# T

#### A] Interpretation: appropriation means a claim of sovereignty--affs may only defend claims of sovereignty by private entities as unjust

#### Violation: they only defend asteroid mining, which is simply extraction

#### Appropriation is a claim of sovereignty.

United Nations

United Nations, Office for Outer Space Affairs, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html

The [Outer Space Treaty](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html) was considered by the Legal Subcommittee in 1966 and agreement was reached in the General Assembly in the same year ( [resolution 2222 (XXI)](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html)). The Treaty was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted by the General Assembly in its [resolution 1962 (XVIII)](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/legal-principles.html) in 1963, but added a few new provisions. The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository Governments (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it entered into force in October 1967. The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following principles: the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by **claim of sovereignty**, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind; States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities; States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

#### Appropriation refers to sovereign claims of land, not using or extracting resources- proven by OST’s guidelines, nation’s interpretations, and prior property regimes.

Wrench, 19 [Wrench, John. 2019. “Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining,” n.d. <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2546&context=jil>.] WL

It is unlikely, however, that the non-appropriation principle is an absolute ban on the ownership of resources extracted in outer space. An interpretation of Article II supporting a blanket ban on resource ownership is unwarranted by the text of the OST and illfounded on account of the international community’s common practices. Scholars have noted that the international community has never questioned whether scientific samples harvested from celestial bodies belong to the extracting nation.60 Furthermore, space-faring members of the international community rejected the Moon Treaty precisely because it prohibited all forms of ownership in resources extracted from celestial bodies.61 The space-faring nations’ support for the OST, coupled with their rejection of an alternative set of rules governing extracted resources, is at the very least an indication of what those nations believe the non-appropriation principle to stand for. It is equally improbable that the international community drafted the non-appropriation principle to be merely idealistic rhetoric. The OST leaves no room for interpretations to squirm out from under its ban on sovereign claims of land.62 The following section illustrates, however, that the distinction between sovereign ownership of land, and the vestment of property rights in resources extracted from that land, is nothing new. Although the OST does not provide a comprehensive guideline for resource extraction in outer space, its foundational logic provides a workable distinction between ownership and use. This part explores three property regimes developed under the same fundamental constraints as the non-appropriation principle: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the Antarctica Treaty System, and the prior appropriation doctrine as applied in United States water law.63 Under each regime, parties may establish some form of ownership in extracted resources despite being restricted from claiming sovereignty over the underlying land. Each section includes a brief discussion of the property regime’s history, its major traits and their relationship to the overarching characteristics of the non-appropriation principle. This part further describes how each property regime fits within the non-appropriation principle’s prohibition on claims to land, while prohibiting waste, separating land ownership from rights to extracted resources, enforcing liability for destruction or damage, and establishing a simple regulatory system to manage claims.

**Presume neg – all parties to the outer space treaty prohibit “appropriation” of resources by private entities.**

Durkee, 19

Melissa J. Durkee, J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia, ’19, "Interstitial Space Law," Washington University Law Review 97, no. 2 423-482

Those answering this question in the affirmative have access to a strong textual argument. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty specifically references "national" **appropriation**.17 9 The context surrounding that appears to confirm that the prohibition of "national" appropriation is directed at nations, as only a nation could have a legitimate "claim of sovereignty." 180 Moreover, "occupation" refers to old international legal doctrines that once allowed nations to claim territory based on occupation. The historical context within which the treaty was drafted supports this position, as the concern of the time was colonization, not commercial use of space resources. As for private parties, they are specifically anticipated by the treaty: **Article VI states that States Parties bear international responsibility for activities by "non-governmental entities" as well as governmental agencies**.' 8 1 The fact that they are anticipated by the treaty but not included in the Article II prohibition on appropriation suggests that the treaty intended to prohibit only national appropriation of outer space resources.18 2 Those claiming that the treaty prohibits both national appropriation and appropriation by private parties can marshal their own textual argument. Article VI defines "national activities in outer space" to include both "activities . .. carried on by governmental agencies" and those carried on by "non-governmental entities." 8 3 This definition of "national" must inform Article II's prohibition on "national" appropriation and thus extend to a nation's citizens **and commercial entities** as well as governmental activities. Moreover, a contrary interpretation defies logic: **if nations themselves may not claim property rights to outer space objects, they have no power to confer those rights on their nationals.**184

#### B] Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh—

#### A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### B] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits:

