# T – FW

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical enactment of the resolution.

#### Violation: they don’t meet because they aren’t debating about the resolution

#### B. Our Offense

#### 1. Limits- post-fiat impacts are limited enough based on the plan text but allowing performative and pre-fiat impacts opens the floodgates – there’s an infinite number of justifications behind the 1AC or performative aspects of they could claim to garner offense from. No part of the 1AC warranted why their performance was a good thing or how they could garner offense which especially proves our argument

#### 2. Causality – debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate

#### 3. Exclusionary rule- you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

#### C. Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

#### Abstract critique has derailed the Asian American Movement- political action is the only hope of change

Lin, JD Yale, 04

(Elbert, IDENTIFYING ASIAN AMERICA Southwestern University Law Review 2004 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 217)

Change is needed in asian America. n1 The asian American "movement" - the asian American struggle for equality and against anti-asian American discrimination - continues to founder. America remains largely unaware or unconvinced of serious race-based discrimination against asian Americans. The problem, I believe, is a deep-seated one. Asian America has not simply been employing an unsuccessful strategy, it has been and continues to be wholly misguided in the sort of strategy it should be using. I lay the blame at the feet of current asian American race scholars. They have taken the asian American movement away from identity-based organizing and toward the universe of coalition building-type strategies. They have also boxed the movement into thinking only about methods that advance a "progressive" agenda. My belief is that only when asian America has shifted its basic direction will it be able to begin considering an appropriate strategy. In this Article, my goal is to address this first step: I make the case for a shift and chart a new direction for the asian American movement. First, I critique current asian American race theory. I demonstrate the weaknesses in its arguments against identity-based organizing. Indeed, I show that a successful strategy must embrace racial identity. I also illustrate the pitfalls of limiting ourselves to a "progressive" (or any political) agenda. Second, I use my critiques as guidelines for a new framework. The appropriate universe of strategies, therefore, includes those strategies that embrace identity-based organizing and that have a broader, more inclusive focus. But given the correct universe of strategies, which is the proper approach? A sufficiently thorough discussion must await a future forum. In this Article, I only set up that conversation. I roughly outline my preferred strategy and demonstrate how it passes my critiques of current asian American scholarship - in other words, that it falls within the new universe of identity-based, inclusive strategies. Before beginning, a few caveats are in order. For one, my critique will seem in large part directed at asian Critical scholars. This is because "asianCrit" dominates asian American race theory. My intent, however, is not to take sides; indeed, I draw on arguments from different asian American race theorists as they are appropriate. I believe no single [\*219] approach has been sufficient. I also do not mean to say asian American race scholarship has been wholly impotent. On the contrary, asian American race thinking has strongly made the case that asian Americans face race-based discrimination. In particular, they have drawn attention to the race-ing of asian Americans as perpetual foreigners, and they have undermined the model minority stereotype. My purpose here is to pick up where this success leaves off. Indeed, the strategy I believe asian America should follow is one where we make our treatment as perpetual foreigners our sole focus. I am critical only of their implementation - that they have failed to make the right things the objects of their action. Finally, I will not address the argument that asian American race theory has not failed or erred because its purpose never was to foment a successful movement. This Article takes as a fundamental assumption the belief that normative theory - including race theory - is intended to have practical effect. Much of legal academia, I understand, would contend otherwise. I assert, however, that race theory especially should have a practical intent. The fact that race scholars continue to struggle to find academic venues for discussion makes it ever more important not to waste our limited space on idle musings.

# Dwelling PIC

Their plan: Thus, my advocacy is to depathologize and dwell within melancholia – re-appropriating melancholia as a militant preservation of the lost object and refusal to attain whitened ideals opens up acts of revolt. You vote aff to endorse the destruction of debate.

