# T

#### A] Interpretation: appropriation means a claim of sovereignty--affs may only defend claims of sovereignty by private entities as unjust

#### Violation: they only defend asteroid mining, which is simply extraction

#### Appropriation is a claim of sovereignty.

United Nations

United Nations, Office for Outer Space Affairs, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html

The [Outer Space Treaty](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html) was considered by the Legal Subcommittee in 1966 and agreement was reached in the General Assembly in the same year ( [resolution 2222 (XXI)](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html)). The Treaty was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted by the General Assembly in its [resolution 1962 (XVIII)](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/principles/legal-principles.html) in 1963, but added a few new provisions. The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository Governments (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it entered into force in October 1967. The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following principles: the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by **claim of sovereignty**, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind; States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities; States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

#### Appropriation refers to sovereign claims of land, not using or extracting resources- proven by OST’s guidelines, nation’s interpretations, and prior property regimes.

Wrench, 19 [Wrench, John. 2019. “Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining,” n.d. <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2546&context=jil>.] WL

It is unlikely, however, that the non-appropriation principle is an absolute ban on the ownership of resources extracted in outer space. An interpretation of Article II supporting a blanket ban on resource ownership is unwarranted by the text of the OST and illfounded on account of the international community’s common practices. Scholars have noted that the international community has never questioned whether scientific samples harvested from celestial bodies belong to the extracting nation.60 Furthermore, space-faring members of the international community rejected the Moon Treaty precisely because it prohibited all forms of ownership in resources extracted from celestial bodies.61 The space-faring nations’ support for the OST, coupled with their rejection of an alternative set of rules governing extracted resources, is at the very least an indication of what those nations believe the non-appropriation principle to stand for. It is equally improbable that the international community drafted the non-appropriation principle to be merely idealistic rhetoric. The OST leaves no room for interpretations to squirm out from under its ban on sovereign claims of land.62 The following section illustrates, however, that the distinction between sovereign ownership of land, and the vestment of property rights in resources extracted from that land, is nothing new. Although the OST does not provide a comprehensive guideline for resource extraction in outer space, its foundational logic provides a workable distinction between ownership and use. This part explores three property regimes developed under the same fundamental constraints as the non-appropriation principle: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the Antarctica Treaty System, and the prior appropriation doctrine as applied in United States water law.63 Under each regime, parties may establish some form of ownership in extracted resources despite being restricted from claiming sovereignty over the underlying land. Each section includes a brief discussion of the property regime’s history, its major traits and their relationship to the overarching characteristics of the non-appropriation principle. This part further describes how each property regime fits within the non-appropriation principle’s prohibition on claims to land, while prohibiting waste, separating land ownership from rights to extracted resources, enforcing liability for destruction or damage, and establishing a simple regulatory system to manage claims.

**Presume neg – all parties to the outer space treaty prohibit “appropriation” of resources by private entities.**

Durkee, 19

Melissa J. Durkee, J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia, ’19, "Interstitial Space Law," Washington University Law Review 97, no. 2 423-482

Those answering this question in the affirmative have access to a strong textual argument. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty specifically references "national" **appropriation**.17 9 The context surrounding that appears to confirm that the prohibition of "national" appropriation is directed at nations, as only a nation could have a legitimate "claim of sovereignty." 180 Moreover, "occupation" refers to old international legal doctrines that once allowed nations to claim territory based on occupation. The historical context within which the treaty was drafted supports this position, as the concern of the time was colonization, not commercial use of space resources. As for private parties, they are specifically anticipated by the treaty: **Article VI states that States Parties bear international responsibility for activities by "non-governmental entities" as well as governmental agencies**.' 8 1 The fact that they are anticipated by the treaty but not included in the Article II prohibition on appropriation suggests that the treaty intended to prohibit only national appropriation of outer space resources.18 2 Those claiming that the treaty prohibits both national appropriation and appropriation by private parties can marshal their own textual argument. Article VI defines "national activities in outer space" to include both "activities . .. carried on by governmental agencies" and those carried on by "non-governmental entities." 8 3 This definition of "national" must inform Article II's prohibition on "national" appropriation and thus extend to a nation's citizens **and commercial entities** as well as governmental activities. Moreover, a contrary interpretation defies logic: **if nations themselves may not claim property rights to outer space objects, they have no power to confer those rights on their nationals.**184

#### This applies to the resolution –

#### 1] Upward entailment test – “appropriation by private entities is unjust” doesn’t imply that “anything done by private entities is unjust” because extraction might not apply

