# Round 5 1NC v West HS SLC ML

## CP

### 1NC Text

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government implement single payer, universal national health insurance programs

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

### Solvency

#### Solves the aff - single payer health care stops evergreening, promotes innovation and eliminates financial burdens on consumers

**Narayanan 19**

(Srivats Narayanan, B.A. Biology@UMissouri-Kansas, “Medicare for All and Evergreening”, 8/15/19, <https://medium.com/@srivats.narayanan/medicare-for-all-and-evergreening-cb84c930e0ea)//HW-CC>

This is because pharmaceutical firms are spending their time and money on a technique known as “evergreening.” Evergreening is when drug companies produce redundant drugs that are nothing but minor modifications of old drugs. By making slight alterations to their medicines, biotech companies continue to hold patents for drugs with minimal spending on research and development (R&D). Pharmaceutical companies then use those patents to prevent competitors from selling generic versions of their drugs. Without any competition, these corporations get away with ridiculously high drug pricing and can thus make big profits on their drugs. The companies simultaneously justify their absurd drug prices by pointing to the inflated R&D costs of producing new drugs. This excuse has been used time and again by the profit-hungry pharmaceutical industry, and it’s coming at the expense of patients who struggle to afford their medicines. A well-known example of evergreening pertains to the anticonvulsant medication gabapentin, which was first sold by Pfizer under the brand name Neurontin. When the drug became available as a generic medication over a decade ago, Pfizer created a very similar medicine, pregabalin (Lyrica), that didn’t have any significant benefits over the original drug. As a result, Pfizer has kept a control over the market for anticonvulsant drugs with negligible innovation. The drug industry’s reliance on evergreening is undoubtedly stifling innovation. This is where Medicare for All, which would impose the government as the only health insurer, would be useful. In our current system, there are many insurers and they each have little market power and consequently little negotiating power to reduce treatment prices. Since the government would have consolidated control over healthcare financing under Medicare for All, its stronger bargaining power would force drug companies to charge lower prices for their products. In addition, prescription drugs would be paid for by the government and not by patients under Medicare for All. Medicare for All would prevent evergreening. National healthcare financing would align how much the government pays a drug company with how much patients benefit from the company’s drugs. If a new drug had more clinical benefits than an older version, the government would pay more for it. If a new drug produced the same results as an older version, the government wouldn’t pay more for the new drug. So, Medicare for All would encourage pharmaceutical companies to pursue truly innovative drugs because such drugs would be more profitable. The policy would incentivize companies to invest in R&D for more useful drugs, instead of just producing redundant and expensive medications. A national healthcare plan would prioritize “patient and community needs” and match up pharmaceutical companies’ interests with actually improving public health. Evergreening has become the name of the game for the pharmaceutical industry. A major solution to the evergreening problem is Medicare for All. A single-payer system like Medicare for All would sharply curtail evergreening, since drug companies wouldn’t be able to profit from it. Medicare for All would usher in a new era of medical innovation.

### 1NC Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

### 1NC Colonialism

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

### 1NC Prolif

#### A. Hegemony destroys non-proliferation regimes and causes global nuclear cascades – throw out any ev that isn’t specific to Trumpian anti-diplomacy.

Heer 17 (Jeet, staff writer at *The New Republic*, awarded a Fulbright Scholarship and award-winning author, “The Real Danger of Trump’s Nuclear Policy Isn’t Armageddon,” The New Republic, 10-24-17, <https://newrepublic.com/article/145479/real-danger-trumps-nuclear-policy-isnt-armageddon)> AG

But the danger comes not just from Dr. Strangelove-style scenarios in which Trump lurches into the apocalypse, with his hapless military staff in tow. It also comes from a degradation of America’s nuclear policy, caused by a combination of **Pentagon hubris** and **Trump’s punch-drunk diplomacy**, which taken together would cause the other nations of the world to abandon diplomacy and put their faith in their own nuclear stockpiles. The longer-term danger isn’t that Trump blows up the world, but that he pushes the international system towards a world with **many more nukes in many more hands**.

The dangers of America undermining nuclear non-proliferation predate Trump. As the world’s sole superpower, the United States has been **torn between** pushing for **international agreements on nuclear issues** and trying to **maintain its hegemony** at all cost. George W. Bush’s enthusiasm for missile defense led to a fraying of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which [America withdrew from in 2002](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02). Barack Obama’s nuclear modernization program, sold to the public on the promise of greater safety, [intensified America’s ability to launch a successful first strike that could disarm a rival power](https://thebulletin.org/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-undermining-strategic-stability-burst-height-compensating-super10578).

