# Peninsula R1 vs Wyoming Virtual JC

## 1

#### CP: Space faring nations should establish a multilateral agreement that restricts asteroid mining done by private entities except in the Principality of Monaco

#### It competes – the plan can’t both happen and not happen in Monaco, mutual exclusivity

#### Monaco’s economy is booming because of business-friendly policies

Pursche 13 Oliver Pursche (Vice Chairman and Chief Market Strategist for Bruderman Asset Management), June 30 2013, "5 Economic Lessons for the US From Europe's Smallest Principality," Monaco Channel, https://www.monacochannel.mc/Chaines/IUM-International-University-of-Monaco/NEWS/5-Economic-Lessons-for-the-US-From-Europe-s-Smallest-Principality, // HW AW

As the European crisis drags on and finance ministers around the world debate how to cut spending, balance budgets, reduce deficits and whether to raise taxes, it might be helpful to take a look at how the economy of **Monaco has developed and prevailed during the past few crisis-riddled years**. Monaco, with a population of 35,427, boasts some interesting economic statistics. The principality has zero percent unemployment, a capital surplus equal to roughly five times its annual GDP -- which, by the way, is the world's highest per capita -- a diversified economy in which no industry amounts to over 20% of the overall economy, and no income taxes. Monaco does have a corporate tax structure, and charges a value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services, so it is incorrect to say that it is a tax-free zone. Nonetheless, the tiny country, which covers about two square miles, attracts entrepreneurs and established business better than most. I just visited Monaco, where I attended the Ernst & Young World Entrepreneur Forum. While there, I had a chance to meet dozens of business leaders, including Jim McCann, Founder and CEO of 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. ( [FLWS](http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/flws) ), and Avi Sashi, who is in charge of Nike, Inc.'s ( [NKE](http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/nke) ) new media ventures, including Nike Plus. During my discussions, many of us agreed that Monaco does a better job at being business friendly and leveraging its resources than most countries. Although Monaco boasts some of the most expensive real estate in the world, the principality ensures that there are plenty of open spaces and parks, thereby making it a very attractive tourist destination. The industry accounts for just over 17% of the country's GDP. By ensuring that its economy doesn't overly rely on any one industry, the principality has reduced the risk to its economy. Banking and the travel industry add about the same percentage to the principality's economy. Most significantly, the Monegasque (Monaco nationals) understand that wealthy people will spend and invest money if encouraged to do so; they also understand that ever increasing income tax rates are counterproductive.

#### Specifically, the government is focused on keeping the space industry attractive to private development

Zwierniak 10-15-21

Simon Zwierniak (writer of 427 articles at the Monaco Tribune), 10-15-2021, "Monaco strengthens its space program," https://www.monaco-tribune.com/en/2021/10/monaco-strengthens-its-space-program/, // HW AW

The creation of the Monaco Office for Outer Space Affairs bolsters the Principality’s attractiveness in this sector. Monaco is gaining ground in a rapidly expanding field: **private aerospace activity**. On 12th October last, the Princely Government announced the creation of the Office of Space Affairs, in line with Prince Albert II’s desire to diversify the economy and strengthen the Principality’s attractiveness. The **challenge** is threefold: to **support companies** in the space sector already established in Monaco, to **create an attractive base** for those who want to set up in the Principality and to **represent Monaco internationally**. “The development of the space sector in the Principality of Monaco bolsters the attractiveness of our Sovereign State in a new field”, emphasised Frédéric Genta, Interministerial Delegate for the Digital Transition, in a press release. Some companies are already established in the territory with the manufacture of Earth observation satellites, telecommunications and the creation of rovers. Developing the space sector allows, among other things, better observation of the Earth and a better understanding of climatic phenomena, as well as the reduction of the digital divide by providing broadband in previously isolated territories.

#### But perception is still fragile – the plan, by destroying a key industry, wrecks investment into Monaco. Asteroid mining is key- proven by their evidence. Double bind- either asteroid mining is great enough to link to our net benefit or it’s not enough to solve for any of their offense.