#### 2] Adverb test – "general appropriation by private entities" doesn’t substantially change the meaning of the resolution

#### B] Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh—

#### A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### B] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits:

**A] Quantitative – the topic is literally too big to count – every specific thing that could be defined as “appropriation” from private entities helping out NASA to them mining some asteroids– unlimited ways appropriation could be defined incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden**

**B] Qualitative – unresolutional spec kills unified generics like the innovation DA because you could just say you’re still allowing entities to make claims of sovereignty and go out into space**

#### D] Paradigm Issues –

#### 1] T is DTD – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### 2] Comes before 1AR theory –

#### A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff

#### B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC

#### C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them

#### 3] Use competing interps on T –

#### A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical

#### B] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4] No RVIs –

#### A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat

#### B] discourages checking real abuse

#### C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

# K

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell, 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### Their representation of space travel promotes disembodiment where masculinity is seen as the strong, advanced cyborg and human bodies are feminine and obsolete. Their obsession with tech and exploration turns space into a playground that reifies patriarchal binaries.

Ileri, 21

(Eren Ileri, PhD Philosophy; (2021 accessed 12-27-2021); “Cyborg Astronaut: Disembodied Masculinity and the Imagination of Outer Space in Contemporary Science Fiction”; Research Gate Catalogue; https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293)//ckd

