## Cap K

#### The aff’s strike-focused politics (e.g. in Bahn 19 and Tucker 13), privatizes and atomizes worker struggle – it channels it towards specific employers rather than class domination as a whole while ensuring the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by privileging alternative modes of settlement outside and in spite of the specifics of the law itself.

Feldman, 94

[George, Assistant Prof. @ Wayne State Law: “Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law,” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Volume 15, No. 2, 1994. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkjemp15&div=14&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals#]//AD

In other ways, however, the liberal vision of labor law that Justice Brennan exemplified has been severely limited. 19 One obvious limitation, for instance, has been the Court's preference for arbitration.20

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 20 STARTS HERE\*\*\*

20. The Court's tendency to privilege arbitration has led it to impose legal limitations on the right to strike that are unsupported by the language, policy, or history of the labor laws. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368 (1974), discussed infra at part III.C. For criticism of the Court's weakening of the right to strike, see Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 548-49; JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES & AssuMiPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 20 ENDS HERE\*\*\*

(1983). Yet a different kind of limit also has been present in the labor jurisprudence of the Court's liberal wing-a limit that is less obvious, usually has less immediate impact, but that is perhaps more deeply seated. The Court's privileging of arbitration restricts the means by which unions legally may act in response to concerns that are concededly legitimate. The limits discussed here, by contrast, define the legitimate boundaries of collective actions and collective concerns. The cases discussed here reflect the liberal doctrine that labor law protects unions only insofar as they limit their role to that of representative of the employees of an individual employer, and that the law will resist any union attempt to move beyond this limitation. That doctrine rejects protection when the underlying issue implicates the proper role of unions in American society.

That question emerges in a variety of contexts. In some, a broad definition of unions' societal function may require, or may seem to require, limiting individual rights;21 in others, the Court's conclusion, or something very similar to it, is so clearly required by statute that the conclusion cannot be ascribed to the conscious or unconscious ideological views of the Justices.22

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 21 STARTS HERE\*\*\*

21. When such a conflict is actually present, the proper place to draw the line is fairly subject to debate; a judge determined to protect both strong unions and individual employee rights might resolve apparent conflicts between the two in different ways without forfeiting a claim of taking each seriously. See infra notes 237-41; cf Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 21 ENDS HERE\*\*\*

At other times, however, liberal members of the Court have narrowed the range of permissible union concerns and therefore of unions' social role in contexts in which the law would have allowed a broader understanding, and in which the danger of conflict with individual rights was either absent or too attenuated to serve as a reasonable justification. In some cases this desire to narrow the sphere of union activity is central to the Court's reasoning; in others, it is a subsidiary theme, or is present only as an underlying assumption, unstated and perhaps unconscious, whose presence helps account for the result reached.

This article examines what the members of the Supreme Court who have been identified with its liberal wing have said explicitly or by necessary implication about what is the legitimate sphere of union activity in American life. This vision of the role that unions should play in society has both practical and ideological consequences. Modern labor law, faithful to the Wagner Act's premises, aims to particularize rather than generalize workers' struggles; it directs them towards their specific relationship to their employer, rather than to the larger relationship of their class to employers and to work; it privatizes and depoliticizes those struggles.23

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 23 STARTS HERE\*\*\*

23. It is in this sense that I think the frequently voiced point of authors associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement is correct. It is not that workers' struggles are channeled to arbitration rather than to a public body like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). but rather that whatever method workers employ-even including a strike or other collective job actions-the locus of the struggle remains the particular workplace or employer. It is in this sense that workers' struggles are channeled away from "political" dimensions.

\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 23 ENDS HERE\*\*\*

Given the contextual limitations mentioned, this analysis necessarily must be cautious. It must take account of the constraints of statutory language and congressional intent and, where applicable, of judicial deference to the decisions of the NLRB. 24 This analysis also must recognize the presence of other policy or ideological considerations that are unrelated to the theme of limiting the breadth of union concerns. Nonetheless, this theme is demonstrably present in a wide variety of legal settings, transecting the doctrinal categorizations that abound in labor law.

#### Rights-focus on labor organizing represents legislative capture – it reinscribes the ontological domination of the state through cooption and interpretation of revolutionary struggle by the law – that alienates movement organizers from each other, demobilizing radical struggle.

Gabel, 84

[Peter, Prof. Law @ New College of California School of Law, San Francisco: “The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,” Texas Law Review 62, no. 8 (May 1984). [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals]//AD](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals%5d//AD)

\*edited for offensive language

B. The Strategy of State Officials: Pseudo-Recognition and Containment by Interpretation

Rights-victories can facilitate a movement's cooptation by tempting the movement to "return" its power to the State in exchange for what I will call a pseudo-recognition of the movement's particular demands. I use the term "the State" here, just as I have earlier, to refer not to a collection of officials conceived as a conceptual unit, but to the projected image of authority that these officials "speak for" and that alienated consciousness "believes in" to provide itself with an illusory political foundation. This collectively believed-in authority serves as the political vehicle for opposing the internal development of the movement precisely to the degree that the group as a whole feels the need to resist the sense of possibility awakened by the movement's energy.

