# 1NC

## Off-Case

### Framing

#### The standard should be preserving human life

#### Epistemic modesty breaks any tie and answers all AC pre-empts. Bostrom 12

Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012. NS

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

#### Extinction justifies moral loopholes

Bok, 1988 (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### 1. Science proves non util ethics are impossible and our version of util solves all aff offense

Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University

(The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### 2. Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util

Gooden, 1995 **(**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

#### 4. Disregarding foreseeable harm reifies structures of domination

**McCluskey 12** – JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo

(Martha, “How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact,” Berkeley La Raza, doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664)

**By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law** reform, **the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a question of whose** interests and whose **harms should count**, in what context and in what form and to whom. **Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account**. **This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through** systems and **structures that make disregarding that harm appear** routine, rational, and beneficial or at least **acceptable** or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," **the** "**unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm** even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. **The unequal effects of** the prevailing **policy** response to the crisis **are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising**. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, **justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects**. But **the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care** for those at the bottom **is to not care to make law more attentive** to the bottom. "**Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique**-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, **like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore** their **harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm**, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.169 **Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to** financial **elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial**.

### Warp Speed CP

#### The governments of the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to buy medicines and distribute it for free as per Adler et al.

#### Solves COVID without reducing IP protections- Operation Warp Speed proves. Time frame is now and the CP is totally feasible and can be conducted through coordination from the WTO and its member nations

Adler et al. 8-4-21 [David Adler is author of the monograph The New Economics of Liquidity and Financial Frictions, coeditor of the forthcoming anthology The Productivity Puzzle, and an adviser on industrial strategy at the Common Good Foundation (UK). Reda Cherif is a Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He joined the IMF in 2008 and worked in several departments on fiscal issues and macroeconomic analysis of emerging and developing countries. His research focuses on development economics, natural resources, fiscal policy, and growth and innovation. Reda holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago. Fuad Hasanov is a Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Georgetown University. Before joining the IMF, Fuad was an Assistant Professor of Economics at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan in 2004-2007. Fuad received a PhD in economics from the University of Texas at Austin. “How to deliver 10 billion COVID-19 vaccines at Warp Speed.” World Economic Forum. August 4, 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/08/how-to-deliver-10-billion-covid-19-vaccines-at-warp-speed/>] HW Alex Lee