#### CP: Thus, my advocacy is to depathologize and live with melancholia – re-appropriating melancholia as a militant preservation of the lost object and refusal to attain whitened ideals opens up acts of revolt

#### The CP solves the whole case- the only time the word “dwell” occurs in the 1AC is in the advocacy text- not a single card mentions or defends it

#### 2 Net benefits

#### 1. Reparative research-We should mourn but not *dwell*- reparative work taps into the continental archive to reanimate life. Progress isn’t linear or short term, but its life affirming

Mbembe and Goldberg, PhDs, 18

(Achille, History@Harvard David Theo, Director, University of California Humanities Research Institute, <https://www.theoryculturesociety.org/conversation-achille-mbembe-and-david-theo-goldberg-on-critique-of-black-reason/>, 7-3)

AM: … yeah. I really believe that the act of writing, that is what its function is. To mourn what is lost in a way that does not dwell in the trauma, to escape the curse of repetition, to put together once again the debris and the fragments of that which has been broken and try somewhat to provide them with a space of rest, to return to life the harvest of bones that have been subjected to the forces of dessication, to render the world habitable for all, again. That’s why I write in the way I do. DTG: So it’s a collage in the best sense? AM: It is a mosaic and a position, it’s a play on differences and contradictions. It’s the putting together of things we don’t usually put together to produce an effect, to produce surprise, an eclat. And where necessary, to enlist adherence. An active process which calls for participation, meditation and, eventually, joy and celebration. It is a praxis and an aesthetics. DTG: In this context repair becomes both imperative and much more capacious in its reach than what has become the African-American archive, or self-understanding, of reparation. Reparation in the American archive has come to be understood, on both, on all sides of the tug-of-war around these things, largely in reductively material terms. AM: In African precolonial systems of thought, matter alone is never enough. What strikes me travelling in the continent quite a lot, in every single major urban center in the continent, when you land, the most striking thing is the number of people busy repairing something – whether a car, whether … anything … DTG: … a tire, a house … AM: … a tire, a house, a pair of shoes, a piece of dress, every single little thing. Or people start building a house, run out of money, then live for years in an unfinished structure, take a long time to save again and then they pick it up where they left off … DTG: … and it becomes something else … AM: And they keep moving and it becomes something entirely different, which might never be completely done in their lifetime, and they will leave it behind, a legacy to those who will come after them. Something significant must be going on in these practices of the everyday, the meaning of which we still have to elicit. To repair is to be alive. So that’s the first sense of reparation – to be alive and to take care of something that matters because that thing is a very condition of my survival with others, my being with others, my moving on with others, my leaving something behind for others, something through which they might remember me. Reparation is the opposite of destruction. It is about building a liberating memory, not dwelling in a traumatic memory, the kind of toxic memory that opens up the door to envy, revenge and nihilism. DTG: There’s a contrast too, when one thinks about it, in the sort of prevailing conception – and this will bring us to the question about identity politics, about which at least, in passing, you make critical reference – of the trajectory through multiculturalism and into a more contemporary relation of the post-multicultural moment. The notion of recognition becomes at least in part imperative. And if you think about, if not the contrast or the relation or the tension between caring and recognition, the distinct both psychic and social condition to which they speak – there’s an interesting shift. It is a shift from a politics of recognition to a politics – I mean it used to be in a feminist tradition an ethics of care – but also now a politics of care. This serves as a kind of underpinning of this more capacious, more expanded, more vibrant notion of repair as self-address. It is a self-address however made possible only through its relation to others – all others – and their world. AM: All others include my contemporaries, those who came before me as well as those who will come after me. This inter- and transgenerational dimension is constitutive of what you call an ethics of care. So too is my relation with the environment