During the movement's rising period, the need to remain alienated continues to exist in each of us, including those at the movement's core, but its intensity is distributed throughout the group as a whole according to "social position," understood in a strictly experiential sense. For insofar as the movement initially finds the conviction to discover itself and "arise" through an affirmation of its difference from the rest of the group, it provokes a complex reaction in the group as a whole that depends in part upon how each person feels "positioned" in relation to the movement's particularity. While each movement as a movement aims at universality, the demands that emerge from its alienated particularity are aimed against others in their alienated particularity in a way that both [silences] ~~mutes~~ (in some locations) and accentuates (in other locations) the movement's transformative appeal. For example, a workers' movement may cause "management" and all those who identify with managerial "differentness" to want to "defend themselves"; yet the very fact that the workers have at first defined themselves against management may allow students who are beginning to discover themselves through their difference from teachers to "hear" the movement's deeper meaning. [Black people] ~~Blacks~~ who organize against whites may cause whites to rigidify behind their difference, while striking a chord among women who are also coming to experience each other in a new way through their discovery of the social meaning of a common physical difference. While any true account of a movement's impact would require a narrative description with much greater phenomenological texture than I can produce here, it is through the totality of these ontological resonances, each acquiring its quality from the unique way that the movement aims at the disalienating universal through the alienated particular, that the movement influences the "consciousness-war" occurring within each one of us between the need to remain alienated and the desire to surpass this alienation.

In this early period it is virtually inevitable that the balance of forces within the group as a whole ("society") will tilt in favor of the loyalty to substitute connection that forms the inertia of the status quo, and the group tacitly will rely upon its State officials to cope with the heightened conflict that the movement has generated within it. The "social position" of these officials is somewhat unique because they are called upon to represent the constitution of the group to itself as it actually is (in the sense that their perceived legitimacy as "representatives" extends no further than the group's own dominant self-understanding), and yet they also help to constitute the balance of forces that forms this understanding in their capacity as real people who are part of the group. And as people they are likely to be relatively unavailable to the movement's transformative appeal because this appeal threatens the very "belief in the State" upon which their existing identities depend; they will be inclined to defend themselves against any movement, because movements by their very nature pose a challenge to the alienated universality that in their case constitutes their particularity. As a result, State officials are likely to play the part of "barometers on the side of alienation," seeking to recognize the movement's presence within the group to the extent necessary to maintain their legitimacy, but doing so in a way that sides with the tilt in the group as a whole toward preserving the collective belief in the authority of the State.

The cooptation strategy that these officials adopt-a strategy that may or may not be conscious as regards its form, but remains unconscious as regards its experiential meaning-is to calibrate their responses to the movement's demands so as to encourage the tendency already present in the movement to return to a state of quiescence. This strategy seems to involve roughly three stages37 that take place across a time-span (often decades) dictated by the pulse of the movement itself. At first, these officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands at all because they are inconsistent with existing law. This risks increasing the anger that forms part of the movement's strength and it may provoke destabilizing confrontations and demonstrations that increase the movement's visibility and appeal (for example, it may create a dispersed group of "sympathizers"). But this risk is a calculated one because it shores up the resolve of those who are opposed to the movement by backing up this resolve with an affirmation of what "the people" believe, while also tempting those within the movement to warp their own understanding of how the movement itself is constituted. Because the movement has achieved its disalienating reciprocity in part on the basis of a "surface recognition" of its common difference within the alienated social order, and because this new feeling of connection is as yet somewhat weak in light of the movement's incomplete internal confidence in its own autonomous and transcendental constitution, the movement suffers from an internal tendency to turn itself back into a group that is constituted "from the outside" on the basis of the inert particularity that as a movement it is seeking to surpass. When State officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands, the movement may partially give in to this tendency by seeing itself less through its own eyes and more through the "eyes of the State," as if "the State" were the source of its being and for that reason ought to recognize it. The initial refusal of recognition by State officials, in other words, may begin to seduce the movement into deciding that "getting our rights" is the movement's ultimate objective rather than being but a moment of its own internal development. To that extent the movement's anger at the State may reveal a tendency toward compliance rather than transformation.