Obama’s modernization program did not end up creating a new era of nuclear competition, in part because it was coupled with the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation in other areas, notably with Iran. Obama was able to argue to the Chinese and Russian governments that their main concern should be limiting the size of the nuclear club, not competing with other members of the club.

But with Trump, **we’re entering a very different era**, where calls for modernization are coupled with a disregard for the diplomacy needed for non-proliferation. This is why Trump’s **hostility toward the Iran nuclear deal**, combined with his blustery **threats against North Korea**, present such a danger. Trump is in effect saying that America is pushing ahead with a new generation of more powerful nuclear weapons while also abandoning global leadership on non-proliferation. Given this toxic mix, there’s **little reason for other nations**, whether great or small, **to abide by existing treaties**.

Trump’s intemperate handling of the nuclear portfolio is entirely predictable. He has been talking about nuclear non-proliferation since the 1980s, when he offered himself unbidden as the man who should settle the standoff with the Soviet Union. But as analyst Cheryl Rofer [rightly](https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2017/06/04/donald-trump-nuclear-negotiator/) [notes](https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2017/06/12/trump-and-putin-some-1980s-background/), Trump’s approach to nuclear issues has been consistently crude, with a few key themes persisting over the decades: that Trump is a great deal-maker, that other people make bad deals, and that America and Russia should team up against the lesser powers. These are not points that are likely to persuade other foreign powers, possibly not even Russia, to put their faith in the United States. (Putin’s Russia, after all, [sees the value](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia/russia-to-the-united-states-stay-in-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1BQ2UK)of the Iran deal Trump wants to jettison).

Trump’s approach to nuclear issues is to make big threats that he can’t necessarily carry out. This is already encouraging other nations to think about **acquiring their own nuclear weapons**. Writing in The Washington Post, Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan [argued](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2017/10/10/to-deter-north-korea-japan-and-south-korea-should-go-nuclear/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.b2c596a60341) that, since the U.S. won’t be willing to sacrifice its own cities to protect South Korea, **South Korea and Japan** should acquire their own nuclear arsenals. In a similar vein, former CIA Director John Brennan [has warned](https://www.circa.com/story/2016/12/20/world/cia-director-john-brennan-says-the-iran-nuclear-deal-isnt-perfect-but-still-works) that scuttling the Iran deal could lead to a **nuclear arms race** in the Middle East.

One area where Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump find themselves in agreement is in believing that their countries are being held back by nuclear arms treaties. As Adam Taylor [noted](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/12/trump-may-be-kicking-off-a-new-age-of-nuclear-weapons/?utm_term=.1fcc3d47f020) in The Washington Post, “Putin has spoken [recently of the need](https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-calls-strengthening-russias-military-nuclear-potential-101800687.html) to ‘strengthen the military potential of strategic nuclear forces,’ while Trump reportedly [denounced an Obama-era treaty](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2A5) that capped the number of nuclear weapons fielded by the two nations during a February call with Putin. Some people, including [former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mikhail-gorbachev-my-plea-to-the-presidents-of-russia-and-the-united-states/2017/10/10/36225a60-ade2-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.e3c4afbb9db9), worry that Washington and Moscow may ultimately end up scrapping these agreements.”

We’re used to worrying about the nuclear era leading to a sudden apocalypse: the mushroom cloud that ends the world. But there is a slower path to destruction: a world where international agreements are scorned, so the great powers push ahead with deadlier weapons while the smaller nations also acquire nuclear weapons since there is no reward for restraint. It is a world where **so many more conflicts could end in nuclear war.**

#### B. Proliferation emboldens leaders and causes nuclear war – psychological pressures and decision-making biases make escalation resulting from regional revisionism inevitable.

