we leave other key constituent elements of security in place, and enable existing security providers to embrace and potentially co-opt this "broader agenda", blunting more radical critiques of the association of security and the state system. Indeed it is probably no coincidence that recognition of the "broader range of threats" to security has found its way in to security statements and agenda of existing institutional security providers.

#### Asteroid mining is impractical and no one is going to try any time soon

Fickling 20

David Fickling (columnist covering commodities and industrial and consumer companies, reporter for Bloomberg, Dow Jones, WSJ, Financial Times, Guardian.; “We’re Never Going to Mine the Asteroid Belt”; *Bloomberg News*; December 21, 2020; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen>; HW-EMJ

It’s wonderful that people are shooting for the stars — but those who declined to fund the expansive plans of the nascent space mining industry were right about the fundamentals. Space mining won’t get off the ground in any foreseeable future — and you only have to look at the history of civilization to see why. One factor rules out most space mining at the outset: gravity. On one hand, it guarantees that most of the solar system’s best mineral resources are to be found under our feet. Earth is the largest rocky planet orbiting the sun. As a result, the cornucopia of minerals the globe attracted as it coalesced is as rich as will be found this side of Alpha Centauri. Gravity poses a more technical problem, too. Escaping Earth’s gravitational field makes transporting the volumes of material needed in a mining operation hugely expensive. On Falcon Heavy, the large rocket being developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, transporting a payload to the orbit of Mars comes to as little as $5,357 per kilogram — a drastic reduction in normal launch costs. Still, at those prices just lofting a single half-ton drilling rig to the asteroid belt would use up the annual exploration budget of a small mining company. Power is another issue. The international space station, with 35,000 square feet of solar arrays, generates up to 120 kilowatts of electricity. That drill would need a similar-sized power plant — and most mining companies operate multiple rigs at a time. Power demands rise drastically once you move from exploration drilling to mining and processing. Bringing material back to Earth would raise the costs even more. Japan’s Hayabusa2 satellite spent six years and 16.4 billion yen ($157 million) recovering a single gram of material from the asteroid Ryugu and returning it to Earth earlier this month. What might you want to mine from space? Water is an essential component of most earth-bound mining operations and a potential raw material for hydrogen-oxygen fuel that could be used in space. The discovery in October of ice molecules in craters on the Moon was taken as a major breakthrough. Still, the concentrations of 100 to 412 parts per million are extraordinarily low by terrestrial standards. Copper, which typically costs about $4,500 per metric ton to refine, has an average ore grade of about 6,000 ppm. The more promising commodities are platinum, palladium, gold and a handful of rare related metals. Because of their affinity for iron, these so-called siderophile elements mostly sunk toward the metallic core of our planet early in its formation, and are relatively scarce in the Earth’s crust. Estimates of their abundance on some asteroids, such as the enigmatic Psyche 16 beyond the orbit of Mars, suggest concentrations several times higher than can be found in terrestrial mines. Still, human ingenuity is all about cutting our coat according to our cloth. If such platinum-group metals are going to justify the literally astronomical costs of space mining, they’ll need to count on sustained high prices for the decade or so that would be needed to get such an operation up and running — and that sort of situation is all but unheard-of in the materials industry. When prices of an essential commodity get excessively high, chemists get extraordinarily good at finding ways to avoid using it, scrap merchants improve their recycling rates, and miners discover new deposits that wouldn’t have been viable at lower prices. Even criminals get in on the game. That eventually pushes supply up and demand down, so that prices rebalance — a dynamic we’ve seen play out in the markets for rare earths, lithium and cobalt in recent years. The world mines about three times more platinum than it did in the early 1970s, but prices have barely changed once adjusted for inflation. That might sound a disappointing prospect to those looking for excuses for humanity to colonize space — but really it should be seen as a tribute to our ingenuity. Humanity’s failure to exploit extraterrestrial ore reserves isn’t a sign that we lack imagination. If anything, it’s a sign of the adaptive genius that put us in orbit in the first place.

#### 1AC Magnuson says the opposite of the tag—there is no Chinese monopoly

In this new era, our operating results and balance sheet demonstrate the potential for U.S. companies to compete.”

### Case Turn

#### Chinese space dominance is k2 global hegemony.

Jaewoo 21

Jaewoo Choo, professor of international politics @ Kyung Hee U, director of China Research Center, 3-11-2021, "The United States and China: Competition for superiority in space to protect resources and weapon systems," OpenAsia | Thoughts and Ideas about Asia, <https://www.openasia.asia/the-united-states-and-china-competition-for-superiority-in-space-to-protect-resources-and-weapon-systems/> //MLT

Whoever rules space rules the future There is one reason why the two countries' space strategy competition will inevitably lead to a hegemony competition. This is because they try to conquer the space order. Conquering the space order is to define and establish the space order. Those who dominate space will dominate almost all sectors of the future world, including economy, technology, environment, cyberspace, transportation and energy. That's why the United States is considered as a hegemonic country on Earth today. The U.S. is recognized as a hegemonic country because it establishes and leads the economic, financial, trade, political, and diplomatic order. There are two areas in the world today where international order has not been established. One is virtual space, which is the cyber world. The other is the space. Since the international order of these two areas is closely correlated with each other, it is likely that the establishment of the order in these two areas will be pursued simultaneously. This means that cyber order cannot be discussed without discussing satellite issues. The Communist Party of China recognized this early on. At the 19th National Communist Party Congress in 2017, it expressed its justification for establishing space order. President Xi Jinping declared that China's diplomatic stage in the 21st century has expanded beyond the Earth into space and virtual space. It was the moment when China defined the concept of diplomatic space as the "universe" beyond the Earth. He then explained that the establishment of a system that can even manage the order of the universe and the virtual world eventually means the establishment of practical governance. Therefore, he justified that China's diplomatic horizon has no choice but to expand into space. Furthermore, he stressed that he is confident that the ideation of building such governance serves as the foundation for the community of common destiny for mankind which China pursues. In other words, he publicly urged China to have the capabilities and means to become a key country in building governance in these two areas.

**Chinese leadership solves extinction.**

Shen **Yamei 18**, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. **The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced**. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but **the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness.** Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state **in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change**. **Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics**. **The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily**. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. **So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations.** Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. **Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability.** C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. **China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”**. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.