As the movement gathers momentum in this double direction-the one toward itself, the other away from itself and toward "the State"- the forces of alienation will begin to realign themselves to prepare for the second stage of the State's strategy, the stage of pseudo-recognition. Through a real intuition that spreads through the withdrawn selves on the basis of their existing organization of reciprocity (a phenomenological definition of "the social structure"), some people remain staunchly opposed to the movement because of their particular social relationship to it, while others begin to mediate the movement's relationship to the group as a whole (through "the media," for example) by recasting the movement's demands as a legitimate "rights-debate" with "difficult arguments on both sides." As leaders of collective experience, these oracles of the center seek to "mold public opinion" in a way that secures its anonymous or empty character against the risk that the desire unleashed by the movement could become a genuinely public force; their efforts are nervously aimed at reassuring the group as a whole that the images supporting our substitute connection can be reorganized to accommodate the movement's demands. These efforts are a measure of the movement's authentic impact. But they are also aimed at bombarding the movement itself with a false picture of its public success by suggesting that the movement is making headway because of its compatibility with the political foundations of the status quo (when exactly the reverse is the case). To the degree that the State's original refusal of recognition has already encouraged the movement to experience its own reciprocity as deriving from its external and role-based particularity, this shift toward mediation may further this temptation by implying that the "bad State" may be willing to back down and atone for its wrongs if the movement will abandon its transformative ambitions, or at least postpone them until an unrealizable future when these ambitions will be "allowed."

When State officials subsequently begin to recognize the movement's specific demands in the form of rights-victories, they do so with the hope that the movement will "trick itself' into equating these victories with its own internal ends. As State officials know perfectly well, it is not necessary or even conceivable that the movement will accept the acquisition of a few rights as all that it means to accomplish. It is necessary only that the movement divert itself from its authentic self-understanding enough to deceive itself into thinking that its objectives could eventually be realized through existing law, as if alienation could ever be overcome with its own agreement. For State officials comprehend in their being that once this diversion occurs, the movement will tend increasingly to see its own capacity to realize itself'as located outside of itself in "the State," and to that degree its transformative momentum will tend to collapse from within for reasons described earlier: "belief in the State" itself derives from the reciprocal denial of desire that divides us from each other by our role-performances and that secures the apparent reality of these performances through our collective obedience to a projected authority. Thus the recognition of the movement's demands by State officials is actually a pseudo-recognition because it intends to strip these demands of their universal and transformative meaning and to induce the movement to grasp itself as a "recognized particularity," playing its part along with all of the others in the circle of collective denial that forms the alienated whole.

But just as the State's original refusal to recognize the movement may partly strengthen as well as weaken the movement's internal solidarity, the eventual recognition of the movement also has this dual potential: it runs the risk of giving the movement the foothold in public consciousness that partly inspired its struggle for rights in the first place. The consciousness-war can be quite fluid at the moment of recognition, with each side struggling over the meaning of what is happening, and struggling not only against each other but among themselves and within everyone insofar as these "sides" are lived as a universal conflict that pervades each person's relationship to others. When bluecollar workers win the right to strike, the bank teller may or may not be happy depending upon countless resonations that overdetermine each other in both directions without absolutely determining anything in advance (including her relationship to her mother, her husband's job, her loyalty to the bank, her "white-collar" identity, her sense of how women should respond to conflict, her vision of her children's prospects, and including what, if anything, happens in the bank that day). To control this fluidity, State officials, to the extent that they remain on the side of alienation, must rely on the third stage of their strategy, the stage of "interpretation," to stabilize a situation that they have had no choice but to help create.

This third stage has been discussed extensively in those critical legal studies writings38 that have traced in specific historical instances how these officials attempt, through a process of doctrinal interpretation and legislative compromise elaborated over many years, to reconcile the movement's rights-victories with the pact of the withdrawn selves (as expressed through the intent of the framers, of the legislature, of the parties, of "the people"), and to distinguish these victories from their true social origins in the intent of the movement. During this extended period while the consciousness-war is waged with fluctuating intensity in countless microphenomenological contexts that mutually influence and totalize each other, these officials play a unique and constitutive role in equilibrating the conflict as a whole by purporting to universalize the meaning of each shift in direction through successive case-by-case revisions of what the Constitution says.39 They absorb what they can of the social texture of these shifts, test it for available alienated image-content, write it up as a fantasy narrative that is vaguely consistent with prior chapters, and then feed it back into the group as a whole as the official interpretation of how they, the people, believe it should "come out."' 40 But I think it is a mistake to understand this process as something that one group does to another, as if the State were trying to manipulate the movement into internalizing false consciousness by acting upon it in a one-way fashion. It is rather the final phase of a reciprocal and intersubjective struggle over the possibilities of social connection itself, as this struggle is mediated through a contest over the ontological meaning of legal concepts in their universal or constitutional dimension.