#### Wrecking asteroid mining means businesses feel threatened – 2008 proves that perception means everything for Monaco’s economy despite diversification

BD 18

Business Destinations (a site about where Businesses should go and gather, who better to write about perception? This is like a primary source), spring 2018, "Monaco," Business Destinations, https://www.businessdestinations.com/10-top-destinations/monaco-2/, // HW AW

The 2008 crash caused an identity crisis for Monaco’s MICE market, but thanks to the campaigning of Monaco Convention Bureau, meetings and events in this unique principality are now more popular than ever For the past four years, Monaco has experienced considerable growth in its meeting and events industry, but to better understand the reasons for this development, we must first explain the issues the region has faced. Despite its tiny size – at only two square kilometres – Monaco is one of the most attractive destinations in the world, known for its glamour, hospitality and entertainment. After the 2008 global financial crisis, however, Monaco’s prestigious image began to garner negative attention. All of a sudden, it was considered too luxurious, too expensive and not appropriate for business events. As a result, many event planners and corporate CEOs intentionally avoided Monaco as a business destination. Monaco has successfully changed its image among professionals and corporate decision-makers without compromising on its core identity Monaco faced a problem with perception – one that has been difficult to overcome. Convinced of the legitimacy of its business brand, Monaco Convention Bureau had to find another way to present itself and attract visitors. A new image campaign was thus launched by the convention bureau in 2013 to overcome the negative stereotypes that had stuck to the principality. The campaign aimed to uphold Monaco’s exclusive image, while encouraging prospective visitors to consider it as a more accessible destination. Since its launch, Monaco has seen a significant increase in the size of its MICE sector; today, it represents 25 percent of tourism activity, compared with just 18 percent in 2012. Changing perceptions Rather than moving away from Monaco’s image of luxury and glamour, the bureau has combined these key components of the region’s identity with the benefits of its unique economic qualities. In addition to easy access, great facilities, a compact size and robust security, Monaco has a diversified economy with highly dynamic employment and consumer markets. Monaco’s economy is competitive and its finance, technology and health sectors are now seeing great success in the MICE market. The new campaign’s slogan, ‘your event needs Monaco’, and marketing promise, ‘choose Monaco for its expertise, to ensure the success of your event’, reinforce the region’s newfound focus on the MICE industry. In less than two years, the destination has successfully changed its image among professionals and corporate decision-makers without compromising its core identity. In April 2017, [Monaco Convention Bureau](http://cvb.visitmonaco.com/) launched its new business tourism campaign as a logical continuation of the 2013 one; it was time to address a larger audience. Taking a light-hearted new look at old clichés, the campaign highlighted the strengths of Monaco Convention Bureau’s business brand, including its expertise, brilliant service, affordability and tailor-made approach. The results of both communication campaigns have exceeded the bureau’s expectations, and have been widely covered by the trade press, local newspapers and magazines. Moreover, Monaco’s ranking by the [International Congress and Convention Association](https://www.iccaworld.org/) surged from 78 to 37 between 2012 and 2013, while its city ranking jumped from 207 to 81. Four years later, it’s still in the top 50 for European cities and top 100 worldwide country rankings, which is largely due to its regular customer base – around 40 percent of clients return every year.

#### Monaco is the lynchpin of the European economy – traditional accounts underestimate importance of offshore markets

Donaghy 3

Donaghy, M (researcher at university of liverpool, published in 5 journals), & Clarke, M. (also a researcher at university of liverpool, only published in 2 journals.) (2003). How Far Offshore? Monaco as a Financial Centre. Competition & Change, 7(1), 3–21. doi:10.1080/1024529032000093343 // HW AW