Cohen, PhD, ‘18

(Michael D., PoliSci@BritishColumbia, SeniorLecturerSecurityStudies@Macquarie, “Fear and Loathing: When Nuclear Proliferation Emboldens,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 56-71) BW

Previous attempts to assess the emboldenment hypothesis fail to come to terms with the systematic effect of a leader’s experience with nuclear crisis. While new nuclear powers tend to authorize assertive foreign policies and/or find themselves in nuclear crises and wars, experienced nuclear powers tend not to (Horowitz 2009). During the Cold War, Nikita Khrushchev developed a nuclear missile capability in 1959 and concurrently instigated the 1959–1961 Berlin crises (Uhl and Ivkin 2001; Podvog 2001; Zaloga 2002). The 1962 Cuban Missile crisis served as a turning point for Khrushchev; after 1963 the Cold War exhibited fewer and less dangerous crises. China developed nuclear weapons in 1964 and, in 1969, found itself in armed conflict with Soviet troops on the disputed Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River that caused hundreds of fatalities. Chinese forces have not engaged in conflict with Soviet troops since 1970, when those border skirmishes escalated to conventional attacks and nuclear threats. By 1991 most lingering territorial disputes with Moscow were resolved. Pakistan, after developing nuclear weapons in 1990, increased its sponsorship of the Kashmir insurgency throughout the 1990s and, in 1999, intruded deeply into Indian-held Kashmir, provoking the 1999 Kargil War. Pakistani-sponsored militants daringly attacked the Kashmir and Indian Parliaments in October and December 2001 and killed thirty-two unarmed civilians in May 2002. However, the 2008 Mumbai attacks notwithstanding, Pakistani policy in Kashmir since the May 2002 nuclear crisis has progressively resulted in fewer fatalities (Ganguly 2008). India has faced a similar conflict pattern following its acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1990. Britain (in Egypt) and France (in Algeria and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) both found themselves in more crises and conflicts when their leaders were inexperienced with nuclear crisis during the early part of the Cold War than thereafter. Israel fought one war every two years with its Arab adversaries immediately after developing nuclear weapons in 1967. However, in the forty years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War (when Israel seriously considered using nuclear weapons), it fought a war only once every eight years. Inexperience with nuclear crisis seems to matter deeply for the question of nuclear emboldenment and international security, but theoretical precision remains elusive. How does experience with nuclear crisis matter for international conflict?

Existing arguments fail to develop causal mechanisms sensitive to the temporal variation in the conflict propensity of nuclear powers. Scholars tend to cherry-pick time periods supportive of their analyses while neglecting other times that are anomalous to their theory and temporal variation across cases (Ganguly 2008; Kapur 2008). For example, Kapur (2008) shows that nuclear weapons emboldened Pakistan to pursue territorial revisionism due to the belief that its nuclear weapons would deter retaliation. Yet, he does not explain why Pakistani revisionism in Kashmir progressively declined after 2002. According to Kapur (2009, 201; 2008), US pressure on Pakistan to join American antiterror efforts after September 11, 2001, caused this foreign policy turnaround. But this is an ad hoc revision to the theory and does not explain the pacifying effect of Pakistan’s past experience with nuclear crisis. If Kapur’s theoretical model is the last word on the consequences of nuclear proliferation on state foreign policy, experienced nuclear powers should behave like new nuclear powers until they have realized their revisionist ambitions or are prevented from doing so. But they do not.

Waltz (1990) and others argue that experienced nuclear powers tend to avoid assertive foreign policies, but they cannot explain why new leaders of new nuclear powers behave differently. The quantitative literature has not identified the experience effect because it washes out in regressions that do not model time. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars note the conspicuous absence of empirically supported theoretical models that explain the behavior of new nuclear powers (Karl 1997, 118–19; Montgomery and Sagan 2009, 321). One partial exception is Narang’s (2014) recent research on the sources and deterrent effects of different nuclear postures. But the same postures can correspond with very different foreign policies. Narang (2014, 76–91) does not explain why Pakistan’s “asymmetric escalation” posture gave rise to assertive policies in Kashmir between 1998 and 2002 but less dangerous policies after Musharraf’s time at the nuclear brink.