I live in, the objects I make in my everyday life, in short, the world I inhabit. This is really, at least in the African context, in the continental African archive, what we mean by repair, the becoming other of the living, be it matter or human; the care for not only the living but also other apparently inert entities. Indeed, the entanglement that keeps the universe tied together is so deep that it’s being broken at any point of time opens the door to serious disorder, political and social disorders, disorders of the mind. So in this sense I think there is a possibility of stretching the idea of repair in a way which goes beyond a mere politics of recognition. The difficulty with a politics of recognition is that I might recognize you, but I don’t really believe that we owe anything to each other. In this sense, recognition is limited to the mere recording of the mere fact that you are here, but your being in my midst entails no obligation whatsoever, neither on your part nor on mine. I have no obligation to speak to you or to listen when you address me. In the project of repair, there’s the admission of a kind of debt that is not expropriatory; a debt that is in fact necessary for the very constitution of either the social or the community. Indeed, there is no community as such without, at its foundation, some idea of a debt. And this has nothing to do with an expropriatory type of debt … DTG: … it’s in the anthropological tradition of debt and the gift … AM: At least there is an embrace of, for instance, the fact that I am not my own creator. It is other people who made decisions, that’s why I am here. Or the fact that what really characterizes all of us – which is basic – is that at some point we have to exit, we have to exit the door. And that everything in fact pushes us towards the door. And in that sense we are just like passersby. But [that] doesn’t mean that we have no duties or responsibilities that come from the fact of us passing by. DTG: So, it requires a sense of psychic and social and cultural investment that is not reducible simply, narrowly, to the economic. AM: It has to be an investment that is premised on some concept of mutuality or reciprocity. So questions of redistributive justice are important, but we can supplement the very concept of justice by drawing on that anthropology in which matters of the common, the in-common, the mutual and the reciprocal go beyond the individual. The in-common is not about communalism. It’s a third-space between communalism and individualism, and there’s a type of – a concept of – justice that it calls for that is not simply redistributive. It is also reparative, regenerative, transformational. DTG: Yeah, redistributive justice on its own in the traditional sense of the term must necessarily fail in what it claims to achieve if that’s all there is. There’s remediation both in a giving back and in a resignifying of the sense of relation that is taking place. In this twofold condition – the one never reducible to the other but also always in play with the other … AM: … and that’s part of what I try to articulate in the conclusion … DTG: … the sense of there being only one world … AM: … There is only one world. We are all entitled to it by the fact of our very existence. The only way in which to ensure its sustainability or its duration is to share it as equitably as possible. And when I say we must share it, I do not simply have humans in mind; we must share it with every other existent, and in so doing, reinvent democracy. Democracy has basically been democracy for the humans. We must extend its meaning so democracy can include more than just us. Or more than just the citizens. Hopefully, the conclusion gestures towards further research, further reflections on the kind of responsibilities we ought to bear in relation to a history that has been torturous and brutal. It argues for a different ethics, one of remembrance that would neither be akin to the performance of trauma, nor lead to revenge or nihilism … DTG: … or reductionism … AM: … so that’s the purpose. To recall past horrors does not need to necessarily end with, as the only alternative, a politics of impossibility. I say this in the full knowledge of the fact that we live in an age when everything works towards the elimination of any temporal distance between the present and the past. Everything invites us to become ignorant. There is an incredible demand for ignorance, for apocalypticism. When blissful ignorance and apocalypticism are coupled with uncritical self-belief, they create a sense of innocence and blamelessness which is at the foundation of the most extreme forms of violence in this age of ours. How we get out of this dilemma might well determine the fate of democracy and our sense of justice in our times.