To the degree that the movement is successful in this universal sense, it can use a rights-strategy as part of its effort to leverage itself into public space with the ultimate aim of creating an experience of public community that could dissolve people's belief in and obedience to the State itself-it is only then that the judge can appear as a man in a tunic and "the law" can appear as something like his speech-impediment. But to the degree that the State is successful in using its rightsstrategy to tempt the movement to substitute rights-consciousness for its own critical self-understanding, the movement's members will gradually find themselves losing each other in their legal reflection and becoming attached to this reflection as the medium through which they recognize one another. By their efforts they will have changed their material and cultural circumstances to the degree that their particular demands can be "balanced" with the common commitment to maintaining the stability of the hierarchical order. But they will experience a hemorrhage of being that will allow them to be reabsorbed into this order, first by depriving them of their unique public appeal in a way that will lead public space to reenclose around them, and finally by hierarchizing themselves to secure the denial of desire upon which their continued acceptance within the group as a whole seems to depend.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### FW—The role of the ballot is to resist neoliberal ideology – filter negative arguments through an epistemological dismantling of neoliberalism.

HAY & ROSAMUND, PhDs, 2002 (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p. 3-5)

The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For **however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis** by the sceptics, their **rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making.** **It is here,** we suggest, that **the discourse of globalisation** — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — **must enter the analysis**. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, **it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves** rather than the context itself **which informs the way in which they behave** (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). **This is no less true of policy makers and governments**. **Whether** the **globalisation** thesis **is ‘true’** or not **may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true** (or, quite possibly, just useful) **by those employing it**. Consequently, **if the aim** of the sceptics **is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation**, then they might **we**ll **benefit from asking** themselves **why and under what conditions** politicians and **public officials invoke** external **economic constraints** in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper. Yet at the outset a certain word of caution is perhaps required. For, even if we accept the potential causal role that ideas about globalisation might play in the structuration of political and economic outcomes, we may be in danger of narrowing the discursive field of our attentions at the outset. The ideas policy makers use to legitimate and/or to rationalise their behaviour should not simply be seen as more or less accurate reflections of the context they perceive (based on more or less complete information). Nor should discourses be understood as necessarily and exclusively ‘strategic’ (i.e. as relating to situations in which an actor’s employment of a discourse correlates directly to particular material interests). **Discourse matters** in at least two respects. **The way** in which **actors behave is not merely a reflection** of the degree of accuracy and completeness **of the information they possess**; **it is also** a reflection of **their normative orientation** towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts. Put simply, **though actors may share a** common **understanding of** the process of **globalisation, they may respond** very **differently to its** perceived **challenges and threats** **depending on whether one regards the future it promises in a positive or negative light** – witness the still ongoing debate within the governing SPD in Germany between supporters of Schröder and Lafontaine (see Lafontaine 1998; Lafontaine and Müller 1998; Schröder 1998; and for a commentary Jeffery and Handl 1999), or that in France between Bourdieu, Forrester and anti-globalisation groups like ATTAC on the one hand and social liberals within the Parti Socialiste on the other (see Bourdieu 1998; Boudieu and Wacquant 1999; Forrester 1999; and for a commentary Bouvet and Michel 1999; Meunier 2000). Within the European Commission, there is evidence to suggest that common understandings of globalisation can be quite consistent with distinct conceptions of the capacity to exercise meaningful agency as actors take up quite different ‘subject positions’ in relation to globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; 2000b). **It is important**, then, at the outset **that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about globalisation in the structuration of political and economic outcomes**.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, **policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve**, in so doing, **to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and,** indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity**.** This provocative suggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). **Globalisation has become** a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, **a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find themselves.** **If** we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that **one of the principal discourses through which that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is likely to affect significantly political dynamics.**

## Police PIC

#### Plan: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right to strike, except for law enforcement officers.

#### Allowing police strikes causes massive unrest and crime and exacerbates corruption within police unions

DiSalvo 20 (Daniel, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and professor of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York, Manhattan Institute, "The Trouble with Police Unions," https://www.manhattan-institute.org/the-trouble-with-police-unions )