A Psychological Theory of Nuclear Emboldenment

Leaders of new nuclear powers may lack sufficient conventional military power to pursue revisions to an undesirable status quo. The acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, can embolden such countries to attempt revision through land grabs, coercive threats, support for insurgencies in other countries, displays and uses of force, and most importantly, threats to respond to conventional or nuclear affronts with challenges that risk nuclear war. I term the resort to threats based on one’s nuclear power as nuclear assertion. The problem for these new nuclear powers, however, is that their nuclear adversaries can react in similar ways that substantially increase the probability of nuclear war. Leaders could avoid this by restricting the role of nuclear weapons to deterrence and pursuing security goals through confidence-building measures and diplomacy. I term this foreign policy nuclear restraint. While this reduces the risk of nuclear war, nuclear restraint relies on tools to address menacing security threats that permitted the establishment of the undesirable status quo in the first place (diplomacy and the pursuit of collective security). This dilemma is the fundamental strategic question facing new nuclear powers: leverage nuclear weapons to revise the status quo but risk war, or use nuclear weapons as a safer deterrent measure, but accept an undesirable status quo. Assertive or restrained foreign policies are the only choices, and the one that leaders select will have strong implications for posture and related policy choices. Rivals of the new nuclear power also face a fundamental dilemma. Rhetoric and defensive military mobilizations suited to maintain the status quo—restraint—may fail to deter a sufficiently emboldened new nuclear power (Fearon 2002). More serious military mobilizations and offensive threats—nuclear assertion—may be necessary to stop the new nuclear power’s assertiveness but increase the risk of nuclear escalation.

In the argument that follows, my unit of analysis is the leader, and I assume recurring crises to be interdependent rather than discrete; lessons learned from one crisis can influence behavior in successive crises. I define nuclear powers to be those states that have developed what their leaders believe to be survivable second-strike nuclear deterrents. It is at this point, and only this point, when the strongest effects of emboldenment against a primary and usually nuclear weapon-equipped adversary kick in. Leaders may be emboldened before this to either challenge other perhaps nonnuclear states or issue lesser challenges to their primary adversary. The effects outlined here are restricted to those directed at primary nuclear weapon-equipped adversaries as these likely pose the greatest threat to the new nuclear power and should thus receive the greatest attention.2 They are also most likely to afflict leaders in states that have newly developed nuclear deterrents—‘new leaders of nuclear powers.’ Finally, by new nuclear power leaders I refer to inexperience with nuclear crises rather than nuclear weapons.

I first briefly address the effects of leadership turnover and make three points. First, while higher leadership turnover in democracies will increase the probability that leaders in experienced democratic powers will authorize nuclear assertion, autocracies exhibit less leadership turnover. Moreover, successors to autocratic leaders will tend to have experienced the same pathologies of availability and fear in the nuclear crisis and therefore refrain from nuclear assertion. Second, unless leaders in experienced nuclear powers confront assertive new nuclear powers, like President Trump and Kim Jong Un today, nuclear assertion should be mostly restricted to new leaders of new nuclear powers because their experiences at the nuclear brink tend to encourage them to authorize confidence-building measures and other diplomatic concessions (like the hotline and nuclear-testing agreements after the Cuban Missile Crisis) that raise the international and domestic costs of assertion for both and largely restrict successors to nuclear moderation. I argue that nuclear proliferation is dangerous when leaders perceive nuclear assertion as a safe strategy to achieve their foreign policy objectives—that is, they do not believe their nuclear threats will actually lead to nuclear war because they can control escalation. In contrast, possessing nuclear weapons becomes safe only when new nuclear powers view nuclear assertion as dangerous. As I outline below, the affect heuristic will make new nuclear programs generate strong psychological pressures for leaders to overestimate their geopolitical possibilities and neglect the limitations, leading to assertive policies. Leaders will then overlearn about nuclear coercion from these apparent victories and persist with it. Research has found that availability biases lead people to learn more from their own policies, primarily those that they have been involved with or exposed to for a long time. Leaders in new nuclear powers will, therefore, tend to act based on their own experiences with their own nuclear program rather than the experiences of others or the historical record. This dangerous cocktail of availability and effect will cause leaders to authorize assertive policies and learn that they work. A second important variable explaining nuclear assertion is fear. Though rational deterrence arguments would expect a new nuclear power to back down upon encountering costly signals from an adversary, I argue that the logic of availability will cause leaders to not respond to costly signals in a rational way. Rather, fear of imminent nuclear war, I contend, is what causes risk aversion even when the subjective probability and cost of nuclear escalation remain constant. Only those costly signals that cause leaders to personally experience the fear of imminent nuclear escalation will cause them to authorize restrained foreign policies.

