# Abolish WTO CP

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government reduce intellectual property protections for medicines as a form of ghostly ethic.

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

### Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

### Colonialism

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej, 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

reduce intellectual property protections for medicines as a form of ghostly ethic.

# Safety DA

#### Covid-19 vaccines are safe and effective right now.

Moline, 21

(Heidi L. Moline, MD; Michael Whitaker, MPH; Li Deng, PhD; Julia C. Rhodes, PhD; Jennifer Milucky, MSPH; Huong Pham, MPH; Kadam Patel, MPH; Onika Anglin, MPH; Arthur Reingold, MD Shua J. Chai, MD; Nisha B. Alden, MPH; Breanna Kawasaki, “Effectiveness of COVID-19 Vaccines in Preventing Hospitalization Among Adults Aged ≥65 Years” <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7032e3.htm> , August 13)

Clinical trials of COVID-19 vaccines currently authorized for emergency use in the United States (Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Janssen [Johnson & Johnson]) indicate that these vaccines have high efficacy against symptomatic disease, including moderate to severe illness (1–3). In addition to clinical trials, real-world assessments of COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness are critical in guiding vaccine policy and building vaccine confidence, particularly among populations at higher risk for more severe illness from COVID-19, including older adults. To determine the real-world effectiveness of the three currently authorized COVID-19 vaccines among persons aged ≥65 years during February 1–April 30, 2021, data on 7,280 patients from the COVID-19–Associated Hospitalization Surveillance Network (COVID-NET) were analyzed with vaccination coverage data from state immunization information systems (IISs) for the COVID-NET catchment area (approximately 4.8 million persons). Among adults aged 65–74 years, effectiveness of full vaccination in preventing COVID-19–associated hospitalization was 96% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 94%–98%) for Pfizer-BioNTech, 96% (95% CI = 95%–98%) for Moderna, and 84% (95% CI = 64%–93%) for Janssen vaccine products. Effectiveness of full vaccination in preventing COVID-19–associated hospitalization among adults aged ≥75 years was 91% (95% CI = 87%–94%) for Pfizer-BioNTech, 96% (95% CI = 93%–98%) for Moderna, and 85% (95% CI = 72%–92%) for Janssen vaccine products. COVID-19 vaccines currently authorized in the United States are highly effective in preventing COVID-19–associated hospitalizations in older adults. In light of real-world data demonstrating high effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines among older adults, efforts to increase vaccination coverage in this age group are critical to reducing the risk for COVID-19–related hospitalization. COVID-NET includes data on laboratory-confirmed COVID-19–associated hospitalizations in 99 U.S. counties in 14 states, representing approximately 10% of the U.S. population.† COVID-NET cases were hospitalizations that occurred in residents of a designated COVID-NET catchment area who were admitted within 14 days of a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result. COVID-NET program personnel collected information on COVID-19 vaccination status (vaccine product received, number of doses, and administration dates) from state IISs for all sampled COVID-NET cases.§ Some sites expanded collection of information on vaccination status to all reported COVID-NET cases, not only sampled cases, which were included for analysis if all cases in a single month had vaccination status available. Data from 13 sites were included for analysis; one site (Iowa) does not have access to the state IIS and cannot collect vaccination data.¶ Population-level vaccination coverage was determined using deidentified person-level COVID-19 vaccination data reported to CDC by jurisdictions, pharmacies, and federal entities through the IISs,\*\* Vaccine Administration Management System,†† or direct data submission.§§ The study was restricted to adults aged ≥65 years and included the period February 1–April 30, 2021. The Janssen vaccine was authorized for use during the study period beginning March 15, 2021.