In the first two decades of the 20th century, the question of whether police associations belonged in the labor movement at all was also debated. Some in the movement were concerned about the "divided loyalty" of police officers in situations where they were tasked with handling strikes by other unionists. Consequently, Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor claimed to have "held off" on chartering police unions for years despite receiving numerous applications, beginning with a group of Cleveland police in 1897. The ability of police to exercise political power in their own right came to national attention with the Boston police strike of 1919. After World War I, Boston police officers — complaining of low pay, lousy working conditions, and autocratic bosses — sought to organize a union and affiliate themselves with the AFL. The city's commissioner denied the officers' right to unionize. In response, about 80% of Boston's police force went on strike. Over the following three days, lawlessness reigned, resulting in many injured persons and much property damage. Calvin Coolidge, the Massachusetts governor at the time, took a firm stand, declaring, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." He sent in 7,000 state militiamen to restore order. To disperse rioters, the state guards shot directly into crowds, killing nine and wounding 23. When order was finally restored, all 1,147 striking officers were fired and replaced. As Joseph Slater of the University of Toledo College of Law has shown, the strike proved disastrous for police unions and public-sector unions more generally. President Woodrow Wilson called the strike "a crime against civilization." From the 1920s through the 1940s, bipartisan opposition to the unionization of public employees was widespread. State- and local-government workers were not even considered for inclusion in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (often called the "Wagner Act"). In a 1937 letter to the leader of the National Federation of Federal Employees, President Franklin Roosevelt bluntly stated that "the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service" and that strikes by public employees were "unthinkable and intolerable." It was not until a wave of state legislation in the 1960s and 1970s — which granted state- and local-government employees collective-bargaining rights — that most police officers gained them as well. The transformation was swift and dramatic. Collective-bargaining rights were extended from 2% of the state- and local-government workforce in 1960 to 63% in 2010. The changes in state laws were spurred by President John Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order 10988, which gave federal employees "the right...to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from any such activity." The new state laws facilitated the conversion of police-officer associations, lodges, and orders into unions. "Hard pressed to defend the invidious distinction between police officers and other public employees on either ideological or political grounds," wrote professor of labor relations Marvin Levine in his history of police unions, "many elected officials realized that it was pointless to resist the rank-and-file demands any longer." The result was the formal recognition of police unions and the extension of collective-bargaining rights to law enforcement in many jurisdictions. In the 1960s, police associations became more politically active, especially since they were gaining labor rights during a period of urban unrest and public hostility to the police. In a 1977 book, Stanford University political scientist Margaret Levi described police unions as a "bureaucratic insurgency" that overcame police-commissioner opposition in several major cities. In some instances, the unions even served as platforms for launching the political careers of former officers and officials. POLICE UNIONS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT Today, police enjoy collective-bargaining rights in 41 states and the District of Columbia, and union locals are dispersed across the roughly 18,000 police departments nationwide. Only Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia prohibit bargaining for public employees, while Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming lack statutes to either advance or oppose police unions. Even where collective bargaining is prohibited, police associations provide members with legal services, political advocacy, and insurance policies. In terms of raw numbers, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey found that in 2019, 57.5% of the nation's 712,336 police officers were covered by collective-bargaining contracts, and 55% of officers were union members. In addition, there were 80,802 police supervisors and detectives, 40.6% of whom were union members and 43.3% of whom were covered by union contracts. Police unions are present throughout the labor movement, but their relationship with it remains tense. Ronald DeLord, a Texas attorney and leading expert on police unions, describes the police labor movement as "a maze of different affiliations." Indeed, police unions are notorious for switching affiliations and shifting back and forth from independent status to affiliation with a larger labor federation. The largest police organization, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), boasts some 354,000 members, though it does not affiliate with any of the major labor federations. The second largest is the National Association of Police Organizations, with some 236,000 members. Though independent, it maintains ties to the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, which is chartered by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), to work on federal legislation. When it comes to organized labor as traditionally understood, only 15% to 20% of law-enforcement employee organizations affiliate with the AFL-CIO. One estimate is that between 100,000 and 150,000 law-enforcement officers belong to locals that affiliate with the AFL-CIO. This helps explain why many police officers don't think of themselves as members of a labor union but instead as part of a lodge or association. Other major union federations also count police locals among their affiliates. These include the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which has between 10,000 and 15,000 police members; the Service Employees International Union (over 10,000 police members); the Communications Workers of America (26,000 police members); and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (15,000 police members). Bizarrely, if one counts the total number of police-union members reported by the major labor federations, one finds that there are more members than there are police officers in the country. Moreover, not all officers are members of a union. The reason for the discrepancy is that many officers and local unions affiliate with multiple union federations, which is illegal in the private-sector union context. Police unions are also known for inflating their membership figures. A complete picture of police-union membership and their affiliations, therefore, remains elusive. Today, tensions between police unions and the labor movement are at an all-time high. A threat of expulsion hangs over police unions, as the labor movement has previously excommunicated unions deemed reprobate. (Excluded unions have included those with links to the Communist Party and organized crime, as well as locals that were racially segregated.) Progressive unionists want police reform — and to distance themselves from unions that oppose such efforts. In fact, after the events of this past spring, several unions sought to excise police from their ranks. The Association of Flight Attendants, for instance, passed a resolution calling on police unions to support reform "or be removed from the Labor movement." A union representing 100,000 workers in Seattle voted to expel the Seattle Police Officers Guild. Other labor leaders, especially at the national level, are concerned that ousting police unions could set a bad precedent. Patrick Lynch, president of the Police Benevolent Association of New York City, offered the clearest statement of the underlying reasoning for keeping police unions within the house of labor: "The rhetoric that [opponents of police unions] are using now is the same rhetoric that has been used to strip union protections from teachers, bus drivers, nurses and other civil servants across this country." The concern is that if collective-bargaining rights for police unions are constricted, similar arguments could be applied to other public-sector unions. It is unsurprising, then, that the leaders of several major federations have come out strongly in favor of police unions. AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka favors keeping police unions in the fold. In his view, it is better to keep police unions in the tent and work with them than to push them out and potentially work against them. Instead, he has called for congressional action to prohibit choke holds, expand the use of body cameras, limit no-knock warrants, and prevent the transfer of military-grade equipment to law enforcement. AFSCME president Lee Saunders, meanwhile, has flatly denied that police-union contracts provide a "shield for misconduct or criminal behavior." He has gone so far as to analogize police unions today to the striking African-American sanitation workers in Memphis with whom Martin Luther King, Jr., was marching when he was shot. As Saunders put it, "just as it was wrong when racists went out of their way to exclude black people from unions, it is wrong to deny this freedom to police officers today." COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND POLICE CONTRACT Like other public-sector unions, police unions influence the structure and operations of police departments in two ways: from the bottom up, through collective bargaining, and from the top down, through political activity. Collective bargaining concerns the power and interests of workers and management. It gives police unions a hand in shaping the departments in which their members work. By circumscribing the rights of management, police unions partially determine the structure and operation of police bureaucracies. Labor unions are largely in the business of protecting members' job security and winning members better salaries and benefits. Collective-bargaining statutes applying to state- and local-government employees thus stipulate that agency managers (and elected officials behind them) must negotiate with unions representing those employees over pay, benefits, and conditions of employment. These statutes, along with union organizational incentives like leadership elections, force union leaders to prioritize such issues at both the bargaining table and in political advocacy. And in fact, research finds that collective bargaining tends to increase the pay, benefits, and job protections of public employees who enjoy such rights. Pay and benefits are not the subject of today's controversies, however. Rather, current concerns focus on the rules inscribed in collective-bargaining contracts negotiated under the rubric of "conditions of employment." In many jurisdictions, these conditions establish disciplinary, grievance, and arbitration procedures for officers accused of misconduct. Such job protections are said to shield incompetent or abusive officers, as union leaders have a legal duty to defend all members equally. To be sure, many of the protections police unions demand reflect the unique challenges of policing. Given the nature of law enforcement, police necessarily develop a somewhat adversarial relationship with the communities they serve. Officers are sometimes faced with unpleasant, high-tension, and even dangerous situations on the job, and are granted considerable discretion in determining when the use of force is necessary to address them. False or exaggerated citizen complaints are unavoidable. Therefore, labor representatives often prioritize protecting their members against these threats. These safeguards are especially important to officers insofar as the skills they develop on the job are not easily transferrable to other employment, which makes dismissal especially costly. A recent study of police misconduct by Ben Grunwald of the Duke University School of Law and John Rappaport of the University of Chicago Law School found that in Florida, officers fired from their preceding job find new law-enforcement work at about half the rate of officers who voluntarily leave their preceding job. Moreover, fired officers take longer to find new jobs than those who leave voluntarily, and they tend to go to smaller departments with fewer resources.