**A] Quantitative – the topic is literally too big to count – every specific thing that could be defined as “appropriation” from private entities helping out NASA to them mining some asteroids– unlimited ways appropriation could be defined incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden**

**B] Qualitative – unresolutional spec kills unified generics like the innovation DA because you could just say you’re still allowing entities to make claims of sovereignty and go out into space**

#### D] Paradigm Issues –

#### Use competing interps on T –

#### A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical

#### B] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

# K

### L: Extinction

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell, 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

### L: Gendered Language

#### 1] Their use of gendered language proves our point- masculinity is so pervasive that it is embedded into language- gendered language in IR scholarship discourages women to enter the field and naturalizes patriarchal norms

Mendenhall, 15

(Beth, 2-26-25, Elizabeth Mendenhall is a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University, working with Daniel Deudney on a dissertation about the challenge of scientific and technological change for global commons regimes., THE BADASS HERSELF, [What You Say is What You Get: The Gender Problem in IR](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/), <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/>, JKS)

“Gendered language” refers to words that carry unnecessary masculine connotations, but are purportedly gender-neutral according to users and dictionaries. But the intention of the speaker and the denotation of a word [do not control the meaning](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/books.google.com/books#v=onepage&q&f=false) that is received and internalized by listeners. Research in psychology suggests that word choice influences our [perception](https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=27+Okla.+City+U.L.+Rev.+297&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=1564c455f2b7f916d000d5ea2fd5c01a) and [cognition](http://books.google.com/books/about/Language_Mind_and_Culture_A_Practical_In.html?id=rvgafOskC6gC), such that gendered language actually reinforces patriarchal attitudes about [who](http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041) is qualified or expected to be a “congressman” or “statesman.” In other words, the connotation shapes the meaning of words, which shapes our understanding of concepts. Many gendered words, like “mankind,” have perfectly good alternatives that eschew any reference to gender, like “humankind” or “humanity.” These linguistic options, in addition to the [decreasing popularity of gendered words](https://www.academia.edu/1597246/The_extinction_of_masculine_generics) in the social sciences, present a puzzle for IR: why are so many IR academics still using gendered language, when they don’t have to, and when they should know better?¶ The list of gendered IR terms is long: “statesman,” “brinksmanship,” “man-made,” “mankind,” “manning,” and “manpower” are some of the most common. As a young woman pursuing a career in mainstream IR, and with an interest in security studies, these words add insult to the injury of seeing panels, syllabi, and the [TRIPS survey](https://trip.wm.edu/reports/2014/rp_2014/) dominated by men. These discouragements to women entering a male-dominated field are often overlooked because they are psychological. Being one of few women in an ISA panel makes one feel highly visible at best, and unwelcome at worst. Gendered language sends the message that I am not expected to be a foreign policymaker (because authors choose “statesman”) or the chair of a committee (because authors choose “chairman”). These kinds of daily exclusions weigh on my psyche.¶ I am often told, in response to such complaints, that I should take a class, attend a panel, or contact a scholar who works on Feminist IR theory. I am a materialist, a theorist of geopolitics. I should not have to change my scholarly interest in order to find an inclusive community. No subject or topic is inherently male-dominated, so there must be something discouraging women from pursuing the most masculinized areas of study. It is the responsibility of all IR scholars to help identify and extirpate the reasons young women are deterred from particular topics. The best places to look are those where we make active choices, choices that can be re-thought and re-directed to neutralize the highly gendered spaces we create with our words and actions.¶ Replacing “man-made” with “anthropogenic,” or coining “brinkship” to replace “brinksmanship,” will not solve the gender problem in International Relations, but it will increase the visibility of [our quotidian contributions to patriarchy](http://search.proquest.com/docview/1530414732?accountid=11752). What we read reinforces what we see, and what we write [reflects what we want to see](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FB%3ASERS.0000037757.73192.06). I do not see myself in most of the texts that I study and engage with. I do not see people who look like me on the Presidential Theme Panels at the ISA. Affirmative action in admissions, hiring, and panel placement can only do so much because there is problem of “self selection.” We need to seriously consider the idea that women select their field at least partially because of the “man-made” social environment that surrounds it.¶ My power is not “manpower,” but it is just as strong.

#### 2] From their case—

“If space is ‘the province of mankind’, who owns its resources?” Occasional Papers, January 24, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/] TDI   
A third possible option is to get a larger global endorsement of the Moon Treaty, which highlights the common heritage of mankind

The aff’s enforcement is an endorsement of the Moon Treaty which explicitly uses gendered and harmful language, and proves its flaws—the aff case is riddled with masculine IR that’s inherently flawed. That their means itself is based on flawed IR means it cannot be trusted and is harmful.