¶¶ Patients were classified as 1) unvaccinated (no IIS record of vaccination), 2) partially vaccinated (1 dose of Moderna or Pfizer-BioNTech received ≥14 days before hospitalization or 2 doses, with the second dose received <14 days before hospitalization), or 3) fully vaccinated (receipt of both doses of Moderna or Pfizer-BioNTech with second dose received ≥14 days before hospitalization or receipt of a single dose of Janssen ≥14 days before hospitalization). Patients with only 1 dose of any COVID-19 vaccine received <14 days before hospitalization were excluded. Daily county-level coverage data for adults aged 65–74 and ≥75 years in the COVID-NET catchment area were estimated using population denominators from the U.S. Census Bureau; vaccination status was classified as described for hospitalized cases.\*\*\* For vaccine records missing county of residence, county of vaccine administration was used. To estimate vaccine effectiveness and corresponding 95% CIs, methods were adapted based on previously published literature (4). Poisson regression was used to compare case counts by vaccination status (outcome) and the proportion of the population vaccinated and unvaccinated (offset).††† Data were stratified by age group because of the potential for confounding by age, and adjusted for COVID-NET site, time (number of weeks since the start of the study period as a categorical covariate), and monthly site-specific sampling frequency.§§§ Vaccine effectiveness was calculated as one minus the exponent of the estimated coefficient of the exposure (vaccination status) variable. For estimating effectiveness of full vaccination, partially vaccinated persons were excluded; for estimating effectiveness of partial vaccination, fully vaccinated persons were excluded. Vaccine product–specific estimates excluded persons who had received other COVID-19 vaccines. To account for the interval between infection and hospitalization, sensitivity analyses were conducted using a reference date 1 week and 2 weeks before admission, rather than admission date, for classification of vaccination status for cases (i.e., adding 7 and 14 days, respectively between last vaccine dose and hospital admission date); the same adjustment was included for population vaccination coverage. Statistical analyses were conducted using SAS software (version 9.4; SAS Institute). This activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.¶¶¶ During February 1–April 30, 2021, among 7,280 eligible COVID-NET patients, 5,451 (75%) were unvaccinated, 867 (12%) were partially vaccinated, and 394 (5%) were fully vaccinated; 568 (8%) who received a single vaccine dose <14 days before hospitalization were excluded from the analysis (Table). Vaccination coverage in the population increased rapidly during this period among persons aged ≥65 years and varied by age and vaccine product (Figure 1). Among adults aged ≥65 years in the COVID-NET catchment area, full vaccination coverage from any of the three authorized vaccines ranged from 0.7% on February 1, 2021, to 72% on April 30, 2021. Effectiveness of full vaccination in preventing hospitalization among adults aged 65–74 years was estimated at 96% (95% CI = 94%–98%) for Pfizer-BioNTech, 96% (95% CI = 95%–98%) for Moderna, and 84% (95% CI = 64%–93%) for Janssen vaccine products. Among adults aged ≥75 years, effectiveness of full vaccination was 91% (95% CI = 87%–94%) for Pfizer-BioNTech, 96% (95% CI = 93%–98%) for Moderna, and 85% (95% CI = 72%–92%) for Janssen vaccine products (Figure 2). Effectiveness of partial vaccination among adults aged 65–74 years was 84% (95% CI = 76%–89%) for Pfizer-BioNTech and 91% (95% CI = 87%–93%) for Moderna vaccine products. Among those aged ≥75 years, effectiveness of partial vaccination was 66% (95% CI = 48%–77%) for Pfizer-BioNTech and 82% (95% CI = 76%–86%) for Moderna vaccine products. Sensitivity analyses accounting for interval between infection and hospitalization did not yield notably different vaccine effectiveness estimates, with point estimates varying by <1% for Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccine models. Point estimates for Janssen COVID-19 vaccine models varied by <10%, with few cases eligible for inclusion and wide CIs.