#### Stronger police unions actively prevent meaningful criminal justice reform

Matthews 20 (Dylan, Vox, "How Police Unions Became So Powerful - and How They Can Be Tamed," <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21290981/police-union-contracts-minneapolis-reform>)

In Buffalo, the city’s Police Benevolent Association president John Evans has actively defended officers who pushed 75-year-old protester Martin Gugino to the ground. When the officers who pushed Gugino were seen leaving their arraignment on felony assault charges, a large crowd of police union members and sympathizers was seen cheering them on. In New York State broadly, police unions led opposition to newly signed legislation that prevents police from hiding misconduct complaints and criminalizes chokeholds. These are hardly aberrations. Police unions in general have become the most vocal interest group opposing criminal justice reforms and especially reforms to police discipline and use of force. Historically, they have, unlike most unions, been profoundly conservative institutions that uphold a particular white ethnic, “law and order”-focused variant of right-wing politics. They have been among Donald Trump’s most fervent allies; Kroll spoke at a Trump rally in 2018, and the International Union of Police Associations has already endorsed Trump for reelection. The foregrounding of police unions’ role in the warping of American law enforcement has also prompted some difficult conversations on the left. The presence of a segment of a union movement that’s unapologetically right-wing and hostile to Black communities has tested the limits of solidarity from more left-wing unionists. As long as police forces exist, police unions will exist in some form as well, even if just as political pressure groups. It is therefore natural to think that reforming police unions in some way must be part of the broader agenda of changing policing in America. They are among the biggest stakeholders in the way the system works now; without addressing their power, other reforms may never get off the ground.