The US government's **Operation Warp Speed** (OWS) initiative **showed how successful public/private collaboration can be in rolling out a mass vaccination programme.** It provides a blueprint for how to build supply, regulate and distribute COVID-19 vaccines on a global scale. This kind of approach would focus on building capacity, supporting production in emerging or developing countries and encouraging rapid testing while vaccine production is underway. Operation Warp Speed (OWS), the US government initiative to accelerate the development, trials and production of COVID-19 vaccines, has been a **spectacular success. It showed that the state could work effectively with private firms to promote innovation and provide a powerful weapon against the virus.** It consisted of early and massive funding of R&D and investment in production of various vaccine candidates, as well as coordinating the value chain and addressing all regulatory and logistical hurdles. The result: several vaccines available within a year and widespread vaccination in most advanced countries. OWS showed that the state could effectively work with private firms to promote innovation and provide a powerful weapon against the virus. —Reda Cherif & Fuad Hasanov, IMF; David Adler, The Common Good Foundation (UK) However, **the pandemic** is far from over. It **is still raging in the developing world.** The official global death toll has passed 4 million people while The Economist has estimated 7-13 million excess deaths, most of which are outside advanced countries. New, more contagious variants are also affecting a younger population, implying that many poorer countries may not be protected by the youth of their populations anymore. **An OWS for the World is needed.** Given the many uncertainties and risks about vaccine production and supply, regulation, distribution, and virus variants, the market will most likely fail to provide the necessary volume of vaccines. This will lead to long delays in reaching global herd immunity. **OWS represents a blueprint of effective industrial policy in action. Speed is of the essence in the face of a pandemic** While the development of a vaccine has been an amazing feat, vaccination campaigns in many parts of the world have been dismal. By mid-June, about a billion people globally have had at least one dose of a vaccine (with more than 2.3 billion doses administered), and most of them reside in advanced countries. Africa has so far inoculated less than 30 million people, little more than 2% of its population. The US, in comparison, has vaccinated more than 170 million people, more than half of its population. The G7 leaders have committed to provide 1 billion vaccine doses by end-2022. The US has pledged to buy a total of 500 million doses from BioNTech/Pfizer to provide to poor countries by mid-2022 (with 200 million doses by end-2021). Although these initiatives show that the race against time to vaccinate the world has started, many campaigners argue **these commitments fall short of what is needed to end the pandemic as fast as possible. To vaccinate the world, another 10 billion doses are urgently required.** Waiting until end-2022 would still wreak havoc on many parts of the world. Delivering 10 billion vaccines in a year A recent IMF proposal to end the pandemic within a year called for donations of extra doses, financing of vaccines for poor countries, and investments to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity by 1 billion doses by early 2022. Moreover, many downside risks considered in the proposal, such as export restrictions and supply chain bottlenecks, have already materialized. The EU and others have called for scaling up and diversification of production as a result. This kind of risk-based approach calls for further global action along the lines of OWS to ensure the delivery of 10 billion doses within a year, accounting for extra capacity and redundancy. This would involve **three main steps**: Purchasing the required capacity from key vaccine manufacturers directly - essentially building capacity, if necessary - to send the needed doses to other countries; Facilitating building or expanding vaccine production in emerging and developing countries, including through partnerships such as that of Senegal’s Institut Pasteur and a Belgian biotech firm; and Producing and distributing rapid tests for widespread testing while vaccines are on the way. Building capacity, facilitating collaboration and rapid testing Creating extra production capacity to produce hundreds of millions of doses a month within a year is **feasible and would cost a fraction** of advanced countries’ foreign aid budget. Producing 8 billion doses of mRNA vaccines would cost between $10 billion (BioNTech/Pfizer) and $25 billion (Moderna) and could be done within a year, according to recent research from Imperial College London. Procurement alone is likely to take longer than desired. Buying or building capacity is what OWS did, and is what economists such as Nobel laureate Michael Kremer have advocated. Coordinating all stakeholders and clearing bottlenecks would be key to the success of OWS for the World. It could be done by the US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), in coordination with an EU or UK vaccine taskforce and WHO, or **any other global task force**. As we argue in the context of industrial policy against pandemics and OWS as a model, this task force needs to set up relevant objectives, clear resulting hurdles - whether in supply chain, distribution, or communication - and coordinate across government agencies, manufacturers, and in this case, global users. The EU vaccine task force has already mapped, tracked, and cleared bottlenecks. It retrofitted a German dengue vaccine bottling factory for Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine, for example. At the same time, advanced countries need to help others build their own production facilities and supply chains to manufacture vaccines and rapid tests. Indeed, this would create a more resilient vaccine production system globally, mitigating against uncertainties and risks when providing booster shots and other vaccines in the future for developing countries. Since vaccine production may take longer, producing rapid tests, which could be easier and faster, is a hedge against delays in vaccine production. Finally, while awaiting vaccines, many countries need to conduct universal or widespread testing to prevent outbreaks. Creating extra production capacity to produce hundreds of millions of doses a month within a year is feasible and would cost a fraction of advanced countries’ foreign aid budget. —Reda Cherif & Fuad Hasanov, IMF; David Adler, The Common Good Foundation (UK) Last year, we argued that testing would end the pandemic within a few months, but only a few countries experimented with it. Rapid worldwide vaccination could do the same. Reducing the length of the pandemic, even by days, **would save lives and is worth the investment. It is not too late to act.**

#### Global interdependence reduce the likelihood of war

Tønnesson ’15 - Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### ARCADE CP

#### Text: High-income member states of the WTO should provide full funding to the ARCADE program for low- and middle-income countries.