### L: War

#### War is unbounded- the aff only locks in the institutionalization of violence, and they cannot separate the act of war from the justifications for war

Cohn, 03

(Carol and Sara, Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, & Ruddick, taught philosophy, peace studies, and feminist theory at the New School University, 03, ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, [www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm](http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm), JKS)

It is not that we fail to distinguish between war and peace, or make distinctions between kinds of violence; but in our vision, and in contrast to much just war theory, it is crucial to not separate war from either the preparations made for it (preparations taken in the widest possible, including the social costs of maintaining large standing armies and the machinery of deterrence), or from its long term physical, psychological, socio-economic, environmental, and gendered effects. This conception of war is sometimes explicit in feminist writings, typically implied by the rhetoric and symbols of feminist movements, and fundamental to our response to conference questions.14 Women’s war and post-war stories underline the unboundedness of war in at least two different dimensions: cultural and practical. Culturally, war is understood as a creation and creator of the culture in which it thrives. War’s violence is not understood as separate and apart from other social practices. There is a continuum of violence running from bedroom, to boardroom, factory, stadium, classroom and battlefield, “traversing our bodies and our sense of self.”15 Weapons of violence, and representations of those weapons, travel through interlocking institutions – economic, political, familial, technological and ideological. These institutions prepare some people but not others to believe in the effectiveness of violence, to imagine and acquire weapons, to use and justify using force to work their will. They prepare some but not others to renounce, denounce or passively submit to force, to resist or accept the war plans put before them.

### L: Resource Wars

#### 1] The aff obscures gendered violence through their over-simplified analysis of resource wars – their discourse creates unidimensional and ineffective responses that further amplify inequalities and fail to address the root causes of conflict.

Cusato, 19

(Eliana Cusato, PhD IR and law teacher at the University of Essex; (10-17-2019)  
“The paradox of plenty and its impact on gendered policy”; LSE Women, Peace and Security; <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/10/17/the-paradox-of-plenty-and-its-impact-on-gendered-policy/>)//ckd