#### CJR strengthens communities, combats injustice, and bolsters the economy

Policy Link 18 (National research and action institute advancing racial and economic equity, "Criminal Justice Reform: Good for Families, Communities, and the Economy," <https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/casey-equal-voice-series-criminal-justice-reform>)

The Economic Benefits of an Equitable Criminal Justice System The current criminal justice system relies on punitive measures to deter or prevent crime and tends to reinforce social structures of inequity; focusing instead on preventing crime and reducing recidivism would make communities safer and more able to thrive economically. An equitable criminal justice system would prioritize community safety, prevention, just sentencing, and alternatives to detention. Such a system would not only make communities stronger, it would also provide strong economic benefits, including the following. • Substantial state and local savings from alternatives to incarceration. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency estimates that if 80 percent of people incarcerated for nonviolent offenses were sentenced to effective alternative programming rather than prison, states and localities across the nation could save at least $7.2 billion annually.7 In California, Proposition 47 reduced the sentencing for nonviolent and nonserious offenses such as simple drug possession from felonies to misdemeanors. With this change, the state is expected to save more than $1 billion over the next five years, which will be directed to substance abuse and mental health programs, among other key services.8 Research suggests that using probation and alternative sentences for low-level, nonviolent offenses could reduce annual per capita corrections costs by an average of $22,250.9 A more productive workforce and stronger economy. Separate from reducing incarceration rates, huge gains could be made in economic productivity by enacting stronger supports for those with arrest and conviction histories. These supports include sealing the records on minor and nonviolent offenses and providing antidiscrimination protections in employment, housing, and public benefits. Such measures would yield economic benefits by increasing earnings, producing higher income tax revenues, and reducing the costs associated with recidivism. The RAND Corporation recently reported that for every dollar spent on education programs in prisons, taxpayers save $4 to $5 in recidivismrelated incarceration costs over the next three years.10 The Center for Economic and Policy Research has estimated that annual GDP would be $65 billion stronger if not for employment losses among people with criminal records.11 • Decreased poverty and unemployment, especially among communities of color. In 2008, barriers to employment for people with criminal records accounted for almost a full percentage point of the nation’s unemployment rate, representing 1.7 million Americans who were willing and able to work but unable to find jobs.12 Researchers have calculated that the U.S. poverty rate would have dropped by 20 percent between 1980 and 2004 if not for mass incarceration and the substantial social obstacles faced by people with criminal records.13

## Case

### FW

**Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.**

**Blum et al. 18**

Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### States must use util.

Goodin 90. Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian

#### Government policy is constrained by limitations on resources. Any government decision must account for tradeoffs, which only utilitarian ethics can do.

Mack 4 [(Peter, MBBS, FRCS(Ed), FRCS (Glasg), PhD, MBA, MHlthEcon) “Utilitarian Ethics in Healthcare.” International Journal of the Computer, the Internet, and Management Vol. 12, No.3. 2004. Department of Surgery. Singapore General Hospital.] SJDI