#### That solves the aff--builds infrastructure for successful R&D and removes every barrier to medicine development in LMICs.

Atkins et al. 16 (Salla Atkins [Health system researcher, Department of Public Health Sciences at Karolinska Institutet], Sophie Marsden [Institute of Development Studies], Vishal Diwan [PhD, Department of Public Health Sciences at Karolinska Institutet], Merrick Zwarenstein [PhD, health services researcher at Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry], North–south collaboration and capacity development in global health research in low- and middle-income countries – the ARCADE projects, Global Health Action, 2016, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524>) hwof

High-quality research and a sound evidence base should inform decision-making in all areas of governance and service delivery, none more so than in the field of global health ([1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). Increasing the capacity to carry out health research is key to global health efforts aimed at improving health services and the health of the population. However, scientific leadership is scarce in those countries most needing high-quality research evidence to inform action. This gap in capacity results in the 90/10 gap, the phenomenon that 90% of the health research is done in countries with 10% of the world's health problems ([2](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524), [3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), and in a mismatch between the disease burden and the technical and human capacity for health research in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) ([4](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). Nurturing local scientific leadership and research capacity is key to capacity building in LMICs ([5](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524), [6](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). Despite efforts to build capacity, which has increased publications originating from Africa ([7](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), this increase in publications is small. There is also a particular lack of relevant research for decision-making, including systematic reviews, which are key to informing policymakers ([8](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). Only 16% of policy-relevant documents in the Health Systems Evidence repository ([www.healthsystemsevidence.org](http://www.healthsystemsevidence.org/), intended as a free repository for evidence for supporting and strengthening health systems) had a LMIC focus in 2013 ([9](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). These gaps are detrimental to local health systems and their policymakers, who need rigorous, summarised, local, and international evidence of impact that can be considered alongside evidence on local modifying factors such as needs, values, costs, and availability of resources ([10](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)). There are a number of complex and interconnected factors that affect the ability of, and opportunities for, southern authors to produce research that will inform and influence health policy and practice at both national and global level. Langer et al. ([11](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)) identified five contributing factors: poor research production (in terms of both quantity and quality) and a critical lack of support for research development activities (including infrastructure and incentives), poor preparation of manuscripts, poor access to scientific journals, poor participation in publication related decision-making processes, and a bias of journals against LMIC authors. In order to address some of these factors, several large capacity-building initiatives were funded through the European Union's 7th framework programme (2011–2015). These included south–north consortia, such as INDEPTH training and research centres of excellence (INTREC) ([12](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), Consortium for Health Systems Policy Analysis in Africa (CHEPSAA) ([13](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), and the African/Asian Regional Capacity Development (ARCADE) in Health Systems and Services Research (HSSR) and Research on Social Determinants of Health (RSDH). (see [www.arcade-project.org](http://www.arcade-project.org/) for the project description). The ARCADE projects that are the focus of this paper developed teaching resources; trained students; and built institutional capacity in communications, grant writing, and grant management. Another capacity-building project, INTREC, combined online training on RSDH with workshops on mixed research methods, while CHEPSAA focussed on networking, short course development, and institutional capacity in communications and IT resources. Each took a slightly different lens to capacity building, with slightly different methods, resulting in outcomes that are not directly comparable. In this article, we describe ARCADE HSSR and ARCADE RSDH and their outcomes in more detail. The consortia focussed on two key areas in research for global health ([14](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)): HSSR in Africa; and RSDH in Asia. They aimed to increase postgraduate students’ research capacity in Africa and Asia, with a stronger focus on PhD-level students in Africa. The consortia employed e-learning principles ([15](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), particularly blended learning ([16](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)), which is considered more participatory than fully online courses ([17](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v9.30524)) such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). We describe a number of activities that contributed to both student and institutional capacity.