#### But, reducing IP protections does not guarantee vaccine safety

Smith Spark, 21

(Laura,- Former Senior Broadcast Journalist for the BBC, and Newsweek editor of CNN,,“Right Countries Urged to Share Vaccine Knowledge as WTO Debates Waving Patents” <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/05/world/covid-19-vaccine-patents-wto-intl/index.html>, May 05)

If the proposed waiver were to be approved, then **technological know-how** must be transferred to new production sites as well as the intellectual property rights, Rockwell said. Countries must also ensure that they have a strict but transparent regulatory infrastructure in place, he added. The proposed waiver has previously been obstructed by a ["small number" of wealthier nations](https://www.msf.org/countries-obstructing-covid-19-patent-waiver-must-allow-negotiations), according to Doctors Without Borders. When it was blocked at the WTO in March, aid organization [Oxfam](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/oxfam-response-wto-trips-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-being-blocked-again-rich-countries) slammed the decision as a "massive missed opportunity" to speed up worldwide vaccine production, and accused rich countries of "siding with a handful of pharmaceutical corporations in protecting their monopolies against the needs of the majority of developing countries who are struggling to administer a single dose."**Gross Failure of Leadership** Rights group Amnesty International and the People's Vaccine Alliance urged G7 leaders Wednesday to listen to their people and ensure vaccine knowledge is shared. "G7 governments have clear human rights obligations to put the lives of millions of people across the world ahead of the interests of the pharmaceutical companies that they have funded," said Steve Cockburn, head of economic and social justice at Amnesty International, [in a news release](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/an-average-of-7-in-10-across-g7-countries-think-their-governments-should-force-big-pharma-to-share-vaccine-know-how/). "It would be a gross failure of leadership to continue blocking the sharing of life-saving technologies, and would only serve to prolong the immense pain and suffering caused by this pandemic." Wednesday's WTO meeting comes a day after the chief of Pfizer said the company was expecting approximately $26 billion in revenue from its Covid-19 vaccine in 2021.More than 300 public health experts [signed a letter](https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/trips_sign_on_letter_4-30-21.pdf) Friday arguing that the United States should join an effort to force vaccine makers to waive intellectual property rights to coronavirus vaccines and treatments so more countries can start making them. The group, led by Columbia University professors Terry McGovern and Chelsea Clinton, said the so-called TRIPS waiver would allow local manufacture of vaccines, treatments and diagnostics. "Allowing countries to manufacture locally will speed access to vaccines and treatment, prevent unnecessary deaths, and facilitate a stronger, faster economic recovery," they wrote. "Until vaccines, testing, and treatments are accessible to everyone everywhere we risk recurring new variants, drug resistance, and greater loss of life and suffering at home and globally." That appeal came a fortnight after more than 170 former world leaders and Nobel laureates, including former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and former French President François Hollande sent an [open letter to the White House](https://peoplesvaccinealliance.medium.com/open-letter-former-heads-of-state-and-nobel-laureates-call-on-president-biden-to-waive-e0589edd5704) urging President Joe Biden to support the temporary waiver on IP rights for Covid-19 vaccines at the WTO. **Legal Battles** But even as public pressure grows, some experts argue that handing over the IP rights for Covid-19 vaccines won't necessarily mean that more can be rapidly produced worldwide at large scale. US infectious diseases chief Anthony Fauci [told the UK's Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/2f41b122-5738-4707-a822-0d79276710c5) on Monday that he was not convinced that forcing companies to share their intellectual property was the most effective approach, warning that legal battles could slow the process."Going back and forth, consuming time and lawyers in a legal argument about waivers -- that is not the endgame. People are dying around the world and we have to get vaccines into their arms in the fastest and most efficient way possible," he said. Thomas Bollyky, director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN on Friday that what's really needed to scale up global manufacturing of vaccines is technology transfer. "It's not just a matter of intellectual property. It's also the **transfer of know-how,**" he said. "I **don't think there's clear evidence** that a waiver of an intellectual property is going to be the best way for that technology transfer to occur."Waiving patents will not work in the same way for vaccines as it has for drugs, Bollyky said. For HIV drugs, for example, manufacturers were more or less able to reverse engineer them without much help from the original developer. It's **very different for vaccines**, where it's really a **biological process** as much as a product. It's hard to scale up manufacturing in this process for the original company, let alone another manufacturer trying to figure this out without assistance," he said. "**It requires a lot of knowledge that's not part of the IP."** The deal between AstraZeneca and the Serum Institute of India is a successful example of such technology transfer, Bollyky said, where the licensing of IP happened voluntarily. "The question is what can we do to facilitate more deals like the one between AstraZeneca and the Serum Institute of India to have this transfer," he said.

#### The plan leads to uncontrolled use of patented technologies, which turns vaccine access, and causes dangerous health consequences.

Crosby and Diamond, 21

(Daniel Crosby JD@Washington University of Law, Evan Diamond JD@Harvard Law School M.S. Biochemistry@UPenn, Isabel Fernandez de la Cuesta JD@Complutense University Madrid, Jamieson Greer JD@University of Virginia Law School, Jeffery Telep JD@University of Florida, Brian White JD@University of Virginia, “Group of Nearly 60 WTO Members Seek Unprecedented Waiver from WTO Intellectual Property Protection for Covid-related Medical Projects” <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/group-of-nearly-60-wto-members-seek-2523821/>, March 05)

Waiver risks uncontrolled use of patented technologies, without improving vaccine access.Pharmaceutical companies can provide, and have provided, licenses to distribute or scale-up production of COVID-19 vaccines and therapies at reduced cost. Such license agreements allow for expanded access in low- and middle-income countries, while also setting reasonable parameters so that patents and other IP rights are used to address the specific medical needs of the COVID-19 pandemic at hand, and not for other purposes. License agreements also allow for orderly technology transfer, including of unpatented “trade secret” information and other critical “know-how,” that may be essential to efficiently producing and scaling-up safe and effective versions of technologically complex vaccines and biologic drug products. Under the present TRIPS waiver proposal, however, member countries could try to exploit an extraordinarily broad scope of IP and copy patented technologies so long as they are “in relation to prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19.” For example, under an expansive reading of the proposed waiver language, a member country could try to produce patented pharmaceutical compounds that have other indicated uses predating COVID-19, if such compounds had later been studied or experimentally used for potential symptomatic relief or antiviral activity in COVID-19 patients. The same risks may be faced by manufacturers of patented materials or devices that have multiple uses predating COVID-19, but also may be used as “personal protective equipment” or components thereof, or in other measures arguably relating to COVID-19 “prevention” or “containment.”At the same time, it is unclear how the proposed TRIPS waiver could provide the technology transfer and know-how critical for making the complex molecules and formulations constituting the various COVID-19 vaccines. Vaccine manufacture undertaken by an unauthorized party without the proper processes and controls could result in a different product that is potentially ineffective or results in unwanted health consequences. And even if an unauthorized manufacturer could overcome those substantial hurdles to reverse-engineer and scale up a safe and effective vaccine copy, it would likely take substantial time and a series of failures to do so. Notably, several of the original COVID-19 vaccine developers have recently faced low product yield and other manufacturing challenges during pre-commercial scale-up efforts and the initial months of commercial production.

# Case

#### 1] Using haunting as a method reinscribes colonial relations- turns the aff

Cameron 08

(Cultural geographies essay: Indigenous spectrality and the politics of postcolonial ghost stories Emilie Cameron cultural geographies Vol 15, Issue 3, pp. 383 - 393 First Published July 1, 2008)

The very slipperiness and indeterminacy of haunting makes it amenable to a great variety of invocations and seems to capture something of the unfinished, contested nature of colonial and postcolonial geographies, but in this essay I ask what risks are involved in deploying a ‘spectrogeographical’ lens in studies of the colonial and postcolonial, and particularly in figuring Indigenous bodies, voices, and histories in ghostly terms. If, as Haraway notes, we inevitably read the world through tropes, we can still choose ‘less-deadly version[s] for moral discourse’,11 and at a time when spectral metaphors are proliferating, it seems crucial to interrogate the ‘deadliness’ of this particular line of thought. I would like to make a contribution along these lines by drawing attention to the longer history of haunting tropes in Canada and their re-emergence in the past decade or so in, among other places, a wilderness park in southwestern British Columbia. My intent is to draw points of connection between past and present hauntologies and interrogate the positionality of those who figure Indigenous peoples in ghostly terms. I will argue that allegorical representations of Indigenous peoples as ghosts haunting the Canadian state reinscribe colonial relations even as they are characterized as ‘post’ colonial expressions of recognition and redress, raising questions about the politics of postcolonial ghost stories. In a recent review of the proliferation of haunting metaphors in Canadian cultural production, Goldman and Saul cite Canadian settler-author Catherine Parr Traill’s declaration that ‘ghosts or spirits… appear totally banished from Canada. This is too matter-of-fact a country for such supernaturals to visit’.12 Traill made this claim in 1833, but it was echoed by poet and critic Earle Birney in 1947 when he stated that ‘it’s only by our lack of ghosts we’re haunted’.13 Birney was referring to certain Canadians’ preoccupation with their apparent ‘lack’ of history in comparison to their American neighbours, a matter of particular nationalist concern that has defined Canadian cultural production for decades. Such claims to ‘ghostlessness’, however, are more the exception than the rule. Northey14 argues that, in fact, ghosts have been at the center of nation-building projects in Canada for a long while, beginning in the nineteenth century. In particular, and of relevance to this essay, Bentley15 argues that ghosts have been instrumental figures in efforts to connect Aboriginality with settler history, creating an aesthetic link between the ‘Indian past’ and the settler present. The Aboriginal ghost has been used to evoke a generalized sense of history in the Canadian landscape, but always with a sense of linearity and succession. It is assumed that Aboriginal ghosts are all that remains of the ‘disappearing Indian’, and that settler-Canadians have inherited this rich land from those who have now ‘passed’.

#### 2] Haunting fails and reinforces colonial power because it requires an AFFECT of indigenous death- calls for material change solve better

Cameron 08

(Cultural geographies essay: Indigenous spectrality and the politics of postcolonial ghost stories Emilie Cameron cultural geographies Vol 15, Issue 3, pp. 383 - 393 First Published July 1, 2008)

What does it mean, then, to be ‘haunted’ in a decolonizing settler colony like British Columbia? Who is haunted in these stories, and who or what is doing the haunting? What kind of future might these hauntings demand? Do they signal, as Derrida intended, a recognition of the always unfinished and unfinishable in our relation to the present and past and, by extension, a sense of generosity and hospitality towards ghosts? Or do they, as Sarah Ahmed55 has argued in relation to white guilt in postcolonial Australia, constitute yet another self-referential engagement with the colonial past, in which the experiences and desires of the settler occlude consideration of other desires and possibilities? This is the reason for my wariness in the face of haunting tropes, for I fear that postcolonial ghost stories risk perpetuating a kind of endless ‘dancing around a wound’56 that Daniel David Moses identifies among liberal, left-leaning Canadians, anxiously replaying their complicity in an ugly colonial past while neglecting to mobilize effectively for change in the present. The ghosts of the Stein do not seem to me to represent the Nlaka’pamux with very much dignity or agency, and surely any postcolonial trope we might mobilize ought at the very least to figure Indigenous peoples with dignity. In Haraway’s terms, it seems to me that ‘haunting’ has the potential to function as a particularly ‘deadly’ trope, one that requires the death and immateriality of Indigenous peoples to make an e/affective claim on non-Indigenous British Columbians. It is a trope within which today’s living descendents of the generalized ‘spirits’ haunting the Stein, people like Chiefs Leonard Andrew and Ruby Dunstan, seem to have no place: As the direct descendents of those aboriginal peoples who have inhabited, shared, sustained, and been sustained by the Stein Valley for tens of thousands of years down to the present, our authority in this watershed is inescapable… Under the cooperative authority of our two bands we will maintain the Stein Valley as a wilderness in perpetuity for the enjoyment and enlightenment of all peoples.57 And so, at a time when (primarily non-Aboriginal) geographers, among others, seem to have taken an interest in ghostly matters, it seems critical to acknowledge that ghostliness is a politicized state of being. Many scholars have interpreted these politics as a function of visibility – that is, they suggest that the uncovering and exposure of the ghosts of the past is an emancipatory act. In many cases this may be true, but I would suggest that there is also a politics of vision involved in these hauntologies. Those who see and imagine ghosts are as deserving of interrogation as the ghosts themselves, and the ghosts of the Stein are profoundly self-referential. And so while the spectral does seem to offer a means of conceptualizing that which we cannot easily see, even of giving some voice to colonial traumas, confining the Indigenous to the ghostly also has the potential to re-inscribe the interests of the powerful upon the meanings and memories of place. Further, while in this essay I have bracketed out the possibility that non-Aboriginal hikers truly are connecting with a complex spiritual world in the Stein, I think Métis scholar Warren Cariou’s comments on postcolonial ghosts are worth considering. In contrast to the horror, anxiety, and sense of punishment or revenge conveyed by Indigenous ghosts in settler literatures, Cariou points out that for Native readers and writers, there is no reason that … Indigenous ghosts or spirits should be frightening. Native people already have plenty of evidence in their daily lives of how the legacies of colonialism have been passed down through the generations; they do not need to summon specters to fulfill that function. But Native writers do represent spirits in their work nonetheless; it is just that these spirits are not necessarily figures of uncanny terror. They may be malevolent beings such as the wihtiko or the skeleton-spirit Pahkakos, but they may also be figures of healing, ceremony, or political action. Or they may simply be ancestors. And while many such spirits do seem to address the transgressions of the colonial past, they usually do so as part of a call for some kind of redress or change in the present.58 Haunting need not be about forgetting, avenging, and lurking; richer understandings of time, place, and materiality are available to us, and I would suggest that geographers might reconsider the political potential of haunting tropes in their accounts of the colonial and postcolonial.

3] The aff doesn’t “do” hauntology. They pass a plan. We have solvency too—we do the same affect. There’s no difference in whether the aff or neg wins to do with using hauntology for what the aff claims.

4] solvency—the aff has nothing to do with solving authoritatianism

5] the roll of the ballot is ultimately to tell tabroom who wins—we win through util

6] neg solves through passing effectively the same plan

7] if you actually care about what the aff claims to solve, vote neg—we have proof for real-world impacts

# FW - Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

**My Value for the debate is utilitarianism. Util is a moral system where the rightness or wrongness of an action is judged by the outcome it produces. This is the best system for debating government actions for 3 reasons:**

**1. State actor—states are not moral individuals so they can’t have Kantian intent.**

**2. Topic specific- debates about the WTO and patents inevitably regress to consequences—the patents are moral or immoral because of their ability to help or hurt the world.**

**3. Relational wording- Member nations in the resolution is plural, this implies we are debating about how the international community should be shaped and not what an individual’s moral obligations may be.**

#### Governments must use util since they can’t focus on every individual rights violation

Goodin, 95

Robert, 1995, Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, pg. 26-27

The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people’s interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one’s duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises from the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain morally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level – the same thing that relieves individuals of responsibility – makes it morally incumbent upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different circumstances and their conclusions inevitably take very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. And those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.