Medicine is a costly science, but of greater concern to the health economist is that it is also a limitless art. Every medical advance created new needs that did not exist until the means of meeting them came into existence. Physicians are reputed to have an infinite capacity to do ever more things, and perform ever more expensive interventions for their patients so long as any of their patients’ health needs remain unfulfilled. The traditional stance of the physician is that each patient is an isolated universe. When confronted with a situation in which his duty involves a competition for scarce medications or treatments, he would plead the patient’s cause by all methods, short of deceit. However, when the physician’s decision involves more than just his own patient, or has some commitment to public health, other issues have to be considered. He then has to recognise that the unbridled advocacy of the patient may not square with what the economist perceives to be the most advantageous policy to society as a whole. Medical professionals characteristically deplore scarcities. Many of them are simply not prepared to modify their intransigent principle of unwavering duty to their patients’ individual interest. However, in decisions involving multiple patients, making available more medication, labour or expenses for one patient will mean leaving less for another. The physician is then compelled by his competing loyalties to enter into a decision mode of one versus many, where the underlying constraint is one of finiteness of the commodities. Although the medical treatment may be simple and inexpensive in many instances, there are situations such as in renal dialysis, where prioritisation of treatment poses a moral dilemma because some patients will be denied the treatment and perish. Ethics and economics share areas of overlap. They both deal with how people should behave, what policies the state should pursue and what obligations citizens owe to their governments. The centrality of the human person in both normative economics and normative ethics is pertinent to this discussion. Economics is the study of human action in the marketplace whereas ethics deals with the “rightness” or “wrongness” of human action in general. Both disciplines are rooted in human reason and human nature and the two disciplines intersect at the human person and the analysis of human action. From the economist’s perspective, ethics is identified with the investigation of rationally justifiable bases for resolving conflict among persons with divergent aims and who share a common world. Because of the scarcity of resources, one’s success is another person’s failure. Therefore ethics search for rationally justifiable standards for the resolution of interpersonal conflict. While the realities of human life have given rise to the concepts of property, justice and scarcity, the management of scarcity requires the exercise of choice, since having more of some goods means having less of others. Exercising choice in turn involves comparisons, and comparisons are based on principles. As ethicists, the meaning of these principles must be sought in the moral basis that implementing them would require. For instance, if the implementation of distributive justice in healthcare is founded on the basis of welfare-based principles, as opposed to say resource-based principles, it means that the health system is motivated by the idea that what is of primary moral importance is the level of welfare of the people. This means that all distributive questions should be settled according to which distribution maximises welfare. Utilitarianism is fundamentally welfarist in its philosophy. Application of the principle to healthcare requires a prior understanding of the welfarist theory as expounded by the economist. Conceptually, welfarist theory is built on four tenets: utility maximisation, consumer sovereignty, consequentialism and welfarism. Utility maximisation embodies the behavioural proposition that individuals choose rationally, but it does not address the morality of rational choice. Consumer sovereignty is the maxim that individuals are the best judge of their own welfare. Consequentialism holds that any action or choice must be judged exclusively in terms of outcomes. Welfarism is the proposition that the “goodness” of the resource allocation be judged solely on the welfare or utility levels in that situation. Taken together these four tenets require that a policy be judged solely in terms of the resulting utilities achieved by individuals as assessed by the individuals themselves. Issues of who receives the utility, the source of the utility and any non-utility aspects of the situation are ignored.

#### Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.

Bostrom 13 [Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy @ University of Oxford, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy Vol. 4 Issue 1, February 2013]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] reversibility – precludes all possibility of future pleasure

#### B] magnitude – 7.5 billion people die

#### C] moral uncertainty – even if we're not sure if [util] is true, saying extinction doesn't matter is too high of a risk

#### C] moral uncertainty – even if we're not sure if [util] is true, saying extinction doesn't matter is too high of a risk

#### C] progress – scientific and moral developments would be lost

#### D] bias – humans are psychologically unable to process the scope and impact so err aff

### Case Proper

#### The racism that labor unions are built on must be acknowledged before true progress can be made

**Dogan ‘17**

(Shamed Dogan, November 13, 2017, Dogan is a Missouri State Representative abd he was served for 7 years, his agenda focusing on education reform, ethics reform, and criminal justice reform, “Unions ignore long history of excluding minorities from jobs”, [https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/unions-ignore-long-history-of-excluding-minorities-from-jobs/article\_ef58bccd-f04a-5172-8dbd-18b8ee5eb9e2.html //](https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/unions-ignore-long-history-of-excluding-minorities-from-jobs/article_ef58bccd-f04a-5172-8dbd-18b8ee5eb9e2.html%20//) HM)

Missouri has taken great strides forward in **restoring free-market** approaches to our economy. Thanks to the efforts of a Republican Legislature and governor, Missouri is open for business. We have passed right-to-work legislation and have begun to challenge the stranglehold that union bosses hold over the labor market. However, this development has not come without a fight; union organizers and bosses are angry because these changes upset the established order. While these union bosses argue that they best represent Missouri workers, they ignore their long history of excluding minority Americans from jobs and opportunities. Although labor unions have made some positive contributions, we must not forget their **legacy of discrimination, prejudice and racism**. For decades, unions worked to exclude black Americans from jobs. White workers felt endangered by black Americans who were willing to work longer and harder, so labor unions used legislation to force blacks out of unions, and out of the labor market. Herbert Hill, the labor director of the NAACP, wrote about this fact in 1959. In his seminal article “Labor Unions and the Negro: The Record of Discrimination,” he noted, “the Negro worker’s historical experience with organized labor has not been a happy one. ... Trade unions practice either **total exclusion** of the **Negro**, segregation (in the form of ‘Jim Crow’ locals or ‘auxiliaries’), or enforce separate, **racial seniority lines** which limit Negro employment to menial and unskilled classifications.”

**No inherency--The National Labor Relation Act serves to protect workers right to strike  
National Labor Relations Board, no date,** “The Right to Strike”, <https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes#:~:text=Section%207%20of%20the%20National,for%20employees%20by%20this%20section>., //NL

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: **the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right.** See for example, restrictions on strikes in health care institutions (set forth below).