Clearly **economistic accounts of offshore markets do not encompass the important political contingencies which exist within OFCs.** Whilst we can point towards some evidence from sociologists (Donaghy, 2002b; Rawlings, 1999) and geographers (Hudson, 2000; Roberts, 1995) regarding the importance of the internal political character of the microstate OFC in affecting the competitive dynamics of the offshore market, it is less well documented how OFCs are dependent upon the external political attitude and intervention of their onshore counterparts. This article has attempted to show, with reference to the relationship between Monaco and France, that ‘onshore patronage’ can indeed be strong within an OFC. Clearly a framework of relations has evolved between Monaco and France, not least via the 1918 treaty, which has given France considerable leverage in the political and economic trajectory of the Principality. Monaco will certainly look to France and carefully consider its ‘interests’ before enacting any major changes or decisions. This has certainly been the case with regard to bank confidentiality, where Monaco has not had the political confidence to implement such a law without a dialogue with France. However, it needs to be stated why we have opted for the term ‘onshore patronage’ as a heuristic conceptual device depicting onshore-offshore relations, rather than some of the more accepted typologies used by many accounts of onshore-offshore relations. We argue that the relationship between onshore and offshore states is a complex issue and cannot be understood merely by reference to sweeping and often uncontested political typologies – such as ‘dependency’, ‘colony’ or ‘independence’ – often used by social scientists to depict onshore–offshore relations (see Hampton 1996). Such typologies, whilst often taking into account the formal rules and networks which exist between some OFCs and HOW FAR OFFSHORE? MONACO AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE 17 Downloaded from cch.sagepub.com at UNIV PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND on August 3, 2015 their onshore counterparts, tend to **mask the historically specific contingencies**, cult**ural meanings and informal networks which operate between them**. Thus ‘onshore patronage’ encompasses both the formal and informal links, historical associations, meaning and events which facilitate an onshore state’s influence on an OFC. It is only by addressing relations in these terms that we can more accurately account for the power relationship which exists between on- and offshore and thus the exact political constitution of the offshore market itself. Thus, the relationship between France and Monaco is qualitatively distinct from that which exists between Britain and its ‘Dependent’ Territories. Historically, Britain has been a great deal more tolerant of the offshore concept than France. Whilst it still maintains an informal oversight of the offshore markets within its respective Dependent Territories, it has not, like France, enforced its own formal regulatory apparatus upon that of another sovereign state. In this sense the notion of ‘dependent’ territory is somewhat misleading with respect to the onshore–offshore liaison, for the Isle of Man for example, though not a sovereign state, has experienced a great deal more autonomy than Monaco which, constitutionally at least, holds greater independence. Whilst we argue that the level of onshore patronage in Monaco is strong, this should not be taken to imply simple dependence. To have used the term ‘dependence’ would have implied a ‘top–down’ relationship between onshore and offshore, a relationship which overlooks the influence which an OFC is able to exert upon an onshore state, certainly in financial terms. Some **sixty per cent of the world’s money now resides in OFCs** (Palan et al., 1996) and, **as the collapse of BCCI illustrated, offshore entities can both affect and radically alter onshore monetary policy**. Moreover, **characterizing the onshore-offshore link as one of mere ‘dependence’ can objectify the various historical and cultural meanings which have been invoked by different onshore-offshore liaisons**. The 1918 treaty, the 1945 monetary union, and the 1963 tax agreement might comfortably be interpreted as though Monaco were dependent upon France. Yet they must be seen in socio-historical terms. We would argue that France’s current desire to consult with Monaco over its bank confidentiality law reflects as much past political tensions (Rainier vs. de Gaulle) and present cultural antagonisms (see afore mentioned anti-French sentiments) as they do France’s legitimate right to be involved in the process. In other words, the level of onshore patronage is strong in Monaco not merely because of the formal links which operate, but because of a variety of informal political, cultural and historical circumstances which have culminated in there being a close, but at times fraught, relationship between the two countries. Moreover, as the interviews with senior bankers showed, such informal links and underlying processes are not seen as peripheral to the overall development of Monaco’s offshore private