## Case

### AT: Bioterror

#### The aff isn’t sufficient to solve bio-terror

Myhrvold 13

(Formerly Chief Technology Officer at Microsoft, is co-founder of Intellectual Ventures—one of the largest patent holding companies in the world; “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf)

Worries about the future of the human race are hardly novel. indeed, the notion that terrorists or others might use weapons of mass destruction is so commonplace as to be almost passé. spy novels, movies, and television dramas explore this plot frequently. We have become desensitized to this entire genre, in part because James Bond always manages to save the world in the end. reality may be different. in my estimation, the U.s. government, although well-meaning, is unable to protect us from the greatest threats we face. The other nations of the world are also utterly unprepared. even obvious and simple steps are not being taken. The gap between what is necessary and what is being contemplated, much less being done, is staggering. my appraisal of the present situation does not discount the enormous efforts of many brave men and women in law enforcement, intelligence services, and the military. These people are doing what they can, but the resources that we commit to defense and the gathering of intelligence are mostly squandered on problems that are far less dangerous to the american public than the ones we are ignoring. addressing the issue in a meaningful way will ultimately require large structural changes in many parts of the government. so far, however, our political leaders have had neither the vision to see the enormity of the problem nor the will to combat it. These weaknesses are not surprising: bureaucracies change only under extreme duress. and despite what some may say, the shocking attacks of september 11th, 2001, have not served as a wake-up call to get serious. given the meager response to that assault, every reason exists to believe that sometime in the next few decades america will be attacked on a scale that will make 9/11 look trivial by comparison. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore.

### AT: Disease Impact

#### Surveillance efforts prevent extinction from future pandemics

Maureen **Miller**, Adjunct Associate Professor of Epidemiology, 8-1-20**21**, "The next pandemic is already happening – targeted disease surveillance can help prevent it," No Publication, https://www.yahoo.com/now/next-pandemic-already-happening-targeted-130202377.html?guccounter=1