### Innovation DA

**Pharma profits are up from COVID vaccines, patent waivers threaten this**

**Buchholz 5-17-21**

(Katharina, https://www.statista.com/chart/24829/net-income-profit-pharma-companies/)

The profitability of coronavirus vaccines has been in the spotlight since U.S. President Joe Biden come out in support of temporarily lifting vaccine patents to make the production of the life-saving inoculations more financially feasible for poorer countries. EU leaders meanwhile remain divided over such a move. Company financial reports show that COVID-19 vaccine makers and developers like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca and BioNTech have seen their profits increase since the vaccine rollout, at times majorly. In early May, stocks of several companies that benefit from COVID-19 vaccine sales **took a nosedive on the news of Biden’s reversal**. Moderna stocks, for example, were still down more than 6 percent at close on May 5, the day of the announcement. Stocks recovered somewhat as German chancellor Angela Merkel came out against patent waivers the following day. While fluctuations in the stock market price have hurt drug makers in the **short term**, patent waivers would diminish the bottom line of companies involved with the development and production of COVID-19 **vaccines in the long term**. Pharma giants like Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer bring in billions of dollars of income every quarter from diverse sources, so the COVID bump was smaller for them. In the case of Pfizer, which has been a bigger producer than J&J, the year-over-year profit increase was a handsome 44 percent, however. For smaller AstraZeneca, the COVID year meant that its profits doubled. In the case of Moderna, the past year has turned a Q1 loss into a profit. The case is similar for German company BioNTech, which collaborated with Pfizer on its COVID vaccine. While Q1 2021 brought in a profit of $1.1 billion, the company ran a deficit since its founding in 2008 up until Q4 2020, when it posted a profit for the first time. The $446 million earned stood in contrast to losses of almost $428 million accrued in the first nine months of the year.

**Strong IP protection spurs innovation by encouraging risk-taking and incentivizing knowledge sharing -- prefer statistical analysis of multiple studies**

**Ezell and Cory 19** [Stephen Ezell, vice president & global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally] HWIC

IPRs Strengthen Innovation

Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46

IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts.

Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.

The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

**Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror**

**Marjanovic and Feijao 20** [Sonja Marjanovic Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] HWIC

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

**That causes extinction, which outweighs.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of **state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

## On-Case

### AT: IPP Racist

#### IPP is vital for developing countries-- boosts competitiveness in global markets, develops domestic economies, and induces job growth.

#### International Chamber of Commerce 05, world business organization enabling international trade and investment. “How IP benefits Developing Countries”, <https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/how-ip-benefits-developing-countries/> LM

Developing countries can and do benefit from the intellectual property (IP) system. This was the robust message conveyed by panellists in an ICC-hosted discussion in the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) yesterday. It sought to reassure developing countries which had questioned whether IP, and particularly the patent system, was of benefit to their people. Representatives from innovative and creative industries in Brazil, India, Argentina and Egypt told delegates at the WIPO Inter-sessional Intergovernmental meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO how IP had helped boost their industries’ competitiveness in local and international markets and contribute to the development of the local economy. Denise Naimara described how Companhia Vale do Rio Doce , the biggest diversified mining company in Brazil with operations in 18 countries, acknowledged and rewarded intellectual property contributions by their employees. “When we license our patented technologies, we know that this contributes to Brazil´s economic growth and the creation of jobs. Since we started protecting our intellectual property, our export revenue has increased, helping to contribute to Brazil’s sustainable development. ”Peter Bloch, Chief Operating Officer of Light Years IP, an NGO specializing in helping developing countries increase export revenue through IP rights, described how LYIP was helping the Ethiopian government use intellectual property techniques to capture a larger share of the intangible value of its premium Harar coffee. “The project could add US$50 million to Ethiopia’s export income,” said Peter Bloch. ” We firmly believe that intellectual property has a function in poverty alleviation and can be a significant factor for all countries that are struggling to compete in export markets against the world’s most efficient producers and manufacturers. ”Dr P V Venugopal, Director of International Operations at the Medicines for Malaria Venture, a public-private partnership formed to develop drugs against malaria, told WIPO delegates that more than one third of the world’s population lacked regular access to essential medicines. “Patents are not the problem, let’s stop arguing about whether patents are necessary or not,” he said. “Medicines can only be developed if pharmaceutical companies are part of the R&D team and they will only play their role if intellectual property rights are protected and proper contractual terms established.” Mohammed Ramzy, Chief Executive of El Nasr Film Company in Egypt, made an impassioned plea to WIPO and governments to act against piracy of intellectual propoerty. “None of my efforts as a creative producer would lead to the successful completion of a film unless I was protected by copyright. To continue to make films that support economic growth and cultural diversity in the Arab world, I need international intellectual property norms that are the same in all the countries where our films may travel .”For Laura Tesoriero, Chief Executive of EPSA Music, an independent Argentinian record label specializing in tango and folk music, “Copyright is what enables cultural creativity in the music industry, not only nationally but also internationally, not only in the physical world but also in the digital one, through the Internet. Artists, interpreters, composers, producers, technicians, we all depend on copyright to enable us to continue to practise our craft.”ICC organized the panel to stimulate discussion on the role of the intellectual property system in developing countries today. “ICC’s mandate is to foster economic growth in developed and developing countries alike, to better integrate all countries into the world economy,” said Peter Siemsen, Brazilian Vice-Chair of the ICC Commission on Intellectual Property. “We believe that intellectual property rights are an invaluable tool for growth and progress and are ready to assist governments and intergovernmental organisations, such as WIPO, in helping individuals, communities and businesses in developing countries make better use the intellectual property system to this end.”