banking centre, but key features in its development. Nor can the relations between onshore and offshore be characterised as functional, integrated and neatly demarcated.2 In many ways, a publicized ‘system’ of relations has been actively avoided by the onshore and the offshore state. Whilst onshore states do not want to undermine the financial benefits which the links with an OFC can accrue, at the same time they do not want such links to be seen to undermine wider political programmes which may run contrary to relations with OFCs. **The issue of bank confidentiality in Monaco clearly bears this out**. Franco–Mone´gasque discussions on the confidentiality text could hardly be said to reflect a routinized programme of meetings and liaisons between the two countries. The nature and frequency of such liaisons can depend as much on the particular French political party in power. Such covert mediation serves a political purpose: 2 For an example of such an argument, see Keohane’s (1969: 291–310) ‘system determining’ and ‘system inaffectual’ conception of relations between large and small states. 18 M. DONAGHY AND M. CLARKE Downloaded from cch.sagepub.com at UNIV PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND on August 3, 2015 Monaco does not want to be seen to be compromising its status as a sovereign state by publicising what appear to be strained meetings with France. And France does not want to be seen by the EU, the OECD or FATF as embarking on a systematic set of meetings with a country which in many ways is moving away from transnational principles of openness and co-operation. Whilst much economics based literature on OFCs would tend to emphasize their rational, instrumental and ultimately apolitical characteristics, this article has shown that OFCs have a clear political dimension. Building on Fligstein’s (2001; 1996) argument that political factors should be viewed as central in creating the conditions or ‘stable worlds’ through which markets evolve and, ultimately, operate, it is important that onshore patrons are viewed as core dynamics in shaping the trajectory and development of economic life, offshore as well as onshore. This should not be construed as a claim that onshore patrons are mere constraints upon OFCs, however, rather **the complex relationship that Monaco has with France is partially constitutive of its competitive position in the global financial market**. France has not seen it as in its interest to annex and assimilate Monaco and has allowed the Principality to sustain a position of independence, which it continues to elaborate, in relation to France as well as in relation to other OFCs, major financial powers (notably the USA) and international regulatory initiatives. In so far as there are global financial markets therefore, we maintain that **OFCs are less an expression of them than positioned in relation to them** (Donaghy and Clarke, 2003). In the case of Monaco, that position is nearer the shore than many OFCs, yet it has successfully used this position, and the complexity it reflects, to defend and develop its independence. Such epistemological arguments regarding the definition of onshore patronage and the politically constitutive nature of OFCs do not merely show the weakness of economistic accounts of global markets. They also force us to re-think the nature of transnational financial regulation under conditions of globalization. The present trend towards greater ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the exchange of information between states (Held, 2000) has led to increased co-operation between OFCs and supranational bodies (e.g. FATF, EU, OECD) in terms of capital adequacy, criminal investigation and exchange of tax information. Yet for such supranational bodies to operate effectively they depend on a map of international financial and political relations, not least upon definitions of what is and what is not offshore. Such definitions are clearly problematic, however, especially when they are accepted as ‘independent’, ‘dependent’ or even ‘colony’ OFCs. Such typologies do not simply serve to obscure actual relations between onshore and offshore but offer no real steer as to whether these places are more or less likely to co-operate with fellow nation states, let alone supranational organisations. Thus whilst France houses many of the supranational organizations such as the OECD and the FATF, claims to be the main architect and exponent of European economic and political integration, and has itself been at the centre of the drive for greater European tax harmonization (The Economist, 1999), this article shows it to be implicated in the actual constitution and development of an independent OFC, and the pillars of confidentiality within it.3 In other words, transnational co-operation cannot simply be understood via the re-working of monetary boundaries between the smaller offshore states and the supranational organizations. It must also acknowledge levels of patronage being applied by onshore states to maintain and develop OFCs. Only by regulators acknowledging this can they ever make more genuine moves towards a level playing field of international co-operation.