#### 2. Capitalism- “dwelling” comes from Heideggarian phenomenology. The relationships it posits about “being” dematerialize the world/sanitizes private property

**Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008**(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 62-64)

The cultural turn naturalizes the anti-labor views of the Taft-Hartley Act through a wide range of discourses from popular culture to philosophy. Heidegger, whose writings bring considerable authority to the interpretive logic of the cultural tum, provides a master lesson in anti-labor cultural critique in his analytics of *dwelling/building (Poetry, Language, Thought* 145-161). He depicts the plight of workers ("truck driver" and "working woman," 145) not as a result of the absence of freedom from necessity but, in effect, as lack of spirituality. As in all ideologies, he explains the material by the ineffable, the worldly by the ghostly, through rewriting "building" (the material house) as "dwelling" (the holy singularity). His interpretation thins and dissipates the material objective ("building") in the religious, the spiritual, and the subjective ("dwelling") by means of "thought." As he writes in "Letter on Humanism," "Thinking" overcomes the objective by engaging Being for Being: "I'engagement par I'Etre pour I'Etre" (194). The material relations of production involved in "building" are transformed into the immateriality of "dwelling"-the primal call of Being *(Poetry, Language, Thought 148).* As Heidegger attenuates the objectivity of "housing" by converting it into the spirituality of "dwelling," the historical alienation of "the truck driver" and "the working woman" produced by wage labor (the relations of the "owner" and the "workers" in "building") is re-Thought as an inability to listen to the silences of language (148). The relation to language, according to Heidegger, and not the social division of labor is what brings about the estrangement of the subject. Heidegger writes that Man acts as though *he* were the shaper and master of language, while in fact *language* remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of *this* relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation." (146) c Spiritualizing the social by transcoding "housing" into "dwelling" enables Heidegger to rewrite the "housing shortage" (161), which is an effect of property relations, as the existential absence of the holy-forgetting the being-in-theworld. He mystifies the wretchedness of not having any actual shelter ("house") by evoking the *"real plight of dwelling"* which "does not lie merely in lack of houses" (161) but lies in the fact "that mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they *must ever learn to dwelt"* (161). Housing (the material) itself is represented by Heidegger as a building alienated from Being, while "dwelling ... is *the basic character* of Being" (160). Significantly, it is in "dwelling" (the spiritual), for Heidegger, that the homeless overcomes the "hard and bitter. ..hampering and threatening" lack of "housing" (the material) and is disalienated into Being (161). After having been subjected to a "concernful deliberation" *(Being and Time* 412) by which he divides Being into *"present-at-hand"* (67) and *"readiness-tohand"* (98), the objective emerges in his writings as numinous and transcendental with a halo of otherworldliness. An objective "hammer," for instance, which "circumspectively" is "too heavy or too light," loses these qualities after his caring reading, because we have now sighted something that is suitable for the hammer, not as a tool, but as a corporeal Thing subject to the law of gravity. To talk circumspectively of 'too heavy' or 'too light' no longer has any 'meaning'; that is to say, the entity in itself, as we now encounter it, gives us nothing with relation to which it could be 'found' too heavy or too light. *(Being and Time 412)* Underneath the object ("hammer") there is always a deeper objectivity (the "corporeal Thing") which is transobjective "Being-in-itself' (98), and unlike the being that is present-at-hand, it is appropriate to Dasein's character (67). Transforming the objective into the otherworldly and reversing the relation of the material to the cultural takes place through "thinking." Social goals, such as objective access and equality (housing), are rendered trivial compared to the spiritual raptures and affective ecstasy of the dweller in Being. For Heidegger, thinking is always "thinking of Being" ("Letter on Humanism" 196), and it is the cure for material dispossession: "as soon as man *gives thought* to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer" (161). To cease to think of Being as an issue is, accordingly, to cease to be human, for whom being ("dwelling") is a question, and to become a thing ("housing") whose being is already decided ("Letter on Humanism" 213-214). By existentializing "thingness" (house), Heidegger dematerializes the social relations of property-what turns humans into things. He, therefore, clouds the fact that the contemporary every day (the "there" and "here" of Being-in-the-world where there is a "housing shortage") is a reified every day in which the producers ("subject") and the products ("object") are at odds with each other not because producers cease to think of Being as an issue but because of the "conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into things" under wage labor in the "working day" (Marx, *Capital* I, 209, 340-416). "Thing-ness," which according to Heidegger is the mark of the transmogrification of human (for whom being is an issue) into non-human (whose being is already determined), is not the effect of a lack of engagement with Being but the outcome of what Marx calls the "personification of things and the reification *(Versachlichung)* of persons" (1054). It takes place because the compulsion of capital for surplus labor makes the former "homed" and the latter "homeless." Heidegger's reading is not a subtle interpretation of "dwelling" "housing" and displacing of the absolute which excludes the difference of Being-in-the-world. Rather, it is a crude masking of class binaries which depersonify humans and personify objects by denying the objectivity of material labor.

# case

#### Even complit crit scholars repeat Freudian mistakes on “mourning”- be skeptical of aff re-appropriation

Forter, PhD, 05

(Greg, English@SCC, Against Melancholia: Contemporary Mourning Theory, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, and the Politics of Unfinished Grief” differences

Since at least the late 1960s, scholars seeking to understand experiences of social or collective bereavement have drawn on Freud’s influential distinction between mourning and melancholia. The distinction is by now well known. “Mourning” designates, on Freud’s account, a psychic response to loss that reaches a definite end or conclusion, since the mourner is able to work through grief in a relatively unambivalent fashion—and so to relinquish past attachments in the name of forming new ones. Melancholia, by contrast, is mourning crippled by a hostility toward what one has lost that prevents one from fully relinquishing it; it entails an ambivalent incorporation of the object as a strategy for keeping one’s argument with it going and results in a sense of inner desolation, an incapacity to form new attachments, and a self-beratement whose unconscious target is the internalized object—but whose intensity can nonetheless culminate in the melancholic’s suicide (“Mourning” 243–53). Early efforts to use this distinction for exploring collective losses accepted uncritically Freud’s **understanding of melancholia as a pathology**, even as they offered important modifications to his theory. Most significant among these efforts was Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich’s The Inability to Mourn. The Mitscherlichs sought to explain the widespread failure in postwar Germany to confront the nation’s Nazi past. They argued that, in the wake of the Third Reich’s humiliating defeat, German society should have undergone a kind of melancholic crisis, a collective plunge into depression at the enforced rupture of individual egos from the Führer as ego-ideal. This melancholic reaction was for the Mitscherlichs the condition of authentic mourning; that is, they thought of melancholia not merely as a crippling psychic debility but also as a more primitive or archaic moment in mourning: a state arising from the loss of identifications so profound as to be constitutive of one’s self, and a state which must be worked through in order to establish the sense of separate- ness that enables one to relinquish what one has lost. Only through this process could the German people have overcome (rather than repress) the narcissistic identifications that provided the psychosocial support for the Holocaust. And only then could so many begin to mourn the genocidal deaths in which they had psychically collaborated. The Mitscherlichs described a number of strategies by which German people evaded this labor, including a tendency to cast themselves as victims, an effort to “derealize” the past, the desperately immediate transfer of allegiance to the Allies, and the collective manic defenses embodied symptomatically in the “economic miracle.” The Inability to Mourn sparked an enormously fruitful controversy in West Germany upon its publication in 1967. I raise it here, in a quite different context, because it seems to me the product of a moment that feels surprisingly remote from our own—a moment when politically committed intellectuals could still believe with some sanguinity that social losses ought to be mourned, that successful mourning was both possible and socially preferable to melancholia.1 To put it this way is to simplify slightly, since the Mitscherlichs trouble Freud’s distinction by recasting melancholia as the prerequisite for mourning; but they value the melancholic state only as an unavoidable necessity. They see it as an affliction caused by the loss of certain kinds of social bonds and insist that it has to be worked through in the name of inventing a society that remembers, rather than unconsciously repeats, a murderous and authoritarian past. By the early 1990s, when Eric Santner extended the Mitscherlichs’ analysis in his Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany, a shift in critical attitudes toward melancholia had placed new demands on the call for mourning. Santner devotes significant portions of his first chapter to the posthumous discovery of Paul de Man’s collaborationist wartime writings. He engages especially the defense mounted by various scholars (including Jacques Derrida) that de Man’s later emphasis on the elegiac character of language represented a rigorous expiation for and displaced working through of his ideological complicity with Nazism. Santner argues that such defenses elide a cru- cial distinction. While it may be true that language entails an originary decentering that cuts us off from the plenitude of Being, and while deconstruction may insist we acknowledge this decentering in order to resist the violence enabled by its disavowal (the subjugation of otherness and its magisterial assimilation to the same), the loss to which language initiates us is clearly not the same as the loss of actual loved ones, let alone the loss of those who died as victims of an ideology to which one has (how- ever temporarily) subscribed. Santner calls this the distinction between “structural” and “historical” mourning. “The error of Paul de Man,” he writes, “was [. . .] that he sought to displace and disperse the particular, historical tasks of mourning [. . .] with what might be called structural mourning, that is, mourning for those ‘catastrophes’ that are inseparable from being-in-language” (29). De Man thus avoided a confrontation with history by displacing his mournful gaze onto the divestments incurred by language. “And since,” Santner continues, “so much recent critical theory has followed de Man’s lead in reducing historical suffering [. . .] to a series of structural operations depleted of affect [. . .] the error of Paul de Man [. . .] becomes exemplary” (29). Not just de Man but poststructuralism more generally has tended to lose sight of the psychosocial histories that particularize contingent losses within the larger, more inescapable field of bereavements that all of us share. Santner himself continues to think of both structural and historical grief-work as mourning. We might, however, recast his distinction as one between mourning and melancholia and say that the emphasis on structural loss as constitutive of human subjectivity marks the emergence in critical discourse of a recuperated melancholia, according to which “surmounting” bereavement becomes a kind of specious denial of our predicament as linguistic beings. A subject constituted by alienation into language is one that is ineradicably melancholy. Any effort to work through this state can only be seen as a retreat into the mystifications of self-presence or into the psychotic delusions of a linguistically unmediated possession of the real. Subjective enlightenment consists, accordingly, in acknowledging that one is disconsolately marooned in the symbolic: compensated for the loss of Being by a language one must never mistake for a medium of mastery or an instrument through which one might properly name and even get an object that makes one whole. Santner’s book could thus be said to elaborate the political limits of a theory that makes subjectivity intrinsically melancholy—a theory the political rationale of which has been a kind of antihumanist libertarianism suspicious of the kinds of closures and restitutions that “normal” mourning implies. Without denying the poststructuralist insight, Santner insists that historical losses exceed those induced by language2 and that for these more concrete losses, we might productively retain an emphasis on the necessity of “working through” and the possibility of compensatory investments. Implicit in such an account is the further recognition that to absorb historical losses—which are contingent and therefore resistible—into structural losses—which are inevitable and irresistible—is to vacate the field of ethical choice and political action altogether. In the decade since the publication of Santner’s book, poststructuralist descriptions of what I am calling a “melancholic subjectivity” have given way to explicit attempts to **rehabilitate melancholia**—and to do so in the context of historical rather than structural (linguistic) catastrophes. Scholars, that is, have mounted spirited defenses of melancholia on political grounds. Their broadest claims have been that the irresolution of melancholia may be characteristic of grief more generally and that the **effort to pathologize such responses** works to **normalize** **restitutive** **mourning** in the name of a **disciplinary social ideal.** Jahan Ramazani thus finds in modern elegy a “melancholic mourning” that challenges Freud’s “**insidious distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ grief**” (140). Philip Novak makes this challenge part of an antiracist politics, suggesting that melancholia may be an appropriate and necessary response for African Americans trying to hold on to a distinctive culture threatened by white racism (191). Michael Moon contends that, because gay men and women are “categorically excluded” from the “normalcy” that mourning restores, “the Freudian model of mourning may look fundamentally normalizing and [. . .] privative.” He therefore recommends that gay men respond to the catastrophes of aids with what amounts to a melancholic fetishism, through which they might extend (rather than relinquish) their erotic attachments to the dead (235, 239). And José Muñoz synthesizes the kinds of arguments made by Moon and Novak, suggesting that “for blacks and queers [. . .] melancholia [is] not a pathology or a self-absorbed mood that inhibits activism, but [. . .] a mechanism that helps us (re)construct identity and take our dead to the various battles we must wage in their names” (355–56). Such politically sensitive revisions mark an advance over post- structuralism’s more globalizing descriptions of melancholy subjectivity. By grounding their claims in specific experiences of loss, often those of subcultural groups, these authors help remind us that to establish a **universal** **pattern** of **mourning** and **enjoin** **all** **victims** **of loss** to follow it is to erase the **particularities of lived experience**, and often, to delegitimate **continued** **attachment** to what a **dominant** **culture deems unimportant or pernicious**. That psychoanalysis has historically abetted such delegitimation makes caution an especially wise policy when addressing social ills with psychic categories. And **though “mourning” may seem a relatively benign term in this context**—compared, say, with the more clearly vexed psychoanalytic history of “homosexual”—the critics I have mentioned are right to point out that the **injunction to mourn is often used in astonishingly normalizing ways**, even by supposedly “enlightened” theorists and analysts such as Julia Kristeva.3 (p. 34-38)