#### Patents are key to protecting indigenous medicinal knowledge from appropriation

WIPO 19 World Intellectual Propert Organization, self-funded UN agency for IP services, policy, information, and cooperation. “Harnessing the Benefits of IP for Development”, <https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2019/03/article_0002.html> LM

The question about how the IP system can benefit holders of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources remains unanswered. To date, traditionally accumulated skills or knowledge relating to plants and animals on the one hand; and traditional cultural expressions, such as rituals, narratives, poems, images, designs, clothing, fabrics, music or dance, on the other hand, remain at risk of misappropriation and commercialization by unauthorized third parties with no benefits accruing to the indigenous communities responsible for developing them. The need to protect this knowledge and these cultural expressions is acknowledged, and discussions on their protection have been ongoing since 2000. The result has been a wide range of agreements, laws and conventions, which have had limited impact beyond the jurisdictions of those sponsoring them. Beyond the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, and the Nagoya Protocol, no comprehensive international IP mechanism to protect these assets exists, as yet. The whole world stands to gain from effective governance of this field of knowledge and culture; in particular, in relation to the generation of new products for nutrition, personal care and medicine, but also in relation to heritage-based cultural and creative industries. In Kenya, for example, we are undertaking an exciting scientific study to validate the ethno-botanical knowledge of a traditional local plant long used by local communities as a natural contraceptive. Our aim is to develop an improved natural contraceptive, which will be of enormous benefit to women around the world who are facing serious threats to their reproductive health. We appreciate progress made towards ensuring that traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources benefit from the IP system. And we hope that all parties involved reach agreement on outstanding issues to ensure that indigenous communities can benefit as well.

Claims of bioprospecting are unfounded and there are easy steps to take against them.

Goans 03  Judy Winegar Goans, registered patent attorney. For the past twenty years, she worked in development assistance, providing legislative drafting and other assistance to help countries strengthen their intellectual property systems and prepare for membership in the World Trade Organization. She is the author of Intellectual Property Principles and Practice, a comprehensive intellectual property text that has been used in several countries, “Intellectual Property and Developing Countries: An Overview”, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=446296> LM

Another objection sometimes raised is that developed-country interests might use the intellectual property system to deprive a developing country of the economic benefits of its own resources. Developing countries are particularly concerned about practices such as “bioprospecting,” by which foreign interests obtain samples of biological materials that they use to generate patentable products, and about patents for inventions that build on indigenous knowledge. Fueling interest in this subject are reports of foreign patents being issued for naturally occurring products to cure diseases, uses that are well-known in the developing country. The biggest worry is that a patent will prevent people from continuing to make use of technology that has been part of their culture for centuries, a situation unlikely to occur by virtue of a foreign patent because patents apply only in the country where they are granted**.** In some cases, patents have been obtained on technological advances that built and improved on traditional knowledge. This is an appropriate use of the patent system. In other cases, it appears that individuals have filed patent applications claiming that they invented technology that was in fact not invented by them but derived from others, on technology that was not new but was well-known. Although patent applications are examined for novelty, the examination is no better than the collection of information available to the examiner. Bringing a legal challenge against such patents can be expensive and time-consuming. A better approach is to minimize the chances of such occurrences by the simple measure of assuring that “traditional knowledge” is part of the collection consulted by patent examiners—a possible subject for technical assistance.

**IPR is key to boosting economic growth in LICs**  
Emmanuel **Hassan 10**, author at RAND Corporation nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world, “Intellectual Property and Developing Countries”, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR804.pdf>

Increasingly, harnessing technological progress is viewed by policymakers as a key priority to boost economic growth and improve living standards. In an open economy, technological progress can be driven either by technology diffusion or technology creation. In less advanced economies, technology absorption can drive economic growth because countries at the forefront of technology act as a driver for growth by expanding the stock of scientific and technological knowledge, pulling other countries through a ‘catch-up’ effect. However, the strength of this ‘catch-up’ effect at the technology frontier decreases with the level of technological development, to the benefit of technology creation. Indeed, technology creation by domestic firms becomes progressively more important as a country moves closer to the technology frontier, because catching up with the frontier translates into increasingly smaller technological improvement. The empirical literature has examined the effects of IPRs on technological progress through these two main channels: technology absorption (i.e. international technology transfer) and technology creation (i.e. domestic innovation). The empirical evidence suggests that stronger IPRs in developing countries may encourage international technology transfer through market-based channels, particularly licensing, at least in countries with strong technical absorptive capacities. In the context of strong IPRs, firms in developed countries are more inclined to transfer their technologies to developing countries through licensing rather than through exports and FDI, since such rights allow them to retain control over their technologies. In the presence of weak IPRs, multinationals in developed countries seem to prefer to retain control over their technologies through intra-firm trade with their foreign affiliates in developing countries or FDI. Nevertheless, the historical evidence shows that many developing countries have benefited from international technology transfer through non-market-based channels, especially reverse engineering and imitation, thanks to weak IPR regimes. The empirical literature also shows that stronger IPRs can encourage domestic innovation, at least in emerging industrialised economies. Nevertheless, the empirical literature suggests the existence of a non-linear function (i.e. a U-shaped curve) between IPRs and economic development, which initially falls as income rises, then increases after that.

### AT: Fugitivity/Undercommons

#### Undercommons/fugitive resistance peters out at best and gets coopted at worst—it trades off with our capacity to use debate to generate utopian imaginaries of concrete alternatives that mobilize systemic change outside the university

Webb, 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7

Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work.

If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents.

What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street.

The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997).

Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision.

There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

#### Fugitivity is a flawed method of political engagement that makes neoliberal violence inevitable.

Love 15—Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” *differences* Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies—prestigious but unevenly institutionalized—still signals absolute refusal or criticality—all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration.

Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification—recognition, description, critique—can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense.

Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines—and the production of knowledge about social deviance—are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history—we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed—in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102)—may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

# 2NR

## On-Case

### AT: Fugitivity/Undercommons

#### worst—it trades off with our capacity to use debate to generate utopian imaginaries of concrete alternatives that mobilize systemic change outside the university

Webb, 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7

Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work.

If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents.

What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street.

The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997).

Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision.

There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

#### Fugitivity is a flawed method of political engagement that makes neoliberal violence inevitable.

Love 15—Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” *differences* Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies—prestigious but unevenly institutionalized—still signals absolute refusal or criticality—all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration.

Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification—recognition, description, critique—can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense.

Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines—and the production of knowledge about social deviance—are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history—we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed—in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102)—may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

### AT: Util hurts minorities

#### 1. They can’t access this argument—the disads prove that they hurt minorities just as much as they hurt the majority. Protecting a minority at the expense of the lives of the majority is ethically irresponsible, but attempting to protect a minority at the expense of the lives of both the majority and the minority is the essence of moral callousness, and, also, is seriously stupid.

#### 2. And, their argument doesn’t apply to our utilitarian framework, which resolves around maximizing the greatest number of lives, not happiness. Their argument assumes that utilitarianism means the wealth and happiness of the majority can justify the subjugation of minorities, and we don’t agree with that—our argument is exclusively that you have to weigh consequences. A cost-benefit calculus would hold that protecting the lives minorities outweighs the happiness of the majority.

#### 3. utilitarianism is vital to protect minority interests

**Hinman, 1998** (Lawrence, professor of philosophy at the University of San Diego, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, <http://ethics.acusd.edu/Courses/ComputerEthics/Utilitarianism.DOC>)

As we have already seen, utilitarianism is, at heart, an impartial moral doctrine, and as such it does not give any special weight to the concerns of any particular group, whether racial, ethnic, or cultural. But its impartiality is, in many ways, also its potential strength for minority groups with little power, for utilitarianism when properly applied says that their suffering and unhappiness counts just as much as the suffering and unhappiness of those who do hold the power and influence in society. Strict adherence to utilitarian impartiality alone could sometimes bring significant advantages to minority groups, but this is not always so. Consider a typical situation in which the interests of minority groups have not counted on a par with those of the majority group. Imagine the planning of a new highway for which private lands have to be appropriated. Often the lands appropriated for such projects are those that belong to poorer groups that have less political influence. Does this violate utilitarian principles? Utilitarianism states that everyone’s suffering is of equal weight (presuming it is of equal intensity). That means that the suffering that a poor person of color experiences when uprooted is of equal value to the suffering that a rich, white corporate executive experiences when uprooted, again presuming both have equally intense feelings about being relocated.

### AT: No Obligation to use Util

#### Straight conceded the offense on util. Science proves all other fws cannot be used.

## Off-Case

### XT-OWS

#### Global interdependence reduce the likelihood of war

Tønnesson ’15 - Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### XT-Innovation DA

#### Biotech strong now -- boosted by COVID and it's an inherently stable sector

Cancherini et al. 4-30 [Laura Cancherini, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey & Company. Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey & Company. Jorge Santos da Silva, Senior Partner @ McKinsey & Company. Alexandra Zemp, Partner @ McKinsey & Company. "What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?," McKinsey &amp; Company, 4-30-2021, accessed 8-25-2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide] HWIC

Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6 Exhibit 3 We strive to provide individuals with disabilities equal access to our website. If you would like information about this content we will be happy to work with you. Please email us at: [McKinsey\_Website\_Accessibility@mckinsey.com](mailto:McKinsey_Website_Accessibility@mckinsey.com) What about SPACs? The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story. Fundamentals continue strong When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances. In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have [more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/on-pins-and-needles-will-covid-19-vaccines-save-the-world), along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development. Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries. Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the [top dozen pharma companies](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/m-and-a/our-insights/a-new-prescription-for-m-and-a-in-pharma) having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on M&A, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising. For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic. More innovation on the horizon The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science. Looking forward, the combination of advances in biological science and accelerating developments in technology and artificial intelligence has the potential to take innovation to a new level. A [recent report](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/the-bio-revolution-innovations-transforming-economies-societies-and-our-lives) from the McKinsey Global Institute analyzed the profound economic and social impact of biological innovation and found that biomolecules, biosystems, biomachines, and biocomputing could collectively produce up to 60 percent of the physical inputs to the global economy. The applications of this “Bio Revolution” range from agriculture (such as the production of nonanimal meat) to energy and materials, and from consumer goods (such as multi-omics tailored diets) to a multitude of health applications.