The resource curse theory expounds a ‘paradox of plenty’ whereby states rich with natural resources experience poor economic growth and an increased likelihood of violent conflict. Within this context, natural resources (oil, minerals, diamonds, timber) are defined in terms of their role in increasing the risk of conflict or acting as an obstacle to peace The resource curse theory and its critique Since the end of the 1980s, there has been a significant body of research proposing a link between natural resource wealth and various socio-political ills. While acknowledging the competing explanations for the resource-conflict correlation, it is possible to identify three main strands within this vast literature. The first is the ‘greed versus grievances’ debate. In The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What can be Done? Collier claims that ‘[some societies are more prone to conflict than others because they offer more inviting economic prospects for rebellion](https://www.sfu.ca/content/sfu/dean-gradstudies/events/dreamcolloquium/SpringColloquium/Readings/Readings/_jcr_content/main_content/download_47/file.res/Paul%20Collier)’ such as large deposits of valuable natural resources. A focus on institutional weaknesses is what characterises the grievances theory, [which regards undemocratic and dysfunctional governance by corrupt political elites as a factor potentially leading to armed conflict](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/working/Ross%20-%20Politics%20of%20the%20resource%20curse.pdf). Second, [resource curse scholars maintain](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237040476_Natural_Resource_Types_and_Conflict_Termination_Initiatives) that the availability of ‘lootable’ natural resources can prolong the duration of hostilities because resource commodities provide rebel groups with the revenues to sustain their military campaign and represent an economic incentive to prolong the fighting. The outbreak of an armed conflict would generate a new “[political economy of war”](https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Political_Economy_of_Armed_Conflict_Beyond_Greed_and_Grievance), where belligerents accumulate wealth through the exploitation of valuable commodities. Third, valuable natural resources can act as a disincentive for the peace process. The literature on environmental peacebuilding emerged more recently to reduce the risks associated with bad resource governance in post-conflict settings. A key concern for this groups of scholars is [to reform how natural resources are managed to improve transparency and accountability, kick start the economy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303324645_Engines_for_Peace_Extractive_Industries_Host_Countries_and_the_International_Community_in_Post-Conflict_Peacebuilding), and thus reinforce the peace process. While some of the early claims associated with the resource curse theory have been revisited, its main propositions have entered [NGO](https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14461/the_sinews_of_war.pdf) and [government](https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13540.doc.htm) debates on armed conflict. In the collective imaginary, conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia (to name a few) have been associated with brutal wars waged by rebels driven by the lust for ‘blood diamonds’. Support for this narrative has resulted in internationally-supported interventions to reinforce governmental control over resource-rich areas, to secure extraction sites, promote ‘good governance’ and responsible business conduct, fight public corruption, and mitigate selected human rights abuses (often committed by rebel groups). Briefly, the resource curse thesis has profoundly shaped our understanding of the problem of conflict resources and legal and policy solutions to address it. By accepting its main propositions, however, the silences and contradictions of the theory have been sidelined. According to postcolonial scholars, a limitation of the resource curse thesis is that it is based upon a ‘commodity determinism’, which ignores the historical and structural dimensions of resource scarcity, maldistribution, and poverty in the Global South. By focusing on local actors (corrupt elites, rebel/military groups), the role of external actors, such as former colonial powers, transnational corporations, and international organisations in producing scarcity, poverty and thus violence is obscured. Cyril Obi argues that “[blind spots in hegemonic discussions of the oil curse in Africa include the place of Africa’s oil in the global political economy, and how transnational actors and structures are deeply implicated in the corruption and armed conflicts in oil-rich states”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25767298?seq=1/analyze). Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt claims that the resource curse thesis is predicated upon on a colonial fantasy, which sees the Global South as a place of “[complete lack of control and disorder…whose inhabitants – by some irrational logic of nature – have found themselves endowed with resources that cannot or do not know how to deal with an orderly manner”](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5219744_%27May_God_Give_Us_Chaos_So_That_We_Can_Plunder%27_A_critique_of_%27resource_curse%27_and_conflict_theories). In the collective imaginary, conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia (to name a few) have been associated with brutal wars waged by rebels driven by the lust for ‘blood diamonds’ These critiques call attention to some generalisations and biases of the resource curse theory, and its incapacity to grasp the broader causes and dynamics of resource wars. Given its dominance in international policy and academic circles, the question that needs to be engaged concerns the effects of the theory on global legal responses to ‘conflict resources’. What becomes seen and what is hidden by the current focus on security, transparency, and good governance? What harms and forms of violence receive international attention and what are marginalised? The effects of normative and policy solutions to conflict resources on women and girls Women may be part of a community affected by conflict-related resource extraction, while at the same time [suffering differentiated impacts to those of men](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332204208_Resource_Extraction_and_the_Human_Rights_of_Women_and_Girls_). These impacts include contamination of lands and water, its effect on biodiversity, and the increased burdens on women who may be responsible for food production and finding clean water; gender specific health impacts of resource extraction; loss of livelihood; and increased risks of sexual violence due to the influx of male workers or the presence of the military and private security forces to protect extractive projects. Yet, [dominant approaches](https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/111/443/202/16975) to conflict resources focus on rape and sexual violence as the main negative consequences suffered by women and on rebel groups/local actors as the key perpetrators. In other words, sexual violence [has been understood](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276112335_Natural_Resources_and_Gender_in_Conflict_Settings) as the primary manifestation of violence against women in these contexts. The emphasis on sexual violence has resulted in the failure to take seriously the structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. Notably, [as observed by Catherine Macdonald](http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198817369.pdf), women in mining communities may suffer economic inequalities in relation to accessing the benefits of extractive projects, while disproportionately bearing the costs. Economic inequality, like gender inequality, is a form of structural violence, which can be understood as violence against those whose economic marginalisation maintains their situation of vulnerability. Economic inequality can be exacerbated by situational factors such as violent conflict. Inequality in access to natural resources is also recognised as one of the drivers of conflict. However, current international approaches to conflict resources [fail to address the root-causes of these wars, including distributive justice concerns](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282238196_Governing_Natural_Resources_for_Peace_Lessons_from_Liberia_and_Sierra_Leone). The emphasis on sexual violence has resulted in the failure to take seriously the structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict scenarios Based upon the connection between resource extraction and sexual violence, the conflict resources narrative assumes that women need to be parted from these settings to be ‘saved’ or ‘rescued’. This approach negates women’s agency, reinforces the same gender stereotypes that help fuel sexual violence (notably, representing men as sexually dominant/aggressive and women as submissive/passive), and becomes the justification for paternalistic and imperial responses, [especially when the ‘victims’ are women in the Third World](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228143416_The_Tragedy_of_Victimization_Rhetoric_Resurrecting_the_Native_Subject_in_InternationalPost-Colonial_Feminist_Legal_Politics). [As noted by Lahiri-Dutt](https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/cjwl.31.1.02), this denies women’s active choices to pursue employment in the extractive industry, by constructing women living near extractive sites as ‘homogenous groups’ and labelling them as powerless, exploited and sexually harassed. Although women living closely to mines may be more likely to be subject to sexual violence and rape than other women, it does not mean that removing them from the mining scene will improve their situation. The ‘[exit strategy](http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1110346/FULLTEXT01.pdf)’ is a way of treating the symptoms, instead of tackling the causes, like patriarchy, structural inequality, and subordination. Given the scarcity of alternative means of income, legislation and policies aimed at protecting women by excluding them from mining/extractive areas [may actually be counterproductive](http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198817369.pdf) as they reinforce the male-dominated nature of extractive industry. Integrating a gender perspective Informal normative processes, like the Kimberley Process and EITI, which have been the mainstream solution to conflict resources, do not sufficiently integrate a gender perspective. Further, measures aimed at reinforcing state control over mines often include the prohibition of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). ASM is the conventional extraction method employed in developing countries (especially in conflict zones), where the workers use simple tools, often digging by hand. [Data shows](https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/igf-women-asm-challenges-opportunities-participation.pdf) that women account for up to 30 per cent of the global ASM workforce, reaching 50 per cent in Africa. As such, the ban on ASM has a negative impact on women livelihoods and socio-economic rights The UN Group of Experts on the DRC [found that](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1259339.pdf) due diligence requirements, combined with commodity sanctions imposed by Western states, have resulted in extractive companies to turn to ‘safer’ sources of origin, such as Asia. The decline in production not only affects local miners but also numerous small businesses in mining areas. Although women are not in a majority in the mining industry, many depend on the demand of services connected to the industry. The side effects of these policies have been raising unemployment and poverty, including among women. Simplified discourses, premised upon the resource curse thesis, have created one-dimensional and often ineffective responses, which leave unaddressed the complex root-causes and dynamics of resource wars. Global efforts to address the resource-conflict nexus and its gender dimensions have done little more than perpetuating inequalities, stereotypes, and the status quo. Moving forward, a deeper engagement with structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict countries is needed. [As feminist legal scholars](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/01/09/women-peace-and-security-a-critical-analysis-of-the-security-councils-vision/) have argued, paying attention to the underlying causes of violent conflict, in particular unequal distribution of natural resources, may eventually lead to a different conceptualisation of peace, as something more than just the absence of war.