#### European economic decline means world war 3

Johnston MA Econ 21

Matthew Johnston (5+ years writing content for Investopedia. Teaches macroeconomics at St. Stephen's University in St. Stephen, New Brunswick, Canada. Passed the first two levels of the CFA exam.), 7-29-2021, "Economic Conditions That Helped Cause World War II," Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/022516/economic-conditions-helped-cause-world-war-ii.asp, // HW AW

Deterioration of International Trade The onset of the [Great Depression](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great_depression.asp) would serve to undermine any attempts at creating a more open, cooperative and peaceful post-war world. The American stock market crash in 1929 caused not just a cessation of loans provided to Germany under the Dawes Plan, but a complete recall of previous loans. The tightening of money and credit eventually led to the collapse of Austria’s largest bank in 1931, the Kreditanstalt, which kicked off a wave of bank failures throughout Central Europe, including the complete disintegration of Germany’s banking system. **Deteriorating economic conditions in Germany helped the Nazi party grow from being a relatively small fringe group to being the nation’s largest political party**. Nazi propaganda that put blame on the Treaty of Versailles for much of Germany’s economic hardships fuelled Hitler’s rise in popularity with voters, who would make him German chancellor in 1933. More globally, **the Great Depression would have the effect of motivating individual nations to adopt more** [**beggar-thy-neighbor**](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/beggarthyneighbor.asp) **trade policies in order to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.** While such trade policies can be beneficial on an individual level, if every country turns to [protectionism](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/protectionism.asp) it serves to reduce international trade and the economic benefits that come with it. Indeed, countries without access to important raw materials will be especially burdened by the lack of free trade. From Imperialism to World War While the British, French, Soviets, and Americans had large colonial empires to turn to for access to much needed [raw materials](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rawmaterials.asp), countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan did not. The deterioration of international trade led to the formation of more regional trade blocs with the ‘have’ nations forming blocs along colonial lines, like Great Britain’s Imperial Preference system. While "have-not" nations looked to form their own regional trade blocs, they found it **increasingly necessary to use military force to annex territories with the much-needed resources**. Such **military force required extensive rearmament and thus, in the case of Germany, meant a direct violation of the Versailles Treaty.** But, rearmament also reinforced the need for more raw materials and consequently the need for territorial expansion. Such imperialist conquests like Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in the early 1930s, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and Germany’s annexation of most of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938, were all manifestations of the need to expand territories. But these conquests would soon draw the ire of two of Europe’s major powers, and following Germany’s invasion of Poland, both Britain and France would [declare war on Germany on September 3rd, 1939](http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/britain-and-france-declare-war-on-germany), thus commencing the Second World War. The Bottom Line Despite noble aspirations for peace, the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference did more to reinforce hostility by singling out Germany as the sole instigator of the First World War. The Great Depression and the economic protectionism it engendered would then serve as the catalyst for the hostility to manifest itself in the rise of the Nazi Party and increasing imperialist ambitions among world nations. It was then only a matter of time before small imperialist conquests would lead to the breakout of World War II.

## 2

#### 1] Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. The appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is **reasserted each day** of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### **2] Proven by their plan- writings on the PTD gloss over the specificity of what native tribes want, justifies federal interference and crushes decolonial praxis. Only alt solves**

Krakoff 2012

Sarah, not Joe, Professor of Law, Wolf-Nichol Fellowship

Natural Resources Law; Civil Procedure; Indian Law @ U Colorado, “Tribes, Land, and the Environment”

The second problem with this view is that, even in cases where tribes may have protected constitutional rights, such as property rights in their natural resources, which cannot be taken without due process or fair compensation, Congress can avoid these constitutional restrictions by pretending to act as a trustee. Some have argued that, in such instances, Congress should not be given any leeway in determining what is in the best interests of the tribes.55 Reid Chambers has argued that the trust doctrine should be construed to limit the power of Congress over Indian Affairs, and that the standard should be whether Congressional legislation is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress’s role as a trustee for the tribes.56 This standard is only useful, however, if one has a concrete and precise understanding of what is in the best interests of the tribes. The lack of a precise standard has led some, like Mary Wood, to presume too much.57 Her proposal leaves open the possibility that federal interference with tribal self-governance might be justified if tribes are acting in ways that do not promote environmental protection. My argument is that, to be truly decolonized, the trust doctrine should never justify congressional legislation that interferes with tribes’ right to self-government and self-determination, at least, not without the full consent and support of the affected Indian tribes. In other words, any such legislation lacking tribal consent should never be considered “rationally tied” to the fulfillment of the trust relationship.

#### 3] Proven by their idea of extending to space via governments instead- space management cannot be understood outside of settler colonialism. The infrastructure, institutions, and Eurocentric values of space policy are considered the hallmarks of science and progress, which become weaponized against Indigenous resistance.