As more and more people around the world are getting vaccinated, one can almost hear the collective sigh of relief. But the next pandemic threat is likely already making its way through the population right now. My research as an infectious disease epidemiologist has found that there is a simple strategy to mitigate emerging outbreaks: proactive, real-time surveillance in settings where animal-to-human disease spillover is most likely to occur. In other words, don’t wait for sick people to show up at a hospital. Instead, monitor populations where disease spillover actually happens. The current pandemic prevention strategy Global health professionals have long known that pandemics fueled by [zoonotic disease spillover](https://www.news-medical.net/health/What-is-a-Spillover-Event.aspx), or animal-to-human disease transmission, were a problem. In 1947, the World Health Organization established a global network of hospitals to [detect pandemic threats](https://www.who.int/influenza/gip-anniversary/en/) through a process called [syndromic surveillance](https://www.cdc.gov/nssp/overview.html). The process relies on standardized symptom checklists to look for signals of emerging or reemerging diseases of pandemic potential among patient populations with symptoms that can’t be easily diagnosed. This clinical strategy relies both on infected individuals coming to [sentinel hospitals](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259884/9789241513623-eng.pdf) and medical authorities who are [influential and persistent](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51364382) enough to raise the alarm. There’s only one hitch: By the time someone sick shows up at a hospital, an outbreak has already occurred. In the case of [SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it), it was likely widespread long before it was detected. This time, the clinical strategy alone failed us. Zoonotic disease spillover is not one and done A more proactive approach is currently gaining prominence in the world of pandemic prevention: viral evolutionary theory. This theory suggests that [animal viruses become dangerous human viruses](https://doi.org/10.3390/v13040637) incrementally over time through frequent zoonotic spillover. It’s not a one-time deal: An “intermediary” animal such as a civet cat, pangolin or pig may be required to mutate the virus so it can make initial jumps to people. But the final host that allows a variant to become fully adapted to humans may be humans themselves. Viral evolutionary theory is playing out in real time with the rapid development of [COVID-19 variants](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/transmission/variant.html). In fact, an international team of scientists have proposed that undetected human-to-human transmission after an animal-to-human jump is the likely [origin of SARS-CoV-2](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9). When novel zoonotic viral disease outbreaks like Ebola first came to the world’s attention in the 1970s, research on the extent of disease transmission relied on [antibody assays](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/testing/serology-overview.html), blood tests to identify people who have already been infected. Antibody surveillance, also called [serosurveys](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/geographic-seroprevalence-surveys.html), test blood samples from target populations to identify how many people have been infected. Serosurveys help determine whether diseases like Ebola are circulating undetected. Turns out they were: Ebola antibodies were found in more than [5% of people tested in Liberia in 1982](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0769-2617(82)80028-2), decades before the West African epidemic in 2014. These results support viral evolutionary theory: It takes time – sometimes a lot of time – to make an animal virus dangerous and transmissible between humans. What this also means is that scientists have a chance to intervene. Measuring zoonotic disease spillover One way to take advantage of the lead time for animal viruses to fully adapt to humans is long-term, repeated surveillance. Setting up a [pandemic threats warning system](http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.16.175984) with this strategy in mind could help [detect pre-pandemic viruses](https://doi.org/10.3390/v13040637) before they become harmful to humans. And the best place to start is directly at the source. My team worked with [virologist Shi Zhengli](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/) of the Wuhan Institute of Virology to develop a human antibody assay to test for a very distant cousin of SARS-CoV-2 found in bats. We established proof of zoonotic spillover in a small 2015 serosurvey in Yunnan, China: [3% of study participants living near bats](https://doi.org/10.1007/s12250-018-0012-7) carrying this SARS-like coronavirus tested antibody positive. But there was one unexpected result: None of the previously infected study participants reported any harmful health effects. Earlier spillovers of SARS coronaviruses – like the first SARS epidemic in 2003 and Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 – had caused high levels of illness and death. This one did no such thing. Researchers conducted a larger study in Southern China between 2015 and 2017. It’s a region home to bats known to carry SARS-like coronaviruses, including the one that caused the [original 2003 SARS pandemic](https://doi.org/10.1038/nature12711) and the one [most closely related to SARS-CoV-2](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2012-7). Fewer than 1% of participants in this study tested antibody positive, meaning they had been previously infected with the SARS-like coronavirus. Again, none of them reported negative health effects. But syndromic surveillance – the same strategy used by sentinel hospitals – revealed something even more unexpected: An additional [5% of community participants](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bsheal.2019.10.004) reported symptoms consistent with SARS in the past year. This study did more than just provide the biological evidence needed to establish proof of concept to measure zoonotic spillover. The pandemic threats warning system also picked up a signal for a SARS-like infection that couldn’t yet be detected through blood tests. It may even have detected early variants of SARS-CoV-2. Had surveillance protocols been in place, these results would have triggered a search for community members who may have been part of an undetected outbreak. But without an established plan, the signal was missed. From prediction to surveillance to genetic sequencing The lion’s share of pandemic prevention funding and effort over the past two decades has focused on discovering wildlife pathogens, and predicting pandemics before animal viruses can infect humans. But this approach has not predicted any major zoonotic disease outbreaks – including H1N1 influenza in 2009, MERS in 2012, the West African Ebola epidemic in 2014 or the current COVID-19 pandemic. Predictive modeling has, however, provided robust heat maps of the [global “hot spots”](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-00923-8) where zoonotic spillover is most likely to occur. Long-term, regular surveillance at these “hot spots” could detect spillover signals, as well as any changes that occur over time. These could include an uptick in antibody-positive individuals, increased levels of illness and demographic changes among infected people. As with any proactive disease surveillance, if a signal is detected, an outbreak investigation would follow. People identified with [symptoms that can’t be easily diagnosed](https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05373-w) can then be screened using genetic sequencing to characterize and identify new viruses. This is exactly what Greg Gray and his team from Duke University did in their search for [undiscovered coronaviruses](https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa347) in rural Sarawak, Malaysia, a known “hot spot” for zoonotic spillover. Eight of 301 specimens collected from pneumonia patients hospitalized in 2017-2018 were found to have a canine coronavirus never before seen in humans. Complete viral genome sequencing not only suggested that it had recently jumped from an animal host – it also harbored the same mutation that made both SARS and SARS-CoV-2 so deadly. [[The Conversation’s most important coronavirus headlines, weekly in a science newsletter](https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=Yahoo&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-corona-important)] Let’s not miss the next pandemic warning signal The good news is that surveillance infrastructure in global “hot spots” already exists. The [Connecting Organisations for Regional Disease Surveillance](https://www.cordsnetwork.org/) program links six regional disease surveillance networks in 28 countries. They pioneered “participant surveillance,” partnering with communities at high risk for both initial zoonotic spillover and the gravest health outcomes to contribute to prevention efforts. For example, Cambodia, a country at risk of pandemic avian influenza spillover, established a free national hotline for community members to report animal illnesses directly to the Ministry of Health in real time. Boots-on-the-ground approaches like these are key to a timely and coordinated public health response to stop outbreaks before they become pandemics. It is easy to miss warning signals when global and local priorities are tentative. The same mistake need not happen again.