#### 2] From their case—

- US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary

- The big question is, will asteroid mining lure away investors in Africa? The planetary resources company estimates that a single 30-m asteroid may contain 30 billion dollars in platinum alone and a 500m rock could contain half the entire world resources of PGM. Considering the abundance of minerals in asteroids, once asteroid mining materialises, it will severely affect the precious metals market, usurp the prices of rare earth minerals, and a whole lot more because minerals that are usually somewhat scarce on earth will be easily accessible on asteroids. While foreign investors run the majority of the large-scale mining activities in the region, reports say that many African countries are dangerously dependent on mining activities

The affirmative focuses singularly on the economic aspects of mining in Africa and ignores the root causes behind resource wars and the gendered violence and exploitation associated with extracting resources.

### L: International Law

#### Framing space as a new province for “mankind” allows inequality to prevail – the aff using space as a scapegoat for existing problems creates a new world that reproduces structural imbalances and gendered dynamics in the formation of space law.

Steer, 20

(Cassandra Steer, Mission Specialist with the ANU Institute of Space (InSpace), and a Senior Lecturer at the ANU College of Law specialising in space law, space security and international law; (07-27-2020) “’The Province of all Humankind’ – A Feminist Analysis of Space Law”; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3670381)//ckd

3. Law and Power in Space The unequal power dynamics of international law are made apparent through the critical lens provided by feminist and TWAIL approaches to international law. But even through slightly less critical lenses, many theories of international law-making will recognize that these processes respond to the demands of international relations at a given point in time, and to the shifts in power dynamics, as different issues or values come to the forefront (Boyle & Chinkin, 2007, p. 1; D’Aspremont, 2010). The assertions of objectivity and neutrality made by the traditional doctrine of sources are therefore laid bare in all sub-branches of international law, including space law. I have argued elsewhere that space law and space politics are determined by the same big players who dominate terrestrial geopolitics: in simple terms, the U.S. first, the EU second, with a counterweight from China and Russia (Steer, 2019, p. 756). As with any other area of international law and international relations, these powerful actors determine how issues are framed and what legal structures are (or are not) put in place. For example, in the year that the OST came into effect, Austria, Iran and Egypt proposed to the UN the establishment of a global space organisation, that could mimic the International Atomic Energy Agency, to monitor space activity and promote the spread of space technology to less-developed countries, in line with the notion that space should be for the benefit and in the interests of all (Moltz, 2014, p. 44). But because this was not in the interests of either of the super-powers, who had a monopoly over space and its governance and who were consumed with their race to the Moon, it did not gain any support from them. Another example is the functioning of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the body under which all five core space treaties were successfully and rapidly negotiated during the Cold War. For many years now, COPUOS has been deadlocked on seeking multilateral solutions to current issues in space, such as the rising concern for weaponization, or access to and sale of natural resources in space. Part of the problem is that it is bound to make decisions by consensus – a process which was intended to ensure equality of all votes among nations, regardless of their relative power. But this only made sense at a time when there were fewer members, and a narrower range of concerns about activities in space, in the mid-twentieth century at the beginning of the space race (Lyall & Larsen, 2018, pp. 16–17). Over time, with more members, it has become more difficult to come to consensus on any issues, and even the adoption of the non-binding Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities took over a decade to agree upon (Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 2019; Martinez, 2018). Often commentators will point to the fact that there have been no new space treaties since 1979, as evidence that there is no international appetite for new treaties. However as I have previously argued, this represents only the view of certain influential players, namely the U.S. and the allies which are tethered to it, because they are dependent upon it for national security or economic reasons: countries like Australia, Canada, much of the EU and the U.K. (Steer, 2019, p. 756). When the U.S. takes a position, tethered allies will follow suit. Issues where the U.S. position has thoroughly dominated include the rejection of a proposed Treaty for the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space (PPWT), and resolutions before the UN General Assembly on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). China and Russia have co-sponsored draft PPWT texts before the Conference on Disarmament, but the U.S. has consistently rejected them, due largely to the fact that these proposals come from its greatest opponents. In 2018, the U.S. was the only country to vote no to all four resolutions proposed at the UN General Assembly on PAROS (Report of the First Committee, 2018; Meyer, 2018), and in 2019, the U.S. opposed discussions in a dedicated UN Group of Government Experts on PAROS, where there was general agreement about the need for an arms control treaty for space (Patriota, 2019, p. 757; Steer, 2019). The U.S. position also clashed with the position of the EU on the tail end of the negotiating process working towards a non-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC) in 2015 (Proposal for an International Space Code of Conduct, Draft, 2014). Despite having supported the initiative at its inception in 2008, the U.S. was unable to force the inclusion of a provision on the right to use force in self-defence, and as a result decided to jettison it’s support (Johnson, 2014; Meyer, 2015). The ICoC also faced pushback from the Global South, but for different reasons. The ICoC