Matson and Nunn 17

(Zannah Mae Matson is a PhD student in Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Neil Nunn is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, 10-3-17, SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPIRE, AND THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHAT THE MAUNA KEA LAND DEFENDERS TEACH US ABOUT COLONIAL TOTALITY, Society and Space, <https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/>, JKS)

Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery… have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement… playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: … we believe in the word of our ancestors…they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth…and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the ‘final frontier’ is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past. This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

#### 4] This debate is not private space good/bad, but instead a question of Native sovereignty and the power to invoke the plan. The 1AC eclipses the authority of Native nations, so in response we affirm the long tradition of Indigenous internationalism across colonial borders.

Estes 19

(Nick Estes is a citizen of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe. He is an Assistant Professor in the American Studies Department at the University of New Mexico. In 2014, he co-founded The Red Nation, an Indigenous resistance organization. For 2017-2018, Estes was the American Democracy Fellow at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University. Chapter 6: Internationalism, Our History Is the Future: STANDING ROCK VERSUS THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE, AND THE LONG TRADITION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE, 2019, hardback, JKS)

The Treaty Council, however, was not the first or only version of what historian Daniel Cobb calls a “global Indigenous identity.” Rather, it belonged to and drew from a long tradition of Indigenous internationalism.5 Prior to European contact, Indigenous nations had often entered into relations with each other for alliance, kinship, war, peace, or trade. As shown in previous chapters, agreements were made not solely between human nations, but also among nonhuman nations as well, such as the buffalo and the land. Such treaties were, and continue to be, the basis of diplomacy and the evidence of a prior and continuing status of Indigenous nationhood. Sovereign nations do not enter into international relations or treaties with domestic or “internal” populations. On the contrary, the very basis of sovereignty is the power to negotiate relationships between those who are seen as different— between other sovereigns and nations. But concepts of “sovereignty” and “nation” possess different meanings for Indigenous peoples than for their European-derived counterparts. And they are not entirely consistent, either, with the aspirations for a nation-state that came to define decolonization movements in the Third World. While doing important defensive work, on face value these Western and Third World concepts only partially reflect traditions of Indigenous resistance. Far beyond the project of seeking equality within the colonial state, the tradition of radical Indigenous internationalism imagined a world altogether free of colonial hierarchies of race, class, and nation. This vision allowed revolutionary Indigenous organizations such as the Treaty Council to make relatives, so to speak, with those they saw as different, imagining themselves as part of Third World struggles and ideologies, and entirely renouncing the imperialism and exceptionalism of the First World (while still living in it). They were in the First World but not of it—much like American Indians are in, but not entirely of, the United States. Indigenous peoples across North America and the world have fought, died, and struggled to reclaim, restore, and redefine these powerful ideas. Their goal has been to take their proper place in the family of nations. Radical Indigenous internationalism, however, predates AIM and the Treaty Council. Contemporary pan-Indigenous movements were a result of more than a decade of Red Power organizing that began in the early 1960s, nearly a decade before the creation of AIM. Earlier, in the 1950s, Flathead scholar and writer D’Arcy McNickle and the National Congress of American Indians had explored a similar intellectual and political terrain of internationalism. And before that, the Society of American Indians advocated for a seat at the table during the 1919 Paris peace talks and representation at the League of Nations. Each distinct instance posed a similar question: If Indigenous peoples are nations, why are they not afforded the right to self-determination? Two strands of thinking about self-determination for the colonial world prevailed following the First World War. In the first, US President Woodrow Wilson argued for self-determination with a limited set of rights that would not radically upset the colonial ord