Gender, Disembodied Masculinity and Femininity In this perspective, outer space became white men’s playground, either in real life aspirations or in science fiction, where the language and images of colonialism can be reproduced. Renewed colonialist imagery in the realm of extra-terrestrial space and the manifestation of a new kind of relationship between human and machine, embodied by the cyborg, together constituted the image of the astronaut, that is defined by supposedly intrinsic qualities of masculinity, such as risk taking, pathfinding and having an insatiable curiosity to explore and to progress (Llinares, 2011). Yet, this image of the space explorer, whether as the spacefarer, the scientist or the economic visionary behind the technology (like scientists such as Wernher von Braun or today’s billionaire business men like Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos) is a complex one, incorporating issues of gender, race and class. What is relatively stable in this construction of representation is that space exploration has always been driven by an unquestioned, axiomatic curiosity or drive for exploration which was frequently ascribed as a masculine quality. For Llinares, “[i]n most evocations of space history ´man´ stands in for a supposedly genderless expression of humanity’s innate subjectivity. Think of Neil Armstrong’s now legendary phrase: ´That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind´, or Star Trek’s mantra, ´to boldly go where no man has gone before´. These phrases have become a naturalized parlance and defining rhetoric of space exploration. Far from being neutral semantics however, they are part of an underlying discourse within space history in which ´man´ implicitly means men” (Llinares, 2011: 5)[[26]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn26). Considering the access to outer space, human spaceflight has not been particularly diverse in terms of gender and race/ethnicity (Dovey, 2018). Out of approximately 600 people who traveled to outer space, only 62 of them were women, while 24 astronauts who traveled to the Moon were all white men[[27]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn27). Only recently, following efforts to increase diversity in the selection process of astronauts, NASA has achieved a 50% ratio of men and women with the 2013 astronauts class, where out of eight graduated astronauts, four were women and four men[[28]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn28). Historically, NASA’s criteria for astronaut selection required the candidates to be chosen from a pool of military test pilots, which was exclusively male, since it was not possible for women to enter this profession in the American army in the 1960’s and 70’s. The Soviet Union’s first female cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova traveled to the earth orbit in 1964, much earlier than NASA’s first female astronaut Sally Ride, who flew to space in 1983. Despite the early date of Tereshkova’s flight, it was nearly 20 years until another woman flew to space. Towards the end of the Apollo program in the late 1970’s, there was a shift in the qualifications of astronauts and more were selected among scientists, instead of the ranks of military test pilots. Today, it became natural to conceive astronaut as a “scientist in the lab”, an identity that starkly contrasts with the 1960’s conception of the military-originated, risk-taking, masculinized adventurer astronaut. As space travel became gradually more inclusive to women and people of color, the traditional language of space travel was also challenged. For instance, since 2006 NASA’s guidelines for space travel language suggest the usage of gender neutral terms such as “human-piloted” or “crewed” instead of the much-used and almost standardized term “manned spaceflight”[[29]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn29). In science fiction, the diversification and democratization of space travel in recent years have also been represented and celebrated, as we increasingly see women and people of color characters in the forefront of fictional space exploration. Yet, considering the “techno-masculinized” subject of space travel, one could argue that the representation of masculinity was somewhat decoupled from the physical body, while tensions relating to the traditional binary understanding of gender were rearticulated on the level of the relationship between bodies and the technological. The traditional hierarchical dualism of masculinity and femininity, frequently positions femininity as masculinity’s inferior other. In the landscape of the cyborg, these traditional definitions of masculinity are being rearticulated, taken away from the biological body image and ascribed to hybrid technological subjects. The traditional model of muscular masculinity, characterized by strength, bravery, independence and virility as masculine qualities, has been destabilized with the advent of the cyborg, while being rearticulated through it at the same time. Human bodies have been “feminized”, rearticulated as needing protection, while technology has been “techno-masculinized” (Fernbach, 2000; Masters, 2005). When considering the cyborg’s potential for guarding the patriarchal lineage they emerged from, Cristina Masters crucially points out that “[…] the figure of the cyborg remains rather faithful to its origins. Thus, while the cyborg may provide new grounds upon which to reveal gender representations as contingent and historically grounded social constructs, we need also to attend to the ways in which the figure of the cyborg may continue to represent a desire for total masculinist control and domination” (Masters, 2010: 2)[[30]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn30). One of the most apparent examples for this kind of disembodied masculinity is incorporated by the cyborg soldier of the American military, where the body is the weakest link in the chain, as Masters argues, “[w]hat we are witnessing, and indeed participating in, with the constitution of the cyborg soldier is a radical rearticulation of subjectivity. Contemporary military techno-scientific discourses have profoundly altered the subject of discursive power productions, with the fleshy body of the soldier no longer standing in as the agent of politics by other means, or in this case, war by other means. With the discursive positioning of military technologies as superior to the human soldier, machines are now the subjects of the text. […] Technology, not the male body, becomes the subject capable of the discursive transcendence of embodiment” (Masters, 2010: 5)[[31]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn31). As discussed, masculinity serves as one of the main pillars for the construction of a dualistic, earth-centric understanding of outer space (Kilgore, 2003). But what does masculinity mean in the context of disembodiment and how is it represented in the posthuman condition? To accurately