had originated as an EU initiative, and in its earliest iterations many developing countries objected to the Euro-centric procedures and selection of issues. To its credit, the EU responded to these critiques with a series of open-ended consultations in various regions of the world, before inviting all members of the UN to attend an international negotiation process in 2015. However, the concerns about process had not been addressed to the satisfaction of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), who stated jointly that “the elaboration of such an instrument should be held in the format of inclusive and consensus-based multilateral negotiations within the framework of the UN” (BRICS Joint Statement, 2015). These countries took the opportunity to assert some power over a process that is typically represented the power imbalance of international law and international relations, and as a result the EU process – and ultimately the ICoC – failed. These examples demonstrate the importance of taking into account the current realities of international relations and international law when seeking to govern space in the twenty-first century. As feminist critiques have shown, law cannot be separated from the political, cultural, economic, and historical context in which it plays out, and in which the nations and people exist who are affected by the law. Already in 1968, the Secretary of the UN at the time, U Thant, warned “that the space age is increasing the gap between the developed and developing areas of the world at an alarming rate” (Note by the Secretary General Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1968, p. 10) It is clear from the processes outlined here that certain countries are unwilling to let the power imbalance remain the status quo. This should be applauded, because that status quo keeps many nations out of the space race altogether, and limits the benefits they receive from human activities in space, in spite of the promise of the OST that space shall be the province of all. It is clear, therefore, that the pretenses of international law as being neutral, objective, and universal are false, and that space law is as much an expression of power dynamics as is any other area of law. There is no equality between countries, despite the notion of formal equality as a value underpinning international law, and the status quo is determined by interests of a small handful of countries which have managed to institutionalize the power they held at the close of the Second World War. There is no equal access to space, nor is there distribution of the benefits derived from space, despite this being a promise of the OST. Space is far from being the “province of all mankind”. Indeed, space is even further from being the province of all humankind. Access to, benefits from, and governance over space is the province of an elite few, and within those few there is a gender imbalance which mirrors the geographical imbalance. At the time that the OST was drafted, not only were there no women at the negotiating table, but under the U.S. programme, women were excluded from being able to become astronauts. To become an astronaut, one had to be a military test pilot, a profession from which women were banned (Koren, 2017). There was a strong lobbying campaign, led by highly qualified women pilots, to convince NASA and the White House to allow women to become astronauts (Klein, 2017), and a clandestine “Women in Space” program was bankrolled by the pioneering pilot Jackie Cochran Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3670381 DRAFT July 2020 – Do Not Cite 24 (Weitekamp, 2004). In this program, a number of women were selected by Dr. Randolph Lovelace, a contractor to NASA who led the physical tests and training for astronauts, to undergo the exact same training as the men, because he suspected women would be better candidates for space travel, due to our generally lighter weights and lower need for oxygen. A higher percentage of women passed the tests than men, and many of the women performed better than the male trainee astronauts. However, despite the test results, the deeply engrained sexism of the time prevailed. Apparently Lovelace’s motives may have been focused on the need for women as secretaries and assistants in future long-term space habitations (Weitekamp, 2004). When “Women in Space” candidate Jerrie Cobb testified before a congressional subcommittee in 1962, she stated “we seek, only, a place in our nation’s space future without discrimination” (Klein, 2017), but astronaut John Glenn testified that creating a programme to train women astronauts would compromise the race to land on the Moon before the Soviets. Moreover, he argued “the men go off and fight the wars and fly the airplanes and come back and help design and build and test them. The fact that women are not in this field is a fact of our social order.” (Weitekamp, 2004; Klein, 2017). Ultimately the lobbying campaign failed, and the Women in Space program was shut down because NASA did not sponsor it. One year later, the first woman in space was a Soviet woman, Valentina Tereshkova, in March 1963. The Soviets had beaten the Americans in yet another milestone in the space race, ostensibly breaking the glass ceiling for women’s participation. However, she was not to be followed by another woman until 1982, when Svetlana Savitskaya flew on a mission to the Soviet Salyut Space Station. Upon her arrival, Savitskaya was handed an apron by her crewmates, who “joked” that she should get to work in the kitchen. Despite this rude welcome, she went on to perform a series of highly skilled engineering tasks for which she had been trained, including testing a tool for welding in space, and becoming the first woman to undertake a spacewalk (Lewis, 2018). Women are still vastly underrepresented in all STEM careers, and in the entire space sector generally, as well as at all international negotiating tables and in national law-making. It matters, then, a great deal, who has the power to determine the laws and norms applicable to human activity in space. If we are at all serious about the promises of the OST, then this power balance must shift. We must take into account the interests of many more players than just the most geopolitcally influential as we seek new space law and governance solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s space activities. It starts with making explicit that space is not at all “the province of all mankind”, let alone the province of all humanity.

### the rest

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making—claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making.

Sjoberg, 13

(Laura Sjoberg, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally.

Youngs, 4

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi, 16

(Carol Bacchi, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

# Case

#### Economic decline won’t cause war

Walt, 20

(Dr. Stephen M Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer, 5-13-20, Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, PhD in International Relations (with Distinction) from Stanford Universtiy, MA in Political Science from University of California, Berkeley, “*Will a Global Depresttion Trigger Another World War?”* <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/JH>)

By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The [world economy is in free fall](https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/14/business/imf-world-economic-outlook/index.html), with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A [plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa](https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/2020/05/05/locusts-africa-swarms-kenya-ethiopia/), and last week we learned about [murderous killer wasps](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/just-how-dangerous-is-the-murder-hornet/) threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes [potentially lethal nostrums](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52407177) and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change. Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question? For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or [several other serious conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_War_of_Independence). The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again. But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has [already considered](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace) the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace. Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in [winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/09/coronavirus-pandemic-peace-talks-yemen-houthi-saudi-arabia/). Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede. For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, [some Americans now worry](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/29/would-trump-start-war-boot-his-chances/) that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the [logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself](http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/articles/Levy%20-%20Diversionary%20theory.pdf). War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 [fits this model perfectly](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396339108442571): The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that [Trump occasionally hints at](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/05/trump-keeps-talking-about-keeping-middle-east-oil-that-would-be-illegal/)—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered [40 or more recessions since the country was founded](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_recessions_in_the_United_States), yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist [Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market](https://www.forbes.com/sites/briandomitrovic/2018/11/22/the-stock-market-has-predicted-nine-of-the-past-five-recessions/#308e13d74089), if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book [Conventional Deterrence](https://www.amazon.com/Conventional-Deterrence-Cornell-Studies-Security/dp/0801493463), national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

#### No economic collapse-it’s resilient

Olsen, 21

Brad Olsen, 8-22-2021, "Resilient economy means we’ll bounce back from this setback," Stuff, https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/opinion-analysis/300388118/resilient-economy-means-well-bounce-back-from-this-setback

OPINION: It’s a position we hoped we’d never be in again, but we always knew was more than likely. Community cases of the COVID-19 delta variant means we’re having to press pause on substantial economic activity to limit the spread of the virus, stop our healthcare system from being overrun, and giving ourselves the best chance to get back to normal. The 17 months since our first Level 4 lockdown have provided us with the time and data to better understand what happens when you freeze the economy. Essential workers keep society moving, people operate from home where they can, and others sit there idle until their work can resume. There’s no doubt this Level 4 lockdown will be a tough blow to the economy. Treasury estimates economic activity is 26% lower during Alert Level 4, costing nearly $1.5b per week in GDP. The wage subsidy could have to support more than a million workers, and Infometrics estimates card spending could fall anywhere between 49% and 60%. But we’ve learnt three important lessons since the first Level 4 lockdown. First, the economic hit, although large, isn’t as big as we first thought. In 2020, Treasury estimated a 40% hit to economic activity at Level 4 but has now revised this back to 26%. Second, spending activity bounced back strongly once we moved down the Alert Levels as pent-up demand got spent. Having locked down first, China’s economy took eight months to return to pre-pandemic spending levels. New Zealand took three. And third, we’ve been getting better at adapting to higher Alert Levels. The fall in spending during recent Auckland lockdowns hasn’t been as severe as the first two lockdowns in 2020, and more businesses have worked to ensure their staff can operate from home and have online stores ready to go. Even I’ve joined in, upgraded from an ironing board desk during Lockdown 1.0 to a slightly better set up this time. Infometrics Principal Economist Brad Olsen Not all sectors will share this improved assessment. For the tourism, hospitality, and retail trade sectors, higher alert Levels will be a real struggle. But many businesses have seen robust levels of demand over recent months as New Zealand’s response to COVID-19 meant we could operate broadly as usual, albeit with border controls. The government has the fiscal firepower to support the country once again, with the first wage subsidy supporting a substantial number of workers and helping limit the peak unemployment rate so far to just 5.3%. With $5.1b in the bank, the government can again be proactive to support jobs, rather than see employment fall. That $5.1b pot of cash is a lot lighter than it should be, and questions need to be asked about some spending from the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund (CRRF) – fishing cameras on boats is hard to tie to a pandemic recovery. Uncertainty remains over COVID-19 – we don’t know when it will end, but it’s increasingly obvious that this pandemic and its impact will reverberate across the world for a time yet. Alert Level 4 means we’ve pressed pause on the economy, but once we hit play again the same issues we had before Level 4 will re-emerge. Inflationary pressures will still be rising, the labour market will remain tight, and Kiwi spending will be high. Uncertainty means it’s hard to plan for what’s around the corner, but we still need to watch out for these emerging issues. But for now, the focus remains on dealing with Level 4. If you’ve got a spare moment this lockdown, start making plans for which local eatery is going to get a visit once we can move about again. Because at Level 4, the issue isn’t that New Zealanders don’t have money – in fact, we save up quite a bit being locked away. Instead, the issue is one of supply – the shops aren’t open, and we can’t purchase. Part of our resilience over the past 17 months has been from our decision as a society to support others. Buy local campaigns have helped inject not only money into Kiwi businesses, but also confidence that households are ready to spend, and that they want to see their local keep going. That’s why I’m confident that the economy will bounce back from this economic setback. Going hard and going early against COVID-19 remains the best response and provides the best health and economic outcomes so that we can reopen and get back towards more normal operations as quickly as possible. Our economy has shown itself to be resilient time and time again, meaning although the economy will take a hit, we’ll bounce back from this setback.