er. Such liberal internationalism, however, glaringly omitted Indigenous peoples, as they understood themselves as nations that existed prior to the formation of settler states. Rarely were Wilson’s principles applied to North America or the United States; nor were they ever intended to extend to Indigenous peoples. A second, more radical vision put forward by Communist revolutionary V. I. Lenin argued for the right of colonized nations to secede and declare independence from their colonial masters. This view was echoed by the Third World decolonization movement, as part of a global Socialist and Communist revolution, and it has frequently been applied in the Asian, African, and South American contexts. But this view remained almost entirely absent in North America, except among radical Indigenous, Black, Asian, Caribbean, and Chicanx national liberation movements. The Treaty Council advocated Indigenous nationhood as part of this global anti-colonial movement and in line with Third World liberation movements. After decades of experiencing land loss, enduring bare survival, attempting to work with federal programs, filing court cases, defeating termination legislation, and facing mass relocation, an assertion of Oceti Sakowin sovereignty went from ambition to prescription. Few avenues remained other than the pursuit of international treaty rights. Treaties made with the United States were proof of nationhood. But what legal institution would uphold this position if the United States refused to? If the goal was to reverse the unjust occupation of an entire continent, the advancement of Indigenous rights through the very legal and political systems that justified that occupation in the first place had proven limited in some instances, and hopeless in others. To survive, AIM and the Treaty Council therefore had to look elsewhere to make their case—beyond the confines of the most powerful political construct in world history, the nation-state. Prior to and during colonization, Indigenous nations had self-organized into deliberate confederacies, alliances, and governments. The Nation of the Seven Council Fires (the Oceti Sakowin), for instance, is a confederacy of seven different nations of Lakota-, Dakota-, and Nakota-speaking peoples in the Northern Plains and Western Great Lakes. They are hardly unique; in North America alone there are the Creek Confederacy in the Southeast, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy of Six Nations in the Northeast, the Council of Three Fires (made up of Ojibwes, Odawas, and Potawatomis) in the Great Lakes region, the United Indian Nations in the Ohio River valley (under the Shawnee leadership of Tecumseh), the All Indian Pueblo Council of the Southwest, and the Iron Confederacy of the Northern Plains. Many other political confederacies also flourished prior to, alongside, and in spite of settler states in North America. And their legacies are hardly relegated to the primordial past. Modern Oceti Sakowin internationalism, for instance, traces its origins to the early twentieth century, an era generally viewed as a low point for Indigenous activism and resistance. In North America alone, an estimated precolonial population of tens of millions of Indigenous peoples had been reduced to about 300,000, and for Flathead historian D’Arcy McNickle, writing in 1949, two processes contributed greatly to this decimation: the institution of private property and the destruction of Indigenous governance that once held land in common. Indigenous nations at the time also possessed little in the way of either collective property or political power, as Indigenous territory had been drastically diminished, and the reservation system had overthrown or almost entirely dissolved customary governments. If Indigenous peoples once constituted the tree of the Americas, whose roots deeply entwined in the land, the cultivation of “growth from the severed stump,” McNickle argued, was the pivotal challenge of the twentieth century.7 Physical extermination and the repression of Indigenous political power verified the United States’ genocidal intent, but these had not accomplished their purpose. And despite otherwise stating pluralistic claims to inclusion, McNickle concluded that the United States simply “can not tolerate a nation within a nation.” If Natives were to be assimilated, they would be assimilated as individuals and not as nations. In the popular imaginary, Natives disappeared into the wilderness of history, were never truly nations, and had been overpowered by a superior civilization. If they were nations, they were eclipsed and replaced by the real nation—the United States. Such erasure notwithstanding, vibrant Indigenous political traditions persisted. But to the untrained eye, nothing was awry. From the severed stump began to regrow the tree of life—the tree of resistance that would blossom into revolt decades later.

#### 5] The process and agents of political change matter. Indigenous internationalism must be asserted through Native sovereignty and organizing. We preempt the perm and the plan- they still collude with settlerism, which trades off with meaningful resistance.

Simpson 16

(Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, renowned Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar. She holds a PhD from the University of Manitoba, and teaches at the Dechinta Centre for Research & Learning in Denendeh. An Interview with Eve Tuck (Unangax̂), Indigenous Resurgence and Co-resistance, Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 19-34, JKS)

PLACE-BASED INTERNATIONALISM

Eve: One idea that Wayne and I floated in our call for papers is that how a person or community understands the roots or source of injustice will have implications for how they go about undoing that injustice. Does this make sense to you? Might it be too simplistic or problematic?