answer this question and to be able to investigate forms and representations of disembodied masculinities in the context of “space exploration”, it is necessary to employ a posthumanist approach, because it allows us to challenge predominantly anthropocentric perceptions of the cosmos. To emphasize a critical proposition towards the understanding of the extra-terrestrial, I will thus draw upon arguments from discourses of posthumanism, new materialism and – albeit with a strong critical distance – transhumanism. Based on this framework, my research investigates how disembodied masculinity manifests itself in the astronaut/spacefarer, in digital game narratives of outer space exploration as well as in the world building and experiencing of outer space through gameplay mechanics. Disembodied and militarized Techno-Masculinity As it becomes apparent in the example of the American soldier – there are organic and formal similarities between the American soldier and the astronaut – the cyborg can become a continuation of patriarchal capitalism and hegemonic masculinity. A similar proposal was also made by Braidotti regarding the condition of the posthuman, recognizing the ambiguity about the end of humanism and “man”: “[t]he Vitruvian Man rises over and over again from his ashes, continues to uphold universal standards and to exercise a fatal attraction” (Braidotti, 2013, 29[[32]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn32); Matthews, 2018, 91)[[33]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn33). Likewise, humanism’s capacity for resistance was also drawn to attention by Neil Badmington: “Apocalyptic accounts of the end of “Man”, it seems to me, ignore humanism’s capacity for regeneration and, quite literally, recapitulation. In the approach to posthumanism on which I want to insist, the glorious moment of Herculean victory cannot yet come, for humanism continues to raise its head(s)” (Badmington, 2003, 11)[[34]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn34). This capacity of “man’s” perpetual insurgency for its validation will form the basis of my thesis. My suggestion is that “man’s” crisis in the face of the posthuman condition and his attempts at reconfiguring the anthropocentric masculine identity in a disembodied subject are exemplified by various representations of the astronaut or outer space exploration narratives and gameplay mechanics across popular science fiction video games. In many popular video games (Metal Gear Solid, Mass Effect, Deus Ex series as few prominent examples for many) we witness a version of glorified transhumanism where the fetishization of human enhancement is expressed both in the game’s narrative and the gameplay itself. At the same time, the aforementioned games morally and ethically question the conditions of the cyborg and almost always posit a tension between the avatar/player and the posthuman condition that is seemingly imposed on the human, posthuman or non-human subject in their narrative. The representation of the “crisis of masculinity” arising from disembodiment in video games is complex and multifaceted, both exemplified by the narratives of conquest, exploitation, antagonistic relationships with non-human entities among others, while also encapsulated by the video games’ intrinsic qualities through gaming technologies which undermine the traditional humanist conception of the subject (Boulter, 2015). Video Game Case Studies The crucial point for contemporary representations of the outer space explorer in video games is the subject’s masculine desire to overcome the organic body’s limitations by transcending into the perfect technological subject. Signaling a crisis in the masculine representations of self and dominated by the anxieties rooted in threatened masculinity, this version of the cyborg desire rids itself of the fleshy body, in an attempt to construct an invulnerable subject position (Masters, 2005). In science fiction the ascription of masculinity away from the human body and on to technology seems to echo the Vitruvian Man’s resistance to the posthuman threat. In the case of the space explorer, the battleground is outer space and the fight is against the othered alien, that being extraterrestrial species, “irrational” artificial intelligence or the hostility of outer space itself; its planets, radiation, lack of breathable atmosphere etc. To develop my argument and expose these tendencies, I will analyze SF digital games that thematically involve outer space and where complex depictions of masculinity are in play. In video games, as discussed by many scholars in the field of game studies, hyper-masculine tropes of man are a common sight (Healey, 2016; Krampe, 2018; Snyder, 2015), but I intend to investigate models that are more intricate in their expression of gender constructs, embodiment and imagination of outer space, such as Mass Effect series (BioWare, 2007 – 2017), Diaries of a Spaceport Janitor (Sundae Month, 2016), The Swapper (Facepalm Games, 2013), Outer Wilds (Mobius Digital, 2019) and The Outer Worlds (Obsidian Entertainment, 2019). Event[0] (Ocelot Society, 2016), Tacoma (Fullbright, 2018), Observation (No Code, 2019), Ostranauts (Blue Bottle Games, 2020) are some of the relevant cases for adventure and life simulation games with outer space settings. Astroneer (System Era Softworks, 2019), No Man’s Sky (Hello Games, 2016), Factorio (Wube Software, 2020) and Satisfactory (Coffee Staion Studios, 2019) are significant cases for how the relationship between the player and the alien planet or outer space is constituted in the open world mechanics of the “sandbox” video games. One of the most prominent models for relatively complex representations of gender and embodiment as well as imagination of outer space as frontier is the video game series Mass Effect. For my research, the most current game in the series, Mass Effect: Andromeda (BioWare, 2017) is of significance, since its narrative exemplifies the dynamics between men and technology and its concept of the “Pathfinder” signifies the idea of militarized and disembodied masculinity. Mass Effect: Andromeda’s plot revolves around the protagonist Scott or Sara Ryder (depending on the normative binary choice of the player to take control of either character), who leads the colonization effort in Milky Way’s neighboring Andromeda Galaxy and becomes humanity’s so called “pathfinder” tasked with finding a habitable planet for colonists to settle on after a 600-year journey. Another prominent game for this research will be No Man’s Sky (Hello Games, 2016) which exemplifies a contemporary iteration of the robinsonade genre. Like No Man’s Sky, many other video games set in outer space can be recognized as examples of this textual genre, utilizing a similar trope in their narratives: the stories typically start with a spaceship crashed and stranded or somehow ejected onto an alien planet, and the games task the player first with survival, and later with the expansion and further exploration and/or exploitation of the planet. Satisfactory (2019), Astroneer (2019) and The Swapper (2013) are further examples. Tracing this trope, the literary genre of robinsonade will be emphasized to track the issues of colonialism and decolonization in science fiction video games. Robinsonade’s importance in the construction of my argument is not only warranted by its reference to colonialism, but also because it exemplifies core humanist tensions and dualities of human and nature, or the alienated “other”, as well as its emphasis on its subject’s necessary qualities for their survival, which is his courage, will for adventure, their positivist faith in science and their Western intellect and training they required back on Earth. In this respect, the robinsonade narrative becomes a theater where tensions between its subject’s core values can be tested or reaffirmed in the face of the posthuman condition. Central Research Questions and Aims This research engages with the following questions: How can the novel representations of disembodied masculinities, which appear in digital games engaged with outer space exploration, be analyzed within a framework derived from posthumanist theory? In what manner is the disembodiment of masculinity and race manifested in the cultural production of outer space in contemporary science fiction video games? How does the cultural production of outer space look like in digital games from 2010 until present? How is the notion of the posthuman related to the cultural production of outer space in contemporary science fiction video games? To engage with these questions, a critical framework of philosophical posthumanism is to be developed in conjunction with science fiction studies. Video game case studies will be analyzed using relevant methodologies from the field of game studies. State of the Art In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of research dedicated to the cultural impacts of outer space. Despite the recent interest in social and cultural significance of the cosmos, in game and visual media studies this topic remains relatively underresearched. Resting on some of the comprehensive works dedicated to this issue in cultural studies, as well as science and technology studies, I intend to address questions about the imagination of outer space, its cultural impacts and its ideological operation in relation to race, gender and the body in game studies. In the field of cultural and media studies, Llinares examines the mythology of the astronaut in the 20th century and its embodiment of complex cultural representations of masculinity (Llinares, 2011). For Messeri’s ethnographical approach towards outer space, place making and mapping practices becomes evident, as she crucially interrogates the legacy of colonialism in this context (Messeri, 2016). Dickens’s work focuses on the “sociology of the universe” and critically engages with the relation between capital and outer space (Dickens, 2016). Similarly, Al-Rodhan interrogates the political notion of the use of technologies in the Earth orbit with the notion of meta-geopolitics of outer space (Al-Rodhan, 2016). For Redfield and Kerslake, respectively, the understanding of outer space exploration and outer space in science fiction become domains of operation for the empire (Redfield, 2002; Kerslake, 2007). Billings traces the ideology of spaceflight and the importance of American exceptionalism for the ideology of spaceflight in order to scrutinize the cultural implications of space advocacy, while Young puts forth Native American perspectives on outer space exploration (Billings, 2007; Young, 1987). Regarding questions related to technology and embodiment, Chun does not just examine the relationship between technology and race but considers race as technology, which draws attention to the performability of race and thereby criticizes biological or cultural perspectives towards it (Chun, 2009). Extending upon this proposition in his post-colonial inquiry, Syed Mustafa Ali positions transhumanism as whiteness, as he analyzes transhumanism’s ideological entanglement with the “White Crisis” (Ali, 2017). Atanasoski and Vora reflect on the relationship between the underlying logic of white supremacy and racial liberalism by sketching the contours and workings of technoliberalism; while Bostrom, Hauskeller and Hughes’ work deals with political, ideological and mythological aspects of transhumanism (Atanasoski, Vera, 2018; Bostrom, 2005; Hauskeller, 2016; Hughes 2002). The aesthetics of techno-utopian, transhumanist visions in right wing reactionary discourses and their relation to the colonization of outer space are present in the writings of M. Ambedkar (Ambedkar, 2017). Fernbach, Masters and Mackinnon engage with the notion of disembodied masculinity in the cyborg (Fernbach, 2002; Masters 2010; Mackinnon, 2018). Regarding the social and ethical implications of human settlement in outer space, Ferrando points out the necessity of a posthumanist reflection of space migration (Ferrando, 2016). In the field of science fiction studies, Hsu-Ming Teo outlines science fiction’s affiliation with American nationalism and the concept of space as the “final frontier”, as well as what it draws from the Enlightenment, such as its views of science, rationality, progress and perfectibility (Hsu-Ming, 1994). Bajaber opens up the genre’s potential for post-colonial writers who engage in decolonization (Bajaber, 2013). Grewell and Pak’s works also investigate the role of colonialism in the imagination of the “conquest” of outer space, as well as the concept of terraforming, while Nama and Kilgore draws upon the notion of race in American science fiction (Grewell, 2001; Pak, 2016; Nama, 2009; Kilgore, 2003). Matthews crucially analyses posthuman masculinity and humanist “man’s self-preservative resistance to an ontology that heralds his obsolescence” in the realm of film (Matthews, 2018: 87)[[35]](https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/733292/733293#fn35). The relationship between the construction of masculinity and outer space, as well as how race comes in to play in this context, requires additional research, since research in this direction for the most part revolves around the history of space travel, rather than focusing on its contemporary implications and impacts, regarding issues of privatization of outer space travel (MacDonald, 2017; Dubbs and Paat-Dahlstrom, 2013) and the rhetoric of “leaving the earth” in the face of the environmental crises caused by global climate change (Impey, 2015). In the light of these aforementioned works I intend to emphasize contemporary critical posthumanist theory. By deploying a feminist and post-colonial critique regarding issues of embodiment, or disembodiment of masculinity in the context of the imagination of outer space, this research addresses the necessity to integrate critical posthumanist theory into the fields of game and science fiction studies.

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making—claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making.

Sjoberg, 13

(Laura Sjoberg, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally.

Youngs, 4

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi, 16

(Carol Bacchi, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

# Case

#### **Economic decline / satellites won’t cause war—war is rare and multifactorial**

Cashman and Robinson, 21

Cashman, Greg, and Leonard C. Robinson. An introduction to the causes of war: Patterns of interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq. Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

In the previous sections, we have identified a large number of factors that contribute to the outbreak of war. While not all of these factors are necessary for war to occur, many of them appear frequently enough in combination with each other to cause us to be wary of their potential to bring about warfare. The case studies presented in the following chapters are used to clarify how these factors (and perhaps other factors) combine to create war. These case studies have not been selected as a representative sample of wars of the past 100 years, and thus they in no way constitute an attempt to empirically test our propositions about the causes of war. The cases have been selected because they appear to be some of the most important instances of war in the past 100 years and because of their inherent interest to students of international conflict. We also tried to select cases from diverse eras and geographic regions, and we wanted to include wars that involved minor powers as well as major powers. The method used in these case studies is called process tracing. Essentially, we attempt to trace the causal process by which initial conditions or root causes combine with more immediate or proximate factors to develop, over time, into war. We do this by focusing on those variables or factors that the theoretical and empirical literature in IR has identified as important causes of war. We wish to see if causal factors identified by research using aggregate data on war apply in the particular cases selected here. More importantly, we wish to ascertain how the various causal factors might cluster together and interact with each other to produce war. In other words, we seek to identify and examine causal chains that produce war and to compare the similarities and differences between the causal chains found in our cases. We consider this study a modest first cut at achieving these goals. It will certainly not end the debate on the causes of war. We begin our investigation of the case studies by laying out a number of assumptions and expectations that are at the basis of our analysis. 1. No single causal factor is responsible for interstate war. 2. Since interstate war is a relatively rare event, and since individual causal factors by themselves are likely to increase the probability of war only slightly, war is most likely to be the result of a relatively rare combination of multiple causal factors that come together simultaneously and interact dynamically with each other to produce situations that are inherently dangerous and prone to violence. (See Bennett and Stam 2004, 155–56, on this point.) Thus, the outbreak of war is likely to be the result of a perfect storm of risk factors occurring simultaneously. 3. These causal factors exist at several different levels of analysis. 4. We expect that the exact nature and number of these factors will vary somewhat from war to war, and that no two cases of war are likely to result from exactly the same combination of forces. 5. Nevertheless, certain factors would appear often enough and in combinations and sequences that are repetitive enough to indicate their crucial impact in turning a dispute into a full-fledged war. In other words, we expect to find clearly discernable patterns and regularities in our search for the causes of war, and these patterns may take the shape of causal chains that sequentially link causal factors together.

#### COVID and economic downturns dampen conflict – military infection, lack of money, and lower levels of international trade.

Posen, PhD, 20

(Posen, Barry (Prof. PoliSci and Security Studies Program Director@MIT, Fellow@UC-Berkeley Graduate School for the Study of World Politics, Member of the CFR, PhD PoliSci@UC-Berkeley). “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?” Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace//SHL)

When one side gains a sudden and pronounced advantage, however, this de-escalatory logic can break down: the optimistic side will increase its demands faster than the pessimistic side can appease. Some analysts worry that something like this could happen in U.S.-Chinese relations as a result of the new coronavirus. The United States is experiencing a moment of domestic crisis. China, some fear, might see the pandemic as playing to its advantage and be tempted to throw its military weight around in the western Pacific. What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is **weakening all of the great and middle powers** more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go **down, not up**. PAX EPIDEMICA? A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.) That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war **depends on people**. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still **threaten military units**, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly. Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an **abundance of caution is likely to persist** for some time after it comes into use. The most important reason disease inhibits war is **economic**. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the **source of military power**. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. **Drained treasuries** will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely **dampen the appetite for conflict** for some time—perhaps up to **five or ten years**. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be **less** **inclined to support adventures** abroad. At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be **diminished trade**, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has **not helped improve relations** between states but rather **fueled resentment**. Less trade could mean **less friction between major powers**, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries. In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination. Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and a great deal to **feed their reasonable pessimism** about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.