Leanne: I think we need to be a bit careful here, particularly in the academy. I think Indigenous peoples understand pretty well injustice in their own lives whether or not they can articulate it using the language of colonialism or decolonization. I think movements that link social realities with political systems and focus on creating real-world-on-the-ground alternatives are powerful. I worry that too much of our energy goes into trying to influence the system rather than creating the alternatives. It matters to me how change is achieved. Change achieved through struggle, organizing, and creating the alternatives produces profoundly different outcomes than change achieved through recognition-focused protest, and pressuring the state to make the changes for us. That is a recipe for co-option. I think it is important to understand root causes of injustice, but it is also important to understand think strategically and intelligently about approaches to undoing that injustice. I think that diagnosis and strategic action must be done within grounded normativity. Indigenous thought has a tradition of place-based internationalism that I think is this beautifully fertile spot because it links place-based thinking and struggle with the same decolonial pockets of thinking throughout the world. Nishnaa- beg have been linking ourselves to the rest of the world since the beginning of time, and throughout our resistance to colonialism we have our people traveling throughout the world to link with other communities of resistors. Grassy Narrows First Nation comes to mind in their nearly four- decade fight against mercury poisoning in their river system and the relationship they have made with the Japanese community in Mnimata.6 We need to use our experiences in the past to think critically about how we respond to injustice today. Right now, Indigenous peoples in Canada need to be thinking critically about the implications of seeking recogni- tion within the colonial state because we have a government that is very good at neoliberalism and seducing our hope for their purposes. Again, Glen Sean Coulthard, in Red Skin, White Masks, using the Dene nation’s experience in the 1970s, provides a blistering critique of the pitfalls of seeking political recognition within state structures. He makes the point that continually seeking recognition with the settler-colonial state is a process of co-option and neutralization, and is a way of bringing Indigenous peoples into the systems that guts our resistance movements, for instance, and we get very little in return.7 In fact, in terms of dispossession—that is, the removal, murdering, displacement, and destruction of the relation- ship between Indigenous bodies and Indigenous land—this serves only to facilitate land loss, not improve things. Engagement with the system changes Indigenous peoples more than it changes the system. This can be destructive in terms of resurgence because resurgent movements are trying to do the opposite—we are trying to center Indigenous practices and thoughts in our lives as everyday acts of resistance, and grow those actions and processes into a mass mobilization. I think it is useful to apply this same critique of recognition to orga- nizing and mobilizing with the purpose of making a switch from mobi- lizing around victim-based narratives—that is, publically demonstrating the pain of loss as a mechanism to appeal to the moral and ethical fabric of Canadian society (which has over and over again proven to be morally bankrupt when it comes to Indigenous peoples)—to using that same pain and anger to fuel resurgent actions. This organizing from within grounded normativity has always fueled Indigenous resistance and continues to happen all the time in Indigenous communities—it is just often misread by others. The community of Hollow Water First Nation created the Community Holistic Circle of Healing as a Nishnaabeg restoration of relationships, or a restorative justice model to address sexual violence in their community.8 Christi Belcourt’s Walking with Our Sisters exhibit has created a traveling display of 1,800 moccasin vamps as a way of honoring and commemorating missing and murdered Indigenous women and children in Canada and the United States. The exhibit does not rely on state funding.9 Thousands of volunteers made the vamps. The exhibit works with local communities and their cultural and spiritual practices to install the exhibit and do the necessary ceremony and community processes. Walking with Our Sisters works with local organizers a year in advance of installation, using Indigenous processes to embed the art in community on the terms of the local community. There is also the work of countless urban Indigenous organizations supporting the families of MMIWG2S people. The Native Youth Sexual Health Network provides on-the-ground, community-embedded, peer-to-peer support around sex- ual health and addiction for youth.10 The Akwesasne Freedom School provides Mohawk education for Mohawk children.11 The Iroquois national and Haudenosaunee women’s lacrosse teams travel using Haudenosau- nee passports instead of American or Canadian ones.12 The Unist’ot’en Camp pursues land protection resurgent action and the reclamation of the original name of Mount Douglas, PKOLS, in the city of Victoria, British Columbia.13

#### 6] The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16

(Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, JKS)

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices an

d to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic